Lectures on the history of moral philosophy john rawls

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L   H  M P L   H  M P J  R Edited by Barbara Herman    Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England  Copyright   by the President and Fellows of Harvard College    Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rawls, John, – Lectures on the history of moral philosophy/John Rawls ; edited by Barbara Herman p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN --- (alk paper)—ISBN --- (pbk : alk paper)  Ethics, Modern—th century  Ethics, Modern—th century  Ethics, Modern—th century I Herman, Barbara II Title BJ.R  ′.′′—dc - C E’ F A N   T I: M M P, –        A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy The Relation between Religion and Science Kant on Science and Religion On Studying Historical Texts           H  M P   P   Background: Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature   Classification of the Passions   Outline of Section  of Part III of Book II   Hume’s Account of (Nonmoral) Deliberation: The Official View    R D   R  R  Three Questions about Hume’s Official View  Three Further Psychological Principles  Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions  The General Appetite to Good  The General Appetite to Good: Passion or Principle?                  J   A V  The Capital of the Sciences  The Elements of Hume’s Problem  The Origin of Justice and Property  The Circumstances of Justice  The Idea of Convention Examples and Supplementary Remarks  Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions  The Two Stages of Development            T C  R I  Introduction  Some of Clarke’s Main Claims  The Content of Right and Wrong  Rational Intuitionism’s Moral Psychology  Hume’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism  Hume’s Second Argument: Morality Not Demonstrable         T J S  Introduction  Hume’s Account of Sympathy  The First Objection: The Idea of the Judicious Spectator  The Second Objection: Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue  The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments  Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason  The Concluding Section of the Treatise Appendix: Hume’s Disowning the Treatise          L  H M P  Introduction  Leibniz’s Metaphysical Perfectionism  The Concept of a Perfection  Leibniz’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth  Some Comments on Leibniz’s Account of Truth [  ]                 S  A S: T F  The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers  Spirits as Individual Rational Substances  True Freedom  Reason, Judgment, and Will  A Note on the Practical Point of View       K  G: P  P I  Introductory Comments  Some Points about the Preface: Paragraphs –  The Idea of a Pure Will  The Main Argument of Groundwork I  The Absolute Value of a Good Will  The Special Purpose of Reason  Two Roles of the Good Will           T C I: T F F        Introduction Features of Ideal Moral Agents The Four-Step CI-Procedure Kant’s Second Example: The Deceitful Promise Kant’s Fourth Example: The Maxim of Indifference Two Limits on Information The Structure of Motives            T C I: T S F        The Relation between the Formulations Statements of the Second Formulation Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue What Is Humanity? The Negative Interpretation The Positive Interpretation Conclusion: Remarks on Groundwork II:– (–) [  ]                   T C I: T T F       Gaining Entry for the Moral Law The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation The Supremacy of Reason The Realm of Ends Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition What Is the Analogy?         T P  R   O   M L       Introduction The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good The Second Three Conceptions of the Good Autonomy and Heteronomy The Priority of Right A Note on True Human Needs          M C  Rational Intuitionism: A Final Look  Kant’s Moral Constructivism  The Constructivist Procedure  An Observation and an Objection  Two Conceptions of Objectivity  The Categorical Imperative: In What Way Synthetic A Priori?           T F  R  Introduction  The First Fact of Reason Passage  The Second Passage: §§– of Chapter I of the Analytic  The Third Passage: Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs –  Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law  What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have?  The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages  Conclusion      [  ]                 T M L   L  F  Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Reflection  The Two Points of View  Kant’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom  Absolute Spontaneity  The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom  The Ideas of Freedom  Conclusion           T M P   R, B I      The The The The The Three Predispositions Free Power of Choice Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil Manichean Moral Psychology Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person  T U  R  The Practical Point of View  The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law  The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law  The Postulates of Vernunftglaube  The Content of Reasonable Faith  The Unity of Reason              H  H R  Introduction  Philosophy as Reconciliation  The Free Will  Private Property  Civil Society   E L  L  Sittlichkeit: The Account of Duty  Sittlichkeit: The State [  ]                   Sittlichkeit: War and Peace  A Third Alternative  Hegel’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism    A     : C    O     I     [  ]      the point of view of humanity, the point of view of God, and the point of view of Geist The idea of the point of view of Geist is the idea of a point of view that is at once human and divine, just as Geist is introduced as the mediation and reconciliation of the traditional concepts of God and humankind Geist is not cruel and certainly not malicious In the development of Geist from substance to subject, human beings suffer and die, not to be resurrected at the last day But it’s essential that social institutions be a framework to realize the good of individuals Only so does Geist achieve its full expression in reasonable and rational social institutions Only so can individuals become bearers of culture—of religion and philosophy, science and art—in the human awareness of which Geist itself achieves its conscious self-awareness For Hegel, Geist achieves its highest self-awareness in religion, art, and philosophy only insofar as human beings can engage in and realize religion, art, and philosophy The collective self-awareness of human beings in higher culture is that in which Geist achieves its fullest realization and complete manifestation Whether they know it or not, human beings live in the service of the goal of Geist—a goal which is in some important sense their own From the point of view of Geist, that is the higher value of human life and culture, not the values and goods as seen from the human point of view These things are shown in Hegel’s remarks about war and historical development But what is the point of view of Geist? It is not the point of view of the separate transcendent God of Christianity For although Hegel thought of himself as a Lutheran, the whole point of his philosophical theology is to reject the idea of the radical otherness of God Rather the selfconsciousness of Geist is collective human self-consciousness over time, the self-consciousness expressed in different forms of human life in culture, and especially in art and religion and philosophy Now, the highest form of human self-consciousness occurs in philosophy when it achieves the realization of absolute knowledge So the point of view of Geist must be the point of view of the absolute knowledge achieved by philosophy in its highest and final stage of development From that point of view, looking back on the whole course of history and culture, it must be possible for philosophy to see that the development of that history and culture is in itself the highest good, the good the realization of which individuals suffered and died for, and nations came and passed away—all for reasons unknown to them ex[  ]     cept insofar as they grasped the truths of philosophy itself, foreshadowed in art and religion The good of individuals and peoples is indeed good, but not the highest good: not the highest good for the sake of which there is the world as we see it spread over time and space, and which makes the world intelligible to itself through and through What philosophical view is expressed in the point of view of Geist so that, when it looks back at the final and highest stage, it sees the whole course of history as good? I suppose there could be no answer to this except the answer that Geist sees that it is good, as it were, as a given fact But this could not really be Hegel’s answer, I think, because he is committed to the view that the world is fully intelligible through and through as a basic thesis of his idealism So when Geist sees the world as good, it does so for a reason: what is this reason? The reason, I believe, is that Hegel affirms the exacting standards Aristotle set up for the highest good: namely, that it be complete, desired only for its own sake, self-sufficient, and such that no added good could make it any better.9 This complete, or perfect, good cannot be achieved by any human individual, or group, or nation, but it can be achieved by Geist— at once human and divine—over the whole course of world history This good is rooted in the potentialities of things and peoples Good is achieved by the full expression of these potentialities in acts of various kinds So when the potentialities of Geist reach their full expression in the world, Geist, in looking back in philosophy, brings them to self-consciousness and from the point of view of philosophy sees the course of history as itself good This good of the course of history as a whole is complete because all the potentialities of Geist have been realized and they express a reasonable and rational view of the whole, the outlines of which are given in Hegel’s account of logic The actualization of potentiality is desired for its own sake, the course of history as a whole is self-sufficient, and there is no added good that could make it any better: every potentiality has been expressed, everything reasonable and rational and good has been done At last the true and the good are at peace in harmony This formulation I take from Gisela Striker, “Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity,” Monist (),  [  ] A Course Outline: Problems in Moral Philosophy In the Harvard University Catalogue of Courses this class is described as a study of Kant’s moral philosophy, with some attention to Hume and Leibniz and, if time allows, to Hegel’s criticisms of Kant The outline of proposed lecture topics given below reflects this description, though it gives more attention to Hume than the description may suggest As circumstances allow, there is some discussion of different approaches to moral philosophy and of how its problems may be seen to arise depending on writers’ different points of view and on what they see as calling for philosophical reflection given the historical and cultural background of their day While reading historically important works is but one approach to moral philosophy, we hope to gain some of its advantages A Hume  The Treatise: a fideism of nature and reason and passions  His account of deliberation and of the role of reason  His account of justice as an artificial virtue and the role of sympathy  His critique of the Rationalists: Clarke and Cudworth  His account of moral judgments: the judicious spectator B Kant: The Moral Law  The Grundlegung: Preface and the argument of Part I  The categorical imperative: the first (law of nature) formulation [  ]          The second (treating humanity as an end-in-itself ) formulation  The third (universal legislation) formulation: relation of formulations  The realm of ends and the order of nature and other difficulties C Leibniz  Metaphysical perfectionism and his theory of truth  Spirits as free and rational substances  The Theodicy and the conception of freedom of the will D Kant: The Fact of Reason (Das Faktum der Vernunft)  The priority of right and the sequence of conceptions of the good  Moral constructivism and the reasonable and the rational  The fact of reason: texts and interpretation E Kant: Philosophy as Defense  The moral law as a law of freedom  Moral psychology of Religion I and die freie Willkuăr The practical point of view and the unity of reason F Hegel  His official criticisms of Kant: what and how serious  His idea of ethical life (die Sittlichkeit) and of freedom  His implicit criticism of Kantian liberalism: what G Texts Hume: Treatise of Human Nature, ed P H Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans H D Paton (New York: Harper and Row, ); Critique of Practical Reason, trans L W Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, ); Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans T M Greene and H H Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, ); Doctrine of Virtue, trans M Gregor (New York: Harper and Row, ) Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed and trans Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, ) Also recommended: Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans H B Nisbet, ed A W Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ) [  ]   R      : Hume: Lectures –: Treatise II, iii, §§–; cf §§– Lecture : ibid., III, ii, §§–; II, i, § Lecture : ibid., III, i, §§– Lecture : III, iii, §§– Kant: Lecture : Grundlegung (Gr), Preface and Part I Lectures –: ibid., Part II; and with this Critique of Practical Reason (KP) Analytic: Chs I, Ak –, and II, – (The Typic) Lecture : Gr II, Ak ff.; KP Analytic: Ch I, Ak f Leibniz: Lecture : Discourse on Metaphysics, Garber # and #, , , ,  Lecture : Garber #, ,  Lecture : Garber #, ,  Kant: Lecture : KP Analytic: Ch II, Ak – Lecture : KP Analytic: Ch III, Ak –; and Doctrine of Method: Ak – Lecture : texts to be given Lecture : KP Analytic: Elucidation: Ak – ; see also KR B– Lecture : Religion (Rel), Bk I, and KP Dialectic: Chs I and II and §: Ak – Lecture : KP: Dialectic: §§–: Ak – Hegel: Lecture : Philosophy of Right: Intro., Abstract Right and Morality, §§– Lecture : Ethical Life: The Family and Civil Society, §§– Lecture : State and World History, §§– It should be mentioned that the lectures consist largely in examining texts and in trying to present a forceful but reasonably accurate interpretation of the doctrine they express I shan’t give Hume’s view, say, and then proceed to criticize it to show how he could have done much better from a contemporary point of view Some critical comments, yes, when sparing and fundamental, but we should be interested in understanding Hume (and the others), as wrongheaded as he may seem at times One can say this of any author worthy of careful study and reflection, as the ones we read certainly are There will be a final examination, weekly sections, and written work summing to about ,–, words [  ] I A priori, –; principles, ; synthetic a priori knowledge, ; objects of the moral law given a priori, –; categorical imperative, – Action (Hume) See Motives; Passions; Practical reason: Hume’s official view of; Reason (Hume) Action (Kant), – See also CIprocedure; Motives; Practical reason; Reason (Kant) Adam,  Adams, Robert,  Aesthetics, ,  Alienation, Kantian morality as, –  Allison, Henry, n, n Ameriks, Karl, n Apology, See philosophy as defense Aquinas, Thomas (Saint), , ,  Aristides (the Just), ,  Aristotle, , , , , ,  Arnauld, Antoine,  Augustine (Saint), , n Autonomy: self-conception of an agent, ; and foundation of morality, , , –, ; formulation of categorical imperative, – See also Choice; Freedom; Heteronomy; Spontaneity Axelrod, Robert, n Beattie, James, ,  Beck, Lewis White, n Belief, , , –; mistaken belief and rationality, – Bellarmine, Robert (Saint),  Benevolence: as a calm passion, , ; as natural virtue, –; in Butler, –; in Clarke, ; rational benevolence,  See also Duty: of mutual aid Bentham, Jeremy, ,  Bismarck, Otto von,  Bouvet, Father Joachim, n Bradley, F H., , n Brutus,  Burnyeat, M F.,  Butler, Joseph (Bishop), n, , , –, n Caesar, Julius, , , , ,  Calvin, John, ,  Carnap, Rudolph,  [  ]      Carriero, John, n Categorical imperative, , ; first formulation (law of nature formulation), –, ; contradiction in conception test, –; contradiction in the will test, , –; information limits, –; second formulation (humanity as ends formulation), –; equivalence of formulations, –, –; third formulation (autonomy), –; synthetic a priori, – ; Hegel’s criticisms, – See also CI-procedure; Fact of reason Categories (the), , ,  Causation, ,  Character, , , , n, , ; moral worth of, –; intelligible and empirical, – Charles II,  Choice (free power of choice), –, ,  CI-procedure, , –, –, , , –, –; content condition, , ; fact of reason condition, , ; freedom condition, , ; publicity, , , , ; perpetuity, –; motivation condition, ; Hegel’s criticism of, – See also Practical reason Civil society, – Clarke, Samuel, n, , , –, –, , , , , , , , ,  Clausewitz, Carl von,  Coherentism, –,  Compatibilism: Leibniz, –; Kant, – Conscience, –,  Constructivism, , , , –, –; and CI-procedure, –, ; and objectivity, –; and facts, – Contract, , – Convention, –,  Cooperation,  Coordination, – Copernicus, Nicolaus, ,  Crusius, Christian August, n,  Cudworth, Ralph, , , ,  Culture, , ,  Custom, , , –, n, ,  Deliberation: Hume’s conception of, – ; Leibniz’s conception of, – See also Practical reason Descartes, Rene´, , , , , n Desire: principle-dependent, , , – , , ; conception-dependent, n, –, , –, , objectdependent desires, – See also Inclination; Passions Dietrichson, Paul, n, n Dignity, , – Disposition, ,  Duty, , –, , , –; of mutual aid, –; of justice, –, –, , ; of virtue, –, , –, ; of moral perfection,  Education, , , – Einstein, Albert,  Empirical practical reason See Hypothetical imperative; Practical reason End-in-itself, –, – Ends, ; final ends, ; in maxims, ; objective, –; permissible, , ; collective,  See also Needs; Realm of ends Equality, ; principle of equity (Hume), –; equal capacity for moral worth (also aristocracy of all), –, , –, ; equality of property (Hegel),  Equality of reason See Reason, unity of practical and theoretical [  ]      Estlund, David, n Evil, – Fact of reason, , – Fairness,  Faith, , , ; practical faith, , , –, ; reasonable faith, –, –,  Finnis, John, n Fitness, relations of, –, , , – Fogelin, Francois,  Fourier series,  Frederick the Great,  Freedom: free creation of earth by God, ; Liebniz’s conception of, –; and principle of justice, ; and final ends, ; rational beings’ conception of, , –, , ; objective reality of/experience of moral law, – , –; Kant’s criticism of Leibniz, –; of reason, –; ideas of, –; realm of ends, , ; and postulates of the highest good, –; Hegel’s criticism of Kant, – ; Hegel’s notion of the free will, –; embodiment of,  See also Autonomy; Choice; Compatibilism; Liberalism of freedom; Spontaneity Frege, Gottlob, n, ,  Freud, Sigmund, ,  Friedman, Michael, n, n Friedrich, Wilhelm III,  Galileo,  Garve, Christian, n Gauss, Carl Friedrich,  Geist, , – See also History General appetite to good/aversion to evil, , , , , ,  God: role in natural law theory, ; role in Butler’s moral theory, –; role in Clarke’s moral theory, –, , – , ; role in Leibniz’s philosophy, –, –; as idea of reason, ; Kant’s criticism of role in perfectionism, ; and the highest good, ; and Geist, Goădel, Kurt, Good, n; highest good, , , –, , , ; complete good, , – See also General appetite to good; Greatest apparent good; Happiness; Will Goods, , , ,  Good will See Will; Moral worth Grace,  Greatest apparent good (Leibniz), , –,  See also Practical reason Green, Thomas Hill,  Grotius, Hugo, , n, , , , n Hamann, Johann Georg,  Happiness: goodness of (vs the good will), –; duty to advance others’, , , ; role in conceptions of the good (highest good), –, , –; propensity to seek, ; and reconciliation,  See also Needs Hardenberg, Karl August von, , n,  Hardiman, Michael, n Hegel, Gottfried Wilhelm Friedrich, , n, , – Henrich, Dieter, n, , n Henry VIII,  Herder, Johann Gottfried,  Herman, Barbara, n, n, n, n Heteronomy, , , –,  See also Autonomy History: progress in, –, –; and cunning of reason,  Hobbes, Thomas, n, , , ,  Homer,  [  ]      Human needs See Needs Humanity, –, ,  See also Categorical imperative: second formulation Humboldt, Wilhelm von,  Hume, David, n, –, –, , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Hutcheson, Francis, n, , , , , , , ,  Huyghens, Christiaan,  Hypothetical imperative, –, , , –, – Idea of reason, , –, , ,  Idealism,  Ideas, ,  Identity over time, , n, ,  Imagination, –, , –,  Immortality, , – Impressions,  Inclination: Hume’s conception of, ; existence of a greatest (Leibniz), – ; role in practical reason (Kant), , , ; as opposed to the good will, , , ; and motives, – ; inclination to duty (to the moral law), –, , , , –,  Institutions, n, , , ; rational, –, – See also Civil society; State Intention See Legislative intention; Maxim Internalism,  Intuitionism (rational): Hume’s criticism of rationalism and, –, –; Clarke’s conception of, , –; similarity of Leibniz and Clarke on, ; Kant’s opposition to Leibniz, –, –; objection to constructivism, – See also Constructivism Judas Iscariot, , n Judgment, , –, – Judicious spectator, , –, – Justice, , , –, –, , , , – See also Duty: of justice Kant, Immanuel, n, , –, , , , –, , , , , –, , , –, , , , , –, , – Kavka, Gregory, n Kemp-Smith, Norman, , , n Kepler, Johannes,  Kingdom of ends See Realm of ends Korsgaard, Christine, n, n La Rouchefoucauld,  Law, , 355–, 364; natural law, , , n, n; practical law,  See also Moral law Legislative intention, – Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, , n, , , , , –, , , , , , , –, –, , , , n, ,  Lewis, David, n Liberalism of freedom, , , ; Kant’s conception of, –; Hegel’s criticism of, – Locke, John, , n, , , , n; Leibniz on, , – Logic, – Luther, Martin, , ,  Mackie, J L., n,  Malebranche, Nicolas,  Mandeville, Bernard de,  Manichean (and Augustinian) moral psychology, , , – Marx, Karl, ,  [  ]      Maxim, , –; of ends, 191–; of common interest,  See also Categorical imperative; Hypothetical imperative Mendelssohn, Moses,  Mill, J S., n, , , ,  Mill, James,  Mohammed,  Molina, Luis de, , n Monads, –, –, – Montaigne, Michel de, ,  Montesquieu, Baron de, , ,  Moore, G E., ,  Moral law: Leibniz, ; as supreme principle of morality (Kant), –, –, –; as law of freedom, , –, –, –; as an idea of reason, –; and conception of the good, –; and the fact of reason, –273; deduction of moral law, – See also Fact of reason; Idea of reason; Law Moral sense, , –, , , –, , – Moral worth, n, –, –, , ; and the highest good, – See also Equality: equal capacity for moral worth; Good; Will Motives, n, , –, –, –, –, –; motive of happiness,  See also Inclination Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus,  Nagel, Thomas, n Naturalism (fideism of nature, psychological naturalism), , , –, , , , –,  Nature, – Needs: true human needs, –, , –; and objective ends, ; and interests, ,  Neiman, Susan, n, n Newton, Sir Isaac, , , ,  Nietzsche, Friedrich,  Ockham, William of,  O’Neill (Nell), Onora, n Origen,  Pareto, Vilfredo,  Parsons, Charles, n, n Passions (Hume), –, –; direct, indirect, and original, –, ; calm/ violent, –, –, , –, , ; strong/weak, –; influence on action, –, ; mistaken, ; mistaken for reason, , –; possibility of change/emendation, , –; present and future, , –; conflict between, ,  See also Desire; Inclination Paton, H J., , n, , , n Paul (Saint), ,  Perfection: metaphysical, –, , ; Kant’s critique of, – Personality (Hegel), – Philosophy as defense: Leibniz, –, ; Kant, , , , , – See also Geist; Reconciliation Plato, , ,  Pleasure/pain, –, , ,  Pluralism, – Pogge, Thomas, n Practical reason: Hume’s official view of, –, –; and rational principles, –, ; whether Hume has a conception of, 96–; Clarke’s conception of, –78; and principle of greatest apparent good (Leibniz), , –, –; Leibniz’s conception of, – ; Kant’s conception of, –, , –, , –, –, –, –; empirical (Kant), –, , , –, , , , , – , –, ,  See also Categorical imperative; Fact of reason; General appetite to good; Hypothetical imperative; Maxim [  ]      Pragmatic law See Rule Praise/blame, ,  See also Judicious spectator Predicate-in-subject theory, – Predispositions, of animality, humanity, and personality, –, – See also Self-conception Price (market price, fancy price),  Price, Richard, n, ,  Pride/humility,  Principle of Sufficient Reason, – Prisoners’ dilemma, –,  Promising, , –, –, –  Property, –, –, n, – Psychology, , , ; principles of (Hume), –, –, , ; Kant’s moral psychology, – See also Practical reason Publicity, ,  See also CI procedure: publicity Pufendorf, Samuel Freiherr von, , n, , , , n Quine, W V O.,  Rational agent/rational being, –, , , , –, ; ideal rational agent, n, , , –, –, , – Realm of ends, , –, –, –, – Reason, unity of practical and theoretical (equality of reason), –, , , , , –, , – Reason (Hume): capacities and limitations of, , –; rationality/rational conduct, , –; reasoning from cause to effect (means-ends reasoning), –, –, , ; demonstrative truths, –, –, ; as motive of action, –, –; opposition to passion, ; strict and calm,  Reason (Kant): supremacy of, , – , , ; critique of, , –; purpose of, – See also Fact of reason; Practical reason; Rational agent; Theoretical reason Reasonable: beliefs, , ; principles, – , n, ; and categorical imperative/ moral law, , , , , –, –, , –, , , –, –, ; as opposed to rational, –, , –, –, , , –, ; beings/agents, –, , , , , , , –, , –, ; and realm of ends, , , –, ; reasonable nature as end-in-itself, –; and autonomy/ freedom, , , , , ; and the complete good, ; and constructivism, –; and a priori knowledge, –; and fact of reason,  Reasonable faith See Faith Reasonable social world See Institutions; Reconciliation; Sittlichkeit Reasons (for action), –, – See also Practical reason; Reasonable Reciprocity, , – Reconciliation (philosophy as), –, –, ; and happiness,  Reid, Thomas, n, ,  Reimann, G F B.,  Religion, freedom of, – Respect, , , , , –, ; and property (respect for persons), – See also Categorical imperative: second formulation; End-in-itself; Moral law; Realm of ends Rhetoric,  Right, –n, , , n, , , – , –; priority of right, , ,  Ross, W D., ,  [  ]      Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, , , , ,  Rule, , –,  See also Convention; Law Satan,  Scanlon, T M., n, n Schiller, Johann Friedrich von,  Schlick, Moritz,  Schneewind, J B., n Scotus, Duns,  Self-conception: Kant, , ; Hume, – ; and predispositions, 291–; and self-knowledge, 202; and supremacy of reason, –; and moral psychology, –; and personality (Hegel), – See also Character; Predisposition; Rational agent Self-interest/self-love/egoism, , , , –, ,  Shaftesbury, Earl of, n,  Sheehan, James, n Sidgwick, Henry, , , , , , , , , , ,  Sittlichkeit, , – Skepticism: and Hume, –; epistemological, –; pyrrhonism, ; conceptual, ; moral,  See also Philosophy as defense Sleigh, Robert,  Smith, Adam, n, , , ,  Smith, Ozzie,  Social contract, – Socrates, ,  Sophocles (Antigone),  Spinoza, Baruch de, , , , , – , , ,  Spirits, – Spontaneity, –,  Standpoints: two, –, –; as practical point of view, – State of nature, –, – State, –; powers of sovereignty, – Striker, Gisela,  Sturm, John Christopher,  Suarez, Francisco, , n, n Sugden, Robert, n Suicide, ,  Sulzer, J G., ,  Sympathy, , , –, –, –,  Talents, , , ; positions open to (meritocracy), – Teleology, Kant’s view distinguished from, , ,  Themistocles,  Theoretical reason, –, , –, – Transcendental Deduction, –,  Truth: Leibniz’s account of, –; and contingency, – Utilitarianism,  Utility, principle of,  Value, of the good will, –, , –,  Vasquez, Gabriel, n Verdi, Guiseppe,  Virtue, , , –, ; artificial (Hume), –, –, ; natural (Hume), –; duties of (Kant), – , , –, ; and Hegel,  Volition, principle of, –,  See also Action; Maxim; Practical reason; Will Voting,  Walpole, Sir Robert, n War, – [  ]      Will: good, –, 177–, 206, 223– ; elective, –, –; Hegel’s conception of, –, – , – See also Categorical imperative: contradiction in the will test Will, free See Choice; Freedom; Spontaneity Williams, Bernard, n, n Wolff, Christian, n, , , , , ,  Wolff, R P., n Wollaston, William,  Wood, Allen, n, n, n, n Wren, Christopher,  Xerxes,  [  ] ... Modern Moral Philosophy The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy The Relation between Religion and Science Kant on. .. L       Introduction The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good The Second Three Conceptions of the Good Autonomy and Heteronomy The Priority of Right A Note on True Human Needs ... conception in human life: how it organizes moral reasoning, the conception of a person that it presupposes, and the social role of the moral conception Along with a substantive account of the right,
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Xem thêm: Lectures on the history of moral philosophy john rawls , Lectures on the history of moral philosophy john rawls , §3. The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy, §4. The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy, §5. The Relation between Religion and Science, §6. Kant on Science and Religion, §7. On Studying Historical Texts, §1. Background:Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature, §2. Classi .cation of the Passions, §3. Outline of Section .of Part III of Book II, §4. Hume ’s Account of (Nonmoral)Deliberation:The Of .cial View, §2. Three Further Psychological Principles, §3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions, §5. The General Appetite to Good:Passion or Principle?, §2. The Elements of Hume ’s Problem, §5. The Idea of Convention, §7. The Two Stages of Development, §2. Some of Clarke ’s Main Claims, §5. Hume ’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism, §6. Hume ’s Second Argument:Morality Not Demonstrable, §2. Hume ’s Account of Sympathy, §3. The First Objection:The Idea of the Judicious Spectator, §5. The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments, §7. The Concluding Section of the Treatise, §2. Leibniz ’s Metaphysical Perfectionism, §3. The Concept of a Perfection, §4. Leibniz ’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth, §5. Some Comments on Leibniz ’s Account of Truth, §1. The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers, §2. Spirits as Individual Rational Substances, §5. A Note on the Practical Point of View, §2. Some Points about the Preface:Paragraphs 11–13, §3. The Idea of a Pure Will, §5. The Absolute Value of a Good Will, §7. Two Roles of the Good Will, §2. Features of Ideal Moral Agents, §3. The Four-Step CI-Procedure, §5. Kant ’s Fourth Example:The Maxim of Indifference, §7. The Structure of Motives, §4. What Is Humanity?, §5. The Negative Interpretation, §7. Conclusion:Remarks on Groundwork II:46–49(427–429), §1. Gaining Entry for the Moral Law, §3. The Supremacy of Reason, §4. The Realm of Ends, §5. Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition, §6. What Is the Analogy?, §2. The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good, §3. The Second Three Conceptions of the Good, §4. Autonomy and Heteronomy, §6. A Note on True Human Needs, §3. The Constructivist Procedure, §5. Two Conceptions of Objectivity, §6. The Categorical Imperative:In What Way Synthetic A Priori?, §2. The First Fact of Reason Passage, §3. The Second Passage:§§5–8 of Chapter I of the Analytic, §4. The Third Passage:Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs 8–15, §7. The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages, §3. Kant ’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom, §5. The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom, §6. The Ideas of Freedom, §1. The Three Predispositions, §2. The Free Power of Choice, §3. The Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil, §4. The Manichean Moral Psychology, §5. The Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person, §3. The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law, §5. The Content of Reasonable Faith, §6. The Unity of Reason, §2. Philosophy as Reconciliation, §3. The Free Will, §1. Sittlichkeit:The Account of Duty, §3. Sittlichkeit:War and Peace, §4. A Third Alternative, §5. Hegel ’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism

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