e JOURNAL URNALUSA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES F E B R U A R Y 0 PROMOTING GROWTH THROUGH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE U.S DEPARTMENT 0F STATE / BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Editor .Jonathan Schaffer Managing Editors .Berta Gomez Andrzej Zwaniecki Contributing Editors Linda Johnson Martin Manning Kathryn McConnell Bruce Odessey Illustrations Editor .Barry Fitzgerald Cover Design .Min Yao Publisher Judith S Siegel Executive Editor Guy E Olson Production Manager .Christian Larson Assistant Production Manager .Sylvia Scott Editorial Board George Clack Kathleen R Davis Peggy England Alexander Feldman Francis B Ward Promoting Growth Through Corporate Governance The Bureau of International Information Programs of the U.S Department of State publishes five electronic journals—Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, Foreign Policy Agenda, and Society & Values—that examine major issues facing the United States and the international community as well as U.S society, values, thought, and institutions Each of the five is catalogued by volume (the number of years in publication) and by number (the number of issues that appear during the year) One new journal is published monthly in English and is followed two to four weeks later by versions in French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Russian Selected editions also appear in Arabic and Chinese The opinions expressed in the journals not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S government The U.S Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and continued accessibility of Internet sites to which the journals link; such responsibility resides solely with the publishers of those sites Journal articles, photographs, and illustrations may be reproduced and translated outside the United States unless they carry explicit copyright restrictions, in which case permission must be sought from the copyright holders noted in the journal The Bureau of International Information Programs maintains current and back issues in several electronic formats, as well as a list of upcoming journals, at http: //usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm Comments are welcome at your local U.S Embassy or at the editorial offices: Editor, Economic Perspectives IIP/T/ES U.S Department of State 301 4th St S.W Washington, D.C 20547 United States of America E-mail: ejecon@state.gov ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 eJOURNAL USA ABOUT THIS ISSUE A series of high profile corporate financial partnered with the Center for International Private scandals in the United States and elsewhere Enterprise (CIPE) to support corporate governance has focused attention on the consequences of development projects overseas that combine local poor corporate governance At the same time, increased demand for investment capital has made companies and knowledge with international principles Other articles in the journal discuss business education countries worldwide look to good governance as a means and the teaching of ethical management practices across of attracting and keeping investors national borders, corporate governance within the context Broadly speaking, “corporate governance” refers to the of family-owned businesses, the role of shareholders in the rules that guide the behavior of corporations, shareholders, corporate decision-making process, and how one major and managers, as well as to government actions to promote pharmaceutical company, Pfizer Inc., has found that “Doing and enforce those rules Corporate governance provides business with integrity is good for business.” the basis for a stable and productive business environment This issue of Economic Perspectives aims to give readers It can be especially important in emerging markets and an overview of the principles of corporate governance, to firms that seek to distinguish themselves in the global current trends in U.S and international policies affecting economy, says corporate governance expert Ira Millstein in businesses and business managers, and the work that is the introductory overview to the journal being carried out by governments and businesses alike In the United States, financial scandals prompted a comprehensive overhaul of laws covering business behavior, to create a more transparent and accountable corporate environment in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Strahota of the U.S Securities and The Editors Exchange Commission (SEC) describe SEC cooperation with overseas regulators to help foreign firms deal with the strict new standards the Act imposes And U.S Department of Justice official Christopher Wray says that Sarbanes-Oxley has given prosecutors a larger arsenal of tools with which to prosecute corporate wrongdoers In other countries, particularly those in the developing world, good corporate governance may require transforming political and economic governance arrangements from relationship-based systems to rules-based systems, say Charles Oman and Daniel Blume of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) explains how, to promote this transformation, it has eJOURNAL USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 eJournal USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE / FEBRUARY 2005 / VOLUME 10 / NUMBER http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm PROMOTING GROWTH THROUGH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Laying the Groundwork For Economic Growth IRA M MILLSTEIN, SENIOR PARTNER, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP Corporate governance is becoming increasingly important for companies and developing countries seeking to attract investment Fostering an International Regulatory Consensus ETHIOPIS TAFARA AND ROBERT D STRAHOTA, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION U.S regulators are working with their counterparts worldwide to facilitate compliance with the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 12 Prosecuting Corporate Crimes CHRISTOPHER WRAY, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE The U.S Department of Justice is moving decisively to crack down on corporate officials who abuse their positions at the expense of shareholders 16 Corporate Governance: The Development Challenge CHARLES OMAN AND DANIEL BLUME, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT Developing countries face the challenge of ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 transforming political and economic governance arrangements from relationship-based systems into rules-based systems 20 Creating a Sustainable Corporate Environment JOHN SULLIVAN, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, AND GEORGIA SAMBUNARIS, CAPITAL MARKETS SPECIALIST, U.S AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT The United States is devoting growing resources to help transition and developing economies create environments that nurture competitive, profitable, and ethically managed businesses 25 Training Managers for the Future MARY C GENTILE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CONSULTANT Ethics and governance are among the most important lessons that future managers need to learn 29 The Case for Powerful Shareholders ROBERT A.G MONKS, FOUNDER, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC Effective shareholders are good for business and the economy eJOURNAL USA 33 A Business Perspective on Corporate Governance INTERVIEW WITH ROSEMARY KENNEY AND NANCY NIELSEN, PFIZER, INC Businesses that hope to succeed in today’s global marketplace must incorporate newer, stricter legal requirements and also take into account growing social expectations 43 Bibliography 45 Internet Resources 38 Governing Family Businesses JOHN L WARD, CENTER FOR FAMILY ENTERPRISES, KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Successful family firms are those that properly define the roles and responsibilities of ownership, management, and the board of directors 42 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance eJOURNAL USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH Ira M Millstein Solid corporate governance is becoming increasingly crucial to attracting investment capital Developing countries in particular stand to gain by adopting systems that bolster investor trust through