CRITICAL THINKING: Consider The Verdict Sixth Edition

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CRITICAL THINKING This page intentionally left blank CRITICAL THINKING Consider the Verdict Sixth Edition Bruce N Waller Youngstown State University Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Upper Saddle River Amsterdam Cape Town Dubai London Madrid Milan Munich Paris Montreal Toronto Delhi Mexico City Sao Paulo Sydney Hong Kong Seoul Singapore Taipei Tokyo Editorial Director: Craig Campanella Editor in Chief: Dickson Musslewhite Executive Editor: Ashley Dodge Editorial Project Manager: Kate Fernandes Director of Marketing: Brandy Dawson Senior Marketing Manager: Laura Lee Manley Production Liaison: Barbara Reilly Operations Specialist: Christina Amato Manager, Text Rights and Permissions: Charles Morris Cover Manager: Jayne Conte Cover Designer: Suzanne Behnke Cover Image: tlegend/Shutterstock Media Director: Brian Hyland Media Editor: Rachel Comerford Media Project Manager: Barbara Taylor-Laino Full-Service Project Management: Shiny Rajesh, Integra Software Services Pvt Ltd Printer/Binder: Edwards Brothers Cover Printer: Lehigh-Phoenix Color Corp Text Font: 10/11 New Baskerville Copyright © 2012, 2005, 2001 by Pearson Education, Inc All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America This publication is protected by Copyright, and permission should be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise To obtain permission(s) to use material from this work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc., Permissions Department, One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458, or fax your request to 201-236-3290 Many of the designations by manufacturers and seller to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks Where those designations appear in this book, and the publisher was aware of a trademark claim, the designations have been printed in initial caps or all caps Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Waller, Bruce N., Critical thinking : consider the verdict / Bruce N Waller — 6th ed p cm ISBN-13: 978-0-205-15866-9 (alk paper) ISBN-10: 0-205-15866-8 (alk paper) Critical thinking Verdicts Logic I Title BC177.W3 2012 160.2'434—dc22 2011010803 10 www.pearsonhighered.com Student Edition ISBN-10: 0-205-15866-8 ISBN-13: 978-0-205-15866-9 À la Carte Edition ISBN-10: 0-205-15881-1 ISBN-13: 978-0-205-15881-2 Contents Preface xiii Acknowledgments xvii Introduction Critical Thinking in Everyday Life Play Fair Seating a Jury Jury Research: Eliminating or Selecting Bias? Impartial Critical Thinking Adversarial Critical Thinking Cooperative Critical Thinking Internet Resources 12 Additional Reading 12 A Few Important Terms Arguments 14 Statements 14 Premises and Conclusions 14 16 Deductive and Inductive Arguments Deduction, Validity, and Soundness 19 21 Induction, Strong Arguments, and Cogent Arguments 23 v vi Contents Review Questions 27 Internet Resources 27 Additional Reading 27 Ad Hominem Arguments 28 The Ad Hominem Fallacy 28 Nonfallacious Ad Hominem Arguments Ad Hominem and Testimony Distinguishing Argument from Testimony Tricky Types of Ad Hominem Bias Ad Hominem 41 Inconsistency and Ad Hominem Psychological Ad Hominem 47 Inverse Ad Hominem 48 Attacking Arguments 29 31 33 41 44 49 Review Questions 54 Internet Resources 55 Additional Reading 54 The Second Deadly Fallacy: The Strawman Fallacy Straw Man 56 57 The Principle of Charity 58 The Strawman Fallacy 58 Special Strawman Varieties 63 Limits on Critical Thinking 63 Review Questions 65 Internet Resources 66 Additional Reading 65 What’s the Question? Determine the Conclusion What Is the Exact Conclusion? Review Question 67 67 68 74 Relevant and Irrelevant Reasons Premises Are Relevant or Irrelevant Relative to the Conclusion 77 76 vii Contents Irrelevant Reason Fallacy 81 The Red Herring Fallacy 81 Review Questions 90 Internet Resources 91 Additional Reading 91 Analyzing Arguments 92 Argument Structure 92 Convergent Arguments Linked Arguments 92 95 Subarguments 96 Assumptions: Their Use and Abuse Legitimate Assumptions Enthymemes 111 Illegitimate Assumptions 111 Review Questions 109 109 113 Internet Resources 114 Additional Reading 114 The Burden of Proof 115 Who Bears the Burden of Proof? Appeal to Ignorance 115 117 The Burden of Proof in the Courtroom 117 Presumption of Innocence 118 When the Defendant Does Not Testify 119 Juries and the Burden of Proof 120 Unappealing Ignorance Review Questions 123 127 Internet Resources 128 Additional Reading 128 Language and Its Pitfalls Definitions 129 Stipulative Definitions 130 Controversial Definitions Deceptive Language 129 131 131 viii Contents The Fallacy of Ambiguity Amphiboly 132 136 Review Questions 139 Internet Resources 139 Additional Reading 139 10 Appeal to Authority 140 Authorities as Testifiers 141 Conditions for Legitimate Appeal to Authority Popularity and Tradition Review Questions 141 148 154 Internet Resources 154 Additional Reading 154 Cumulative Exercises One 156 (Chapters through 10) 11 Arguments by Analogy Figurative Analogy 164 164 Deductive Argument by Analogy 165 The Fallacy of Faulty Analogy 170 Analyzing a Deductive Argument by Analogy 175 Deductive Arguments by Analogy and Cooperative Critical Thinking 179 The Fallacy of Analogical Literalism 180 Caution! Watch for Analogies That Look Like Slippery Slopes! 