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THE MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ELITE IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA:
A STUDY OF DOMINANT IDEAS AND ORIENTATION OF
PROMINENT RELIGIOUS PERSONALITIES AND THEIR IMPACT
NORSHAHRIL BIN SAAT
(B. POL SCI (HONS), NUS
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF MALAY STUDIES
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2010
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All Praises to God, The Most Gracious and the Most Merciful! There are numerous
people whose intellectual and moral support has inspired me to complete this
Masters dissertation. Firstly, I will like to thank Dr Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, for
agreeing to supervise my thesis, sharing her views and knowledge, and contributing
constructive comments. Thank you for exposing me to the great academic works and
for your guidance in completing this thesis. Thank you for being such a great
supervisor and mentor! I also wish to thank ISEAS and NUS for the funding of my
research. Many thanks also to my parents, Hj Saat Dawood and Hjh Azizah Sahlan,
and brother Norshahizal Saat, for their continuous and unremitting support‐ be it
emotionally, spiritually and financially. Without their presence and support, I would
not be where I am today. Thank you for all the moral support and prayers.
I am indebted to the Department of Malay Studies. My special thanks go to the Head
of Malay Studies, Associate Professor Syed Farid Alatas, for being so supportive
towards my academic development. I truly enjoyed the frank discussions we had
during my two years and have benefitted from them. Not forgetting also Dr Suriani
Suratman, Dr Maznah Mohamad, and Dr Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljuneid for all the
constructive comments and contributions.
I would also like to thank the personalities that I had interviewed, namely Dr Mohd
Asri, Dr Mohd Ridhwan Tee, Dr Yusri Muhammad, Dr Zahazan Mohamed, and Dr
Chandra Muzaffar. Thank you for sparing valuable time answering my “burning”
questions and satisfying my curiosity. Without their contributions and comments,
completing this thesis would not have been possible. Thank you also for the
hospitality given during my fieldwork in Malaysia. I have also benefitted and learnt a
lot from our conversations and your writings.
ii
I would also like to thank Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (PUM), Telaga Biru Sdn Bhd, and
Jabatan Mufti of Pulau Pinang for providing me with primary research materials that
are relevant for my study. I also wish to thank the staff from the following libraries:
National University of Singapore, Universiti Malaya, International Islamic University
Malaysia, and Universiti Sains Malaysia for facilitating my research work and material
gathering.
Last but not least, I would also like to thank Associate Professor Hussin Mutalib from
the Department of Political Science, and also Associate Professor Shaharuddin
Maaruf, formerly the Head of Malay Studies, for all their support and
recommendations, especially during my undergraduate years. Thank you all.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Summary
Abbreviations and Acronyms
A Note On Translation, Spelling, And Other Conventions
Chapter 1‐Introduction
Background
Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia
Objective and Methodology
Hypothesis
Traditionalism
Literature Review
Themes of Study
Chapter 2‐ Veiling and Domesticating Women
Introduction
Islam Has Emancipated Women
Domestic Roles of Women and the Superiority of Men
Likelihood of Fitnah and Justification of Sexual Crimes
Women’s Representation and Leadership
The Administration of Morality
Chapter Conclusion
ii
iv
vii
viii
ix
1
3
9
12
12
25
34
38
39
43
53
62
67
70
iv
Chapter 3‐Islamic State and Society
Introduction
The Ideal Islamic State
Islamic Political System and Philosophy
Political Leadership
Shariah Laws and Secular Laws
Islamic/Non‐Islamic State
The Rights of Minorities in An Islamic State
Utopian Mentality and The Islamic State
Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 4‐Islamizing Malay Society: Adat, Culture,
And Folk Beliefs
Introduction
Islam and Malay Cultural Practices
Religious Rituals of Malays
Malay Folk Beliefs
Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 5‐Muslims and the ‘Other’: The Social Construction of the Deviant
Introduction
Relations with Non‐Muslims
Intra‐Muslim Othering
Liberal Islam
71
74
82
88
97
104
107
112
115
116
117
128
133
141
143
147
156
166
v
Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 6‐ Conclusion
Bibliography
Appendixes
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
171
173
181
198
200
202
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SUMMARY
This study seeks to examine the dominant religious orientation of the prominent
religious personalities in contemporary Malaysia. It seeks to analyze the salient
features of their religious orientation and their implications on the Malaysian society
at large. By orientation we mean a style of thought that influence not just the
selection of religious ideas and issues but also how they are conceived and
understood. Some of the religious issues explicated by these religious elite that will
be explored include the role of women in society, the concept of Islamic state, the
problematization of adat or Malay culture, and the attitude towards the “Other”. My
central argument is that the religious elite’s understanding of these issues or the
sense of them is a function of an orientation which reveals the salient traits of
traditionalism. Though the profile of the religious elite is heterogeneous, in that they
emerge from different strata in society, age groups, political affiliations, deploy
various methods whilst preaching, and even articulate opposing viewpoints; the style
of thought reveals the common and distinct traits of traditionalism. This is not to
deny the existence of other thought styles or orientations in as much as it is
maintained that traditionalism features pronouncedly in the selection and
appropriation of major issues raised by the religious elite.
The study is confined to the more prominent religious elite, particularly the ‘trend
setters’ in religious debates. They include members of political parties, civil‐society
organizations, state bureaucracies, as well as the pendakwah bebas or independent
preachers. Among the personalities discussed include Nik Aziz, Hadi Awang, Dr Mohd
Asri Zainul Abidin, Dr Haron Din, Harussani Zakaria, Dr Zahazan Mohamed, Yusri
Mohamad, members of JAKIM, IKIM, PUM, and ABIM. Apart from portraying the
characteristics of their religious orientation, this study also highlights the possible
factors that condition the prevalence of their religious orientation and the
implications they bear not only on the Muslim community, but also on the larger
multi‐ethnic and multi‐religious Malaysian society, within the context of change,
development and modernization.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABIM
Aliran
AMLA
ASWJ
BN
CRLO
Darul Arqam
IFC
IKIM
IIUM
ISA
ISTAC
JAIS
JAKIM
JAWI
JUST
MACMA
MCCBCHST
MP
MUIS
NGO
PERKIM
PUM
SHURA
SIS
PAS
UKM
UM
UMNO
UPNM
USM
YADIM
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth Movement of
Malaysia)
Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara
Administration of Muslim Law Act
Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Sunni)
Barisan Nasional (National Front Coalition)
Permanent Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions
House of Arqam
Suruhanjaya Antara Agama (Inter‐faith Council)
Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Institute for
Islamic Understanding)
International Islamic University of Malaysia
Internal Security Act
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor
Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic
Development Malaysia)
Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan
International Movement for a Just World
Malaysian Muslim Chinese Association
Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhist, Christianity,
Hindusim, Sikhism, and Taoism.
Members of Parliament
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore)
Non‐Government Organizations
Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia
Persatuan Ulama Malaysia
Secretariat for Asia Assembly of Ulama
Sisters in Islam
Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia)
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of
Malaysia)
Universiti Malaya
United Malays National Organization
University Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (National Defence
University of Malaysia)
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Islamic Da’wah Foundation Malaysia
viii
A NOTE ON TRANSLATION, SPELLING, AND
OTHER CONVENTIONS
This study utilizes many primary materials that are written in the Malay language or
translation of Quranic verses and Hadith in Malay. Quotes and interviews that are
originally written or spoken in the Malay language are translated to English by the
author.
The plural forms of Arabic terms are retained. For instance, the term Ulama
(religious scholars) in Arabic is the plural for Alim. However, as largely used by the
Malays, the term Ulama used in this study can either refer to a group or a single
person. The term Shiites refers to the plural form for Shia.
Quotations from the Quran are based on the text by Abdullah Yusof Ali, The Meaning
of the Holy Quran (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1996). Where the translation is
obtained directly from the interpretation from the religious elite themselves, these
will be clearly indicated.
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
This study examines the dominant religious orientation of a selection of prominent
religious personalities who comprise a significant part of the Muslim religious elite in
contemporary Malaysia. By orientation, I am referring to a style of thought or mode
of religious belief that influences the way a person views his reality (Mannheim
1936, 40). Religious orientation conditions religious sensitivity and the sense of
issues (Shaharuddin 2002, 1). It does not refer to Islamic theology, doctrine, or ideas
but the perspective that shapes one’s religious belief. In examining orientations, our
focus is not in determining the acceptability or validity of theological issues or
judgement but the mode in which these issues are conceived, understood, and
applied. Hence, this study reflects on the way the prominent religious elite approach
religious or theological ideas, as manifested in their views on a range of
contemporary issues expressed in their writings, sermons, and personal interviews.
While undeniably there can exist among them a diversity of views on a particular
religious matter, the religious orientation underlying them reveal traits that are
similar and consistent. The study also discusses the ramifications and implications of
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the dominant style of thought on the lives of Muslims and the larger society more
generally.
The study of orientation is important for several reasons. It facilitates
understanding of the social basis of religious ideas as conditioned by the thought of
relevant social actors. Investigating the orientation of social groups also helps one to
understand why certain ideas, beliefs, and practices are prevalent in a particular
society. Furthermore, such an approach can explain the source of religious conflict or
controversies more objectively, instead of succumbing to ideologically partisan
charges such as ignorance, intellectual bankruptcy, misrepresentation, fanaticism,
and deviation from the ‘true’ Islam (Shaharuddin 2002, 1). By examining the ways
social groups select, conceive and experience Islam, one avoids the simplistic and
reductive tendency to ascribe to the religion or theology the source of problems
relating to the community.
The focus on a selection of prominent members of the religious elite is
significant for they generally constitute the authoritative and interpretive class in the
religious domain. It is not uncommon for these religious elite to be a source of
reference and advice for a variety of problems pertaining to the individual, their
family, and the larger community. Possibly, the ideas of the religious community
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reflect the ideas of their religious elite. Riaz (2008) maintains that the close
interaction between the society’s interpretive class and their religious orientations
shape the religious consciousness and worldview of the Muslims in a given society
(38). Moreover, as Islam touches on the lives of Muslims on many fronts, the
religious elite’s influence extend beyond the realm of teaching rituals and values.
They influence and penetrate thought and ideas on the problems of modern man
and society, which can have profound impact on the lives of ordinary citizens.
RELIGIOUS ELITE IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA
It is important at the outset to define the term religious elite, identify who they are,
and locate their dominance and influence in Malaysia today. The term ‘elite’
connotes groups with power or influence that extends beyond the environment of
ordinary men and women. The elite occupy positions that allow them to make
decisions that have major implications on those who are subject to their influence
(Mills 1959, 3‐4). By religious elite we refer to a particular social group whose
emergence is a product of social necessity as there is hardly any system of belief that
does not comprise a group of individuals forming a class of ‘the selected few’, whose
task is to provide leadership in that aspect (Noor Aisha 2008, 248). Being trained in
the religious sciences and theology, the religious elite are revered by the community
as having the competency to deal with matters pertaining to religious beliefs, rituals,
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and ethical codes. They are also generally respected by the community based on the
belief that they are authorities on Islam, pious, and morally upright. Furthermore, by
virtue of their training in the religious sciences, they see themselves as the spiritual
and intellectual custodians of Islam. Hence they define problems falling within the
sphere of religion and provide solutions based on what they deem as the divine law.
The religious elite are by no means homogenous. They constitute a
heterogeneous social group that is believed to have expertise in religious knowledge
including law (fiqh), exegesis (tafsir), theology (kalam), and traditions of the Prophet
(Hadith). They also function in various capacities: as jurists, theologians,
grammarians, teachers, mufassirin or writers of Quranic commentary, and
muhaddithin or interpreters of Hadith (Muhammad Yusof 2007, 207). Furthermore,
there is also a hierarchy of authority among them. The Ulama, commonly perceived
as the ‘heirs of the Prophet’, occupy a higher authoritative position vis‐à‐vis ordinary
preachers and religious teachers. The influence of the Ulama is contingent upon
their contributions towards religious knowledge, credentials, fatwa (legal opinions),
and writings. The Ulama’s scholarship, opinions, and works are normally referred to
by the ordinary religious teachers in their classes and sermons. In contrast, the
influence of the ordinary religious teachers is more localized, for they normally
function as preachers at local mosques, villages, and madrasahs. These religious
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teachers are generally not instrumental in official fatwa making that are publicly
circulated.
This study is not meant to be a comprehensive and an all encompassing
analysis of the orientation of the religious elite as a whole for the group is too varied
and diverse. It is confined to a selection of religious personalities who are prominent
within Malaysian society. The criterion of prominence has less to do with the quality
of their ideas, but more with the influence they exert in society. Generally their ideas
are widely circulated and disseminated among the masses. Some amongst them
have extensive following. They also influence policies, pronounce fatwa through
involvement in fatwa‐making bodies, influence directions for law enforcement
agencies, and generally contribute to shaping the society’s religious consciousness.
In Malaysia, these prominent religious elite function within different capacities,
work in various organizations, and command several key positions. Among them are
politicians, civil activists, bureaucrats, Mufti, independent preachers, Shariah court
judges, and academics in universities. They may obtain social recognition via ‘formal
legitimacy’, by which they are formally recognized through appointments into
positions within the State’s apparatus, such as Mufti, Qadhi, officials in Religious
Departments, and political office bearers. Saeed (2004) refers to this category as the
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‘official Ulama’. Nonetheless, there are others who are independent of the state and
do not rely on it for legitimacy. These elite solely base their ‘popular legitimacy’ on
the community‐ through their credentials, appeal, conduct, and piety. ‘Popular
legitimacy’ is also determined by their charisma which extends to the ways their
ideas are articulated in public, the events they attend, the way they dress, the
lifestyles they lead, the issues and concerns they discuss, and the prestige of descent
(Ghozzi 2002, 317; Nagata 1984, 48). This study tries to incorporate religious
personalities with formal legitimacy and/or popular legitimacy. A fair share of
politicians, civil activists, lecturers, popular independent preachers, bureaucrats, and
Mufti are included as my case studies.1
The religious elite with ‘formal legitimacy’ normally have access to the
commands of key institutions of the state such as the religious councils. Such
institutions indirectly provide the basis of power and prestige to the elite and the
means of exercising them (Mills, 9). In Malaysia, although Islam falls under the
jurisdiction of the Malay royalty, it mainly acts upon the advice of the religious elite
in its respective state’s religious council. Similarly at the federal level, the various
state Mufti, Shariah Court judges, and religious bureaucrats, may be appointed as
members of the National Fatwa Council which was established to provide
1
See Appendix 1 for the profiles of the religious elite selected in this study. See Appendix 2 for the
institutions and organizations selected as case studies.
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recommendations to the Council of the Kings on matters pertaining to Islam. These
major institutions provide the religious elite, especially the Mufti who sits as the ex
officio member of the state executive council, with access to a powerful legal
instrument, the fatwa (Wain 2009, 229). Not only do fatwa operate as guides for
judges in both Shariah Courts and civil courts, they have a force of law once they are
gazetted. Contravening a gazetted fatwa in Malaysia is a punishable offence.2
Some amongst them also exert influence on directions of state’s policies, by
sitting in the government as Cabinet members, parliamentarians, bureaucrats, and
heads‐of‐government. By 1982, the Federal Government had over 100 Ulama in the
Department for Islamic development in the Prime Minister’s Office and some 715
religious elite in the Ministry of Education (Norani, Zainah, and Zaitun 2005, 90).
Among the prominent Ulama recruited by the government include Dr Yusof Nor,3
Abdul Hamid Othman, Fadhil Hanafi and Dusuki Ahmad (Kamarulnizam 2002, 182).
Others such as Dr Mashitah Ibrahim, and Pirdaus Ismail, formerly the Head Imam of
the National Mosque, have also run as candidates on UMNO’s ticket during recent
elections. Historically, the Ulama from PAS have been elected as Heads‐of‐
2
Fatwa in Malaysia are legally binding once they are gazetted and can be enforced as law of the state.
Due to the Malaysian federal system, a fatwa can be issued at the federal level by the National Fatwa
Council administered by JAKIM (a federal institution under the Prime Minister’s Office). However, for
the fatwa to be enforced and to obtain legal status, it has to be gazetted at the various state levels.
(Suwaid 2004, 36‐37).
3
Dr Yusof Nor was formerly the Dean of Faculty of Islamic Studies, UKM.
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government and Members of Parliament. Nik Aziz Nik Mat and Abdul Hadi Awang
had been elected as the Chief Ministers of the state of Kelantan and Terengganu
respectively.4
Apart from these political appointments, their influence is reinforced by the
availability of various channels and platforms for their ideas to get disseminated to
the masses. Other than traditional religious platforms such as the local mosques, or
contributions to publications of books, columns in newspapers, and magazines, the
religious elite in Malaysia today also utilize the electronic media, including the new
media, to propagate their ideas and opinions in the public sphere (Zaman 2002, 56‐
58; Norshahril 2009a). Today, their views and opinions are easily accessible via the
radio channels (radio IKIM), television channels (ASTRO OASIS), personal blogs,
websites, and even You Tube. These medium, nonetheless, are mainly accessible to
the middle class and the highly urbanised audience. The popularity of such religious
programmes is further facilitated by their ease of access, which have significantly
accentuated the significance and reach of the religious elite to the masses.
4
Abdul Hadi Awang was the Chief Minister of Terengganu from 1999 to 2004. Nik Aziz has been the
Chief Minister of Kelantan since 1990 to the present.
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OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
The main objective of this study is to portray and characterize the dominant religious
orientation of a selection of prominent Islamic religious elite in contemporary
Malaysia by examining the debates and contestations surrounding issues such as
women, governance, Malay culture, and relations with the ‘Other’. Some major
implications arising from their mode of thinking on the Muslim community, as well
as the larger multi‐ethnic and multi‐religious Malaysian society in the context of
development and modernization, will also be discussed.
In analyzing the orientation of the religious elite, this study utilises some
insights from Mannheim’s discussion on the sociology of knowledge. The sociology
of knowledge emphasises the importance of understanding the social basis of
thought. It investigates the relationship between ideas and socio‐historical
conditions in the development of human thought (Mannheim 1936, 265). Essentially,
it establishes the point that ideas do not exist in a vacuum but are rooted in
particular social and historical milieu. Furthermore, it maintains the view that man
does not think in isolation from the thought of his social group and the position the
group occupies in society. These influence perspectives and orientation, conditioning
what are promoted, downplayed, or neglected. As Mannheim explicates,
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“… the sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in
concrete setting of an historical‐social situation out of which
individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges.
Thus, it is not men in general who think, or even isolated individuals
who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have
developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of
responses to certain typical situations characterizing their common
position.” (3)
By applying this approach, this study seeks to uncover how the religious elite think,
and why they think in a certain way. This approach can also assist in understanding
and predicting how the religious elite will deal with new problems and challenges
confronting them. Some relevant socio‐historical facts that condition the elite’s
mode of thinking shall also be highlighted. An in‐depth study of these facts, however,
is beyond the constraints of this thesis.5
Sources utilized for this study include the prominent religious elite’s writings
and publications. These writings take the form of books, newspaper articles,
conference papers, brochures, and pamphlets. Their sermons or speeches are also
5
The significance of social institutions such as family, school, class, professional organizations, social
networks and socialization in shaping the elite’s weltanshauung, the type of religious education they
underwent, as well as the curriculum in the religious schools or institutions they attended, may have
also contributed to their religious outlook. This is however not within the scope of this study and is
best treated as an independent subject of investigation.
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analyzed, and they are available in the form of online‐videos and video‐compact
discs. Apart from these, interviews were conducted to complement these primary
materials. In all, five interviews were conducted and they were all carried out while
undergoing fieldwork in Malaysia. The personalities interviewed were Dr Zahazan
Muhammad, Dr Ridhwan Tee, Dr Yusri Muhammad, and Dr Mohd Asri. The
interviews were aimed at clarifying doubts on their writings and sermons, and
seeking views on other issues not contained in their writings that provided insights
into their mode of belief. Interviews with scholars who are not part of the selected
religious elite in this study, such as Dr Chandra Muzaffar, were also conducted. They
provided further insights into the problems examined. Each interview lasted
between one to two hours.6 Several institutions and organizations such as Persatuan
Ulama Malaysia (PUM), Jabatan Mufti Pulau Pinang, Malaysian Institute for Islamic
Understanding (IKIM), Telaga Biru Sdn Bhd, and International Islamic University
Malaysia (IIUM), and University Sains Malaysia (USM) were also visited to obtain
primary materials such as unpublished conference papers, brochures, and
pamphlets.
6
See Appendix 3 for the Interview Guide.
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HYPOTHESIS
This study maintains that traditionalism is a marked feature of the religious
orientation of the prominent religious elite in contemporary Malaysia. Though the
profile of the religious elite is heterogeneous, as they emerge from different strata in
society, age groups, organizational affiliations, deploy various methods whilst
preaching, and even articulate opposing viewpoints; their style of thought reveals
common and distinct traits of traditionalism. This is not to say that other styles of
thought or orientation do not exist or are absent within the religious elite as a whole
or in this group concerned. Those may co‐exist with traditionalism, and there may
even be shifts in their mode of thinking, depending on the issues discussed.
However, it is traditionalism that features pronouncedly in the issues raised and
conceptualised in this study, which are in fact the major issues they constantly deal
with. That traditionalism is deemed the dominant mode of orientation also does not
imply the absence of specific political ideologies which the religious elite uphold.
TRADITIONALISM
The term traditionalism has been used by many scholars in different ways. To avoid
confusion, it is important to define the way the term is used in this study. Mannheim
(1986) explicates traditionalism as a dogmatic attitude that clings firmly to old ways,
resisting innovations or accepting them unwillingly. The fear or rejection of
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innovation is not based upon reflection or careful deliberation. Traditionalism has
also been defined as a form of religious belief. Towler (1986) characterizes religious
traditionalism as the blind, emotional adherence to selected traditions transmitted
from the past and a marked attitude that is non‐questioning. In this style of belief,
one cannot explain what is believed; rather, the best one can do is to recite or quote
a verse from sacred texts. Furthermore, the selection of religious traditions inherited
from scholars of the past are deemed absolute, immutable and binding, without
need to justify the bases of selection amid the existence of different readings of the
same traditions or other conflicting traditions. Not only are the religious traditions
cherished, there is an overriding tendency to respect and jealously guard them at all
costs. According to Towler,
“Traditionalism as a type of religious attitude is marked by a
certainty which is unquestioning. It is not only certain, it is
delighted by its certainty, for the stable and secure order which it
knows is something to guard and cherish.” (90‐91)
Hence, to question traditions and the authorities who narrate them is deemed
sacrilegious. As Towler puts it, “The implicit plea which underlies traditionalism is not
for questions to be answered, but for all questioning to be taken away and put under
lock and key of a trustworthy authority” (90‐91).
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Yet, these traditions, which are seen as complete, final, binding, and
immutable, are essentially particular selective traditions from the past.
Traditionalism denies other relevant traditions on similar issues that differ from the
ones selected and upheld. In many Muslim societies today, such orientations are
epitomized in the approaches towards the Sunnah of the Prophet, the commentaries
of the Quran, and the legal judgements of the classical jurists, even though all these
sources have been subjected to many competing authorities and interpretations (El‐
Fadl 2001a, 6‐7, 87‐89; Ramadan 2004; Saeed, 2007). Yet, these competing
interpretations are overlooked, if not ignored, within the mode of thinking or
attitude that is strongly characterised by unquestioning reliance on selective sources
and authorities derived from pious savants of the past.
Hence, traditionalism is generally resistant towards any changes, innovations,
and reforms. The predominant attitude towards a tradition, thus, is that it is ‘the
same as yesterday, today and forever’ (Towler, 84). There is the strong sense of
necessity of believing rather than what is believed. The strong reservations towards
the use of reason and principles underlying religious traditions correlate with the
overemphasis on the literal or textual expression of sources, while ignoring their
repercussions on the lives of people. Dogmatically clinging on to selective opinions,
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and treating these as ultimate truths may result in labelling others which conflict
with their selection as ‘non‐Islamic’ or ‘deviant’. The refusal to evaluate counter
discourses is often treated as synonymous with the ‘defence of Islamic traditions.’
Traditionalism does not distinguish ideas and teachings which are products of
specific socio‐historical epochs and their underlying universal moral and ethical
principles (Noor Aisha 2008, 253). They tend to see them as all encompassing to the
extent that they can provide ‘ready made’ solutions to all problems by simply
‘rehearsing the solutions in solemn fashion’ (Towler, 86). Hence, traditionalism often
points to the perfectibility of the ‘past’. They assume that religious traditions of the
past can be transferred, practiced, and applied to present situations without any
fears of impending incongruence or mismatch. These past religious traditions
provide the ‘instant fix’ to any contemporary problems. Problems of the
contemporary world are often diagnosed as neglect or deviation from these models
of the past. Therefore, there is less need to grapple with contemporary ideas,
theories, and knowledge, for these past models assure success and are sufficient for
mankind. New perspectives and alternative approaches to understanding religious
sources are recurrently seen as conflicting with traditions. This inhibits critical
thinking and re‐evaluation of sources and traditions that is necessary and relevant to
the lived experiences and challenges of contemporary Muslims.
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This definition of traditionalism does not refer to an orientation that is rooted
in tradition and is self‐conscious about preserving and promoting it. It also does not
refer to varying degrees of dogmatic acceptance of traditions. It is important to
emphasise that the concept used here is not about the desire to preserve or
promote traditions, but the mode of thinking in which this is achieved. Given its
salient traits as explicated above, traditionalism is in essence at odds with
reformism. It can be referred to as conservative if it proceeds to become self
conscious in preserving its basic paradigm in facing challenges posed by contending
groups (Mannheim 1986, 72‐77).
Used in the sense defined above, traditionalism is also not intertwined with the
debates surrounding the acceptance of the Sunnah or Hadith of the Prophet, the
second most sacred guide to the Muslims after the Quran, or the system of
transmission of traditions, namely the isnad paradigm (of Hadith) and the ijazah
method of personal authorization commonly associated with the Sufis. Graham
(1993), for instance, is one example that illustrates such usage. Equating these
sources and systems as traditionalism, he concludes that,
“It is in this spirit that the Muslim spirit of traditionalism lies, not
in some imagined atavism, regressivism, fatalism, or rejection of
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change and challenge‐ especially since this same traditional
ittisaliyah has served modernists as well as reactionaries as
authority for their ideas.” (522)
In contrast, traditionalism in this study has nothing to do with upholding the Sunnah
or Hadith or the ijazah system as such, but the unquestioning mode of thinking
about these sources and traditions. In other words, a Muslim can uphold the Sunnah
and Hadith, while not subscribing to traditionalism as a mode of thinking about their
contents.
Traditionalism is also distinguished from the concept of tradition which has
often been used interchangeably with it (Shepard 1987, 319).7 Tradition refers to the
value systems which have been influential in moulding or shaping the world‐view of
a given people for a significant period in their cultural history; and provides a stable
core which guides the society’s responses to contemporary problems and future
challenges. The nature and premise of tradition itself promotes progress which
caters for adjustments, adaptations, assimilation of new elements, and the
discarding of obsolete ones; whilst simultaneously maintaining the basic or
fundamental elements of the cultural heritage of the past (Shaharuddin 1992, 242‐
7
As a result of equating tradition and traditionalists, Shepard concludes that it is unfair to accuse
traditionalists of rigid conservatism. Hence, his reference to these terms differs from the way they are
used in this study.
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243). Whether or not tradition is dynamic is conditioned by social actors who uphold
it. According to Shils,
“There is something in tradition which calls forth a desire to
change it by making improvements in it. There is an unceasing
striving in the strongest human minds for ‘better’ truth, for
greater clarity and coherence, and for adequacy of expression of
the perceived and imagined.” (Shils 1981, 214)
The meaning of traditionalism is also distinguished from mere reference to
issues and problems of the past. In other words, the concept of traditionalism is not
one that is issue‐centred or merely associated with issues or problems that are
lodged in the past. The problems of modern societies, such as the ‘state’ or the
modern economic system can be the basis of discourse within traditionalism.
References to these modern issues and constructs do not render the mode of
thinking of the religious elite less traditionalistic.