transparency and rule of law Photo above: Investors grant the power to run the corporation to the board of directors, a group of people entrusted with the task of making decisions in the best interests of the company and all its investors © Jose Luis Pelaez, Inc./CORBIS Ira M Millstein is senior partner with the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, and a visiting professor in Competitive Enterprise and Strategy at the Yale School of Management He chairs the Private Sector Advisory Group of the Global Corporate Governance Forum founded by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Mr Millstein thanks Rebecca C Grapsas, an associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, for contributing valuable input and insights for this article ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 C orporate governance is entering a phase of global convergence, driven by the growing recognition that countries need to attract and protect all investors, both foreign and domestic The equation is clear: global capital will generally flow at favorable rates to where it is best protected, but will not flow at all or will flow at higher-risk rates where protections are uncertain or nonexistent In many countries whose legal systems are rooted in British common law, the interests of shareholders are held to be paramount in most corporate decisions However, this has not been the case throughout the rest of the world—at least not until now Countries that have traditionally fostered notions of partnerships between management, employees, and other stakeholders, have other social priorities, or have mixed government-private ownership arrangements are now recognizing investor protection as an important signal to potential capital providers This is especially the case for developing countries They need to demonstrate adoption of corporate governance principles so as to foster investor trust and attract capital, which will in turn lead to investment and economic growth Of course, these principles need to be tailored to fit local needs—one size eJOURNAL USA will not fit all But there are certain fundamentals that cannot be ignored Corporate governance comprises a combination of regulatory rules and private sector-driven guidelines In countries with more sophisticated financial markets, corporate governance rules and structures are contained in laws protecting property rights and shareholder rights through legislation, accompanying regulations, judicial decisions, and stock exchange listing rules This is the essential enabling governmental infrastructure In addition to formal rules, corporations adopt best-practice principles and guidelines, which are continually being developed by the private sector and academia in response to prevailing market conditions and investor demands Developing countries need to take both elements— governmental infrastructure and best practices—into account THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION Understanding corporate governance requires an understanding of the concept of the corporation and the position it occupies in the business world This understanding will demonstrate why corporate governance, as I have described it, is essential to legitimizing the corporation’s role in society and providing a vehicle for economic growth The corporation is an entity created by law It has existed in some form or another for hundreds of years, and its essential features have stayed virtually the same over that whole period One of the most important features of a corporation is limited liability, which allows people to invest money or other property in the corporation without any of their other personal assets being placed at risk in the event the company fails This money is locked away in the company, and investors are denied any sort of meaningful access to it For example, they cannot demand that the company pay a dividend or give back any of the capital Their capital is at risk because while the investors profit if the corporation succeeds, they can lose it all if the corporation fails After contributing money or other property to a company, investors are issued shares, which represent the entitlement to a reward for assuming this risk In most cases, shares are freely transferable, so shareholders can sell their shares to other investors Or they can “walk away” from a corporation entirely if they wish Another key feature of a corporation is perpetual existence The corporation’s ability to continue eJOURNAL USA indefinitely gives stability to the enterprise by ensuring that businesses can survive their founders The corporation became the dominant form of business organization in response to a need for growth capital It is the most efficient way to amass large amounts of capital Shareholders are able to invest in companies without risk of personal liability and not need to rely on the reputation or trustworthiness of their fellow investors as they would in a partnership They can also spread their risk by investing in a number of different companies, with the aim of maximizing their overall return THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS In exchange for the benefits of limited liability, perpetual life, and transferability of shares, investors grant the power to run the corporation to a group of people entrusted with the task of making decisions in the best interests of the company and all of its investors, not just a particular segment of investors In this way, the corporation is not directed by special-interest investors, and the shareholders are protected against one another’s unique agendas This group of entrusted people, elected by shareholders, is called the board of directors Much of the law regulating corporations relates to the board of directors, with many of the specific rules designed to foster investor confidence that directors will the right thing The board is responsible for managing or directing the business and affairs of the company In practice, the board delegates its authority to make day-to-day decisions concerning the operation of the company to full-time employees Boards appoint a chief executive officer (CEO) to coordinate and oversee these management efforts, and the CEO, in turn, is empowered to hire the top managers But the interests of shareholders, directors, and managers can sometimes conflict For instance, some shareholders may wish to receive a dividend, while other shareholders and management may prefer to reinvest profits and promote internal corporate growth The board is required to manage these conflicting interests by making decisions in the best interests of the company and all of its shareholders CONVERGING MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE In many common-law countries, shareholders are the constituents to whom directors have primary regard in the decision-making process Other countries such as ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 France, Germany, and the Netherlands have historically placed emphasis on the interests of other stakeholders, including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the community in which the corporation operates The current corporate governance climate is tending toward convergence of these models Investor interests are increasingly paramount as a result of the global nature of modern investments, the rise of the institutional investor as a dominant player, and the related focus on protecting investment—regardless of where the corporate headquarters are located Moreover, corporate boards are increasingly aware of the need to treat nonshareholder constituents fairly and have regard for their interests so that the corporation can succeed financially, as well as live up to the demands for social responsibility placed on it by those stakeholders and others The convergence is thus from both sides For example, when Johnson & Johnson, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, immediately and voluntarily removed all possibly tampered-with bottles of Tylenol from distribution, it showed responsibility beyond the bottom line Accountability to shareholders and the other stakeholders is assured by a set of duties—spelled out to one degree or another in many developed countries— with which directors must comply in making decisions These duties are known as fiduciary duties