... bringing to birthdisabled children. These questions are: What counts as a worthwhile life?’;and What sort of people should there be?’.The question What counts as a worthwhile life?’ has to do with ... lives compared. However, when we are talking about possible lives rather than actual people things are diVerent. Here there is no life that has value in the existential sense because there is ... harmful but are also morally responsible for B’s being in that condition,therefore A and/or C have harmed B. A thus harms B whenever A puts B in a harmful326R. Bennett and J. Harris 20 Are there...
... glass? - , thereare seven. - Is there a under the book? - , there is not. - Arethere any over the desk? - , thereare not. - Arethere any in front of the teapot? - , thereare some. ... cam there ?" để hỏi bạn mình về những người/vật ấy. - , there is not. - Arethere . in the box? - , thereare not. - Is there a beside the cup? - , there is. - Arethere ... Arethere any apples on the table? - Yes, thereare some. Arethere any pears in the box? - Yes, thereare two. Bước 5: Dịch sang tiếng Anh. ...
... behaviour are those with the superscript “*”. These are interacted with the dummy variable d, which captures the differential effects of increases and decreases in the monetary policy indicator. There ... main results are the following. In both regimes (partial liberalization and complete deregulation), the cumulative long-run changes in iL, iD and iB to a monetary shock are symmetric. ... unitary elasticity between both the short-term lending Temi di discussionedel Servizio Studi Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates to monetary shocks?Number 566 - November...
... the government ANNE Is there somewhere to have lunch? Dùng arethere để hỏi về số nhiều. Are there tigers here? Are there enough cars to take us all? ANNE Are there some kangaroos? 4. ... best steak I’ve ever had. 3. IS THERE / ARETHERE Ta nói are hay is trước there trong câu hỏi. Ta dùng is there để hỏi về số ít. Is there an elephant? Is there enough food? next then after ... a koala. Is there a koala here? Dùng a cho 1 vật trong số nhiều vật. There s a red car over there. (but thereare other red cars in the world) STEVE There s a café just over there. Ta...
... snoRNA genes are there? Journal of Biology 2010, 9:4.Page 4 of 4 that for many major taxonomic clades thereare few or no known snoRNAs annotated.In the Archaea, annotated snoRNAs are notably ... ermoprotei [8].Some eukaryotic taxa fare little better. For example, in the unicellular diplomonads (Diplomonadida; Figure 2), such as Giardia lamblia, thereare no snoRNA families listed in ... genome sequence was published nearly a decade ago and eight further projects are in progress, yet despite this apparent wealth of information no snoRNAs have been identified. But like diplomonads,...
... citation purposes)Annals of General PsychiatryOpen AccessPrimary researchQTc and psychopharmacs: arethere any differences between monotherapy and polytherapyJadranka Жulav Sumić*, Vesna Barić†, ... combination.Concomitant use of antipsychotics and antidepressants is not rare in our clinical practice. The studycompares the length of QT interval in patients on monotherapy with an antipsychotic ... 6(page number not for citation purposes)28. Al-Khatib SM, Allen LaPointe NM, Kramer JM, Califf RM: What cli-nicians should know about the QT interval. JAMA 2003,289:2120-2127.29. Rijcken CAW,...
... thereare intrinsic limits to transparency in banking: wehave to recall that the main economic role of banks is precisely to allocatefunds to projects of small and medium enterprises that are ... ixGeneral Introduction and Outline of the Book 1References 14PART 1. WHY ARETHERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 19Chapter 1. Why Arethere So Many Banking Crises?Jean-Charles Rochet 211.1 Introduction ... 1Why Arethere So Many BankingCrises? ✐✐“rochet” — 2007/9/19 — 16:10 — page 10 — #22✐✐✐✐✐✐10 GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOKthe bank’s return on assets and closure date are...