182 Inductive Arguments by Analogy Review Questions 184 201 Internet Resources 202 Additional Reading 202 12 Some Distinctive Arguments and Potential Pitfalls: Slippery Slope, Dilemma, and Golden Mean Arguments Slippery Slope 204 Separating Slippery Slopes from Straw Men The Slippery Slope Fallacy 206 Genuine Slippery Slopes 206 205 204 ix Contents Dilemmas, False and True 211 Genuine Dilemmas 212 False Dilemmas 212 False Dilemma Combined with Straw Man Consider the Possibilities 216 Golden Mean 216 220 The Golden Mean Fallacy 220 Constructing Golden Mean Fallacies Review Questions 220 224 Internet Resources 225 Additional Reading 225 13 Begging the Question 226 The Problem with Question-Begging Arguments 226 A New and Confusing Use of “Begs the Question” Subtle Forms of Question Begging 227 227 Synonymous Begging the Question 227 Generalization Begging the Question 228 Circular Begging the Question 229 False Charges of Begging the Question Self-Sealing Arguments Complex Questions 231 231 233 Review Questions 238 Internet Resources 238 Additional Reading 238 Cumulative Exercises Two 239 (Chapters through 13) 14 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Necessary Conditions 253 Distinguishing Necessary from Sufficient Conditions Sufficient Conditions 253 255 256 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Ordinary Language Conditional Statements 258 Alternative Ways of Stating Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Both Necessary and Sufficient 256 261 259 437 Answers to Selected Exercises narrowly: A posted sign is a required warning for a vicious dog (but that says nothing about verbal warnings, nor does it imply that the warning is a sufficient safeguard) The city attorney (interpreting the piano lesson precedent narrowly) can argue that the principle is that home businesses are permitted so long as they not produce any material product for sale (or, perhaps, home businesses are permitted so long as they are exclusively educational in nature) The plaintiff might argue that the precedent implies that businesses are permitted so long as they operate out of the primary residence When the Torelli precedent is added, the city attorney must narrow the precedent still further: the principle is that home businesses are permitted so long as they not produce and sell any material product Chapter 12 Exercise 12-1 10 13 Fallacy Fallacy Fallacy Legitimate Legitimate Exercise 12-2 Straw man Straw man Exercise 12-3 False dilemma; it might not cause cancer, but might cause damage to the heart, lungs, or nervous system Genuine dilemma False dilemma; some good upright Scots might be honestly mistaken 10 Genuine dilemma 13 False dilemma; she might be indifferent to him 16 False dilemma; it could be a case of self-defense 19 False dilemma; we could raise taxes, or make cuts elsewhere Exercise 12-4 1a Smoking in public restaurants should be banned It would be a mistake to try to enact a total prohibition against smoking On the other hand, we shouldn’t just allow people to smoke anywhere, with no consideration of others Therefore, there should be no smoking in any situation where it is likely to bother others, such as in restaurants or airplanes or offices b Smoking in public restaurants should not be banned It would be wrong to allow smoking in areas where it poses a major threat or annoyance, such as in hospitals or in elevators On the other hand, we shouldn’t take the extreme stance of banning all smoking in public places, such as restaurants 2a Passive euthanasia should be permitted Obviously we should not go to the extreme of allowing the purposeful causing of death by active euthanasia; but on the other hand, it would be wrong to require that treatment continue even when the dying patient does not want it Therefore, allowing passive euthanasia is a good and reasonable policy b Passive euthanasia should not be permitted That is not to suggest that we go to the extreme of requiring all possible treatment—even experimental and burdensome treatments—for every patient; but we should not go to the other extreme and allow standard treatments to be stopped for terminally ill patients So the good, moderate position is this: We not always require extraordinary treatment measures, but we should also never allow passive euthanasia Chapter 13 Exercise 13-1 10 14 Begging the question Complex question Begging the question Does not beg the question Self-sealing Exercise 13-2 The assumption is that women think less analytically than men Assumes the existence of such a plan Assumes that the mind does cause the body to things; and more basically, assumes that the mind and the body are distinct (assumes that materialism is false, that the mind is something different from the brain) 10 Did he, or did Leif Ericson? More to the point, how could he “discover” a continent on which people were already living? If an Iroquois sailor had landed in London, would we say that he “discovered Europe”? Cumulative Exercises Two Irrelevant reason, fallacy False dilemma, fallacy Appeal to authority, legitimate 438 10 Ambiguity, fallacy (“good argument” is being used in two different senses; one, in the sense that it worked—it sold a lot of cereal—and the other in the sense of actually giving good reasons in support of the conclusion) 13 Golden mean, fallacy 16 Ad hominem, legitimate 19 Inverse ad hominem, fallacy 22 Begging the question, fallacy 25 Appeal to ignorance, fallacy 28 Ad hominem, fallacy; followed by straw man, fallacy 31 Appeal to tradition, fallacy 34 False dilemma, fallacy 37 Begging the question, fallacy 40 Ad hominem, legitimate 43 Golden mean, fallacy 46 Complex question, fallacy 49 Ad hominem, fallacy 52 Irrelevant reason, fallacy 55 Inverse ad hominem, fallacy 58 Genuine dilemma, legitimate 61 Appeal to popularity, fallacy 64 Slippery slope, fallacy 67 Appeal to tradition, fallacy 70 Appeal to authority, fallacy 73 Slippery slope, legitimate 76 Begging the question, fallacy 79 Straw man, fallacy 82 Self-sealing, fallacy 85 Ambiguity (“made with real fruit” implies that they are primarily fruit, when it is likely that they are primarily sugar with a tiny amount of fruit flavoring) 88 Ad hominem, legitimate 91 Appeal to authority, fallacy 94 False dilemma, fallacy 97 Self-sealing, fallacy 100 False dilemma, fallacy (could have been a case of self-defense) 103 Ad hominem, legitimate 106 Slippery slope, fallacy 109 False dilemma, fallacy 112 Ambiguity (something can be “desirable” in the sense of actually being desired without being “desirable” in the sense of being worthy of desire) 115 Faulty analogy, fallacy 118 Straw man, fallacy (in the response by Annas) Chapter 14 Answers to Selected Exercises Exercise 14-2 a a Exercise 14-4 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 a b b b a a c