They include the duty to exercise care, the duty to be loyal to the company, the duty to be candid and transparent, and the duty to act in good faith A breach of any one of these duties can result in potential director liability to either government regulators or shareholders In the United States, for example, shareholders may institute lawsuits against directors in their own right or on behalf of the company to gain redress for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty Such cases abound in the United States, as witness the host of shareholder suits against Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, among many others Some suits have merit and some not, but the possibility of such suits is a strong motivation for better director performance Shareholders can also the “Wall Street walk” and sell their shares if they are unhappy with what is happening at the company And regulators can step in for more egregious behavior In other countries, the existence and enforceability of these directors’ duties vary significantly But it is also becoming clear that duties without enforceability may be hollow ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 RISK TAKING AND ACCOUNTABILITY It might be reasonable to wonder whether directors would be comfortable making decisions that might result in good returns to the company but that are either inherently risky or uncertain The law assists directors in this regard by freeing them of liability for their decisions, provided they act in good faith and with care and diligence In the United States, for example, this is achieved by means of court-made law In addition, companies can assume the costs of defending directors who act in good faith, and they can also purchase insurance to cover such costs All of this works together with the duties outlined above to reduce the risk of mistakes without sacrificing economic efficiency in decision making To illustrate, consider this scenario: The board of a gold mining company is deciding whether to purchase an expensive license to prospect in an area that has a 20 percent chance of yielding valuable gold deposits A riskaverse group of directors might reject the opportunity if there were a possibility that shareholders could sue them if it were discovered that there were no deposits Decisions such as those, at an aggregate level, would be disastrous for business because fearful directors might make many economically inefficient decisions Once the specter of personal liability is removed, those same directors should be more likely to make more efficient decisions This overall system protects directors under what is known as the business judgment rule Courts will protect directors who use business judgment in good faith and with care and diligence NOURISHING INVESTOR TRUST The legal requirements relating to directors form part of a larger framework aimed at nourishing investor trust in the corporate form Many of these are structural in nature, including those ushered in by the corporate governance reforms of recent years, such as mandatory director independence, committee structures requiring independent directors to meet alone without management present in order to discuss frankly and openly whatever they wish, and an active audit committee Recently, the corporate governance movement has begun to focus on other ways of bolstering the integrity of directors and managers For instance, U.S Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman William Donaldson has emphasized the importance of directors and senior management setting the right tone at the top in terms of high ethical standards Going forward, the eJOURNAL USA corporate governance movement will be striving to find directors with a moral compass who are endowed with qualities revered by 18th-century economist Adam Smith, such as prudence, justice, beneficence, temperance, decency, and moderation Boards comprising people possessing at least some of these qualities should foster investor trust in the board and the corporation Moreover, directors with a demonstrable moral compass should be more inclined to make risky but efficient decisions, since courts will be less likely to impose liability upon such persons The existence of a solid corporate governance regime will be important to an individual investor’s decision whether to buy shares in a company Investors are unlikely to want to commit their funds to a corporation whose board and management cannot be trusted to the right thing for all the shareholders The decision of each potential investor to invest or not invest in a company can be aggregated at the national level to illustrate the importance of corporate governance on a macro scale If a country or region has a demonstrable governance infrastructure, public and private, its overall economy will benefit from increased local and domestic investment BRAZIL’S EXPERIENCE Recent reforms in Brazil provide a useful illustration of how investor trust in the integrity of the corporation as an institution can be a crucial ingredient in the growth of capital markets A reform program was begun at the Brazilian stock market in October 2000 after years of stagnation In less than a year, a second market, called the Novo Mercado, was launched The Novo Mercado prescribes strict corporate governance standards as a eJOURNAL USA prerequisite to listing and has been successful in attracting investment Corporate governance measures such as those instituted by the Novo Mercado strengthened investor confidence in the integrity of the corporate form and those who are overseeing their investment For instance, rules regulating transactions involving a conflict of interests have promoted a transparent environment and well-informed market participants In addition, governance measures that protect the rights of shareholders have ensured that directors and managers are accountable to investors The Novo Mercado demonstrated the importance to investors of openness, transparency, and the existence of good corporate governance The lesson is not restricted to countries with stock exchanges—it applies to any corporation and country seeking new capital for growth from the increasingly sophisticated global capital markets And it applies equally to other providers of capital such as banks, which can improve their local economies by improving both their own corporate governance, thereby attracting deposits, and the governance of borrowers, by extending loans to those borrowers with demonstrable good governance Developing countries can look toward corporate governance models such as those in place elsewhere in the world for guidance in crafting and instituting local corporate governance rules and principles In the global capital market, these rules and principles can serve to bolster investor trust in the local corporate form that will ultimately lead to economic growth and prosperity  The opinions expressed in this article not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S government ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 FOSTERING AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CONSENSUS Ethiopis Tafara and Robert D Strahota More than 1,200 foreign companies file reports with the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission and are thus affected by changes to U.S law, including the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 To ease the path to compliance for those and other firms, U.S regulators have been working with their foreign counterparts and the business community to remove barriers and reconcile differences in national standards and practices Photo above: President Bush speaks to business leaders on Wall Street outlining his agenda for coroprate reform (©AP/WWP Photo/Kathy Willens) Ethiopis Tafara and Robert D Strahota are director and assistant director, respectively, of the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of International Affairs The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, other commissioners, or the staff of the Commission ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 T he Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the most comprehensive and important U.S securities legislation affecting public companies and independent accountants since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created in 1934 The