Do better institutions boost firm performance the case of manufacturing firms in vietnam

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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS HO CHIMINHCITY VIETNAMTHE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES THE HAGUE VIETNAM - NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DO BETTER INSTITUTIONS BOOST FIRM PERFROMANCE? THE CASE OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN VIETNAM BY NGUYEN THI NHA TRANG MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY, NOVEMBER 2015 UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS HO CHIMINHCITY VIETNAMTHE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES THE HAGUE VIETNAM - NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DO BETTER INSTITUTIONS BOOST FIRM PERFROMANCE? THE CASE OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN VIETNAM A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS By NGUYEN THI NHA TRANG Academic Supervisor: Prof Dr NGUYEN TRONG HOAI HO CHI MINH CITY, NOVEMBER 2015 DECLARATION “This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Do better institutions boost firm performance? The case of manufacturing firms in Vietnam”, which is submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Development Economics to the Vietnam – The Netherlands Program (VNP) The thesis constitutes only my original work and due supervision and acknowledgement have been made in the text to all materials used.” Nguyen Thi Nha Trang ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing a thesis is like taking a long journey, which requires a lot of time and effort During this journey, sometimes we feel lost, exhausted and want to give up, and to get to the destination we truly need guidance, cheers, encouragement and motivation from instructors, families, friends, and even passers-by Looking back at this journey, I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to many people who have wholeheartedly cheered me on and guided me through First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Nguyen Trong Hoai, who was always available to answer any questions of mine and helped me stay focused on the research Extremely busy, he never failed to answer my calls or send me a text back His knowledge, patience and encouragement were the emotional and intellectual fuel that I needed to stand up and step forward whenever I felt discouraged and wanted to stop halfway I would also like to extend my most sincere thanks to Dr Tran Tien Khai, Dr Pham Khanh Nam, Dr Pham Hoang Van, and Dr Truong Dang Thuy for their valuable suggestions and comments on my TRD, which kept me from straying away from “the main road” Without their support, I could never reach the finish line of this journey My special thanks also go to all the VNP teachers and support staff Not only did they assist me with my study and thesis drafting process, they also made me truly feel to be a part of this wonderful community, to relive a beautiful and unforgettable college life I wish to thank, from the bottom of my heart, my wonderful classmates: Khanh Vu, for guiding me through the complicated Vietnam Enterprise Survey and Stata techniques, friends from my mini-group: Thien, Nhung, Hung, Ly, Viet for constantly reminding me of not giving up so that we can proudly celebrate together as VNPers, and other classmates for co-building a warm and bright C19 family Finally, I thank you my family, my husband and my little son for their unconditional love and support I always hope I can make them proud ABBREVIATIONS ADB : The Asian Development Bank AEC : The ASEAN Economic Community ASEAN-6 : Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand ASEAN-4 : Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand BTA : The U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement GDP : Gross domestic production GSO : General statistics office of Vietnam GVN : Government of Vietnam OECD : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PCI : Provincial Competitiveness Index ROA : Return on Assets ROE : Return on Equity SMEs : Small and medium enterprises SOEs : State-owned enterprises TPP : Trans-Pacific Partnership UN : The United Nations US : The United States of America VCCI : Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry VES : The Vietnam Enterprise Survey VNCI : Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative WB : The World Bank WTO : World Trade Organization ABSTRACT This paper