c c b b a Exercise 14-5 No permission is a necessary condition of Joe’s guilt Joe’s guilt is a sufficient condition of no permission G→ P ϳ Mighty Casey striking out is a sufficient condition for no joy No joy is a necessary condition of Mighty Casey striking out SO → J ϳ Playing is a necessary condition of winning Winning is a sufficient condition of playing W →P 10 Answering correctly is a necessary condition of passing Passing is a sufficient condition of answering correctly P → AC 13 Seeing is a sufficient condition for believing Believing is a necessary condition for seeing S →B Exercise 14-6 Affirming the consequent Modus ponens Denying the antecedent Exercise 14-1 Exercise 14-7 Against He may be guilty of some other crime, but if he had permission to be there, he cannot be guilty of breaking or entering (not having permission is a necessary condition of guilt) Modus tollens, valid Affirming the consequent, invalid Denying the antecedent, invalid 439 Answers to Selected Exercises 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 Affirming the consequent, invalid Modus tollens, valid Modus tollens, valid Modus tollens, valid Modus tollens, valid Affirming the consequent, invalid Modus tollens, valid Modus ponens, valid Denying the antecedent, invalid Chapter 15 Exercise 15-1 One, if an elderly person can afford a pet, that person is more likely to be able to afford medications and better health care; two, it’s likely that the cause is coming from the other direction: healthier people are more likely to be able to take care of pets, so it’s being healthy that causes them to keep a pet, rather than the pet causing them to be healthy; and finally, the results in this study might have occurred by chance One, people have to be fairly healthy in order to go gambling, so it is probably being healthy that increases the likelihood of gambling, rather than gambling causing good health; two, if one can afford to gamble, one can also afford other health-enhancing benefits such as healthy food and better living conditions And finally, this result might have occurred by chance in this study, and another study might give different results Exercise 15-2 Another difference is that the team has an additional year of experience; and there is always the possibility that the other teams in the league have become much worse Hard to tell, but this is probably just a chance result: the added player was just a coincidence, having nothing to with the changed record In this case, it is not the stopping smoking that causes death; rather, it runs in reverse: being very sick and close to death finally causes people to stop smoking There are too many other factors: the closeness of the community, with the social pressures and social management that brings, is probably the decisive factor 10 In this case, there is probably a decisive factor that is associated with playing Mozart for babies; namely, parents who are eager to seize every possibility of pushing their children ahead academically (that’s why they play Mozart for them as babies) also are more likely to encourage their children to homework, get them tutoring when they need help, enroll them in special summer academic camps, and so on 13 It’s not the size of the stadium, but something associated with stadium size: the top football programs, that spend the most on their athletic programs and hire the best coaches, are also the programs with the huge stadiums Exercise 15-3 It may be that sicker patients (who need longer to recover) are placed in interior rooms, with no windows (e.g., the intensive care unit often is in the center of the hospital, and has no windows) Also, the patients who have windowed rooms may be paying more for those rooms, and thus have significantly better health insurance and more money, and thus have access to the top medical care from the most expensive specialists (access that poorer patients not have) Chapter 16 Exercise 16-1 1a Someone who is supportive of the rally may—in his or her enthusiasm—draw an exaggerated impression of the size of the rally d If this is someone who recently bought the car, it is very likely that the owner will be pleased; after all, that person picked out the car, and would not have chosen it if he or she had not liked it; and if the car is quite new, then it is unlikely that it has had serious mechanical problems g Is this a person who already disliked the defendant? Is this a person who stands to gain by his or her testimony against the defendant? Exercise 16-2 Do any apple juices contain added sugar? (None that I know of, since apple juice is naturally quite sweet, and adding sugar would make it undrinkable.) How close to impossible is “all but”? And might dangerous levels of radiation escape elsewhere (into the water table, for example)? Perhaps most of the people who receive tax cuts will be middle class (not surprising, since there are more middle-class people than rich people); but will most of the tax cuts go to the middle class? That is, will lots of middle-class people receive very small tax cuts, while a few rich people receive enormous tax cuts? In the U.S presidential campaign of 1996, the Republicans noted that most of the people who would receive tax cuts from their proposed reduction of the 440 capital gains tax would be middle class That was true However, most of the tax cut dollars were destined for the wealthy, with the bulk of the tax cut money going to the extremely wealthy The number of deaths from cancer is declining; but the number of cancer cases is increasing The decline in cancer deaths is due to better cancer treatment methods, not because the cancer rate is decreasing So the continuing increase in cancer rates—the important half of the truth that the article omits— raises legitimate concerns about increasing carcinogenic hazards in our environment Cumulative Exercises Three Ad hominem, fallacy Deductive argument by analogy; whether it is a good analogy or a faulty analogy would be a matter of dispute Ad hominem, legitimate (Art Sinn may be giving an argument, but at least part of