broad reforms in the act address disclosure and financial reporting by public companies, corporate governance, and auditor oversight But what is especially striking is the interest, concern, and debate that the act has generated outside the United States When the SEC was created, no one could have imagined that revisions to the U.S securities laws could have such an impact abroad Today, the more than 1,200 foreign companies that file reports with the SEC represent nearly 10 percent of all SEC reporting companies Some of these companies’ shares are among the most actively traded on U.S markets More than ever, capital markets around the world are interdependent, and changes to national laws can have repercussions outside of borders eJOURNAL USA fund managements blame corporate managements collectively for putting them under undesirable shortterm pressures and vice versa Breaking this vicious circle is one of the most important challenges for corporate governance reform Governments should affirm, in support of the fundamental principle that there should be no power without accountability, that creating an effective shareholder presence in all companies is in the national interest and that it is the nation’s policy to aid effective shareholder involvement in the governance of publicly owned corporations A national-level council should 32 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 be created to ensure that this policy is applied by all executive and judicial branch agencies, competition authorities, stock exchanges, and other similarly involved entities  The opinions expressed in this article not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S government eJOURNAL USA A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Interview With Rosemary Kenney and Nancy Nielsen of Pfizer Inc Businesses that hope to succeed in today’s global marketplace must incorporate newer, stricter legal requirements and also take into account growing social expectations According to one pharmaceutical company that has distinguished itself as a leader in corporate governance, good citizenship and ethical practices eventually produce a stronger bottom line “Doing business with integrity is good for business,” says Nancy Nielsen, Pfizer’s senior director of corporate citizenship She and Rosemary Kenney, the company’s senior manager for corporate governance and communications, spoke with the Economic Perspectives editors on Pfizer’s perspective Photo above: Trachoma examination in Morocco Pfizer, in conjunction with the World Health Organization, supports a program to combat trachoma, the leading cause of preventable blindness in the developing world A critical component of the strategy is the use of Pfizer’s antibiotic, Zithromax Patients can take a single-dose oral treatment for trachoma— a radical advance from the previous regime of daily applications of antibiotic eye ointment over a six-week period (©1997, Pfizer Inc) Pfizer Inc discovers, develops, manufactures, and markets prescription medicines for human beings and animals The company has more than 100 plants around the world and its products are available in more than 150 countries eJOURNAL USA Question: Following a series of scandals in the U.S business world, corporate governance became a global buzzword and the U.S Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act strengthening corporate governance regulations Some firms have complained that the pressure to be more transparent and accountable actually shackles them instead of providing guidance The debate begs the question: Is good corporate behavior good for business? And can you really force it on corporations? Answer: What most corporations are talking about are the costs associated with complying with new U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules mandated under Sarbanes-Oxley And yes, it does cost money to implement internal auditing practices if a company never had them before Doing so may require additional personnel, additional work—sometimes outsourcing—to determine the best methodology to conform to the new guidelines On the other hand, companies like Pfizer already had most of these procedures in place and were already following very high standards of ethical practices for transparency and accountability We did have to make some minor adjustments to our internal policies and procedures, but the Sarbanes-Oxley rules have not had the same impact on us as on some other companies And while it has cost us some additional money, Pfizer does not look at Sarbanes-Oxley as a burden because we agree with it ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 33 Q: What about those companies—especially smaller firms— that find it a struggle? How can they be convinced that it’s in their best interest? to better understand the issues facing the pharmaceutical industry And that certainly has been a very beneficial relationship A: The bottom line is that if you want to be a publicly traded company, you have to conform to these mandates I used to work for a much smaller company, but I was still under the same SEC mandates as a larger publicly traded company Those mandates included paying New York Stock Exchange listing fees and the costs associated with publishing a proxy statement and annual report, mailing it to investors, filing a 10-K report [a comprehensive overview of a company’s business and financial condition] with the SEC, and filing SEC forms for the officers and directors of the company The SEC’s role is to protect the shareholder If you’re a publicly traded company, it’s far better to invest in good practices that support accountability and ethical behavior, rather than hoping that the SEC or any other regulatory body never questions you Q: Many non-U.S companies don’t have a system like Pfizer’s Could you describe how they might implement a similar approach to corporate governance? Q: So if these practices were already in place, it suggests that your company believed them to be good for business Is that the case? A: As a rule, good conduct is good for business, and doing business with integrity is good for business In the early 1990s, Pfizer became the first company to establish a vice president for corporate governance—an officerlevel position—so obviously Pfizer is not new to the idea that high standards of corporate integrity are integral to doing business And that’s basically what Sarbanes-Oxley is trying to do: It’s trying to regulate and mandate ethical behavior Q: What precipitated Pfizer’s decision to create the position of vice president for corporate governance? A: There were at the time a lot of shareholders questioning some of the decisions being made by Pfizer, and the chairman and CEO [chief executive officer] saw an opportunity to discuss with institutional investors— who were very large shareholders in Pfizer—the issues that Pfizer faced as a pharmaceutical company They designated a vice president for corporate governance whose mandate was to go out and speak to institutional investors and open a dialogue that would allow for an exchange of ideas from both sides The goal was for management to better understand the issues that were important to institutional investors and for the investors 34 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 A: The approach to corporate governance starts at the top of the corporation There is no way it can be implemented unless there is “tone at the top.” It has to come from the senior management and the board of directors; there has to be an absolute buy-in that corporate governance is good for business In practical terms, the good governance message is sent to employees through training manuals and mandatory education Pfizer employees have to take online governance tests Employees are made aware of the laws and rules and how they apply to everyday operations Pfizer also has a 24-hour hotline that employees can call if they see behavior that might involve wrongdoing Our compliance department makes presentations at staff meetings for employees in locations all around the country Employees receive e-mail reminders on a regular basis, and corporate governance posters are regularly on display At Pfizer there’s always some message about compliance with governance and laws and rules I’ve worked in a number of different companies, and it’s more pronounced here