explores how institutional reforms in Vietnam affect the performance of manufacturing enterprises across 63 provinces by utilizing a unique dataset which includes the 2007-2012 Provincial Competitiveness Index merged with a set of data on firm-level performance extracted from the annual Vietnam Enterprise Survey The results show that provincial competitiveness significantly and economically explains the performance of firms located in different provinces Out of the nine subsets of institutional reforms, at least four sub-indices significantly and positively associate with the economic performance of the firms observed, which are Labor and Training, Legal Institutions, Transparency and Business Support Services Keywords: provincial competitiveness index, firm performance, labor productivity, ROA, ROE TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABBREVIATIONS ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES LIST OF APPENDIX 10 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 11 1.1 Problem statement 11 1.2 Research objectives 14 1.3 Research questions 15 1.4 Scope of the study 15 1.5 The structure of the study 15 CHAPTER LITERATURE REVIEW 17 2.1 Institutions 17 2.1.1 Definitions 17 2.1.2 From institutions to governance 18 2.2 Institutions and economic performance: 19 2.2.1 More definitions and clarifications 19 2.2.2 Institutions and economic performance: theoretical views 20 2.2.3 Institutions and economic performance: empirical studies 25 2.3 Measurement of institutions: 28 2.4 Firm Performance 28 2.4.1 Definitions: 28 2.4.2 Measurement of firm performance: 29 2.5 Analytical framework for the study 30 CHAPTER RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 32 3.1 Data sources: 32 3.1.1 Vietnam Enterprise Survey: 32 3.1.2 Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 34 3.2 Model and variable construction 37 3.2.1 The Model: 37 3.2.2 Variables 3.2.2.1 Dependent Variables (Proxies of Firm Performance) 37 3.2.3 Descriptive (Initial Relationship) 42 3.2.4 Analytical Approach 48 CHAPTER FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 50 4.1 Overview of the business sector performance in Vietnam during the observed period:50 4.2 Overview of Basic Institutional Reforms and Their Impacts on Business Formance 52 4.3 Empirical results 54 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 62 5.1 Main findings 62 5.2 Policy implications 63 5.3 Limitations and directions for further research 67 REFERENCES 69 APPENDIX 73 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Institutions………………………………………………………………… 18 Figure 2: A visual explanation of institutions and economic performance (Ugur, 2010): 24 Figure 3: Analytical Framework 3030 Figure 4: Number of Firms Surveyed from 2007-2012 (VES) 32 Figure 5: Collection, Construction and Calibration of PCI Data 35 Figure 6: Number of Issued Legal Documents, 2010-2014 ………………………… 54 Figure 7: Example of an eRegulations Portal………………………………………….63 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Number of Firms and Observations in the Sample 33 Table 2: Number of Firms Surveyed by the PCI Research Team from 2007-2012 34 Table 3: Sub-Index Weights 35 Table 4: Explanation of PCI Ranking 37 Table : Firm level variable definitions ………………………………………………….39 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 43 Table 7: Mean Values by Types of Ownership 44 Table 8: Mean Values by Years 44 Table 9: Statistics of Institutional Variables and Economic Environment 45 Table 10: Mean Values by Manufacturing Industries 46 Table 11: Correlation Matrix 48 Table 12: Results of Regression No (DV: Labor Productivity)…………………….58 Table 13: Results of Regression No (DV: Capital Productivity)………………… 59 Table 14: Results of Regression No (DV: ROA)………………………………………… 59 Table 15: Results of Regression No (DV: ROE)……………………………………………60 LIST OF APPENDIX Appendix : Summarized Description of PCI Sub-indices Appendix : Full 2012 PCI Rankings Appendix : PCI Map Appendix : 2014 PCI Rankings Appendix : Boxplot Chart for each Variable (VAL, KL, ROA, ROE) Appendix : Regression Results 10 Laeven, L., & Woodruff, C (2007) The quality of the legal system, firm ownership, and firm size The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(4), 601-614 Lauth, H.