... failure.2Whereas bank runs are often inefficient, bank closures are also necessary in order to eliminateinefficient institutions. Such closures correspond to whatare knownas fundamental runs, ... is not the job of the regulatorsto tell the banks what they have to do when they are not in trouble.On the contrary, their job is to take care of ailing banks. Thus, I believemore attention ... (strictly) decreasing in t. The extremal equilibria are in strategies that are monotone in type, which with two actions means that the strategies are of thethreshold type. The game among mutual...
... (3.7) and (3.8) are satisfied if the costs of efforts e0and e1 are small and if δ (the increase in the probability of success) and ∆β(the reduction in the probability of solvency) are large. In ... hence we may assume that there is only one category ofdepositors and that they are fully insured.We neglect internal agency problems within banks and assume thatbanks are run by risk-neutral ... proposition shows.Proposition 2.2. There is a critical liquidity ratio¯m of the bank suchthat, for m¯m, we have R∗= Rs; this means that only insolvent banksfail (there is no coordination failure)....
... conditions are satisfied: supervision is inefficient, sothat insolvent banks are not detected; it is very costly to screen soundfirms; and interbank market spreads are high. These conditions are morelikely ... λ<R0.Hence at t = 1, insolvent banks (which are not detected becausesupervisors are inefficient) have no incentive to declare bankruptcy andthus are not closed: they borrow λI at the same terms ... inequalities are always binding:BL=e1pδand BS= pge1δp−λ. (3.31)Therefore,BN= maxe1pδ,1pβNe0∆β+BS−βLβNBL. (3.32)In other words, thereare two cases:(a)...
... monitoring are poor, we must partly conjecture what monitoring would look like ina more incentive compatible world. Following the literatures on moralhazard and adverse selection, thereare two ... ofthe welfares of banks 1 and 2 and their depositors as in the autarkiccase,15subject to (i) the interim incentive constraints guaranteeing thatthe banks are diligent when they are not liquidated, ... monitor one another.5 There might be “political economy” considerations for why the centralization ofliquidity management might be undesirable. We are, however, not aware of any explicitmodel...
... collateral, exclude a participant,etc. (There are two differences with the paradigm envisaged here: theclearinghouse has an explicit budgetary constraint and thereare com-plementary systems, so that ... centralized system are that institutions conformto the monitoring-is-a-natural-monopoly idea (there are no externalitiesbetween lenders or between payment systems), and that there is nosystemic ... markets. First, prices are net, taking into account the costs to the bank of depositing collateral and of usingother systems when caps are reached. Second, those net prices are not the same foreveryone...
... all banks are solvent. There are no other equilibria when α = D0. Indeed, if xi= 0, thenequation (7.5) implies that Xi= 0orDi= Ri. But Xicannot be zero(unless all xj are also zero) ... banks simply with large size.21Consider, for example, the case where thereare three locations (N =3). Locations 2 and 3 are peripheral locations and location 1 is a moneycenter location. All ... 8.5. Capital requirements are introduced in section 8.6, and limitedliability in section 8.7. Section 8.8 contains some concluding remarks,and mathematical proofs are gathered in two appendixes.8.2...
... the regulator, the bank is liquidated and the shareholders are expropriated.25This regulatory threshold ARis designed in such away that bankers are never tempted to shirk.Proposition 9.2.(i) ... capitalized banks shirking.Interestingly, thereare parameter values for which the agency problemdoes not matter: when γ/D is large (greater than (a + 1)/(λa) − 1),shareholders decide to close the bank ... wheredeposits are fully insured (and therefore depositors have no incentivesto withdraw), but the bank is left unregulated. The closure threshold AE(below which the bank declares bankruptcy)23and...
... value of deposits are fixed (once xRhas been fixed), the changes in the value of equitycome from changes in the value of subordinated debt. The questionis therefore: under what conditions does ... formally.Following this proposal, we assume that banks are required to issue acertain volume s of subordinated debt, renewed with a certain frequencym. Both s and m are policy variables of the regulator. To ... threshold xR. We focus on the case where λxR<d,so that deposits are risky, while subdebt holders (and stockholders) are expropriated in case of closure. We use the same notation as before...