than anywhere I’ve ever worked Q: A major theme of corporate governance today involves the active participation of shareholders in a company’s decision making How Pfizer shareholders make their concerns known? A: Shareholders make their opinions known through the time-honored methodology of sending shareholder proposals to the company on an annual basis Those proposals are usually published in a proxy statement, and they often voice shareholders’ discontent with certain issues More recently, Pfizer was one of the first companies to provide e-mail addresses for the chairs of each of the committees of the board, as well as for the board of directors as a whole Some shareholders have taken advantage of that and communicate with directors via email eJOURNAL USA But whatever the form of communication, Pfizer’s policy is always to answer shareholder questions and keep an open line of communication Q: What is the volume of these communications, and from whom they tend to come? Are they limited to the large institutional investors? A: We receive e-mails primarily from individual investors Mail totally unrelated to business—résumes, solicitations, requests for philanthropy—are filtered out and forwarded to the appropriate person for handling The board gets a quarterly report that lets them know what issues are of importance for the shareholders, and, when appropriate, the board will respond Q: How is corporate governance involved in the selection of the Pfizer board of directors? A: Each director undergoes an annual nomination process conducted by the corporate governance and nominating committee of the board Each director’s attendance, fees, other board affiliations, and so on are reviewed on an annual basis The board is predominantly an independent board The only “insider” is our chairman and chief executive officer, Hank McKinnell, and we have what’s called an outside related director in our former CEO, Bill Steere (William Steere Jr.) The rest of the board is independent Q: Could you describe how Pfizer distinguishes between corporate governance and corporate citizenship? A: We talk about citizenship as being our role in the local and global community and how we conduct business responsibly We break that into five different pieces: advancing good health, engaging in dialogue with stakeholders, protecting the environment, conducting business responsibly—that’s the governance piece—and respecting employees Q: What form does that take, in practical terms? A: When you construct a value chain, you go through every piece of a business In pharmaceuticals, the chain would include research, development, manufacturing, sales, marketing, delivery, etc We have a chart on our Web site that identifies each piece of our value chain, and underneath each we’ve written what the components are for corporate citizenship eJOURNAL USA For example, in research and development (R&D) it would involve the allocation of the R&D budget to developing and developed world diseases Or it might involve the transparency of clinical trial data One of the things we’ve done recently is to post our political action committee contributions [to political candidates] on our Web site When you add the pieces on the value chain, you get an overall picture of the kinds of things that make for a responsible company locally and globally Q: How would you respond to economists who argue that companies should not be used for “social engineering,” or that involvement in charitable enterprises can cause a firm to lose focus on its primary purpose of maximizing profits? A: You asked earlier whether good governance affects profits And while there is no direct contribution to the bottom line, there is a clear indirect contribution to a company’s success For a good company to be successful today, it really has to both Over the last 10 years, we’ve seen tremendous changes in society—with globalization, advances in communications, greater awareness of social inequities—and there’s been a shift in how society sees the role of business One reason Pfizer takes on these environmental and social projects is that it helps protect our license to operate The second reason is that we’ve looked at what it takes today to create a sustainable business, and we’ve concluded that it requires being involved in all aspects of the community So there is an impact on the bottom line, and that’s the business case for corporate governance Q: Do you have any concrete examples of cases in which your involvement in community or environmental projects has been good for Pfizer as a business? A: The watershed in the pharmaceutical industry was the summer of 2000, when 39 pharmaceutical companies sued the South African government to prevent it from importing cheaper versions of AIDS drugs Pfizer was not among those companies, but most experts look back on that as a time when the pharmaceutical industry was out of touch with the expectations of society And the industry as a whole suffered from the negative public reaction We also know that by engaging on the ground, socially and environmentally, we create relationships that we would not have otherwise It creates a channel ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 35 through which we can educate people about the industry Remember, pharmaceuticals is a high-risk, highreward field Ninety-five percent of the attempts in our laboratories fail; only percent turn into medicines that make it to the market Therefore, the medicines that make it to the market need to cover the costs of all the failures That’s one of the very basic things that we need to communicate to the public Being on the ground also gives us an early warning system for upcoming issues If the industry had been really engaged back in 2000, the pharmaceutical lawsuit against South Africa never would have happened And if you start spinning out the implications of that lawsuit had it really taken off, it potentially could have led to such a backlash that it would have shut down some pharmaceutical companies’ licenses to operate Q: What does Pfizer mean when it states that one of its goals is to improve access to health care across the globe? A: Our primary mission is to discover and develop medicines We have the largest private laboratory in the world, with 13,000 scientists and 116 plants around the world making medicine The next piece of it is to make medicines availableand, we would say, affordableto people around the world Q: How you go about doing that? A: We that largely through public-private partnerships We partner with governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, faithbased groups, and patient advocacy groups to help deliver the medicine We also have multiple channels for medicine donations to hospitals and health care clinics In the United States, we’ve very recently started a program under which people who not have drug coverage insurance—45 million people in the United States—can qualify for free or discounted Pfizer medicines The program is outlined on our Web site, and there’s a toll-free number that people can call 24 hours a day to find out if they are eligible Q: How effective has this been? A: We introduced it about four months ago, and we’ve been struck by the amount of marketing necessary to get such a program under way You would think that if you put information on the Web and sent letters to senior citizens and patient advocacy groups, people would seize 36 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 Pfizer partners with governments to donate Diflucan ® to treat opportunistic infections associated with HIV/AIDS in developing countries The company has helped train 18,000 health care providers in 915 dispensing clinics in 23 countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean (Photo of Helen Joseph Hospital in South Africa © Pfizer Inc) the opportunity right away, but we’ve actually had to treat this as a marketing campaign to get people to apply Q: Do Pfizer shareholders ever complain about these and other donation programs? A: We get complaints sometimes from Pfizer shareholders—they usually send a letter to our chairman—and our response is really the point that I was making earlier: In order to protect our license to operate and to run a sustainable business in today’s world, to meet society’s expectations of business and society’s expectations of