... ”:HumanRightsandthePoliticsofFatalism’.28ForexampleBrownseemsinterestedneitherinaliberalnorahumanrightsper-spective;Benthamwasaliberalbutdidnotbelieveinhumanrights.29ForexcellentlegalcommentariesontheConvention,seereferencesgiveninnote1ofChapter2.30Critiqueswhicharenotdiscussedinthebookbutwouldhavebeenhighlyrelevantincludecommunitarianism,criticalracetheoryandstrandswithinthecriticallegalstudiesmovement.31Marie-Be´ne´dicteDembour,‘HumanRightsTalkandAnthropologicalAmbivalence:TheParticularContextsofUniversalClaims’,inOliviaHarris(ed.),InsideandOutsidetheLaw:AnthropologicalStudiesofAuthorityandAmbiguity(London:Routledge,1996)19–40.32ToborrowanexpressionfoundinDouzinas,EndofHumanRights,at4.33Thus,togiveafewexamples,IsurmiseinChapter8thatJackDonnelly(Politics),AlanGewirth(Philosophy),MichaelPerry(Law)andMichaelFreeman(Govern-ment)arenaturalscholars;MichaelIgnatieff(History),ConorGearty(Law)andRichardWilson(Anthropology)deliberativescholars;UpendraBaxi(Law),CostasDouzinas(Law),GuyHaarscher(Philosophy)andKenBooth(InternationalPolitics)protestscholars;TalalAsad(Anthropology),WendyBrown(Politics),MakauMutua(Law)andmyself(Law,withatraininginAnthropology)discoursescholars.Asthisbriefpresentationmakesclear,Idonotbelievethatfault-linesinscholarlydebatesabouthumanrightsfollowdisciplinaryboundaries.34Thus,MichaelIgnatieffqualifiesareligious-likeapproachtohumanrightsas‘ido-latry’:Ignatieff,HumanRights.Thissecular-likeapproachtohumanrights(whichdoesnotpreventdeliberativescholarsfrombeingreligiousintheprimarysenseoftheterm)isalsohumanist:Fagan,‘ParadoxicalBedfellows’.35IthinkIshouldbeallowedtheuseoftheword‘disciple’:GuyHaarscher,whomIclassifyasaprotestscholarinChapter8,usestheFrenchword‘dressage’(literallytraining, ... ”:HumanRightsandthePoliticsofFatalism’.28ForexampleBrownseemsinterestedneitherinaliberalnorahumanrightsper-spective;Benthamwasaliberalbutdidnotbelieveinhumanrights.29ForexcellentlegalcommentariesontheConvention,seereferencesgiveninnote1ofChapter2.30Critiqueswhicharenotdiscussedinthebookbutwouldhavebeenhighlyrelevantincludecommunitarianism,criticalracetheoryandstrandswithinthecriticallegalstudiesmovement.31Marie-Be´ne´dicteDembour,‘HumanRightsTalkandAnthropologicalAmbivalence:TheParticularContextsofUniversalClaims’,inOliviaHarris(ed.),InsideandOutsidetheLaw:AnthropologicalStudiesofAuthorityandAmbiguity(London:Routledge,1996)19–40.32ToborrowanexpressionfoundinDouzinas,EndofHumanRights,at4.33Thus,togiveafewexamples,IsurmiseinChapter8thatJackDonnelly(Politics),AlanGewirth(Philosophy),MichaelPerry(Law)andMichaelFreeman(Govern-ment)arenaturalscholars;MichaelIgnatieff(History),ConorGearty(Law)andRichardWilson(Anthropology)deliberativescholars;UpendraBaxi(Law),CostasDouzinas(Law),GuyHaarscher(Philosophy)andKenBooth(InternationalPolitics)protestscholars;TalalAsad(Anthropology),WendyBrown(Politics),MakauMutua(Law)andmyself(Law,withatraininginAnthropology)discoursescholars.Asthisbriefpresentationmakesclear,Idonotbelievethatfault-linesinscholarlydebatesabouthumanrightsfollowdisciplinaryboundaries.34Thus,MichaelIgnatieffqualifiesareligious-likeapproachtohumanrightsas‘ido-latry’:Ignatieff,HumanRights.Thissecular-likeapproachtohumanrights(whichdoesnotpreventdeliberativescholarsfrombeingreligiousintheprimarysenseoftheterm)isalsohumanist:Fagan,‘ParadoxicalBedfellows’.35IthinkIshouldbeallowedtheuseoftheword‘disciple’:GuyHaarscher,whomIclassifyasaprotestscholarinChapter8,usestheFrenchword‘dressage’(literallytraining, ... rights. Though this may come as a surprise to some readers, Marx was less scathing than Bentham in his critiqueof human rights. While he did not regard human rights as a panacea, MarxIntroduction...