that argument seems to depend on his own testimony) 10 Analogical literalism, fallacy 13 Faulty analogy, fallacy 16 Appeal to tradition, fallacy 19 Fallacy of denying the antecedent 22 Ad hominem, legitimate 25 Slippery slope, fallacy 28 Ambiguity, fallacy 31 Modus tollens, legitimate 34 Inverse ad hominem, fallacy 37 Questionable cause, fallacy 40 Modus tollens, legitimate 43 Ad hominem, legitimate 46 False dilemma, fallacy 49 Slippery slope, fallacy 52 Questionable cause, fallacy 55 Denying the antecedent, fallacy 58 Golden mean, fallacy 61 False dilemma, fallacy 64 Begging the question (or possibly self-sealing), fallacy 67 Begging the question, fallacy 70 Ad hominem, fallacy 73 Genuine dilemma, legitimate 76 Ad hominem, legitimate 79 Straw man, fallacy 82 Analogical literalism, fallacy (and it starts with a figurative analogy) 85 Faulty analogy, fallacy 88 Analogical literalism, fallacy 91 Questionable cause, fallacy 94 Begging the question, fallacy 97 Ad hominem, legitimate 100 Ad hominem, legitimate Answers to Selected Exercises 103 106 109 112 115 118 121 124 127 130 133 136 139 142 145 148 151 154 157 160 163 166 169 172 175 178 181 184 187 Golden mean, fallacy Questionable cause, fallacy Appeal to ignorance, fallacy Appeal to popularity, fallacy Complex question, fallacy Analogy (could be read as either figurative or deductive), legitimate Deductive argument by analogy (might be read as figurative), legitimate Deductive argument by analogy; there could be dispute over its legitimacy, but I would count it as legitimate False dilemma, fallacy Appeal to tradition, fallacy Deductive argument by analogy; you will have to judge whether it is legitimate or fallacious; either way, it will be controversial Slippery slope, fallacy Begging the question, fallacy Appeal to authority, fallacy (Krugman is a genuine authority, but there is no agreement among authorities) Appeal to popularity, fallacy Slippery slope, legitimate Irrelevant reason Ad hominem, legitimate Ad hominem, fallacy Begging the question, fallacy Questionable cause, fallacy Inverse ad hominem, legitimate Alice offers a legitimate deductive argument by analogy, which is followed by an attack which commits the fallacy of analogical literalism Straw man, fallacy Inverse ad hominem, legitimate Faulty analogy, fallacy Ad hominem, fallacy Irrelevant reason (red herring), fallacy Ad hominem, fallacy Chapter 17 Exercise 17-1 You need to know what sense of “average” is being used; for example, if there have been tuition increases of these percentages: 4, 4, 9, 11, 12, 15, and 18, then the mode (one sense of “average”) is only percent, but that is not a very helpful measure in this case That sounds like important data; in fact, the claim is outside of any context of reference To make it meaningful, we need to know what percentage of the population as a whole (or what population of nonsmokers) live past 70 Also, there is a comparison of apples and 441 Answers to Selected Exercises oranges: Don’t compare smokers with the population as a whole (for that includes all the people who died in infancy or childhood); instead, compare those who smoked with those who didn’t, starting with perhaps age 16 Obviously such a comparison shows nothing, since there is no information concerning the number of skydivers and the numbers of soccer players If there are 30,000 soccer players who play twice a week, and 1000 skydivers who jump twice a month, then certainly skydiving will pose a greater risk than a game of soccer This is a detached and meaningless statistic; first, it does not tell you what is used in comparison (Cleaner than using water alone? Cleaner than using a competing brand? Cleaner than using mud?) But the basic problem is that it puts a number on something that is not really quantifiable: one thing may be cleaner than another, but it’s not clear that something can be 30% clearer (rather than, say, 32% cleaner) Exercise 17-2 Exercise 18-3 ~(J & S) (T & F) (T F F) T F Since one conjunct of the conjunction is false (it is false that the sun is a planet), the conjunction is false; so the negation of the conjunction is true S ∨ (E → M) F F F (T (T F) F F) F False S → (~P → C) T T T TF (~F F) (TF F) (TF F F) (TF F F) False C is the best R ∨ (W & S) F ∨ (T & T) F∨ T T Chapter 18 Exercise 18-1 10 13 C & B, true F →O, true W & B, false ~J ∨ E, false J ∨ P, true (Since J is true, the truth or falsity of the second disjunct does not matter; one disjunct is true, so the entire disjunction must be true.) Exercise 18-2 1 4 J →(A ∨ E) ? → (? ∨ T) ? →( T ) True (Since the consequent is true, the conditional will be true no matter what the truth value of the antecedent.) Exercise 18-4 P Q P → Q/~Q/ ‹ ~P T T F F T F T F T T F F T F T T T F T F FT TF FT TF FT FT TF TF Valid argument; there is no line in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false True P Q P → Q/~Q/ ‹ ~P T T F F T F T F T T F F T F T T T F T F FT FT TF TF FT TF FT TF Invalid argument; in the third line all the premises are true and the conclusion is false P Q ~P →~Q/Q/ ‹ P TTFT TF FT F T TF F F TF T T F T FT TF FT TF T F T F T T F F Valid argument, since there is no truth-value assignment that makes all the premises true and the conclusion false P Q R TTT TT F T FT TFF FTT P ∨ (Q → R)/~R & ~P/ ‹ ~Q TT TT TT TT FT (T T (T F (F T (F T (T T T) F) T) F) T) FT F FT TF F FT FT F FT TF F FT FT F TF FT FT TF TF FT 442 Answers to Selected Exercises FT F F FT FFF F F (T F F) F T (F T T) F T (F T F) TF T TF FT F TF TF T TF FT TF TF Valid P Q R TTT TT F T FT TFF FTT FT F F FT FFF ~[P & ~(Q ∨ R)]/P → Q/R/ ‹ ~ Q T T T F T T T T TF TF TF TT FF FF FF FF F(T T T) F(T T F) F(F T T) T(F F F) F(T T T) F(T T F) F(F T T) T(F F F) T T T T F F F F TT T TT F F FT F FF TT T TT F T F T T F F FT FT TF TF FT FT TF TF Invalid, as shown by the first line (all the premises are true and the conclusion false) and also by the fifth line Exercise 18-5 ~Q ∨R/~Q/ ‹ ~R T TT T T TF FT FT FT Start with the conclusion false: In order for~R to be false, R must be assigned true That means that R must be true in the first premise, and