pharmaceuticals, this has to be part of our business model now There has been a big shift in this country over the past five years People believe that they should get new medicines at very cheap prices, but somebody needs to pay for innovation Q: So how you reconcile those opposing demands? eJOURNAL USA A: One of the ways we it is through these publicprivate partnerships, like the one I mentioned for drugcoverage help to 45 million Americans But it’s an issue that the entire industry is wrestling with right now Q: Do you have partnerships like that overseas? A: One of my favorites is what we call Global Health Fellows We have created a medical “peace corps” of skilled Pfizer employees—doctors, epidemiologists, technicians—who go on six-month sabbaticals to developing countries, specifically to work on the ground with NGOs to find and treat infectious diseases, primarily AIDS Our longer-term programs include an international initiative to treat trachoma, which is the leading cause of preventable blindness in the world We have, in conjunction with the World Health Organization (WHO), a program to prevent trachoma that involves donations of our antibiotic Zithromax, environmental help, basic sanitation education, and some surgery We’re going to be able to completely eliminate trachoma by 2020 I think we’re in 18 countries Another program is the international Diflucan partnership This is for AIDS-related infections such as thrush Diflucan helps eliminate thrush almost immediately, and we provide it for free For the least developed countries that meet a certain WHO income threshold, there is no cap and no time limit on the medicine donations And we that through partnerships with the government and NGOs It’s not just us on our own Everything we’re doing nowadays is through partnerships A: The ultimate performance measure is healthy people, or people who don’t get sicker—for example, the number of people cured of thrush, or the number of people who either regained their vision or were prevented from going blind It all comes down to people and health That’s the bottom line One of things we’re looking for is unmet medical needs and to see what we can there That’s a big area that has been neglected, and we’re prepared to take that on We’re not going to make any money from it; it’s part of being a good corporate citizen Our 2003 annual report opens with this phrase: “We will define success as something broader than performance in the marketplace.” Q: Do you find that you are at the forefront of a movement involving other businesses? A: It’s not limited to us But because Pfizer is the thirdor fourth-largest company in the world by market capitalization, and because we’re in health care, which affects everybody and is tied to everyone’s economy, I think that what we has a big impact and therefore it’s really important that we it I also think there is a trend among industry leaders I know that my counterparts at Microsoft, HewlettPackard, Coca-Cola, DuPont, are all moving in the same direction  The opinions expressed in this article not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S government Q: What sort of performance measures you use in deciding which programs receive funding? eJOURNAL USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 37 GOVERNING FAMILY BUSINESSES John L Ward Corporate governance of family businesses differs fundamentally from that of widely held public companies Family ownership concentrates control and facilitates decision making, which can both lower governance costs and permit unconventional but strategically advantageous decisions A well-functioning system helps build trust within the family, and a good family dynamic, in turn, becomes an asset to the business because it enables each separate piece of governance to function better and add more value while remaining aligned with the other components of the governance system These governance advantages can provide clear economic benefits However, a growing business becomes increasingly complex and creates its own demands for a more formal organizational structure Family business managers must adapt their governance practices accordingly Indeed, success drives the need to adapt and change—and all family businesses eventually face this reality FAMILY BUSINESSES: PROS 38 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 CONS W ith ownership controlled by one or a few people from a family, family firms have competitive advantages and disadvantages over publicly held companies On the plus side, controlling ownership can take the long-term view Patient, consistent investments can yield excellent future benefits Investments in corporate culture can also yield benefits that firms that are run for short-term stock market results not have the time to reap And companies controlled by a small group of hands-on owners can pursue contrarian strategies and reject mediocre conventional wisdom On the other hand, firms controlled by a few can be isolated and insulated from market realities Seeking personal comfort and forsaking external accountability can lead to stale strategy, no succession planning, and organizational stagnation And unchecked quarrels among family owners can be catastrophic to a company The difference between a family firm that succumbs to its weaknesses and one that exploits its relative strengths lies in the quality of the governance system Successful family firms appreciate the power of their ownership control, volunteer for the accountability of an independent board, and take care to properly define the roles and responsibilities of ownership, management, and the board of directors The essence of the family business difference is that the nature of ownership is different Successful family firms also understand how governance practices need to evolve to reflect the changes in the business and within the family THE NATURE John L Ward is clinical professor and co-director of the Center for Family Enterprises at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management He is the Wild Group Professor of Family Business at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Lausanne, Switzerland, and is a regular visiting lecturer at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the Indian School of Business, and the University of Navarra’s graduate school of business (IESE) AND OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP Family ownership groups not only concentrate control but also often have a strong emotional attachment to their businesses A family can have a sense of moral obligation to other stakeholders, or even view their business as a vehicle for making a positive contribution to society Moreover, family owners sometimes see the eJOURNAL USA business as a social legacy built by past generations, and one that should continue in succeeding generations The lack of readily available liquidity is another important difference between public and family ownership Relinquishing ownership of family companies is often difficult Some families create legal restrictions on the sale of stock, and many family businesses are privately held In these circumstances, creating a market for the sale of stock can be complex Tax policy can also come into play, making the sale of stock in the family business costlier than continued ownership Owning stock in a family company tends to concentrate the wealth of individuals in a single asset In family ownership groups, a disproportionate percentage of the net worth of many individuals is often tied up in the family business This means that family business owners, as a group of investors, have less diversification and higher risk than they would as investors in the broader stock market Such concentrated risk makes family business owners more attentive to their investment and tends to keep them more active and engaged And this, in turn, makes families more committed to fixing what is wrong with their businesses, rather than fleeing them economically At times, concern for the family’s reputation can seem as important as safeguarding the collective family business investment BUSINESS GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC COMPANIES Governance in the public market is built on a paradigm that relates directly to the nature of widely held ownership Owners of shares in a public company can “vote with their