... are at alossregardingwheretogo for furtherinformation.Insum,wehaveadangerouscombinationof(a)officialstatements the public cannottrustand(b)criticalinformation the public cannotfind,leaving the fieldwideopentorumorandcontagion.Ratherthanmakingitpossible for consumerstorationallyshifttheirfunds from weakertostrongerinstitutions,bankingregulatorshavecreatedanenvironmentthat,inadeepeningdepression,maydriveconsumerstowithdrawtheirfunds from the bankingsystemasawhole.Initseffortstoprotect all banksanddepositors, the governmentisultimatelyprotectingnone.Initszealtoavertpanic at all costs,itmayactuallyberendering the systemmorevulnerabletoafarmorecostlypanic.31PartVGovernmentRescuesHaveBothFailedtoResolve the DebtCrisisANDWeakened the BankingSystemWith the exceptionofLehmanBrothers, the federalgovernment s responseto the debtcrisishasbeentoavoidlargefinancialfailures at all costs.Moreover, the consensusviewisthat the Lehmanfailurewasresponsible for the implosionofglobalcreditmarketsin the fallof2008,reinforcing the “toobigtofail”doctrine.Inlinewiththisdoctrine,multiplenovelstrategieshavebeenimplementedandmanymoreproposed.However,mosttendtofallunderoneof the threefollowinggeneralapproaches:(1)government‐backedmergersorbuyouts,(2)governmentpurchasesoftoxicpaper,and(3)nationalization.Beloware the irgeneralgoals,alongwithourcommentsontheirlikelyconsequences.Approach#1.Government‐BackedMergersandBuyoutsTraditionally,whenafinancialinstitutionfails, the applicableregulatoryauthoritiesstepin,takeover the operation,andfire the seniormanagement.Theythenseektofindabuyer for the company,rehabilitate the institutionunderreceivership,orsell the assets.However,under the too‐big‐to‐faildoctrine, the authoritiesbypassstandardbankruptcyprocedures:Theybrokerashotgunmergerorbuy‐out,typicallyassumingsomeresponsibility for futurelossesif the assetssinkfurtheror the dealturnssour. All partiesinvolvedin the transaction— the seller, the buyerand the regulators—recognizethat the institutionhasfailed.Buttheytacitlyagreetomaintain the fictionithasnot.Accordingly,inrecentmonths,federalauthoritieshavearm‐twistedlargefinancialconglomeratestoacquirefailingcompaniesin the midstof the debtcrisis,turningablindeyeto the enormousrisks,whileoffering the carrotofmuchlargermarketshares.Threemegabanks—BankofAmerica,JPMorganChaseandWellsFargo—standoutasprimeexamplesandserveasimmediatelyrelevantcasestudies.CaseStudy#1.BankofAmericaIn2007,as the realestatebubblewasbursting,BankofAmericasteppeduptoassistCountrywideFinancial,makinga$2billioninvestmentinwhatwasthen the nation s largestresidentialmortgagelenderbyvolume.However,asCountrywide s lossesmountedthrough the secondhalfof2007,itbecameclearthatBankofAmericawouldhavetopourinmorecapitaltoprotectitsinvestment.InJanuary2008, the Charlotte,N.C.bankinggiantagreedtopurchaseCountrywide for anadditional$4billion,transformingBankofAmericainto the largesthomemortgagelenderandmortgageservicerin the world.CompletedonJuly1,itwas the largestmergerin the historyof the mortgageindustry.Justtenweekslater,onSeptember15,2008,in the wakeof the collapseofLehmanBrothersHoldings,BankofAmericaembarkedonafarlargerdeal,agreeingtoacquireMerrillLynch&Co.inan all stocktransactionvalued at $50billionwhen the agreementwassigned,withBankofAmericareceivinga$15billionTARPinfusiononOctober28. ... The lossofconfidenceislikelytobeparticularlyacuteincountriesthathavelargeinvestmentsin U. S. companiesandsecuritiesandwhosecitizensmaysuffersignificantlossesasaresultof the failureofAIG s foreigninsurancesubsidiaries. ... Intotal, the thriftsweredependenton$192.3billioninhotmoneydeposits,representing26.19%of the total,withmanyindividualinstitutionsmorereliantonhotmoneythan the industryasawhole.Third,governmentofficialshavehistoricallyrecognizedthat,in the longterm,expandedFDICcoveragelimitscanbecounterproductive,raising—ratherthandiminishing—systemicrisk.Itwas for thisreason, for example,thatNationalEconomicCouncilchiefLawrenceSummersspokeoutinoppositiontohigherFDICcoveragelimitswhenhewasTreasurySecretaryin the lastyearof the ClintonAdministration,stating“suchanincreasewouldbeill‐advisedandwouldrepresentaseriouspolicyerrorthatcouldincreasesystemicriskbyerodingmarketdiscipline.”Itwasalso for thisreasonthatFormerFedChairmanAlanGreenspanstatedthatmosteconomistsconsideredpriorcoverageincreasestobe“abadmistake,”andthatanynewproposaltodosowouldalsobe“amajorpolicymistake.”Similarly,webelieve the mostrecentincreaseinFDICcoveragelimitwasyetanotherrushtojudgmentbypolicymakerslacking the criticaldataneededtosupportprudentdecisions for the benefitof the economyasawhole.Fourth,mostrecentbankrunshavenotbeencausedbyinsureddepositors.Theyhavebeencausedby the exodusoflarge,uninsuredinstitutionaldepositorswhoaretypically the firsttorush for cover at the earliesthintoftrouble.That s the mainreasonWashingtonMutual,America s largestsavingsandloan,lostover$16billionindepositsinitsfinaleightdaysin2008.That s alsoamajorreasonWachoviaBanksufferedasimilarrunsoonthereafter.During the manyfinancialfailuresof the 198 0s and199 0s, the storywassimilar:werarelysawarunon the bankbyindividuals.Rather,itwasuninsuredinstitutionalinvestorsthatjumpedshiplongbeforemostconsumersrealized the shipwassinking.Fifth,evenif the governmentcancalmnervousdepositors,ithasnocontrolovershareholders,who,inrecentmonths,havedemonstratedthattheycanswiftlydriveacompany s stockinto the gutter. The investorpanic,inturn,sends the signaltodepositorsthattroubleisbrewing,greatlydiminisheseachbank s marketcapitalization,andmakesitmoredifficult for the institutiontoraiseadditionalcapital.Sixth,banksandbankingregulatorshavesofarmadeitdifficult for consumerstodiscriminatebetweenweakandstronginstitutions,asfollows:1....