Traditionalism in the Malay World
The dominance of traditionalism as a style of thought in the domain of religion could
have been conditioned by several socio‐historical factors. Historically, Islam was
woven into a Malay society that was largely feudal. Within the absolutism of Malay
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feudalism, the ruling class defined and monopolized the important ideas and values
of the society at large.8 As a potent political force, religion was subjected to the
authority and ideological interests of the ruling class with consequences on the
religious consciousness of the society as a whole (Shaharuddin 2002, 1). The classical
Malay texts such as the Malay Annals or Sejarah Melayu, originally entitled Sulalatul‐
Salatin and commissioned by the Ruler Sultan Mahmud, depicted the kind of
religious orientation in Malay feudalism which was characterised by magic, fear of
authority, unquestioning loyalty to authority, symbolism, occationalism, indifference
towards social justice, and dualism (anti‐thesis between world and hereafter). Such
ideas were deeply entrenched in the feudal society and propagated by the ruling
class in order to keep themselves in power (Ibid). Notably also, that feudal
arrangement had impeded the formation of a strong alternative religious
orientation. Although progressive orientation was evident in the 17th century
medieval Malay text Tajus Salatin, which made references to the existence of Sufistic
humanism with its emphasis on the centrality of Man and the ideal of the human
personality (Azhar 2008b, 14), their influence remained marginal in the political and
intellectual climate of Malay feudalism.
8
One cannot underestimate that Islam spread rapidly to many parts of the Malay world during the
Malacca Sultanate (Hussin 2008, 25).
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Such a feudal religious culture persisted centuries later as reflected in Abdullah
Munshi’s account of the Malay feudal society in his Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah, during
his voyage to Kelantan (from Singapore) in 1838. Abdullah observed the neglect of
important areas of social reform and human development such as education,
environment, and abolition of vices (Shaharuddin 1988, 32). The impact of this
culture on the religious domain is well illustrated by Abdullah’s observations to the
effect that the religious life of the Malays was highly ritualistic, in that they read the
Quran without understanding it. The conspicuous neglect of Islamic values was also
evident; prostitution, gambling, opium smoking and cock‐fighting were ubiquitous
and tolerated by the oppressive ruling class (Ibid, 35).
Almost three centuries of colonialism also did not bring about a significant
transformation in the religious domain of the Malays. Modernization was thrust
upon Malay society rather than through internal reform (Shaharuddin 1992, 253‐
254). Furthermore, while the authority of the British in terms of politics and
economics increased with the signing of the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, the position
of the Sultans was enhanced as the custodian of Islam and Malay culture. British
colonialism did not facilitate any significant revolution in terms of religious ideas,
thinking, and modernization, which were still intertwined with feudal elements and
worldview. Even when Malays were allowed to enter the government‐run schools,
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they were taught feudal romances and Hikayat instead of the sciences. While
reformist ideas did exist, their impact was checked under the weight of Malay
feudalism that persisted during colonialism. Efforts at reform of religious education
made little progress. Some alternative madrasah, such as Al‐Iqbal, aspired for
change in religious orientation through education, was closed down one year after
its inception in 1907, due to the lack of community support and funding (Mukhlis
2006, 33).
This was exacerbated by British attitude towards religious groups that
clamoured for reforms by attacking the traditional religious leadership. Reformist
ideologies did arrive in the Malay world via contacts some had with the Middle
Eastern and South Asian Islamic reformers in the early 20th century (Roff 1994, 67‐
96).9 Traditional religious elite were challenged by members of the Kaum Muda such
as Syed Sheikh Al‐Hadi and Haji Abbas Taha, through the publication of periodicals
9
The reformist group (Kaum Muda) was heavily influenced by the modernist movements in Egypt led
by Mufti Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. These reformers in the Malay world were critical of
economic underdevelopment of the Malays as well as towards traditionalist religious elite (Kaum
Tua), who they accused of taqlid buta or blind faith. The Kaum Tua group was largely part of the state
establishment. The Kaum Muda faction, on the other hand, was more activistic in their approach, and
was committed towards social transformation through the greater use of akal (reason) in approaching
Islam.
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such as Al‐Imam, Al‐Ikhwan, and Saudara. Nevertheless, the impact of these
publications was marginal and they were not widely circulated.10
Traditionalism was further reinforced by the impact of the Islamic resurgence
which began in 1970s. The wave of Islamic resurgence did not free the Muslims from
the traditionalist shackle. Conversely, traditionalism was further entrenched, taking
on a more utopian mode and language. The way the resurgent groups understand
the Quranic verse of ‘Islam as Ad‐Din’ or a complete way of life reinforced the
appeal to an Islamic order that is fixed and immutable. The resurgent movements
invoked concepts such as Islamic state, Islamic development, Islamic economy,
Islamic banking, Islamic sciences and Islamic solutions to problems, based on the
understanding that these existed in the past. However, they scorned upon
intellectual inquiry of their position and do not aspire for an intellectual defence of
their ideas (Shaharuddin 2006, 319). According to Noor Aisha (2008),
“They utilize the labels and terminologies of modern systems and
concepts, interweaving them into their construction of an Islamic
10
Refer to Chandra (1978). Chandra highlighted several reasons for the failure of the reform
movement to establish itself as a force in Malay society. They include (1) the reform movement being
weak, (2) the failure to recognize their audience and how to communicate with them, and (3) the
suppression of their publications and periodicals by the British (in 1925‐1926). For instance, an
amendment to the Muhammadan Laws Enactment of 1904 was passed in 1925‐1926 to provide
“severe penalties for anyone printing or publishing literature concerning Islamic religion without
written permission of the Sultan in Council.” (259‐262) This resulted in the prohibition of books and
newspapers from entering the Peninsular.
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past with the overriding aim of demonstrating that not only was a
concept, principle, knowledge or institution found back then, they
are also more superior to the present. However, far from being
intellectual in terms of their insights, reasoning and perspective,
their arguments are generally rhetorical.” (262)
Apart from these factors which may have contributed to its predominance,
the institutions where these religious elite are trained, and the mode of religious
instruction they received, may also account for the persistence of traditionalism.
There are several preferred Islamic universities and madrasahs which the religious
elite attend. Many pursue their tertiary religious education either from the Al‐Azhar
University (Cairo), Darul‐Ulum Deobandi (Pakistan),11 Islamic University of Madinah
(Saudi Arabia), Yarmouk University (Jordan), or the International Islamic University
Malaysia (Malaysia). For instance, Nik Aziz graduated from the Al‐Azhar University
after studying at the Darul‐Ulum Deobandi. Similarly, Dr Haron Din, Siti Noor Bahyah,
and Hassan Ahmad all graduated from Al‐Azhar University. Both Dr Zahazan and Dr
Mohd Asri received their training at the Yarmouk University in Jordan, and had some
affiliations, either as teaching staff or student, with the International Islamic
University of Malaysia (IIUM).12 Madinah University was the institution where Hadi
Awang obtained his BA in Shariah law. Harussani, the Mufti of Perak, completed his
11
For an account of the kinds of religious training conducted in Madrasah Darul Ulum Deobandi
today, see the travelogue written by Farish (2009, 78‐96)
12
Dr Mohd Asri later studied at the International Islamic University of Malaysia for his PhD.
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diploma in a local Islamic college. Mohammad Nidzam, along with a few others,
graduated from International Islamic University of Malaysia.
There are others who did their higher degrees in non‐religious fields including
those from Western universities. However, their religious training came mainly from
local institutions. Ismail Kamus studied at UKM but received his religious training at
the local Kolej Islam Kelang. Dr Ridhwan Tee, for instance, was trained as a political
scientist, but he received his religious training from the International Islamic
University of Malaysia. Dr Yusri Mohammad, the former President of ABIM, studied
at School of Oriental and African Studies (UK) and majored in law at the
International Islamic University of Malaysia.
By and large, however, religious pedagogy even in Al‐Azhar University is
steeped in traditionalism. As the late Muslim thinker Fazlur Rahman had pointed
out, traditional religious education in Al‐Azhar remains outmoded, lacking creativity
and intellectual adventurousness. The fact that the curriculum of the madrasahs and
universities of the Sunni Muslim world is fashioned largely towards Al‐Azhar’s
structure exacerbates the intellectual crisis in the Muslim world even further (Azhar
2006, 113‐114). Generally, Islamic education in these institutions still promotes
memorization (of the Quran and Hadith) and the compulsory reading of classical
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texts as their primary mode of learning, at the expense of cultivating critical thinking
and analytical skills which could have contributed to the development of an
intellectual culture to counter traditionalism. In fact, some other traits of Islamic
traditional religious education and pedagogy highlighted by Hoodboy (1992), such as
the dominance of other‐worldly orientation, the authoritarian teaching style, the
notion that knowledge is revealed and hence unchallengeable, and the mindset of
student that is passive‐receptive (123), still applies to these institutions.
Nonetheless, one must not conclude that the dominance of traditionalism is
solely contingent upon the religious institutions the elite graduated from as there
may be other intervening factors. The fact that there are graduates from the
universities mentioned above who do not reflect traditionalism in their writings and
sermons caution against overemphasising this factor.13
LITERATURE REVIEW
Works that examine traditionalism as a form of religious orientation of the religious
elite in Malay society are few compared to the literature that centres on (1) statist
Islam or Islam as situated within or around the UMNO‐PAS dichotomy and Islamic
13
For instance, the late Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh, who is widely recognized as progressive
in his ideas, was a graduate of Al‐Azhar. Osman (1961, 1490) remarked that nobody has contributed
to the renaissance of Muslim thought in modern Egypt more than Abduh. For a biography of Abduh
and his contribution to Islamic thought, see Osman (1961)
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institutions, (2) Islamization as linked to the global phenomenon of Islamic
resurgence, and (3) biographical and textual, which glorify the contributions of
Islamic personalities, leaders, and icons. However, although these major themes do
not delve into the problem of orientation, they are nonetheless relevant to providing
the necessary socio‐historical backdrop for this study.
Works on statist Islam tackle the role and impact of UMNO and PAS, the
strongest Malay‐Muslim, grassroots‐based political parties in Malaysia today. These
two parties have been at the forefront in the nation‐building process, and are widely
identified as the focal shapers of the contemporary discourse on Islam. Some of the
more recent works that look at Islam through the lens of statism include Liow (2003),
Amrita (2003), Kamarulnizam (2002), Farish (2004) and Ahmad Fauzi (2006). They
primarily cover the socio‐historical origins and developments of the parties and their
ideological leanings. Central to these works is the parties’ electoral and political
strategies, political goals, organization, evolution, and leadership; in attempting to
garner the support of the Malay‐Muslim electorate. This thesis which focuses on the
dominant mode of thinking of the religious personalities and office bearers from
both parties, including Nik Aziz, Abdul Hadi Awang, Haron Din (all from PAS), and
Abdul Hamid Othman (from UMNO), is informed by the backdrop of the wider
religio‐political dialectics captured in their works.
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Discourses in Malaysia on Islam are also tied to the developments in the
Islamic world in the late 1970s. The Islamic resurgence movement was sparked by
the Iranian Revolution with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan (Interview with Chandra). This development, coupled with the
massive sponsorship by Saudi Arabia’s ‘petro‐dollars,’ had led to the booming of
dakwah movements in many parts of the Islamic world including Malaysia. This
phenomenon had also led to great academic interests, bearing witness to the high
number of works dealing with it. Some of the writers that focus on this phenomenon
include Nagata (1984), Chandra (1987), Zainah (1987), Jomo and Shabery (1988), and
Hussin (1990). Their works move away from solely focussing on political parties and
the state as the main actors of Islamization by paying more attention to the civil
society movement and advocacy networks. Among some of the influential
organizations highlighted in their works include ABIM, Darul Arqam, Tabligh, Perkim,
Aliran, as well as other no less significant Islamic student organizations in university
campuses.
These works serve as a good starting point for this study for mainly three
reasons. Firstly, they provide the backdrop for the kinds of issues that have emerged
in recent years by groups and movements. These resurgent ideas resonate well
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among the masses, especially those who felt marginalised by the state. Secondly,
they feature a number of religious personalities who are important in sustaining the
course of their respective movements. The works by Hussin and Zainah are
particularly useful for their works provide insights, by way of some interviews, of the
thinking and ideas of dominant personalities relevant to this study. Thirdly, the
generation that actively led the resurgence movement in villages and campuses back
in the 1980s today occupy key positions in key institutions. They are the leaders and
dominant players of influential Islamic‐NGOs, universities, religious bureaucracies,
and political parties, some of whom are the subject of analysis of this study.
Another dominant trend in the study of Islam in Malaysia is the biographical
and textual analysis. The biographical and textual approach examines the
contributions of prominent personalities in the Islamization process. The writers who
have utilised this approach include Ibrahim (1974), Abdullah Al‐ Qarni (1974), Ismail
Mat (1992), Ismail Che Daud (1992), Hooker (2000), and Aveling (2000), Riddell
(2003), Cheah (2006), Riduan and Mohd Fadli (2007), and Ismail Said (2008). Most of
their works tend to glorify the personalities or Ulama studied, stressing their
sacrifices and role in mobilizing the society for collective action and social
movements against the colonial masters. This approach also covers the writings of
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religious personalities and intellectuals, and they include literary works (novels and
poems).
These works are also relevant to this study as they provide a useful historical
account of Islamization in the Malay world during the colonial and early post‐colonial
period. Besides, some of these works also point out the ideas and philosophy of the
past generations of Islamic personalities in the Malay world such as Tok Kenali, Tok
Janggut, Syeikh Daud Al‐Fathani and Burhanuddin Al‐Helmy. 14 Others appraise the
writings of contemporary intellectuals and politicians such as Professor Syed Naquib
Al‐Attas and Shanon Ahmad, some of whom are the teachers and mentors of the
contemporary religious elite being studied in this thesis. These works are also
valuable to this study because they provide the background for our understanding of
the continuity or change in the religious orientation of the religious elite.
Apart from these, there are works that focus on the study of orientations in
general. Among these is Alatas’s typology of human types.15 In his work Kita Dengan
14
It was noted that, Nik Aziz’s father, Ustaz Nik Mat, was a student of Tok Kenali. Nik Aziz is the
Murshidul Am of PAS today. See Farish (2004, 474).
15
Bearing a similar theme, Alatas (1974) wrote Biarkan Buta. This work exposed and censured the
style of thinking of the Singapore religious elite, namely the Mufti and religious officials in religious
council (MUIS), for their restrictive and conservative interpretation of religious doctrines. Alatas
criticized a fatwa issued in the 1970s that cornea transplant from a deceased body as forbidden in
Islam by providing alternative traditions and humanistic and ethical reasoning for its permissibility.
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Islam (1978), specifically his chapter ‘The New‐Man in Islam’ (107‐146),16 Alatas
discusses the thinking of several progressive Muslim elite in Indonesia such as Tan
Melaka, Sukarno, and Syafruddin. He also analyzes the problems in the mode of
thinking of prominent personalities such as Mawdudi. His discussion highlights the
problem of orientation in human‐types and their consequences on progress and
development of the Muslims.
More explicitly, Shaharuddin’s (2002 and 2006) works have sought to uncover
the socio‐historical conditioning of groups’ styles of thinking, such as those found
during Malay feudalism and the utopian mentality of the resurgence groups of the
1970s. By applying the sociology of knowledge approach of Karl Mannheim,
Shaharuddin also went on to delineate the characteristics of their approach to how
Islam is conceptualized and experienced, and discussed the implications of such
orientation on the Malay community. The recent contribution by Norani, Zainah, and
Zaitun (2005) is no less relevant. The work highlights elements of extremism and
fundamentalism in the perspective of prominent activists and politicians in their
discourse on women in contemporary Malaysia. It also examines how these
elements are concretised in the form of laws and enactments passed and their
negative impact on women.
16
See the Chapter 18 ‘Jenis Manusia Baru Dalam Masyarakat Islam’.
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By and large, the study of traditionalism as a form of religious orientation
amongst the Malays is still underdeveloped. Nevertheless, it has been developed by
Muslim scholars in their research on Muslims in other parts of the world. One
notable scholar who has deployed this approach without using the term
traditionalism specifically is Khaled El‐Fadl, whose work Speaking in God’s Name
(2001a), among many others, discusses the mode of thinking in fatwa deliberations
and formulation on issues pertaining to women and law in Arabian society. The
central focus of the book is an evaluation of the style of thought of the CRLO
(Permanent Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions) in Saudi Arabia.
Though the term ‘traditionalism’ is not used in his work, the traits of the mode of
thinking, which he defines as authoritarian, bears very similar characteristics to
traditionalism. Likewise in The Great Theft, El‐Fadl (2007) problematizes the mode of
thinking of puritanical groups, namely Wahabism.
Similarly, Shahadeh’s The Idea of Women under Fundamentalist Islam (2003)
provides a critical evaluation of the mode of fundamentalist thought in the religious
ideas of prominent Muslim personalities and ideologues, such as Hassan‐Al Banna,
Mawdudi, Khomeini, Hasan al‐Turabi, and Sayyid Qutb on women. Shahadeh traces
the commonalities underlying their portrayal of men and women, their ideal roles in
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society, and the implication they have on facilitating adjustment to the modern
world.
Arslan’s (1952) critique of conservative traditional ulama also hinges on the
traits of religious traditionalism. In his diagnosis of the causes of decline of Muslim
civilization, he identified, among others, factors such as their poor mastery of
modern sciences and ambivalence in the use of reason. Alatas (1954) too had, in his
discussion of the problem of Muslim religious elite in general, highlighted the
problem of traditionalism as a major impediment to alleviating the problems of
Muslims in the midst of modernization.
The term ‘traditionalism’ as defined in this study has also been used in the
same manner in the works of some Muslim scholars such as Saeed (2007), Ramadan
(2004) and Khundmiri (2001), where the salient traits of this mode of thinking
feature in their analysis of religious thought in Muslim history and society. Saeed and
Ramadan applied the concept in relation to Islamic jurisprudence, law, and
scholarship. Ramadan, for instance, coined the term ‘scholastic traditionalism’ to
refer to the uncritical acceptance of one or other school of jurisprudence (the Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali, Zaydi, Jafari), where scope for interpretation of these works
are very limited and does not allow for development (2004, 24). In the same vein,
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Saeed used the term ‘legalist traditionalists’ to describe blind faith (taqlid)
particularly in matters pertaining to jurisprudence and law (2007, 397). Khundmiri in
his discussion on traditionalism depicted its incongruence in relation to the demands
of modernization. His critique of religious men who sought guidance from religious
theology of the past even in matters which could easily be guided by human reason
and experience illustrates its salient traits.
In the case of the Malays, an early work that highlighted the problems of
traditionalism in the Malay world is Al‐Hady’s Ugama Islam dan Akal (Islam and
Reason) written in 1931. Al‐Hady’s critique centres on religious traditionalism of the
dominant religious elite as contributing to the development lag in Malay society. He
made a strong argument regarding the permissibility and advantages of the use of
reason with the very sources used by the traditional religious elite and emphasized
the importance of Islamic philosophy and ethics, in advocating for a more rational
and individualistic approach to religion.17
Some insights on traditionalism can also be found in Chandra’s evaluation of
the ideas of Islamic revivalist groups and movements in his Islamic Resurgence in
Malaysia (1986). In his assessment of ideas of several influential electoral and non‐
17
See a reprinted version Al‐Hady (1965)
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electoral actors such as PAS, ABIM, Tabligh and Darul Arqam, Chandra highlighted
the mode of religious traditionalism and analyzes its impact on man and society.
More recent studies on traditionalism in Malay society include the works by
Noor Aisha (2008) and Azhar (2001). Noor Aisha applied the concept of
traditionalism to understanding the religious orientation of the religious elite in
Singapore, particularly their response towards modern knowledge and science, while
Azhar (2001) delineates its traits in relation to the religious life of the Malay society
in general. In a later work, Azhar discussed the competing orientations of
traditionalism and reformism, and their manifestation in the public religious debates
in Singapore (Azhar 2008a). Given the dearth of scholarship on this particular type of
religious orientation amongst the Malays, this study hopes to contribute to filling the
lacunae.
THEMES OF STUDY
It would not be possible for the purpose of this study to include all the issues
discussed by the religious elite as they are far too many. The four themes that are
selected are not only the major issues in the religious discourse in Malaysia, they are
also the dominant ones that are found in the thinking of the religious elite.
Moreover, these are the themes which in recent years have been under intense
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debates and contestations, and have sparked much controversy. For the discussion
of each theme, I shall restrict my selection between five to ten religious elite, who
frequently discuss the particular themes and are those commonly identified as
authorities or specialists in it. These five to ten religious elite will be treated as my
study samples for each issue. Each of these themes shall constitute the focus of
individual chapters. We seek to portray and analyze how ideas pertaining to these
themes reveal the salient traits of traditionalism and its implications.
In Chapter 2, we shall discuss the issue pertaining to women and Islam, which is
a major theme in the current discourse of the prominent religious elite in Malaysia.
This chapter examines the concerns of the religious elite pertaining to women and
gender, and their roles in modern society. It also reveals how certain social problems
rampant in Malaysian society are encapsulated through the lens of gender. Among
the issues discussed include the portrayal of women, their domestic versus public
roles, theological injunctions relating to women and conception of leadership,
women’s status in Islam, and issues on the administration of morality with
implications on women. To give an unbiased discussion, the views of women
religious elite are also included in this chapter. This chapter shall basically highlight
the prevalence of androcentrism in traditionalist discourse.
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Chapter 3 shall examine the religious elite’s ideas pertaining to the concept of
Islamic State. This chapter shall analyze several issues such as the understanding of
an ideal Islamic state, the concept of leadership, political philosophy and system,
laws, and institutions. It also deals with issues relating to governance and the status
of minorities. Although at the centre of the Islamic state debate would be the
religious elite identified with UMNO and JAKIM and the opposition PAS, this chapter
shall also cover the outlook of the politically ‘neutral’ ones. We shall also explore the
relevance of the concept of utopian mentality and how it is woven into
traditionalism in analyzing the style of thought of the religious elite.
Chapter 4 examines the debates surrounding the Islamization of Malay culture
and Malaynizing of Islam (localizing Islam). Against the backdrop of Islamic
resurgence, this chapter focuses on the religious elite’s views and attitude towards
Malay culture, rituals, customs or adat, and folk beliefs.
Finally in Chapter 5, we examine the ideas of the religious elite on the ‘Other’.
The ‘Other’ here refers to groups that are not part of the ‘mainstream’. It can mean
people of other faiths and ethnicity, and even Muslims with different religious
orientations as well. In this chapter, I shall observe the ‘construction of the deviant’
by the religious elite towards those whom they see as not part of the Ahlus Sunnah
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Wal Jamaah (ASWJ). The chapter also examines the religious elite’s views on inter‐
religious and intra‐religious relations.
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CHAPTER 2- VEILING AND DOMESTICATING
WOMEN
INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to discuss how traditionalism shapes the religious discourse of the
contemporary Malaysian religious elite on women. The focus is how the image of
women and their roles and status in society are caricaturized and portrayed. While
Islam is always sought for solutions concerning problems of men, women, and
society, this chapter examines how traditionalism influences their conceptualization
of women and shape perspective on issues relating to them. It also analyses the
impact of traditionalism on ideas of women, on themselves, and the larger society
more generally. The focus is on the more prominent trend setters of the Islamic
discourses on women. They include inter alia Nik Aziz, Dr Haron Din, Dr Mohd Asri,
Harussani Zakaria, Nooh Gadut, Dr Ridhwan Tee, and Dr Yusri Mohamad. The views
of two prominent women who are part of the religious elite are also included as my
case studies, namely Dr Sharifah Hayaati and Siti Nor Bahyah. Their views on issues
relating to women and gender roles in society are widely disseminated in Malaysia.
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ISLAM HAS EMANCIPATED WOMEN
A common view generally upheld by the religious elite is that the arrival of Islam
1400 years ago had emancipated women from the harsh treatment, discrimination,
and marginalization by men in pre‐Islamic societies. Islam had for instance put an
end to the cultural practice of the Arabs that permitted female infanticide because of
the misfortune they might bring. Islam is also believed to have introduced a number
of significant reforms that provided women with rights hitherto unknown including
inheritance, entering into contracts and having ownership of property in their own
name, and many other radical changes within the domestic and public realms. The
religious elite generally concur with this view. They opine that had it not been for the
spread of Islam, women will, to the present day, be living under the oppressive
jahilliyya (uncivilized) condition. Nooh Gadut (2006), the ex‐Mufti of Johore, argues
that, “Islam had raised the standards of women, where they have been liberated
from the practices of jahiliyya which oppressed and marginalized them” (19).
While there is no doubt that Islamic values and teachings have in many ways
raised the standards of women’s conditions and their lives in the past, traditionalists
succumb to the overriding belief that the impact of Islamic teachings and injunctions
pertaining to women and gender are fixed, perfect, and immutable. Hence, all
rulings, laws and religious opinions from the past are not subject to any re‐thinking
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or re‐evaluation. In this respect, the religious elite dogmatically cling on to selected
religious traditions that have been transmitted for generations as the sole
authoritative rulings on women and gender relations.
Alternative religious sources ascribed to the Prophet or his companions which
depart from their selection of Islamic traditions are not considered or may even be
deemed to deviate from Islam even if they facilitate adjustments to change and
improve women’s conditions. Furthermore, principles and values of the religion,
though eternal, are not regarded as Islamic if they are not based on selective
traditions deemed complete and binding. For instance, Dr Mohd Asri, formerly the
Mufti of Perlis, opines that:
“After analyzing carefully, all of the Prophet’s Hadith, all the rulings and
judgments on women are fair and neutral. They do not negate the
rights of others. Unfortunately, certain groups try to fight for women’s
rights without referring to the Hadith at all.” (2006a, 83‐84)18
Hence, one cannot rely on universal moral principles and values that are
encapsulated by the religion without citing a Hadith that is deemed valid. By the
Prophet’s Hadith here, traditionalists refer to those that are passed down or
18
rd
This stand was reiterated during my interview with Dr Mohd Asri on the 3 November 2009.
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transmitted to them to the exclusion of others. What is Islamic is not judged on the
basis of principles, ethical values, and context, but whether it is lodged in selective
traditions of the past upheld by the group. To them, one cannot speak about Islam
without directly citing particular Hadith that they themselves uphold and cherish.
The view of the perfectibility of the selected opinions of savants of the past has
impeded efforts towards the betterment of women’s socio‐economic conditions.
Undeniably, the Prophet had during his lifetime tirelessly fought for the rights and
sanctity of women to be restored. However, the Prophet was responding to the
socio‐cultural circumstances during his time (Masud 2009, 85). 1400 years have
passed since the Prophet’s demise, yet, fresh attempts to revive the spirit and
mission of reforms towards women by the religious elite to meet the Quranic ideals
of justice and equality is still wanting. While time and again the traditions of the
Prophet which emphasizes the equality of men and women are cited, traditionalists
have a rigid orientation towards the definition of equality, which they claim was the
standard set by the Prophet. Although Islamic basic principle of equality is not
doubted, how it is understood reveals the overreliance of religious traditions that
emerge in the past.
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The evidence of traditionalism is also apparent judging from the simplistic
response given when diagnosing problems confronting women today. More often
than not, the origin and nature of problems are not objectively analyzed, but simply
attributed to the lack of Islam. Dr Yusri Mohamad, the sixth President of ABIM,
believes that the problems facing women in Malaysia result from the lack of
understanding about ‘true’ Islam, and also because the women themselves are being
negatively influenced by foreign cultures and values. Dr Yusri opines that:
“Muslim women in Malaysia are suffering because of the lack of
Islam, Islamic education, and awareness. There is too much exposure
to other competing values such as Bollywood and Hollywood.”
(Interview with Dr Yusri)
He also believes that the Islamization process in Malaysia is a work in progress, and
it should be given time to prove its worth in solving many contemporary issues
facing women in Malaysia and in other parts of the Islamic world (Interview with Dr
Yusri). His condemnation of the whole entertainment industry is not only rhetorical,
but also shows no attempt whatsoever to discern between progressive influences
and those that do not contribute to the development of women. Anything novel or
new is perceived as emanating from the West or other cultures which must be
shunned for fear it will undermine women’s dignity which has been guaranteed by
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Islamic religious traditions. Such views also assume that societies can be isolated
from outside influences, which is not in sync with reality.