feet” by selling their shares when performance is below expectations The individual shareholders of such companies have little recourse to influence the decisions of their boards or managers Instead, they join other individuals in the market and create pressure for performance through their collective short-term decisions to buy or sell stock The governance of public companies reflects this paradigm of inactive but mobile shareholders creating market pressures for performance Public companies have independent boards that act primarily as fiduciaries, or agents, of potentially mobile shareholder interests These boards operate under the paradigm of maximizing near-term share value in order to sustain and expand their pool of shareholders Market demand for the company stock is the primary measure of success, and this market fluctuates daily based on the fluid relationship of many economic factors, both inside eJOURNAL USA and outside of the company Because of this, the board of directors is the locus of power in the governance of public companies The board is charged with the oversight of management and must ensure that management is creating value that will be recognized in the market In widely held public companies, management is often perceived as self-interested Active governance is seen as necessary to curbing potential management abuses, as well as to assuring the effective alignment of management interests and shareholder interests The boards of public companies spend a great deal of time and effort designing systems to control and monitor management activities and compensation, reinforcing a potentially adversarial relationship In addition, boards and their practices are under increasing scrutiny today, and many new laws and regulations are being written to reform the governance of public companies Many of these laws are designed to strengthen the independence of boards and increase their accountability As the boards of public companies become more independent and powerful, the expectation that they should provide more than oversight increases, as does the expectation that they should actively direct management on behalf of ownership interests However, boards focused on corporate performance and share value can become averse to taking risks that may have significant short-term impacts They can become captive to the conventional wisdom of the market and forgo more unconventional strategies that might better capture long-term value in their unique market segment Often, management is better positioned to see how dynamic new strategies will create value for customers and improve business performance Unfortunately, the governance paradigm of public companies does not always enable the pursuit of creative new business strategies HOW GOVERNANCE DIFFERS IN FAMILY COMPANIES Family business governance systems are more uniquely suited to the pursuit of unconventional strategies Family businesses can more readily bypass the adversarial qualities of conventional business governance Ownership can exert influence and care on multiple levels, making the family an agent of more effective decision making in management, on the board, and among owners Rather than functioning as a costly system of checks and balances, governance in family firms often serves to enable transparency and partnership across the system This, in turn, can enable the pursuit of strategies that are ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 39 the separate functions of the ownership, board, and management also is vital to effective family business governance—all the more so because family members often wear multiple hats, functioning as owners, directors, and managers While the direct involvement of the family on multiple levels complicates the system, it also provides an important link between the different areas of governance This built-in link, combined with a positive development of family ties and relationships, can fundamentally change the dynamic of trust that pervades the governance system A well-functioning system helps build trust within the family, and a good family dynamic, in turn, becomes an asset to the business because it enables each separate piece of governance to function better and add more value while remaining aligned with the other components of the governance system STAGES Russ & Daughters’ landmark store on New York City’s lower east side Established in 1914, the business has been run by four generations of the Russ family (Photo courtesy of russanddaughters.com) potentially more productive in the long term, despite short-term costs or risks Conventional business governance often focuses on establishing boundaries and defining the separation of decision-making powers In contrast, family business governance is often focused on establishing productive, procedural engagement across the system Practices that provide for simultaneous consultations among owners, directors, and managers permit a freer flow of ideas as well as speedier decision making They also contribute to an ongoing alignment of interests and objectives over time The active participation of owners is the key to effective family business governance Family ownership defines the values, vision, and objectives of the business It articulates the financial goals and performance expectations that guide board and management decisions Owners also provide an overall vision of the company that generally defines a business strategy This clarifies and focuses objectives across the system and helps set appropriate strategic constraints on board and management decisions But establishing a clear, shared understanding of 40 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 OF FAMILY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT Most family businesses begin with an entrepreneurial founder Initially, the founder embodies the governance system, being the all-powerful owner and operator of the business Founders sometimes make use of advisory boards, but they generally retain all decision rights In many cases, the chief challenge of founders is deciding how to sustain their family business through succession Some founders seek a single heir who can re-create the concentrated power of the owner-operator More, however, see the business as a collective inheritance and divide it among members of the family When ownership passes down across generations, it passes through distinct stages The first stage is the sibling or family partnership, with parents sharing ownership with their children Eventually, the involvement of the parents ends, and the siblings come to share ownership in a partnership spirit They must decide among themselves how to govern the business; often, this is described as the “kitchen table” period The siblings can sit down together and consult informally, and sometimes they form a board to help build consensus for strategy Roles may begin to separate at this stage, as some siblings may be active in the business while others are not From this point on, the level of trust in the family often determines how formal governance practice becomes The third generation succession often involves a diverse group of cousins This generally changes the scale of the family and differentiates family roles further Family members may continue to be involved in management, the board, and ownership Ownership eJOURNAL USA holdings can become increasingly variable in size, with some remaining quite concentrated Family members can be active to varying degrees in the business and governance, and their level of involvement may not necessarily reflect their level of economic interest These complications generally lead to the development of more formal governance practice When majority ownership moves outside of management, the board will often take on more of a fiduciary characteristic The extent to which trust is cultivated directly between the controlling owners and the leaders of management often determines how formal governance practice becomes at this stage and whether the family can continue to create effective agency in governance The next family succession causes another significant change in ownership scale At this stage, the development of family governance, which functions in parallel to business governance, is often an added feature of an increasingly formal and complex governance system Family