-J (2005) The Impact of Informal Institutions on Democratic Performance: Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Findings Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Lieberman, M B., & Kang, J (2008) How to measure company productivity using value-added: A focus on Pohang Steel (POSCO) Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(2), 209-224 Lieberman, M B., Lau, L J., & Williams, M D (1990) Firm-level productivity and management influence: A comparison of US and Japanese automobile producers Management Science, 36(10), 1193-1215 Lin, J., & Nugent, J B (1995, p.2306) Institutions and economic development 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re-registration in days - Percentage of firms that need additional licenses/permits - Number of licenses and permits necessary to start operations after 2010 - Number of days to wait for Land Use Rights Certificate - Percentage of firms waiting more than a month to complete all steps necessary to start operations - Percentage of firms waiting more than three months to complete all steps necessary to start operations - Percentage of firms registering or re-registering through one-stop-shop - Procedures at one-stop-shop are transparently listed (% Agree) - Guidance and instruction on procedures at one-stop-shop are clear and adequate (% Agree) - Staffs at one-stop-shop are professional and knowledgeable (% Agree) - Staffs at one-stop-shop are friendly (% Agree) - IT application at one-stop-shop is good (% Agree) - None of the statements above are true (% Agree) Land Access and Security of Tenure A measure combining two dimensions of the land problems confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure once land is acquired, including: - Percentage of firms that own land and are in possession of an LURC - Percentage of land that has been registered and provided with official LURCs - Percentage of firms that say non-state enterprises not have difficulties in accessing land or expanding premises - Firms' rating of expropriation risk (1: Very High to 5: Very Low) - Percentage of firms that say compensation for land is always or highly likely fair - Percentage of firms that agree that changes in government land prices reflect changes in market prices - Percentage of firms that have completed land procedures in the last two years and have encountered no difficulties in land-related procedures - Percentage of firms that want to have LURCs but don't have LURCs because of complicated procedures and troublesome staffs Transparency and Access to Information A measure of whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and the business utility of the provincial webpage 73 - Access to planning documents (1=easy to access; 5= impossible to access) - Access to legal documents (1=easy to access; 5= impossible to access) - Relationship important or very important to get access to provincial documents (% Important or Very Important) - Negotiations with tax authority are an essential part of doing business (% Agree or Strongly Agree) - Predictability of implementation of central laws at the provincial level (% Usually or Always) - Firm gives comments on government regulation (%) - Openness and quality of provincial webpage - Business Associations' role in advising and countering provincial polices (% Important or Very Important) - Percentage of firms have accessed provincial websites (%) - Budget documents have enough details for use in business activities (% YES) - Budget documents are published right after being approved (% YES) Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance A measure of how much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance, as well as how often and for how long firms must shut their operations down for inspections by local regulatory agencies - Percentage of firms spending over 10 percent of their time on understanding and complying with regulations - Median number of inspections (all agencies) - Median tax inspection hours - Government officials are effective (% Strongly agree or Agree) - Government officials are friendly (% Strongly agree or Agree) - Firms don't have to travel many trips to obtain stamps and signatures (% Strongly agree or Agree) - Paperwork is simple (% Strongly agree or Agree) - Fees are listed publically (% Strongly agree or Agree) - No noticeable improvements are made (% Strongly agree or Agree) Informal Charges A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment of those extra fees results in expected results or "services," and whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents - Enterprises in my line of business usually have to pay for informal charges (% agree or totally agree) - Percentage of firms paying over 10 percent of their revenue for informal charges - Rent-seeking phenomenon is popular in handling administrative procedures for businesses (% strongly agree or agree) - Percentage of firms saying that informal charges usually or always deliver expected results - Informal charges are at acceptable levels (% Strongly agree or Agree) Proactivity of Provincial Leadership A measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector development, and working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local private firms 74 - Firms' assessment of the attitude of provincial government toward private sector (% Positive or Fairly Positive) - The PPC is flexible within the legal framework to create favorable business environment for nonstate firms (% Strongly Agree or Agree) - The PPC is very proactive and innovative in solving new problems (% Strongly Agree or Agree) - There are good initiatives at the provincial level but they are not well implemented by departments (% Strongly Agree or Agree) - Provincial leaders have good policies they are not well implemented at district level (% Strongly Agree or Agree) - Province's reaction to lack of clarity in central policies/documents: % "delay and seek instructions" and "do nothing" Business Support Services Used to be named "Private Sector development services", this is a measure of provincial services for private sector trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms - Number of trade fairs held by province in previous year and registered for present year - Ratio of the total number of service providers to the total number of firms (%) - Ratio of the number of non-state and FDI service providers to the total number of service providers (%) - Firm has used business information search services (%) - Firm used private provider for above business information search services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for business information search services (%) - Firm has used consulting on regulatory information (%) - Firm used private provider for consulting on regulatory information (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for consulting on regulatory information (%) - Firm has used business match making services(%) - Firm used private provider for business match making services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for business match making services (%) - Firm has used trade promotion services (%) - Firm used private provider for trade promotion services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for trade promotion services (%) - Firm has used technology related services (%) - Firm used private provider for technology related services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for technology related services (%) - Firm has used accounting and financing training services (%) - Firm used private provider for above accounting and financing training services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for accounting and financing training services (%) - Firm has used business administration training services (%) - Firm used private provider for above business administration training services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for business administration training services (%) Labor and Training A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement of local labor 75 - Services provided by provincial agencies: general education (% Very Good or Good) - Services provided by provincial agencies: vocational training (% Very Good or Good) - Firm has used labor exchange services (%) - Firm used private provider for above labor exchange services (%) - Firm intends to use above service provider again for labor exchange services (%) - Percentage of total business costs spent on labor training - Percentage of total business costs spent on labor recruitment - Overall Satisfaction with Labor (% Agreeing labor meets firm needs) - Ratio of vocational training school graduates to untrained laborers - Secondary school graduates as % of workforce - Percentage of workers having completed training at vocational schools Legal Institutions A measure of the private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official behavior - Legal system provided mechanism for firms to appeal against officials' corrupt behavior (% Always or Usually) - Firm confident that legal system will uphold property rights and contracts (% Strongly Agree or Agree) - Cases filed by by non-state entities at Provincial Economic Court per 100 firms - Business used courts or other legal institutions to resolve disputes (%) - Non-state claimants as a percentage of claimants at Provincial Economic Court - Median months to resolve court cases - Median formal and informal costs as a percentage of case - Provincial court judge economic cases by the law (% Agree or strongly agree) - Provincial court resolve economic cases quickly (% Agree or strongly agree) - Court judgements are enforced quickly (% Agree or strongly agree) - Legal aid agencies support business to use laws to sue when disputes arise (% Agree) - Formal and informal costs are acceptable (% Agree or strongly agree) - Judgement by the court is fair (% Agree or strongly agree) - Willingness to use court in case a dispute arises (% Yes) 76 Appendix 2: Full 2012 PCI Rankings 77 78 Appendix 3: 2014 PCI Map 79 Appendix 4: 2014 PCI 80 Appendix 5: Boxplot Chart for each Variable (VAL, KL, ROA, ROE) by Industry 81 82 Appendix 6: Regression Results and Hausman Test xtreg ln_VAL KL Small Large SOE Pri For edu ln_GDPP pop AIPI infras1 PCITO , fe note: For omitted because of collinearity Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: id Number of obs Number of groups = = 14242 4118 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 3.5 within = 0.1515 between = 0.0024 overall = 0.0190 corr(u_i, Xb) F(11,10113) Prob > F = -0.1267 = = 164.10 0.0000 -ln_VAL | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -KL | 0022102 0001978 11.17 0.000 0018224 002598 Small | 1796411 0292918 6.13 0.000 1222234 2370589 Large | -.3403873 0434991 -7.83 0.000 -.4256542 -.2551204 SOE | -.1699426 1237747 -1.37 0.170 -.4125657 0726805 Pri | -.0246781 102832 -0.24 0.810 -.2262493 176893 For | (omitted) edu | 1.124686 1.630889 0.69 0.490 -2.07218 4.321551 ln_GDPP | 1.005992 0360584 27.90 0.000 9353104 1.076674 pop | -4.86143 1.344489 -3.62 0.000 -7.496896 -2.225963 AIPI | 0031111 0034609 0.90 0.369 -.003673 0098951 infras1 | 6.14e-06 000013 0.47 0.636 -.0000193 0000316 PCITO | 0059594 0014906 4.00 0.000 0030376 0088812 _cons | -5.017969 2849588 -17.61 0.000 -5.576545 -4.459393 -+ -sigma_u | 1.0393422 sigma_e | 51961397 rho | 80003518 (fraction of variance due to u_i) -F test that all u_i=0: F(4117, 10113) = 10.54 Prob > F = 0.0000 estimates store fixed xtreg ln_VAL KL Small Large SOE Pri For edu ln_GDPP pop AIPI infras1 PCITO , re note: For omitted because of collinearity Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: id Number of obs Number of groups = = 14242 4118 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 3.5 within = 0.1321 between = 0.1897 overall = 0.1806 corr(u_i, X) Wald chi2(11) Prob > chi2 = (assumed) = = 2375.76 0.0000 -ln_VAL | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -KL | 004073 0001619 25.16 0.000 0037557 0043902 Small | 0307675 0261538 1.18 0.239 -.020493 0820281 Large | -.0870062 0321515 -2.71 0.007 -.1500219 -.0239906 SOE | -.1681656 0835684 -2.01 0.044 -.3319566 -.0043747 Pri | -.3752542 0622469 -6.03 0.000 -.4972558 -.2532525 For | (omitted) edu | 4.874216 1.27844 3.81 0.000 2.36852 7.379911 ln_GDPP | 876932 0349807 25.07 0.000 808371 945493 pop | 7686163 1.160014 0.66 0.508 -1.504969 3.042201 AIPI | 0026015 0033335 0.78 0.435 -.003932 009135 infras1 | 000065 0000121 5.36 0.000 0000412 0000887 PCITO | 0088692 0013306 6.67 0.000 0062613 011477 _cons | -4.319471 2640405 -16.36 0.000 -4.83698 -3.801961 -+ -sigma_u | 85560197 sigma_e | 51961397 rho | 7305546 (fraction of variance due to u_i) - estimates store random 83 hausman fixed random Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (9) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (11); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale Coefficients -| (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) | fixed random Difference S.E -+ -KL | 0022102 004073 -.0018628 0001138 Small | 1796411 0307675 1488736 0131904 Large | -.3403873 -.0870062 -.2533811 0292994 SOE | -.1699426 -.1681656 -.001777 0913045 Pri | -.0246781 -.3752542 350576 081852 edu | 1.124686 4.874216 -3.74953 1.012615 ln_GDPP | 1.005992 876932 1290601 0087497 pop | -4.86143 7686163 -5.630046 6797207 AIPI | 0031111 0026015 0005096 0009304 infras1 | 6.14e-06 000065 -.0000588 4.60e-06 PCITO | 0059594 0088692 -.0029097 0006718 -b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 478.82 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 xtreg ln_VAK ln_KL Small Large SOE Pri For edu ln_GDPP pop AIPI infras1 fe robust cluster (id) note: For omitted because of collinearity PCITO , Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: id Number of obs Number of groups = = 14242 4118 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 3.5 within = 0.4417 between = 0.3258 overall = 0.3307 corr(u_i, Xb) F(11,4117) Prob > F = -0.2423 = = 471.77 0.0000 (Std Err adjusted for 4118 clusters in id) -| Robust ln_VAK | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ln_KL | -.8435814 0119376 -70.67 0.000 -.8669855 -.8201774 Small | 1449613 0376182 3.85 0.000 0712094 2187132 Large | -.3036017 0490706 -6.19 0.000 -.3998067 -.2073968 SOE | -.1418503 1141384 -1.24 0.214 -.3656231 0819226 Pri | 0186106 0812582 0.23 0.819 -.1406994 1779205 For | (omitted) edu | 7407915 1.716669 0.43 0.666 -2.624808 4.106391 ln_GDPP | 9266834 0439221 21.10 0.000 8405724 1.012794 pop | -4.634087 1.612768 -2.87 0.004 -7.795983 -1.472191 AIPI | 0031658 0011506 2.75 0.006 0009101 0054215 infras1 | -2.00e-06 000013 -0.15 0.877 -.0000274 0000234 PCITO | 0054869 0015157 3.62 0.000 0025153 0084586 _cons | -4.883701 3289044 -14.85 0.000 -5.528532 -4.238871 -+ -sigma_u | 1.0300422 sigma_e | 51610425 rho | 79932686 (fraction of variance due to u_i) xtreg ROA ln_KL PCITO Small Large SOE Pri For edu ln_GDPP pop AIPI infras1 robust cluster (id) note: For omitted because of collinearity Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: id Number of obs Number of groups 84 = = 14242 4118 , fe R-sq: within = 0.0252 between = 0.0002 overall = 0.0009 corr(u_i, Xb) Obs per group: = avg = max = F(11,4117) Prob > F = -0.1387 = = 3.5 20.92 0.0000 (Std Err adjusted for 4118 clusters in id) -| Robust ROA | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ln_KL | -.0014628 0001925 -7.60 0.000 -.0018401 -.0010855 PCITO | 000099 0000311 3.19 0.001 0000382 0001599 Small | -.0009715 0005227 -1.86 0.063 -.0019962 0000532 Large | -.0010804 0007699 -1.40 0.161 -.0025899 0004291 SOE | 0066704 00332 2.01 0.045 0001615 0131793 Pri | 0038009 0026311 1.44 0.149 -.0013576 0089593 For | (omitted) edu | 0458933 0288514 1.59 0.112 -.0106712 1024577 ln_GDPP | -.0042305 0008424 -5.02 0.000 -.0058822 -.0025789 pop | -.0568297 026765 -2.12 0.034 -.1093036 -.0043559 AIPI | 000045 0000154 2.93 0.003 0000149 0000752 infras1 | 5.87e-07 2.70e-07 2.17 0.030 5.73e-08 1.12e-06 _cons | 0386845 0064059 6.04 0.000 0261255 0512436 -+ -sigma_u | 01390391 sigma_e | 00992055 rho | 66264955 (fraction of variance due to u_i) -xtreg ROE ln_KL Small Medium Large SOE Pri For edu ln_GDPP pop AIPI infras1 , fe robust cluster (id) note: For omitted because of collinearity Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: id Number of obs Number of groups = = 14242 4118 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 3.5 within = 0.0157 between = 0.0006 overall = 0.0000 corr(u_i, Xb) F(12,4117) Prob > F = -0.1619 = = 13.21 0.0000 (Std Err adjusted for 4118 clusters in id) -| Robust ROE | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ln_KL | -.0026426 0004013 -6.59 0.000 -.0034293 -.0018559 Small | 0019311 0019989 0.97 0.334 -.0019878 00585 Medium | 0040616 0019232 2.11 0.035 0002912 0078321 Large | 0018491 002756 0.67 0.502 -.0035542 0072523 SOE | 0148629 0071828 2.07 0.039 0007807 0289451 Pri | 0102541 0059661 1.72 0.086 -.0014427 0219509 For | (omitted) edu | 0886829 0599343 1.48 0.139 -.0288207 2061865 ln_GDPP | -.0010597 001687 -0.63 0.530 -.0043672 0022477 pop | -.1504109 0477288 -3.15 0.002 -.2439852 -.0568367 AIPI | 0000894 0000284 3.15 0.002 0000338 0001451 infras1 | 2.00e-06 5.91e-07 3.39 0.001 8.43e-07 3.16e-06 PCITO | 0003046 0000604 5.05 0.000 0001863 000423 _cons | 0124447 0132459 0.94 0.348 -.0135244 0384138 -+ -sigma_u | 02728989 sigma_e | 02048602 rho | 63958141 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 85 PCITO ... impact of institutions on firm performance Applying quantitative research on a panel data of firms in the manufacturing sector in Vietnam and the PCI data, the thesis attempts to answer these... govern and shape the interactions of human beings in part by helping them to form expectations of what other people will do There still remain different opinions on the definition of institutions ;... Prof Dr NGUYEN TRONG HOAI HO CHI MINH CITY, NOVEMBER 2015 DECLARATION “This is to certify that this thesis entitled Do better institutions boost firm performance? The case of manufacturing firms
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