that automatically makes the first premise true (it’s a disjunction, with one true disjunct) Now we simply assign a truth value that makes the second premise true (make Q false, so that ~Q is true), and the result is that both premises are true and the conclusion is false; so the argument is invalid P → ~Q/~P/ ‹ Q T TF T TF TF F F F We have found a truth-value assignment that makes both premises true and the conclusion false; therefore, this argument is invalid ~Q →~R/R ‹ Q TF TF T TF FT T TF F FT T F F F F F We had to make Q false in order to make the conclusion false That made the antecedent of the first premise true Then we had to make R true in order to make the second premise true But that made the consequent of the first premise (~R) false But with a true antecedent and a false consequent, the first premise was false So it’s impossible to make all the premises true and the conclusion false; therefore, the argument is valid ~(~P & Q)/~P →R/~R/ ‹ Q ( ( T( F F F F F) F F) F F) (Since the conjunction is false, the negation of the conjunction is automatically true.) T( T( T( F F) F F) F F) TF F F TF F FT T F TF F The premises are all true, and the conclusion false; the argument is invalid ~[P & (Q ∨ ~R)]/P → R/Q/ ‹ ~R [ [ [ [ [ T[F F ( ( ( ( (T T (T T )]/ FT)]/ FT)]/ FT)]/ FT)]/ FT)]/ T T T T / / T/ / T/ / T/T/ T/T/ T/T/ FT FT FT FT FT FT (In order for the first premise—which is a negation of a conjunction—to be true, the conjunction must be false The second conjunct—a disjunction—is true; therefore, the other conjunct—P—must be assigned false.) That makes all the premises true, and the conclusion false; the argument is proved to be invalid 13 Invalid (Start with R true, in order to make the conclusion false Then turn to the first premise: for that negation to be true, the conditional must be false; for the conditional to be false, the antecedent— P—must be true and the consequent false The consequent is a conjunction—Q & R—and R has already been assigned true, so Q must be assigned false in order to make that conjunction false Then take it from there.) Exercise 18-6 I ∨W G →(M &R ) I →G M & ~R ‹W S →P C →~S ~C →(M ∨D) ~(M ∨ D ) ‹ ~P ~G →[A ∨(P & J)] J ∨C G & ~C ‹ P & ~A Notice that the conclusion is P & ~A; the alibi witness lied: The alibi witness did not tell the truth 443 Answers to Selected Exercises Exercise 18-7 Valid (though obviously unsound, since the conclusion is false) Invalid The key is the fourth premise: to make that negation true, you must make the disjunction false, and that means that both disjuncts must be false Invalid It is usually best to start by making the conclusion false, but not in this case Since the conclusion is a conjunction, there are too many different truth-value assignments that would make it false Start instead with the third premise: There is only one way to make it true (G must be assigned true, and C must be assigned false) And then move to the second premise Since C is false, J (the other disjunct) must be assigned true in order to make that premise true Now look at the first premise: since G is assigned true, ~G is false; and that makes the entire premise automatically true, since the antecedent is false So now you can assign any truth value you wish to A, and also to P: All the premises will still be true Drop down to the conclusion and make it false (you can make one conjunct true and the other false or make both false: whatever you prefer) Invalid ~E →(A∨~B)/G ∨ ~E/~(G & ~ A) →~H/H ‹ ~B ( ( ( ( ( ) FT) FT) FT) FT) ( ( ( ( F( ) ) ) T ) FT T ) FT T FT FT FT FT FT Since the consequent of the third premise is false, the antecedent—the negation of the conjunction— must be false in order for the conditional statement to be true ( ( (F (F F FT) FT) FT) T FT) T T F( T ) F(T T TF) F(T T TF) F(T T TF) T FT FT FT FT T T T T FT FT FT FT At this point we have a truth-value assignment that makes the conclusion false and the second, third, and fourth premises true The consequent of the first premise is false, so we have to try to make the antecedent false in order to make the first premise true That’s easy: We just assign E true in order to make ~E false And that completes the truth-value assignment: All the premises are true and the conclusion is false, and so the argument is proved invalid FT T (T F FT) T T FT F(T T TF) T FT T FT Invalid Notice that there is only one truth-value assignment that will make the conclusion false Since the conclusion is a conditional, the only way it can be false is for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false So H must be assigned true, and B must also be true (in order to make ~B false) 11 Valid A must be false to make the conclusion false Then in order for the third premise to be true, both E and D must be assigned false With E false, however, B must be false in order to make the first premise true But then it’s impossible to make the second premise true: The second disjunct (D) has already been assigned false, but the first disjunct (the negation of a conjunction) is also false Chapter 19 Exercise 19-1 Subject term: Penguins (not some penguins) Predicate term: Wear red bow ties (or wearers of red bow ties) Form: PA (particular affirmative) Subject term: Olympic athletes Predicate term: Quite wealthy (or people who are quite wealthy) Form: PA (particular affirmative) Subject term: Defendants Predicate term: Guilty (The predicate is guilty, rather than not guilty) Form: PN Exercise 19-2 Valid Invalid If there are any seals, they are not cribbagecheats; but since there is no X in SPC, we can’t be sure that any seals really exist So the argument is invalid Valid (Note that the conclusion is: “No Ninja warriors are good psychiatrists.”) Invalid Exercise 19-3 Some prisoners are innocent people (or, Some innocent people are prisoners) Some weak-chinned persons are not criminals Some extraterrestrials are Earth visitors (This does not suggest that all extraterrestrials visit Earth; Earth may be a hot vacation spot for extraterrestrials, but it is not a mandatory stop on the extraterrestrial itinerary.) All