DOMESTIC ROLES OF WOMEN AND THE SUPERIORITY OF MEN
To the traditionalist, Islam has not only emancipated women, but has clearly
assigned them defined roles in society. Essentially, the ideal and best place for
women is in the home. Ideally, women are prohibited from playing any role that
transcends the domain of the family and household and leaving the confines of
domestic domains is contingent on exigent circumstances. Nik Aziz, the Murshidul
Am (Spiritual Guide) of PAS and a veteran politician, in highlighting one of the
characteristics of an ideal wife explicates that, “A pious wife is one who restricts her
activities to the home, and leaves her house only when circumstances force her to
do so” (Nik Aziz 2007, 12). This view is shared by Dr Haron Din, the Deputy Murshidul
Am of PAS, when he commented on Surah An‐Nur verse 31. The verse states that:
“And say to the believing women that they should lower their
gaze and guard their modesty, that they should not display their
beauty and ornaments except what (they ordinarily) appear
thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and
not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers,
their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their
brothers and their brothers’ sons , or their sisters’ sons, or their
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women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male
servants free of physical needs, or small children who have no
sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their
feet to attract attention to their hidden ornaments. O you
Believers! Turn you all together towards God, that you may attain
Bliss. “19
Interestingly, Dr Haron Din (2007a) interprets this verse to mean that, “Women
must obey God’s orders. Islam has instructed women to stay at home because their
honour will be well protected there. Only by doing so can they carry out their
responsibilities towards their husbands, children, and household. Women should not
go out (of their houses) unless for important reasons” (18). Although the verse does
not speak directly about women and work outside the home, Dr Haron Din
maintains it as a Quranic injunction. The notion that women are obliged religiously
to stay at home as pointed out by Dr Haron may well be based on a certain selected
Hadith which ignores other traditions. It was reported that the women in Medina
(the Ansars) were more involved, bolder and assertive. The Prophet’s Meccan wife,
Aishah, was reported to have remarked that, “Blessed be the women of Ansar,
modesty did not prevent them from seeking knowledge” (Ramadan 2009, 98). This
19
Translation of Surah An Nur verse 31 by Abdullah Yusof Ali (1996, 352).
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proves that women during the time of the Prophet had been actively involved in
matters outside the traditional confines of the home.
Gender roles in society are also deemed to have been fixed till eternity by
Islam. Apart from distinction based on physical and psychological attributes, women
are also deemed to be more emotional and men more rational. Given this
distinction, their prescribed roles differ. Women function best as care‐givers while
men’s primary obligation is to maintain their wives. Verse 34 of Surah An‐Nisa is
often cited to justify this claim. The verse states that:
“Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has
given them more (strength) than other, and because they support them
from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient,
and guard in (the husband’s) absence what God would have them guard.
As to those women on whose part you fear disloyalty and ill‐conduct,
admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat
them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them
means (of annoyance): for God is Most High, Great (above you all).”20
In commenting on the verse above, Dr Haron Din (2007a) deduced that “Men
are naturally talented and possess the necessary qualities in management and
20
Translation by Abdullah Yusof Ali, (91).
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leadership, namely in the affairs of the public sphere. This is in line with the different
physical attributes of men”(26). To him, the role of the men to provide for women
regardless of different societal conditions is deemed as non‐negotiable. This view
ignores many other opinions that have translated this verse to mean that the
position of maintainer, guardian, or protector is based on objective capacities which
can be fulfilled by either men or women. If a woman is the one who provides the
financial support, then she becomes the one entrusted with the burden of
guardianship. Similarly, if the financial responsibility is shared between the partners,
then they become each other’s guardians (El‐Fadl 2001a, 210‐211).
Such views on fixed gender roles in society have three potential implications.
Firstly, it is incongruent with reality. It fails to consider that women in the 21st
century receive the same level of education as men and are very much involved in
the workforce, making the spheres of business and professions a shared
responsibility. In 2006, women’s labour participation (age 20‐45) make up to about
50‐65 percent of the total labour force in Malaysia (Siti Rohani 2009, 28). The ratio
of men and women occupying professional, technical, administrative and managerial
jobs are almost equal (Ibid, 41). The percentage of female students matriculated in
Malaysian public universities in 2005 is 63 percent (Ibid, 51), way beyond the
percentage of their male counterparts. This trend dismisses the notion that men are
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‘naturally talented’ for leadership positions. Despite the fact that women and men
have been actively involved in the public sphere, the perception of that shared
responsibility is not extended to the domestic sphere. The idea that only men can be
maintainers of their spouses entrenches the belief that women’s participation in the
public sphere is voluntary, but seeing through the needs in the domestic sphere is an
obligation and a necessity.
Secondly, traditionalism in this aspect can only contribute to dilemmas and
conflict between motherhood and career, which have negative impact on both
women, men and the family. Such dilemmas may result in women having problems
adapting to sound changes, or create unnecessary doubts and ambivalences
pertaining to work and family life. These dilemmas resemble the ‘ideological lag’
that existed in the 19th century Western Europe in the process of industrialization
and modernization, where changes to cultural attitudes and popular ideologies were
slow to correspond to material changes (Klein 1946; Noor Aisha 2007, 484). While
modernization has broken down the traditional sexual or gendered dichotomization
of roles, the notion that only women, and not men, have to see the needs of the
domestic sphere persisted. As observed by Myrdal and Klein (1956), in societies
where the perception of gender roles is clearly defined, the woman employed
outside her home would often ask herself whether she is not putting an undue strain
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on her husband by expecting him to give her a hand in handling domestic chores, or
is she perhaps too absorbed in her own affairs to be the wholehearted and devoted
listener he expects? If she has children, her doubts and guilt‐feelings will grow, such
as whether they have been given the necessary attention (142‐145).
Thirdly, having wives going to work not only challenges traditional norms; they
also serve a direct challenge to the men’s ego. Men may unnecessarily experience a
loss of dignity and self‐respect. In a study conducted on Moroccan society, Mernissi
(1975, 94‐95) observes that men generally felt his honour ‘soiled’ when women, be
they their wives, daughters, sisters or unmarried female relatives, go out to work.
Interestingly, in a study conducted by Riaz (2008), close to 80 percent of Muslims in
Malaysia, regardless of their gender, believe that if men are not in‐charge of women,
women will lose sight of all human values and the family will disintegrate (197). Such
dilemmas could certainly have been exacerbated with the dominance of
traditionalism woven into gender roles in religious teachings and ideas.
Apart from the notion that Islam has fixed gender roles in society, to be an
ideal Muslim woman, one has to fulfil several obligations in the domestic sphere.
Generally, women have always been caricaturized in terms of sexuality. One is to
have the desire to please their husbands with their looks and charm, and longing for
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romance and love. A good wife to Nik Aziz (2007) is one who constantly makes the
effort to charm their husbands with their beauty, and to speak softly so as not to rile
their husbands (12‐13). An ideal wife is also one who is loyal and obedient to their
husbands. This duty is imposed on wives without correspondingly extended to
husbands, and entrenches women’s status as subordinates to their husbands. Nik
Aziz cites a tradition believed to be ascribed to the Prophet as narrated by Abu Daud
that a wife cannot refuse her husband who desires intercourse even while riding on
a camel (Ibid, 20). Apart from being caricaturized as sexual subjects of their
husbands, Nik Aziz opines that the ideal women (wife) should be: sensitive, by not
being rude to their husbands; apologetic, by apologizing even though she is treated
unfairly; appear presentable at all times, ensuring good looks, sweetly scented, using
good language and remaining attractive at all times; and always be ready to
welcome their husbands from work at the front door everyday (Ibid, 12‐13). Nik Aziz
added women should also reflect on their inadequacies and inability to satisfy their
husbands’ desires when they face husbands who are stern and wife‐beaters (Ibid,
37).
In this respect, some religious elite opine that wife‐beating is permissible in
Islam when the wives commit nusyuz or are recalcitrant towards their husbands. The
Quranic verse 34 Surah An‐Nisa was often referred to when discussing issues
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concerning conjugal relations. Harussani Zakaria (2010), the Mufti of Perak, argues
that when advice and a three day separation from bed fail to discipline a disobedient
wife,21 a husband has the right to beat her (125). Among the offences that are
categorized as nusyuz include the wife’s refusal for intercourse, leaving her house
without the husband’s prior permission, and being rude and disobedient to her
husband.
The notion that women must be unquestioningly obedient to their husbands
ignores alternative traditions which underscore the opinion that both men and
women must equally be obedient only to God. In Islam, the conception of marriage
is not based on servitude, but on cooperation and compassion (El‐Fadl 2001a, 220).
The ultimate goal of obedience to God is not conditioned on the pleasure of another
human being. Permitting wife‐beating violates the very foundational ideals and
principles of the Quran, which promotes love, compassion, friendship, and virtue.
Compelling unquestioning reverence and blind obedience to husbands is certainly
not conducive to love and compassion as underscored by Islam. It also contradicts
the portrayals of the Prophet’s character (Ibid, 220). Furthermore, the Quran also
acknowledges the equality of men and women. Amina Wadud (2009) cites Surah Al‐
Ahzab verse 35 to substantiate this view:
21
This is based on a literal reading of the Quran which advices husbands not to engage in any forms of
sexual relations with their disobedient wives for three days as a way of disciplining them.
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“Indeed, men who surrender to Allah and women who surrender, and
men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey and
women who obey, and men who speak the truth, and women who
speak the truth, and men who persevere in patience and women who
persevere in patience, and men who are humble and women who are
humble, and men who give in alms and women who give in alms, and
men who observe the fast and women who observe the fast, and men
who guard their modesty and women who guard their modesty and
men who remember Allah much and women who remember Allah
much, Allah has prepared them forgiveness and a great reward.”
(104‐105)
As traditionalism is gender neutral, it is unsurprising that images of women
portraying their sexuality and their domestic roles are also shared by women
religious elite themselves. Selective and unquestioning reliance on religious
traditions that have negative effect on entrenching the subordinate position of
women vis‐à‐vis their spouses in a marital relationship are also utilised by them. This
relationship is one of duty to husbands, not love or compassion, without
corresponding obligations on husbands. Chief among them is Ustazah Siti Nor
Bahyah, a popular, celebrity‐styled preacher, who authored the popular work Cakar
Harimau (2005).22 This book is littered with portrayals of the roles and obligations of
22
Translated as Tigers’ Claws: Tips for a Happy Marriage.
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the ‘domestic wife’. While the book did mention that both husbands and wives
share equal responsibility, the images found in the book subscribe to the notion that
it is the duty of women, given her feminine attributes of being caring and motherly,
to take the lead in pleasing their tired, exhausted husbands.
Similarly, a recent biography of Sabariah Ishak (2009), the wife of Nik Aziz, also
conveys that the ideal role for women is in the domestic sphere (11‐13). Not only
does she feel the sense of obligation to trim Nik Aziz’s fingernails and cut his hair
regularly, she is inspired by the acts of Siti Muthiah, presumably a historical female
personality deemed as exemplary in Islam, who prepared food for her family along
with a cane, just in case the meal is less than desirable. The views of these women
certainly reflect and strengthen traditionalist discourse on women that is based on
unquestioning acceptance or selective religious traditions, despite the existence of
competing traditions on similar issues.
Traditionalism is oblivious to alternative views and fails to discuss them. The
basic principles and message of Islam‐ namely equality and justice irrespective of
gender‐ is not effectively evaluated in relation to the traditions upheld. The socio‐
historical context of the religious tradition and revelation are also not discussed. The
fact that women during the time of the Prophet, including all his wives, had
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participated in public life is often ignored. The Prophet’s first wife, Siti Khadijah, was
a well‐known, successful businesswoman. Traditionalists have also ignored the vast
number of Quranic verses which dwells upon equality of men and women in every
respect of social life. For instance, Quranic verse 71 of Surah At‐Taubah states that,
“The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is
just and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practice regular charity,
and obey God and His Messenger. On them will God pour his mercy.”23 According to
Asghar (1999), these verses prove that men and women are equal and are rewarded
equally for their good deeds and thus no distinction whatsoever be made between
them (52‐53).
LIKELIHOOD OF FITNAH AND JUSTIFICATION OF SEXUAL CRIMES
Arising from the rigid dichotomy between men’s and women’s roles and their
attributes, it follows in traditionalists’ discourse that the presence of women in the
public sphere is likely to invite fitnah. Fitnah refers to certain acts which may result
in sexual enticement. To prevent fitnah, it is best for women to remain at home and
to dress or behave appropriately when stepping out of their houses. Based on
several, yet selective, references to Quranic injunctions and Hadith pertaining to the
restrictions imposed by the Prophet during his time on women, the traditionalist
23
See translation by Abdullah Yusof(194).
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religious elite largely disapprove of women’s participation in public life at a certain
time of the day, their use of perfumes, certain types of dress code and involvement
in certain activities. It is interesting to note that in a study conducted by Riaz (2008),
89 percent of Malaysian Muslims surveyed agreed that women are sexually
attractive, and segregation and veiling are necessary for protection from males
(187). Such conclusions may have been conditioned by such religious ideas that are
dominant in the thinking of the religious elite.
The religious elite generally believe that women’s participation in public life
should be restricted. This is based on the extension of certain Hadith attributed to
the Prophet encouraging women to pray at home instead of the mosque. Dr Mohd
Asri (2006a) cited the opinion of an ancient Islamic scholar Al‐Munawi, who believes
that the Prophet had prevented women from performing their evening prayers at
the mosques because these are the times when women are at the greatest risks of
crimes (91). 24 Without considering the social context and problems in which the
Hadith was formulated, traditionalists unwittingly extend its application to all
circumstances. Even its initial restrictions have been subjected to broader
determination. As Nik Aziz maintains,
24
I would personally acknowledge that Dr Mohd Asri is one of the more progressive elite in
contemporary Malaysia. In an interview with the writer, Dr Mohd Asri appreciated the efforts made
by several feminist groups that fight for women’s cause. Fairly recently, he is beginning to speak
about the need to look at the principles and values underlying religious opinions and traditions of the
past before passing a judgement today.
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“Even if she is given permission by her husband to go to the
mosque, praying at home is better and safer for women. This is
because along the way to the mosque, women are exposed to
social ills, fitnah as a result of the intermingling of men and
women, road accidents, thieves and robbery.” (Nik Aziz 2007, 121‐
122)
This theological viewpoint was accepted despite the vast differences of the
conditions today. Questions such as who was the audience the Prophet was
speaking to and what were the conditions at that time were never asked. Current
conditions, where roads are well lit, are never taken into account. The merits of
women’s participation for evening prayers in mosques in today’s context are not
discussed. The fact that women move and work at all times of the day without being
exposed to the crimes mentioned also proves irrelevant in traditionalist discourse.
Fitnah is interwoven into the portrayal of the female sex as objects of
temptation. Women’s seductive powers are intensified when they put on perfumes
and when they speak in public. To justify this claim, the Prophet’s Hadith, “Women
who put on perfumes should not join the evening (Isyak) prayers,” is quoted.25 This
tradition was used by Dr Mohd Asri (2006a, 91‐92) to validate how men’s judgments,
25
Hadith was narrated by Abu Hurairah.
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productivity and rationality would be undermined when facing women putting on
perfumes. Dr Mohd Asri adds that,
“Without looking at the circumstances, we still have women step
out of their houses, and this is against Islamic teachings. In the end,
they will be at the losing end. If women are forbidden from
attending night prayers when they put on perfumes because they
may entice men, what more if they put on perfumes and go out to
other public places where they expose themselves to immoral men
(91‐92).”
Apart from the use of perfumes, women’s seductive powers are also extended
to their voices, which are considered as part of their modesty (aurat). For this
reason, Nik Aziz had once disallowed women to participate in the Tilawah Al‐Quran
or Quran recital competition (New Straits Times 7 Dec 2006). Similarly, Nooh Gadut
(2006, 31), quoting verse 33 of Surah al‐Ahzab, came to the conclusion that,
“Women should not raise their voices when speaking to men because that may
entice the latter.” Alternative reading that attempts to situate a tradition within its
context reveals that this verse was addressed specifically to the Prophet’s wives
only. It reminded them of the dangers of complacency of speech which has been
later understood unquestioningly as enticement through speech. Reading this verse
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together with the verse before it would give a clearer picture. Verses 32 and 33
Surah al‐Ahzab states that:
“O Consorts of the Prophet! You are not like any of the (other)
women: if you do fear (God), be not too complacent of speech,
lest one in whose heart is a disease should be moved with desire:
but speak you a speech (that is) just. And stay quietly in your
houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former
Times of Ignorance; and establish regular prayer, and give regular
charity; and obey God and his Messenger. And God only wishes to
remove all abomination from you, you members of the Family,
and to make you pure and spotless.”26
Ironically, while Islam is said to have liberated women, the same religion is said to
have denied them existence as they cannot be heard (El‐Fadl 2001b, 49‐51). Women
are treated as potentially seductive and they must be restrained by various means to
avoid distracting men, including disallowing them to put on perfumes, going out at
night, and rendering them as a objects of temptation.
The perception of women as a source of temptation of the flesh is woven into
the formulation of the causes of sex offenses and other sex‐related crimes. This in
26
See translation by Abdullah Yusof (425).
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turn affects solutions proposed in dealing with them. Nik Aziz is the most notorious
in associating women’s dressings with crimes of rape. In 2001, he declared that
scantily‐dressed women invite rape and cause many social ills. In 2003, he
pronounced that Muslim women should not wear lipstick outside their homes
because it could arouse men and induce them to rape women (New Straits Times 8
Dec 2008). In a State assembly session that same year, Nik Aziz mentioned, “The
women’s way of dressing is important. Improper dressing might lead to premarital
sex, rape and other vices” (New Straits Times 28 Oct 2003). In 2005, Nik Aziz lectured
that women who wear indecent clothing are telling men that they are selling their
bodies, and contributing to rising sex crimes.
Nooh Gadut (2006) too allude to the same views by concluding that Islamic
dressing (including the hijab) and other Islamic teachings are preventive factors,
which can reduce incidences of rape, un‐wed child, divorce, and AIDS (34). The mode
of conceiving problems in this way points out that women are perpetrators and
causes of crimes simply by their form of dress, ignoring the complexity of the sexual
offence. It also diverts blame from the perpetrators (mostly men), by shifting the
blame to women for not conforming to the Islamic guidelines on attire and
interaction. Little substantive research that accompanies the traditionalist discourse
is clearly evident.
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The notion of women’s bodies as objects of temptation is integrated into the
formulation of policies and regulations in proposals for solution of crimes. Many
amongst the religious elite posit that to deal with crimes related to sex, the state
should restrict women’s participation in the public sphere, make them dress
appropriately, and do not allow the different sex to intermingle in public. Nooh
Gadut (2006, 35) even suggested that the state come up with guidelines on how
women should dress in public. In a similar fashion, Nik Aziz, as the Chief Minister of
Kelantan, ordered a strict enforcement of the decade old rule to have separate
check‐out counters in supermarkets in 2008 (The Press Trust of India Limited 22 Jan
2008). According to Nik Aziz, the rule is necessary to prevent men and women from
rubbing shoulders and prevent perverts from groping women while queuing up at
the counters. He opines that,
“By segregating the shoppers by their genders, these problems
(sex‐crimes) can be avoided and there will be fewer cases of
adultery, pre‐marital sex and rape.”
Supermarket operators who defy this rule could be slapped with a USD 300 fine. The
segregation of sexes is also extended to public swimming pools and even public
cultural performances. Clearly these regulations are at odds with the general pattern
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of societal arrangements in contemporary Malay society, which is not polarised
along gender lines and where social interaction between sexes is a norm.
This perception is selective even if recourse for evidence is derived from
religious traditions and the history of Muslim society. They reveal that both men and
women intermingled even in mosques for congregational prayers with the Prophet,
especially during the Eid celebrations (El‐ Fadl 2001a, 242). There are also traditions
which reveal that the mosque of the Prophet was full of rows of women lining up for
prayers, and that men too have prayed behind women (Ibid, 242). There are also
traditions which portray that Muslim women in the past were free to move freely in
public, and they attended the sermons and lectures delivered by Caliph Ali, Ibn
Abbas and others. A careful reading of Islamic history would also reveal that the
system of seclusion came much later in Islamic history, which is possibly a reaction
to a pathological condition in that period which made it unsafe for women to leave
the home without protection (Ameer Ali 1926, 69).
By restricting solutions to what they define as consonant with Islamic
traditions, traditionalists overlook significant factors that contribute to such crimes.
For instance, while emphasizing regulations in women’s code of dress, they ignore
the imperative of an efficient police force or law‐enforcement agency that ensures
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crime prevention. Likewise, they overlook the study of the psychology of criminals
and circumstances conditioning their disposition. In fact, research done by several
organizations point out that rape has nothing to do with women’s dressing (Rohana
1997; Lai et al. 2002; Working Group of the Women’s Crisis Centre Network 2004).
Even the state of Kelantan, which has enforced strict dress codes for men and
women, as well as segregation of sexes, has not been able to reduce incidence of
rape. In Kelantan alone, there were 35 rape cases reported in 1999, 52 cases in 2000,
and 74 cases in 2001. Incest cases are also on the rise. This excludes unreported rape
and incest cases. Besides, rape is still committed on veiled women (New Straits
Times 14 Feb 2004).
To recapitulate, traditionalism has entrenched the portrayal of women’s bodies
as sexualised objects. This is done through the selection, reliance and extension of
certain traditions of the Prophet as well as verses of the Quran, even if there is
diversity of construction of the authorial intent. Traditionalism also affects the
diagnosis of certain problems in society as well as the solutions they provide. The
assumption of the finality of certain traditions and authorities blurs the existence of
a corpus of knowledge which is useful for alleviating problems more effectively. As a
result, traditionalism cannot perceive the causes of sex‐related crimes beyond
women’s dressing and voices.
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WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
Undeniably, women have not been denied the opportunity to run for parliamentary
elections in Malaysia, and they have indeed been sworn in as members of parliament
alongside men. This could mean that alternative religious orientations do exist.
However, one should not easily conclude that all the religious elite who allow
women to participate in elections are non‐traditionalistic, for traditionalists can be
forced to change or depart from their standpoint. Under the weight of political
pressure, they may be coerced to take pragmatic measures and adjust to changing
conditions. Such changes are not based on conscious reflections of problems or
objective reasoning based on principles. As Towler observes, “The ways in which,
when it cannot suppress change, traditionalism manages to meet specific changes,
disarm them and make allies of them, are many and complex”(90). While the ends
may give the impression of reform, the style of thinking may fundamentally remain
traditionalistic.
PAS’s view on women and politics serves as an example. Since 1959 the Ulama
of PAS precluded women to contest in the General Elections. All along PAS has
argued that women should not play prominent roles in politics and administration
and are not encouraged to hold high public office or lead important sectors of
society (Noor Aisha 2007, 501). Only in the 2004 elections did they field 10 women
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candidates (Maznah, Cecelia, and Beng Hui 2006, 33). It must be acknowledged
however, since the 2008 general elections, more and more women have been
allowed to hold important positions in the party.
Questions remain whether the move to allow women to run as candidates is a
result of philosophical change or pragmatism. While such attempts give the
impression of the loosening of the traditionalist mentality, what spurred these
Ulama to make such concessions was the need to dispel the ‘anti‐women’ image
post 9/11. In addition, there was growing public opinion which pointed out that
women’s participation in politics had never been an issue or perceived problem in
Malaysia (Norani, Zainah, Zaitun, 87). Notwithstanding, despite having women’s
representative in the women’s wing, PAS is still reluctant to allow women to head
the party. Furthermore, we still hear today the sexist remarks and policies made by
the leaders of PAS, particularly Nik Aziz, on women.27 This proves that the dominant
clerics in the party have yet to move away from traditionalist views on gender roles
in society.
Ambivalence against women’s political leadership is also evident in the thinking
of Dr Yusri Mohamad who holds the view that the top political post of the country
27
Nik Aziz’s view is reflected in his book Bunga Kebahagian in 2007.
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should be held by man, unless under conditions of exigencies (darurat). Dr Yusri,
when asked about a Malaysian woman as Prime Minister one day, opines that his
standpoint is based on Islamic principles. Yet, his justifications reveals perceiving
women as subordinate creations fitted for only less important roles to men, which is
a common feature of traditionalism.
“I think that would be as an exception (darurah). This is the general
rule based on the principles of Islam and personal experience. For
the top post in the country is not like being a school principal. You
don’t have to sound a war and make important decisions. The scope
of the decisions to be made is different. The Prime Minister should
be a man. There may be a situation where things are not going well,
then I can accept a woman as Prime Minister and I will not lose
sleep. I will support her. I can accept that (women as Prime
Minister) but only based on necessity.” (Interview with Dr Yusri)
The discourse of darurah (exigencies) itself manifest traditionalism for it reflects the
reluctance to deal with principles and values that underlie religious opinion and
standpoint. Darurah when invoked merely means the suspension of a theological
viewpoint without an effort to re‐evaluate it in the light of new circumstances and
needs. It also departs from willingness to accept changing realities of today where
women are able to perform political offices equally as good, if not better, than men.
Dr Yusri still believes that men are naturally better at the job than women. It is
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gender, not merit, which serves as an important marker for the top post, based on a
selective reading of Islamic teachings.
Dr Yusri’s view on women and leadership is also shared by Dr Ridhwan Tee, a
popular TV preacher and Utusan Malaysia columnist. According to Dr Ridhwan:
“(For women) to lead an organization: Yes. But to lead a country:
then I’m sorry. Not that I am saying they can’t, but if there are still
men, then they should be prioritised. It’s not to denigrate women.
To be a Minister or an organization leader is okay. Men and women
are naturally different…Men and women are different emotionally.
God created us differently. It’s better for women to stay at home,
because housework is better for them. Men are different physically.
Women’s emotions vary from time to time, during their menstrual
periods as well as during pregnancy. They must accept that…If all
men become drug addicts, heavy drinkers, then women can lead.”
(Interview with Dr Ridhwan)
Though some may invoke other competing traditions, they continue to be
bound by the belief that essentially a women’s place is in the home and that their
obligations to the family and their etiquette in public to guard their honour and
morality reign supreme. For instance, Dr Sharifah Hayaati (2004, 64‐82) from
University of Malaya (UM) paints a more balanced picture about women’s role in
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politics by featuring both sides of opinions and weighing conflicting traditions.
However, she still subscribes to the importance of women to realize their roles in
their respective families before participating in politics. She also reminds women
that before seeking political office, they must be equipped with the necessary skills
and knowledge about politics and Islam, so that they will not stray away from their
fundamental roles in their families as well as the etiquette of public life (Ibid, 83).
Such conclusions still bear the traits of traditionalism, as it assumes that women are
naturally not equipped and suitable for politics, by virtue of their gender. The same
precautions are also not generally levelled against men.
The majority of the religious elite who clearly prevent women from
participating in politics simply ignore alternative traditions in Islamic history. Yet, it
has been narrated that Caliph Umar had appointed a woman to manage the affairs
of a market. This woman was responsible for the management of public affairs, a
task that was previously only given to men (Alatas 2002, 30). Many other traditions
such as the fact that the Prophet consulted his wife Umm Salamah regarding the
treaty of Hudaibiyah, and the fact that the Prophet’s wife Aishah led a rebellion after
the death of Caliph Uthman are clear evidence that women had taken up leadership
roles in the past (El‐Fadl 2001a,229‐231). The religious elite also ignore the position
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of Queen Balqis in the Quran, which lauded for her ability and competency to lead
her people (Chandra 1994, 24).
THE ADMINISTRATION OF MORALITY
The impact of traditionalism can be problematic when their views based on selective
opinions of savants of the past form the basis of legal thought and directions. In
some instances, this can lead to a blurring between morality and law. Traditionalism
is concretised in the form of laws and policies through the issue of fatwa or legal
opinions regulating what are essentially matters of moral conscience.28 Between
January and May 2002, 120 women were fined for not wearing the headscarf,
ranging from 20 to 50 ringgit in Kelantan (Asian Political News 17 June 2002).
Likewise, there are many other rules which have been implemented in Kelantan
including the segregation of sexes at check‐out counters in supermarkets and the
lighting up of cinemas. Furthermore, a lot of funds have been channelled towards
campaigns for women to cover their aurat in the light of modesty. It was reported
that the Kelantan State government spent RM 60 000 on a road show aimed at
‘educating’ women to don the hijab. The rationale for such campaigns bears the
traditionalists’ sexual portrayal of women, which simply asserts that improper
dressing leads to premarital sex, rape, incest and abortion (New Straits Times 29
28
In Malaysia, a fatwa becomes legally binding once it is gazetted.
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October 2003). Such costly campaigns are carried out despite many other major
socio‐economic problems facing women. It also reveals unquestioning reliance on
selective theological opinion of not only what constitutes aurat but also the
imposition of penalty for failure to conform to what it deems as the Islamic dress
code.
Traditionalist discourses underlie the basis of action of the religious
administrators, as reflected in the major preoccupation with the issue of modesty
and close proximity. Martinez (2002) stressed that the term ‘indecent dressing’ is
referred to widely by the religious officials and the religious affairs department
during the arrests of three beauty queens in June 1997 (302). The arrests were in
line with a fatwa issued in 1995 forbidding Muslim women to participate in beauty
contests. Religious officials were instructed to take action against Muslim women
who wear “body‐hugging dresses, bikinis, leotards, low cut blouses which expose
part of the body or breasts or high skirts which expose part of the leg” (Ibid, 308).
