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22/03/2014, 23:20
... upon
whichtheyincreasinglyrely
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.
MembersofClass2alsoprofit,especiallyasinterestratesrise,sincetheyarenetsavers
(creditors)withpredominantlyshorttermassets.Class3memberssufferfromhigherinterest
ratesas the recoverycontinues,butto the extenttheyhaveborrowedtobuyrealassets
(especiallyhouses)theyalsoseemtogainas the pricesofthoseassetsrise.Rajan(2010)
contendsthatgovernmentsactivelyencouragedthisprocess
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toallowlowerincomepeople
tocontinuetoconsume,evenastheirincomesandjobprospectswerebeingfurthersqueezed
bytechnologicaldevelopmentsandglobalization.
In the bustphaseof the cycle,assetpricescollapseandClass1speculators can losepart
(thoughrarelyall)of the wealthaccumulatedearlier.
Sharplyeasiermonetaryconditionsease
theirburdenmaterially.Again,thereislobbyingtoensurethat the otherformsofsupport
promisedearlierbygovernmentsactuallymaterializes.MembersofClass2bear the main
burdenofthistransferfromcreditorstodebtors,eitherdirectly(astheirfinancialassetsearn
verylittle)orindirectlyduetolowerpensionsandhigherinsurancecost.Asdebtors,members
ofClass3alsobenefitfromultraeasymonetarypolicy
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.Overall,however,theysuffer the
mostbecausetheirnetwealthisverylow,theiraccesstofurthercreditdisappears,andthey
are the mostliabletolosetheirjobsin the downturn.Ironically,ifRajan’sthesisiscorrect, the
policiesoriginallydesignedtohelp the poorhavehurtthem the most.
Thisstoryishighlystylizedandperhapsnottrueincertainrespects.Nevertheless,itseemstrue
enoughtowarrantfurtherinterdisciplinaryresearchinto the potentialredistributive
implicationsofultraeasymonetarypolicy.
D. ... increasehasbeennotable,
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Thisisnottodenysuccessfuleffortsbyanumberofcountries,includingChina,toexpandmarketsinother
EME’s.Ofcoursethisstillleaves the broaderquestionof the robustnessof the totalityofthosemarketsin the
eventofaseriousdownturnin the AME’s.
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ThisproblemisanalogoustothatfacedbyJapanesecorporationsin the 1990’s,aftermanyyearsofdebt
financedinvestmentwhichprovedunprofitable.Koo(2003)stronglycontendsthat the weaknessofinvestment
spendinginJapanin the 1990’swasduetothis“balancesheeteffect”,andwasnotdueto
ashortageofloans
causedbyaweakenedbankingsystem.
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SeeBIS(2012)p29forafullerdocumentation.AlsoseeMcKinsey(2010)whoidentify the householdsectorin
fiveof the fourteencountriestheyconsiderashavingahighprobabilityoffuturedeleveraging.TheyidentifySpain,
the US, the UK,CanadaandKorea.While the householdsectorsinBrazil,Russia,
ChinaandIndiawerenotjudged
tobeoverleveraged,notethat the dataconsideredextendedonlyto2009.Thus the reportmissed the recent
sharpincreasesinhouseholddebtlevelsinthosecountries.
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TettG(2012)“Size can bedeadlyinalowrateworld”FinancialTimes17May
TurnerP.(2011)“Is the long‐terminterestrateapolicyvictim,apolicyvariableorapolicylodestar”–BIS
WorkingPaper367,Basel,December
WaldropM.M.(1992)“Complexity”–LemonandSchuster
Paperbacks–NewYork
WedelJR.(2009)“ShadowElite”–BasicBooks,NewYork
WhiteW.R(2004)“ArechangesinFinancialStructureExtendingSafetyNets?”–BISWorkingPaper250,
Basel
WhiteW.R(2006a)“IsPriceStabilityEnough?”–BISWorkingPaper205,April
White ... when
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The flatteningofyieldcurveshasalreadyledtoanarrowingofinterestspreads.SeeBankforInternational
Settlements(2012)TableVI.1
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SeeBillGross(2012).Thisisparticularlyperniciousifitthwartslongertermlendingtofund the longerterm
investmentthatmanyAME’sreallyneed.
108
SeeMeyer(2012)
109
SeeHaddockandBarnes(2012).Theycontendthat,priorto2007,manyhighlyleveragedpropertydealsin the
UKusedswapstominimize the risksofrisingfinancingrates.Indeed,manyoftheseswapshadamaturitylonger
than the underlyingloanitself.Nowmanyofthesedealsneedto
berestructured,butlowpolicyrateshaveraised
the costofbreaking the swaptoprohibitivelevels.Thisisanotherexampleofhowlowpolicyrates can impede the
purgingofmalinvestmentsin the downswingof the creditcycle.
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Theseareverysimilarto the implicationsforpensionfundswhichwerediscussedabove.
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Dickson(2001)
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Antolinetal(2011),Frenchetal(2011),StandardandPoors(2011)andRamaswamy(2012)
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closely...