people-who-can-be-on-the-team are hardworkers Exercise 19-4 “Royalty” is “a member of the royal family.” So the argument goes: Only royalty are permitted to wear the crown jewels That is: All permitted to wear the crown jewels are royalty No penguin is permitted to wear the crown jewels Therefore, no penguin is royalty And a simple Venn diagram shows that to be invalid 444 Answers to Selected Exercises Or you could write it like this: All accused are entitled Some accused are not popular Therefore, some entitled are not popular All sick-people are morose Some firefighters are sick people Therefore, some firefighters are morose Valid Either way, it’s valid Exercise 9-5 All liver-eaters are cribbage-cheaters Some liver-eaters are drinkers Therefore, some cribbage-cheaters are drinkers Valid All accused are entitled Some accused are unpopular Therefore, some unpopular are entitled All results-of-coercion are worthless Some confessions are worthless Therefore, some confessions are results-of-coercion Invalid (The X in your Venn diagram is inside the Confessions circle, but it is on the line of the Resultsof-Force class; so we cannot conclude that there must be confessions that are the results-of-force.) Index Note: Page numbers followed by n.refer note numbers A Abramovsky, Abraham, 121 Abel, David, 202 Abramson, Jeffrey, 12, 114n., 183–184, 202n Ad hominem, 28–55, 56, 141, 145–147 circumstantial, 55n fallacy, 28–29, 41–48, 56 inverse See Inverse ad hominem nonfallacious, 29–33 and testimony, 31–39, 42, 141, 145–147 types of, 41–48 bias, 41–44 inconsistency (hypocrisy), 44–47 psychological, 47–48 Adams, Randall, 312, 316n Adler, Stephen J., 12 Adversarial system, 5–10, 56–57, 179, 294–295 Affirming the consequent, fallacy of, 270–271 Alampay, D A., 315n Alberta Department of Justice, 43 Albrecht, Brian E., 202n Aldrich, Gary, 161 Alexander, Lamar, 312 Allen v United States, 149 Ambiguity, fallacy of, 132–136, 345 of “average,” 345 American Law Institute, 75n., 91n., 202n Amphiboly, 136 Anacin, advertisement, 111–112, 136, 311 Analogical literalism, fallacy of, 180–181 Analogy, 164–186 deductive argument by, 165–168 faulty analogy, fallacy of, 170–171 figurative, 164–165 inductive argument by, 184–186 illustrative See Figurative slippery slope and, 182–183 Angell, Marcia, 298 Annas, George, 252 Answer Book for Jury Service, 13 Antecedent, 258–259 Appeal to authority, 140–147 fallacious forms, 141–143 legitimate use of, 141–142 testimony and, 141, 145–147 Appeal to ignorance fallacy, 115–117, 123 Appeal to popularity fallacy See Popularity Appeal to tradition fallacy See Traditional wisdom Aquinas, Thomas, 330 Argument, 14, 16, 18–25, 92–104, 143 See also Deductive argument; Inductive argument; Testimony structure of, 92–104 convergent, 92–94 linked, 95–96 subarguments, 16, 96–104 Aristotle, 224n Aronson, Harvey, 55n., 201 Assumptions, 109–113, 290 background, 290 Atlanta Constitution, 311 Authority See Appeal to authority Average, 343–345 Averbuch, Bernard, 55n B BBC, 277 Bacall, Lauren, 34 Bacchetti, Peter, 356n 445 446 Background assumptions, 290 Bailey, F Lee, 43, 55n., 201 Baird, Davis, 27 Baldus, David C., 201n Bastion Law Corporation, 13 Baucus, Max, 296 Beckenback, Jerome E., 202n Begging the question, fallacy of, 226–235 circular, 229–231 false charges of, 231 generalization, 228–229 synonymous, 227–228 Bergman, Daryl A., 114 Bergman, Paul, 55 Berrigan, Philip, Bero, Lisa, 356n Best, Joel, 354, 357 Blackmun, Justice Harry A., 62, 199 Borchard, Edwin M., 317 Bower, G., 316n Bowers v Hardwick, 62, 66, 66n Bray, Robert M., 317 Brennan, Justice William, 209 Brodsky, Stanley, 118 Brooks v Mississippi, 167 Brown, Marshall, 91n Brown, Tom, Jr., 155 Browne, Dik, 213 Brumvand, Jan Harold, 316n Bruner, Jerome, 301, 315n Buckley, William F., Jr., 58, 173 Bugelski, B R., 315n Burden of proof, 115–122 in criminal cases, 117–122 Burt, Sir Cyril, 140 Buse, John, 296 Bush, George W., 311, 344 C “Camel’s nose is in the tent” argument See Slippery slope arguments Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 118, 121 Cantril, Hadley, 302, 315n Capron, Alexander Morgan, 154n Carroll, Lewis, 131, 227, 238n Casteneda v Partida, 74, 128, 357 Categorical propositions, 389–391, 407–408 nonstandard forms, 407 translating ordinary language into, 407–408 types of, 389–391 Causation, 278–284 distinguished from correlation, 279–284 questionable cause, fallacy of, 283–284 Index Cerf, Christopher, 224n Challenger spacecraft, 116 Cheney, Richard, 57 Cherry-picking, 350 Chesen, Jeff, 154 Citizens United v Federal Elections Commission, 168 Clark, Marcia, 38, 187 Classes, 389–391 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 83, 91n., 163, 224n., 242 Clinton, Henry Lauren, 55n., 222, 224n., 315n Coady, C A J., 54, 154 Cogent/uncogent, 24–25 Coleman, Brenda, 160 Complements of classes, 392 Complex question, fallacy of, 233–235 Conclusion, 8, 14, 16, 67–70, 76–82 importance of determining, 8, 67–70, 76–82 Conditional statement, 215–216, 258–260, 360 dilemmas as conditionals, 215–216 material implication and, 361–362 truth-functional definition of, 361 Confirmation bias, 293–294, 350 Confounding factors, 280, 282 Conjunction, 359 Consequent, 259–260 Consumer Reports, 65, 69, 75n., 114n., 134, 139n., 316n., 317 Contradictories, 390 Cook, Beano, 191 Cooperative critical thinking, 7–10, 56–57, 179, 294 Copi, I M., 391 Corona, Juan, trial of, 236–237 Craig, Mr Justice (British Columbia Court of Appeal), 199–200 Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 119 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 121 Critical Thinking Web, 238 Crossen, Cynthia, 298 Crowe, Robert, 43–44 Cruzan, Nancy, 125–126 Cunningham, Emma Augusta, trial of, 45 D Darrow, Clarence, 43–44 Darwin, Charles, 112 Dawes, Robyn M., 357 Data-dredging, 350 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 154n., 155 Deductive argument, 19–23, 164–168 by analogy, 165–168 distinguished from inductive, 19–20 Definitions, 129–131 controversial, 131 ostensive, 129–130 stipulative, 130–131 447 Index DeMorgan’s Theorems, 369 Denying the antecedent, fallacy of, 269–270 Diderot, Denis, 202 Dilemma arguments, 211–217 conditional form of, 215–216 false dilemma, fallacy of, 212–217 with strawman, 216 genuine dilemma, 212 DiNicola, Ralph, 242 DiPerna, Paula, 12, 13n Dirck, Joe, 163 Disjunction, 359 Dispositive facts, 171 Dixon, Jeane, 291 Donohue, Brian, 13n Double-blind experiments, 286, 294, 350 Doublespeak, 132, 139 Dowden, Bradley, 55 Drosnin, Michael, 281 Du Cann, Richard, 55n Duhem, Pierre, 114 Dunagin, Ralph, 280 Dworkin, Ronald, 126, 128n., 168 Dwyer, Jim, 317 Dwyer, William L., 12 E Eckardt, Robert, 189 Eddleman, David, trial of, 34 Epidemiological study, 288 Ehrenfreund, Norbert, 224n., 225, 425 Enthymemes, 111 Euphemism, 132 Evidence-driven deliberation, Ewen, Stuart, 317 Expert witnesses See Testimony, expert Eyewitnesses See Testimony, eyewitness Ezzell, Carol, 225 F Factcheck.org, 316 False dilemma See Dilemma, false Faulty analogy, 170–171 Fenton, Andrew, 155 Filling-in memories, 307 Fischer, John Martin, 177–178, 201n Fleming, Peggy, 34 Flew, Antony, 231, 238n Folger Coffee Company, 134 Fontes, Norman E., 316n Forer, Lois G., 297n Foster, Kenneth R., 154 Frank, Barney, 64 Frazier, Kendrick, 297n., 315n Frankfurter, Felix, 128n French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 118 Frontline, 91n., 316 Frye v United States, 154n Fuller, Lon L., 192, 202n G Gaskins, Richard H., 128, 128n Gates, Bill, 187 Gay-Williams, J., 209, 224n Giago, Tim, 191, 202n Gideon, Clarence Earl, trial of, 61–62 Giere, Ronald N., 298 Giles, F T., 55n Ginsburg, Justice Ruth Bader, 167 GlaxoSmithKline, 351 Glenmullen, Joseph, 351 Golden mean fallacy, 220–223 and jury deliberations, 222–223 Golding, Martin P., 114, 202 Goodman, Nelson, 357 Grassley, Charles, 296 Greeley, Andrew M., 331 Greensboro Daily News, 50, 55n., 86, 139n., 201n., 202n., 229, 285 Greider, William, 317 Griffin v Illinois, 202 Groopman, Jerome, 298 Gross, Samuel R., 6, 13n Guilt not proven, 119 Gupta, Anil, 139 H “Hagar the Horrible,” 213 Half-truths, 311 Halley, Edmond, 289 Hans, Valerie, 9, 12, 13n., 297n Hardin, Garrett, 225 Harris, Carlyle, trial of, 230 Harrisburg Seven, Hart, Betsy, 251 Hart, H L A., 298 Hart, Johnny, 234, 277 Hastorf, Albert, 302, 315n Hightower, Jim, 222 Hill, Betty, 51 Hinckley, John Jr., trial of, 144 Hocking, John E., 316n Hoffer, Marilyn Mona, 316n Hoffer, William, 316n Holland, Barbara, 13n Holland v Illinois, 66, 74, 225 448 Index Honoré, Tony, 298 Huber, Peter W., 154n., 154 Huckabee, Mike, 208 Hudson v McMillian, 198–199 Huff, Darrell, 297n., 357 Hume, David, 298 Hunt, Morton, 13n Hutcheon, Mr Justice (British Columbia Court of Appeal), 200 Klenk, Virginia, 277, 387, 410 Kloosterhuis, Harm, 202 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 11 Koop, C Everett, 147 Krimsky, Sheldon, 298 Krugman, Paul, 312 Kuhn, Thomas, 114 Kunstler, William M., 121, 128n Kurtz, Howard, 154n I L Impartiality, Indian Country Today, 191, 202n Inductive argument, 19–20, 23–25, 164, 184–186 by analogy, 184–18 Innocence Project, 13, 316 Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow, 317 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 27, 55 Intersection of classes, 392 Invalid See Valid Inverse ad hominem, 48–49 fallacy of, 48–49 and testimony, 48–49 Irons, Peter, 12, 128n Irrelevant reason fallacy, 30, 81–82, 104 LaFleur v Cleveland Board of Education, 116 Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District, 181–182 LaMond, Grant, 202 Landers, Ann, 86, 91n., 353, 356n Lavoisier, Antoine, 112 “Law and Order,” 172 Law, Steven, 337 Lay, Kenneth, 311 Lee, Henry, 188 Lee, Kirby, 356n Leslie, John, 298 Levi, Edward H., 114 Levy, Eugene H., 202 Lewis, Anthony, 66n Lewontin, R C., 252 Limbaugh, Rush, 51, 189 Linder, David, 425 Linder, Douglas O., 13 Lineups, problems with, 305–307 Lithwick, Dahlia, 225 Loaded questions, 234 Loeb, Jerod M., 43 Loeb-Leopold case, 43–44 Loftus, Elizabeth, 301, 303–305, 315n., 316, 317 Loftus, G R., 305 Lungren, Dan, 337 Lustgarten, Edgar, 113n Lutz, William, 139, 139n J Jack and Chalie v The Queen, 203 Jaffee, A J., 356n., 357 Jaffee v Redmond, 79 Jailhouse informants, 43, 54–55 Janik, Allan, 114 Jarvik, Robert, 142 Jofre, Shelley, 356n Johnson, Samuel, 49, 55 Jury, 2–4, 9–11, 13, 78–79 ideal, 11 presumption of innocence in, 120 role of, 78–79 selection, 2–4 Jury Rights Project, 13 M K Kassin, Saul M., 12 Katz, Leo, 305, 315n Kaufman Commission, 54–55, 91, 139, 298, 317 Keillor, Garrison, 297n Kelvin, Lord, 142 Kerr, Norman L., 317 Ketcham, Katherine, 315n., 317 Kinsley, Michael, 341 Kipnis, Kenneth, 181 Kitmna, Jamie Lincoln, 154 Klass, Philip J., 315n M L B., Petitioner v S L J., 203 Manitoba Justice Department, 54 Matrixx Initiatives v James Siracusano, 298, 357 Mauro, John, 357 McCabe, Sarah, 128n McCleskey v Kemp, 183–184 McCormick, Mark, 12 McDonald, Country Joe, 174, 201n McGarity, Thomas O., 298 McKanze, F Aurelius, 145 McKay, Brenda, 281 McKay, Thomas J., 202 449 Index McMahon, Jack, 2, 13n McMillan v Pennsylvania, 128 Mean, 343–344 Median, 343–344 Meese, Edwin,, 208, 224n Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, “The Middletons,” 280 Mill, John Stuart, 298 Miller, Gerald R., 316n Millikan, Robert Andrews, 142 Minogue, Brendan, 128, 201n Mississippi Supreme Court, Mobil Oil, advertisement, 59–61 Mode, 343–344 Modus ponens, 267–268 Modus tollens, 268–269 Moore, Timothy E., 154, 154n Morin, Guy Paul, wrongful conviction of, 54–55 Morrison, Steinie, trial of, 94 Mortimer, John, 85, 91n., 205, 224n Mullis, Kary B., 148 Munson, Ronald, 224n Munsterburg, Hugo, 300, 315n., 317 Musschenga, Albert W., 202 Myth, ambiguity of, 133 N National Center for State Courts, 13 National Coalition Against Pornography, 80–81, 91n National Council of Teachers of English, 139 National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 13 National Geographic, 174, 201n Navasky, Victor, 224n Necessary conditions, 253–261, 267–274 Necessary and sufficient conditions, 261 Negation, 273, 358–359 truth-functional definition of, 358–359 Neuborne, Bert, Neufeld, Peter, 317 Newton, Isaac, 140, 289, 294 Noble, John Wesley, 55n North Carolina Independent, 55n North Carolina Pattern Instructions, 75n., 277n Nostradamus, 291 O Obama, Barack, 59 O’Connor, Justice Sandra, 198–199 Occam’s razor, 292–293 Olivieri, Nancy, 296 Olson, Ken, 142 Oostvogel, Fieke, 356n Oyez.org, 13 P Pagano, Father Bernard, 300 Parade of horribles argument, 204 Park, Robert L., 297n Paulos, John Allen, 193, 297n., 357 Penrod, Steven D., 12, 317 Perka v Regina, 202n Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 82, 328 Photo-bias, 306–307 Pitts, Leaonard, Jr., 139 Placebo effect, 283 Plea bargaining, 180–181 Popper, Karl, Popularity, fallacy of appeal to, 148–149 Portney, Paul, 315 Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 283 Postman, Leo, 301, 315n Powell, Justice Lewis, 173 Prediction, 288–291 importance in science, 288–291 vague, 291 Premise, 14, 16 Presumption of innocence, 117–122 Principle of charity, 58 Product of classes See Intersection of classes Prospective study, 288 Public Agenda Online, 356 Pulaski, Charles A., Jr., 201n Punctuation in symbolic logic, 366–370 Q Question-Begging arguments See Begging the question Questionable cause, fallacy of, 283–284 Quinion, Michael, 91 R Rampton, Sheldon, 65, 147, 154, 154n., 316n., 317 Rand, Tamara, 292 Randi, James, 297n., 316 Randomized experimental design, 287–288 Raymo, Chet, 297n Reasonable doubt, Red herring fallacy, 81–83 See also Irrelevant reason Rehnquist, Chief Justice William, 126, 128n Reuben, David, 206 Rieke, Richard, 114 Right to remain silent, 121 Robertson, John A., 328 Robertson, Pat, 58, 115–116 Robbins, William W., 133 Rosenberger v University of Virginia, 181 Rumpole of the Bailey, 85–86 Rumsfeld, Donald, 124 450 Russell, Bertrand, 23, 118 Russell, Francis, 120, 128n S Sacco and Vanzetti, 120 St John of Chrysostom, 209 St Paul Pioneer Press, 52 San Jose State University Critical Thinking Web Page, 27 Scalia, Justice Antonin, 79, 199 Schauer, Frederick, 225 Scheck, Barry, 317 Schick, Theodore, 317 Schmitz, Anthony, 298 Schulman, Jay, Science, method of, 286–295 Scottish verdict, 119 Scriven, Michael, 114 Selby-Bigge, L A., 298 Self-sealing fallacy, 231–233 Semmelweis, Ignaz, 287 Shafer, Jack, 139 Shaw, David, 315 Shermer, Michael, 281, 297n Shevrin, Howard, 144 Short-cut method for determining validity, 374–384 Simpson, O.J., trial of, 6, 38, 105, 113n., 148, 187 Singer, J L., 316n Singh, Gurkipal, 296 Skenazy, Lenore, 55n Skeptical Inquirer, 55n., 316 Skyrms, Bryan, 357 Slippery slope arguments, 182–183, 204–208 alternative names for, 204 and analogy, 182–183 fallacy of, 206 genuine slippery slopes, 206–207 Smallwood, Irwin, 174, 189, 201n., 202n Sophonow, Thomas, wrongful conviction of, 54 Sound argument, 23 distinguished from unsound, 23 Spence, Gerry, 13 Spio, Mary, 282 Spirer, Herbert F., 356n., 357 Spirer, Louise, 357 Starr v Hale, 12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 139 Statement, 14–15 State of North Carolina v Rich, 277 Statistics, 343–355 base comparisons, 346–347 context of, 345 empty, 345 faulty comparisons, 347 half-truths, 348 Index Stauber, John, 65, 147, 154, 154n., 316n., 317 Stewart, James R., 315n Stone, Irving, 55n Strawman, fallacy of, 56–66, 205–206, 212 with false dilemma, 212 slippery slope, distinguished from, 205–206 Strong/weak, 24–25 Sufficient conditions, 254–261, 267–274 Summers, Dana, 280 Sunstein, Cass R., 202 Suppressed evidence, 310–312 Surveys, 352–355 push polls, 355 representative sample, 353 sample size, 353 target population, 353 T Tannen, Deborah, 12, 13, 66 Teepen, Tom, 8, 191 Testimony, 31–39, 42, 140–147, 299–309 distinguished from argument, 31–39 expert, 141–143 eyewitness, 42m 299–309 Texans for Public Justice, 311 Texas v Johnson, 224n Thomas, Cal, 59 Thomas, Justice Clarence, 167, 199 Thompson, Clive, 317 Thomson, Donald M., 307 Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 174–175, 201n Toulmin, Stephen, 114 Tradition, fallacy of appeal to, 148–150 Treat, Lawrence, 224n., 225, 425 Truth-functional definitions, 358–362 Truth-table, 358 Truth-table method for determining validity, 363–365, 370–373 Turner, Kathleen, 34 Twelve Angry Men, U Ulm, Brian, 160 Unsound See Sound argument Urban myths, 313 V Valid/invalid, 21–23 van der Steen, Wim J., 202 Vandevelde, Kenneth J., 114, 202 Van Koppen, Peter J., 12 Van Natta, Don, Jr., 337 Vaughn, Lewis, 317 Venn diagrams, 391–406 451 Index Venn, John, 391 Ventura, Jesse, 52 Verdict-driven deliberation, Victor v Nebraska, 128 Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities, 118 Vidmar, Neil, 9, 12, 13n., 297n Villasenor, Victor, 238n Voir dire, 2–3 Volokh, Eugene, 225 Von Daniken, Erich, 291 W Wagner, Wendy E., 298 Waldholtz, Enid, 188 Wall, Patrick M., 316n Waller, Bruce N., 27, 54, 66, 91, 128, 202, 238 Walton, Douglas, 12, 54, 55, 91, 114, 128, 154, 224n., 225, 238 Warren, Mary Anne, 114, 277 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v Village of Stratton, 114 Watt, James, 224n Watterson, Bill, 178 Waxman, Henry, 30 Weasel-words, 139 Wedge arguments See Slippery slope arguments Weeks v Angelone, 139, 277 Wellman, Francis L., 238n Westmoreland, William C., 142 Wheeler, Michael, 357 Whitehead, Barbara Defoe, 225 Wijsbek, Henri, 202 Wilhoite, Lynn, 221 Williams, Bernard, 225 Winkler, John, 317 Wishman, Seymour, 13n., 235, 238n “Wizard of Id,” 234, 277 Woodruff, Judy, 91 Woods, Tiger, 146 Woodworth, George, 201n Wrightsman, Lawrence S., 12 X XKCD, 310 Z Zuckerman, A A S., 128 ... points in the arguments presented But not all critical thinking follows the adversarial model, and the sixth edition of Critical Thinking: Consider the Verdict gives careful attention to the contexts... thinking process Both the promise and the pitfalls of cooperative critical thinking are examined in this new edition The sixth edition of Critical Thinking: Consider the Verdict contains a number... labeled the verdict- driven” deliberation, jurors then align themselves with those who are on the same side and talk about the evidence that supports the verdict favored by their faction In verdict- driven
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