In January 2005, The Federal Territory Religious Department (JAWI) arrested
100 Muslims found at dance club during a raid. The women arrested were made to
parade in front of the religious officials in order to determine whether their dressing
is in line with Islam or otherwise. Some of the women complained that they were
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denied access to the toilets during their detention. One of the women detained
during the raid, celebrity Jeslina Hashim remarked that, “I was treated like a
prostitute!” Her remarks drew response from an Utusan Malaysia reader who
wrote, “If you wear clothes that expose part of your body, then don’t get angry for
being called a prostitute. Is there any dignity left if we do not know how to protect
the dignity of the religion?” (The Straits Times 18 Feb 2005) Such response reveal the
prevalence of ideas propagated by the religious elite.
Besides, there are a growing number of self‐vigilante Islamist groups and
individuals who go out to public places to harass women who do not put on the
hijab (headscarf), who mix with non‐Muslims, and who take part in activities where
men and women interact (Norani, Zainah, Zaitun, 85). There were instances where
both Muslim and non‐Muslim women were stopped and reprimanded by the
security guards at public buildings for not covering their heads. Couples holding
hands in public were also not sparred the scolding. In addition to the raids at night
clubs, we hear many stories of raids conducted at hotel rooms to catch un‐wed
couples found in close proximity. Unfortunately, these religious administrators
claimed to be sanctioned by the religious elite, and such raids are supported on the
basis of Islam.
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CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Traditionalists generally believe that religious traditions formulated in the past have
been perfected and are immutable; hence, to deal with modern problems
concerning women more effectively, the best solution is by referring to the past. The
traditions they select are not based on due deliberation and reflection on competing
legal traditions on similar issues by recourse to principles and relevant values and
their contextualization in contemporary Malay society. By solely clinging on to the
selective and partial traditions of the past, ideological lag and incongruence with
social conditions, and ineffective solutions to pressing issues encountered by women
such as changing roles, institutional inadequacies, abuse and other major issues,
remain evident. Much emphasis is given to strongly encourage women to remain in
the domestic sphere as a solution to the problem. Rather than using Islam and its
traditions to facilitate adjustment to change and social transformation particularly in
the value sphere, Islamic teachings as appropriated by the traditionalists generally
impede this challenge. More than that, the practical dimensions are often ignored,
entrenching and exacerbating existing problems and dilemmas.
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CHAPTER 3- ISLAMIC STATE AND SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the religious orientation of the elite towards governance and
the concept of Islamic state in Malaysia. The issue of the state widely discussed by
the prominent contemporary religious elite provides yet another relevant theme
which reveals the strong influence of traditionalism. As explained, traditionalism
does not refer to the contemporariness of the issue of concern which in this case
centres on the state, but a style of thought that influences perception. However
what is of importance of this chapter is to reveal that the way in which the state is
conceived and discussed is based on a construction of an infallible and fixed past
which is presented as relevant to this epoch. This perception of the past includes the
history of which the religious community was organized, as well as the kinds of
institutions deemed fundamental to the state.
When Malaysia gained its independence on the 31 August 1957, it never
declared itself as an Islamic state. Although Islam is the official religion of the state in
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the constitution,29 Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was
sceptical that Malaysia will ever become an Islamic state (Saeed and Saeed 2004,
136; Hussin 1993, 94‐95).30 This is not to say that the discourse on Negara Islam
(Islamic state) in Malaysia had not existed before its independence. The concept of
Negara Islam was envisioned and discussed by prominent Malay nationalists such as
Dr Burhanuddin Al‐Helmy (Farish 2004, 351). While Dr Burhanuddin’s reference to
the Islamic state is based on principles of government which invoked idealism of
unity, pan‐nationalism, and anti‐colonialism, the language underlying the call for the
establishment of an Islamic state took a different meaning in the 1970s with the
emergence of the movement commonly referred as Islamic resurgence. This was
when PAS, under the leadership of Yusof Rawa, began to champion for a greater
Islamization of society and the inception of an Islamic state.
In 2001, Mahathir surprised many when he openly declared that Malaysia is
already an Islamic State. Mahathir’s remark, which was later echoed by Abdullah
Badawi and Najib Razak in 2007, was a complete departure from his earlier position
and also UMNO’s founding members. This generated some lively discussions among
29
In any other secular constitution, there is no prescribed official religion and no state aid given to
any religion or any religious purposes. However, the situation in Malaysia is different for the word
Islam occurs at least 24 times in the constitution (Shad Saleem Faruqi 2005, 45).
30
According to Tunku, “Malaysia cannot practice Islam fully because about half of the population is
not Muslim. They have a different culture and different way of life, and they don’t want Islam.” For
the full interview, see Hussin Mutalib, (1993, 94‐95).
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the federal Islamic institutions (JAKIM and IKIM in particular), civil groups, political
parties, and the religious elite. PAS, unsurprisingly, strongly disapproves UMNO’s
stance, for it has its own version of an Islamic state which it seeks to establish in
Malaysia.
It is against this backdrop that the discussion of Islamic state by the religious
elite will be carried out. The religious elite selected in this chapter are those who
have mainly discussed the problem of Islamic State in their writings and sermons.
They include PAS leaders, more significantly its president Abdul Hadi Awang, as well
as ex‐ABIM Presidents, Dr Siddiq Fadhil and Dr Yusri Muhammad. In addition, the
views of Dr Zahazan Muhammad, a prominent television personality who has
translated and written commentaries on the subject, shall also be examined in this
chapter.31 Publications and statements by prominent academics from IKIM and
JAKIM are also incorporated. Being institutions formed by the government, they
conventionally represent the state’s view. Among those who have spoken and
written a lot about Islamic state in Malaysia is Dr El‐Muhammady from IKIM. Besides
these elite mentioned above, I shall also examine others who have focussed on the
subject. The discussion shall be divided into the following themes: the understanding
31
The writing of commentaries discussing the works of classical scholars is a way one constructs
religious authority and influence in society. Commentaries published were based on the lectures of
their teachers or masters (Zaman 2002, 38‐59).
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of the ideal Islamic state, Islamic political system and philosophy, political leadership
and governance, laws, and political institutions.
THE IDEAL ISLAMIC STATE
Although the state is a modern institution, the religious elite believe that an Islamic
state had existed in the past. The system of administration and governance which
existed in Medina during the time of the Prophet is often pointed out as the ideal
state to be emulated. The Al Dustur Al‐Medina (Covenant of Medina), which the
Prophet agreed upon after his emigration from Mecca in year 622, has often been
hailed as akin to the modern‐day constitution. The religious elite concur that the
Islamic state model is unequivocally visible in the Quran, Sunnah, and/or Ijma
(consensus of the classical jurists), although they remain divided on how that model
can be realised today, and what are the benchmarks for a state to be called Islamic.
To illustrate this point, let us recap the criteria for an Islamic State by PAS and JAKIM.
In its Islamic State Document tabled in 2003, PAS highlights some of the
essential elements of an Islamic state it envisions. Nik Aziz declares that this
document is based on the Quran, Sunnah, opinions of Ulama, and analogy or qias
(Nik Aziz 2005, 100). These elements can be summed‐up as follows:32
32
PAS, “The Islamic State Document,” (2008, 130‐147).
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1. The first Islamic state was established in a multi‐racial and multi religious
Medina during the time of the Prophet and the rightly‐guided Caliphs.
2. The Constitution of Medina, ‘Sahifah Medina’, has stipulated the rights of
minorities.
3. Islamic state is guided in the Belief in God.
4. The Quran and Sunnah are the primary sources of legislation.
5. The Shariah law is implemented and observed, including hudud laws.
6. The state’s leadership is governed by the Ulama on the basis of faith (Taqwa).
7. In the Islamic state, government is based on consensus (Shura) which is the
fundamental guiding principle.
Contrary to PAS, JAKIM admits that the Islamic state concept is not clearly
defined by the Quran and Sunnah. Nevertheless, the model can be found in legal
opinions (ijtihad) of later Islamic scholars. Utilizing the opinions of such scholars,
namely Muhammad bin Hasan As‐Syaibani and Dr Mohammad Said Ramadhan al‐
Buity, JAKIM maintains that Malaysia is already an Islamic state as it manifests the
following features:33
1. Islam is the official religion of the state. But people of other faiths can
practice their religion freely.
33
See Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, “Malaysia Negara Islam 7 March 2002,” (2008, 120‐123)
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2. It is headed by a Muslim. In the case of Malaysia, the Head of state is the
Yang‐ Dipertuan Agong and the Malay royalty. The state’s army is also
headed by Muslims.
3. The administration of Islam is under the jurisdiction of the state.
4. Malaysia is acknowledged internationally as an Islamic state by Muslims and
non‐Muslims states, and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
5. An Islamic state does not require the implementation of hudud laws.
6. There are established Islamic institutions that oversee the administration of
Islam and Shariah laws‐ such as JAKIM, The Office of Mufti, and Shariah
Courts.
7. It has also established key Islamic institutions such as Islamic banking,
Takaful, Al Rahn and more.
The perception held by JAKIM and PAS reveal the salient traits of
traditionalism. Both groups uncritically select traditions and opinions of scholars of
the past to justify their stances. Even then, the selection of traditions gives
overriding emphasis on forms rather than principles. For example, both PAS and
JAKIM concurs that a state is deemed ‘Islamic’ as long as certain institutions and laws
are established in the state and that it is ruled by Muslims. There is little, if any,
substantive discussions that has implications on their relevance and effectiveness in
improving, developing, and modernizing the society as a whole. Yet, for an
institution or system to be deemed Islamic, it must prove that it is better than what
exists. Besides, none of these authorities they select, confront or engage with
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modern and contemporary problems of democratic, modern nation‐states. There is a
complete disregard of the discussion by other Muslim scholars that have spoken
about the challenges posed to Islam and Muslims in relation to a changed context of
the modern nation‐states which emerged in Europe in the 18th century (An‐Naim
1998). For example, the idea of citizenship in democratic nation‐state is
underdeveloped or absent in traditionalist discourse in which individuals and groups
continue to be determined and categorized on the basis of religious affiliation, and
likewise their rights and obligations. In contemporary nation‐states, the rights of
individuals are secured and guaranteed on the grounds of equality under the law and
universal human rights. They are incongruent with the categories and institutions
used in traditionalist discourse on the Islamic state.
The way JAKIM rejects the necessity of hudud laws (Point 5) in an Islamic state
further illustrates the contention on the prevalence of traditionalism. Responding to
PAS, JAKIM unquestioningly selects the position of an Ulama to justify its claim. It
falls short of clarifying why it chooses the opinions of Dr Mohammad Said Ramadhan
al‐Buity instead of agreeing with PAS, or why his arguments are more valid and
relevant to the modern context. It merely uses a selective tradition as basis for its
belief or judgement, rather than deliberate on its relevance in the context of a
modern nation‐state. This is a classic manifestation of traditionalism as described by
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Towler, in which the tendency is not to explain what is believed and why but to
recite a verse at best in justifying the creed (84).
Leaving behind the debates between PAS and JAKIM, there are personalities
who are optimistic that Muslim nations today can advance the imagined model of an
Islamic as close as possible. They do not deny the existence of such models in the
past. Dr Zahazan Mohamad, a young, influential television/radio‐based religious
preacher and Shariah consultant believes that,
“There is no compromise about God’s rulings in Islam. There are
two elements (God’s rulings): foundational and complementary.
The best model is the time of the Prophet and the Caliphs, where
the Prophet said follow me and these people. Islamic state is not a
terminology or theory, but more of application.” (Interview with
Dr Zahazan)
Dr Zahazan’s view seems to indicate that there is no necessity for discussions
of a model that has already been assumed to have existed in the past. To him, what
has been formulated is so clear that there is no need for rethinking or reformulating
the legacy of the pious savants of the past. When asked about the model Islamic
state today, he replied that,
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“There is no 100 percent model that we can talk about today, but
Saudi Arabia is close to it. Saudi Arabia is a respectable state,
which has Islam’s holiest sites. It’s obvious, because of the
effectiveness of the laws (Islamic) it has, crimes can be prevented.
The people fear to commit murder because they fear for
reciprocal punishments.” (Ibid)
Therefore, for Dr Zahazan, one of the major features of an Islamic state is the
implementation of Shariah laws and the position of the holy sites. Such views show
that more emphasis is given to forms rather than principles. Ironically, the problems
of political culture, the nature of the ruling elite, their treatment towards women,
and the issue of distribution of wealth found in Saudi Arabia are not treated as
important benchmarks for an Islamic state. Many would not have forgotten the
incident which saw the burning of fourteen girls to death in a public school in Saudi
Arabia in 2002, who were denied escape by the mutawwaun (religious police)
officers for not putting on the veil (niqab).34 Moreover, the basis of the Saudi
Arabia’s political economy is highly capitalistic, which neglects many aspects of
socialism that is in line with Islam.35 A greater appreciation towards Islamic
principles, which promotes values such as accountability and justice rather than
34
Responding to the international criticisms that follow this incident, the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah
ordered all newspapers not to report the incident. Until today, no action has been taken towards the
individuals who are responsible for the deaths.See a critique by El‐fadl, (2005: 250‐251).
35
Alatas has discussed at length the compatibility of many principles found in socialism with Islam.
See Alatas (1976) Islam dan Sosialisma.
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forms, were certainly not deliberated in the ideal Islamic state as envisioned by
Zahazan.
Dr Yusri Mohamad admits that although the concept of the Islamic state is
ambiguous, the Prophet’s model is a flawless one. Remarkably, Dr Yusri believes that
Malaysia is already an Islamic state. According to Dr Yusri,
“Malaysia is already an Islamic state. Malaysia has pronounced
the syahadah (article of faith), which is in the constitution. To me,
that (the provisions in the constitution) is like pronouncing the
syahadah. But this is the initial step. I don’t think that Malaysia is
the most ideal (Islamic) state yet. But we are better than
Indonesia.” (Interview with Dr Yusri)
Such reasoning fails to draw a distinction between individual affirmation of God and
Prophethood from the fundamental law of the state, namely the constitution. This
notion is simplistic and provides another example where forms are underscored
over principles in identifying whether a state is Islamic or not. This is definitely
similar to the opinion upheld by JAKIM earlier that a state is Islamic when ‘Islamic’
institutions and systems are in place, without clear and profound explication of what
is meant by the terms.36
36
See Islamic State criteria by JAKIM.
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On the other hand, Dr Ridhwan Tee maintains that there is no Islamic state
model that one can speak of today, not even Saudi Arabia or Iran. He admitted that
the nation‐state is a modern construct that never existed in the past. However, Dr
Ridhwan did not rule out that those countries with more than two‐thirds majority
Muslims can eventually become an Islamic state. He cited Brunei as an example
(Interview with Dr Ridhwan). He argues that only with such a clear majority can
Islamic laws be enforced without any difficulties, just as during the time of the
Prophet. These statements again reveal the emphasis on forms based on a bundle of
laws that was believed to have been enforced during the Prophet’s lifetime, rather
than principles and substance in the conception of an Islamic state.
In brief, there is a strong belief that an ideal Islamic State existed during the
time of the Prophet and it is a religious duty for Muslims today to adhere closely to
that model. Such views are traditionalistic because: the construction of an Islamic
state model is based on ‘patchwork’ selections of traditions from the past
unthinkingly; the model is not congruent with the present context; and the model is
based on forms rather than principles. The discourse on the ‘imagined’ Islamic state
model simply pits one theological opinion against another unthinkingly. In truth, no
premise for a theory of the state is to be found either in the Quran or Sharia (Beatrix
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1995, 34). In Muslim history, the political concept of an Islamic state emerged only
in the 1920s, in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Chandra 2008, 57).
ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PHILOSOPHY
The belief in the Islamic state model immediately translates into believing in an
authentic, essentialized, Islamic state system and philosophy. Traditionalism is
dismissive towards political systems deemed as ‘Western’ and ‘Secular’. It is often
reiterated that ‘Islam is Islam’ and that Islam is not ‘Socialism, Capitalism, or
Democracy.’ There is a strong belief that the Islamic State is unique because it
merges religion and politics. The two are inseparable because Islam is Ad‐Din, a
complete way of life. Muslims are reminded that they should never pursue the path
of secularist Christians who segregate the two. For instance, the Machiavellian “Give
to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s!” is interpreted by Abdul Hadi to
mean that God’s role in ‘secular’ philosophy is undervalued. Not only is secularism
incongruous with Islam for segregating religion and politics, it is also seen as a
colonial project to disrupt the Islamic State agenda (Abdul Hadi 2007, 9‐13).
Abdul Hadi also sees the present Malaysian state as different from the
‘Medinan’ model of the past.37 The Islamic state is to be established on the premise
37
See Point 7 of the Islamic State document issued by PAS in 2003. See also Appendix 3.
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that it is ordained by God, which is a manifestation of divine will and destiny.38 As
Abdul Hadi added,
“Islam cannot accept the weaknesses of Western democracy
based on secularism, which separates politics and religion, hence
leading to the deprivation of spiritual, faith (iman), and attitudinal
(akhlak) elements based on the merits (pahala) and demerits
(dosa) in Islam.” (Abdul Hadi 2009a, 24‐25)
The religious elite also cast doubts on the suitability of democracy with the
concept of Islamic state. For instance, Dr Mohd Asri considers democracy, which he
defines as the rule or the voice of majority, as dangerous because the principles of
revelation (wahyu) are neglected. According to Dr Mohd Asri,
“The Islamic World should not honour democracy. Muslims have
already been equipped with the syura system which is just and
based on the principles blessed by God. The principles of syura
are authenticated by God’s revelation, while the principles of
democracy are man‐made.” (Minda Tajdid, drmaza.com)39
38
Such views are consistent with other contemporary Islamist groups based in the Middle East
(particularly Egypt) such as the Muslim Brotherhood. (Farish 2004, 734).
39
Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, “Bahaya Demokrasi Tanpa Prinsip Wahyu,” in drmaza.com,
http://drmaza.com/home/?p=591#more‐591 (Date Assessed: 8 August 2009).
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Dr Mohd Asri fears that by ruling through the voice of the majority, instead of
‘syura’, acts forbidden by Islam such as consumption of alcohol, gambling, adultery,
and homosexuality can be allowed and respected.
Such views ignore the role of the ‘Constitution’ as stipulated in the theory of
modern governance. The constitution sets the parameters and enshrines the broad
moral principles and values of the citizens. In the case of Malaysia, not only do laws
pertaining to matters of religion and custom require endorsement in state councils
to be passed or amended, they have to be accented by the King, who functions as
the guardian of Islam and Malay culture. Hence, enough mechanisms are in‐place to
ensure those that go against Islamic or universal principles are not passed.
Moreover, the ‘Divine code’ or moral principles, such as those suggested by Dr
Mohd Asri, may not be enforceable. It is the duty of religious elite, as moral
conscience of the society, to continuously play their historical role as advisers and
teachers of the people and appeal to their hearts and minds (El‐Fadl 2007, 196). In
modern arrangements, such roles can be played through civil society movements
and pressure groups, which arguably is vibrant in contemporary Malaysia today.
Moreover, the belief in an essentialized ‘syura’ model lodged in the past is yet
another manifestation of traditionalism which accords overriding significance to
forms at the expense of principles. It is true that the term syura originates from the
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Quran, but the term simply means governance by consultation. In traditionalist
discourse, the syura system is seen as more superior to any other system of
governance, including democracy. Yet, while syura is portrayed as a complete set of
theory of governance in Islam, authoritarian governments have been projected as
modelling it instead of modern democracies, which have institutionalised consensus
building in their constitutions and practice. It can be argued that democracies are
the ones that have implemented the principle of syura more than any other states
that have declared themselves as Islamic today. Furthermore, in this
syura/democracy discourse, very little is heard about institutional and procedural
guarantees that would ensure that values such as justice and benevolence can be
effectively concretised. While there appears to be overriding emphasis on the piety
of leaders, little is said about institutional measures that could be taken to ensure
that leaders abide by the laws (Ibid, 198).
The overemphasis on forms is also evident in the views of Dr Yusri Mohamad
who believes that democracy can never be seen as ideal. According to Dr Yusri,
“Great rulers (in Islam) have emerged from the monarchical
system such as Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Salahuddin Al‐Ayubbi, Sultan
Muhammad Al–Fatih. We of course have the democratic model,
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but we don’t have any great leaders emerging from the electoral
system.” (Interview with Dr Yusri Muhammad)
It is clear from his view that what is deemed Islamic is a political system ruled by a
monarch. Only such a system can produce outstanding leaders such as those found
in the past. It is likely that this conclusion is derived from the thinking that only an
‘Islamic state’ lodged in the past can produce outstanding leaders. Moreover, the
leaders cited are all Muslim leaders, with little regard for the contribution of
numerous non‐Muslim historical figures towards humanity.
As doubts are cast about the legitimacy of democracy in an Islamic state, the
religious elite are also sceptical about other political philosophies such as capitalism,
communism, and socialism. Abdul Hadi generally disapproves such political
philosophies on the grounds that they are atheistic, materialistic, and curb individual
freedom (Abdul Hadi 2008, 183‐195). The critique towards these philosophies is
neither based on objective reasoning nor on principles and values; rather, it is an
emotive response to defend their opinions. Abdul Hadi’s defensive stance is clear
when he maintained that,
“Capitalism is men’s creation and hence is weak. It sits on the
same level as other man‐made inventions. It digresses from God’s
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teachings which promote equality among mankind. Hence it
contradicts Islam.” (Ibid, 186)
Abdul Hadi’s line of reasoning is different from the arguments raised by the
Muslim reformers, who may also disagree with these ‘secular’ principles, but
forward a more concrete, systematic, and less emotive argument against them.
Indeed there are many elements of socialism and democracy that do not contradict
with Islamic principles (Alatas 1976; Khundmiri 2001). It is thus the duty of the
Muslims to objectively segregate the elements that may contradict the principles of
Islam with those that do not. So far, the problematization of these philosophies
points out that there is an essentialized Islamic political philosophy vis‐à‐vis the
secular ones. Debunking these alternative philosophies, in most instances, take on
grounds of theology, not accompanied by an understanding of alternatives. For
example socialism is not essentially anti‐God, yet the whole philosophy is dismissed
in toto based on this assumption.
To date, we have yet to see any concrete plans or instruments of an Islamic
State offered by the religious elite. Although the religious elite have paid lip‐service
to the broad principles and values in Islamic governance‐ by acknowledging that the
Islamic state looks into the welfare of the people, justice, equality, and the rights of
the minorities and women‐ they have yet to concretise them in the form of
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alternative mechanisms and instruments such the as ‘check and balance system’,
‘separation of powers’ or ‘electoral systems’ found in modern theories of
governance. Granted that democracy does not guarantee justice, it does
nevertheless provide a system through which persons can pursue the Islamic
‘imperative of justice’ (Johnston 2010, 19). This attitude towards the ‘secular’
political system is in a way captured by Towler’s depiction of traditionalists as, “They
find that they simply cannot tell you what they believe and the best they can do is to
recite the creed, or to quote a verse from the Bible, or to mention some lines from a
favourite hymn (84).” On this issue, this favourite hymn is the rhetoric that, “Islam is
Islam and not Democracy, Socialism and Capitalism.”
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
To the religious elite, the basis of an Islamic state is a pious, Muslim government.
Their conception of leadership often points to unquestioning loyalty to the pious
leader. Loyalty towards the leaders should not be compromised unless they commit
blatant sins, including forbidding Muslims to perform the basic rituals in Islam:
prayers, fasting, and the tithe. In their discussion of this issue, the religious elite
merely listed several opinions of classical jurists without even evaluating and
discussing its relevance in today’s context. Former IKIM academic El‐Muhammady
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(2004)40 merely cites a Prophetic tradition as narrated by al‐Nawawi which states
that, “The Ulama must obey the leaders under all circumstances even if they trouble
you, unless when they commit obvious sins” (92‐93). Even if the need arises for
them to be corrected, toppling the Muslim leaders (Ulil Amri) should be the last
resort. If they commit any mistakes, they should just be advised (Ibid, 92‐93).41
Interestingly, El‐Muhammady makes little reference to contemporary Muslim
scholars who have written on the same issue, but relied on mainly classical scholars
who were writing in their political (Caliphate) contexts, such as Al‐Mawardi, An‐
Nawawi, and Al‐Khattabi.
Likewise, many other vocal religious elite, such as Harussani Zakaria (Mufti of
Perak), went all out to defend the institution of the Malay royalty. During the Perak
political crisis in 2009, Harussani publicly declared those who went against the Sultan
of Perak as un‐Islamic, and they are considered as menderhaka (committing
40
Dr Uthman El‐Muhammady is currently affiliated with ISTAC.
41
This view is in line with the often cited Hadith of the Prophet. Firstly, as narrated by Ibn Umar, “A
Muslim has to listen and obey (the order of the Muslim ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as he
does not order to commit a sin. If he does, he should neither listen nor obey.” Secondly, as narrated
by Wail Al‐Hadrami, when the Prophet was asked about leaders who demand for their rights but
denying their citizens’, the Prophet responded, “Listen to them and obey them, for on them will be
their burden and on you your burden.” See Al‐Hafiz Kakinddin Abdul Azim Al‐Mundhiri, (2000, 674‐
675).
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treason).42 Harussani even justifies the notion of unquestioning loyalty to the Sultan
as a Quranic injunction.43 This is unsurprising given a traditionalist discourse on
leadership. As Towler has pointed out, in traditionalism, one does not have to search
for meaning of traditions‐ the main task is to receive and accept it (87). While the
issue is not about the loyalty to the institution of the monarchy as the rightful
custodian of Islam and Malay culture in Malaysia, reliance on specific religious
traditions without question or deliberation has been key in avoiding discussion of
problems associated with the institution. The notion of unquestioning loyalty is
justified on this basis. Generally there is a lack of appreciation of the Islamic
principles of justice, equality, and accountability in their defence of the royalty.
Moreover, there is also the belief that the Rulers’ excesses must also be
tolerated as long as they remain committed to Islam. This can explain why the
religious elite were willing to tolerate other forms of excesses including the opulent
lifestyles of the rulers, or excessive accumulation of wealth of the capitalists. Even
the PAS government in Kelantan‐ its Ulama’s credentials notwithstanding‐ has
tolerated the extravagance of the Royalty (Chandra 2002, 222). For instance, Nik Aziz
42
This political crisis resulted from the defections of four PKR state‐assemblymen to Barisan Nasional
(BN) and the intervention from the Sultan of Perak. These defections resulted in the BN regaining
control of Perak government from the opposition.
43
“Tidak taat pada Raja adalah derhaka‐Mufti,” Utusan Malaysia (7 February 2009)
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was tight‐lipped during the recent scandal in 2009 involving the Kelantanese Prince,
who was alleged to have sexually abused his own wife, a teenage model, originating
from Indonesia. To this day, probably the only Ulama studied in this thesis who had
openly been critical of the excessive of the Royalty and the ruling elite is Dr Mohd
Asri (2010, 7).
The reliance on selective traditions to the effect that leaders are judged based
on their piety, which is generally understood as referring to observance of rituals,
clearly ignores other important dimensions and qualities of leadership much needed
in complex, modern nation‐states, such as the ability to manage or govern with
effective policies and programmes, and ensuring transparency in the execution and
administration of the state. Less attention is given to traditions that invoke the need
to judge rulers on the basis of their deeds and contributions to society, as captured
by the Prophet Muhammad’s companions. For instance, Caliph Umar Al‐Khatab
(Second Caliph) was quoted to have said during his inauguration as a Caliph that, “If
they (the governors) do well, I will reward them, and if they do badly, I will punish
them (As‐Sallabi 2007a, 172‐173).” In fact, other attributes such as capability and
trustworthiness, knowledge, familiarity with local customs and traditions,
effectiveness, and compassion were the primary stipulations and considerations
before Caliph Umar appointed his governors or representatives (As‐Sallabi 2007b,
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45‐54). This means leaders must be judged by performance and merits, not only
religiosity.
There is also a lack of concrete understanding and appreciation of modern
instruments and concepts of governance. Their discourse shows a preoccupation
with how one should approach the rulers‐ whether to carry out open defiance or
only disagree quietly. Through citing an un‐narrated tradition of the Prophet, El‐
Muhammady (2004, 94) opines that one should not resort to violence and warfare
to bring down a sinful, unjust, and harsh ruler, but should approach him in a calm
and just manner. Such a view assumes that violence, open rebellion and warfare are
the only instruments to check a leader’s excesses. The language of discourse, thus, is
still rooted in the structure of traditional systems. Strengthening the electoral
system, having free‐and‐fair elections, and building an effective and independent
judicial system and other institutional safeguards that can check on excesses of the
ruling class do not feature in their discourse.
Besides discussing one’s attitude towards the leader, another point of
contention is who has the right to lead an Islamic state. The Ulama/non‐Ulama
leadership of the state is also an issue which pre‐occupies traditionalist discourse of
the religious elite in Malaysia. This issue has cropped up once again in the 55th
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Muktamar PAS in 2009, where the thrust on the need for a ‘pious’ leadership for the
country has surfaced. In this respect, some PAS members argued that in Islamic
history, only the Ulama (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali, Muawiyah) had assumed
leadership positions (Utusan Malaysia 1 May 2009). This reasoning infers not only
that piety is equated with knowledge of Islamic law and theology, it is also oblivious
to other significant factors that impacts upon leadership in the modern world.
Mohammad Daud Iraqi, the Head of Ulama Council PAS opines that,
“The reality today is that PAS needs to be headed by the Ulama to
ensure that the movement, administration, decisions are in line
with Islam, especially Siyasah Syarriyah (Sharia‐based politics).”
(Harakah 8‐11 June 2009)
Despite the rise of the professional faction in PAS, the 55th PAS Muktamar
(Congress) in 2009 saw the Ulama faction retaining and buttressing their positions of
authority in the Party. Undeniably, while PAS in its document of an Islamic state do
point out that the Islamic state will further strengthen the Parliamentary
Consultation and Representation (Shura) and Constitutional Monarchy, the party
organization itself points to the position of Ulama as infallible (PAS 2008, 144). For
instance, Nik Aziz, currently the Murshidul Am of PAS, commands huge support and
influence in the party that his position cannot be challenged through the electoral
process. As a sign of his infallibility, his views can overwrite other dissenting voices in
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the party.44 Being the supreme Ulama of the Party, Nik Aziz, has the authority to
comment, criticize, and initiate reforms within the party ahead of the elected
leadership including the President, as well as purging those whom he dislikes or
disagrees with (Farish 2004, 483‐484). The justifications that the Ulama should be in
power is based merely on a selected interpretation of verse 59 Surah An‐Nisa
quoted by Abdul Hadi,
“Ulil Amri refers to the Ulama or scholars of Islam who guides
society with their knowledge. They govern society through the
Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet who did not separate the affairs
of society, religion, and way of life.” (Abdul Hadi 2009a, 32)
Besides, only the Ulama have the sole authority and legitimacy to speak on
Islam. Any challenges towards their authority can never be tolerated. For instance,
Abdul Ghani Shamsudin, formerly the Patron of PUM and a senior PAS leader,
reminds Dr Chandra that,
“The gates of reforms are not closed. There are many pious
religious scholars such as Yusof Al‐Qardhawi, Bin Bazz, Muhammad
44
There have been rumours about the differences Nik Aziz had with Hadi Awang on the talks about
forming a ‘unity’ government with UMNO. At the end, the party decides to follow Nik Aziz’s view of
no Unity talks with UMNO.
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Al‐Ghazali and many others who have conducted ijthad in response
to issues and problems which resulted from Westernization. We
(PUM) disagree with Dr Chandra. Not everyone, even those with
some knowledge of the Quran, Sunnah, Islamic history and more
can conduct ijtihad.”
“Only a person with integrity and faith, and free from sins can
conduct ijtihad and the community have faith in them. Their
integrity is never questioned and they never do it for their self‐
benefit.” (Abdul Ghani Shamsudin 2002, 35)
Such views are problematic for three reasons. Firstly, it equates knowledge to
simply mean religious knowledge (theology); hence a person with religious
knowledge alone should lead a society. Secondly, it assumes with religious
knowledge alone, modern problems and challenges can be resolved. Thirdly, not
only must the leaders be pious religious scholars, they cannot be men or people of
other faiths apart from Islam (JAKIM 2008, 121; Interview with Dr Mohd Asri). Here,
there is a complete disregard that society today is too complex to be ruled by a
group versed only on theology. The concept of leadership is not only exclusive; it
lacks the understanding of the dynamics of modern societies and complexities of
issues and problems.
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Interestingly, the Quran’s definition of Ulil Amri simply means those charged
with authority and responsibility or decision in general. Islam also makes no
distinction between secular and religious affairs.45 There is no mention that only
Muslims or those versed in theology can lead a government. An attempt to elicit a
response from Dr Mohd Asri as to why non‐Muslims cannot take on leadership role
is met with a blunt response:
“Only Muslims can govern a society especially in the
administration of Islam. Even Americans cannot allow a
communist to lead their nation, who is anti‐democratic. Equality is
for all, but the realization of this equality through Islam can only
be carried out by Muslims.” (Interview with Dr Mohd Asri)
The origin of such thinking could have emerged from the notion that Islam has its
own set of governing systems and principles in which only Muslims can better
manage and administer. It stems from the failure to realize commonality of good
and effective governance. For example, honesty in Islam is no different from honesty
in Buddhism (Interview with Chandra). Furthermore, such thinking is at odds with
the principle of equality of all citizens before the law within nation states.
45
Verse 59 Surah An Nisa is translated by Abdullah Yusof Ali as, “O you who believe! Obey God and
Obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among
yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger, if you do believe in God and the last Day: that is best
and most suitable for final determination.” See Abdullah Yusof Ali (2002, 94).
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Moreover, it becomes a problem when piety becomes the sole indicator for an
ideal leadership. When leaders are elected to ensure better laws, better
administration of the government, and better formulation of policies and their
effective implementation, expertise, capacity, and skills are important traits. Piety,
therefore, cannot be the sole value and basis of leadership. It is certainly
problematic to assume the Prophet and his companions rules solely as pious
individuals, without intellectual ability to ensure justice and good governance.
SHARIAH LAWS AND SECULAR LAWS
One of the major elements of an Islamic state portrayed in the discourse is that an
Islamic state is governed on the basis of shariah.46 The need for the preservation and
effective implementation of shariah laws forms the basis for why the Ulama, and not
other ordinary Muslims, or non‐Muslims, should be at the apex of the political
hierarchy.47 By definition, shariah refers to the sacred, eternal and universal values,
revealed to the Prophet by God functionally or in concrete terms, to direct man’s
life. Fiqh, on the other hand, denotes a more human endeavour to discern and
extract legal rules from the Islamic traditions (Mir Hosseini 2009, 24‐26; Al‐Ashmawi
1998, 51). Fiqh is therefore contextual in terms of its forms and origins. According to
Mir‐Hosseini:
46
This view is also shared by religious elite outside Malaysia. See Mohammed Ayoob (2008, 42‐43).
47
See comments by Ustaz Mohammad Daud Iraqi above.
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“While the shariah in Muslim belief is sacred, eternal and
universal, fiqh, consisting of the vast literature produced by
Muslim jurists, is like any other system of jurisprudence‐human,
mundane, temporal and local.” (25)
The crux of the problem is that the religious elite tend to equate shariah with
fiqh. The confusion towards the two results in the belief that every Juristic opinion of
the past is final and immutable law revealed by the divine. In fact, the actualization
of shariah principles as codified law, including hudud, is a result of the debates and
opinions of past jurists and scholars. Their efforts were hence historical, provisional
and imperfect, far from being divine (Norani 1994, 150). Moreover, some of the laws
and rules have ossified, for they were developed by the great Muslim jurists of
antiquity. Their social circumstances and the quantum of knowledge available to
them were of a different order (Chandra 1986, 58).
As a result of adherence to the belief that all laws in the past are eternal, the
necessity for implementing ‘shariah’ is deemed overriding. This includes what is
based on a selective understanding of hudud laws. In 1993, the Kelantan Shariah
Criminal Code (II) bill was passed in the Kelantan state assembly. The bill, which was
declared as Islamic, underscores several hudud offences such as sariqah (theft),
hirabah (robbery), zina (unlawful sexual intercourse), syurb (intoxication of liquor)
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and riddah (apostasy). Punishments towards these crimes include stoning to death,
whipping, amputation or mutilation of hands and feet. Fines and jail sentences are
also included, but accorded as takzir (Farish 2004, 501; Rose 1995).48 Abdul Hadi
then threatened that any Muslims who resisted the Bill is murtad (apostates). The
mandatory nature of the hudud laws is reflected in The Islamic State Document by
PAS, which cites and interprets Verse 38 Surah Al‐Maidah as:
“And (as for) the male thief and the female thief, cut off their
hands as a recompense for that which they committed, a
punishment by way of example from Allah: And Allah is All
Powerful, All Wise.” (PAS 2008, 136)
Nik Aziz later defended that hudud is not a PAS creation but God’s laws that
must be implemented. According to Nik Aziz (2005, 107),
“PAS only existed for 51 years. Hudud laws are in the Quran for
more than 1400 years. PAS did not create it! Until today UMNO
doesn’t dare to implement hudud. They only talk about PAS’s
hudud. Where is UMNO’s hudud?”
Several criticisms have been levelled on the hudud Bill passed by PAS in
Kelantan and they centre on its implementation and provisions. Despite the
48
Takzir refers to punishments not fixed by the Quran.
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problems raised, the necessity for the implementation of hudud laws is supported by
many other members of the religious elite including Dr Zahazan, who deemed these
God’s laws as final and perfect. In the same way, Dr Yusri Mohamad also assures
that if given political power, he will implement more of such ‘Islamic’ laws
(Interviews with Dr Zahazan and Dr Yusri). Some of the problems raised on the
provisions and understanding of hudud laws are as follows.
Firstly, the hudud enactment is at odds with many other alternative opinions
upheld by Muslim jurists, particularly those from the Shafie and Hanafi schools of
law. This is despite the fact that the religious elite claimed to be followers of the
Shafie School of Jurisprudence. Some have even argued that the PAS Ulama mainly
select the opinions of the Maliki and Hanbali schools and treat them as ‘final’ (Rose,
79).49 They also fail to account for the context and societies of which these laws
were formulated by these classical jurists, and question whether they can better
serve the society in today’s modern context.
Secondly, many provisions in the proposed hudud Bill‐ such as ‘two women‐
one man rule in providing evidence’,50 ‘no women as eyewitness rule’, and ‘four
49
This is the view of Izman Ismail, The Dean of Law Faculty (IIUM).
50
The evidence of two women equals to the evidence of one man.
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adult male eye‐witnesses are required to establish the offence of rape’‐ are not only
sexist and impractical, but also negate the original intent of the Quran, which is to
uphold justice. In fact, the verse quoted to justify ‘two women‐one man rule’ does
not apply to evidence in general, but is related to loan agreements (Ibid, 44). It has
been contended that the verse emphasises the need for justice to be upheld, and
less the matter of evidence. This reveals the emphasis on the literal reading of the
verse and not its underlying values, consistent with traditionalism.
Thirdly, the proponents of the hudud Bill are oblivious towards the implications
of their proposed law. For instance, women or men who are victims of rape have
little hope of proving rape through eyewitness evidence because four adult male‐eye
witnesses must be present according to the provision made in hudud. This problem
worsens when the religious elite also insist on four witnesses to prove that a sexual
act has taken place when modern technology such as DNA tests and CCTV cameras
can be used instead. Nik Aziz for instance has criticized the use of DNA technology to
prove Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy charges in 1999. He asked, “Where are the four
witnesses as required by Islam?” (Nik Aziz 2005, 82)
Fourthly, their understanding of Islamic laws is only confined to certain modes
of punishment. Such an understanding is problematic because there are
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disagreements about whether certain types of conduct are punishable or not, or
whether they fall under the realm of private morality that cannot be enforced.
Fifthly, such views fail to account for why many Muslim societies, except Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and Sudan, have not introduced such hudud laws. In many Muslim
states, laws that differ from the set of crimes and punishment generally understood
by the religious elite as hudud have been accepted as consistent with the ethical
principles as underlined by the shariah and also the Quran. This position is
consistent with the Quran itself which hesitated not to draw its norms from pre‐
Islamic laws of the past. Hence, the Egyptian jurist Al‐Ashmawi (1994) has argued
that since the Quran did not forbid borrowing from ‘pagan’ legal system, Muslims
have thus appropriated laws of any society if such borrowing results in advancement
and contributes to human welfare (17).
The religious elite’s view of the perfect and immutable nature of laws it deems
Islamic at once devalues ‘secular’ laws. Hence, there is a strong desire that Islamic
laws, guided by the Quran and Sunnah, should be the basis of Parliamentary laws
and state laws in Malaysia. Dr Siddiq Fadhil, ex‐President of ABIM and a prominent
Ulama believes that,
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“Under Western secular laws, the world is getting less safe. Its
about time the world accepts Islamic laws in order to recover
peace and human civilization.” (Siddiq Fadhil 1989, 160)
“Islamic laws not only punish, they are also educative in nature.
Islamic laws are equipped with moral values, unlike secular laws,
which are devoid of morality to the extent that there can be a
situation that what is legally right is morally wrong. The
implementation of Islamic laws will facilitate a more substantive
Islamization process which forms the basis for human
transformation‐ in building an ummah in realizing Islam.” (Ibid,
162)
Laws that have evolved in the contemporary period to meet the challenges and
demands of the modern world are completely rejected on groundless basis. The
argument that Western laws are devoid of moral principles is not based on objective
discernment of the laws in concrete terms. Such allegation is not based on careful
understanding of the universal principles underlying Western laws as much as the
laws they deem as Islamic.
Notwithstanding the above, there are views among the religious elite to the
effect that an Islamic State does not require shariah or hudud laws. This view is
normally held by those closely affiliated to the state, which runs counter to PAS.
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However, many of these religious elite do not reject the hudud laws in principle.
Their concern, however, rests on the timing and appropriateness of the
implementation. Mohd Yusof Nor, closely identified as an UMNO Ulama, believes
that hudud is not appropriate for a multiracial composition of Malaysia. Abdul Hamid
Othman, another UMNO Ulama, also believes in the sanctity of hudud laws, but
argues that they must be implemented at the right time (Saeed and Saeed, 137). Dr
Ridhwan Tee posits that one should not talk about hudud laws unless Muslims are at
least two‐thirds of the whole population, as in Brunei (Interview with Dr Ridhwan).
ISLAMIC/NON‐ISLAMIC STATE
Another major theme of interest in the Islamic State discourse among the religious
elite pertains to issues dealing with warfare and conquest: such as the rights of
captives in wars, rights of animals, and abuses of the environment. All these are
backed by the selection of the Prophet’s traditions and his conduct during the wars
of his time in 7th century Arabia. While their discussions highlight broad and
universal principles, the discourse is not in sync with contemporary problems and
debates on these issues rooted in human rights perspective. Furthermore, little
attention is given to the actualization of these broad principles into concrete plans
and actions, especially is the context of the modern world.
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It is often pointed out that the basis of cooperation, alliances and warfare,
should solely be on the grounds of religion. Abdul Hadi, for instance dichotomizes
states into three categories: (1) Darul Islam, or Islamic state; (2) Darul Ahdi, non‐
Islamic state but establishes peaceful diplomatic ties with Islamic states, and (3)
Darul Harbi, non‐Islamic states which are antagonistic towards Islamic states (Abdul
Hadi 2009b, 206‐208). Such categorizations, nevertheless, cannot be applied today;
in the context where Muslims live all around the world in societies that are culturally
plural. In contemporary nation‐state arrangements, citizens, Muslims and non‐
Muslims, have equal and full protection of the law. Dichotomies based on religious
affiliations reflect the discourse of 10th century jurists (El‐Fadl 1994) in response to
problems encountered by Muslims during the period of the expansion of Islam.
Historically, the dichotomy between darul Islam and darul Harb was a response to
the Mongol invasion of the Muslim heartland in the 13th century (Kamali 2009, 132).
Such categorizations did not exist during the time of the Prophet, but were later
constructions of Muslim jurists in respond to their context. These later constructions
are what traditionalists treat as immutable Islamic categories, which they weave into
the challenges confronting Muslims in this contemporary era.
There is still a dominant perception that the basis of conflict is religion. Hence,
it is also inferred that the basis of jihad (struggle) should be religious in character.
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Haron Din (2007b, 37), for instance, interprets verses 39 and 40 of Surah Al‐ Haj as a
justification for warfare in the name of defending religion (Islam), when these simply
refer to the general allowance for anyone, regardless of any particular religion, to
defend their homeland.51 Haron Din’s very idea of warfare is traditionalistic, for he
claims that wars are motivated by defence of religion. An analysis on the study of
warfare are overlooked or missed. The fact that the causes of wars are largely
political or economic and that their source is multi‐causal escapes their attention.
Even the idea of jihad itself reflects a traditionalist mode which does not
address contemporary problems. While the religious elite concur that jihad can also
mean individual struggle, they have seldom used it to address the struggle against
modern problems of injustice, discrimination, massive exploitation, poverty, the
environment and more. Such a restrictive conception of jihad to mean warfare
against non‐Muslims confined to territories distinct from Muslims as reflected in
traditionalist discourse is incongruent with the lived realities today. Furthermore,
the restricted and traditionalistic discourses on jihad has created what Chandra
51
The verses quoted is translated by Abdullah Yusof Ali as “To those against whom war is made,
permission is given (to fight) because they are wronged; verily, God is Most Powerful for their aid.
(They are) those whop have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, or for no cause
except that they say, “ Our lord is God” Did not God check one set of people by means of another,
there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in
which the name God is commemorated in abundant measure. God will certainly aid those who aid His
cause; for verily God is full of strength, Exalted in Might, (able to enforce his will). See Abdullah Yusof
Ali, (336).
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perceives as the religious elite’s and communities’ silence on significant issues that
threaten humanity, including predatory capitalism, communalism, chauvinism, and
the caste system and gender discrimination, which is happening worldwide (Chandra
2005, 42‐43).
THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES IN AN ISLAMIC STATE
Based on the general discourse of the religious elite, the non‐Muslims in an Islamic
state should be treated as dhimmis, the term used in classical Islam to describe the
minorities. An Islamic state, in the eyes of the religious elite, does not only highlight
that Muslims should be at the apex of political power and has shariah laws as its
basis, it also spells out the rights of the non‐Muslims living in an Islamic state. The
religious elite argue that minorities should not be denied their rights as in an Islamic
state. As seen in the following, the discussion of rights is still latched on the
discourse of the medieval period by medieval Islamic jurists. Such cross checking of
contemporary context against another from a few centuries ago is problematic for
the chasms of time, evolution and context totally collapses in a comparative analysis
(Martinez 2006, 249‐250).
The view of a young and emerging religious preacher, Mohammad Nidzam
Abdul Kadir, illustrates this point. Nidzam (2009) has written on the guidelines for
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how Muslims should treat their non‐Muslim counterparts. To Nidzam, non‐Muslims
are divided into two categories‐ dhimmis and harbis. Dhimmis are non‐Muslims who
do not wage war on Muslims, whilst Harbis are those that are at war with Muslims.
Although Nidzam grants that the rights of the dhimmis must be honoured and any
agreements with them respected, doubts are cast about accepting non‐Muslims as
their representatives or leaders (wali). This belief is derived from his interpretation
of Surah Ali Imran Verse 28,
“Muslims should not elect kafirs as their leaders (representatives)
and leave behind the Muslims. Those who continue to do that (to
elect the non‐Muslims) shall not benefit anything from God, but
will only remain in fear because of them (non‐Muslims).”
(Mohammad Nidzam, 145)
Clearly, Nidzam has difficulties reconciling what he understands from this verse
with the realities of the day. On the one hand, Nidzam posits that a Muslim should
not sideline the truth for the sake of his non‐Muslim friends, maintaining that there
are limits to Muslim/non‐Muslim relations. He cites Verse 22 from Surah al‐
Mujadalah to mean that
“You can never get a believer (of God and the Hereafter) to have
good relations with those who go against God and the Prophet,
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even though the person is his father, child, relative, or family
members.” (Ibid, 146)
On the other hand, Nidzam admits that Muslims are highly encouraged to co‐
operate with non‐Muslims in several areas: economic, to establish the halal market;
politics, to maintain stability; and social and community matters. However, Nidzam
reminds Muslims that war must be waged on non‐Muslims who impede Islamic
dakwah (preaching) to the masses (Ibid, 146). Possibly, such views are conditioned
by reliance on a selective interpretation of Islamic history that sees the relationship
between Islam and other faiths in terms of warfare, conflict, revenge, and conquest.
Apart from the issue of the dhimmis, another issue the religious elite are
concerned about is the jizyah, or pay‐roll tax. This tax has to be paid by non‐Muslims
to their Muslim authorities in the past. The term jizyah is derived from the Quran
and a tradition from the Prophet. Nidzam raises several concerns when it comes to
the jizyah that must be collected from non‐Muslims living in an Islamic state (151‐
154). To be sure, any references to categories such as dhimmis and jizyah by
Malaysian religious elite, who are living under a modern‐nation state remains
doubtful. Such discussions are problematic in several ways. Firstly, they are not
grounded on existing institutions and their functions. The language used by the
religious elite clearly shows that they are also not versed in modern economic
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instruments and taxation systems, integrated in modern states monetary and fiscal
policies. Often, such modern institutions and instruments are simply deemed as un‐
Islamic or irrelevant. Furthermore, their analysis of obligations is entrenched in the
context of pre‐Industrial and pre‐capitalistic Islamic society of the past, which are not
relevant today.
Secondly, their conceptualization of the dhimmis is devoid of principles of
justice and equality upheld by Islam. There is only one type of citizenship that Islam
acknowledges which is based on equal rights and duties (Kamali, 132). This is in line
with a renowned statement made by Caliph Ali on non‐Muslims that, “They have the
same rights and the same obligations as we have”(Ibid, 131). Ironically, while the
religious elite have underscored that the rights of the minorities be upheld, these
religious elite are the ones who have tolerated the abuses towards minorities and
their rights to practice their religions. For instance, the majority remain silent when
Hindu temples and other places of worship are demolished, even though these
temples were constructed a century ago on unused lands (Hunt 2009, 590).
Thirdly, they have failed to come to grips with the full implications of
citizenship in a modern state and what citizenship demands in a modern state.
Chandra (2008, 19‐20) highlights that the notion of citizenship in the post‐
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Westphalia era is one that cannot distinguish or differentiates its citizens based on
religion. Therefore, the religious elite must acknowledge, recognize, and respect
equality of all its citizens‐ Malays, non‐Malays, Muslims and non‐Muslims. It is
troubling when the opinions they cling on to suggest that non‐Muslims should be
treated as second class citizens. JAKIM for instance used classical Shafii jurist Al‐
Mawardi as their primary reference (Martinez 2006, 249). The uncritical selection of
such a source is worrying for Al‐Mawardi is one to have equated the jizya with dues
or punishments for unbelief (Ibid, 250).
Fourthly, the very questions they ask, particularly on the jizyah, show their
preoccupation with institutions that has no place in Malaysia’s modern state system.
They do not take into consideration the changing contexts of the Quranic injunction
on the jizyah, which had perfect validity during the time of the Prophet. When the
Quran was revealed, it was common inside and outside Arabia to levy poll taxes
against alien groups, and classical Muslim jurists build upon this practice in their
formulation of legal rulings (El‐Fadl 2002, 21). Hence, the jizya is contextual. The jizya
could not have been obligatory because Caliph Umar (second Rightly‐Guided Caliph)
was reportedly to have returned the poll tax to an Arab Christian tribe because he
was unable to protect them from Byzantine aggression (Ibid, 21). In another
tradition, Caliph Umar substituted the jizyah with zakat (annual tithe) when
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negotiating a peace settlement with Arab Christian tribes because the latter felt the
jizyah was degrading (Ibid, 22). Interestingly, no other Muslim societies today have
applied the jizyah; even the Islamic Republic of Iran did not include jizyah in its legal
code (Mohsen 2006, 141).
UTOPIAN MENTALITY AND THE ISLAMIC STATE
The discourse on Islamic state also reveals the elements of the utopian mentality.
The utopian mentality is not necessarily rooted in the past. However, dominant
orientation of the prominent religious elite in Malaysia reveals elements of utopian
mentality woven into traditionalism. It reflects the political demands of this group in
their challenge against the present system with the intent of replacing it with an
alternative one rooted in the past. This imagined authentic past is based on a
selective appropriation of religious traditions. They are radically at odds with
contemporary conditions and problems. Within utopian mentality, the diagnosis of
contemporary problems is attributed to the notion that Muslims have departed
from the Islamic state model.
Utopian mentality reflects the thinking of oppressed groups who are only
interested in the destruction and transformation of a given society that they
unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it
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(Mannheim, 40‐41). It is wishful thinking that seeks refuge in selective constructions
of the past. Utopian thinking generally seeks to oppose the existing order and
replace it with a new one, without even considering the merits of the existing order.
According to Mannheim,
“In the utopian mentality, the collective unconscious, guided by
wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects
of reality. It turns its back on everything which would shake its
belief or paralyse its desire to change things.” (40)
Elements of utopian thinking can coexist with traditionalism. As the basis of
utopian thinking is the attainment of power to revamp or replace the existing order
with a ‘new’ one, it fuses with traditionalism when this ‘new’ order found in an
‘imagined’ past deemed pristine, pure and perfect.52 Shaharuddin (2006) has
discussed at length the emergence of utopian thinking among Muslims in Southeast
Asia. He problematizes a particular kind of rhetoric centring on the notion of Islam is
Ad‐Din. While Muslims generally agree that Islam is a complete way of life that
provides guidance in all walks of life, in utopian mentality the understanding is
thwarted. In effect Islam is essentialized and reduced to fixed and complete systems
that encompass everything including the individual and social, material and moral,
52
Utopian thinking can be futuristic as well, as manifested in Marxist conception of a classless society.
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economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international. Furthermore,
this closed system is dichotomized from the ‘secular’ which is itself an image, a
caricature of the West. Utopian thinking has become the basis for increasing
demands for the establishment of Islamic state and the implementation of Islamic
laws, which was believed to have existed during the time of the Prophet and the
rightly guided Caliphs. Furthermore, utopians are critical of the present system
which they see as secular or Western, and which they believe needs to be replaced
with an ‘Islamic’ one. In short, utopian thinking coexist with traditionalism, in this
case as the political motif is to be achieved by destroying the existing order and
replacing it with a selective version of the glorious past.
Many of the religious elite discussed in this chapter, especially those from PAS
markedly reflect such utopian tendencies. Under the PAS game plan, not only does
the party want to supersede the present constitution, it also seeks for it to be
abolished and replaced. Therefore, the whole idea is not to win the game, but to win
in order to change the rules (New Starits Times 9 July 2003).Utopian mentality also
fails to explain what is so un‐Islamic about the present system of governance or the
modern‐nation state system. They often charge that the modern nation‐state is a
‘human’ construct, if not ‘Western’ and ‘secular’’ in origin, as opposed to the Islamic
state system, which is ‘divine’. Such thinking also applies to their conception of laws.
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For instance, the religious elite seek to replace the existing laws with a set of laws
deemed Islamic, namely hudud. However, they neither attempt to explicate
concretely what makes existing laws un‐Islamic, nor why despite the changing
conditions and circumstances continuation of laws of the past is warranted.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter has pointed out that the discourse of the religious elite on the concept
of Islamic state reveals a mixture of the strong influence of traditionalism and traits
of utopian mentality. Traditionalism is the adherence to selective traditions without
question or doubt. The problem with this mode is that it is unable to distinguish
eternal principles from its manifestation in concrete historical conditions. The result
is that it conditions maladjustment to changing social conditions. The mode of
thinking on the very concept of Islamic state, the philosophy underlying it, the
conception of a leader in the perceived Islamic state, the notion of the laws that
regulates human relations, all reveal the traits of traditionalism. The political motif
which is revealed in this discourse also reflects elements of the utopian mentality
which seeks to challenge the existing order and replace it with a radically different
alternative. Though the utopian mentality is not necessarily rooted in the past, its
coexistence with the traditionalist mode of thought is born out of the religious elite’s
discourse on the Islamic state.
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CHAPTER 4- ISLAMIZING MALAY SOCIETY:
ADAT, CULTURE AND FOLK BELIEFS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to examine the religious elite’s understanding of Islam, Malay
culture and folk beliefs. One significant aspect of Malay culture is adat. To the
Malays, cultural symbols, rituals, ceremonies, and customs are important markers of
their identity that primarily distinguishes them from the ‘other’. The centrality of
adat in the Malay identity is embodied in the well‐known Malay proverb, “Biar mati
anak, jangan mati adat.”53 Adat does not only refer to norms and customs, but also
rules and laws that are related to administration and governance (Abdul Rahman
1964, 19). In this study, adat is not restricted to Malay dances, arts, customs, food
and costumes, but includes many religious rituals ordinarily identified and practised
by the Malays. Therefore, rituals such as the kenduri, doa selamat, maulid, zikir
(ratib), and honouring of the malam nisfu Syaban, which have become integrated
with the religious practices and traditions of the Malays, also fall into this definition
of adat.54
53
It means ‘to lose a child is more acceptable than losing one’s culture.’