members may continue to be involved across the governance system, linking ownership, the board, and management Often, the business at this stage has become a holding company, creating the need for a board that can strategically manage a portfolio of businesses THE EVOLUTION OF over time it is also unavoidable Success drives the need to adapt and change At certain stages, business or family growth will tend to become exponential All family businesses eventually face this reality Because family and business life cycles often challenge the effectiveness of existing governance practices, family businesses are actually quite attentive to adapting their practices over time With each generation of succession or change in business scale, family companies are often confronted with the need to re-create their business governance Family business life cycles can lead to fundamental changes in the roles, functions, and practices of the governance system Faced with the dilemmas of change, families frequently study current best business practices However, rather than simply adopting prescriptive best practices, families tend to adapt practices to their historic business culture, and so renew the effectiveness of their governance agency over time  The opinions expressed in this article not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S government FAMILY BUSINESS GOVERNANCE As a business grows, it becomes increasingly complex, creating its own demands for a more formal organizational structure While adapting governance practices to the emerging needs of families and businesses as they grow is a very complex and challenging endeavor, eJOURNAL USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 41 KEY OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities II The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights III The equitable treatment of shareholders The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights IV The role of stakeholders in corporate governance The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises V Disclosure and transparency The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company VI The responsibilities of the board The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders 42 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 eJOURNAL USA BIBLIOGRAPHY Additional readings on corporate governance Bebchuk, Lucian Arye “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.” Harvard Law Review vol 118, iss (January 2005): pp 835-914 Berenbeim, Ronald “Corporate Governance: Giving Ethics Operational Meaning.” Vital Speeches of the Day vol 71, no (15 November 2004): pp 87-89 Cadbury, Adrian Family Firms and Their Governance: Creating Tomorrow’s Company from Today’s New York: Egon Zehnder International, 2000 54 p http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/ family_firms.pdf Claessens, Stijn Corporate Governance and Development Focus No Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, 2003 44 p http://www.gcgf.org/library/Discussion_Papers_and_ Focus%20Notes/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_ Development.pdf Cornelius, Peter K and Bruce Kogut, eds Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 506 p Jickling, Mark Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They Work and How They Fail Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 27 December 2004 58 p Kirkpatrick, Grant Improving Corporate Governance Standards: The Work of the OECD and The Principles Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 p http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/24/33655111.pdf Meisel, Nicolas Governance Culture and Development: A Different Perspective on Corporate Governance Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 142 p http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,2340,en_2649_ 37439_33788503_1_1_1_37439,00.html eJOURNAL USA Melvin, Colin and Hans Hirt Corporate Governance and Performance London: Hermes Pensions Management Ltd, January 2005 p http://www.hermes.co.uk/pdf/corporate_governance/ corporate_governance_and_performance_060105.pdf Morck, Randall Corporate Governance and Family Control Discussion Paper No Washington, DC: Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2003 23 p http://www.gcgf.org/library/Discussion_Papers_ and_Focus%20Notes/Corporate%20Governance %20and%20Family%20Control,%20Morck%20%20Nov%202003.pdf Morck, Randall K and Lloyd Steier The Global History of Corporate Governance – an Introduction NBER Working Paper No 11062 Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2005 47 p http:// www.nber.org/papers/W11062 Oman, Charles and Daniel Blume Corporate Governance: A Development Challenge Policy Insight No Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 2005 p http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/45/28/34342425.pdf Oman, Charles, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-Market Economies OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No 23, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003 49 p http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/49/28658158.pdf Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003 90 p http: //www.oecd.org/document/26/0,2340,en_2649_34813_ 30929498_1_1_1_1,00.html ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 43 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 66 p http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,2340,en_2649_ 37439_31530865_1_1_1_37439,00.html Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Policy Brief Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, August 2004 p http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/32/33647763.pdf 44 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Survey of Corporate Governance Developments in OECD Countries Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003 72 p http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/27/21755678.pdf _ The U.S Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources from other agencies and organizations listed above All Internet links were active as of February 2005 eJOURNAL USA INTERNET RESOURCES Online resources for information about corporate governance UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT European Corporate Governance Institute http://www.ecgi.org/ U.S Agency for International Development http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_ governance/technical_areas/anti-corruption/ Global Corporate Governance Forum U.S Department of Justice Institutional Shareholder Services http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud.html http://www.issproxy.com/ U.S Securities and Exchange Commission International Chamber of Commerce – Corporate Governance http://www.sec.gov/ http://www.gcgf.org/index.htm http://www.iccwbo.org/cg.htm The White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ corporateresponsibility/ International Corporate Governance Network INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Investor Responsibility Research Center Asian Institute of Corporate Governance National Association of Corporate Directors http://www.aicg.org/ http://www.nacdonline.org/ Center for International Private Enterprise http://www.cipe.org/programs/corp_gov/ index.htm The Conference Board http://www.icgn.org/ http://www.irrc.org/ OECD – Corporate Governance http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_ 37439_1_1_1_1_37439,00.html http://www.conference-board.org/knowledge/ governance.cfm World Council for Corporate Governance Corporate Governance Yale University, International Institute for Corporate Governance http://www.corpgov.net/ http://www.wcfcg.net/index.htm http://iicg.som.yale.edu/links/links.shtml The Corporate Governance Encyclopedia http://www.encycogov.com/ Corporate Governance Quotient http://www.isscgq.com/gcgq/g_central.asp The U.S Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources from the other agencies and organizations listed above Links to all were active as of February 2005 The Corporate Library http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/ eJOURNAL USA ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / FEBRUARY 2005 45 http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm U.S DEPARTMENT 0F STATE / BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS