Bài tập môn US antitrust and EU competition law

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Ngày đăng: 27/02/2019, 01:46

12345678901234567788901234567890123difsghb8sdybg09weht90ewangfsodamngaowemjtiQMWFOWND0INWgnWENGPWIENGIWJ0ỤHT50W8htj9uehg0sDNGw123456789012345678990x3uh9fhrsp9ubf9pwUHT903GH9EDUbfuENW0FI0wehf0QJIPEIWÃRer A The main difference between anticompetitive agreement and collective dominance Anti-competitive Agreement Abuse of Dominant position (ADP) (ACA) An anti-competitive practice form as An anti-competitive practice, but not an agreement (whether written, oral an agreement, just the undertakings Nature or the conduct) between or more have illegal and harmful exploitations independent competitors Intention Number of An agreement  Bilateral of the domination position to eliminate the competitors / A Conduct  Unilateral Multilateral Must be at least 2, no need to have Can be one only, but it must have the parties monopoly power + Price fixing Content of the + Market division / source of supply practice division monopoly power + Tying Open or Secret (in secret form: it is A conduct Form the collusion, or Cartel) agreement Can be in written, oral or implied Not always illegal per se (Không Always illegal per se (Mặc định mặc định phạm pháp, cần xem xét phạm pháp, không cần xem xét, ngoại lệ = Can have exclusion and mà phang = No exclusion, always open regulations allow to do) illegal at any cases) Except Cartel: Always illegal per se No need to determine the market Need to determine the market power Exemption Leniency Type share Regulated in Article 101.3 TFEU No exemption Yes No Horizontal (Separate, independent Vertical parties) or Vertical Impose to the other party in Agree to the same conduct to the transaction 3rd party Same as Cartel Punishment B Đề thi lớp CLC-40A I Are those following statements correct? Why False Exemption for agreements between small companies, which together holding no more than 10% market share, is only applied in EU competition law (de minimis notice) False Acquisition is an undertaking/firm (A) acquires more than 50% of shares of another undertaking/firm (B), which make the acquired firm/undertaking(B) becomes the subsidiary of the acquiring firm/undertaking False DDD is a form of structural remedy: dissolve/divestiture/divore II Compare “excessive pricing” and “predatory pricing” Criteria Type of act Aim Act Effect III Exercise Excessive pricing Exploitative abuse Abuse the dominant position Achieve the higher profit Raise the price of products unreasonably Cause damage to customer Predatory pricing Exclusionary abuse Attempt to monopolization Remove the competitors Lower the price below the reasonable level The competitor has to leave the market New competitor may join the market A X F D W E ACQUIRE T Y C z I Calculate the turnover of:  C, D, E, F (Article 5.5 EU Merger regulation 2004)  A, X, Y, 50% of Z (Article 5.2) II Will announce if satisfy all requirements in Article 1.3 C Đề thi lớp CLC-38B I Are the following statements correct? Why? False, also the one firm/undertaking which holds the dominant position/monopoly False According to the Article 5.2, only the turnover of parent companies of buyer undertaking is taken to account for calculation of worldwide combined… False Directives are binding only on the member states to whom they are addressed, which can be just one member state or a group of them II Compare US antitrust and EU competition law on remedies Same:  Both have conduct and structural remedies  Apply to punish the anti competitive acts, abusing the dominant position, attempt to monopolize Criteria Legal base US antitrust remedies US code title 15 section and Monetary damages  Fines: Maximum $100M for corporation, $1M for a person  Compensation: treble damages (3 times the real damage), awards to the victim(s) Can up to maximum 10 years Prisonment III EU competition law remedies EU guidelines on the method of setting fines  Fines: maximum 10 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year of the undertaking or association of undertakings participating in the infringement  Compensation: based on real damage, awards to the victim(s) No Exercise What’s this infringement’s name? Why? IRAC formula:  Issue: What type of infringement that company A conduct  Rule: Article 102 TFEU, Article 80, 81, 82 EU guidance on abusive conduct by dominant undertakings  Analyze: o Company A is in dominant position as the supplier in the upstream market and being a competitor in the downstream market o The refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market: A is the supplier for the downstream market o The refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market: A raised the price of inputs in the upstream market so high and lowered its prices to its to customers in the downstream market, which can harm the other competitors in lower market, affect the competition o The refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm: no information  Margin squeeze Company A, if doesn’t agree with the decision of the Eu Commission, it can lodge an appeal to the EU general court D Đề thi lớp CLC-38A I Are the following statement correct? Why False Antitrust bills are created and drafted by the senate or the house representatives False The acquired firm/undertaking become the subsidairy of acquiring firm/undertaking False Structural remedies in US antitrust and EU competition law require some form of structural change on the part of the party or parties to whom the measures are directed Not in order to seize any asset of the infriged undertaking II Exercise Discrimination ... they are addressed, which can be just one member state or a group of them II Compare US antitrust and EU competition law on remedies Same:  Both have conduct and structural remedies  Apply to... become the subsidairy of acquiring firm/undertaking False Structural remedies in US antitrust and EU competition law require some form of structural change on the part of the party or parties to... punish the anti competitive acts, abusing the dominant position, attempt to monopolize Criteria Legal base US antitrust remedies US code title 15 section and Monetary damages  Fines: Maximum
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