54
For a detailed discussion of these religious rituals, see Zainal Kling (1997, 72‐75).
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While the Malays have for a very long time regarded such practices as part of
their religious life and consistent with Islamic norms and values, it is interesting to
examine the views of the religious elite, especially in the context of Islamic
resurgence as there are marked shifts in the attitude towards adat during that
period. Apart from examining their views on Malay culture and adat, this chapter
shall also analyze their views on Malay folk beliefs, many of which predated the
coming of Islam. These Malay folk beliefs have significantly conditioned the
worldview of the Malays and how they respond to issues and problems. In this
chapter, I shall break the discussion on Malay culture into three issues: Malay
cultural practices, including art forms, dances, and customs; Malay religious rituals,
such as the kenduris, maulid, zikir (ratib); and Malay folk beliefs.
ISLAM AND MALAY CULTURAL PRACTICES
Islam has always been regarded by the Malays as the most fundamental element of
their identity to the extent that one cannot speak of being Malay without Islam.55 In
fact, Islam remains the most important stabilizing marker of their identity vis‐à‐vis
the others, such as Malay language and adat. It is widely seen to have played a
crucial role in the development and revolution of the Malay language, thought,
philosophy, system of values, and literature since the early days of the Islamization
55
The religious elite’s view of the close nexus between Islam and Malayness has been discussed and
developed by the writer elsewhere (Norshahril,2009b)
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of the Malay World (Al‐Attas 1969). The inseparability of Islam from being Malay is a
sentiment held by Nik Aziz. When asked about the relationship between Malay
identity and Islam, he echoed with a short and sharp response that “I am a Muslim
first, and being a Muslim means automatically being a Malay too” (Farish 2008, 63).
Nik Aziz also noted that, “Malays found their identity (makna diri) after knowing
Islam” (Nik Aziz 2009, 49). “The question of what is Malay?” according to Nik Aziz,
“could not be answered without the element of Islam which determines the quality
of Malayness” (Ibid, 126). For that reason, the dilemma faced by the religious elite is
not so much about whether Islam is or is not part of Malayness; rather, it is what
Islam means to their lives and how it should be appropriated to achieve an ideal
society.
While the basic premise of Islam allows for three forms of relationship
corresponding to local cultures and practices‐ namely conflict, agreement, or
neutrality (Alatas 1978, 38‐48) ‐ the prominent religious elite have specific views on
which aspects of Malay culture exist in conflict, which are encouraged, or those
which are neutral to Islam. Although the religious elite do not deny that culture has
as an important place in Islam, the problem lies in their conceptualization of which
aspects of Malay culture they negatively sanction as un‐Islamic. The mode of
thinking in determining this issue reveals the traits of traditionalism. Consequently,
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many Malay local practices and culture are problematized as either non‐Islamic or
un‐Islamic. To be sure, there is a diversity of opinions among the prominent religious
elite themselves. Nevertheless, this diversity is based on differences of theology,
where conflicting traditions are quoted to debunk their opponents, without
justifications that take into consideration the historical experiences of Muslim
societies and the sociological function of these cultural practices and customs in
relation to these communities.
By‐and‐large, the thinking of Nik Aziz on Malay adat and culture manifest
traditionalist streak. Nik Aziz believes that several aspects of adat should be
Islamized. Although in principle he believes in the importance of preserving Malay
culture, his actions and policies reflect intolerance and disapproval towards many
Malay cultural practices which he labels as ‘un‐Islamic.’ To Nik Aziz (1999b, 431‐434),
the relationship between culture exists only in two forms‐ Islamic (permissible or
halal) or non‐Islamic (forbidden or haram). Evidently, the state of Kelantan, which
Nik Aziz has led as the Chief Minister since 1990, has outlawed many cultural
performances such as Mak Yong, wayang kulit (shadow play) and menora.56 Such
56
The Mak Yong has been banned by the PAS government of Kelantan on the grounds that it breeds
the intermingling of males and females. See “Ministry to go ahead with Mak Yong performance in
Kelantan,” (Bernama Daily Malaysian News 21Mar 2006).
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performances, in Nik Aziz’s view, do not parallel the true Islamic teachings (Nik Aziz,
1999a, 222‐226). When asked for his views on Malay culture, Nik Aziz responded:
“As long as all this culture that you find in Kelantan does not transgress
the values and rules of Islam, that’s okay. Look, I was the one who
officiated the wau (kite‐flying) festival here in Kelantan. I opened
traditional music festivals. That’s all right. But if they want to perform
wayang kulit performances with myths and fables, about things and
people who don’t exist, then I just tell them, ‘Don’t bother lah’. If they
want to do a wayang kulit performance about the life of Tok Kenali for
example, no problem. But if they only want to perform shows about
mythical stories or with characters like Pak Dogol or things like that,
don’t bother. What’s the point of filling the heads of Malays with more
nonsense? There’s enough nonsense there already!” (Interview with Nik
Aziz by Farish Noor 2008, 61).57
Nik Aziz is against wayang kulit not only because the characters in the play are
mythical. He is also against it because he deemed these characters as un‐Islamic and
that the art form originated prior the coming of Islam. On the wayang kulit, Nik Aziz
opines that:
57
See also the comments made by Nik Aziz on wayang kulit, a Malay puppet show in Nik Aziz (1995 ,
133).
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“Wayang Kulit contains Hinduistic elements such as the God‐
Kings which is not based on reality. It is based on Hindu culture
which draws from books such as Ramayana and Mahabhrata. It
promotes figurines such as Wak Long, Pak Dogol, Hanuman, Seri
Rama, Raja Buata, Bota Maharaja Wana and more.” (Nik Aziz
1999, 431‐434)
The banning of the wayang kulit here is based on the grounds that it is
Hinduistic, and the fear that tolerating or promoting it will lead to un‐belief. Such
discourse again bears the traits of traditionalism, the unthinking emotive reaction
that is not based on careful deliberation on the basis of principles. It is also oblivious
to the sociological significance of cultural practices, art forms, and the values
underlying them. There is a failure to discern that although the wayang kulit uses
characters as found in Hindu texts, Malays no longer worship them as they did in the
pre‐Islamic times. Furthermore, the overriding message of the plays conveys the
universal significance of triumph of good versus evil. Moreover, the art form
provides an important form of social entertainment. It is then very similar to
watching any program that has flooded the Malay entertainment market, which do
not use any Islamic characters as such. More importantly, watching the wayang kulit
or menora does not tantamount to believing in Hinduism.
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It is clear that given traditionalism, Nik Aziz fails to see events and ideas
beyond selective theological standpoint. The fact that the generally God‐fearing
Malays who have been Islamized centuries ago do not succumb to this view also
does not provoke traditionalists to question the relevance of their standpoint. It is
not uncommon that their unquestioning dogma conditions their view that their
forefathers were ignorant of Islam. The issue however has less to do with Islam than
with the strong tendency of the traditionalists to cling on to a particular version of
the teachings of the religion as the only complete and infallible one.
Another cultural practice among Kelantanese Malays that did not escape Nik
Aziz’s disapproval includes the sembah pantai ceremony (also known as puja pantai).
This ritual is believed to have been conducted by fishermen during the monsoon
season where originally buffaloes are slaughtered and drowned into the sea, with
the intention to calm the sea. Nik Aziz holds the view that such rituals should not be
allowed because they deny the oneness of God, harm other creatures, promote
cruelty towards animals, and divert the attention of the people away from engaging
in other useful activities (Ibid). He fails to acknowledge that the sembah pantai has
long been syncretised with Islam. Prayers to God were also offered during these
rituals, as a gesture that God is supreme, above and beyond the lower spirits of the
sea. The ways in which it has been practised has long departed from its original form.
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This puritanical reaction may be influenced by ideas of resurgent groups which
attempt to recreate a pure, pristine society which they believe characterize Muslim
society in early Islamic history. Again, the rejection of such practices are latched on
to selective theology devoid of principles and values influenced by Islam and the
overriding fear that one would compromise one’s belief in God (akidah). The
resurgence movement itself manifests emotional streak towards problems and
political developments in the newly independent Muslim states in the Middle East
and South Asia. Both traditionalism and the resurgence movement operate through
the same modus operandi. It is unsurprising that the language and discourse of the
resurgence movement in the Malay world mirrors their counterparts in the Middle
East and South Asia. Many of the Islamic‐based civil‐society movements and
organizations back in the 1970s and 1980s established close ties with similar
organizations in other parts of the Muslim world. For instance, in the 1980s, it was
reported that ABIM had established links with a total of 24 Muslim organizations
overseas which include the famous Jama’at‐i‐Islami in Pakistan and India, Ikhwanul
Muslimin (Islamic Brotherhood) in Egypt, and the Muhammadiyah and Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) in Indonesia (Hussin 1990, 79). ABIM too had participated in
numerous international seminars and gatherings. Another organization, Darul
Arqam, was also reported to have many ties with international student organizations
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and bodies as far as in Australia, United Kingdom, United States and Canada (Ibid,
88).
Traditionalism being an unthinking mode of thought is easily swept by the
currents of resurgence, which endeavours to re‐establish what its actors perceive as
pure Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, Islam in its
entirety, in the lives of the Muslims everywhere as the solution to the problems
encountered by the Muslims against the onslaught of Westernization and the
problems of social change. The language used by the resurgence, to re‐create an
Islamic ethos, and Islamic social order, at the vortex of which is the Islamic human
being, guided by the Quran and Sunnah (Chandra 1986, 2), could have easily
convinced traditionalist minds of the need for the establishment of an essentialised
Islamic culture lodged in the past, ignoring the evolution over thousands of years of
the historical interactions of Islam with other diverse cultures and civilizations.
Hence, resurgent ideas woven into traditionalist discourse have been very a‐
sociological and a‐historical.
In this context, practices commonly associated with the Malay wedding, the
bersanding (the couple sits on the dais) and the tepung tawar, are also often
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criticized by the religious elite.58 For instance, Dr Mohd Asri (2008) believes that
these practices contradict the shariah. “If a particular adat and culture result in syirik
(dualistic view of God),” Dr Mohd Asri asserts, “like the tepung tawar and other
innovations which obfuscate the true Islamic teachings, then they must be
disallowed and destroyed (92).” Again, consistent with traditionalism, such
obscurantist views ignore the diversity of opinions on that matter and the function of
the adat in traditional society.
Alatas (1978, 38) for instance maintains that Islam is neutral to the bersanding.
It neither rules against the practice nor encourages it. Such criticisms on the
bersanding also ignore the social meanings attached to the custom. Its social
function in forging community bonding in traditional societies is completely
overlooked in traditionalism. The practice that has been observed in Malay society
also provides for a couple to be seated together for the first time in the company of
friends and relatives. Furthermore, the ritual is accompanied by communal feasting
which reinforce ties amongst kin and members of the village, and forges social
solidarity. While the social significance of the ritual, like many others pertaining to
marriage, is waning today, the matter has less to do with theology than with its
continued relevance in contemporary society which has been subjected to changing
social conditions impacting courtship patterns and marriage.
58
See Nik Aziz and Hadi Awang (2008, 174)
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All in all, the religious elite’s discourse on adat is generally oblivious towards
the social significance of cultural practices, and the principles and humane values
underlying them. Such attitudes towards culture are manifestations of the process of
de‐culturization (Roy 2004) often accompanied by a neglect of a profound
understanding of the relationship between Islam and culture and its expressions in
the history of Muslim societies. Just as the arrival of Islam to the Arabs in the past
did not destroy their love for poetry, calligraphy, grammar, and literature (Ameer Ali
1922, 363), similarly the coming of Islam had a significant impact in assimilating and
enriching many indigenous customs, arts and cultural forms (Al‐Attas 1972).
Conversely, given the rise of traditionalism reinforced by resurgent ideas, Malay
cultural practices such as menorah and makyung, commonly associated with the
Kelatanese art forms, are on the brink of extinction.
Moreover, the attacks on Malay culture are based on selective traditions and
understanding of them which clearly ignores other theological views and traditions.
One important verse from the Quran which is not considered specifically says that
“All other than these (specified in the Quran) are lawful to you.” Muslim jurists have
interpreted this verse to mean that whatever that has not been explicitly forbidden
is allowed (Muhammad Hamidullah 1981, 28‐29). Such an understanding has been
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applied to the customs and practices of pagans and idolaters and those of the Arabs.
Another Hadith noted by scholars further states that in cases where the Prophet had
not received a direct revelation, namely the verses from the Quran, he observed the
customs and customary laws of the People of the Book (Jews and Christians). It was
also reported that the Prophet respected the Ansar’s love for arts and singing, and
women’s role in society when he migrated to Medina from Mecca (Ramadan 2009,
187).
This principle was later operationalized by various caliphs for various purposes
including Caliph Umar, the second Caliph, who ordered his governors to apply tariffs
as set by the foreign traders’ territory when Muslims dealt with them. This means
that when Muslims deal with the Chinese and Persians, they had to be charged with
the amount as normally set in China and Persia respectively. This shows the flexibility
Islam allows in appropriating local customs and values that do not contradict the
basic principles (Muhammad Hamidullah, 29‐32). Such inevitable assimilation of pre‐
existing cultures and customs since the inception of Islam was perceived as
manifestation of God’s will to establish plurality of tribes, nations, and cultures as
stipulated in the Quran. It also supports the view that Islam never sought to
homogenise Muslim cultures, expressions and symbols (Ramadan 2009, 192).
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RELIGIOUS RITUALS OF THE MALAYS
The restrictive attitude towards Malay adat and rituals are shared by many other
religious elite, including Dr Mohd Asri, whom many hail as one of the most
progressive Ulama in Malaysia today. Dr Mohd Asri is more concerned with the
religious rituals of the Malays rather than the cultural rituals. In his writings, Dr
Mohd Asri (2005a,17; 2008,281) unequivocally confessed that Islam encompasses
cultural practices as long as they do not contradict the shariah, otherwise, they are
considered as bid’ah or innovations which are prohibited. Some of the religious
practices commonly practiced among the Malays censured by Dr Mohd Asri include
the recitation of the Yaa‐Sin (a chapter in the Quran) on the Malam Nisfu Syaaban
(Night of 15th Day of the month Syaaban), the slametan or kenduri (feast and prayers
after the burial of the deceased), maulid celebrations, and the mass zikir (ratibs)
after prayers (2005, 17‐40). Criticisms against several Sufi tarikat groups and rituals,
including the act of tawassul (the belief in intermediaries in prayers), have become a
central feature of many of his writings, publications, and sermons. These practices,
he argues, do not have any basis from the Quran and Sunnah.59 Dr Mohd Asri also
disapproves of many Sufi practices which he believes promote unquestioning loyalty
towards the Sufi masters. According to Dr Mohd Asri:
59
Dr Asri considers the act of tawassul as syirik (Which causes a person to denounce his religion).
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“To this group (Sufis) their teachers deserve more respect than Abu
Bakr, Umar and other Companions (Caliphs of Sunni Islam). Their
teachers can never be objected. It is clear that in Islamic history the
acts of the companions can be questioned by others.” (Ibid, 51)
On the rituals of the Malam Nisfu Syaaban, Dr Mohd Asri posits that such
practices are un‐Islamic because there are no clear directives to be found in the
Quran and Sunnah. According to Dr Mohd Asri,
“The authenticity of religion must be protected so that God’s
orders will not be infested with man‐made innovations. If religion
can be created, revelation is no longer important and the Prophet
need not be appointed. Therefore, Islam forbids fabrications in
the name of religion.” (Minda Tajdid:drmaza.com)60
Such a view on Islamic rituals reflects traditionalism at its core. These religious
rituals commonly practised by the Malays are condemned as un‐Islamic because
they do not conform to the particular selection of religious traditions considered
authentic and inviolable at the expense of others. By saying that such customary
practices have no basis in the Quran and Sunnah, Dr Mohd Asri alludes that there
exists a single, authentic authority and reading of the Sunnah. Such a standpoint is
60
Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, “Hadi Palsu Rejab, Syaahan,” in Minda Tajdid. See
http://drmaza.com/home/?p=646 (Date assessed: 2 September 2009).
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problematic as it denounces diverse religious views based on principles and values
that depart from the ones upheld. Those who observe these rituals believe they are
Islamic as they do not conflict with the fundamental creed of monotheism.
Furthermore, these rituals and religious ceremonies promote community spirit,
and constant remembrance of God. There seems to be a blatant assumption that
these practices in themselves are problematic, without making a clear distinction
between tariqahs that promote unquestioning obedience to leaders, which must be
censured, from those that do not succumb to this. Similarly the excessive
preoccupation with zikir at the expense of involvement in other problems impeding
Muslims can be detrimental towards development and should be condemned.
Nevertheless, condemning the entire ritual is indeed extreme. What aspects of these
rituals are negative in terms of their impact and what are positive are not
deliberated objectively.
In addition, such religious practices have become integrated with Malay
cultural life, and these practices, more often than not, are forms of reflections and
expressions of religious piety and commitment towards religion. For instance, during
maulids, a celebration commemorating the Prophet’s birthday, stories of the
Prophet’s struggles, his sacrifices, his attitude, his contributions are constantly read
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and recapped. The traditionalist mind however fails to discern that the Malays have
regarded these practices as part of their religious experience and a demonstration of
piety (Zainal, 74‐75).
The attitude of the traditionalists to regard maulid as an innovation in Islam for
it is not based on an authentic tradition of the Prophet is different from the
approach taken by some Muslim scholars elsewhere. For instance, Alwi Shihab, a
prominent Indonesian Islamic scholar delineates two sides of the arguments for and
against maulid (2001, 44‐45) before making his judgement based on the local
cultural context. While he acknowledges the existence of opinions against the
practice, such as those of Ibn Taimiyyah and Al‐Shatibi, he also considered the
opinions of classical scholars Al‐Suyuti and Al‐Izz ibn Abdul Al‐Salam for supporting
the maulid. After weighing the opposing opinions, Alwi opines that the practice
should be permitted in the local context in Indonesia because of its many
advantages and significance. Amongst the advantages it brings are the inculcation of
the love for the Prophet and his companions, and the elevation of spirituality of the
Indonesian Muslims (45).
Moreover, some scholars, Alwi argued, have interpreted the Prophetic
tradition that encourages Muslims to fast on Mondays to commemorate his Birthday
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and the day the Quran was first revealed as a sign that maulid is permissible in Islam
(Ibid, 44). Interestingly, maulid, tariqahs, and zikrs have continued to be practised
for centuries in the Malay World despite the attempts of several groups to denounce
them as un‐Islamic. Even the ‘Wahabbi’ movement during the Paderi Wars of 1831‐
1837 in West Sumatra (Roff 1994, 61), which sought to purify Muslims from
innovations and targeted practises such as the maulid and tahlil (prayers for the
deceased), remained at the peripheries and did not make much of an impact.
Nevertheless, the concerns raised by Dr Mohd Asri about innovations in
religion have become increasingly accessible to youths and students in the institutes
of higher learning in Malaysia today, especially through his blog postings and
sermons uploaded on YouTube. Such views create unnecessary doubts and schisms
pertaining to Malay beliefs and attitudes that are based on theological partisanship
rather than reasoning on how they impact on society’s well being. Contestations on
religious rituals have dominated the religious discourse of the Malays to the extent
that they have neglected other pressing problems in society, such as the problem of
corruption, attitude towards modern knowledge, and many others. Furthermore,
such theological debates are not useful, for they have never been resolved for
centuries in the Islamic world. Dr Mohd Asri’s criticisms of the religious rituals have
themselves effected to earn him the label ‘Wahabbi’ by other equally traditionalist
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elite, and is believed to be the reason for his arrest by the religious authorities of
Selangor (JAIS) in November 2009 (Kosmo 2 Nov 2009).
MALAY FOLK BELIEFS
The belief in supernatural powers, spirits, ghosts, demons, like in other societies, has
coloured very much the traditional worldview of the Malays. According to Mohd Taib
(1989), in Malay villages, the bomoh and pawang are generally regarded as
intercessors between the unseen spirits and demons and the ordinary world of
village life (61). In dealing with these supernatural existences, the Malays subscribe
to the several rites, ceremonies, charms, and rituals (Skeat 1900, 320‐580). Such
beliefs are termed as collective representations, for it is not the belief of one or few
individuals, but it is subscribed to by the society at large. Collective representation
refers to concepts or ideas formed concerning objects or events which differ from
those derived from ordinary empirical experience without any magico‐religious or
occult admixture (Alatas 1973, 54).61 Such beliefs promote irrationality, and deviates
from the basic premise of logic, reason, and science. Collective representations are
also empirically non‐verifiable.
61
See definition by Levy Bruhl.
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Essentially many Malay folk beliefs have been criticized by the religious elite on
the theological grounds that they promote syirik or dualism. For instance, belief in
ghosts and supernatural powers, termed as tahyul and khurafat, have been labelled
as deviant, as belief in them undermine belief in the Supreme Being. In a Friday
sermon issued by JAKIM, the beliefs in the bomoh (faith‐healers), the dukun (witch‐
doctors), mantras, amulets and love spells in order to fulfil one’s wishes are
denounced as un‐Islamic.62
Dr Mohd Asri also agrees with this point by commenting that,
“They (referring to those who believe in these practices) are not
only uncivilized, they are also backward as they deviate from the
authentic brand of Islam. They still believe in amulets, bomoh,
magic and saints.” (Mohd Asri 2008, 184)
While the religious elite generally condemn these forms of collective
representations, which remain prevalent among the Malays, their criticisms on
collective representations are mainly on the grounds of doctrine such as tauhid,
syirik, and khurafat. They invoke the fear that such practices may undermine their
belief in one God. In traditionalist discourse, their attack using religion does not
62
JAKIM, “Khurafat Membawa Sesat,” http://www.islam.gov.my/khutbahjakim/ (31 October 2008)
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tackle the problems of irrationality and its implications on the well‐being of society.
Hence they legitimize what are essentially collective representations when these
take on Islamic labels. A classic example is ‘perubatan Islam’ (Islamic healing) which
is promoted by some religious elite. Their idea of ‘Islamic healing’ or ‘Islamic
medicine’ reveals strong elements of the belief in collective representations woven
into Islam. While the Quran does speak about jins and sihir (witchcrafts) in general,
such terms are ‘localized’ by the religious elite revealing continuity with folk beliefs
from the past. Jins are extended to include Malay spirits such as orang Bunian,
pelesit, pontianak, langsuar, toyol and jembalang (Ismail Kamus 2000, 23).63 These
spirits, devils and other supernatural creations invoked are lodged in the cultural and
traditional beliefs system of the community. The religious elite’s invocation of them
for purposes of healing bears persistence of the mode of thinking lodged in the past.
These are modified and legitimised by invoking Islamic labels.
Some of the religious elite prescribe and practice a method of healing for
illnesses they diagnose as ‘rasuk’. These include depression, marital problems,
cancer, bad habits, and a host of other physical or psychological illnesses. The victims
are believed to be possessed or disturbed by evil spirits such as jins, and prescribed
with chants from the verses of the Quran. Many of the verses cited have little to do
63
See also Darulsyifa Website. http://www.darussyifa.org/SJ003.php (Date assessed 18 December
2008)
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with the existence of these supernatural beings or healing which these religious
personalities nonetheless selectively utilise in their diagnosis.
Two main well‐known personalities who are at the fore‐front of this practice
are Haron Din and Ismail Kamus. Ismail Kamus is frequently invited to deliver
sermons on jins and black magic. Issues such as abode of jins, the possibility of jins
marrying humans, the various forms of jins, their names, and whether it is possible
for humans to come in contact face‐to‐face with jins permeates his sermons and
writings (Ismail Kamus 2000, 8‐35, 77‐70). For instance, in deliberating about where
jins normally live, Ismail Kamus cites several Hadith ascribed to the Prophet and
Quranic verses. He concludes that jins like to dwell in isolated or lonely places,
forests, and toilets. Ismail bases this view with the Prophet’s sayings:
“Where possible, avoid being the first person to enter a market and
avoid being the last person to leave it because the market is the place
where syaitans (Devils) battle and uphold their flags.” (Ismail Kamus
2006, 30‐31)
Ismail generally distinguishes ‘Jinn Islam’’ and ‘non‐Islamic Jins’. He claims that non‐
Islamic jins basically stay in toilets, because the Prophet encourages Muslims to
recite a prayer before entering toilets. The Prophet was quoted to have said, “Oh
God! Protect me from the male‐devil and female devil.”
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It cannot be denied that the Quran made references to devils and jins,
although their exact nature is obscure. The issue however is not the matter simply of
belief in their existence. It is that such belief dominates and permeates the
traditionalist orientation conditioning its entire outlook and worldview. The belief in
the supernatural is enmeshed with what is deemed to be Islamic teachings. They
influence entire mode of thinking in which every phenomenon is subject to
collective representation. The remedies prescribed are believed to differ from resort
to black magic, but utilise verses from the Quran and Hadith. To deal with evil spirits,
which cause disturbances to men, one has to recite several prayers and verses from
the Quran. In this way, the practice does not undermine one’s faith. Apart from
prescribing several Quranic verses, some of the advice Ismail Kamus (2006, 186‐187)
gave to those who want to avoid being possessed include (1) not to pour warm
water into the toilet or a hole, (2) not to urinate into a hole (3) to perform ablution
when sleeping alone, (4) not to kill snakes found in your house but to caution them
for three days, (5) not to hurt dogs and cats, and (6) never to walk alone when in a
desert or forest.
Haron Din is another well‐known ghost buster and spiritual healer. Apart from
being a PAS member, Dr Haron is currently the Master (Tuan Guru) of Darulsyifa, a
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‘faith‐healing’ organization.64 Like Ismail Kamus, Dr Haron Din, widely known as
‘Ustaz Bomoh’, uses the Quran and Hadith to heal his patients. Besides ordinary
Malaysians, his clients originate from countries as far as Belgium, Australia, Saudi
Arabia and Britain (New Sunday Times 22 October 2006). Rumours are widespread
that he is widely patronized even by the members of the ruling elite, and has
become an iconic figure in the field of alternative healing. In 2003, Ustaz Haron Din
was called in to conduct exorcism on the Istana Raja DiHilir, Perak, which was
believed to be ‘haunted’ (The Malay Mail 3 May 2003). Although Dr Haron (2007c, 1‐
3) believes that Islamic principles and values are necessary pre‐requisites for social
development, he does not see the preoccupation with collective representations, or
irrational beliefs, as contrary to Islamic teachings.
Traditionalism of the religious elite does not effect any real change against the
problem of collective representation, but merely adapts it. Hence recourse to jins
and evil spirits are deemed valid within the Islamic framework. These religious elite
succumb to diagnosing numerous problems that they deal with as brought about by
evil spirits and jins possessing their victims. This has become the major prognosis of
‘Islamic medicine’ or healing. Ismail Kamus (2006) believes that the possibility of one
being possessed by these evil spirits is found in the Quran, hence he chastises
64
Darulsyifa Website, http://www.darussyifa.org/ (Date Assessed: 18 December 2008)
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anyone who does not believe in them (117). He cites two Quranic verses (Ibid, 118)
to justify his claims, which he translates as:
“Those who commit riba’ (usury) cannot stand just as those who
are possessed by the Devil and madness.” (Verse 275 Surah Al‐
Baqarah)
“Those who fear God, when they get assaulted by the devil, they
will remember God and remain vigilant.” (Verse 201 Surah Al‐A’raf)
In truth, those verses have little to do with one being possessed by spirits. The
first threatens those who commit usury, while the second generally warns Muslims
to fear God and avoid evil. It is the nature of traditionalists to select verses without
context, in order to strengthen a particular claim or opinion they are familiar with or
exposed to. In many ways their beliefs reveal continuity with the past, particularly in
pre‐modern/feudal Malay society (Shaharuddin 2002). By and large, such mode of
thinking reinforces irrationalism which impedes the development of a scientific
approach to life in a society already proliferated by popular culture and religiosity
filled with myths, magic, and supernatural elements that pervades the cultural
atmosphere. This is substantiated by the vast number of tabloids and movies bearing
the themes of sorcery, magic, and witchcraft easily available in many roadside
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newspaper‐stands and cinemas. The dominance of traditionalism does not
contribute to the tackling of problems by using progressive values provided by the
religion. These religious elite have generally condemned one form of collective
representation but justified another based on theological beliefs. Their diagnosis of
health problems or natural phenomena faced by individuals and society are devoid
of modern scientific knowledge. Consequently, this reliance on magico‐animistic
practices inhibits the scientific orientation towards life, for taboos and magic
provides a ready explanation that dispenses with the need for further inquiry (Alatas
1973, 61; 1977, 26).
Such an orientation reduces attention for the need to promote understanding
of illness and health through modern knowledge such as psychology, medicine, or
counselling, and emphasis on their development. The unthinking attitude that it
promotes invokes the need for a magic helper that reinforces the ‘receptive
orientation’ of the individual as described by Fromm (1947, 45). When men cannot
rely on themselves for solutions as they are disempowered, they tend to develop
dependence on a ‘healer’’ or ‘magic helper’. This leads to alienation from
understanding life through reason. Equally pertinent, such practices can endanger
human lives for they obstruct necessary treatment for illnesses suffered by victims.
On the whole, collective representation woven into religion denies rational and
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consistent basis of religious beliefs. It rejects the ability for critical evaluation and
appraisal of given ideas. One must submit and have faith in the power of
supernatural beings and forces lodged in selective texts and how they are construed.
The belief is not arrived at by means of rational causal connection but sheer
adherence to given specific religious traditions which cannot be questioned.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter reveals that traditionalism is interwoven with the religious elite’s
discussion of adat and Malay culture. This mode of thinking which is not based on
objective reasoning allows for the ready acceptance of resurgent and magical
(collective representation) ideas imported elsewhere and from the past. Two trends
exist in the religious elite’s analysis of Islam and Malayness. Firstly, there is a greater
emphasis on problematizing Malay cultural symbols and rituals as either non‐Islamic
or un‐Islamic. Increasingly, the religious elite uphold that there is an authentic set of
Islamic culture and symbols. Such views are problematic because they ignore the
allowance Islam has made for the assimilation of local cultures and practices, which
includes dress codes, music, arts and dances. Secondly, there are fears which they
justify based on their selective construction of religious sources that certain aspects
of Malay culture will undermine strict monotheism. Again these cultural aspects are
treated as being infested with un‐Islamic elements such as Hinduism and animism. In
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the same way, the belief in spirits and magic prevalent in Malay folk traditions are
also condemned for the same reason. On the contrary, such irrational beliefs, when
expressed using Islamic labels, are justified by selective use and reliance of specific
Islamic traditions, which are not questioned. This certainly has a major impact on the
societies’ attitude towards modern scientific knowledge, and the significance of
rationality that are crucial to the demands of modernization.
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CHAPTER 5- MUSLIMS AND THE ‘OTHER’:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
DEVIANT
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia is a highly plural society with the Malays (Muslims) forming a bare majority
of 55 percent of the total population of 28 million. This chapter seeks to examine the
religious elite view towards the ‘Other’. Apart from looking at how the Muslim
religious elite deal with people of other faiths, this chapter shall also examine how
they respond to alternative ideas and viewpoints within the community itself.
Needless to say, any given society and community is never homogenous, and
Malaysia is no exception to this. An analysis of the religious elite’s views towards the
‘Other’ shall be organized into three main parts: (1) attitude towards the ‘Other’ and
the relationship between the Muslims and them, (2) attitude towards the diversity
and plurality of religious views within the Muslim community itself, and (3) the
general attitude towards a spectrum of interpretations and ideas in Islam within the
Muslim community itself. Several fatwa, enactments, and guidelines issued by the
religious elite and institutions on the ‘Other’ shall be examined.
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Islam is inherently diverse and inclusive, not only towards different faiths, but
also towards different views. There are many verses in the Quran that supports the
freedom of choice of one’s beliefs. It also describes the diversity of languages,
nations and ethnicity, as signs of God’s grace and not a cause for distinction of
superiority and inferiority. Therefore, differences are divine, and societies differ in
their ways of life (Syed Farid 2009, 13). Two of the most important verses in the
Quran that directly speaks about pluralism are verses 27 and 28 of Al‐Faathir:
“See you not that God sends down rain from the sky? With it We
then bring out produce of various colours. And in the mountains
are tracts white and red, of various shades of colour, and black
intense in hue. And so amongst men and crawling creatures and
cattle, are they of various colours. Those truly fear God, among
His Servants, who have knowledge: for God is exalted in Might,
Oft‐Forgiving.”65
Verse 256 of Al‐Baqarah also clearly underlines that:
“There is no compulsion in religion: Truth stands our clear from
Error: Whoever rejects evil and believes in God has grasped the
65
See translation of Abdullah Yusof Ali (440)
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most trustworthy authority handhold that never breaks. And God
hears and knows all things.”66
The Quran also specifically stipulates freedom in finding or losing one’s way in
the world. According to Mohsen, it has shown people the just path and leaves it to
them to choose or ignore it. God and the Prophet have allowed the people to choose
their religion, whilst at the same time telling them what the right path is (135). Surah
An‐Naml states that:
“For me, I have been commanded to serve the Lord of this city,
Him Who has sanctified it and to Whom (belong) all things: and I
am commanded to be of those who bow in Islam to God’s will.
And to Rehearse the Quran: and if any accept guidance, they do it
for the good of their own souls, and if they stray, say “I am only a
warner.” And say “Praise be upon God, Who will soon show you
his Signs, so that you shall know them”: and your Lord is not
unmindful of all that you do.”67
In line with the principles of pluralism and freedom of worship, the Quran in Surah
Yunus clearly underlines that:
66
See translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali(56).
67
See translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (383).
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“If it had been your Lord’s will, they would all have believed‐ all
who are on earth! Will you then compel mankind, against their
will, to believe!68
In fact, some Muslim scholars even maintain that Islam never discriminates non‐
Muslims from Muslims, and this is reflected in the Covenant of Medina (Asghar
2009, 112‐113). Some of the terms provided by the covenant include inter alia: Jews
and Muslims are to live as one, with both communities respecting and not
interfering in the affairs of each other, and that in the event of an attack on the city
of Medina, both parties shall join hands to defend. Such religious differences and
diversity are respected by Islam. El‐Fadl (2003, 15) maintains that the Quran not only
expects but accepts the reality of difference and diversity within human society: “O
humankind, God has created you from male and female and made you into diverse
nations and tribes so that you may come to know each other. Verily, the most
honoured of you in the sight of God is he who is the most righteous.” However, such
views are not clearly reflected in the religious orientation of the religious elite in
Malaysia dominated by traditionalism, which subscribes to a single, absolute version
of truth, based on the dogmatic adherence to selected traditions and how they are
construed.
68
See translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (213).
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RELATIONS WITH NON‐MUSLIMS
In recent times, prominent religious elite in Malaysia provide fatwa and opinions to
questions by ordinary Muslims on issues relating to life in a plural society. Some of
these include issues such as whether Muslims can celebrate non‐Muslims’ festivities,
work with them, dine with them, and visit their places of worship. Traditionalist
response to issues relating to non‐Muslims is permeated with legal categories which
accord rights and obligations and regulate relations. Muslims are often told about
the need to distinguish the Kitabiyah from the non‐Kitabiyah. The term Kitabiyah in
the Quran refers to the People of the Book, which many jurists have interpreted to
mean the Jews and the Christians. The Quran grants special privileges to the People
of the Book‐ among them allowing Muslims to take on Kitabiyah spouses and
consume their slaughter. Generally the Malaysian religious elite believe that
Kitabiyah cannot include believers of the Bible and Torah today as their sources are
no longer authentic, meaning that they have been skewed and distorted from the
original state in which they were revealed. Therefore, the special provisions or
rulings in the Quran that specifically deals with the Kitabiyah are deemed as no
longer valid in today’s context, for they are only applicable during the time of the
Prophet Muhammad 1400 years ago.
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These views manifest the traits of traditionalism which are oblivious towards
alternative construction of religious traditions. These question whether the Bible
and Torah may not be in its original form as in the time of Jesus and Moses as there
are many diverse opinions on this issue. There exist opinions that acknowledge and
respect them as “Books of God” (Saeed 2002, 419‐436). More importantly, the
division of non‐Muslims into legal categories from the past, namely Kitabiyah and
non‐Kitabiyah, is problematic. Such a dichotomy will result in the non‐Muslim not
being treated as an individual or a human subject, but always as a legal category
subjected to rules permitting friendly relations with him or otherwise. This impedes
development of spontaneous relations or mutual respect with one another in a
society which is marked by cultural pluralism and diversity.
All non‐Muslims, to the religious elite, are kafirs. This categorization creates
dichotomy between Muslims and non‐Muslims which strongly influences how
Muslims should relate to them. In a paper presented to Persatuan Ulama Malaysia
(PUM), Dr Abdul Hayei, an academic from the University of Malaya, responded to
the issue of whether it is permissible for Muslims to celebrate the festivities of the
non‐Muslims. The argument and reasoning suggests insecurity and doubt about
forging relationship ties with non‐Muslim based on universal values applicable to all.
Claiming that his view is a moderate one, he opines that:
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“If a kafir (non‐Muslim) openly shows he is anti‐Islam, we should
not be involved in the festivals, even if they are kitabiyah (People of
the Book). If the kafir is loyal to the Islamic state, just like the non‐
Muslims in Malaysia, and has contributed to the harmony of the
country, then it is permissible for Muslims to share their joy during
their festivals, provided they do not undermine their akidah.
However, their evangelist movements should not be taken lightly,
especially through the electronic media, which is highly accessible
by our children.”69
Hayei’s sentiments are to some extent shared by Mohammad Nidzam, a
popular preacher and writer. In commenting on the sharing of festivities, such as
Deepa‐Raya (Deepavali and Hari Raya) and Kongsi‐Raya (Chinese New Year and Hari
Raya), the major justification that these religious elite use in their argument
pertaining to the relations with non‐Muslims is akidah, or the belief in God. Nidzam
posits that Muslims are not encouraged to attend a procession of other faiths
because the Quran verse 72 of Surah Al‐Furqan states that, ”The people of Faith
(Muslims) should not witness falsehood!” (1‐5). Nidzam then cited the view of Imam
Al‐Qurtubi who stated that “A characteristic of Allah’s slaves should not attend and
witness falsehood.”
69
Paper courtesy of Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (2008).
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Consistent with the traits of traditionalism, such a verse is read without
attempting to understand the underlying principles strongly exhorted in the Quran.
In fact, the Quranic verse cited by Nidzam made no reference of such celebrations,
but falsehood in general.70 It is clear that the way the selected verse is read by
Nidzam contradicts many other verses and traditions which positively sanctions
goodwill, peace, and harmony among mankind. No attempt is made to evaluate
them against the ones upheld. Their fear or threat to the faith being undermined in
interaction and relations with non‐Muslims is a major basis that conditions their
responses. Such views breed intolerance and exclusive streaks which undermine
efforts in bridging goodwill among the different ethnic groups. It reveals a negative
orientation that may serve as an impediment towards social cohesion in a plural
society such as Malaysia, as well as any steps towards any fruitful dialogue.
The constant harping of religious differences exacerbates suspicion and doubt
Malaysian Muslims generally have towards people of other faiths. This is reflected in
many issues including the recent controversy associated with the use of the term
‘Allah’ in a Catholic publication, The Herald. Harussani, the outspoken Mufti of
Perak, was furious when the Home Ministry relaxed its position by allowing the use
of the term ‘Allah’ in Christian publications (Utusan Malaysia 28 Feb 2009). In
Malaysia, apart from the term ‘Allah’, several other terms are also banned from
70
See translation by Abdullah Yusof Ali (364)
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being used by non‐Muslims in their publications and sermons, such as ulama,
Hadith, ka’bah, wahyu, syariah, qiblah, and haji. The Indonesian translation of the
Bible, Al‐Kitab, was also banned by the authorities. This ban was later lifted but the
distribution was only restricted to certain churches and bookstores. The fear of
Christian evangelism and that Muslims would be confused was also evident when
the religious authorities called for the banning of a song by Indonesian popular
artist, Agnes Monica, entitled Allah Peduli (Allah cares) because it contains the verse
‘sebab Allah Jesusku mengerti’ or ‘Allah My Jesus understands’ (Utusan Malaysia 14
Mar 2009).
The “Allah” term controversy shows that the religious elite cannot effectively
analyze new issues and challenges posed to the Muslim community. They merely
justify their arguments and judgements by unquestioningly selecting traditions from
the past. The dominant argument in this controversy is that the use of the term
‘Allah’ by the Christians is an attempt by evangelical groups to confuse Muslims. The
Fatwa committee of Perak, headed by Harussani as its Mufti concurred that the use
of the term ‘Allah’ is exclusive to the Muslims and the main justification given is that
a verse in Surah Ali‐Imran states, “The only accepted religion to Allah is Islam.”71 The
committee also pointed out that the use of the term by non‐Muslims may negatively
71
Jabatan Mufti of Perak Website:
http://mufti.perak.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=1 (Date
assessed: 29 July 2010)
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affect Muslims whose faith (akidah) is not strong, disrupt public order, create
tensions, and encourage more liberalist and pluralist understanding of Islam.
On this issue, Nik Aziz has departed from many of his contemporaries in
allowing the non‐Muslims to use the term ‘Allah’. According to Nik Aziz:
“The Prophet’s father’s name was Abdullah, and he was born before
Muhammad was appointed as a Prophet, during the times of
jahiliyya (pre‐Islamic). Even then his name was Abdullah (slave of
Allah). Allah’s name has been used by the Arabs long time ago.”72
Later, Nik Aziz also laid down two conditions in order for the Christians to be allowed
to use the term. Firstly,
“If I want to judge the Christians favourably, I will say to them (the
Christians), if you want to use the term Allah, it is better if you
accept the religion of Allah (Islam), and not just use the term
Allah. Today you may just take the name, later embrace the
religion fully.”73
72
Zulkifli Sulong, Salmah Mat Husein and Rizal Tahir, “ Nik Aziz: Royalti, nama Allah dan hubungan
antara
agama,”
from
Harakah
Daily
http://www.harakahdaily.net/v2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24535:nik‐aziz‐
royalti‐nama‐allah‐dan‐hubungan‐antara‐agama&catid=98:tamu‐dan‐wawancara&Itemid=144 (Date
assessed: 10 January 2010)
73
Ibid.
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Secondly,
“If I want to judge the Christians in a negative way, they just want
to use the term to confuse (Muslims). That is not acceptable. If
they want to spread Christian teachings, they don’t have to
confuse the community, instead bring forth arguments.”
Although the PAS spiritual leader’s position differed from the other prominent
religious elite, his line of reasoning essentially reflects the same style of thought. It
adheres to a specific interpretation of religious sources without grappling with the
complexities of the problems advocated by various groups including court
judgements, political rhetoric, doubts and insecurities of Muslims, as well as the
arguments put forth by various groups of people including Christian groups who use
the term. The notion that the Christians are there to confuse the Muslims still
preoccupies his thought revealing the sense of insecurity that threatens inter‐
religious relations in Malaysia.
For certain, the ‘Allah’ controversy provides a new challenge which is novel to
the religious elite, for this is an issue that they are not familiar with. While some
doubts and insecurity on the part of the religious elite have surfaced, discussing and
evaluating the ramifications it has on Malaysians today have not been forthcoming.
The dominance of traditionalism forces the religious elite to go back to the past for
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justifications of their views, even though these may not have any relevance in
solving the issue within the contemporary context.
Furthermore, this whole episode also reflects the religious elite’s unfamiliarity
with the present laws and constitutional guarantees in Malaysia. The constitution
unequivocally does not promote the proselytization of Muslims. Such guarantees
ensure that if the Christians had intended to use the term ‘Allah’ to proselytise
Muslims, it will not make much headway. Moreover, the court ruling on the issue,
which the religious elite disputed, specifically stated that the use of the term ‘Allah’
is only for congregational purpose; hence materials used in the Herald by the Church
cannot be circulated outside the church. This shows some extent of consideration
and guidelines in safeguarding the Muslims from conversion.
The lack of adequate response that takes into consideration the various
measures and thought within the context of Malaysia in responding to this
controversy while relying solely on selective theological injunctions can exacerbate
insecurities and confusion that is harmful. It may heighten negative attitude towards
the people of other faiths that feeds intolerance, exclusivism, sectarianism and
fanaticism found in the society. We hear today in Malaysia Muslims demolishing
other religion’s places of worship‐ such as the Sri Maha Kaliamman and Mathurai
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Veeran temples in Selangor‐ and becoming insensitive towards the sentiments of
other faiths, such as the parading of bloody cow’s head in protest of the building of a
Hindu temple (The Straits Times 31 Oct 2009), and the burning of three churches
during the “Allah term” controversy in January 2010. Qualifications often levelled at
‘kafirs’ in their discourse can provide fodder or exacerbate abuses for those who
seek to appropriate an exploit religion for their own political agenda.74
Such views may also dampen chances for genuine dialogue that can bridge
commonalities and forge understanding between different religious groups. In 2006,
several Muslim and non‐Muslim groups such as Aliran and Article 11 wanted to
organize an interfaith dialogue in Penang to clarify these issues. Nevertheless, the
event was cancelled, when 500 Malays objected to the initiative from the start
(Hussin 2007, 43). The police had to intervene and stop the dialogue on the grounds
that the gathering will aggravate tension between Muslims and non‐Muslims. In
April 2010, Harussani Zakaria expressed his regret towards the Cabinet’s plan to set
up a committee to deal with inter‐religious issues. According to Harussani,
“Other faiths should not be seen as occupying the same position as
Islam…Any form of dialogue that can corrupt the sanctity of Islam
should be avoided.” (Utusan Malaysia 13 Apr 2010)
74
Nik Aziz and Dr Mohd Asri have condemmed such attacks on places of worship.
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Recently, Dr Ridwan Tee opines that,
“…the decision of Muslims not to participate in the Malaysian
Consultative Council of Buddhist, Christianity, Hindusim, Sikhism, and
Taoism (MCCBCHST) and the Inter‐faith Council (IFC) is the right one,
as it prevents them from being ‘trapped’. Even then, they (non‐
Muslims) have not given up and continue to pressure us (Muslims).”
(Mingguan Malaysia 1 Aug 2010)
Such views fail to appreciate the centrality of dialogue found in the Quran and in
course of Islamic history, where there were many encounters of mutual learning
between civilizations (Syed Farid 2008, 13). Regrettably, inter‐racial events and inter‐
religious dialogues are never easy to be organized in Malaysia. One of the main
reasons for this is the lack of support by prominent religious elite who do not take an
active role in leading and organizing them. Even if they are interested in dialogues,
the religious elite are keener to impose their perspectives and views on others.
INTRA‐MUSLIM OTHERING
Apostasy
Malaysia has recently made the headlines for the way the apostasy issue was
handled. The unsubstantiated, yet controversial, declaration made by Harussani
Zakaria that 100 000 Muslims in Malaysia had become apostates, elicited an
emotional response by Muslims and non‐Muslims alike (Liow 2009, 51). Some of the
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more recent, heated conversion issues include the cases of Lina Joy (Azlina Jailani),
Shamsala, and Subashini (Maznah, Zarizana, Chin 2009, 59‐101). Lina Joy’s case had
received more public attention than others. The Lina Joy issue also confirms that all
matters pertaining to Islam, including religious conversion, should be tried in the
Syariah Courts, not any other civil courts, meaning that the renunciation of Islam by
Muslims cannot be decided by any other courts (Ibid, 79). This makes the study of
the style of thinking of the religious elite towards religious conversion more
significant, given that they are accorded more authority to judge on such cases.
Many amongst the religious elite in Malaysia are more inclined to the view that
apostasy is a criminal offence that requires the perpetrators to be executed. They
may differ, however, on the period given for the apostates to repent. While the
more extreme ones refuse opportunity for repentance, others allow for a maximum
of one month’s grace period. A fatwa issued by the religious council of the State of
Perlis on apostasy states that:
“A woman (person) who embraces Islam and then leaves it is
considered a murtad (apostate) and must repent within three
days. If not, in accordance with Islamic law, she must be executed.
However, since in Malaysia Islamic laws are not fully exercised,
execution cannot be carried out. According to Imam Abu Hanifah
(classical Jurist) the person must be imprisoned to death. On
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matters concerning name, once a person leaves Islam, her
responsibilities are revoked.” (Religious Council of Perlis)75
The justifications for upholding such views are again the result of the
unquestioning acceptance of selected traditions and opinions of scholars of the past.
Although the Quran makes no mention on this issue, there is generally no attempt at
evaluating alternative traditions and principles contained in Quranic verses bearing
on the issue of freedom of religion. Some jurists for instance have opined that the
context for punishment for apostasy was not due to the matter of faith but treason.
Apostates then were not only renegades to the faith, but joined the warring
disbelievers’ camp. One can then understand why death penalty was not imposed
on women apostates, because they were not involved in the war (Kamran 2008, 28).
Today, those who leave Islam are not at war with Muslims. Yet, the context of the
revelation and conditions affecting rulings and judgements are not effectively
considered.
The ruling on death penalty for apostasy is also shared by Ann Wan Seng
(2009), a respectable Malaysian Chinese Muslim scholar and President of MACMA,
and the Mufti of Pulau Pinang, Hassan Ahmad (Jabatan Mufti Pulau Pinang, 2008:4‐
5). Seng cites a tradition by the Prophet which says that, “Those who leaves Islam,
75
See JAKIM website for online fatwa, http://www.e‐fatwa.gov.my/
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execute them!” Although Seng (2009) realizes that this tradition is a disputed one,
he merely relies on the view of Al‐Qardawi, a contemporary and revered Middle
Eastern scholar, who posits that death for apostasy should stand because there are
no other alternative laws stipulated in the Quran and Sunnah (75). Seng further
argues that in line with the opinions of past jurists, the wealth of the apostates must
be confiscated, and their rights to inheritance reduced (Ibid, 92‐93). He simply
dismissed opposing views that have been formulated by activists, academics,
intellectuals alike who disagree with the death for apostasy ruling on the grounds
that they are Western‐trained. Despite the diversity of opinions in Muslim legal
tradition that forms the basis of these alternative views, he rejects them by labelling
their views as influenced by the West. According to Seng:
“These views (those who reject death on apostasy) are the views
of scholars who are Western trained who are influenced by the
human rights scholarship in the West.” (Ibid, 91)
Harussani Zakaria (2010, 268‐270) even argues for an extension of the existing
legislation by the state to prevent apostasy of Muslims. Harussani wants the
authorities to curb any “deviant” views that are spreading to the Muslims.
Moreover, he wants the Home Ministry to include the apostasy issue into the
definition of ‘disturbing public order’. This implies that any form of evangelical
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activity to convert Muslims falls under the Internal Security Act (ISA). In addition, he
wants the authorities and parents to discourage Muslims from being influenced by
Bollywood and others (269). Such views clearly trivialize the universal principles of
human rights and freedom of choice, which are in line with the teachings of Islam
(Chandra 2005). Even though it is possible to conceive that not every right as found
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Covenant for Political and Civil
Rights is compatible with Islam, it is important for anyone to envision human rights
as an ethically desirable goal (El‐Fadl 2007, 182‐183). The right to choose one’s belief
and to live, subject to certain conditions such as not causing harm to oneself and
others, are certainly humanistic principles upheld by Islam and other major religions.
The predominance of traditionalism amongst the religious elite may have also
conditioned their tendency to dispense with the need to consult and deliberate
ideas that have emerged in other parts of the Islamic world grappling with the same
issue. Undeniably, as stated early on in this chapter, there are differing opinions on
Islam’s position on the rights of the individual to freely choose his religion and
philosophy. The same right exist for one to preach, to invite others to one’s religion,
to build places of worship, and to leave and enter a religion, subject only to the
observance of the fundamental rights of others. (Mohsen 2006, 119‐120). If
discussed rationally, the religious elite would have realised that restricting one’s
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right to choose his or her religion has its demerits. Some of the demerits discussed
by Mohsen (129‐132) include:
1. A person’s belief may be superficial and not deeply internalized.
2. Force and compulsion may lead to dissemination of false belief about the
religion. This will certainly impact upon religious conversion.
3. It is inevitable that when constantly confronted with plurality of ideas, forcing
people into one will only lead to deceit, discord and hypocrisy.
4. By having an official (authoritarian) reading of religion, it robs and devalues
the contribution of intellectuals.
5. By prohibiting religious freedom and the right to change religion, few
individuals from outside the religion are likely to become believers.
Besides, much scriptural evidence in the Quran supports religious pluralism.
Verse 256 of Al‐Baqarah quoted above has been used as the foundation by many
scholars, both classical and contemporary, to argue that Islam upholds religious
pluralism and respects individual choice (Abd Moqsith 2009:215‐269). Basically,
strengthening one’s faith towards religion cannot be achieved through compulsion.
God has positioned Man as a rational being, who can weigh the positive and
negative aspects of religion (Ibid, 225‐226). While believing in the sovereignty of God
as the Supreme creator, human beings are entitled to conduct their own affairs they
deem appropriate. A negative attitude towards reason in religious understanding
can be detrimental to the Muslims’ quest for development.
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Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) and the Shiites
The religious elite’s approach and attitude towards Muslims who do not share their
ideology also operates through the same traditionalistic orientation. For instance,
the majority uphold that only the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ or Sunni)
promotes authentic Islamic belief. Even then, their conception of what is ASWJ is
based on a selective understanding that essentializes the group and its beliefs,
ignoring its heterogeneity and diversity within it. Muslims who engage in what is
deemed as non‐ASWJ teachings or practice tends to be labelled as ‘deviant’ (Saeed
and Saeed, 128).
According to the Hadith as narrated by Abu Daud and Ibnu Majah:
“The Jews will break into 71 sects. One will go to Heaven the
others to Hell. The Christians will break up into 72 sects. 71 will go
to Hell, the remaining one to Heaven. Muslim will break up into
73 sects. One will achieve Heaven the others Hell. When asked
who is this one group (to achieve paradise), the Prophet
responded by saying the one in Jamaah.” (Abdul Hadi, 2008:2)
Relying on a specific interpretation of this tradition, the ASWJ is positioned by the
religious elite as the ‘Jamaah’ or the mainstream. Essentially, the ASWJ is deemed to
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be the Sunnis. Membership to this group and its interpretation of facts is held as the
only way that can assure salvation and heaven, as opposed to Muslims that fall
outside the fold, especially Shiites.
The religious elite’s use of traditions accords the ASWJ, as defined by their
selective version, as the only God‐sanctioned sect in Islam that accords them as the
true followers of the authentic traditions of the Prophet. Other sects are either seen
as derailed from the ‘truth’, or believed to have been manipulated by the leaders for
their own benefits. No consideration is given to the fact that the ASWJ, as a
movement or ideology, did not exist during the time of the Prophet and the Caliphs.
It was only later in Muslim history that the movement grew self conscious of its
position in response to opposing factions. Even then it had also undergone a
tremendous change from the ‘original’ state and the teachings from the Quran
(Fazlur 2000, 30‐60), as theological debates pertaining to it developed within the
context of political conflict into which religion was woven.
As the traditionalist do not question what is believed, they have never
attempted to fully appraise the development of Islamic thought, theological
constructions, and ideology in Islamic history (Fazlur 1982). There is no indication of
the perception that ASWJ itself remains a contested term, or that there exists a
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struggle for the right to define its authentic version within the group itself. The
attempts to declare Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin as a Wahabbi by the religious council
of Selangor (JAIS) serve as a case in point, even though the ex‐Mufti of Perlis sees
himself as a Sunni and has spoken against Shiism.76
Stemming from such absolute theological constructions that are deemed as
complete and infallible, some states in Malaysia have gazetted the fatwa that the
ASWJ is the only accepted ideology in Malaysia, and consider the Shiites heretics.
For instance, in September 1997, the fatwa declaring that all Terengganu citizens
must follow the ASWJ sect was gazetted. This means that any form of materials, be
they publications, films, or documents, that are deemed not in line with the ASWJ
teachings as defined by the group are banned (JAKIM e‐Fatwa).77 The Malacca
Religious Authorities too passed a similar enactment in 1997. The Malaccan
enactment specifically outlines the differences between Shiism and the teachings of
ASWJ (JAKIM e‐Fatwa).78 Although the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites still exist
today in many parts of the Islamic world, which in some cases have resulted in
76
Dr Mohd Asri was detained by The Selangor Religious Council on 1 November 2009 for allegedly
delivering a sermon in Selangor without certification. However, rumours are widespread that Dr
Mohd Asri was detained because he was seen as spreading the teachings of Wahabbism, allegations
which Dr Mohd Asri has denied.
77
See Pegangan Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah. http://e‐fatwa‐intranetportal.my. (Date Assessed: 19
February 2010)
78
See Wajib Berpegang Dengan ‘Aqidah Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaáh (Ke Arah Membendung Pengaruh
Syiáh). http://e‐fatwa‐intranetportal.my. (Date Assessed: 19 February 2010)
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violence and warfare (like in Iraq), in most countries, the followers of these two
sects have learnt to acknowledge their differences and live peacefully. However,
given the mode of thinking, Muslims in Malaysia are induced to be cautious of Shiite
ideology which is thought to be ‘secretly growing’.
This negative view towards Shiism has resulted in several official statements
and enactments being passed by the religious authorities pertaining to it. The Pulau
Pinang Office of Mufti estimates that three brands of Shiism can be found in
Malaysia, with the Jafari School being the most influential. This claim however
remains unsubstantiated. The Mufti even warns that some university lecturers tried
to preach Jafari ideology in campuses (Jabatan Mufti Pulau Pinang 2008, 2‐6). In fact,
Shiism in Malaysia has to some extent been framed as a national security issue. In
1997, seven Shia followers were detained for spreading deviationist teachings (Liow
2009, 163). They were arrested for allegedly threatening religious harmony and the
nation’s political and economic development. As a precondition for their release,
they were told to denounce the Shiite beliefs and revert back to Sunni. Between
October 2000 and January 2001, six followers on Shiite teachings were arrested
under the Internal Security Act (Saeed and Saeed, 128).79 Again the same reasons
79
Out of the six arrested, one was released, two were sent to restricted residence and the rest were
detained for a two‐year period.
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were cited, essentially, that they threatened religious harmony in Malaysia, in which
Muslims are predominantly Sunnis.
LIBERAL ISLAM
The religious elite also cast doubts on what they view as ‘liberal’ ideologies.
Liberalism is always portrayed in a negative light, as contravening true Islam. When
labels are passed declaring a group or person as liberal, it connotes that the group or
person is a deviant. The ‘Liberals’ are also suspected to be Western and secular
educated (Idris, 2006:5‐7), or those who adore the West (Mohd Asri 2006b, 39‐46).
Abdul Halim Abdul Kadir (2008) the Patron of the Persatuan Ulama Malaysia,
defines ‘Islam liberal’ as encompassing secularism, pluralism, feminism, and
hermeneutics (3). He adds that ‘Islam liberal’ refers to the act of emancipating
Muslims from the traditional style of thinking which has already been established
and agreed upon by the Muslims of the past. Abdul Halim opines that these liberal
ideologies only create confusion, which is already happening in Indonesia. Generally,
the religious elite in Malaysia dismiss ‘liberal’ Islam as being anti‐Hadith, resorting to
excessive rationalism, and fighting for equal rights among man and woman.
The recourse to labelling is problematic as it fails to identify actual problems
contained within these thoughts, if any. It also merely assumes that all are non‐
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Islamic and have no basis in Islamic traditions. The labelling which is accompanied by
adverse implications directed at these thoughts is also problematic as more often
than not it involves overgeneralizations and misleading deductions. The charge that
liberal Islam is synonymous with being anti‐Hadith is common, albeit inaccurate.
They lump those who reject Hadith entirely with proponents of liberal Islam. Abdul
Halim’s statement illustrates the point:
“The anti‐Hadith controversy hit Malaysia in the 1980s. This is a
rejection of the fundamentals of Islam. This is a challenge. Hence,
many Ulama and authorities defended the Sunnah and reject these
deviant groups.” (Ibid, 7)
Abdul Halim also referred to the Malaysian writer, Kassim Ahmad, whom he refers
to as Islam liberal. Indeed Kassim Ahmad is an extreme case for he totally rejects the
authority of Hadith altogether. However, to treat Kassim Ahmad with those who try
to introduce new methodologies or ways of reading the Hadith as advocated by
some of those deemed to be within the fold of liberal Islam is misleading. The
concerns of the latter are not the rejection of the religious sources such as the
Quran and Hadith, but the emphasis on appraising these texts based on socio‐
historical contexts. It is unsurprising then that several Indonesian religious scholars,
who have attempted to re‐read Hadith contextually, such as Harun Nasution,
Nurcholis Majid, Alwi Shihab, Siti Musda Mulia, Ulil Absyar, Azyumardi Azra, and
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Abdul Rahman Wahid, to name a few, are all dismissed as liberal Muslims (Idris
Zakaria, 19; Fauzi Deraman and Mohammad Kamil 2006, 155). Similarly, Malaysian
scholars and activists such as Zainah Anwar, Farish A Noor, Akhbar Ali, Marina
Mahathir, Chandra Muzaffar, Yasmin Ahmad, Zaid Ibrahim are also seen as liberal
Muslims with negative connotations (Fauzi Deraman and Mohammad Kamil 2006,
156; Mohamed Hafiz, 2008). Such labelling persists despite their contributions, the
diversity of views found among them, and the fact that none reject the centrality of
Hadith in Islam.
Presumably, the prominent religious elite in Malaysia uphold only one
methodology of interpreting texts as the authentic one. Although the exact nature of
this methodology is not clearly defined, it appears that the traditionalist way of
interpreting texts is not based on rationality. Even so, they believe that their
methodology is more superior to other modes of interpretation. According to Abdul
Halim,
“Liberal Islam is influenced by the Orientalist. They tried to
apply the Biblical interpretation methodology to the Quranic
interpretation methodology. In Quranic interpretation, there
exist an accepted methodology that has been used by the
Ulama of the past.” (Ibid, 6)
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Yet, there exists a variety of methods of interpreting the Quran amongst
Muslims. Saeed (2007) for instance portrays a theological basis for the three
methods of interpreting the Quran he observed‐ textualist, semi‐textualist and
contextualist. It is likely that though the traditionalists are familiar with such
differences in existing scholarship, they are generally not concerned with engaging
with those that depart from what has been passed down to them. They only cling on
to the materials and methodology that they are familiar with, deeming them as
absolute and immutable.
Another group charged as being ‘liberal’ are the feminists. The feminists groups
are condemned for demanding equality between men and women. At the receiving
end of such labelling are Malaysian feminist groups such as Sisters In Islam (SIS). It is
not surprising that many papers presented by the religious elite in a seminar on
Islamic thinking organized by PUM and YADIM in 2008 pointed out many of SIS
leaders as liberals.80 In fact the members of the organization have been subjected to
character assassination and criticisms mainly by PAS members, especially Nik Aziz,
because they were against the implementation of hudud laws (Nik Aziz 2008, 58‐59).
PAS has also been at the forefront in calling for the banning of the women’s rights
organization. Interestingly, Dr Ridhwan Tee frankly opined that the word ‘Islam’
80
See papers by Dr Marzuki Mohamad, Yusof and Jamilah, and Mohamed Hafiz. These papers are
presented at Seminar Pemikiran Islam in 2008 .
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should be removed from Sisters in Islam, and it should be ‘Sisters in Malaysia’. To
him, SIS has no right to speak on Islam because they cannot speak Arabic, cannot
read the Quran, and cannot correctly pronounce the words in the Quran (Interview
with Dr Ridhwan).
Recently, SIS was again criticized for protesting against the caning of three
Muslim women for committing adultery. Leading this criticism was Harussani
Zakaria. The three women who underwent caning were punished under Shariah law.
The main contention of SIS is that caning of women is an act against section 289 of
the Penal Code and as well as an act of discrimination against women. However,
rather than studying the standpoint objectively by taking into consideration the
existing provisions in the Malaysian law and its enforcement as SIS had advocated,
Harussani was quick to label the group as deviating from belief in God’s laws and
hence falling out of the fold of Islam (Utusan Malaysia 19 Feb 2010). According to
Harussani,
“These people don’t understand Islamic laws, they go against and
hate Islamic law because they are influenced by the Orientalist
West who go against Islam” (Ibid).
Harussani adds that,
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“If you want to consider six strokes of the cane, it is too lenient
when the original punishment is 100 lashes to those to commit
adultery and 80 lashes for taking alcohol.”81
Clearly, the response of Harussani and others do not appraise the issue based
on a broader understanding of the relevant Malaysian laws, the administration of
justice, and their implications. SIS’s position was that there is a need for consistency
in passing legal judgments, particularly by the Shariah Courts. Furthermore, their
main contention is the problem of the timing of the execution, as the case of Kartika
Sari, who was sentenced to six strokes of the cane for consuming alcohol, had not
been concluded due to procedural flaws and limitations. Generally, traditionalism
pays closer attention to the literal wording of law, rather than its principles and
implications on human lives. It does not engage in the debates and complexities
pertaining to issues that have consequences on the lives of those affected.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Traditionalism is manifested in the lack of engagement in alternative ideas and
opinions before arriving at the selected judgment deemed absolute and complete.
As reflected in the attitude towards the ‘Other’, it is dismissive of opinions that differ
81
Ibid.
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from those upheld without justification or reasoning. Hence, discussions on the
‘Other’ remain very shallow and superficial. Labels are passed unthinkingly towards
the ‘Other’ and hence dismissive. Without any discussion of new ideas and a more
comprehensive understanding of an issue including problems and ramifications of
views expounded, very little attempts towards reform can be initiated. The religious
elite are quick to label the ‘Other’ unthinkingly, resulting in the ‘Other’ being
categorized, stereotyped, depersonalized, and negatively evaluated (Pieterson 1997,
347). Their lack of reflection on the issues raised reveals the level of understanding
and grasp of problems. Indonesia, for instance, is seen as a country where the minds
of Muslims have been corrupted with liberal ideologies. It is unfortunate that their
contributions towards scholarship are ignored, and their thinkers seen only as trying
to confuse the Muslim public.
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CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION
This study has examined traditionalism as the dominant mode of religious
orientation in the views, judgement and thought of prominent religious personalities
amongst the religious elite in Malaysia. This mode of orientation conditions the
major issues that are discussed in relation to the themes of the chapters. This study
has shown how traditionalism is still dominant in the religious elite’s understanding
of issues concerning women, concept of the state, culture, and relations with the
‘Other’. Undeniably, traditionalism is not unique to Malaysian religious elite. It is a
dominant orientation within the religious domain in many parts of the Muslim world.
Its persistence affects the potential and capacity of religion to contribute effectively
to the process of modernization and facilitate Muslims adaptation to social changes
induced by rapid industrialization since the 1960s. Moreover, traditionalism is not
only a phenomenon that exists among the religious elite from the rural parts of
Malaysia, but equally evident amongst those who live, preach and teach in the more
urban setting and in academic institutions and universities.
To recapitulate, traditionalism is distinguished by several salient traits. They
include the blind acceptance and reliance of selected religious traditions that are
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received, the overemphasis on forms rather than principles in the reading of
traditions, the failure to contextualize religious traditions taking into consideration
present needs and conditions, the ambivalent or negative attitude towards the use
of reason, and the notion that the selective version and interpretation of traditions is
immutable, complete and absolute despite the existence of diversity of thought
within the religious tradition. The dominance of traditionalism is conditioned and
reinforced by several socio‐historical factors, including Malay feudalism, colonialism,
the Islamic resurgence, and the nature of Islamic education generally received. Such
orientation becomes dominant in society when the main agents of the religious
socialization process are involved in various domains including politics, policy
making, and key religious institutions. It is facilitated and reinforced by their
utilization of the new and print media.
In the chapter on traditionalism and women, we have identified several issues
and concerns that preoccupy the religious elite. Their discourse reveals a perceived
social arrangement of pre‐industrial, pre‐modern societies marked by sharp division
of roles within the family as well as the public domain. Utilising selective religious
sources, traditionalism is manifested in the tendency to cling strongly to the view
that women are better placed to function in the domestic sphere and ideally should
not encroach into the public sphere, which is reserved for men. Women’s bodies are
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also treated as objects of temptation and their presence in the public sphere may
only exacerbate social problems and sexual crimes. The notion that women should
refrain from politics remains strong among some of the religious elite, even though
some changes have been made in this area lately. However, departures are not
based on conscious deliberation, but prompted by exigencies. While Malaysian
women are generally allowed access to education and employment outside homes,
there remains the preoccupation with issues such as gender segregation and social
interaction, modesty of women, and the observance of Islamic dress code, at the
expense of other pressing issues including reproductive health, equality, problem of
laws affecting women, family and work, and women’s rights. These have
repercussions on the overall well‐being of women and the extent religious teachings
and values can contribute to addressing their adjustment to the demands of
modernization and social change.
In Chapter 3, our major contention is that although the issue of the state is a
modern issue, the discussions continue to reflect the characteristics of
traditionalism. The religious elite’s views belie the assumption that there exists an
ideal Islamic state during the time of the Prophet. Although the main actors in this
Islamic state discourse are JAKIM and PAS, lately, other religious elite have joined in
the debate. Essentially, their conception of an ideal Islamic state is one that is
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governed by Shariah laws, including the implementation of a selective understanding
of hudud laws. An Islamic state must have institutions that are deemed ‘Islamic’
including a ‘Majlis Syura’. Even though they remain divided on whether the state
should be governed solely by the Ulama, they fundamentally agree that the key
fundamental positions within the state can only be led by a Muslim. Ideas about the
state reveal the traits of the utopian mentality. There is a strong desire by some
quarters to politically replace the entire existing system, deemed ‘secular’ and
‘western’, with a system that is believed to have its roots in Islamic traditions.
Traditionalism is also revealed in the overemphasis on forms rather than principles
within the state and one in which the people within the state are not deemed as
citizens with equal rights before the law. Instead, terms and concepts used pre‐date
the modern nation‐state and reflect 10th century Muslim juristic discourses. Pressing
issues taking place on the international plane pertaining to human rights and
minority rights are rarely, if at all, considered. The discussion also makes references
to categories such as jizyah and dhimmis and in which inter‐state relations are
determined on the basis of whether Muslims are at war or exist in peace with
‘Others’.
The impact of traditionalism on Malay culture discussed in Chapter 4 is also
evident. There is apparently a strong desire to problematize many aspects of Malay
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culture that is deemed as non‐Islamic based on dogmatic adherence to selective
religious traditions. While the religious elite did pay‐lip service by claiming that local
customs play an important part in Islam, by and large, there is a growing sense of
intolerance towards many cultural practices that are seen as relics of the Malay’s
Hindu and animistic past. Such dichotomous worldview between Islamic and pre‐
Islamic past renders many Malay cultural practices such as the menorah, wayang
kulit, and bersanding as conflicting with Islam, despite the fact that for centuries
many Malays had no objections to these cultural forms or believed that Islam is
neutral towards these aspects of culture. There is also very little regard for the
sociological significance and underlying moral values in such cultural practices which
are consistent with universal principles. Furthermore, many religious rituals, which
are seen as devoid of Islamic traditions by the religious elite, have long been
accepted as complementary to the religiosity of the Malays. Yet no attempt is made
to understand the diversity of religious thought and opinion on the subject.
Unfortunately, areas which need attention, such as the prevalence of collective
representation, superstition, myth and magic in Malay society, are not only
neglected, they are also positively sanctioned and legitimised by weaving Islam into
such a mode of thinking. Examples of ‘Islamic medicine’ and ‘Islamic healing’
practised by some prominent religious personalities reveal evidence of how specific
conditioning of religious traditions is used to promote irrationalism on the basis of
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Islam. The problematic implications of such thinking on the development of man and
society have been discussed. Similarly the potential for religion to reform worldview
incompatible with the modern world is largely impeded by religious traditionalism
that has reinforced collective representation.
In the last chapter, we examined problems and issues pertaining to the
Muslims’ relationship with the ‘Other’. The prevalence of traditionalism as a style of
thinking is shown to have contributed to the deteriorating inter‐religious and inter‐
ethnic relations in Malaysia. Traditions taken out of context denounce non‐Muslims
as ‘kafirs’ with their negative connotations in forms of rights, obligations, status, and
basis for interaction with them. They are also treated as legal objects or categories
based on traditions that are incongruent with reality. Traditionalism is also reflected
in the way in which many recent conflicts such as the apostasy issue, the use of the
term “Allah”, and the ASWJ movement are discussed. It prevents the religious elite
from grappling with new issues effectively and objectively. To paint a rather
pessimistic view, no progress or headway can ever be made towards resolving these
issues when at its foundation the religious elite have a narrow view of religious
pluralism, which can impede genuine understanding needed for the well being of the
plural society in Malaysia. Traditionalism has also contributed to the problem of
‘labelling’ which has become a very powerful tool in denouncing or casting suspicion
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of the ‘Other’. Labelling a group or sect as ‘liberal’ or ‘feminists’ renders their views
doubtful from the perspective of Islam and devalues them as subservient to
personal, ideological, and vested interests and agenda of the West. They are also
seen as having no authority to speak for and on Islam. Not only does labelling the
‘Other’ signifies the traditions they uphold as authentic and unquestionable, it also
safeguards the religious elite’s sole authority and rights towards ‘truth’ in all religious
matters. Indirectly, this results in the blind rejection of many progressive and vibrant
views on theological matters, impeding the development of intellectual culture.
Having outlined the mode of religious orientation of the religious elite and the
problems associated with it, it is hoped that this study can serve as a modest
contribution towards understanding the religious discourse and controversies in
Malaysia better. Studies on Islam in Malaysia always refer to the differences of ideas
based on their organizational, party, and institutional affiliations. This study,
however, points out another dimension of thought that features similarities in the
style of thinking or orientation underlying these differences.
It is doubtful whether genuine reforms can emerge from within traditionalism.
Nonetheless, traditionalist religious elite do need to be constantly challenged by an
orientation that emphasizes the importance of rationality based on the humanitarian
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spirit, universal values and principles. What is perhaps more important is the need
for the development of alternative orientation that is grounded in the rich and
progressive intellectual heritage of Islam and other civilizations. Though such
orientation rooted in the universal principles of human rights, justice, equality, and
tolerance is not absent in Malaysia, it may not be dominant. Muslims must learn to
appreciate their own intellectual tradition which is often undervalued in
traditionalist discourse. The rich Islamic heritage captured by the writings of great
thinkers such as Iqbal, Fyzee, Ameer Ali, Kalam Azad, Ali Shariati, Syed Hussein
Alatas, Muhammad Said Al‐Ashmawi, and many more that promotes universalism,
justice and equality for all cannot be neglected or undermined in challenging
religious traditionalism (Chandra 2008, 22).
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2008 organized by Persatuan Ulama Malaysia and Yayasan Dawah Islamiah Malaysia.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
A SAMPLE OF RELIGIOUS ELITE IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA
NAME
Abdul Ghani
Shamsudin
Abdul Halim
Abdul Kadir
Abdul Hamid
Othman
Abdul Hadi
Awang
Dr Abdul Hayei
Ann Wan Seng
Fauzi Deraman
Dr Haron Din
Harussani
Zakaria
Hassan Ahmad
CURRENT
OCCUPATION
Civil Activist
ORGANIZATION
AFFILICATION
Civil Activist
DEGREE OF DOMINANCE/POSITIONS HELD
PUM
PAS Ulama and Patron of SHURA
Formerly Patron of PUM
Patron of PUM
Bureaucrat
UMNO/ Federal Religious Ministry
Minister
Politician
PAS
Academic/ Civil
Society
Civil Activist
UM
PAS President
Formerly Chief Minister of Terengganu
UM Lecturer
MACMA
MACMA President
Academic
UM
Lecturer
PAS
Darusyifa
Religious Department of Perak
Deputy Murshidul Am PAS
Mufti of Perak
Religious Department of Pulau Pinang
Mufti of Pulau Pinang
Politician
Faith healer
Bureaucrat
Bureaucrat
SHURA
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Ismail Kamus
Popular Preacher/
Faith healer
Mohammad
Politician
Daud Iraqi
Mohammad
Popular Preacher
Nidzam
Dr Mohd Asri
Academic
Zainul Abidin
Dr Muhammad
Bureaucrat/
Uthman El‐
Academic
Muhammady
Nik Aziz Nik
Politician
Mat
Nooh Gadut
Bureaucrat
Dr Ridwan Tee
Academic/ Popular
Preacher
Dr Sharifah
Academic/
Hayaati
Popular Preacher
Dr Siddiq
Civil Activist/
Fadhil
Academic
Siti Noor
Popular Preacher
Bahyah
Writer
Dr Yusri
Civil activist
Mohamad
Academic
Dr Zahazan
Popular Preacher
Mohamad
CEO
PAS
Popular Preacher
Ex‐PAS politician
Head of Ulama Council PAS
Independent
Popular Writer
USM
ISTAC
Ex‐Mufti of Perlis
Lecturer in USM
Policy Consultant
Formerly IKIM member
PAS
Chief Minister of Kelantan
Murshidul Am PAS
Formerly Mufti of Johore
Media Personality
Lecturer UPNM
TV Religious Forums
UM Lecturer
Head of Academic Institute
Formerly ABIM President
Popular Media Personality
Formerly ABIM president
Lecturer IIUM
Popular Media Personality
Formerly IIUM Lecturer
Independent
Johore Religious Department
UPNM
UM
ABIM/ Institut Daral Hikmah
Independent
IIUM
Telaga Biru Publishings
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APPENDIX 2
SAMPLE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATION
CLASSIFICATION
ABIM
NGO
IKIM
Think‐Tank
JABATAN MUFTI
PULAU PINANG
Bureaucracy (State)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION
One of the most active, vocal, and popular civil‐society movements that was established
during the Islamic Resurgence movement of the 1970s. ABIM was an officially registered
organization in 1971. It was formed to defend and propagate the message of Islam. One
of its most popular leaders in the past includes Anwar Ibrahim. ABIM is seen as the
largest Islamic‐based pressure group. Its membership includes top academics, Ulama, and
professionals. A fair share of its members is today in PAS and UMNO. In this study, the
views of its Presidents Dr Siddiq Fadhil and Dr Yusri Mohamad are examined.
IKIM is the acronym for the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia. Established in
February 1992, it is think‐tank set up by the state to discuss and research Islamic issues.
Apart from running television and radio programmes (Radio IKIM), IKIM also publishes
monthly magazines and books. IKIM publishes the magazine called VISI. IKIM also runs
training programmes as well as Islamic conferences and seminars. IKIM’s main objective is
to provide a better understanding about Islam through workshops, seminars,
consultation, training and publications.
The Office of Mufti is led by Dato’ Hassan Ahmad. Unlike the Mufti from its neighbouring
states, Perlis and Perak, the Pulau Pinang Mufti is deemed as less controversial. Since the
state of Pulau Pinang does not have a Sultan, it answers to the Yang Dipertuan Agong
(Malaysian King). One of its principle objectives is to provide fatwa for the citizens in
Pulau Pinang. As a bureaucracy, it advices the Malaysian King, Pulau Pinang state
government, and the Pulau Pinang Governor on matters pertaining to Islam.
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JAKIM
Bureaucracy (Federal)
PAS
Political Party
PERSATUAN
ULAMA
MALAYSIA
NGO
TELAGA BIRU
SDN BHD
Business Enterprise
JAKIM was formerly known as BAHEIS. It was called JAKIM only in 1997. JAKIM is a federal
institution set up by the government to deal with Islamic affairs. It sets up committees to
discuss fatwa and make recommendations to the Council of the Kings. JAKIM issues
sermons for Friday prayers. JAKIM can be treated as the highest ranking body in Islamic
administration in Malaysia at the Federal level.
Undeniably the largest Islamic‐based political party in Malaysia. It is popular in the more
rural areas of Malaysia such as Kelantan and Terengganu. Some of the prominent leaders
included in this study are Nik Aziz, Haron Din and Abdul Hadi Awang. PAS considers itself
as the Party of Ulama. Its history is probably as long as UMNO’s. PAS was at one point of
time part of the National Coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) with UMNO, but later split.
Arguably, PAS became more conservative in character, when the Ulama faction took over
the party leadership in the 1980s.
PUM was established in 1974. PUM is a civil‐society organization or pressure group. PUM
started out as a pro‐state, but later became more politically neutral. Today, PUM is seen
as pro‐PAS. Early members include the likes of Dr Haron Din (PAS), Dr Abdul Hamid
Othman (UMNO), Fadzil Noor (PAS), and Taib Azamuddin. PUM is active in organizing
seminars and conferences on Islam. It also publishes some works.
This company is led by Dr Zahazan Mohamad, a popular religious preacher and academic.
Telaga Biru Sdn Bhd is a publication company which publishes religious books, magazines
and digitised religious sermons (Compact Discs and cassette tapes). It is famously known
for publishing the Islamic magazine Solusi, which is easily available in Malaysian
bookstores. Among some of the authors whose works this company has published include
Ismail Kamus, Mohammad Nidzam, and Siti Nor Bahyah.
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APPENDIX 3
INTERVIEW GUIDE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
How do you define the notion of religious elites and authority in Islam?
What are the criteria for one to be called Ulama?
Generally who do you see as Ulama in today?
What is the role of the Ulama in society?
What do you make of the concept of an Islamic state? Would you consider
Malaysia as an Islamic state?
6. What are the features of an Islamic state? Which aspect of the Malaysian state
today that you feel is not Islamized?
7. Do you see any model Islamic state in the past and present?
8. Are the Ulama equivalents to the Umara (political elites)?
9. Hudud laws are seen today as harsh and brutal? Do you think this is a fair
assessment?
10. How do you view the rights of the minority groups?
11. In the context of the recent protests by HINDRAF, do you think such calls are
justified?
12. Should groups such as ‘Shiism’ ‘Ayah Pin’ and Darul Arqam be tolerated in the
name of freedom of religious expression?
13. Do you agree with the principles of the New Economic Policy?
14. Given the different context and economic environment today, where more
women are going out to work, how do you see their role in society?
15. What do think of groups such as Sisters in Islam which has been fighting for
women’s rights?
16. Can a woman play an important part or role in politics and become the Prime
Minister of the country?
17. The notion of Islam in Malaysia has been intertwined with Malay culture, what
do you make of that equation?
18. Do you see yourself as a Malay first or a Muslim first?
19. How should we approach Malay arts, music and culture? Do you see them as
contrary to Islamic practices?
20. Which aspects do you think (of arts) are comparable to Islam?
21. What do think of the notion of Islam as Ad‐Deen (complete way of life)?
22. How should we view and approach Western knowledge?
23. Do you see any problems with the way Islam is understood by the Malays today?
202
[...]... Tua), who they accused of taqlid buta or blind faith. The Kaum Tua group was largely part of the state establishment. The Kaum Muda faction, on the other hand, was more activistic in their approach, and was committed towards social transformation through the greater use of akal (reason) in approaching Islam. 21 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... Traditionalism in the Malay World The dominance of traditionalism as a style of thought in the domain of religion could have been conditioned by several socio‐historical factors. Historically, Islam was woven into a Malay society that was largely feudal. Within the absolutism of Malay 18 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... by their ease of access, which have significantly accentuated the significance and reach of the religious elite to the masses. 4 Abdul Hadi Awang was the Chief Minister of Terengganu from 1999 to 2004. Nik Aziz has been the Chief Minister of Kelantan since 1990 to the present. 8 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... (Malaysia) . For instance, Nik Aziz graduated from the Al‐Azhar University after studying at the Darul‐Ulum Deobandi. Similarly, Dr Haron Din, Siti Noor Bahyah, and Hassan Ahmad all graduated from Al‐Azhar University. Both Dr Zahazan and Dr Mohd Asri received their training at the Yarmouk University in Jordan, and had some affiliations, either as teaching staff or student, with the ... Dr Mohd Asri later studied at the International Islamic University of Malaysia for his PhD. 23 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact diploma in a local Islamic college. Mohammad Nidzam, along with a few others, graduated from International Islamic University of Malaysia. ... Generally, Islamic education in these institutions still promotes memorization (of the Quran and Hadith) and the compulsory reading of classical 24 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact texts as their primary mode of learning, at the expense of cultivating critical thinking ... from both parties, including Nik Aziz, Abdul Hadi Awang, Haron Din (all from PAS), and Abdul Hamid Othman (from UMNO), is informed by the backdrop of the wider religio‐political dialectics captured in their works. 26 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... family, and the larger community. Possibly, the ideas of the religious community 2 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact reflect the ideas of their religious elite. Riaz (2008) maintains that the close interaction ... One cannot underestimate that Islam spread rapidly to many parts of the Malay world during the Malacca Sultanate (Hussin 2008, 25). 19 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact Such a feudal religious culture persisted centuries later as reflected in Abdullah Munshi’s account of the Malay feudal society in his Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah, during ... members of the National Fatwa Council which was established to provide 1 See Appendix 1 for the profiles of the religious elite selected in this study. See Appendix 2 for the institutions and organizations selected as case studies. 6 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... Possibly, the ideas of the religious community The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... woven into a Malay society that was largely feudal. Within the absolutism of Malay 18 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact ... best treated as an independent subject of investigation. 10 The Muslim Religious Elite In Contemporary Malaysia: A Study Of Dominant Ideas And Orientation Of Prominent Religious Personalities And Their Impact
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