CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This work is a political and cultural history of the bilateral relations between the Siamese and Vietnamese courts from the 1780s to the 1850s. Through the examination of the diplomatic worldviews and outlooks of the respective courts, this work demonstrates how the Siamese and Vietnamese’s similar views towards interstate relations affected their interactions. Their approach to diplomatic relations with other countries largely followed a culturally hierarchical pattern - between a superior and an inferior. Both courts defined themselves as a central and powerful state dominating other small surrounding states. However, their diplomatic relationship was the only exception to this conceptualization of their geopolitical centrality, as Siam and Vietnam both regarded and approached each other as equal great kingdoms. This was contemplatable in principle, but hardly realizable in practice. Siam and Vietnam struggled with this special arrangement because they both had never treated any other foreign states as their equal. Siam and Vietnam maintained this diplomatic relationship and understanding with great difficulty, especially when it came to issues pertaining to the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms that became the peripheries to the two states competing to be the center of the region. The rise of powerful dynasties in Southeast Asia brought about interactions among different societies with different kinds of politics and cultures, each desiring to expand its territory to guarantee its overlordship of its region. The prosperious dynasties established states and strengthened their claims to authority and sovereignty. These states tried to demonstrate their power and grandeur through establishing formal politics and luxurious court ceremonies; as Clifford Geertz 1 commented, “Power serves pomp, not pomp power.” Due to their contrasting levels of political and economic power, the states in Southeast Asia developed different interstate relationships, between the big states seeking to counter-balance one another, and between suzerainties and tributaries. The diplomatic relationship between Siam under the Chakri dynasty and Vietnam under the Nguyễn dynasty illustrate the shift of bilateral relations from friendship to antagonism, especially between the 1780s and the 1850s. Diplomatically, the relations between Bangkok and Huế were not only affected by their direct interaction but also by the competition to gain influence over neighboring states, in particular the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms, through different political and cultural policies. The two states were competitors striving to be the overlord of the region. A people’s worldview, as a collectively-held set of understandings and beliefs, was a vital factor in shaping interstate diplomacy and determining the shifts in the character of the relationship between Siam and Vietnam. The two societies hailed from different cultural backgrounds – Indian cultural influences shaped Siamese worldviews while China was a powerful influence on Vietnam. These divergent influences contributed to the Siamese and Vietnamese conceptualization of their identities and became the basis of each state’s cultural expansion and political 1 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 13. 2 formation. However, their worldviews were similar in spite of their differing cultural backgrounds and this similarity in turn led to diplomatic conflicts, which escalated to military confrontation in some instances. Despite the cultural differences, both thought that they were the center and the most powerful state in the region. Additionally, they saw themselves as more superior to others. They acted like a superior and treated others like inferiors; these were fundamentally based on their own cultural identities. The Siamese and Vietnamese concepts of statehood and kingship The conceptions of statehood fundamentally affected the relationship between the Siamese and Vietnamese courts. Politically, both Siam and Vietnam held cosmological beliefs that defined their respective states as the center of the region. Stanley Tambiah’s concept of “galactic polity” aptly explains how the Siamese state managed itself and the other cities that were directly and indirectly under its control.2 Within this conception, Siam formed the center to which the other states related to as satellites. The layout of the state consisted of the center (ratchathani or muang luang), the different layers of encircling provinces (muang or hua-muang), and vassals (muang prathetsarat). In the case of Vietnam, the Nguyễn court held Sinic culture as paramount and readily adopted and applied the imperial system, institutional practices and arrangements modeled after the Chinese court and the Lê 3 court of Vietnam. Vietnam as was conceived as a culturally civilized state and central 2 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 48. 3 Alexander B. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century 3 kingdom surrounded by barbarians who had to send periodic royal tribute and envoys in acknowledgement of and homage of Vietnamese power.4 Domestically, both the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts established formal court rituals, social systems, political adminstrations, and luxurious ceremonies and performances to demonstrate their power and greatness. With respect to external affairs, they exercised tributary expansionism towards the neighboring states. Geopolitically, Siam and Vietnam did not consider their vassals as directly controlled parts of their kingdoms but rather construed them less tangibly as territories under their “sphere of influence”, to use a modern-day concept. Both countries counted Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as their dependent vassals, “muang khun” (in Thai) and “thuộc quốc” (in Vietnamese). However, neither Siam nor Vietnam could claim to be the single supreme power in the region and exercise absolute dominance over the other territories that could absolutely control expanded territories. This led to the complex balancing of the influence of the two powers over the region and 5 consequently affected their diplomacy. The conception of kingship centered on the correlation between the ideology of the state and the status of the ruler. A ruler with charisma was required for the existence of a prosperous state. Both Siam and Vietnam considered their ruler as the embodiment of the state. The ruler was the state and vice versa. The Siamese Chakri Kings were imagined as the “Universal sovereign (Cakravartin)”, and the“Righteous (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1988), p. 253. 4 Ibid., p. 235. 5 Klaus Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I, 1782-1890 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1968), p. 110. 4 King (Dhammaracha)”, the latter a concept from Theravada Buddhism. The Nguyễn Emperors of Vietnam were seen as “the charismatic Sino-Vietnamese Son of Heaven 6 (Thiên tử).’ These conceptions of state and kingship in turn informed their diplomatic worldviews and approaches, and their relationship with their perceived vassals. In the early Bangkok period, the King of Siam seriously focused on perpetuating and welding together the concepts of Cakravartin and Bodhisattva in order to legitimize the court’s authority, and expand the circle of vassalages. As the founder of the Chakri Dynasty, Rama I adopted institutional and kingship concepts from Ayudhaya. The concept of universal sovereign or “Cakravartin” originates from Hindu and Theravada Buddhist teachings which also contain a body of thought about the idea of the greatest king of all kings.7 The Siamese king, as a bodhisattva, blesses his peoples and subjects with peace, happiness and fertility. The teachings encompassed the code of righteous kingship in conducting world affairs.8 To attaining the dignity of the universal sovereign, the king needs to be the King of Righteousness, and adhere to the ten virtues, including alms giving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, selfrestriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and non-obstruction.9 Although the king had supreme authority over the life and death of his peoples and subjects, the Buddhist kingly virtues prescribed the manner in which he was to exercise his power. 6 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 255. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, pp. 102-111. 8 George Coedès, The Making of South East Asia (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1966), pp. 220-221 and Sunait Chutintaranond, “Cakravartin: The Ideology of Traditional Warfare in Siam and Burma, 1548-1605” (Cornell University, Ph.D. thesis, 1990), p. 7. 9 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969), pp. 41-42. 7 5 In Vietnam, the Nguyễn emperors adopted of the Confucian ideologies that posited the great ruler as the Son of Heaven with a divine mandate to govern. Gia Long, as founder of the Nguyễn Dynasty, sought to model the glorious Lê dynasty of the fifteenth century in using the Chinese model of administrative management. The Nguyễn emperor idealized the emperor’s “passive moral rectitude (vô vi nhi trị)” as the basis of his legitimacy to rule. 10 Similar to the other previous Vietnamese dynasties, the Huế court adopted Confucianism in the Vietnamese court and society by extolling three cardinal bonds (tam cương) – ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife. It also promoted the five constant virtues (ngũ thường) of Confucian ethics – benevolence, righteousness, proprieties, wisdom, and fidelity – as a basis for living.11 These ideas were not unique to the Nguyễn court. According to Confucian ethics, subjects had to obey the king just as children had to obey their father. The Vietnamese emperor had, in theory, absolute power over his state. However, no emperor really forced these values completely on his subjects. In practice, he had to engage or contend with the opinions of others like his court officials or subjects, especially since he portayed himself as a compassionate and benevolent ruler. Genearally speaking, Siamese kings and Vietnamese emperors, therefore, possessed the right and power to make major state decisions. The rulers took on roles as a father and a protector to the people, as well as the most powerful person in the kingdom. They claimed overlordship over the people of their states, and their vassals who were under their protection. Thus, both courts actively exerted a paternalistic sphere of 10 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 253. Trần Trọng Kim, Việt Nam Sử Lược (A Historical Summary of Vietnam) (Hanoi: Culture and Information Publishing House, 2008), p. 461. 11 6 influence over their vassals. Worldviews: the creation of ‘selfness’ and the differentiation of ‘otherness’ “Weltanschauung”, or worldview, signifies ideas and beliefs, a singular interpretation of the internal and external world, shaping notions of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ and the 12 interactions of these two. Worldview defines the self, determining the boundaries of 13 “who and what I am.” It also shapes the ‘non-self’ or the ‘other’, as things which are not the self. The worldview is expressed and manifested through cultural ideas such as cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religion, ritual, customs and cultural practice.14 It influences the response of ‘self’ to ‘others’ and prescribes behaviors. The ruler and ruling elite’s worldview effectively become the worldview of the whole state and influence its diplomatic relationship with other states. The ruling elite played the main role in creating hegemony over other states. This study approaches Siam-Vietnam relations from the lens of their “diplomatic worldviews”, encapsulated in the ways the two states, based on their cosmological and ideological backgrounds, defined their own identity, in order to show and exert supremacy, while differentiating the other as dissimilar or inferior. The Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ conceptions of their identities mainly depended upon political and cultural elements that originated from their ideological and 12 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Routledge and K.Paul, 1952), pp. 35-43. 13 William W. Cobern, ‘Worldview Theory and Science Education Research: Fundamental Epistemological Structure as a Critical Factor in Science Learning and Attitude Development’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, 62nd, San Francisco, CA (March 30April 1, 1989), 2. 14 Ibid., 1-3. 7 cosmological background. Cultural influences from India and China formed and evolved different cultures in Siam and Vietnam. The Siamese state was Indianized while the Vietnamese state was Sinicized. The Indianization of Siam was only indirect, as the Siamese never had direct contact with India. Instead, they received Indian culture through Angkor, and even the Mon and Burmese peoples. Chinese and Indian influences shaped various facets of Siamese and Vietnamese politics, culture and society, including religion, language, self-knowledge and identity, rituals and cultural practices, and political and cultural policies. These facets were crucial to the formation of relationships and understandings between the two courts, and between each court and their respective vassal states. The cultural dimension of how states interpreted their position and identity vis-à-vis other states deserves highlighting. It shaped and guided the foreign policy worldviews of the two powerful states. Hevia's study about the differences in court rituals and cultural practices between China and England is applicable to the case of Siam and Vietnam. Hevia argues the courts’ ritual practices served as their own customary ways to assert superior-inferior relations between the Chinese Emperor and the King of England’s representative. 15 These cultural productions, therefore, may well explain Siamese and Vietnamese relations too. The court ceremony, rituals and protocol that were followed during SiameseVietnamese diplomatic encounters were meaningful as they indicated the status the two states accorded each other. As Hevia notes, “the ceremonial encounters between 15 James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 169-170. 8 the head of one state and the ambassador of another became the primary site for the 16 mutual recognition of sovereign equality.” Even as the Siamese and Vietnamese courts interacted with each others as equals, it was scarcely possible to manifest this conceived equality in practice as the traditional rituals of the two courts were designed solely to perform superior-inferior hierarichal relationship. The different ritual processes involved in the audiences between the Siamese and Vietnamese court and their respective ambassadors is also a crucial issue to be discussed in terms of the problem of the different interpretation of cultural practices. These included the exchange of gifts and tribute from the royal courts, which held significant political and diplomatic meanings and symbolisms. For instance, as part of the ritual process to prepare for an audience with the Vietnamese emperor, the Siamese embassy had to check the royal letters and wrap the presents in accordance to the correct protocol and form for three days, and also wear Vietnamese dress. Similarly, for the Vietnamese envoys’ audiences with the Siamese King, they had to follow the Siamese ritual process. Furthermore, the cultural diplomacy practiced by both the Siamese and Vietnamese courts illustrated their changing worldviews and diplomatic relationships with other states. Their rites were a powerful method of crystallizing the status and nature of a relationship with a foreign state. 17 While the two suzerain states treated each other equally, they did not treat their subject states with similar protocol. In his study on the 18 British Empire, David Cannadine suggests the term “ornamentalism”. Although this 16 Ibid., p. 235. Ibid., pp. 173-174. 18 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (New York: 17 9 concept was applied within the context of colonialism, it also applies to the old form of overlords-vassals relations in Southeast Asia. The suzerain states claimed their mastery over the vassal states or tributaries through various kinds of practices and rituals that symbolized overlordship, for example the conferment of decorations, insignia, regalia, and the organization of coronation ceremonies, and court ritual practices. Both of the Bangkok and Huế courts practiced these with their tributaries or their supporters, for example by organizing the coronations of the Cambodian and Laotian kings, establishing a king’s succession, and conferring titles on princes or ruling families. The courts required the representatives of subordinate states to perform the ‘kowtow’ or prostration. They received tributes from the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. These tributes symbolized the vassals’ declaration of fealty and signified their acknowledgement of their subordinate status. Religion also played an important role in the courts’ differentiation of themselves from the outside world. The Siamese differentiated themselves from the other peoples by evaluating the latter via the yardstick of Theravada Buddhism. They portrayed other religions as wrong because these religions did not follow the laws of Dharma. In the same way, the Vietnamese court considered itself a civilized Sino-Vietnamese kingdom that followed Confucianism. Other religions, therefore, were heterodox (tà giáo, tà đạo) in the eyes of the Vietnamese court.19 When Siam and Vietnam competed for overlordship over Cambodia, the influence of their worldviews led to different diplomatic strategies, particularly pertaining to cultural policy and propaganda such as propaganda letters or messages. The Chakri Oxford University Press, 2001). This perception did not apply to all Buddhists, but specifically to Theravada Buddhists because they were not Confucianized or Sinicized. 19 10 court preferred to use cultural strategies to ensure that their tributaries’ Indianized local culture, in particular Buddhism, was preserved. The Nguyễn court conversely tried to integrate Vietnamese cultural practices into Cambodian royal culture. For instance, the Vietnamese mandated that the Cambodian court should follow the Vietnamese dressing style and model its court ceremonies after the Vietnamese. These worldviews and cultural perceptions of both states might raise the question of how we could compare the Siamese and the Vietnamese’s mentalities with regards to their bilateral relations with each other and with their Cambodian and Lao vassals. The Siamese and the Vietnamese conceived of and imagined their empire hierarchically. They viewed their own system as superior and dominant, and that of 20 the other states as inferior and subordinate. The cultural differences and the different interpretation of court rituals, therefore, were part of the main factors leading to clashes between the two courts. Tributary expansionism in the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms Both the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts resorted to the tributary system as a major political mechanism to assert supremacy. The Cambodia and Lao kingdoms had always posed important diplomatic issues. The two territories were obstacles in the relationship between Bangkok and Huế. The bilateral relations between Siam and Vietnam were initially troubled by their respective interest in territorial expansion. The internal situations in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms further complicated the intense competition between Siam and Vietnam. 20 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p. 5. 11 From the eighteenth century however, Siam and Vietnam expanded their influence over the territory of the Lao kingdoms, when the kingdom of Lan Xang (Millions of elephants) broke up into three states, Louang Phrabang, Vientiane and Champasak. When the Ayudhya dynasty of Siam was weakened by an invasion from Burma in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Nguyễn lords took the opportunity to claim their supremacy over these states. In 1768, Taksin was able to restore Siam’s independence from Burma, and he went on to recover all of the vassals from the Ayudhya period, including the three states that previously made up the Lan Xang kingdom, which was then officially a Siamese vassal under the Ayudhya dynasty. In 1776, Taksin sent troops to Champasak to compel it to acknowledge Siamese suzerainty and the southern Lao kingdom finally came under Siamese influence. In 1778, another Siamese expedition was sent to take Vientiane. Because of the conflict with Vientiane, Luang Phrabang also pledged loyalty to the Siamese monarchs, and Siam was able to reclaim overlordship over the two kingdoms. From 1770, the Nguyễn lords in Vietnam lost their power after the Tây Sơn uprising and Siam was able to succeed in re-asserting their dominance over Laos again. From the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, Cambodia too became a hostage in the power struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors. Siam and Vietnam each established and supported pro-Siamese and pro-Vietnamese factions in Cambodia. During the seventeenth century, the Nguyễn lords finally annexed sizable areas to the west and the south of their territory. They continued their expansion through acquiring territorial concessions from marriages between Vietnamese princes and Cambodian princesses. The Vietnamese expansion aimed at absorbing Cambodian territory and forcing the indigenous people to accept Vietnamese culture. 12 After its liberation from Burma, Siam under the Taksin regime was able to reassert their dominion over Cambodia. Siam quietly annexed Cambodia's provinces (Battambang and Siemreap) and installed Ang Eng (1779-1796) as the Cambodian King. From that time onwards, Cambodia became a vassal of both Siam and Vietnam at the same time. Siam and Vietnam aimed to expand their territories to guarantee their dominance over Cambodia and Laos. Both courts saw themselves as an overlord and a protector. The result of Siamese and Vietnamese ambitions of regional expansionism led them to view each other as competitors and rivals for supremacy in the region. Cambodia and Laos were the victims of the contestation between Siam and Vietnam. As David P. Chandler, who had studied the history of Cambodia during this period, notes, it was a 21 dark age for Cambodia. The Cambodian’s Siamese patrons imposed Theravada Buddhism to “protect” Cambodia from the Vietnamese’s “wrong views”. The Vietnamese overlord, similarily, aimed to extend patronage to the Cambodian king and nobility and expand their occupation of Cambodian land, in hope of cultivating 22 Cambodia as a buffer between south Vietnam and Siam. In Laos, the revolt by the Vientiane ruler, Anouvong, against Bangkok between 1827 and 1828 troubled the relationship between Siam and Vietnam. During the reign of Rama I, Vientiane was under the vassalage of Siam. However, when Anouvong started to send tribute to Huế in 1826, his kingdom came under the spheres of influence of both overlords. When Anouvong lost to the Siamese troops, he sought 21 David P. Chandler, “Cambodia before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom: 1794-1847” (The University of Michigan, Ph.D. dissertation, 1973), pp. 2-3. 22 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 13 Vietnamese protection. As an overlord, the Vietnamese became involved with these developments by claiming that Vientiane was a dependency of the Nguyễn court. However, even as Anouvong sought asylum in Vietnam, the Nguyễn court was more interested in preserving peace with Bangkok than in interceding on Anouvong’s behalf. 23 This war led to the decline of Vientiane in 1828, which was annexed by 24 Siam because no ruling family could govern it. The cultural imperialism that the Bangkok and Huế courts practiced with the Cambodian and Laotian vassals guaranteed their dominant status and preserved their power. Both states imposed their cultural policies over Cambodia and Laos in different patterns over various periods. Their expansion of state sovereignty relied not only on military power, but also, more interestingly, on the idea and belief in cultural supremacy. The diplomatic history of Siam and Vietnam reveals that, beyond the conventional understanding that culture serves as an indicator of the stability of existing foreign relations, culture and politics were actually symbiotically interwoven. This is a fundamental but often ignored dimension. Thai and Vietnamese historiographical perspectives Within modern Thai and Vietnamese historiography, studies about the relations between Siam and Vietnam have mainly focused on examining the political and diplomatic policies, and military strategies, that mostly related to the problem of Cambodia and Laos. On both sides, the deterioration of good relations between the 23 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration: Fifty Years of Diplomacy and Warfare in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1778-1828 (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1998), pp. 2629. 24 Ibid., p. 14. 14 Bangkok and Huế courts resulted from their desire to preserve or expand their dominance over Cambodia and Laos. The national historiography of both countries today however tells this story from a nationalistic perspective to serve the respective government’s political purposes – mainly to legitimatize past expansionism. History was important for the Thai government in the stimulation of Thai nationalism. Writers produced historical accounts to serve various political needs. During Rama V’s reign (1868-1910), the threat of colonialism and the influence of the West, led the government to retro actively map present territory onto the Thai’s historical dominion and commission the creation of national narratives to strengthen the power of the state and monarchy.25 From then on, Thai historical works concentrated on exalting the greatness of the Thai Kingdom in the past. They argued that neighboring countries accepted Thai overlordship and, somehow, were geographically a part of the kingdom. Particularlly, they emphasized that Cambodia and Laos were dependencies (muang khun) or protectorates (muang prathetsarat) of the Thai kingdom.26 At the same time, Thai scholarship legitimised the Siamese invasions over Cambodia and Laos as just retribution for their vassals’ betrayal. The Thai textbooks produced between the 1940 and 1960s exemplified the historiography that defended the diplomatic activities of the Thai state. A whole generation absorbed the idea that Thailand was just in its inter-states relations. The 25 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 110-118. 26 Chot Mahakhan et al., Tamrakhumue Prawattisat Rieprieng tam Laksut khong Krasuang Thammakan samrap Matthayom Plai: Buraphaprathet, ton Yuan Khamen Mon Phama (The Historical Textbook following the Course of Ministry of Education for Secondary School: Orient Countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Mon, Burma) (Bangkok: Thaikhasem, 1931). 15 Social Studies (Sangkhom suksa) textbooks for the primary school level students27, and the history of neighboring countries (Prawatsat Prathet Phuenban) for secondary schools28, and especially a critical study of textbooks edicted by Warunee Osatharom29 portrayed the history of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam with a strong political bias. Furthermore, Manich Jumsai’s work, which is one of the accepted books in the study of Thai history and relevant issues related to Thailand’s interactions with its neighbors, was also written from a strong nationalistic standpoint.30 The narratives about Siam and Vietnam were primarily based on Thai sources and focused on Siamese diplomacy and the relations between Gia Long (called in Thai, Ong Chiang Su) and Rama I. For instance, these works argue that the close relationship between Siam and Vietnam deteriorated because of the indecisiveness of the Vietnamese ruler.31 The Vietnamese ruler was obdurate as he interfered with Siamese internal affairs during the Anouvong rebellion and tried to uproot Siamese influence over Cambodia. The Cambodian and Lao rulers were purportedly instigated and supported by the Vietnamese court to be disloyal to, and betray, the Siamese kings. The Lao kingdoms were also depicted as close relatives of Thailand, in terms of language, religion, and culture. The destruction of Vientiane was 27 Krasuang Suksathikan (Ministry of Education), Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa, ton thi 1 thung 2: Raw lae Phuenban khong Raw (Social Studies Textbook, Volume 1-2: We and Our Neighbors (Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1963). 28 Krasuang Suksathikan(Ministry of Education), Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa Wicha Prawattisat Chan Matthayomsuksa Pi thi 1 (Social Studies Textbook in History, Secondary School Grade 7) (Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1961). 29 Warunee Osatharom and Kanchanee La-ongsri (Ed), Lao Hu Yang-Thai Ru Araj: Wikhraw Beaprean Sangkhom Suksa (Laos and Thailand: What do we learn?: Analysis of Social Historical Textbook) (Bangkok: Five Area Studies Project, 2001). 30 Manich Jumsai, History of Thailand & Cambodia, from the Days of Angkor to the Present (Bangkok: Chalermnit, 1970). 31 Warunee Osatharom, ‘Beabrean Thai kap Asia Tawan-ok Chieng Tai “Phuenban Khong Raw”, Phapsathon Chetakhati Udomkarn Chatniyom Thai (Thai Textbooks and Southeast Asia “Our Neighbors”, The Reflection of Ideology of Thai Nationalism)’, in Lao Hu Yang-Thai Ru Araj, pp. 6-8. 16 due punishment for the betrayal, as Rama III had already offered a chance for negotiations, but Anouvong, again, used traps to attack Siam.32 Thai academicians, such as Thanom Anamwat33 and Veeranant Vareevichanont34, are more objective with regards to the historiography about the inter-state relations among Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. They attempt to to be unshackled by existing conventional viewpoints, and begin to seek more nuanced and more comprehensive explanations.They claim that Siam, during the reigns of Rama I and Rama II, attempted to compromise with Vietnam on the issue of their overlapping territorial boundaries on many occasions. Thanom suggests that Rama III believed that the Huế court attempted to overpower Cambodia with its “silent encroachment policy”. Because Siam did not retaliate with physical force, Vietnam’s concern over Siam’s reaction to its effort to expand its power over Cambodia was reduced. Veeranant gives a more objective account of the protracted war between Siam and Vietnam from 1833 to 1845. From the viewpoints of both sides, he argues that Siam and Vietnam provoked the war over Cambodia because they aimed to obtain absolute suzerain rights over Cambodia, as well as to secure a buffer state. Puangthong Rungswasdisap’s new study35 explains the conflicts through the lens of politics and economics. She believes that the ultimate motivation behind the rivalry was the desire to control the local trade networks in this area. Trade and human resources were the basis of Siam’s power and led to Siam’s intervention in Cambodia from 1767 and 32 Ibid., pp. 34-35. Thanom Anamwat, Khwam Samphan rawang Thai Kamen lae Yuan nai Samai Rattankosin torn ton (Relations Between Siam, Cambodia, and Vietnam during the First Part of the Rattanakosin Period) (Bangkok: Khrurusapha Publishing, 1973). 34 Veeranant Vareechanont, “The Importance of the Annamese-Siamese War to Siam, Cambodia and Annam” (Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1970). 35 Rungswasdisab, Puangthong, “War and Trade: Siamese Interventions in Cambodia, 1767-1851” (University of Wollongong, Ph.D. thesis, 1995). 33 17 1851. Currently, Thai scholarship is on the trend of becoming open, and of taking into account not only Thai primary sources, but also Vietnamese and Cambodian ones. These authors suggest that Siamese-Vietnamese relations essentially functioned on a basis of equals, in terms of dimensions such as military strength and authority over their vassals. Vietnamese scholars, similarly, study the issue through their own ideological perspectives. The perceptions of the Nguyễn are a heated topic in Vietnamese scholarship. Two different schools of historiography emerged in the north and south of Vietnam. The different sides held divergent attitudes and feelings towards the Nguyễn dynasty, especially since the country was divided into two parts. Serving a socialist government, the Hànội scholars preferred to make criticisms about the Nguyễn rulers. Huế and Sàigòn scholars were more positive in accepting the Nguyễn rulers. The historiography about neighboring countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, consequently developed into different narratives. The Hànội version, produced in the 1960s, combined the account of Siam-Vietnam relations with criticisms of the Nguyễn family. The Communist party scholars produced a national history by creating a national hero, Nguyễn Huệ (or Emperor Quang Trung) of the Tây Sơn dynasty, and depicting Nguyễn Ánh as the one who invited enemies into the homeland. The official history that was promoted through the textbooks and represented the government’s standpoint had the most far-reaching influence on the society. In the history textbooks by the Ministry of Education and Training,36 the strong sense of 36 Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (Ministry of Education and Training), Lịch sử 7 (History 7) (Đồng Tháp: Education Publishing House, 2003) and Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo 18 national pride pervades. When Hànội writers referred to the relationship between Siam and Vietnam in the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, they highlighted the battle at the Rạch Gầm Xoài Mứt battlefield as one of the finest victories in Vietnam’s history. This discourse is completely different from that in the Thai version. Nguyễn Ánh had sought military support from Siam in his bid to restore his family’s power. When Siam first won the first rounds of combat and expanded into the southern area of Vietnam, the Siamese were brutal. Without restraint, they burnt and destroyed all the property and killed countless people. However, Siam finally lost the battle to Vietnam and was forced back. Some textbooks even titled this event as “the subversion of the yoke under the Nguyễn family rule and the victory over the Siamese troops.”37 The writers depicted the Siamese enemy in such ways: “[when they] speak, their words are boastful but in their mind they are really afraid of the Tây Sơn troops like they are afraid of a tiger.”38 They thought that Nguyễn Ánh and Siam suffered a big defeat because they were overwhelmed by Nguyễn Huệ’s strategy. The battle was portrayed in an exaggerated fashion - in only one night the Vietnamese troops totally defeated and completely annihilated the Siamese troops. This Communist party historian exalted the role of the Vietnamese peasants and saw the battle as a grand show of peasant resistance. It was greatly emphasized that the sovereignty and independence of the country was preserved through Vietnamese solidarity. Nguyễn Khắc Viện saw (Ministry of Education and Training), Lịch sử 8, tập 2 (History 8, Volume 2)( Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2003a). 37 Nguyễn Quang Ngọc (Ed), Tiến trình lịch sử Việt Nam (The Process of Vietnam History) (Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007) and Trương Hữu Quýnh, et.al., Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam toàn tập (General History of Vietnam - Complete work) (Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2008) and Nguyễn Khắc Viện, Vietnam: A Long History (Hànội: Thế Giới Publishing House, 2007). 38 Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, Tiến trình lịch sử, p. 180. 19 Nguyễn Ánh’s request for support from Siam as “the classic tactic of feudal lords in distress – calling in foreigners.”39 He also compared the Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn rulers and felt that “Nguyễn Huệ emerged as a brilliant strategist and national hero in contrast to Nguyễn Ánh, who had tried to win back his throne by relying on foreign troops.”40 Thus, the Hànội narratives mainly tried to show the the complicity of the Nguyễn dynasty in sanctioning and causing an invasion of Vietnam. They concluded that the victory of Nguyễn Ánh later on was because of the death of Quang Trung. For the Huế and Sàigòn scholarship, their historiography of Thailand reveals similar prejudices. These historians tried to show the Nguyễn court as a great imperial kingdom. They suggested that the dominance of the Huế court and the weakness of Siam, led the Siamese king to attempt to maintain cordial relations with Vietnam. As in the discourse of the northern historians, Siam was the depicted enemy of the region, an invader that oppressed Cambodians and Laotians. This led to both Cambodia and Laos to seek Vietnamese protection. Đặng Văn Chương’s recent version of the relations between the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts 41 attibutes the cause of the broken relationship between Siam and Vietnam to the territorial expansionism of Siam, and their political ideology of “A big fish nurtures a small fish (Cá lớn nuôi cá bé)” and “The strong wins, the weak loses (Mạnh được yếu thua).” They were the policies and ideas that guided the incursion of Siam into Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. He concludes that Siam always used a two- 39 Nguyễn Khắc Viện, Vietnam: A Long History, p. 100. Ibid., p. 101. 41 Đặng Văn Chương, “Quan hệ Xiêm-Việt từ 1782 đến 1847 (The Relationships between Siam and Vietnam from 1782 to 1847)” (University of Pedagogy, Hanoi, 2003). 40 20 faced policy: being overtly friendly and helpful to neighbors but covertly waiting for her chance to reduce Vietnamese influence in Cambodia and Laos. In contrast, the Nguyễn's diplomatic policies were friendly and the Vietnamese never ignored neighboring states. 42 He also emphasizes in his article that the invasion by Siamese troops of Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc was due to their desire to be the overlord over Cambodia and Vietnam.43 Đinh Xuân Lâm presents a different perspective from other Vietnamese historians by examining and articulating the broad course of Vietnamese expansionism over Cambodia from the reign of Gia Long to Thiệu Trị.44 Seeing the uprising by Anouvong in positive terms as a great struggle for the independence of his country, Vietnam was portrayed as having acted as an invaluable ally in supporting this revolution. Subsequently the Huế court successfully expanded their territory in Cambodia because of the weakness of the Siamese court. He notes, however, that the Cambodians had actually seen Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia as an incursion into their land. The Nguyễn court wanted Cambodians to become ‘Vietnamese’, and seized Cambodian resources and property. Regarding Cambodia and Laos, politics affected the way historiography was written. The Indochinese Communist Party attempted to maintain solidarity with the two 42 Ibid., pp. 167-170. Đặng Văn Chương, “Về cuộc tấn công của Xiêm vào Hà Tiên và Châu Đốc cuối năm 1833 đầu năm 1834(The Attack of Siam to Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc from the End of 1833 to the Beginning of 1834)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử (Journal of History Research), 3(2002). 44 Đinh Xuân Lâm, “Quan hệ Việt – Campuchia thời Nguyễn trong nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX (The Relationships between Vietnam and Cambodia in the Nguyễn Period in the First Half of Nineteenth Century)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứư Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 6(2002). 43 21 countries. However, there are different versions between Hànội and Sàigòn. The Hànội version scarcely mentions, or even attempts to silence the Nguyễn court’s invasions of other states in the nineteenth century, especially into Cambodia.45 Similarly, the history of Vietnamese aggression towards the Lao kingdoms during the Nguyễn period is “virtually a taboo subject for Party-sanctioned history.”46 However, in recent years, the Hanoi scholars have been active in conferences on the Nguyễn’s expansionism towards Cambodia and Laos. Although Hanoi scholars had never wanted to talk about these issues for a long time, such discussion is now becoming widely accepted and common within academic circles.47 Topics such as Vietnamese military expeditions into Cambodia and Laos could now be more openly discussed. Nonetheless, there is little change in how these historians see Siam. Rather than portray Siam as a competitor and rival equal to Vietnam, these historians still strongly focused on highlighting Siamese aggression towards Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. With regards to the study of Siam-Vietnam relations, a piece of classical work needs to be mentioned - Michael Dent Eiland’s dissertation, completed in 1989, entitled 45 See also Bruce M. Lockhart, “Competing Narratives of the Nam Tiến”, Unpublished paper presented at a workshop organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2003. 46 Bruce Lockhart, “The Historical Laos-Vietnamese Relationship: Seen from the Laos PDR,” in New Research on Laos (Recherches nouvelles sur le Laos), edited by Yves Goudineau and Michel Lorrillard (Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Publishing Public Company, 2008), p. 269. Italics mine. This article discusses the Lao perspectives on national history which reflect the influences of the Communist Party. 47 Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Nam Bộ và Nam Trung Bộ những vấn đề lịch sử thế kỷ XVII-XIX (Proceedings of a Conference Southern Vietnam and Central Vietnam on the issues of history from the 17th to 19th century in Hanoi, 2002; Kỷ yếu Hội thảo khoa học Những vấn đề lịch sử dân tộc và thế giới (Proceedings of a Conference on the issues of national and world history, Đại học Huế, 2002); Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Khoa học Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh (Proceedings of a Conference of Science Ho Chi Minh city), 4&5 – 4 – 2006 (Hanoi: Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, 2009). 22 “Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847.”48 Eiland’s approach to the topic was based on the premise that Siam and Vietnam possessed completely different worldviews. His main argument centered on the dissimilar leadership styles and ideologies of the Chakri kings and the Nguyễn emperors that led to diplomatic clashes and conflicts.49 Furthermore, he argued that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and Laos was due to security concerns while the Siamese needed to preserve their prestige by opposing Vietnam.50 He concluded that the Siamese saw states in terms of Mandalas, whereas the Vietnamese had a more tangible sense of territorial expansion and acquisition. This concept, however, could not totally explain the foreign relations between the two powerful states and their vassals. For example, Vietnam did employ the idea of Mandalas to conceptualize their relationship with various Tai groups in Mường Thanh and Mường Lai, currently located in the northwestern Vietnam.51 Even though the Vietnamese utilized different geopolitical imaginings to discursively justify and explain the expansion of their influence or occupation of other territory, the final result was the same – the successful expansion of Vietnam’s territory and sphere of influence. Considering all the previous studies on Siam-Vietnam diplomatic relations, this study aims to address the limitations of those studies and examine the above-mentioned themes and topics in Siam-Vietnam foreign policies from a more nuanced, balanced and less predisposed standpoint. This study principally uses both Siamese and Vietnamese primary sources to examine the historical evolution of bilateral relations 48 Michael D. Eiland, “Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847” (The George Washington University, 1989) 49 Eiland, “Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847”, p. 1. 50 Ibid. 51 I am grateful to a thesis marker for pointing this out. 23 between Siam and Vietnam, in particular their perceptions towards each other, and their entanglements over Cambodia and Laos. The Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ diplomatic records The diplomatic correspondence that was transmitted between Bangkok and Huế is a rich reservoir of information on foreign relations between Siam and Vietnam. The royal messages contain an account of their political negotiations and interactions and therefore reveal their relationship, as well as their perceptions of each other. The court records of both states, including official documents, chronicles and annals in both Thai and Vietnamese languages, therefore constitute one main set of sources for this study. By utilizing both Thai and Vietnamese court sources, this work effectively avoids bias that had often been caused by the usage of sources from only one side. The Thai documents used in this work are, chiefly, the royal correspondence, the Chotmajhet (records) and the Phraratchaphongsawadan (chronicle) that were exchanged during the first three reigns of the Chakri dynasty. Most of the letters between the Chakri kings and the Nguyễn emperors have been translated into Thai because the royal messages sent between the two courts were always required to be translated into both Thai and Chinese Han script. For the Vietnamese sources, the letters from Vietnamese emperors that are found in Thai annals have been utilized. 52 Furthermore, “modes of visual representation” and “cultural artifacts” contribute another way of viewing history, and this study utilizes poetry, inscriptions and paintings as another group of useful source material. For example, the “University in 52 Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of the Past (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 122-130. 24 stone” at Wat Pho (Phra Chettuphon Wimon Mangkhlaram Ratchaworamahawihan temple), where the cultural life of races and poems are painted, could be employed to uncover the worldview of Siam court vis-a-vis other states. The main Vietnamese primary sources of this work are the court correspondence in the Han Chinese script or Nôm, as well as the Đại Nam Thực lục (Veritable Records of Đại Nam)53. They record the diplomatic interactions between Bangkok and Huế from the Vietnamese perspective. According to the protocol about the official language of the Vietnamese royal correspondences, these letters must be written or translated into Sino-Vietnamese or Han script, and the distinctive Vietnamese script or Nôm. The Nguyễn court strictly followed the forms and formats of writing letter that were borrowed from the Chinese court. The other sources from the Nguyễn court such as Khâm Định Đại Nam hội điển sự lệ (Administrative catalogue of the Đại Nam established by imperial order), Đại Nam Nhất Thống chí (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam), and Đại Nam liệt truyện (The Đại Nam Court Biography)54 are recorded by the Vietnamese mandarins who worked under the Nguyễn government. These primary sources are beneficial to this work because they present the Vietnamese perspective about their own state, and illuminate how they perceived Siam politically and culturally through the incidents and missions between the two courts. The 53 Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam (Institute of History Studies, Department of Social Sciences of Vietnam), Đại Nam Thực lục (Veritable Records of Đại Nam) (Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007); 54 Viện Sử học, Trung tâm Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn Quốc gia (Institute of History Studies, The National Center of Social Sciences and Humanities), Khâm Định Đại Nam hội điển sự lệ (Administrative catalogue of the Đại Nam established by imperial order) (Huế: Thuận Hóa Publishing House, 2005); Đại Nam Nhất Thống chí: Quốc sứ quán Triều Nguyễn (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam, The missions of the Nguyễn Dynasty), Unpublished paper; Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam (Institute of History Studies, Department of Social Sciences of Vietnam), Đại Nam liệt truyện (The Đại Nam Court Biography) (Huế: Thuận Hoá Publishing House, 1993). 25 Vietnamese residents in Bangkok also compiled historical records called “Phongsawadan Yuan”.55 This is an interesting source because Thai historiography often employed it as a crucial Vietnamese source. However, this record has to be regarded as both a Thai and Vietnamese source, since the author was a Vietnamese official in the Thai context. Furthermore, the sources relating to Cambodia and Laos provide information on the interaction of the two states and their tributaries. These tributary states functioned as buffers between the Bangkok and the Huế courts. The accounts of warfare between Vietnam and Siam (Anam-Sayaam Yuth)56, recorded by the General of Siamese army – Chaophraya Bodindecha - and later compiled by Kulab Saipradit, is a significant source about the warfare between the four countries – Cambodia, the Lao kingdoms, Siam and Vietnam. This source contains description of battles, military strategies, agendas and worldviews of commanders-in-chief. The Vietnamese source about the 1827 conflict between Siam and Lao kingdom of (Vientiane) titled “Journal of our imperial court's actions with regards to Quốc triều xử trị Vạn Tượng sự nghi lục (the incident involving the Kingdom of Vientiane)”57 by Ngô Cao Lang remarkably supplies other points of view on this incident. The Vietnamese administrators recorded it when Anouvong fled to ask for Vietnamese protection in Nghệ An. 55 Yong, Phongsawadan Yuan (Vietnamese Historical Records) (Bangkok: Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalai Publishing House, 1966). 56 Kulab, Anam-Sayam Yuth (The Vietnamese-Siamese War) (Bangkok: Khosit, 2007). 57 Mayouri Ngaosyvathn and Phueiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Vietnamese Source Materials concerning the 1827 Conflict between the Court of Siam and the Lao Principalities: Journal of Our Imperial Court's Actions with regard to the Incident Involving the Kingdom of Ten Thousand Elephants (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for Unesco, The Toyo Bundo, 2001). 26 The comparison of the original documents in Thai and Vietnamese, and later translations and compilations of these documents reveal interesting differences. When the original letters were sent from Huế, Vietnamese translators in Bangkok would translate the official letters from Nôm into Thai. However, there were two versions of the exchanged letters in Thai and Chinese sent from Bangkok. Before the letters from Bangkok were sent to Huế, the translator would translate them from Thai to SinoVietnamese (Han). When the letters arrived to Gia Định, the Ministry of Rites examined the letters and gifts to prove their authenticiy again before sent them on to Huế. The doctored sources comprises Thai and Vietnamese chronicles — i.e., Đại Nam Thực Lục and Phraratchaphongsawadan, and the compilations of records, such as the Anam-Siam Yuth (“The War Between Vietnam-Siam) and the Phongsawadan Yuan (“Yuan Chronicles”) contain accounts by the later scribes of what those documents said. Interestingly, the language in the actual documents which were exchanged between the two courts was obviously either polite or neutral. Conversely, the language used in the doctored sources was very hierarchical and still mirror the language of a tributary relationship, even if the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts did not define each other as a vassal. The records of communications between the Siamese and Vietnamese which were later compiled by each court do not reflect the original correspondence. In the process, a different perspective was invented or probably added (at least in some cases) from persons who compiled the orginal sources. We can see this by comparing what was written in the original and rewritten sources, especially in terms of terminology. In chapter three will elaborate on this in more detail. 27 The study, therefore, aims to demonstrate how a wide range of individuals and groups interpreted the diplomatic relationship between Siam and Vietnam, and reinterpreted and represented this relationship in different ways in the diplomatic correspondence and court records. These sources could be approached in two different ways — first, from the points of view of both Siam and Vietnam, in terms of the continuity of local institutions such as kingship, patronage, warfare, domestic and inter-state policy; and second, through the history of Cambodia and Laos as clients, the image of an overlord over a tributary. In chapter two, I analyze the evolution of Siam-Vietnam relationship from the 1780s to the 1850s. Chronologically, I reveal how each significant event affected the bilateral relations between Siam and Vietnam. At the same time, the inter-state relations between Siam and Vietnam were more complicated than the direct interaction, and involved the competition over the vassals, Cambodia and Laos. Chapter three studies the Siamese and Vietnamese’s reciprocal perceptions and court rhetoric, from the beginning until the changes in their relationship. Principally, the discourse of the Siamese court from Thai sources and the Vietnamese court from Vietnamese sources display the political and cultural perceptions that both courts had towards each other through a body of knowledge, thought and culture. In addition, I examine cultural aspects such as the rituals of the courts and the ceremonies between the two courts as indicative of the forms of relationship. 28 Chapter four concentrates on the tributary expansionism of Siam and Vietnam and the response of Cambodia and Laos. Both states adopted tributary expansionism in competing for domination over Cambodia and Laos. Through a paternalistic combination of royal patronage, military strategies, cultural policies, and propaganda campaigns, Siamese and Vietnamese courts claimed their status over Cambodia and Laos. Chapter five draws the conclusion by highlighting the different cultural foundations that indirectly but significantly influenced the perceptions of Siam and Vietnam towards each other and their tributaries. 29 CHAPTER II THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SIAMESE AND VIETNAMESE RELATIONS FROM THE 1780s TO THE 1850s It is vital to historicize the changing foreign relations between the courts of Siam and Vietnam within its evolving historical contexts. Each incident that took place between both courts and their vassals was meaningful in understanding the historical evolution of their foreign relations. These events play a crucial role in explaining how the two courts altered their relationship and how these transformations affected their tributaries. By considering the important events that affected their relationships, this chapter lays the groundwork for the following chapters which will look at the reciprocal Siamese and Vietnamese perceptions. By the turn of the 19th century, the rise of a new dynasty and the decline of an old kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia resulted in a shift in the balance of power. The Chakri Dynasty of Siam and the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam became the new powerful ruling families. Throughout the seventy years of diplomacy in the reigns of the first three Chakri kings and Nguyễn emperors, the two courts’ relationship changed from amity to enmity. The reign of Rama I (1872-1809) and Gia Long (1802-1820) represented the most cordial period in the relationship, while the reigns of Rama II (1809-1824) and Rama III (1824-1851) in Siam, and Minh Mạng (18201840) and Thiệu Trị (1841-1847) in Vietnam, was the period when there was a reevaluation of their relations. Their diplomatic relations depended on the direct interaction between the two courts and also the vacillating loyalties of the Lao and 30 Cambodian ruling elites. Siam58 From 1715 onwards, the Siamese kingdom of Ayudhaya attempted to contend with the Nguyễn lords for control over Cambodia, although it had not yet become a powerful kingdom by the time. While the Siamese fought with the Vietnamese, there was also the Burmese threat. In 1765, the Burmese troops invaded the territories of Ayudhaya. In 1767, the Burmese troops laid a short siege to the cities under Ayudhaya’s dominance. These Siamese cities capitulated and the capital was sacked and burnt. Accompanied by the internal problems inside the kingdom, the Ayudhaya period met its end. The Burmese invasion completely devastated the kingdom. Fortunately, the Burmese subjugation did not last long and the Thonburi Kingdom soon proclaimed an independent Siamese state again. The former governor of Tak, Phraya Taksin, was able to count on the support of many Ayudhaya’s former vassals and defeated the Burmese. Phraya Taksin founded the Thonburi Kingdom and established the new capital opposite the Chaophraya River, and ascended the throne as King Taksin in 1768. During the Thonburi period (1768-1782), Taksin began to extend Siam’s power and began a policy of expansionism. He sent troops to subjugate the muang surrounding Siam as tributaries under Siamese control. Because of the focus on territorial expansionism, internal problems concerning 58 For more details, please see: Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge ; Port Melbourne, Vic. : Cambridge University Press, 2009) and B J Terwiel, A History of Modern Thailand (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984) 31 political and economic issues were sidelined and this eventually affected the power of the Thonburi kingdom. In 1782, when Thonburi’s troops went away to invade the Cambodia and Lao principalities, a powerful official — Phraya San led a rebellion in Thonburi. The rebels ultimately took control of the capital and forced Taksin to abdicate. Later, the Siamese officers supported Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, the commander-in-chief of the Siamese army to ascend the throne, as he was the highest ranked official. He eventually succeeded the throne as king Rama I and established a new dynasty at a new capital, known as the Rattanakosin kingdom, and a new Chakri dynasty. King Taksin was executed shortly after. After the restoration of the state and the founding of the Chakri dynasty in 1782 by Rama I, Siam sought to be a power center in mainland Southeast Asia. The Bangkok court aimed to expand its supremacy and successfully enlarge its territory into the most extensive ever in its history. In order to be a prosperous state, Rama I reshaped and revived its political system, court ceremonies, laws, literature and social organization, basing these on the model of Ayudhaya. The pomp of the Siamese court signified the status of the state and its power over vassals and challenged other states, in particular Vietnam, which was a major competitor striving to claim overlordship over small neighboring kingdoms in the first half of the nineteenth century. 32 Vietnam59 Vietnam in the sixteenth century was divided into two dynasties, the southern and northern dynasties (known as Nam Triều Bắc Triều) between the Lê and the Mạc rulers. The Lê Dynasty had initially controlled the whole of Vietnam, but the Lê emperor was overthrown by its general, Mạc Đăng Dung, in 1527. After that, Mạc Đăng Dung founded the Mạc Dynasty and succeeded to be the emperor. A mandarin of the former Lê court, Nguyễn Kim, restored the Lê heir to the throne and established a ‘resistance zone’ opposed to the Mạc, in the southern part of the Vietnamese kingdom. It led to the division of the country. The resulting civil war in Vietnam between the northern court under the control of the Mạc dynasty and the southern court under the control of the Lê dynasty led to turmoil and strife. However, in 1545, Nguyễn Kim, who was the actual power behind the puppet Lê emperor, was assassinated, and his son-in-law, Trịnh Kiểm, usurped power and raised troops to fight with the Mạc court. The southern court came under the power of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families, while the Lê kings functioned as figureheads. After sixty years of fighting, the war between the southern and northern courts finally ended in 1592.60 The southern court under the control of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families had defeated the Mạc ruler. However, Vietnam remained divided. The Lê successor was again theoretically in control of the whole country, but he was considered a figurehead. The Trịnh family assumed power over the former northern court while the Nguyễn family asserted its influence and dominance in the south. 59 For more details, please see: Oscar Chapuis, A History of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), and David Chandler et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1987) 60 Chapuis, A History of Vietnam, p. 116. 33 Vietnam under the separate administration of two families gradually declined. In the seventeenth century, the Trịnh government gradually weakened, and the north encountered many political and administrative problems, and much corruption among the ruling mandarins. Similarly, in the south, the farmers and peasants in Vietnam faced numerous difficulties under the administration of the Nguyễn lords. Political uncertainty and peasant uprisings shook the authority of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn courts. This finally culminated in the revolt in southern Vietnam led by the three brothers, Nguyễn Nhạc, Nguyễn Huệ, and Nguyễn Lũ in Bình Định, in 1770. This became known as the Tây Sơn movement. Between 1773 and 1786, a peasant insurgency had emerged, led by the leaders of the Tây Sơn, with the objective of overthrowing both the Trịnh and the Nguyễn governments.61 The decline of the power of the Nguyễn ruling family caused Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, or Nguyễn Ánh, the last heir of the Nguyễn family, to move to Gia Định in 1777. Nguyễn Ánh sought asylum in Siam in 1784 and attempted to restore the Nguyễn family’s power many times, for instance, through the Battle of Rạch Gầm – Xoài Mút which will be discussed later. In 1802, Nguyễn Ánh managed to defeat the Tây Sơn movement. He restored Nguyễn power and unified Vietnam at the same time. He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long. The power of the Huế court spread throughout the region. Gia Long revived Vietnam as a state following the Chinese model of governance, like the glorious Lê dynasty. This included the establishment of the administrative procedures, structures and systems of the new government, and, like Siam, establishing the court’s customs and projecting its pomp. In the first half of 61 For more details on the history of the Tây Sơn era, please see George Edson Dutton, The Tây Sơn Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Late Eighteenth-Century Vietnam, 1771-1802 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006). 34 the nineteenth century, Vietnam became one of the most powerful states in the region. Nguyễn Ánh’s solicitations of Siamese support Nguyễn Ánh began the close relations between the Chakri dynasty of Siam and the Nguyễn dynasty of Vietnam. After the Trịnh family seized Phú Xuân (Huế) in 1774, the defeated Nguyễn lords moved to southern Vietnam and eventually settled down in Gia Định (Sàigòn). The Tây Sơn movement took this opportunity to attack and exterminate the Nguyễn clan, but Nguyễn Ánh survived. He successfully sought asylum and protection from Siam in order to battle against the Tây Sơn. As a prince of the ruling family of Vietnam, Nguyễn Ánh tried to contact Siam for support twice, during the reign of Taksin of Thonburi, and during the reign of Rama I of Bangkok. The first attempt failed because the relations between the two states deteriorated in 1780. Taksin did not respond to Nguyễn Ánh’s request, and even executed Nguyễn Ánh’s uncle, Tôn Thất Xuân, who had sought asylum in Thonburi, along with Tôn Thất Xuân’s 53 retinues.62 Thai and Vietnamese sources provide different explanations of this incident. Thai sources from the Chakri dynasty attributed the cause to Taksin’s madness, as he had thought that Tôn Thất Xuân stole his diamond and would escape from Thonburi.63 However, Vietnamese sources suggested that Taksin was infuriated when Vietnamese robbed a Siamese ship, and killed the traders on board, at Gia Định. Furthermore, the Vietnamese sources indicated that Cambodian noblemen had framed Tôn Thất Xuân by sending a letter to 62 63 ĐNTL(Volume 1), pp. 206, 209 and P.R.R.I, p. 38. Ibid. 35 Thonburi accusing Tôn Thất Xuân to be spying for the Nguyễn ruler in Gia Định.64 The execution of Tôn Thất Xuân caused the banishment of Vietnamese in Thonburi from the Siamese capital to an unidentified location.65 Nguyễn Ánh’s second attempt in 1782 was successful. He was able to contact Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk (soon to become Rama I) and gained the support of the Bangkok court. From 1771 to 1782, as part of Taksin’s expansion policy, general Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, and his brother Surasi managed to subjugate the Laotian kingdoms that included Vientiane, Luang Phrabang and Champasak, and almost the regions of Cambodia that was composed of Phnom Penh, Phutthaimat (Hà Tiên in Vietnam today) and Siem Reap.66 In 1781, Taksin sent troops to Cambodia as he thought the Cambodian ruler was about to rebel.67 When Siamese troops arrived in Siem Reap, the Cambodian king asked for military aid from Gia Định. Interestingly, only Vietnamese sources documented the negotiation for peace between the Vietnamese and Siamese Generals. No Thai source mentions this incident. Nguyễn Ánh ordered Nguyễn Hữu Thụy, General in charge of the Nguyễn army, to send troops to Cambodia in 1782 in response to the Cambodian king’s request.68 Although the Vietnamese essentially sent these troops to fight, Nguyễn Hữu Thụy sought to negotiate peace with Siam instead. Nguyễn Hữu Thụy believed that Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk and his brother suffered by serving Taksin. He initiated friendly relations with the Siamese generals by giving them a knife, a sword and a 64 ĐNLT2, p. 565. ĐNTL(Volume 1), p. 209. 66 Chandler et al., In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 112. 67 P.P.R.I, p. 23. 68 ĐNTL (Volume 1), pp. 210-211. 65 36 flag.69 Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk saw this as a great opportunity for a coup amidst the chaotic domestic circumstances of Siam during the late Taksin reign where numerous uprisings were taking place.70 Vietnamese sources reported that Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk agreed to be an ally of Gia Định. In a letter that Nguyễn Hữu Thụy wrote to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, Nguyễn Hữu Thụy suggested that the two sides maintain amicable relations. To enable the arrangement to materialize, he proposed that the two states consider Cambodia as a buffer state between Siam and Vietnam, and place Cambodia under the joint protection of Siam and Vietnam. He suggested that an amicable relationship between Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk and him was to their mutual advantage in the future, as they could seek assistance from one another. He pledged to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk his willingness to “share happiness and sorrow”. If Taksin was to pose any problem to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, the Nguyễn would also consider it their problem.71 Rama I also demonstrated his friendship. Eventually after the foundation of the Chakri dynasty in 1782, Rama I expressed his good will to the Nguyễn family. He granted support to Nguyễn Ánh and his retinues.72 He allowed the Vietnamese, who were exiled during the Taksin period, to move back to Bangkok, and bestowed upon them money, clothes and other provisions.73 69 Ibid., p. 211. Ibid. 71 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 211 and PY, pp. 383-389. 72 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 211. 73 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 70 37 Nguyễn Ánh takes refuge in Bangkok Nguyễn Ánh’s successful flight could be attributed to the Siamese. Nguyễn Ánh had escaped from Gia Định to Krabue Island (currently in Chonburi province, Thailand) after the Tây Sơn’s conquest over Gia Định between 1782 and 1783. According to the Thai records, he met two Siamese noblemen, Phraya Chonburi and Phra Rayong, on the island. The two suggested that he sought refuge with the Bangkok court and attempted to convince him of the humaneness and benevolence of Rama I.74 Phraya Chonburi, according to the Bangkok court records, was an intelligent and reputable man. Nguyễn Ánh accepted his advice and became the adopted son of Phraya Chonburi.75 Thai records suggested that Phraya Chonburi generously supported Nguyễn Ánh, and his family and retinues. Vietnamese records reported that Nguyễn Ánh was very glad when he received a promise of support from Rama I. Furthermore, when Phraya Chonburi tried to invite Nguyễn Ánh to seek asylum in Siam, Nguyễn Ánh was without fear and headed to Bangkok along with Phraya Chonburi.76 When Nguyễn Ánh arrived in Bangkok in 1784, Rama I gave him a warm welcome by arranging a royal procession, in the same manner the Siam king would treat a foreign prince.77 Rama I bestowed upon Nguyễn Ánh’s family and his retinues pensions and land. He also kept his promise to Nguyễn Hữu Thụy, a General of Gia Định, at Phnom Penh and pledged to help Nguyễn Ánh restore Nguyễn power.78 Rama I invited him to attend the royal court and provided Vietnamese translators. 74 Ibid., p. 220 and P.R.R.I, pp. 33-34. P.R.R.I, p. 41. This person would have a crucial role subsequently as a representative of the Siamese court and as a Siamese envoy to Vietnam. 76 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 220. 77 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 221 and P.R.R.I, pp. 33-34. 78 ĐNTL (Volume 1), pp. 220-221 and ĐNLT2, pp. 566-567. 75 38 Rama I also permitted him to follow Vietnamese customs, for example squatting in the Vietnamese way.79 Rama I’s kindness towards Nguyễn Ánh was understandable. Rama I and Nguyễn Ánh were acquainted with each other before the former became the ruler of Siam. Furthermore, the Tây Sơn rulers that caused the flight of Nguyễn Ánh were a more imminent threat to Siam. The Tây Sơn court was invading Vientiane, a Siamese vassal, and was thus the immediate rival of Siam then. Granting asylum to a refugee Vietnamese prince would enable Siam to negate the threat of the ambitious Tây Sơn, by restoring a friendlier neighboring ruler. Siamese refusal of the Tây Sơn’s offer In the rivalry between the Nguyễn family and the Tây Sơn, Rama I sympathized with the former. When the Tây Sơn court, in 1789, sent an emissary to Siam asking for its cooperation in apprehending Nguyễn Ánh, Rama I refused this request.80 Rama I decided to support Nguyễn Ánh as a Vietnamese prince, providing the rationale that the two states depended on each other, and that people deserved to live happily and peacefully under Siamese protection.81 Rama I clearly treated Nguyễn Ánh as a subordinate because Nguyễn Ánh was truly under his protection. He declared that enemies of Nguyễn Ánh were also enemies of Bangkok.82 79 P.R.R.I, p. 34. C.H.I/2/1156(1793C.E.) Letter from Rama I to the Tây Sơn emperor. 81 Ibid., P.R.R.I, p. 129. 82 Ibid., pp. 150-154. 80 39 The Bangkok court often took advantage of the internal conflicts of the other states by supporting one side against the others. The divisions within Vietnam also constituted an advantage for Siam, since it would decrease the Tây Sơn's power.83 Although Siam successfully invaded and asserted its supremacy over Cambodian and Lao peripheries, the Tây Sơn’s power was still growing. The Tây Sơn disrupted the balance of power between Siam and southern Vietnam that had already been established. The Bangkok court saw Nguyễn Ánh as a better neighbor for Siam in the long run. Rejecting the request from the Tây Sơn was a strategic and rational decision. It actually benefited Siam by allowing it to preserve and expand its overlordship over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. Nguyễn Ánh’s departure from Bangkok While Nguyễn Ánh was living in Bangkok, he assisted the Siamese court, and learnt about Siamese customs, political and military administration. Only Vietnamese sources suggested that Nguyễn Ánh even volunteered to serve in the vanguard in the war with Burma, and won in battle. His victory made Rama I very satisfied. Rama I praised his bravery in the battle and bestowed many presents on him and his soldiers.84 The Thai side did not mention any relevant information on the other hand. However, after the battle with Burma, Nguyễn Ánh decided to leave Bangkok in 1784, and went to Gia Đình without first acquiring Rama I’s approval.85 He aimed to fight against the Tây Sơn in order to regain the power of the Nguyễn family. According to the Thai chronicles, he explained in a letter to Rama I that he was 83 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 68 and Anamwat, Khwamsamphan, pp. 19, 22-23. ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 225. 85 P.R.R.I, pp. 90-91. 84 40 reluctant to trouble Rama I for military assistance. He also worried that Rama I would not allow him to return to his country.86 According to Thai records, the departure of Nguyễn Ánh led to two divergent opinions between Rama I and his brother Surasi, the Uparacha or “Wang Na”, which means the second king. Rama I understood Nguyễn Ánh’s decision to not ask for Siamese support, since Siam was then facing the threat from the Burmese, and was therefore unable to help. He stated that he should not end his benevolence to Nguyễn Ánh. In contrast, the Uparacha was angry and suspicious of Nguyễn Ánh’s loyalty. He pointed out that Nguyễn Ánh would surely cause trouble subsequently because he had lived in Bangkok for many years and knew Siam very well, especially Siam’s naval weaknesses. It would pose a difficulty for Siam should Nguyễn Ánh become an enemy.87 However, this incident was not mentioned in Vietnamese account. The departure of Nguyễn Ánh from Bangkok reveals the Siamese court’s intricate self-image. On the one hand, the Siamese court records boasted that Nguyễn Ánh gave his allegiance to the Siamese king and accepted the dominance of Siam. The account suggested that this realized the worldview that Siam and Siamese king was the center of the world. On the other, the Siamese rulers themselves were in reality not able to ignore the possibility that Vietnam and Nguyễn Ánh could be a potential rival that they could not really subdue. Even though Nguyễn Ánh did not officially pledge to be a vassal of Siam, he, however, displayed his loyalty to the Bangkok court by agreeing to pay tribute to Siam. 86 87 P.R.R.I, p. 92. P.R.R.I, pp. 90-93. 41 Nguyễn Ánh’s tribute of gold and silver trees to Siam Although the Siamese was afraid that Nguyễn Ánh would become a disloyal rival, Nguyễn Ánh kept his words and maintained amicable relations with Siam by sending gold and silver trees. The Vietnamese’s presentation of tribute is only documented in Thai accounts, and is not mentioned in Vietnamese records. In Southeast Asia, gold and silver trees symbolized tributary relations. After Nguyễn Ánh became the legitimate ruler of Gia Định, he first offered golden and silver trees as tribute to the Bangkok court in 1788 and sent another six missions up to 1802.88 At the same time, he asked Rama I for support against the Tây Sơn. 89 The Siamese court considered Vietnam its vassal although the Nguyễn ruler did not intend to be a Siamese dependency. The movements of Siam and news from Bangkok were always sent to Gia Định. Vietnamese records, however, only depicted Siamese assistance of provisions and weaponry to the Nguyễn side in order to fight against the Tây Sơn. The Vietnamese did actually send tribute along with gifts as the Siamese recorded. They did not document this into the chronicles because they probably did not want to admit that they had done this. Besides offering symbolic tribute, Nguyễn Ánh demonstrated friendship to Siam by providing substantial support. When Siam was in need, he also provided the Bangkok court with provisions such as provisions and rice from Gia Định.90 He helped to vanquish the Pattani rebels that wanted to destroy Siam. The Pattani ruler had asked Nguyễn Ánh to send naval troops to attack Siam, but Nguyễn Ánh refused and informed Bangkok. Later Siamese forces defeated Pattani and Rama I executed the 88 P.R.R.I, pp. 113, 127, 148, 156, 166, 170. Ibid., p. 113. 90 Ibid., pp. 121, 123, 153 & ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 245. 89 42 Pattani ruler.91 The seemingly amicable relations between the two states, however, were not always reciprocal. According to the Vietnamese records, when Nguyễn Ánh was ruling Gia Định, Rama I asked him for reinforcements, and also required him to cede Long Xuyên, Kiên Giang, and Bassac92 to Cambodia. Nguyễn Ánh, however, refused. He reasoned that Gia Định was still concerned about an invasion from the Tây Sơn’s leader, Nguyễn Huệ, who was invading Luangphrabang and would march on to Gia Định.93 Furthermore, his people faced difficulties because of the enemy’s presence. Nguyễn Ánh hinted to the Bangkok court that if Nguyễn Huệ conquered Gia Định, they would march into Siamese territory. The Tây Sơn, therefore, was not only his enemy but also Siam’s.94 Interestingly, the Thai records do not mention this event. Nguyễn Ánh’s refusal indicated that Nguyễn Ánh still retained authority and preserved the independence of Vietnam. Despite the symbolic present of gold and silver trees, Gia Định was not a Siamese vassal as the Bangkok court intended. The account of this incident would have damaged the image of Siam as the overlord of Gia Định that the Siamese records had tried to create. 91 Ibid., pp. 123-125 & ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 253. Bassac was a region situated in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta. 93 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 284. 94 Ibid. 92 43 The battle of Rạch Gầm – Xoài Mút After Nguyễn Ánh successfully left Siam and prepared to battle with the Tây Sơn, he asked for military support and provisions from Bangkok. Rama I granted Nguyễn Ánh’s request by sending troops and weapons.95 Nguyễn Ánh and the Siamese troops were repeatedly beaten by the Tây Sơn troops. Their biggest defeat was at the battle of Rạch Gầm - Xoài Mút (currently at Tiền Giang province) in 1785. In 1785, Nguyễn Ánh and Siamese reinforcements marched to fight the Tây Sơn troops led by Nguyễn Huệ at Trấn Định (currently in Tiền Giang province). The alliance did not succeed satisfactorily. Thai records claimed that Nguyễn Ánh and his soldiers did not co-operate smoothly with Siamese troops. Thai and Vietnamese records clearly state that the Bangkok court continuously received complaints that Siamese soldiers were not hard-working and they visited prostitutes. They also bullied the local people and that was a factor that underpinned their loss to the Tây Sơn.96 Rama I had to investigate and settle this issue so that he and Nguyễn Ánh would not have any conflict. Subsequently, the Siamese army and naval forces were overconfident and fell into Nguyễn Huệ’s traps. On January 19, 1785, the Tây Sơn’s army defeated the Siamese troops along the Mekong River at the Rạch Gầm - Xoài Mút area. This battle took only one night and resulted in a great victory for the Tây Sơn and a big loss for Nguyễn Ánh and Bangkok. From the Siamese perspective, giving substantial aid to Nguyễn Ánh in his fight against the Tây Sơn was ample support. Despite the defeat, this battle played a part in 95 96 Ibid., p. 298. Ibid., pp. 221-224 &P.R.R.I, p. 128. 44 fostering good relations between the Chakri and the Nguyễn family. This battle caused Nguyễn Ánh, again, to take refuge in Bangkok for a short period. Gia Long’s succession to the throne and his goodwill towards Siam Nguyễn Ánh further resorted to assistance from the French, and with the help of Siamese forces and French mercenaries, he united Vietnam in 1802. In 1785, when he regained power over Gia Định, he tried to ask Pigneau de Behaine, a French Catholic priest, for support from the French.97 His eldest son, Prince Cảnh (Nguyễn Phúc Cảnh), sailed to France with Pigneau in order to sign a treaty of alliance between France and Vietnam in the same year.98 However, this attempt for direct support failed as the French Revolution broke out during the reign of Louis XVI in 1789. Pigneau and Prince Cảnh returned to Vietnam and raised the military forces to help Nguyễn Ánh. The death of Nguyễn Huệ in 1792 was a big boost to the Nguyễn ruler. The power in Tây Sơn shifted into the hands of other mandarins. The weakness of the Tây Sơn showed when several officials who had served Nguyễn Huệ were executed and people soon became disenchanted with the Tây Sơn regime. Finally, Nguyễn Ánh defeated the Tây Sơn in 1802, after which Nguyễn Ánh ascended the throne as Emperor Gia Long of Vietnam. He changed his base from Gia Định to Huế. Both the Bangkok and the Huế courts still maintained their close friendly relationship after Nguyễn Ánh became the emperor. The two courts exchanged royal letters to update each other of the situation in their respective countries, and offered royal presents to show goodwill. The Nguyễn court showed its willingness to assist Siam on 97 98 Chapuis, A History of Vietnam, p. 140. Ibid., p. 170-179. 45 many issues. Rama I asked Gia Long to send troops for the battle with Burma and Gia Long acceded, proclaiming that the Bangkok and Huế courts were allies. He agreed to send the navy but refused to send an army because of the difficult mountainous terrain to traverse.99 Gia Long prepared navy troops to attack Burma but the navy was not needed eventually because the Bangkok court informed Gia Long that its own forces had already defeated the Burmese troops.100 King Chan of Cambodia and the omen of the first Siamese-Vietnamese conflict After Rama I passed away, suspicion between the Bangkok and the Huế courts surfaced. The first conflict emerged over the issue of Cambodia, diverging from the mutual understanding between Rama I and Gia Long that Siam and Vietnam could jointly control the territory. In 1809, Rama II succeeded as the new king of Siam amidst the tension of warfare between Siam and Burma. The relationship between Gia Long and Rama II was still smooth. At this time, the Bangkok court had to pay more attention to Burmese threats and was less concerned about Vietnamese expansionism over Cambodia and Lao tributaries. Rama II preserved Siamese overlordship over its vassals by accepting yearly tributes that symbolized their vassalage. Bangkok occasionally demanded support, i.e., troops, from its vassals for expedient situations. Siamese vassals were willing to seek two overlords in order to decrease Siamese influence over them. Lao and Cambodian vassals frequently mentioned that Siam brought them trouble and that they needed Vietnamese protection. This led to the expansion of Vietnam’s power 99 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 757. Ibid., pp. 757-758. 100 46 when the Nguyễn court started to claim its overlordship over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. However, when Chan, the Cambodian ruler, began to send tribute to Huế in 1807, Cambodia became a tributary of two courts.101 The conflict between Siam and Cambodia started when Chan refused to send troops to support Siam against the Burmese in 1811. In the role of a vassal, Cambodia needed to obey the demands of either Bangkok or Huế, beyond merely sending tribute. This rejection led Rama II to angrily send troops to Cambodia. Chan fled to seek the support of Huế. Gia Long attempted to be the mediator of the conflict. He claimed that Cambodia was also a dependency of Vietnam. Rama II demanded a penalty from Chan, but Gia Long suggested Rama II forgive Chan because both Siam and Vietnam were such great kingdoms and should be merciful and magnanimous to a small state like Cambodia. 102 The conflict between the pro-Siamese and pro-Vietnamese factions within Cambodians further led to serious tensions between the two courts. Chan was more inclined towards Vietnam while his brothers, Ang Snguon, Ang Im, and Ang Duong were pro-Siam. To resolve the disputes among the brothers, Rama II and Gia Long sent messages to each other between 1809 and 1810 asserting their intention to create an understanding among the brothers.103 They also cooperated and collaborated in resolving the problems.104 In 1813, Siam agreed to withdraw its troops from Battambang after Lê Văn Duyệt, a high ranking mandarin (who later became the 101 ĐNTL(Volume 1), p. 683. ĐNTL(Volume 1), pp. 797, 812 & P.C.K.12, p. 616 & Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, pp. 85-89. 103 C.H.II/9/1171-1172 (1809-1810C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 104 C.H.II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) & C.H.II/25/1174 (1812 C.E.) Exchange of letters between Rama II and Gia Long. 102 47 viceroy of south Vietnam), wrote a letter reproaching Siam. The Huế court thought that Siam’s weakness and Vietnam’s superior strength had caused Bangkok to attempt to be friendly with Vietnam.105 Thai accounts mention that Rama II sent envoys to ask Gia Long how the two overlords could resolve the tensions among the Cambodian elites. Gia Long replied that the two courts should show benevolence to the small countries and allow Chan to remain the king of Cambodia. Rama II accepted the request from Vietnam out of respect to the long friendly relations between both courts.106 The Siamese court, therefore, avoided conflict. The reason why Rama II agreed to Gia Long’s request was probably because of the close and cordial relationship between Rama II and Gia Long. Both of them had known each other since Gia Long took refuge in Bangkok, and before Rama II succeeded to the throne. Furthermore, Siam was more concerned about the Burmese threat.107 Gia Long took advantage of the war between Siam and Burma to solve a problem in Cambodia. Cambodians had migrated to the area under Vietnamese influence because of drought and famine. Gia Long claimed that Siam and Vietnam were close and that Cambodia was under the protectorate of both courts. He asked Rama II to entrust him with managing these problems and ensured that Vietnam would never betray Siam by taking over Cambodia.108 Rama II replied that he had faith in the long friendship between Gia Long and Rama I, which guaranteed the loyalty of Vietnam to Siam.109 After Gia Long passed away and Minh Mạng succeeded the throne in 1820, the impasse between Siam and Vietnam over Cambodia became unstable. The Bangkok 105 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 839. P.R.R.II, pp. 33-35. 107 Ibid. 108 C.H.II/19/1173-1175 (1811-1813C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II. 109 Ibid. Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 106 48 court levied an accusation against Vietnam over Cambodian territory, but the issue was resolved peacefully. The Bangkok court thought that Vietnam had invaded Cambodia while Siam was preoccupied with the Burma invasion during the reign of Rama II.110 Vietnam gave the explanation that the local Cambodians had been forced by starvation to flee to Vietnamese territory in Cambodia. Siam accepted this explanation. The conflict did not become escalate because both Rama II and Minh Mạng attempted to follow the rules of diplomatic reconciliation that Rama I and Gia Long shared. Minh Mạng argued that the Huế court had remained an ally of neighbors like Siam for more than twenty years without border disputes or other concerns.111 Similar to the Vietnamese accounts, Thai records mentioned the care Rama II exercised throughout his reign in preserving the friendly relations with the Nguyễn court. This is especially when he agreed to cede Phutthaimat (or Hà Tiên in Vietnam today) in response to Gia Long’s request in 1810.112 The conflicts were solved because both courts relied on their close relations and long friendship. The relations between Siam, during the reign of Rama II, and Vietnam during the reigns of Gia Long and Ming Mạng, were still peaceful, although the quarrel among Cambodian ruling elites initially brought misconstruing between the two overlords. In the conflicts between Siam and its vassals, Vietnam attempted to act as an intermediary for reconciliation. This made the Siamese think that Vietnam was interfering in Siam’s internal affairs. 110 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 10. ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 168. 112 P.R.R.II, p. 19. 111 49 The Nguyễn’s rejection of the Burmese court The Burmese court twice sent an emissary to Huế, first in 1813 during the reign of Gia Long and 1823 during the reign of Minh Mạng, asking for Vietnamese cooperation in its attack on Siam. In the letter, the Burmese King mentioned that Siam and Vietnam were incompatible regarding the problems in Cambodia, and, he hoped for Vietnamese cooperation. The Nguyễn court, however, refused.113 In 1823, this request, however, led Minh Mạng and the Nguyễn court to have a big debate. The court wanted to assist Burma in attacking Siam, while Minh Mạng and some mandarins decided to preserve the friendship with Siam.114 The Vietnamese court finally rejected the Burmese ambassador’s proposal. The cordial relations between Huế and Bangkok again played a vital role in influencing the Nguyễn court’s decision. Minh Mạng sent a letter to inform Bangkok of the situation so that Siam would not be suspicious of Vietnam. Rama II expressed his gratitude to Minh Mạng and the Huế court for their strong support.115 Even though there was a rumor in Bangkok that Vietnam was willing to help Burma attacked Siam, the Huế court and generals attempted to reassure Siam. The Vietnamese General, Lê Văn Duyệt, stated that Vietnam could not betray Siam because Siam was benevolent towards Vietnam.116 Furthermore, the Nguyễn court 113 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324 & Nhu Viễn, pp. 283-285. ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324-325. 115 P.R.R.II, p. 113 and P.R.R.2(Dam-2), pp. 174-183. 116 C.H.II/4/1183 (1821C.E.) The Investigation of the Situation in Vietnam in 1821. This is an account by Siamese officials who went to Sàigòn for trade and talked with Lê Văn Duyệt. 114 50 followed the Chinese system of ethics which stipulated loyalty to benefactors.117 In Minh Mạng’s explanation of his decision, he referred to Gia Long’s advice that the Nguyễn heir should keep in mind the benevolence of Rama I.118 When letters from Huế were sent twice in 1813 and 1823 to Bangkok regarding the Vietnamese rejections of Burma’s overtures, the Siamese, according to Thai sources, analyzed that the reason why the Vietnamese did not pursue Burma’s offers was possibly because Gia Long had stated before he passed away that: “I will not allow any ascendants to harm Siam because Rama I was very helpful to me when I was suffering. It was also with Rama I’s support that I could restore our country again.”119 In Vietnamese accounts however, Mạng emphasized to the long history of friendly relations they two countries had before Gia Long ascended the throne. He refused the Burmese request based on the reasoning that Siam was a sincere friend and that there was no reason to severe relations with a neighboring country like Siam.120 The refusal of the Nguyễn court was significant to show the Vietnam’s loyalty and friendship to Siam. Anouvong’s incident Siam and Vietnam agreed to be joint-overlords when the kingdoms of Vientiane and Luang Phrabang started to pay tribute to both Bangkok and Huế since 1800s. Before the 1820s, Gia Long did not clearly assert the claim over Vientiane and Luang Phrabang. This was perhaps that the Lao rulers did not officially offer tribute to Huế; 117 Ibid. ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324-325. 119 P.R.R.III, p. 13 and P.R.R.2(Dam-2), pp. 175, 184. 120 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324-325. 118 51 and that the personal relations between Gia Long, and Rama I and Rama II were very close. The issues concerning Lao kingdoms were under the power of both Siam and Vietnam. By the 1820s, the Nguyễn court was more intent on expanding its power over the Lao. Towards the expansion of Vietnamese influence in the early 1820s, the Siamese did not have a clear reaction on this. They seemed to stay calm and accept this change. However, the decline of Siamese and Vietnamese foreign relations began in the reigns of Rama III (1824-1851) and Minh Mạng, especially after Rama II passed away. Tensions between Bangkok and Huế became clear when both rulers sought to resolve the tensions resulting from Anouvong’s rebellion. The turning point of Siam and Vietnam diplomatic relations began when the Vientiane ruler, Anouvong, fought against the Bangkok court between 1827 and 1828. Anouvong sent troops to invade the northeast of Siam aiming to regain independence for Vientiane. Vientiane troops initially succeeded in attacking Khorat (currently Nakhonratchasima Province). A few days later, Siamese troops led by Chaophraya Bodindecha restored Siamese rule over city and defeated the Vientiane troops. Anouvong fled to Nghệ An in Vietnam and asked for the support of the Nguyễn court. Anouvong reported that Rama III had sent troops to force him to seek refuge in Vietnam.121 Minh Mạng allowed Anouvong and his followers to take refuge with the Nguyễn in Nghệ An, claiming that Vientiane was also under the protectorate of the Nguyễn court.122 After Anouvong escaped from Vientiane to Vietnam in 1827, Minh Mạng arranged for an envoy to send Anouvong back to Vientiane, giving him troops to support the 121 122 QXVT, p. 119. Ibid., pp. 65-66 & ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 642 & P.R.R.III, p. 69. 52 negotiations. Anouvong, however, decided to utilize the Vietnamese troops to fight the Siamese but he again lost to Siam. Anouvong requested for more support from Huế, but Ming Mạng refused. Rama III ordered Chaophraya Bodindecha to sack Vientiane in retaliation for its rebellion. The Siamese burnt all properties, including the palace, temples and homes. They forced the Lao peoples from Vientiane to relocate to the right bank of the Mekong River. In the battle between Siam and Vientiane, Vietnam blamed Rama III for not informing them of the initial conflict and the ensuing military action. Minh Mạng reasoned that Bangkok was concerned that Vietnam would seize the opportunity to completely claim supremacy over Vientiane.123 However, Minh Mạng attempted to be an intermediary once again. The reason why Siam and Vientiane fought was because Anouvong hated Siam and that he had initially attacked Siamese territory.124 The Nguyễn court attempted to prove its friendship with Siam by sending an envoy to consider Rama III’s request.125 Rama III replied in the letter stated: “Considering the long friendly relations between Siam and Vietnam, I would forgive Anouvong if he showed remorse for his mistakes.”126 A very important incident for the relations between Siam and Vietnam was when Anouvong and the Vietnamese troops, which Minh Mạng sent for Anouvong’s protection, killed 200 Siamese during the year of 1828 that both courts were 123 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 609. Ibid., p. 599 and P.R.R.III, pp. 78-79. 125 QXVT, p.52. 126 C.H.III/6(8)/1190(1828C.E.), Letter from Rama III in reply to Minh Mạng. 124 53 negotiating for reconciliation after Anouvong had fled to Nghệ An.127 The news of Anouvong’s use of Vietnamese troops against Siamese without permission was sent to Minh Mang. Minh Mạng then realized that Anouvong ordered these killings without informing him. He re-commissioned Vietnamese envoys to reconcile the conflict between Siam and Vientiane. Minh Mạng wrote to Bangkok, making an apology for Anouvong’s actions, and suggesting that Rama III forgive him so that “[Vientiane] would be a vassal of the two great kingdoms as before.”128 Minh Mạng, however, claimed that the Vietnamese were not to be blamed for the massacre of Siamese as this was due to Avouvong’s arrogance.129 After the Siamese massacre by Anouvong and the Vietnamese troops, Siam and Vietnam relations reached a low when Siamese officials killed Vietnamese envoys who interceded for Anouvong.130 Minh Mạng asked Rama III to punish the culprits. He claimed that no execution of envoys had ever happened in the history of diplomacy. Rama III replied: “Siamese officials took vengeance on the Vietnamese because they aided Anouvong in killing 200 Siamese soldiers even as Siam and Vietnam sought reconciliation over Anouvong wrongdoings.”131 Rama III, however, eventually sent a letter to apologize. Rama III’s response to Minh Mạng expressed that Siam never thought that Vietnam would violate the Siamese sphere of influence in the Lao territories due to the trust between the two courts, although Siam was in reality precisely extremely concerned about that.132 The Nguyễn still felt however that the Siamese were unjust in resolving the issue. Months later, Siam caught Anouvong 127 P.R.R.III, pp. 78-79. ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 783 and P.R.R.III, pp. 79-80. 129 P.R.R.III, p. 79. 130 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 131 Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, p. 137 and P.R.R.III, pp. 129-130. 132 Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, p. 137 and P.R.R.III, pp. 129-130. 128 54 with the assistance of a Siamese vassal, the ruler of Phouan, Chao Noi, and executed him. After Minh Mạng knew the news, he gave an order to put Chao Noi to death reasoning that Phouan was also a Vietnamese vassal and Chao Noi had no right to hand Anouvong over to Siam. The Vietnamese’s assistance of Anouvong and the impasse over the Siamese execution of Vietnamese envoys led to the shift in foreign relations. After these episodes, the contacts between Bangkok and Huế were less frequent and cordial than before. This incident was perhaps a turning point in Siam-Vietnam relationship. Lê Văn Khôi and the Siamese invasion of Hà Tiên Siam-Vietnam relationship was worsened when Rama III sent troops to Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc in late 1833.133 The Siamese invasion at Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc from 1833 to 1834 and Siamese aid to the Lê Văn Khôi rebellion opposing Minh Mạng’s rule in Southern Vietnam represented the breakdown of diplomacy between the two courts. In 1832 with the death of General Lê Văn Duyệt, one of the most powerful mandarins in Vietnam, Minh Mạng ordered that he be posthumously indicted, and one hundred lashes applied to his grave.134 Minh Mạng asserted: “when Lê Văn Duyệt was still alive, he wielded absolute power and committed perverse deeds. It was difficult to grant amnesty to him.”135 Lê Văn Duyệt’s adopted son, Lê Văn Khôi, and supporters rose up against the Nguyễn in Gia Định; this was known as the “Lê Văn Khôi rebellion.” 133 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 897. Ibid. 135 Ibid. & P.R.R.III, pp. 126,129. 134 55 The rebellion was made up of two main groups Christians who were suppressed under Nguyễn rule, and Lê Văn Duyệt’s supporters in southern Vietnam. During the revolt, Lê Văn Khôi requested assistance from Siam. Rama III decided to support Lê Văn Khôi that because Vietnam had asserted its authority over the territory under Siamese suzerainty several times since Rama I’s reign.136 He ordered General Chaophraya Bodindecha to lead Siamese troops to Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc to support Lê Văn Khôi. While the Siamese aimed to cause trouble for Minh Mạng, they did not intentionally want to overthrow Minh Mạng. Rama III’s purpose was to stop or reduce Vietnamese incursions into the Cambodian territory that was under Siam’s influence since Rama I’s period. In late 1833, Khôi seized Gia Định and requested Siamese help against the Huế troops. Rama III arranged for Siamese reinforcements to attack Vietnam. Siam tried to reduce the strength of the Nguyễn military force by sending a small contingent of troops to attack the central part of Vietnam (Quảng Trị) and Xieng Khouang (currently in Laos).137 However, Trương Minh Giảng, a central Vietnamese general, led the Vietnamese troops to victory over Siamese troops in Châu Đốc and Hà Tiên. The Nguyễn court repelled them on the Lao border and reinvaded Cambodia. The Vietnamese forces drove the Siamese out of Cambodia and Minh Mạng established a full-fledged protectorate over Cambodia.138 Vietnam counted Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc as a part of Vietnamese territory.139 The Vietnamese thought that Siam not only engaged in expansionism over Cambodia and 136 P.P.N, p. 152 and P.R.R.III, pp. 129-130. ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 899 and P.R.R.III, p. 164. 138 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 249. 139 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 154. 137 56 Lao territories but also over Vietnam.140 When Siam invaded Hà Tiên, Minh Mang was still of two minds about Siamese intentions, although Minh Mạng still believed in the possibility of diplomacy, and attempted to maintain the relations between the two states.141 In the end, however, Minh Mang became distrustful of Siamese intentions. Rama III’s support of Lê Văn Khôi caused severe diplomatic tensions between Siam and Vietnam. The Nguyễn court gained more power over Cambodia. From then on, Siam and Vietnam embarked on a tough policy towards each another. Subsequently, factionalism in Cambodia allowed both supreme powers to contest for hegemony over Cambodia. It led to the prolonged war between the two courts over their vassal. Siamese and Vietnamese war over Cambodia (1835-1847) The main cause of the Siamese-Vietnamese war over Cambodia was the disharmony of Cambodian ruling elites. The conflicts from the King Chan period continued even after he passed away in 1835. Chan did not have sons but only daughters for Cambodian throne. The Nguyễn court elevated Chan’s daughter as the new Cambodian ruler, Queen Mei. Although Cambodia had a new ruler, absolute power was in the hands of the Vietnamese mandarin, Trương Minh Giảng.142 Similarly for Siam, Prince Duong used to be an instrument of the Bangkok court for its influence over Cambodia. Both courts treated Cambodian elites as puppets to expand or preserve their supremacy over Cambodia. 140 Ibid., pp. 912, 924. Ibid., p. 909. 142 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, pp. 126-127. 141 57 The war between Siam and Vietnam over Cambodia lasted over a decade. The superior strength of the Siamese land armies was more than evenly matched by the superior naval strategies and ships of the Vietnamese, which led resulted in a protracted war. Siamese troops were based at Battambang, and Vietnamese forces at Phnom Penh. During the battle, both courts competed in both military and cultural strategies but no single side won completely. The Siamese and Vietnamese policies towards Cambodia will be presented in more detail in Chapter IV. However, the instability within the Vietnamese court over the succession to Minh Mạng was one of the main reasons that led Thiệu Trị to stop the war. Furthermore, the Nguyễn court also was also alert to the threat of the French in the southern part of Vietnam. During his reign, he frequently showed that he disagreed with many policies of Trương Minh Giảng towards Cambodia and the military strategies against Siam. Chaophraya Bodindecha also informed the Bangkok court that it would be hard for the Siamese to sustain this protracted war because of the loss of forces and the lack of provisions. Furthermore, local Cambodians became more difficult to control because Cambodians were exhausted from this long war.143 Finally, Chaophraya Bodindecha and Doãn Uẩn, a Vietnamese General, signed the peace treaty. In 1845, both countries accordingly withdrew their troops from Cambodia.144 This period saw the two countries contest their overlordship over mainland Southeast Asia. In the late 1840s, Siam and Vietnam sought a solution after the prolonged war over Cambodia. In 1847, both courts agreed to end the war and to accept Cambodia as their tributary. A new Cambodian king ascended the throne and an annual payment 143 C.H.III/6/1208 (1846C.E.) Letter from Phraya Yommarat to new Cambodian officials about the issues in Cambodia. 144 Trần Trọng Kim, Việt Nam Sử Lược, p. 505. 58 and triennial tribute of Cambodia to Bangkok and Huế was decided. Rama III and Thiệu Trị still attempted to prove Siamese and Vietnamese legitimacy over the coronation of King Ang Duong (1841-1859). Rama III recognized Duong as King Harirakramathibodee. Thiệu Trị also conferred a title on Ang Duong as Cao Miên Quốc Vương. This incident was the last conflict between Siam and Vietnam before the coming of Western colonialism. Conclusion Historical events vitally illustrate the evolution of the inter-state relations between Siam and Vietnam. These incidents highlight turning points in the change of perceptions between the two countries. The desire for expansionism in terms of both geographical territory and cultural boundaries explained their diplomatic conflicts. The relationship between Siam and Vietnam moved from amity to enmity. In the first stage of relations between 1780s and 1800s, both the Siamese and Vietnamese courts acted amiably. The founders of both dynasties had close relations. This period represented the most cordial relationship. Envoys’ credentials were always exchanged between Bangkok and Huế. Rama I and Gia Long always helped each other on many issues. The second period of relations was characterized by enmity, especially when Rama III and Minh Mang vied for tributary expansionism. Siam tried to maintain its overlordship over its vassals. Vietnam attempted to assert its power in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms, especially between the 1820s and 1840s. The Bangkok and the Huế courts focused on Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as indicators of their diplomacy. 59 Rama II (1809-1824), and Gia Long (1802-1820) and Minh Mạng (1820-1840) still tried to maintain friendly relations, although some conflicts over their zones of interest often meant they had to come to an understanding that they would not interfere in each other’s affairs. The distrust between the two courts, however, grew as a result of the conflicts between Chan and his brothers among the Cambodian elite, and because of Anouvong’s resistance against Siam. Their friendly relations came to an end; both courts considered each other as enemies when the Siamese offered support to the Lê Văn Khôi rebellion and sent troops to Cambodia in 1833. Afterwards, the royal missions that had been conducted between the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts ended. Chapter III explores the reciprocal worldviews of the Siamese and Vietnamese courts as their relationships shifted from amicable to inimical. The rhetoric employed in the letters and chronicles of both courts evidenced their political and cultural perceptions. Furthermore, the differences in the Siamese and Vietnamese cultural foundations accounted for the dissimilar rituals and ceremonies of courts, which led to different understandings among them. 60 CHAPTER III SIAM’S AND VIETNAM’S PERCEPTIONS OF EACH OTHER In the seven decades of foreign relations between Siam and Vietnam, both courts attempted to balance their equal status as great kingdoms as well as joint-overlords. In their relations, both states were theoretically not superior to the other. The court rhetoric and diplomatic language both courts employed undoubtedly reveals the worldviews that Siam and Vietnam held and shared, as well as their perceptions of each other. This chapter focuses on three aspects: (1) the political and cultural dimensions of both courts’ perceptions of each other; (2) the entanglements between Bangkok and Huế regarding court rituals and cultural strategies towards their vassal states that led to shifts in their consciousness and attitudes within different contexts; (3) the creation of knowledge and imaginings of each other. Royal correspondence between Bangkok and Huế, as well as the courts’ records, showed the attitudes towards each other and their interaction. The diplomatic rhetoric showed the evolution of their relations, attitudes and, in some instances, hidden contradictions. The difference between the original letters received by each court, and the information it records, is the use of language which exhibits both hierarchical and non-hierarchical patterns. In the original letters, the languages used between the two states were more polite or neutral, unlike the recorded version which tended to depict the diplomatic relationship in hierarchical terms of superiority and inferiority. 61 Court rituals and protocols followed by the diplomatic missions also revealed the cultural dimension of Siamese and Vietnamese foreign affairs. The symbolic implications of the presents sent between Bangkok and Huế influenced each court’s interpretations of their counterpart’s intention. Based on their own positioning of themselves as the primary political center in the region vis-à-vis other states, both courts produced knowledges and imaginings of each other through various types of texts – i.e. narrative descriptions, poems and paintings. Political perceptions: the status of state and territory The state’s power was measured in terms of size, political influence and authority. The Siamese and the Vietnamese saw themselves as exemplary centers and powerful states, surrounded by junior states and lesser powers that had to accept their authority. At the founding of both dynasties, Siam and Vietnam both sent emissaries and tributes to China asking for recognition from the Qing court. This common identity as a tributary of China was one of the possible reasons for both states to consider each another as equally powerful states. Although this was not mentioned in any Thai or Vietnamese text, both countries presumably conceptualized their hierarchical position in relation to China. Siam and Vietnam, at least, knew that each other sent periodic tribute to China. Correspondence between the Bangkok and the Huế courts also illustrated their perceptions regarding the status of both states. In these messages, both kingdoms addressed and referred to one another as equal, big, and powerful states. The correspondence exchanged between the Siamese kings and the Vietnamese emperor over incidents regarding the Cambodia and Lao tributaries also revealed that both 62 courts felt that, as joint overlords, they had to be benevolent towards their vassals. For example, in the correspondences between Rama II and Gia Long in 1811 over Cambodia, the latter wrote that: “The Vietnamese imperial court thinks that Cambodia was a subject (kha) of the two great states (song phramahanakhon yai). … Vietnam could not ignore and, therefore, ordered Saigon governor to send troops to resolve the chaos in Cambodia. …Our Cambodian dependency can live happily.”145 Rama II replied : “…As the desire to stop the chaos as the cause of the sending of troops to Cambodia by a governor of Saigon, Siam was not suspicious [of the intention of the Vietnamese court] since [both] are big states (song phramahanakhon) and we are close friends. …As we are big kingdoms, not like other small states [as it guarantees], we can trust each other forever…”146 The Siamese and the Vietnamese courts acknowledged each other’s prestige as benevolent overlords, especially when they had to deal with their vassals states. This significantly suggested the Siamese and Vietnamese mutual recognition of equality, as indicated by the use of the term ‘song phramahanakhon’ (two big states). However, in their court records, they recorded information about each other using hierarchically-toned language, attempting to demonstrate their own superiority over the other. 145 C.H. II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II. [As given in Thai translation in the same royal chronicles] 146 C.H. II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Rama II expressing his gratitude to Gia Long. 63 From a vassal to a friendly peer: the Siamese perception of Vietnam From a geopolitical perspective, the size of Siamese territory reached its largest during the reign of Rama I. The honorable fame of Rama I was “spread to four directions to many of his vassals from Lao Phung dam, Lao Phung khaw, Lao Lue, moved down to Cambodia and Vietnam (Yuan) of Saigon… the kingdom is even bigger than in the Ayudhaya period.”147 This text was written in 1805 when Siam was powerful enough to expand its territory northwards, including Chiang Tung (Keng Tung, currently in Myanmar), Chiangrung (Jinghong, currently in China) and Sipsongpanna (Xishuangbanna, currently in China). Siam clearly defined itself as a suzerain over Nguyễn Ánh’s regime. Siam considered Vietnam a vassal for a brief period before Gia Long’s restoration of the Nguyễn’s power but changed its perception after Vietnam was founded in 1802. Rama I probably saw Prince Nguyễn Anh as a vassal but Emperor Gia Long as an equal. Siam’s conception of Vietnam as a vassal before Gia Long’s enthronement is clearly shown in the Phraratchaphongsawadan. Thai records suggest that the Bangkok court displayed benevolence towards the Nguyễn ruler before the establishment of the Nguyễn court. Rama I requested Nguyễn Ánh to send troops, ammunition and provision in the same manner as other vassals.148 A letter sent to Nguyễn Ánh in 1791 underlines Rama I’s assumed disposition of overlord. As recorded in the Thai chronicle: “The King of Siam has been planning to support Nguyễn Ánh to be a ruler of Muang Yuan (Vietnam). Similar to Cambodia, the King intends to support Ang 147 148 P.R.R.I, p. 191. P.R.R.I, pp. 121, 123, 131, 153. 64 Eng to rule his people. His aim was that the two states would be in the same piece of territory (pen thong phen diew kan)…”149 The Thai term “pen thong phen diew kan” generally means to be affiliated by marriage. In this context, the phrase connotes a sense of very close companionship equivalent to that with relatives or people in the same family. Furthermore, Siam claimed that Nguyễn Ánh had said, in a letter he left before he departed from Bangkok to Gia Định, that: “…if I could restore my country, I would accede to becoming a subject under Siamese authority (khakhopkhanthasima)150 and will not betray you [Rama I].151 Nguyễn Ánh’s message undoubtedly meant to Siam that he was willing to become a protectorate of Siam. Thai records additionally emphasized that: “Nguyễn Ánh fulfilled his promise in his letter to be a vassal (Muang Prathetsarath) of Bangkok.”152 In the traditions of the states in Southeast Asia, golden and silver trees were a symbol of tributary admission. According to Thai sources, Nguyễn Ánh sent silver and golden trees from Gia Định to Bangkok six times between 1788 and 1801.153 The Siamese interpreted these gifts as tribute that evinced Nguyễn Ánh’s acceptance of his vassal status. After Nguyễn Ánh ascended the throne, Rama I initially sent a crown to Gia Long in 1803, but Gia Long refused the conferment and returned it to Bangkok. This shows Rama I’s perception of Gia Long as a vassal ruler, as this was how the rulers of the other vassals were treated. When the new ruler ascended the throne, the Siamese king would usually bestow a crown and/or make an oath of allegiance. However, after Gia Long refused to accept the gift of a crown, Rama I started to treat him as an equal 149 Ibid., p. 129. The term “khakhopkhanthasima” is a combination of “kha”, meaning “subject”, and “khopkhanthasima”, which means “boundary”. 151 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 67. 152 Ibid., p. 70. 153 P.R.R.I, p. 113. 150 65 and a close friend. Rama I replied to Gia Long thus: “[The Emperor of Vietnam] accepted the presents for the Emperor, but [the Emperor of Vietnam] arranged envoys to return a crown reasoning that a crown has immeasurable; [I] have never been wearing it, I would like to return it [to you]. By the way, the Emperor of Vietnam humbly to offer gifts [to me], it would hardly arrange the returned presents following the correct traditional custom of [your] country.” 154 The Thai accounts did not exactly mention how Rama I felt to Gia Long’s response. Rama I probably was just experimenting to see how far he could go with Gia Long. He perhaps speculated that Vietnam could become Siam’s vassal and this led him to send a crown to, and bestowed presents upon, Gia Long. However, Rama I’s reply showed that he was disappointed with Gia Long’s response, and avoided embarrassment by invoking cultural differences. The original correspondences sent between Gia Long and Rama I show that Siam did not perceive Gia Long as a vassal ruler, unlike the Lao kingdoms and Cambodia. The language used in the letters exhibited a strong sense of friendship, or a formal polite tone of equality between an elder king and a younger emperor. Although the two rulers did refer to each other in generational terms, i.e. ‘an elder’ and ‘a junior’, which suggest a relationship of subordination, the relationship between Rama I and Gia Long was exceptional. Gia Long’s reference to himself as a junior was intended to demonstrate his politeness and exalt Rama I, and not to imply subordination or vassalship. Gia Long, therefore, acted as a humble emperor of a big country. The emperor did not regard the assistance the Siamese rendered him as the benevolence demonstrated by an overlord to a vassal, but the natural support friends rendered to 154 C.H.I/2/1166 (1804C.E.) Letter from Rama I to Gia Long. 66 each other. This is different from the depiction in Thai chronicles which clearly presented a stronger sense of hierarchical status -- between an overlord and a dependency. It was clear, especially after Gia Long’s succession, that Siam defined Vietnam as its equal as a big state. For example, a letter sent from Siam to Vietnam in 1806 highlighted how “Vietnam and Siam are situated in the same sea, the same sky. Although, the two countries are far apart, we seem to live in the same piece of territory.”155 In another letter, Rama I wrote: “...[I] the Siamese king also tried to maintain the royal tradition for both states to be in a long term relationship. [I] wish that the two states retain their long-lived friendship and remain the same piece of territory (suwan pathaphee diew kan) forever.”156 This phrase “suwan pathaphee diew kan” implies equality for two separate countries. The other evidences showing that Siam considered Vietnam a friendly peer were the news usually sent between Bangkok and Huế to inform each other about their domestic and international situations, such as the news about funerals of the royal family members and the situations concerning the political instability of Siam resulting from the Burmese threat. Both courts showed their concern and sincere support for each other. After Gia Long’s ascendancy in 1802, the Siamese regarded Vietnam as an equal friend: “He [Gia Long] never sent silver and golden trees to Siam anymore.”157 When Gia Long sent a letter to Rama I declaring that: “I finally could occupy Huế and 155 Lê Quý Đôn, Phủ biên tập lục (Micellaneous Records of Pacification in the Border Area) (Hanoi: Social Sciences Publishing House, 1977), pp. 261-262. This letter was sent from Bangkok to Huế. 156 C.H.I/2/1168 (1806C.E.) Letter from Rama I to Gia Long. 157 P.R.R.I, p. 174. 67 ascend the throne as Gia Long.”158 Bangkok recorded that Gia Long defined himself as a ruler of a big state (Chao phean-din-yai ).159 Siam was, at first, careful neither accept this definition nor to feel this change as Vietnamese arrogance. Siam did not rush to pass a negative judgement on Vietnam because it waited to see how Gia Long would behave. To Siam however, this implies that Gia Long had distanced from Bangkok. Gia Long had made a transition, from being a dependent vassal to a peer. In the records, Siam accepted that Gia Long’s ascension meant that Vietnam would no longer be a Siamese vassal. According to Thai records, the Nguyễn court took advantage of Siam’s preoccupation with the war with Burma to expand its power over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The growth of Nguyễn power in the region was swift and effective. During the reign of Rama I, Gia Long started to enlarge Nguyễn power over surrounding states. However, the Siamese perceived that Gia Long did not expand his influence to a large extent over Siamese vassals, even if he perhaps desired to expand Vietnamese influence in Cambodia, because he appreciated Rama I’s earlier support against the Tây Sơn.160 No conflict between Siam and Vietnam ensued, even though the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms agreed to pay tribute to both courts, as they managed their diplomatic relationship, based on mutual trust, honesty and prestige as big kingdoms, well. Royal correspondence was a vital and effective diplomatic tool. For Siam, the late First Reign was an unstable period. Gia Long would rather wait till Rama I had passed away before he began the expansion of Vietnamese influence over Siamese vassals.161 In the correspondence between Bangkok and Huế, the Siamese always mentioned that 158 Ibid. Ibid. 160 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 9. 161 Ibid. 159 68 they cherished their sustained friendship, although the Bangkok court subsequently realized that Vietnam was an independent rival. Achieving balance - the Vietnamese attitude towards Siam In the Nguyễn records, the Vietnamese never depicted themselves as Siamese vassals. Even before Gia Long ascended to the throne, no Vietnamese official information acknowledged the status of Vietnam as a tributary of Siam. No court text mentions the tribute missions Nguyễn Ánh sent to Siam even once, even though Thai records mentioned the submissive letter he sent with his tribute of golden and silver trees. The Vietnamese considered their state as equal to Siam and this therefore entails that Vietnam denied that the sending of silver and golden trees represented their acceptance of tributary status. Gia Long merely wrote that he would always recognize Rama I’s support and would like to send the silver and golden trees as a gift.162 He was referring to a previous gift that he had sent while he was still a prince. He wrote this when the Nguyển court once sent royal gifts to Siam consisting ten gold bullion, a hundred of silver bullion, a halberd, beeswax, granulated sugar and silk from Vietnam.163 The tributes that were sent from Gia Định (Sàigòn) while Nguyễn Ánh was still fighting with the Tây Sơn were their way of showing their gratitude for Rama I’s support. Although the Vietnamese court did not accept that Vietnam was a Siamese vassal, at that time he had to know what sending silver and golden trees meant. 162 163 C.H.I/5/1166(1804C.E) Letter from Gia Long to Rama I. P.R.R.I, p. 179. 69 In the Nguyễn chronicles, Nguyễn Ánh defined Siam as a friendly peer. For example, when Siam asked Gia Định to provide rice, he said: “To the Siamese, our country is their friend. The people of Siam are also same as our people. The Siamese are experiencing famine and hunger, how could we ignore them instead of giving them tenderly help”164 Vietnamese official records describe the attempt of Huế court to establish good diplomatic relations with the Bangkok court. In 1809, Gia Long mentioned to his court that “Siam and our country have friendly relations.”165 Similar to Siam, Vietnam also employed the same concept as seen in the letter from Gia Long to Rama II in 1811, which stated: “[Vietnam] sends this letter to Bangkok following our friendly relations and seeks news about the Siamese king and Uparacha. [I] wish that both prosper more and more. And [I] give tribute (bannakan) to an ambassador for preserving our friendship; the two big kingdoms (phramahanakhon) were on the same stretch of territory (phaendin diew kan) and had long friendly relations since the past till now.”166 Although the term bannakan suggested submission, this case was perhaps an exception, especially since the message contained no other term or word acknowledging inferiority. There was no other example of such language except for this word. Within a few decades, Vietnam expanded its territory to its largest ever, especially during the reign of Minh Mạng. The rivalry with Siam over vassals led Vietnam to confirm its power and sovereignty in the region. In the court’s letters, the Huế court 164 ĐNTL(Volume1), p. 304. Ibid., p. 757. 166 C.H.II/22/1173(1811C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II. [As given in Thai translation in the same royal annals] 165 70 showed its friendship to Siam by expressing concern about the Siamese-Burmese war. In the eyes of Vietnam, Siam and Burma were longtime enemies of each other.167 Minh Mạng told the Siamese ambassador that “If Burma was invaded or fought with other countries such as Britain, it is good for Siam because the court will not be troubled with the Burmese threat anymore.”168 The Bangkok court expressed its gratitude for Vietnamese friendship by sending their thanks to Minh Mạng. Siamese and Vietnamese attitudes towards each other’s involvement in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms Their attitudes influenced the diplomacy between the two courts and their tributaries, Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The Siamese and Vietnamese claimed their legitimacy and overlapping spheres of influence over their Cambodian and Lao peripheries. Both states defined themselves as a center and a powerful authority. From the Siamese perspective, Rama III tried to preserve Siamese authority over Anouvong of Vientiane and Chan of Cambodia, especially since they had grown closer to the Huế court during Rama II’s reign. About this time, Minh Mạng expanded Nguyễn power in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The personal attitudes and leadership styles of the Chakri kings and the Nguyễn emperors partly influenced the changes in the character of their relationship. Vietnamese policies of expansionism led to new perceptions about each other, which became marked by hostility, antagonism and rivalry. The reigns of Rama III and Minh Mạng marked a turning point as their views of each other shifted from friends to 167 168 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324-325. Ibid., p. 372. 71 rivals, or in some instances, enemies. Issues over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms led to distrust in their diplomatic relations. From the perspective of the Siamese court, it was the vassal states’ rulers who generally decided the level of their overlord’s involvement. The Bangkok court thought that when Cambodia gravitated towards whichever of the two sides which it assessed as more powerful.169 But if both kingdoms were seen as equally powerful, Cambodia would accept being one vassal under two overlords. The Siamese was agreeable to be joint-overlords with the Vietnamese. Arguably, the main reason was that Bangkok was concerned with the Burmese threat, even though the court also realized that the Nguyễn court tried to reclaim its power over Cambodia and Lao states because the latter believed that these cities used to be under Vietnamese domination. The Vietnamese expansion started after Gia Long’s enthronement. He spread the news to Cambodia and other cities to show that Vietnam had restored its territory, set itself free from the Tây Sơn and become as powerful as before. However, Siam still believed that Gia Long dared not commit any transgressions while Rama I was still alive.170 From the Siamese perspective, the events following the death of Rama I clearly showed Vietnamese intention to reclaim suzerainty over Cambodia. During the cremation of Rama I and the coronation of Rama II, Gia Long asked to restore Hà Tiên as a Vietnamese protectorate, claiming that it used to be a Vietnamese vassal and 169 170 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 61. Ibid., p. 72. 72 Rama II acceded to the request.171 There was no point for Siam to reject the request because Rama II was still concerned with the situation with Burma and did not want to provoke more enemies.172 Bangkok saw that it was losing authority over its vassals to the Nguyễn court gradually. Thai sources wrote that after the 34 cities of Cambodia were solely under the Vietnamese kingdom for a few decades; Siam got them back during the reign of Rama III.173 Siam and Vietnam foreign relations became marked with distrust. From the Vietnamese perspective, although the Bangkok court still sent missions to keep its friendship with the Huế court and to preserve peace, the Siamese still found a way to invade Cambodia, by conspiring with the people who were opposed to the Vietnamese court.174 Furthermore, they believed that even after Siam had lost its foothold in Cambodia, Bangkok still sought to expand its power in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The Huế court saw that “the Siamese had unreliable minds like snakes.”175 Vietnamese records further suggested that after the Vietnamese troops expelled the Siamese from Cambodia, the border area of Vietnam was peaceful and the territory of the Western protectorate (Trấn Tây) grew larger.176 171 P.R.R.II, p. 19. P.R.R.2(Dam-1), pp. 78-79. 173 Ibid., pp. 114-115. 174 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 153. 175 ĐNTL (Volume 4), pp. 27-28. 176 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 6. 172 73 Discourses of friendship between Siamese and Vietnamese rulers One factor in explaining the Siamese and the Vietnamese diplomatic attitudes was the worldviews and leadership styles of the Siamese kings and the Vietnamese emperors. The fundamental ideology of Siam’s and Vietnam’s rulers was similar – to exhibit high morals and act as benevolent rulers towards the small states. They claimed to protect and support the weaker states regularly. On the other hand, they had to manage their relations with each other as equal, powerful kingdoms when they deal with the problems over their vassals. Out of the first three reigns of the Chakri and the Nguyễn dynasties, the best relations were between Rama I and Gia Long. In the subsequent reigns, the Siamese kings, especially Rama III, felt that the Vietnamese emperors were less considerate than before and were also attempting to claim domination over Siam. This could be particularly seen in Minh Mang’s request that the Bangkok court alter some portions of the format of their letter, and also in his rejection of a gift by Rama III. A. Rama I and Gia Long The fundamental principle of the Buddhist King (thammaracha) was crucial in shaping the perception of the Siamese king.177 To be the world conqueror, he had to follow the ten kingly virtues which were basically based on the benevolence of the King to his people.178 Rama I considered himself as the king of righteousness who was supposed to follow the rule of ten virtues to relieve people from distress. At the same time, he was confident that Nguyễn Ánh would not pose a threat to Siam and 177 178 Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 46. Ibid., p. 41. 74 himself for the long time. This concept obviously underpins the attitude of Rama I, as a religious man, towards Nguyễn Ánh. Rama I always showed his will to support the restoration of the Nguyễn prince. The Buddhist discourse used by Rama I in his letter to the Tây Sơn stated that “The Bangkok court follows the rule of ten kingly virtues (Thotsaphit Ratchatham). [We] do not exploit neither big nor small countries, and also all foreign traders. [We] only demonstrate mercy towards them.”179 He also saw himself as neutral during the conflict between the Tây Sơn and Nguyễn Ánh as he answered: “For the [Bangkok] court, whatever [we] decided to do, [we] always follow the ten kingly virtues. Therefore, the Tonkin [i.e., Tây Sơn] ruler and Nguyễn Ánh are enemies, if both can negotiate that would be better.”180 Although Rama I assisted Nguyễn Ánh, the reason of his rejection to the Tây Sơn was probably that he did not want to officially declare the Tây Sơn as his enemy. The letter that the Bangkok court sent in reply to the emperor in Tonkin reveals the Siamese royalty’s view of the world. According to the ten virtues of Siamese kings, all states were the same in their humanity. It was inappropriate to violate either the strong or the weak states. The Siamese court was a great guardian to all human beings akin to the Mount Meru that guided and guarded the ocean.181 Siam was also like a big tree that was a habitat for all types of birds; after growing up they happily flied to this world. Similarly, Nguyễn Ánh was like a habitant that needed protection when he sought help. The Siamese court was responsible for protecting him as they protected 179 C.H.I/2/1156(1793C.E.) Letter from Rama I to the Tây Sơn emperor. Ibid. 181 C.H.I/2/1156(1793C.E.) Letter from Rama I to the emperor of Tonkin (Tây Sơn) and P.R.R.I, pp. 150-151. 180 75 the rest of the people. The protection of Nguyễn Ánh also implicated Bangkok’s pride and prestige. The benevolent king of Siamese traditions was not supposed to withdrew his support and generosity. Otherwise, other countries would criticize Siam for lacking hospitality, which the society would consider as a humiliating scandal. The Siamese realised that they were indispensable to the Nguyễn ruler because they had provided troops, ammunition, and provisions for Nguyễn Ánh’s war with the Tây Sơn. This is corroborated by Vietnamese sources, which show that Rama I was generous every time that Nguyễn Ánh asked for reinforcements. This sentiment was also present in 1779 when Nguyễn Ánh asked for troops to help in Nghệ An.182 Although, Rama I patronized many royal families of his vassals such as Cambodian and Lao princes, his relationship with Nguyễn Ánh was more special than that with other vassal princes. The Thai chronicles strongly emphasize that the Vietnamese prince came to Siam because he wished to take refuge with the King.183 The Siamese perceived that the personal relationship between Rama I and Nguyễn Ánh was very close. Rama I allowed Nguyễn Ánh to meet him everyday, and sit beside his throne.184 Rama I regarded and treated Nguyễn Ánh with high respect. When Nguyễn Ánh had an audience with the Siamese court, Rama I allowed him to come by a Vietnamese boat with his servants carrying an umbrella for him. Nguyễn Ánh could squat in the manner of Vietnamese customs and had his own Vietnamese translator.185 182 ĐNTL (Volume 1), pp. 376-377 and P.R.R.I, p. 143. Ibid., p. 45. 184 Ibid., p. 33. 185 P.R.R.I, pp. 33-34. 183 76 The other reason why Rama I supported Nguyễn Ánh was because the Bangkok dynasty was just established and the political situation was still unstable from the situation with Burma. Siam had to deal with the political instability both inside and outside the country. Furthermore, the Tây Sơn was increasing its power in Vietnam and could possibly become a new powerful rival to Siam. It was thus advantageous for Siam to support Nguyễn Ánh.186 In addition, Rama I assumed that Nguyễn Ánh would eventually defeat the Tây Sơn because Nguyễn Ánh evidently showed his resoluteness against the Tây Sơn since he first reached to Bangkok.187 After Nguyễn Ánh reunified Vietnam and declared himself Emperor Gia Long, he still maintained good relations with Siam. To Rama I, Gia Long seemed to be his best friend. Gia Long regularly sent royal messages and presents to Rama I and the Uparaja.188 Gia Long demonstrated his sincerity by rejecting Burmese overtures for aid against Siam and passing on news about the rebels. When the Uparaja passed away in 1803 and a successor had yet to be appointed, Gia Long sent a message to Rama I in 1804 warning him that: “…The competition among equal ranking princes might be take place. That would be a serious concern for the future. [I would suggest] to appoint the oldest prince, Chaofa Krom Luang Isarasundhorn to be the Uparacha so that he will have more manpower. The country will be in good condition…”189 186 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 68. ĐNTL, p. 221 and P.R.R.I, pp. 33-41. 188 P.R.R.I, p. 179. 189 Ibid., p. 187 and P.R.R.2(Dam-1), pp. 10, 72. 187 77 In reality, Rama I did not need Gia Long’s advice on such an important issue; and his eventual appointment of Prince Issarasunthorn as the Uparacha in 1804 was probably not related to Gia Long’s advice as this prince was Rama I’s logical choice. Thai records did not show any response towards Gia Long’s advice, this caution evinced the familiarity between the two rulers. It was difficult to find such correspondence on succession matters at the state level if both sides did not first share intimate personal relations. To Vietnam, Gia Long’s experience and viewpoints were crucial for the diplomatic responses and policies as precedents for later rulers.190 In the Vietnamese records, Gia Long often emphasized Rama I’s help and highlighted his friendship with Siam. Their characters and long relations, even before both had established the Chakri and the Nguyễn dynasties, were also crucial factors in maintaining their friendship. Gia Long appreciated this good diplomatic relationship, and wanted his heirs to preserve it. He had encouraged his heirs to adopt a patient attitude instead of being confrontational towards Siam.191 Thereafter hence, in the eyes of the Huế court, the emperors attempted to maintain the best possible relations with the Siamese kings.192 Similarly, even if the Nguyễn court tried to expand its power over Cambodia during the Gia Long reign, Rama I was not seriously concerned about Vietnamese expansion. He wrote to Gia Long expressing his faith in Gia Long’s loyalty to him and his willingness to cultivate friendship with Vietnam. He also suggested to Gia Long that the two courts should not be mutually suspicious of each other.193 191 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 324-325. ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 168. 193 C.H.I/2/1168(1806 C.E.) Letter from Rama I to Gia Long. 192 78 B. Rama II and Gia Long The reign of Rama II was known as a period of peace and calm without frequent warfare with neighboring states, and also reduced assertion of authority over vassals. It was possibly because the tributes from vassals such as Cambodia and Lao kingdoms were unceasingly sent to Bangkok. Furthermore, Rama II was still concerned about the Burmese threat. The personal relationship between Rama II and Gia Long was still close in the beginning. However, their relations became distrustful over some matters, especially the issues over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. Nonetheless, the smooth state-to-state relations were continued because Gia Long still recognized the assistance of, and his obligations to, Rama I. Even in the cordial period of Siam-Vietnam relations, Gia Long also did not entirely trust Siam. This was clearly stated in Vietnamese records in the end of the chronicles of Gia Long’s reign that the court must “be careful [of] Siamese obstruction of Vietnamese expansion, nurture Cambodians, comfort Vientiane…so that its prestigious fame will resound afar, its benevolence would cover all the smaller countries, and its territory would be enlarged”.194 Gia Long held quite different attitudes towards Rama I and Rama II. To Rama I, Gia Long acted like a junior paying respect to the elder. Rama II on the other hand was treated like an equal. This probably because of their similarity in age and the form of relations that both Gia Long and Rama II knew each other before both of them became the leader of their countries. 194 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 1004. 79 C. Rama II and Minh Mạng After the death of Gia Long, the personal relations between Minh Mạng and Rama II were good. He considered Rama II to have the same status as the king of a neighboring state: “Our country and Siam are countries of the same rank (nước ngang hàng).”195 Gia Long strongly influenced him in maintaining friendship with Siam. Minh Mạng followed his father’s advice, continuing to send royal messages and missions to explain his position regarding the problems in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms to the Siamese. Minh Mạng’s amicable attitude towards and consideration for the Bangkok court was also evinced through the issues raised by the Vietnamese mandarins. One of those was Lê Văn Duyệt who played a crucial rule in attempts to govern Cambodia. In the Cambodian issue, Duyệt informed Minh Mạng that Siam looked down on Vietnam and intended to occupy more and more Vietnamese territory. He asked permission to battle with Siam so that Siam might realize how great the Vietnamese army was. He warned Minh Mạng that if Minh Mạng would not allow him to fight with Siam this time, when he passed away, Minh Mạng would surely see Siamese troops invade Vietnam.196 Minh Mạng disagreed and rejected Duyệt’s wishes. Minh Mạng seemed patient and claimed that the long friendship between Bangkok and Huế since his father’s generation meant that both were very close. He described how his father also swore brotherhood.197 The two courts clearly held different interpretations of this incident. 195 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 83-84. ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 221. 197 Ibid., p. 885. 196 80 D. Rama III and Minh Mạng However, the personal relations between Minh Mạng and Rama III led to the most difficult period in the relationship between the two states. The problems were partly due to the desire for expansion and some differences in cultural and diplomatic interpretation. Rama III was more concerned about preserving his power over his vassals and Siamese territory, and this led to antagonistic relations with neighboring states, especially Vietnam. Rama III was more concerned about this than his father because the Burmese threat had subsided and the Cambodian and Lao states had become more and more ready to rely on the Vietnamese. This was especially after Gia Long ascended to the throne. Since 1803, a number of Siamese vassals such as Luang Phrabang, Cambodia, Muang Phouan, Vientiane paid tribute to Vietnam and asked to be under the protection of the Nguyễn court. Siam exploited Vietnam’s political instability to exert hegemony over some vassal states that used to be under Vietnamese influence. Later on, these vassals easily caused problems to Siam such as Chan’s obduracy to Rama II and the Anouvong incident against Siam. In addition, Rama III personally told Minh Mạng that he thought that Minh Mạng was claiming dominance and cultural superiority over Siam as a result of some issues regarding protocol which will be studied in more detail. Rama III stated in 1833 before he sent troops to Hà Tiên that: 81 “When Chan was a rebel and escaped from Siam, Vietnam accepted him. When Anouvong was a rebel and escaped from Siam, Vietnam accepted him. The Vietnamese also appointed their mandarins to bring Anouvong to restore his power which was the same as [Chan] in Cambodia. [The Vietnamese] only aim to protect the Siamese territory. ….[When the emperor] asked [the court] to address him as “Viet Nam Đức Hoàng Để (Emperor of Vietnam),” the court did not mind and accepted his request. … This seems they wanted to claim their dominance over Siam. How can we both still maintain friendship.”198 To the Siamese, there were probably two reasons for the Vietnamese’s attempt to assert dominance over them. Firstly, Vietnam’s assistance to disobedient vassals did not show that Vietnam was still maintaining the role of sincere friend. It was rather than taking those vassals to Vietnamese single power. Secondly, the Siamese possibly thought that the request to alter the title used to address their counterpart was unprecedented in the history of Siamese diplomacy. The title of emperor seemed to connote dominance and overlordship over the addressee. If Siam and Vietnam perceived each other as equal, the Vietnamese should not make this type of request, which was practiced only on vassal subordinate states. Minh Mạng felt that the Siam, and not the Nguyễn court, caused Vietnam to consider Siam as an enemy, by being insincere in conflict resolution.199 Vietnamese sources from the Ministry of Rites also recorded in 1834 that “After Siam sent troops to help our enemy [Lê Văn Khôi’s rebellion], our country broke off the relations with Siam.”200 This was the end of friendly relations between both courts. 198 P.R.R.III, pp. 129-130. ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 783. 200 Nhu viễn, p. 279. 199 82 Protocol, ceremony, and language as indicators of status The dynastic chronicles contain the thoughts and attitudes of the Siamese and the Vietnamese courts about one another. The royal correspondence shows how both courts made contact, indicated their goodwill and exchanged news between Bangkok and Huế. Cultural assumptions shaped the political behavior of Siamese and Vietnamese rulers. The cultural ceremonies between the two courts illustrate to us the close relationship they shared, and were also used to make some strategic negotiations. The relationship between the two courts can be seen from the diplomatic court rituals. The Siamese and the Vietnamese court created diplomatic ceremonies to illuminate their status to as powerful states, for example through the welcome ceremonies for envoys, the exchange of presents, the bestowal of regalia, and the royal cremation. Some issues about court rites and differing customs caused conflicts between the Siamese and the Vietnamese courts. The differences between the Indianized and Sinicized cultures affected the rituals of court and different ways of interaction between them. In some ways, the manner in which diplomatic missions were treated signified the warmth of relations between the two courts. Protocol and ceremonies have a dual function: they can be used to honor someone, but also to reinforce a hierarchical relationship or a position of superior authority. This would certainly be true in the case of Siam and Vietnam. With regard to court rituals and protocol, the Bangkok court mostly adopted the luxurious model and practices from the Ayutthaya period. The Huế court conversely modeled its rituals after the Qing court of China and also the Lê court of Vietnam. The conspicuous 83 luxurious royal court ceremonies and the bestowal of royal gifts to other countries implied the prosperity and greatness of the Siamese and Vietnamese vis-à-vis their neighboring states. The missions between Huế and Bangkok were sent in two ways, by land and sea. The Vietnamese mission to Bangkok consisted of twelve people by land and fifty people by ship. The Siamese mission to Huế consisted of fourteen people by land and fifty people by ship.201 The Nguyễn court established the rule that letters sent to Siam had to pass through Cambodia first. Vietnamese records also describe that when the Bangkok envoy came to Huế, he had to stop at Gia Định (Sàigòn) before heading to Huế.202 The Nguyễn and the Chakri courts traditionally sent missions between Bangkok and Huế every year. Their purpose was to maintain their friendship and to negotiate diplomatic issues. The Huế court recorded the rules for welcoming Siamese emissaries and treated them as a close neighboring state because both states tried to maintain their friendship. These features, such as the frequency of correspondence and the exchange of presents, and the warm welcomes extended to each others’ envoys, reflected each’s effort to treat the other as a close friend. This mutual treatment was reflected in both Vietnamese and Siamese sources. Both courts arranged royal missions between Bangkok and Huế to participate in important events such as the funerals of the royal family members, and the coronation of new rulers. The cordial relations between Siam and Vietnam were shown through the warm welcome and good care of their respective missions. For example, John Crawfurd described the warm welcome the Siamese gave to the Vietnamese envoy 201 202 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 691. Ibid. 84 during Rama II’s reign and how Siam was very respectful and towards the Vietnamese. He narrated that, “The Ambassadors were feasted on the way, serenaded with Siamese music, and amused with gymnastic and theatrical performances, wherever they rested…There were not less than twelve or thirteen gilded barges, each rowed, or rather paddled, by twenty-five to fifty boatmen, who were uniformly dressed in scarlet, and who pulled with great animation, keeping time to a Siamese song.”203 Thai sources also mentioned that “In 1810, Vietnamese envoys were welcomed with full honors because the Siamese court arranged for a welcome procession from Samutprakan and also allowed their ambassador to meet Rama II everyday like the Siamese officials.”204 For Siam and Vietnam, funeral ceremonies were important rituals that signified the goodwill between the two courts. Furthermore, the envoys for royal funerals and coronations between Siam and Vietnam also engaged in diplomatic discussion over issues and conflicts at these ceremonies, in what could be termed as “funeral diplomacy”.205 Royal funerals were an important occasion for both courts to reinforce their respective diplomatic status. Gia Long sent a mission and presents from Huế to express his sorrow and condolences upon the death of Rama I in 1809. The news of the death of Gia Long's mother in 1811 was disseminated from Huế, and Rama II showed his court's friendship by sending royal letters and presents to Gia Long saying that Siam 203 John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy to the Court of Siam and Cochin China (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 146. 204 P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p. 78. 205 Anamwat, Khwam Samphan, p. 42. 85 and Vietnam always shared their suffering and happiness.206 The cremation notifications from Bangkok were sometimes interpreted for hidden meanings by the Nguyễn court. While the Nguyễn mandarins grew suspicious about the death of the Siamese elites, Gia Long believed that the royal announcement of their funerals did not bear any hidden meanings or implications.207 The reason why the mandarins were suspicious of these messages was possibly because they thought the messages were written in the style of an overlord disseminating orders and information to its tributaries. At this point, the Vietnamese probably believed that the Siamese might think that the Vietnamese accepted Siam’s power should they send an envoy for the cremation. However, Gia Long also gave a warm welcome to Siamese envoys, showing great respect to Rama I. He bestowed wealthy gifts upon the Bangkok ambassador and also gave royal presents for the Siamese kings in return.208 In 1822, when one of the other royal family members passed away, Rama II sent an envoy to announce his death. Some of the Vietnamese mandarins thought that Siam had a hidden agenda in sending this news but Minh Mạng did not perceive illintentions on the part of the Siamese. He decided to follow the custom of the Gia Long period by sending an envoy and giving mourning gifts.209 When Siamese envoys announced the cremation of Rama II and the succesion of Rama III, Ming Mạng ordered three days of formal mourning in Huế to demonstrate his respect for the deceased king.210 It was unusual for the Nguyễn emperor to mourn the death of the ruler of a foreign state like Siam. Minh Mạng, however, carefully 206 C.H.II/18/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 690. 208 PY, pp. 732-733. 209 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 231. 210 Ibid., p. 372. 207 86 justified by referring to a precedent from Chinese history where the Chinese emperor mourned the ruler of a small country.211 Minh Mạng probably used this Chinese precedent as an excuse because it helped Vietnam to preserve its sense of superiority. It was, therefore, a special exception Vietnam was making for Siam as a purportedly inferior country. However, the Bangkok court never reciprocated Minh Mang’s gesture for the funerals of Vietnamese emperors or Vietnamese royal families. The Huế court also reported the funeral of the previous emperor to Bangkok. In 1820, Minh Mạng sent an envoy to Bangkok to announce Gia Long's death and his succession to the throne. The Vietnamese ambassador was forced to accept the Siamese court custom when Rama II made a generous gift of gold to express bereavement. However, when the Vietnamese envoy returned to Huế, Minh Mạng was furious at his acceptance of the gift as he thought it was against Vietnamese court traditions which did not allow as the acceptance of presents in the color yellow or gold. The presents must usually be wrapped in or made from red material.212 The reason why Minh Mạng was very angry was perhaps these presents were inappropriate for the Vietnamese emperor to accept as it implied that the Emperor of Vietnam was following the Siamese royal rites. It was possible that there was a misunderstanding, because yellow was the preferred royal color in Siam but while it was red in Vietnam, and the ambassador was supposed to follow Vietnamese court protocol. Furthermore, the Bangkok court usually gave this type of presents to its vassals. It possibly meant to Minh Mạng that Vietnam accepted being treated at the same level as Siamese dependencies. 211 212 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 260. Ibid. 87 The other incident was when Rama II passed away and Rama III sent the letter to inform Minh Mạng regarding Rama II’s funeral and his own succession. The Vietnamese court discussed how many envoys they should send to Bangkok, mentioning that during the reign of Gia Long the court arranged two processions for such a case. One procession was to congratulate the new king and another was to bring offerings in honor of the deceased. The Vietnamese mandarins suggested to Minh Mạng that it was unnecessary to follow the old practice because one procession could both mourn the deceased king and congratulate the new ruler. They provided further justification by arguing that, in the past, the Qing dynasty only sent one procession to confer honors upon the emperor and pay a visit of condolence. Minh Mạng agreed and only sent one procession of envoys to Bangkok to mourn Rama II’s death and also witness Rama III’s ascension.213 The decision to follow a Chinese precedent possibly indicated the desire to act like a superior state like China and treat Siam like a junior state. This was probably when Vietnam began to change their attitude towards Siam and accord them a lower status through the reduction of the number of envoys and the treatment of Siam as an inferior. Since the Siamese and the Vietnamese imagined themselves as the center power in the region, it affected the format of their royal correspondence and their processions. The differences in the court rituals became a source of conflict and tension. Vietnamese mandarins in Gia Định sometimes complained to Huễ that the royal letter written in Chinese from Siam had many ‘mistakes’ as it did not use the correct forms of letterwriting established by the Huế court. For example, in 1809, the officials in Saigon reported to Huế that “The Vietnamese mandarins found that the contents of the letter from Siam contained many boastful words. When that Vietnamese mandarin told the 213 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 383. 88 Siamese ambassador that the Siamese ambassador was being arrogant, the Siamese ambassador denied it and said that the Vietnamese mandarin was harming SiamVietnam friendly relations.”214 Normally, for the Nguyễn court, this type of letter would be rejected. Gia Long however accepted the letter on the basis of the long friendship with Siam. On this issue, Gia Long replied: “the Bangkok court could not write the Chinese script. It was entirely the mistake of the Chinese who came along with the envoy. Actually, when the Siamese court wrote to Vietnam, it used a Chinese translator who did not know the form of Chinese court customs well.” 215 This was possibly a convenient excuse for Gia Long to explain the inappropriate terminology in the letter. He was probably being sincere and wanted to justify the Siamese attitudes through his experience in Bangkok and knowledge of the Siamese court rites.216 It shows that distortions and mistakes that even the courts did not deliberately intend for might have occurred during the translation of the letters. It is especially the use of the terminology which probably has sensitive meanings and significant effects on the state of their bilateral relations. To Siam, the written form of the letter required by the Nguyễn court became a source of criticism. Rama III was very angry when Minh Mạng sent a letter mentioning that, “From now on, whenever the Vietnamese emperor sends letter to Bangkok he would address himself as Việt Nam Đức Hoàng Để …” Minh Mạng asked the Siamese court to change the addressee term used for the Vietnamese emperor and stated that “If the great kingdom Ayutthaya [Bangkok] was to send an ambassador to Huế, the Siamese 214 ĐNTL (Volume 1), pp. 770-771. Ibid. 216 There is an interesting parallel from the reign of King Chulalongkorn when the Thai claimed that when Chinese in Siam in earlier times had translated the letters to and from China, they had distorted the terminology to make Siam into a Chinese vassal. This point has been suggested by Assoc. Prof. Bruce Lockhart. It is mentioned in Thai sources regarding China during the Fifth Reign. 215 89 must follow the format of prefacing the letter with the salutation: “The letter of the Buddhist King of Siam (Xiêm La Đức Phật Vương) sent to show respect to the Emperor of Vietnam (Việt Nam Đức Hoàng Để).” 217 Rama III expressed to his court that Minh Mạng’s request aimed to honor himself. He compared this with the protocols of the Chinese court: “Vietnam is a smaller state than China. China is a greater state, but it has never even once forced Siam to write the letter in accordance with Chinese rules.”218 From the Siamese perspective, this signified that Minh Mạng thought Vietnam was greater than China, and that Vietnam was proudly acting as a great state.219 This issue angered the Siamese greatly as they probably felt that Minh Mang was attempting to assert power over Siam by commanding the Siamese king to follow his wishes. The Siamese court was not alone in feeling that Vietnam’s request was a terrible affront. Rama III too perceived that Minh Mạng’s intention was to show the other states who knew Chinese that Siam was afraid of Vietnam’s power. In the eyes of the Siamese, if Rama III acceded to the request, the Siamese vassals would possibly believe that Vietnam dominated Siam or, at the very least, that Siam was eager to please Vietnam. That would entail an infringement of Siamese prestige. Rama III also felt that this was only a matter of prestige for Vietnam.220 The two requests were important factors for Rama III to change his perception of the Vietnamese court. The Bangkok court also expected that the Vietnamese court would give honor and prestige following the form that was practiced before Minh Mạng’s 217 Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, p. 138. Ibid. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid., p. 156. 218 90 request. Rama III stated: “I had never seen any ruler like the emperor of Vietnam. He intended to break our diplomatic relationship.”221 Furthermore, Minh Mạng also wished to alter the customary diplomatic rules. He compared Minh Mạng with Gia Long by saying that, “the previous emperor followed the rules of diplomacy and was friendly and smooth in his treatment of Siam. In contrast, this emperor seems to insult the Kingdom of Siam.”222 This incident caused much tension between the two courts. The Bangkok court felt that Vietnam was condescending towards Siam, and no other state would treat them like Vietnam had, not even Burma, the Western states and other vassals.223 Finally, Rama III concluded that Siam should no longer remain friendly with Vietnam.224 The exchange of presents between the two courts was part of the diplomatic relationship. Gifts and royal regalia contained diplomatic meanings. For Siam, the royal regalia were important in signifying the status of Siamese patronage. When Rama I sent regalia to Gia Long, the Vietnamese emperor did not accept the crown. He returned it to Siam. The Vietnamese court mentioned that the crown was exalted and Gia Long had not been wearing it. Rama I mentioned: “Regarding the Vietnamese emperor returning a present [a crown] back to Bangkok; [the Siamese court] also found that it is difficult to choose a suitable present to send to the Vietnamese court following Vietnamese customs.225 221 Ibid., pp. 156-157. Ibid., p.157. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid., p. 158. 225 C.H.I/2/1166 (1804C.E.) Letter from Rama I to Gia Long. 222 91 The crown was actually regarded as the highest regalia for Siam and the Indianized states. The acceptance of a crown from the king of other states symbolized submission to the bestowing monarch. The Siamese king had bestowed crowns on the Cambodian and Lao kings. As discussed earlier, Gia Long did not accept the crown probably because the crown signified an acceptance of Siamese power and supremacy over Vietnam. This perhaps also led the Vietnamese to feel that they had lost their prestige because the Siamese had employed this custom with Cambodia before.226 Only the Siamese king did bestow a crown to the rulers of his vassals. Vietnam never bestowed a crown upon their vassal rulers upon their ascension. It was not within Vietnamese tradition to do this. The Nguyễn court was very careful in its consideration of their acceptance of the presents from Bangkok. Gia Long had expressed his gratitude for the bestowal of the crown without accepting it. This incident was an early indication of tensions between the Siamese and Vietnamese expectations of the nature of their relationship. The Vietnamese court’s refusal to accept Siamese gifts also happened during the reign of Minh Mạng. The Huế court strictly followed Sino-Vietnamese court customs. In the reign of Minh Mạng, Siamese envoys first had to pass through Gia Định before coming to Huế. The Siamese ambassador refused the Saigon official’s request to view the state’s official letter. The official letter did not follow the court’s prescribed format. Furthermore, the royal message that Rama II sent to Minh Mạng seemed to indicate his seniority vis-a-vis Minh Mạng.227 The gifts were decorated in gold or yellow, i.e. a golden betel box, a golden spittoon, a golden pipe. All were presents that the Siamese king customarily bestowed upon vassals and his officials. The Bangkok 226 227 R.P.K.K, p. 219. Anamwat, Khwam Samphan, p. 40. 92 court also sent money as donations to charities.228 This was a serious issue among the Nguyễn court. To the Vietnamese, it had never happened before in diplomatic history. Finally, Minh Mạng allowed Lê Văn Duyệt to make the decisions. Lê Văn Duyệt eventually won the argument, although Minh Mạng did not agree with him. It was probably because Minh Mạng felt that this big issue was unprecedented and because he did not want to get implicated as the majority of Vietnamese mandarins in Huế court also criticized the Siamese. Lê Văn Duyệt interpreted that the gifts as symbolizing Siamese condescension and expression of superiority. He thought that, if the Vietnamese court accepted the presents, Vietnam would probably lose prestige; but if the court did not accept, it would harm the goodwill with Siam.229 Minh Mạng thought that Siam and Vietnam were foreign countries, and the Nguyễn court should not disregard them. Finally, Lê Văn Duyệt returned all the presents to the Siamese envoy. The Siamese ambassador explained that Siam was a Buddhist kingdom. The king felt that those were valuable and fit gifts to give to the Nguyễn emperor. As for the money that the Bangkok court donated for charity, the ambassador answered that this followed the customs of Siam because the Buddhists believed they would gain merit if they engaged in charity.230 From this incident, Minh Mạng voiced his opinion within his own court that the Bangkok court did not know how to follow the customs. Duyệt wrote a letter accusing Siam of trying to assert supremacy and show greater 228 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 83. Ibid. 230 Ibid. 229 93 prestige than Vietnam’s.231 There is no record of the Bangkok court’s reaction to this. The situation worsened when Siam sent envoys to Vietnam in 1830 after Siamese generals killed Vietnamese envoys. Rama III wrote a letter and sent more presents to Huế than usual. Actually, each time the Bangkok court normally sent only seven items. Minh Mạng was very angry and returned some presents to Siam. He complained that the reason why Vietnam had been maintaining long friendly relations to Siam was not because of the numbers of presents.232 Minh Mạng was displeased with the larger number of presents because he probably thought that these presents would not be able to compensate for Siam’s grave offence. Instead, Minh Mạng expected Rama III to punish the guilty Siamese generals. After Siam did not accede to this request, it led to the hostile reception of the Siamese mission by the Nguyễn court. The Siamese ambassadors had to go back to Bangkok themselves without any assistance from the Vietnamese. Rama III was angry with the Vietnamese reception, or rather the lack of it, as it suggested that the Siamese had lost prestige. Rama III and the Siamese court felt that Vietnam had made a huge mistake in their diplomatic relations. The treatment of Vietnam made Siam want to end their friendship. Geopolitically, Siam no longer depended on Vietnam for support and possessed as much manpower and provisions as Vietnam. From Siam’s point of view, Vietnam started the conflict first; Siam was merely reciprocating the Vietnamese’s behavior.233 231 Ibid., p. 84. Nhu viễn, p. 275 and Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, pp. 147-150. 233 Ibid., pp. 153-155. 232 94 Prestige and honor seemed very important to Siam. Siam responded to Vietnam when the Vietnamese sent an envoy to pay respect upon the death of the Uparaja. Rama III did not allow the Vietnamese ambassador to meet him in front of his throne. This was different from how Siam treated Vietnam in the past. Conversely, the Bangkok court arranged for the ambassadors of other countries to meet Rama III. From the Siamese perspective, Siam had remained magnanimous in honoring their long relationship even though Vietnam had invaded many Siamese territories of Siam, and some of their vassals had also accepted Vietnamese overlordship. Rama III thus thought that the generosity of the Bangkok court had led the Nguyễn court to believe Siam was afraid of Vietnam and that the Vietnamese were deeming their Emperor to the greatest emperor in this world.234 Furthermore, Rama III mentioned that the Vietnamese actually denigrated Siam as an inferior vassal, even though they behaved like a close friend.235 These affronts gave Siam the pretext and opportunity to declare war with Vietnam. When Vietnam sent a propaganda letter to publicize how Siam had initially severed the diplomatic relationship with Vietnam and initiated the conflict, Siam defended itself by sending a letter in both Chinese and Thai to the Cambodian and Lao vassal cities, describing how Vietnam had slandered Siam. Siam may have been the only country with which the Vietnamese had relations with that was neither an overlord (China) nor a vassal (Cambodia and Lao kingdoms). Officially, the Vietnamese did not call the Siamese “barbarians.” However the term 234 235 Ibid., p. 160. Ibid., p. 171. 95 was used in exceptional occasions when, for instance, Vietnamese emperor or generals were angry at them. For example, Minh Mạng criticized Siamese troops before his army in 1834 during the war, remarking that “the barbarian Siamese were many times defeated by our troops…”236 It was difficult but still possible for Vietnam to deal with another country on an equal basis. The Vietnamese court embraced the concept of the emperor as the ‘Son of Heaven’, and the idea that the imperial court was supposed to exercise singular dominance over the region. However, in practice the Vietnamese was unable to prevail as a single power and needed to contend with the equally powerful kingdom of Siam. On the other hand, the Siamese were already used to dealing with the Burmese, who were also neither overlord nor vassal, and hence could more readily countenance the need to manage relations with an equal power. However, the Siamese only considered the Burmese as an enemy, never a friend like Vietnam before the tensions in their relationship. Interestingly, the Vietnamese did not define Siam as barbaric like other surrounding states despite the Siamese’s possession of totally different beliefs, customs and culture. Even Burma, which should be considered an equally powerful country, was thought of as ‘barbarian’.237 The language and specific terminology used in communication reveals the communicators’ perceptions and attitudes towards the others. In the case of Siam and Vietnam, both hierarchical and unhierarchical rhetoric were used in different Thai and Vietnamese texts. In the original letters, the language employed was unhierarchical. Both courts used the polite and neutral language. Conversely, the information about 236 237 ĐNTL (Volume 4), p. 79. Nhu viễn, pp. 283-289. 96 each other that the two courts recorded contained hierarchical terms and language that suggested superiority and inferiority. In Vietnamese records i.e., Đại Nam Thực lục and Nhu Viễn, the Vietnamese used the word “tặng (贈)” which has two meanings, “to present or give”, and also “to bestow.” It connotes the granting of something from a superior to a junior. Meanwhile, when the Thai gave gifts to the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese sources translated that they “dâng sản vật địa phương [presented/offered local products],” this is the language which this used to refer to what happens when a tributary state presents tribute, since “dâng” means that an inferior is offering something to a superior.238 Similarly, the Siamese used hierarchical terms in Thai sources, writing that the Vietnamese “thawai” gifts, which means “to give” from an inferior to a superior. For instance, the Siamese used the word that the Vietnamese “to send tribute (thawai khreung ratchabannakan)” when there were missions from Huế.239 Furthermore, the term “thawai bangkhom” which means “to pay homage” also signified the hierarchical position. In the letter sent from Gia Long to Rama I in 1804, Thai source recorded that “the letter from Vietnamese Emperor sent to pay homage (thawai bangkhom) to Siamese king…. I have never forgotten the kindheartedness of you, your majesty. You have been always benevolent and taking care of me. ... I sent envoys to submit tribute (thawai bannakan) to you.”240 Both sides, therefore, recorded information about this relationship as a one between a lord and a vassal, however both depicted themselves as the lord and the other as the vassal. 238 Nhu viễn, p. 275. This point has been suggested by one of the thesis markers. I am grateful to one of the thesis markers for pointing this out. 240 C.H.I/5/1166 (1804C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama I. 239 97 The creation of knowledge and cultural perceptions of the courts The sense of identity or sameness in society consists of a set of common characteristics, as well as illustrates otherness by pointing out the dissimilarity of the others. This reflects how people in that period see their own world and the outside world. Each society produces a discourse about their identity, including facets such as language, beliefs and skin color. On the other hand, they defined the others as strangers and produced discourses to serve their knowledge or understanding about themselves. Some perceptions of the Siamese and the Vietnamese were reflected from cultural aspects. An interpretation of meanings from cultural performances, the creations of cultural description and changes in the use of language such as reference terms show the traits of their diplomatic relations. A. Terms of reference Reference terms show how the Siamese and the Vietnamese perceived each other. They illustrate changes in their perceptions of one another. The shifts in reference terms employed between them depended on the nature of their diplomatic relations. The Siamese referred to the Vietnamese as “Yuan” which was probably an adaptation of the Sanskrit word “Yavana”, which Siam borrowed from Cambodian script.241 Although this term does not have a pejorative meaning like another word, “Keo”, its 241 David Thomas, “A Note on Yuan,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 94, 1(January-March, 1974), p. 123. 98 meaning depends on the context in which this word was used to reveal the Siamese perception to Vietnam. From the reign of Rama I to Rama III, this term was used for different connotations. The derogatory prefix term “ai” displayed a negative attitude towards Vietnamese. The use of “ai” towards the Vietnamese only appeared in Third Reign materials. This term usually referred to enemy or people of disdain such as Burmese and, sometimes, Lao and Cambodians. Using this derogatory term indicated Siamese diplomatic attitudes towards other people. In the reign of Rama I and Rama II, the meaning of “Yuan” was either positive or neutral. In the Nguyễn records, Siam was referred to by the Sino-Vietnamese terms “Tiêm La” or “Xiêm La”. The other term is “lân bang” or neighboring state, which was usually used before their conflicts broke out. When the war between Siam and Vietnam exploded, the word “tặc/giặc” or “bandit, pirate” was used to refer to the Siamese. The Bangkok court was pictured as the state which always hungered for power.242 The Vietnamese perception of Siam was mainly shaped by the influence of Buddhism. Buddhism played an important role in shaping their outlook towards Siam. The Vietnamese characterized Siam as “Buddhist”. Furthermore, Vietnamese courts used to refer to the Siamese king as “Phật Vương Xiêm La” or the Buddha King of Siam”.243 The Vietnamese followed this title, probably, because the Siamese used it while addressing them. The documents of the Gia Long period recorded that Rama I signed himself as “Phật” and the Siamese referred to themselves as Buddhists because 242 243 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 911. ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 211. 99 Buddhism was above everything in Siamese customs and values.244 Vietnamese sources recorded that the Chakri king addressed the Nguyễn emperor as “Việt Nam Quốc Phật vương” or the Buddha king of Vietnam.” 245 Gia Long accepted this term without any objection. B. The descriptions of the Siamese and the Vietnamese The differences of culture between the two countries led to the imagining of self and other. Both courts identified themselves vis-à-vis the other. Some of their cultural products, such as performances and paintings, depict events from the history of diplomacy between the two kingdoms. These are meaningful in revealing the Siamese understanding of their status, especially for the Bangkok court. The restoration of Wat Phra Chettuphon Wimon Mangkhlaram Ratchaworamahawihan (or Wat Pho) in the reign of Rama III is representative of the new perceptions and knowledge of the world among the Siamese elite. The wall of each pavilion in the temple was inscribed with pictures and poems describing the character of foreign peoples in 32 countries, called “khlong tang phasa” or foreign language poetry. This was a collection of pictures and poems about various peoples, such as the Khmer, the Vietnamese and Portuguese, whom the Siamese felt were significant enough to record as part of their knowledge.246 Vietnam was one of the foreign countries (ethnic groups) which was pictured and described by the Siamese aristocrats. 244 Ibid. Ngoại quốc thư trát (Foreign Correspondence), Gia Long 15-16 (1816-1817) cited in Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 259. 246 Davisak Puaksom, Khon Plaekna Nanachat Khong Krung Sayam (The Strangers of Siam) (Bangkok: Matichon Publishing, 2003), p. 10. 245 100 The Siamese nobility based their perceptions of the Vietnamese on the experiences of ambassadors, traders and other people who came to Siam. The Siamese formed a picture of the Vietnamese through their dress, the state's location, their characteristics and skills. They described how the Vietnamese lords usually sat on a hammock, which was carried by bearers, and held folding fans. The Siamese also portrayed the Vietnamese as skilled carpenters and as being consumers of crocodile meat. The state’s location by the coast was deemed to have determined their unique abilities in carpentry and shipping (see appendix A).247 The Vietnamese image of Siam in the early 1800's reinforced the Sino-Vietnamese worldview that saw itself as a political center. Siam was described thus: “This country's customs and disposition are strong and violent, and cunning and deceitful as well. [The Siamese] are experienced in sea warfare … Many men and women become monks and nuns, and eat only vegetables and do penance … All the people live in two-storey houses without beds or chairs. The men cut their hair and let it grow before they cut it again.”248 From the Vietnamese text, it reveals the Vietnamese’s objectification and exoticization of Siam as a different culture in order to distinguish their counterpart from themselves. The Siamese painting “Nguyễn Ánh Paying Tribute and Pledge Allegiance to Rama I in 1787” (see Appendix B) in Waropat Phiman Hall, Bangpain Palace, Ayutthaya, can be read for perceptions of Vietnam.249 The poem authored by Prince Damrong relates 247 Ibid., p. 125. ĐNLT2, p. 586. Translated by Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, pp. 256-257. 249 Aphinan Posayanon, Chittakam lae pratimakam beab tawantok nai ratchasamnak (Western-style painting and sculpture in the Thai Royal Court) (Bangkok: Bureau of 248 101 this painting to an incident in 1782 where Nguyễn Ánh and his family had escaped to Krabue Island. The Siamese official had asked him to take refuge in the great kingdom of Siam. Rama I accorded him the same patronage as other princes who were outside of their homeland. For instance, Rama I gave him a house, and allowed him to meet at Chakraphatphiman Hall and sit in the Vietnamese way.250 These artistic pieces reveal how the Siamese culturally recorded and depicted their perceptions of, and interactions with the Vietnamese. The Siamese also read cultural meanings in performance. The Vietnamese lantern dance and lion ritual dance were performed by Nguyễn Ánh’s followers at the court pavilion of Bangkok.251 As these two Vietnamese performances were reserved only for the Vietnamese ruling elite, the Siamese interpreted the gestures as Nguyễn Ánh presenting himself to Rama I as a symbol of power, courage and loyalty to the king. Reciprocally, Rama I honored Nguyễn Ánh by organizing these two performances in the celebration of the Emerald Buddha Temple in 1784. Conclusion The Siamese-Vietnamese relationship changed from amity to enmity across different periods. The personal characters of the rulers, their shifting relationship and courtly customs were influenced by their cultural background. The difference of cultural interpretation and treatment of the diplomatic courtly rituals were important issues which led to the different interpretations. The nature of the reception of the court missions also bore significant implications for diplomacy. the Royal Household, 1993), p. 31. Ibid. 251 P.R.R.I, p. 41. 250 102 The non-observance of court rituals and customs was in fact one of the important factors for the end of amiable diplomatic relations, in addition to than conflicts over territorial expansion. When both countries could not arrive at a satisfactory outcome to their negotiations, their diplomatic attitudes were changed. Siam used the changes in correspondence protocol that the Vietnamese emperor requested to legitimize their provocation of war with Vietnam. After the Siamese invasion of Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc in 1833, Vietnam regarded Siam as an enemy, no longer a friend, and continued a decade of war between the two states over Cambodia. The clash between Siam and Vietnam ensued because of the similar aspects of their worldviews, and not the differing elements. Even though they hailed from differing cultural backgrounds, both their Indic and Sinic cultural legacies influenced both countries to imagine themselves as the regional center and power, possessing supremacy over all other vassal states. To manifest their centrality, they had strict formats and forms of court rituals and customs that other states had to abide by. This led to the sense of cultural superiority and sometimes discordance in their diplomacy. In Chapter four, the problems over the overlapping peripheries, namely Cambodia and Lao kingdoms, will be discussed. This was one of the most important elements that led to the shift in Siam and Vietnamese relations, as well as the policies that both Siam and Vietnam employed towards Cambodia and Lao vassals. The conflicts that usually occurred between the Bangkok court and Cambodia and Lao kingdoms pushed the Huế court into the disputes as a middleman. The differences in diplomatic negotiations, cultural policies and military strategies between the two overlords and their policies towards Cambodia and Lao vassals will be compared. Furthermore, the response of the local vassals to Siam and Vietnam will also be examined in detail. 103 CHAPTER IV COMPETING CENTERS, OVERLAPPING PERIPHERIES: THE SIAMESE-VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC WORLDVIEWS, AND THE CAMBODIA AND LAO TRIBUTARIES In the early nineteenth century, the Siamese and Vietnamese courts were competitors striving to be seen as the center of the region and overlords over their Cambodian and Lao vassals, especially during the reign of Rama III (1824-1851), and Minh Mạng (1820-1840) and Thiệu Trị (1840-1847). As shown in previous chapters, the diplomatic relations of the two states changed from amity to enmity over time. From the 1820s to 1840s in particular, the relations between Siam and Vietnam centered on the struggle over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The main cause of conflict was not only the direct relations between the courts but the competition to be overlord over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. This is because both vassals were geographically situated in the region of overlapping Siamese and Vietnamese suzerainty. The rivalry between the Chakri and Nguyễn court for overlordship over their tributaries continued for decades. The importance of location was very significant in the contest between Bangkok and Huế over the Cambodia and Lao peripheries. Cambodia and Lao kingdoms became the victim of expansionist rivalry because there was no single power that was able to bring the entire area under its control. A predominant Vietnamese influence in Cambodia or even in Lao states was sufficient to disturb the balance of power to an 104 extent highly disadvantageous to Bangkok.252 In this case, Cambodia and Lao states were both pawns and stakes in the power struggle between the Chakri king and the Nguyễn emperor. The Siamese and the Vietnamese had different reasons for expanding their influence. Siam sought Cambodian acknowledgment of its suzerainty in both the territorial and cultural dimensions, whereas the Vietnamese sought the expansion of their geographical boundaries.253 Interestingly, the cause of the conflict was not only due to the aims of the Bangkok and the Huế courts but also due to the role of Cambodian factionalism in bringing both courts into conflict. The political and cultural policies of the two overlords towards their peripheries, as well as their bilateral relations, affected not only Siam and Vietnam, but also Cambodia and Lao states. The unstable relationship between Siam and Vietnam became one of distrust because both states realised that the other side was attempting to expand their influence over the region. These led to a clash of diplomatic relations and, in some instances, to military confrontation as well. Their cultural similarities and dissimilarities also influenced the diplomatic policies that Siam and Vietnam used vis-à-vis other states, as well as their vassals such as Cambodia and Lao states. The contestation between Bangkok and Huế over Lao territory was especially acute during Anouvong’s campaign against Bangkok in 1827-1828. While Siam and Vientiane were at war, Huế supported Vientaine because of its desire to expand its power. In the case of Cambodia, Vietnam succeeded in absorbing Cambodian territory little by little, especially at the area of the mouth of the Mekong River. From 252 253 Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand, p. 110. Eiland, Dragon and elephant, p. 11. 105 the 1810s, after King Ottey Racha (Chan) sent tribute to Huế, Siam tried to preserve its patronage over Cambodia. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Nguyễn court became a new great power that competed for hegemony with the Chakri court. This struggle, however, was not new since the Vietnamese and Siamese had different sorts of entanglements and contests even before the two dynasties ascended to power. This chapter focuses on three key dimensions of Siam and Vietnam’s approach towards their key vassals: first, the diplomatic worldviews and mentalities of Siam and Vietnam, which saw them regard Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as inferiors; second, a comparative examination of the functioning of the different systems, including political propaganda and cultural strategies, that informed Siamese and Vietnamese dealings with their Cambodian and Lao vassals over two decades; and third the vassals’ attitude towards their Siamese and Vietnamese overlords. Diplomatic worldviews and mentalities of the Siamese and Vietnamese towards Cambodia and Lao tributaries The tributary system can generally be seen as important in the foreign affairs among Southeast Asian states. The more powerful and stronger states sought to assert their domince over the weaker states through divergent political, cultural and institutional forms. This concept was also apparent in the relationship between Siam and Vietnam as both competed for regional hegemony even as they endeavored to balance relations with each other. As long as their vassals sent periodic tribute, that meant they submitted to Siamese and/or Vietnamese overlordship. Both claimed their status as an overlord and a protector, and used the concept of kinship ties as a parent to legitimise 106 their domince over Cambodia and Lao states. The expansion of suzerainty would lead to conflict as much as balance. The fundamental belief in their own centrality in the region led Siam and Vietnam to define themselves as suzerain. The Siamese and Vietnamese perceptions of Cambodia and Lao kingdoms were that they were small tributary states and had been under the patronage of Siam and Vietnam for centuries.254 Thai sources referred to Cambodia as a small country situated between Siam and Vietnam that had to send tribute to both overlords since a long time ago.255 The Vietnamese conceived of themselves as a big state that usually reconciled the conflicts between the Bangkok court and Vietnamese dependencies. The Vietnamese perceived Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as small barbarian states.256 However, it was obvious that both Cambodia and Lao kingdoms initially chose Vietnam to be the joint overlords with Siam, i.e. Anouvong of Vientiane, King Chan and Ang Im of Cambodia when they initiated conflicts with Siam. Both overlords felt that the problems regarding Cambodia and Lao kingdoms originated from internal situation of Cambodia and Lao kingdoms resulting from their immaturity. The diplomatic outlooks between themselves and their Cambodian and Lao vassals can be observed through the exchange of royal messages between Bangkok and Huế. These royal discourses display the ways in which both overlords attempted to assert their legitimacy over their tributaries. The Chakri and the Nguyễn courts attempted to mediate the royal relationships between themselves, Cambodia 254 C.H.II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Correspondence between Rama II and Gia Long and ĐNTL (Volume 6), pp. 946-947. 255 P.C.K.12, p. 616. 256 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 925 and ĐNTL (Volume 5), p. 524. 107 and Lao kingdoms by approaching them as deferential juniors while they were the respectful superiors.257 For instance, in the correspondence regarding the domestic conflicts among Cambodian ruling elite, Vietnam stated: “From the past until now, [Vietnam] thinks that [the Siamese king] is similar to Vietnam in extending patronage to Cambodian rulers… Both Siam and Vietnam hope that they would reciprocate with loyalty. It follows that the two great kingdoms, Vietnam and Siam, intend to foster our vassals’ happy lives.”258 Siam replied: “…The two overlords [Siam and Vietnam] agree to protect Cambodia and the peaceful lives of our vassals, with no difficulties for the vassals.”259 The Siamese kings and Vietnamese emperors insisted on being both the benevolent protectors and overlords of Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. In exploring the Siamese and the Vietnamese’s foreign policy strategies, their political, cultural and ideological backgrounds are significant. The aspiration to be the greatest ruler, with the Chakri kings operating under the Theravada ideology of the Righteous King and the Nguyễn emperors under the Confucianist ideology of the Son of Heaven, is vital in explaining their diplomatic worldviews and strategies between them and their vassals. Both concepts were used to legitimize their overlordship of their tributaries. The Siamese and Cambodians followed Theravada Buddhism, whereas the Vietnamese were later Mahayana Buddhists to some extent. On the state level, Theravada Buddhism was an important discourse underpinning the “Baramee” or the charisma of the Buddha King. Conversely, the Vietnamese emperor might not need to 257 C.H.II/18/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long , C.H.II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II and reply from Rama II to Gia Long, and C.H.II/25/1174 (1812C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 258 C.H.II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II. 259 C.H.II/22/1173 (1811C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 108 rely on Mahayana Buddhism, but influenced by Confucianism. The charisma of Siamese kings, therefore, justified their benevolence towards Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. The old Bangkok court attempted to be a patron to the ruling elites of its tributaries. As a Buddhist patron, Rama III claimed his suzerainty over the Cambodians on the basis that he needed to preserve Buddhism for them so that the Vietnamese invaders could not destroy its presence in Cambodia, for example, by burning temples and disrobing monks. Siam received the news that Vietnam was deliberately seeking to eradicate Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia.260 The Bangkok court thought that the Cambodians paid more respect to Siam than to Vietnam because of their shared culture and customs.261 Furthermore, the Bangkok court believed that the continued belief in Buddhism was crucial to preserve Cambodian orthodoxy and ensure that it would not be replaced by Vietnamese heterodoxy. If the Vietnamese invaders were able to eliminate Buddhism, Cambodia would perish and enter a dark age.262 263 The Sinicization of Vietnam also led to the emergence of “civilisational centrality”. The terminology used by the Vietnamese to name and refer to vassal states was all coined by the Chinese court. The Vietnamese court considered Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as inferiors plagued by “peripheral barbarism”. 264 The Cambodians and Lao were referred to as barbarians (“Man”[蛮] or “Di”[狄]).265 Cambodia was known as 260 C.H.III/25/1202 (1840 C.E.) Phraya Wibun and Phraya Phrakhamen came to Bangkok to request permission for Ang Duang to rule Cambodia. 261 P.C.K.12, p. 616. 262 P.C.K.12, p. 774. 263 Anthony Reid, “Introduction: Negotiating Asymmetry: Parents, Brothers, Friends and Enemies,” in Negotiating Asymmetry: China's Place in Asia, ed. Anthony Reid and Zheng Yangwen (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 8-9, 14. 264 Ibid., p. 14. 265 ĐNTL (Volume 4), pp. 971-972. 109 Upper Barbarian (“Cao Man” or “Cao Miên”) from the eighteenth century (before then, the Vietnamese called Cambodia “Lục Chân Lạp” or Land Chenla).266 The Cambodian King was referred to as “a barbarian vassal ruler” (phiên vương) by the Huế court. It was only during Minh Mạng’s period that these terms clearly show how the Vietnamese viewed themselves and how they organized their peripheral relations. Only in the cases of the Cambodians and Chams, this perception guided the Nguyễn rulers and mandarins to attempt to alter their vassals’ indigenous culture and beliefs. This strategy, however, was not practised for the Lao apparently. The Siamese and Vietnamese attitudes towards their vassals were both similar and different on some points and this depended on what roles they adopted in different incidents, i.e. the Anouvong affair between 1827 and 1828, and the factionalism crisis in Cambodia. A. Anouvong and the decline of Vientiane: Siamese revenge and Vietnamese mediation After Gia Long’s ascendancy, Anouvong started to offer tribute to Vietnam in 1806. Before that, Vientiane was a tributary of only Bangkok, from the time Rama I established the Chakri dynasty in 1782. Initially, Anouvong seemed to be closer to Rama I than Gia Long. After the death of Rama I, Anouvong, however, started to gravitate towards Vietnam. In the eyes of Siam, Anouvong became less subservient to Siam and more reliant on Vietnam. The Siamese thought that the Nguyễn emperor 266 Đinh Xuân Lâm, “Quan hệ Việt –Campuchia thời Nguyễn trong nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX (The relationships between Vietnam and Cambodia in the Nguyễn period in the first half of Nineteenth Century),” in Journal of Southeast Asian Research, 6(2002), p. 15. 110 was attempting to assert his suzerainty over Lao kingdoms. Anouvong's actions in Vientiane in 1827 led Siam and Vietnam to make this issue a diplomatic conflict about their vassals because both courts considered the Lao to be their subjects. The Nguyễn court, however, chose to be the arbitrator in order to resolve this conflict, claiming that Vientiane was its vassal and paid triennial tribute.267 Concerning the relations with Siam, Minh Mạng stated: “We are neighboring countries co-existing without hatred. We must not side with one and let the other be disappointed.”268 In the royal message from Minh Mạng to Rama III in 1828, he showed his sincerity as an overlord in endeavoring to solve the conflict. He claimed that Siam and Vietnam were great states that should be magnanimous in ruling a small state (their subjects).269 Furthermore, he claimed that he wanted to help because of the emperor’s custom in being benevolent towards people who had difficulties.270 This means that Vietnam had acquired rights over its Lao dependency. Emperor Minh Mạng’s claim led to a new status quo in the relationship between Siamese and Vietnamese territories.271 Minh Mạng also wrote in another letter that he did not have any intention to take advantage of Siam’s entanglements with its vassals to occupy Vientiane and Lao kingdoms. He also suggested that the Bangkok court forgive Anouvong so that both states would win praise and respect from other small states.272 Rama III replied that he was glad that the Huế court had sent a message to convey Anouvong’s apology. 267 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 727. QXVT, pp. 53-55. 269 C.H.III/6-8/1190 (1828 C.E.) Letter from Minh Mạng to Rama III. [As given in Thai translation in the same royal annals] 270 Ibid. and ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 599. 271 QXVT, p. 22. 272 C.H.III/6/1190 (1828 C.E.) Letter from Minh Mạng to Rama III. [As given in Thai translation in the same royal annals] 268 111 However, Rama III politely rejected this apology, claiming that Anouvong had instigated other Lao states to move against Siam. Consequently, he decided to conquer Vientiane.273 Vietnam’s attempt to reconcile the Siam-Vientiane conflict became ineffective. Following the records of the Siamese army led by Chaophraya Bodindecha, Anouvong provoked contempt between the Huế court towards the Bangkok court.274 Similarly, the incident in which Siamese troops killed Vietnamese ambassadors and soldiers stimulated the shift in the Huế court’s perception of Siam.275 Minh Mạng always levied blame on Siam for the killing of Vietnamese ambassadors and soldiers before the Huế court mandarins. The Bangkok court, he felt, made more mistakes when they failed to bear clear responsibility in punishing those Siamese officials.276 Minh Mạng lost his trust in Siam and never believed that diplomatic negotiation with Siam would ever be fruitful. Minh Mạng stated, “Now Siam has abandoned friends and looked for enemies. They intended to provoke war. It was clearly their mistake that they could not negotiate in a peaceful way anymore.”277 This is an important incident as it would affect the other vassals under both overlords later on. From the Siamese perspective, Anouvong’s military campaign against Bangkok was called the “Chao Anou Rebellion.” Anouvong was a traitor and rebel in the eyes of Siam. Similarly, the Huế court also depicted Anouvong as a rebel as well as defeated 273 Ibid. P.R.R.III, p. 87. 275 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 80. 276 Ibid., p. 153 and P.R.R.III, pp. 96-100. 277 Ibid., p. 925. 274 112 weakling. 278 The war between Siam and Vientiane provoked suspicions between the two powerful states. This incident led the Bangkok court to believe that the Huế court regarded Vientiane as a territory of Vietnam and that the Vietnamese court had sent a letter to insult Siam.279 Anouvong, therefore, had caused Siam to lose prestige. The chaos that prevailed in the other Lao cities emerged only because of Anouvong.280 In the eyes of Vietnam, this mistake by Anouvong caused such devastation among the Lao that they were no longer able to live in peace.281 The Huế court also thought that Anouvong led troops and forced the other small cities to follow him in revolt against Siam. With regards to court protocol and attitude, Vietnamese sources indicate that the Siamese kings and Vietnamese emperors treated Lao kings differently. Vietnamese emperors treated Lao kings as the leader of a foreign state and of the same rank as Siamese kings.282 However, the Vietnamese would not see Siam as their vassal. Vietnamese sources reveal that in every imperial ceremony, the Huế court always treated Lao states better than they did Siam. In contrast, the Chakri kings were always aware that Lao kingdoms were their vassals.283 Although Minh Mạng saw that the conflict between Siam and Vientiane originated from Anouvong, he still showed commiseration towards Anouvong as a weak person. The Huế court followed every detail of protocol and prepared all the necessary gifts to treat Anouvong as the king of Vientiane. Minh Mạng ordered his Vietnamese mandarins to remember to extend 278 Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, p. 19. Kulap, Anam- Siam Yuth, p. 87. 280 C.H.III/6/1190 (1828 C.E.) Letter from Rama III to Minh Mạng. 281 QXVT, p. 180. 282 ĐNTL (Volume 2), pp. 522-523. 283 Ibid. 279 113 generosity to the beleaguered and behave accordingly towards the Lao King.284 Later, these Vietnamese actions were vital in persuading the Lao court to gravitate towards Vietnam. The Huế court showed its benevolence to Anouvong and his followers. While Anouvong was living in Nghệ An, the court took care of every detail in his life. For instance, they took care to prevent Anouvong or his followers from being cheated when they went to the market to buy or sell goods by keeping the accompanying interpreter informed of the genuine prices of merchandise. Although the Vietnamese saw the Laotians as barbarians, they tried to exhibit their civilized manners and protect their country’s dignity.285 Furthermore, the Vietnamese showed deference to Anouvong and his followers whenever they sat, lied down, walked, or stood, and were cautious in the words they use so as to avoid boasting like a master or holding them in contempt.286 In the correspondence about Vientiane, the Vietnamese court portrayed themselves as very direct and strong whereas Siam was always seen as insincere about resolving the problem. Lê Văn Duyệt mentioned that Siam was a neighboring country but actually acted like an enemy.287 In the fighting between Siam and Vientiane, Siam did not inform the Huế court about what was going on between them. The Huế court thought that this might be because Siam was afraid that Vietnam would seize an opportunity to expand its influence over Vientiane.288 Minh Mạng saw that it was unclear why 284 QXVT, p. 119. Ibid., p. 120. 286 Ibid. 287 ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 626. 288 Ibid., p. 609. 285 114 Anouvong had become caught in such a situation. Although he believed that Anouvong had initiated the conflict, he could not reject Anouvong’s plea due to his obligation to show compassion and lend relief to weaker countries.289 Vietnam was always aware of Siamese oppression of Vientiane and other Lao states. In Vietnam’s view, while Siam levied threats at its vassals, Minh Mạng preferred diplomatic persuasion and negotiation. The Vietnamese, however, thought that the Siam was unresponsive to the Vietnamese willingness to resolve their quarrels.290 The Nguyễn court felt that they dealt with this issue in a very straightforward forthright manner, while Siam always remained ambiguous. Lê Văn Duyệt mentioned that Siamese actions could be deliberate attempts to antagonize Vietnam and destroy Siam-Vietnam relations.291 Siam was concerned about its dignity, especially when Vietnamese court pressed Siam to appoint the new ruler of Vientiane in 1829. It appeared to Siam that the Vietnam court was misbehaving in court relations.292 For Rama III, Minh Mạng's attitude towards Siam, which appeared to disparage him and his Siamese court, provoked war.293 B. Cambodian factionalism During the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Cambodia became a hostage in power struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors. The Nguyễn lords finally 289 QXVT, pp. 53-55. ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 728. 291 Ibid., p. 626. 292 Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, p. 137 and P.R.R.III, pp. 98-100. 293 Kulab, Anam-Siam Yuth, pp. 154-155. 290 115 annexed sizable areas to the west and the south of their territory. They continued their expansion with territorial concessions from a marriage between a Vietnamese prince and a Cambodian princess. In 1834, Vietnamese encroachment aimed to absorb Cambodian territory and to force the indigenous people to accept Vietnamese culture. As for Siam, after being liberated from Burma, the Siamese under Taksin reasserted their domince over Cambodia. Siam quietly annexed the Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siemreap as Rama I had given Chaophraya Aphaiphubet the authority to govern Cambodia since 1783. From that time on, Cambodia became a vassal of Siam under the Siamese sphere of influence. Between 1783 and 1794, the Cambodian prince, Ang Eng, lived in Bangkok like other princes of Siamese vassals. In 1794, Rama I installed Ang Eng (King Narayanaracha III) as Cambodian king. For the Cambodian ruling elites, it was a hard time to preserve their independence from their two powerful neighbors. In the eyes of Siam and Vietnam, the Cambodian nobility lacked a sense of solidarity and were, most of the time, violent.294 The competition between two different factions in the Cambodian nobility led to requests for support from either Siam or Vietnam. The Bangkok and the Huế courts took advantage of this to relegate the Cambodian royalty to a puppet role. Nonetheless, Cambodia was at least able to maintain some degree of balance its vassal status between two suzerains, and not be under the absolute control of a single overlord.295 294 C.H.II/9/1174-1177 (1812-1815C.E.) Correspondence between Rama II and Gia Long and ĐNTL (Volume 2), p. 349. 295 C.H.II/22/1173 (1811 C.E.) Letter from Gia Long to Rama II and CH.II/6/1174 (1812 C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 116 The conflicts between the pro-Vietnamese King Chan and his pro-Siamese brothers (Snguon, Im and Duang) led both sides to seek support from their respective overlords. In the letters sent between Bangkok and Huế, Vietnam claimed to be the sole suzerain by invoking the concept of parenthood towards Cambodia. Minh Mạng, taking on the role of mother, sought remission for Chan, as a child, from King Rama II, who was compared to a father.296 The conflicts between the Cambodian royal brothers were likened to quarrels between children that led them to take refuge in Bangkok or Huế.297 The Chakri claimed that King Chan always behaved as a child and offended Siam.298 The Nguyễn court referred to Snguon as a disobedient younger brother of Chan.299 Siam was worried that the conflicts among the Cambodian ruling elite would spark antagonism between Siam and Vietnam. Rama II showed his intention to compromise and supported the Cambodian royalty so that they might realize their obligations to both overlords.300 Minh Mạng expressed his sympathy to Rama III as he saw Cambodia as a small state and an orphan.301 The Bangkok court attempted to show that both Siam and Vietnam were equally charitable to their vassals. The royalty, nobles and ordinary Cambodians were depicted as living peacefully and were compared to seeds from the same fruit.302 296 P.C.K.12, p. 616. C.H.II/25/1174 (1812C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long and C.H.II/2/1183 (1821C.E.) Letter from Minh Mạng to Rama II and ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 845. 298 C.H.II/18/1173 (1811 C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 299 C.H.II/25/1174 (1812 C.E) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long and ĐNTL (Volume 1), p. 845. 300 CH.II/22-2/1173 (1811 C.E.) Letter from Rama II to Gia Long. 301 Ibid. 302 Ibid. 297 117 The Huế court often took their turn in managing the conflicts when Siam was at war with Burma. The Vietnamese emperor wrote a royal message to the Siamese king stating his desire to assist Siam.303 Lê Văn Duyệt told Luang Phakdiwanich, when they had a meeting in Saigon in 1821, that Minh Mạng tried to cooperate with Siam in the coronation of the Cambodian King to resolve the quarrels among Cambodian princes.304 This was different from previous practice where the Cambodian king was installed solely by the Siamese king. In their treatment of Cambodia, both suzerains actually had the same agenda but pursued it in different ways. Both courts had principally different attitudes in their diplomatic policies towards Cambodia. Interestingly, the cultural similarities between Siam and Cambodia lent strength to the idea, apparent in Thai documents, that Cambodia should pay more respect to Siam than to Vietnam because Cambodia shared the same religion and customs. 305 Siam had no intention of transforming Cambodian culture, and only wanted Cambodia's loyalty as demonstrated through the regular sending of tribute and its agency in overseeing the coronation of the Cambodian king. Previously, the Siamese kings hosted the coronation ceremony of the Cambodian kings. The Bangkok court nurtured the Cambodian royal family by bringing them to live and be educated in Bangkok, as a mark of their benevolence.306 The use of this strategy was in order to assert their control over Cambodia. The power of Siam over 303 Ibid. C.H.II/4/1183 (1821 C.E.) Report from Luang Phakdiwanich regarding his meeting with Lê Văn Duyệt in Saigon in 1821. 305 P.C.K.12, p. 616. 306 P.R.R.I, p. 33. 304 118 Cambodia, therefore, hinged on the trust between the Siamese King and the Cambodian King.307 This actually became a major issue as the Cambodian king often deviated from the Siamese to side with the Vietnamese. The Nguyễn policy towards the Cambodian royalty was different. The Vietnamese officers preferred to keep the Cambodian royals in Huế and used them as instruments to disseminate their propaganda to the local Cambodians because the Vietnamese court believed that the Cambodians respected their royals. This was a short-term policy.308 The Cambodian royal family played a crucial role as the puppet of the two powerful courts. Woodside called the contestation of suzerainty between Siam and Vietnam over Cambodia as the “war of Cambodian succession”309 The weakness of the Cambodian royal family fed the rivalry between Siam and Vietnam. After Cambodia sent tribute to Vietnam in 1803, the Vietnamese began to see Cambodia as not just a Siamese vassal but also a Vietnamese dependency. They supported the claim by claiming that Vietnam had more than two hundred years of involvement in Cambodian affairs.310 The Huế court pictured Cambodians as barbarians that needed to be civilized by following Sino-Vietnamese culture.311 The Vietnamese court definitely had different policies from Siam as they needed to occupy and expand their territory over Cambodia. However, when the Vietnamese mandarins forced the Cambodians to adopt Sino-Vietnamese culture, it led to the disputes between them. When the Cambodians rose against the Nguyễn power, Minh C.H.I/4/1154 (1792 C.E.). Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, pp. 151-152. 309 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 247. 310 ĐNTL (Volume 3), p. 400. 311 ĐNTL (Volume 4), p. 38. 307 308 119 Mạng’s attitude was cruel. He told his court that the Cambodians were unreliable and easily wavered in their loyalties. The Cambodian revolts infuriated him. He felt that “Hundreds of knives should be used to chop [the Cambodian rebels] up and to dismember them.”312 The most important struggle between the two rival courts was in the 1830s and 1840s, when there was war over Cambodian territory. During the reign of Thiệu Trị, he attempted to use a soft approach to gain trust from local Cambodians. He also found that Trương Minh Giảng’s policy over Cambodia was misguided because it led the Cambodian people to rise up against Nguyễn suzerainty.313 Under both Siam and Vietnam’s strategies to control Cambodia and Lao kingdoms, both states had to demonstrate the power of their government along and beyond their overlapping frontiers.314After the prolonged war between Siam and Vietnam in 1847, Cambodia was placed under joint suzerainty. Sending tributes to both was a face-saving device for the two overlords. The yearly tributes to Bangkok were resumed after the Cambodian court had stopped sending them since 1830s. The Cambodian court also had to deliver triennial tribute to Huế. Siam and Vietnam however both portrayed themselves as the singular overlord over Cambodia even though they tacitly accepted the joint overlordship arrangement. For example, in the Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ letters endorsing the coronation of Ang Duang, they suggested that they were the only overlord of Cambodia. According to the letter that Rama III sent to Duang during his coronation, the Siamese highlighted the violence of the Vietnamese troops in burning and destroying Buddhist 312 ĐNTL (Volume 5), p. 886. ĐNTL (Volume 6), pp. 1107-1108. 314 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 66. 313 120 temples. The Bangkok court took advantage of their shared Theravada culture to persuade the Cambodians to preserve their own culture. King Rama III’s words teachings to Ang Duang accompanying his bestowal of recognition of his coronation showed that the Siamese sympathized with them and wanted to preserve Cambodian culture as well as the glory of Buddhism. Rama III mentioned: “...Cambodia has to be defiant, His Majesty knows that the Vietnamese will destroy the glory of Buddhism in Cambodia, [they will] make the right ways becomes the wrong ways. [They will] change Cambodian culture to Yuan (Vietnamese) culture, including the perversion of Theravada Buddhism, the disrobing of the monks and leaving only one monk for each temple, demolishing the many temples in Phnom Penh. [They] have killed a lot of the honorable Phraya phrakhamen (Cambodian officials) since ages past.”315 The Siamese court’s rhetoric clearly shows that Siam emphasized its status as the overlord and protector of Cambodia, which Cambodia needed to depend on for assistance. The letter from Rama III reminded Ang Duang to be loyal to Siam like his father (Ang Eng, 1779-1796) had been. He urged Ang Duang to preserve Buddhism and govern his country morally.316 Rama III conferred upon Ang Duang the title of King Harirakramathibodee. In Vietnamese letters to Bangkok, Thiệu Trị mentioned that Vietnam was a great state and traditionally received tributes from many vassals. Vietnam was benevolent to all vassals like a parent that always loves his children.317 He described Cambodia as a 315 P.C.K.12, p. 774. C.H.III/168/1209 (1847 C.E.) Copy of Rama III’s letter to a vassal king. 317 ĐNTL (Volume 6), pp. 968-969. 316 121 small state that had been a Vietnamese protectorate for twelve generations. Cambodians lived peacefully in the Vietnamese empire. Cambodia easily sent tributes to Vietnam by land or sea. All the property, even the grass or trees, in Cambodia belonged to Vietnam.318 Although Vietnam was far from Cambodia, it seemed very near. When Cambodia was in chaos, the Vietnamese court was sympathetic and wanted to help, following the royal tradition of the great emperors, because the Cambodian king, as an inferior, recognised Vietnamese emperor as an overlord.319 Thiệu Trị conferred a title on Ang Duong as the King of Cambodia (Cao Miên Quốc Vương).320 A contestation of cultural strategies: Siamization versus Vietnamization The cultural similarity and dissimilarity between the Bangkok and the Huế courts, and their tributaries were the main elements that influenced cultural strategies. As Siam and its vassals shared the same Indianized cultural foundations, Siam’s policies toward its vassals usually did not entail the transformation of local culture and customs. 321 Shared religious ties were deployed as crucial elements in the foreign policy towards its vassals. Conversely, in some cases, the Vietnamese slowly intruded upon the cultural lives of their vassals because Sinic culture was deemed to be the 318 C.H.III/169/1209 (1847 C.E.) Copy of the Vietnamese Emperor’s letter regarding the bestowal of a new title on Ang Duong. Cao Man Quốc Vương and ĐNTL (Volume 6), p. 968. 319 C.H.III/21/1209 (1847 C.E.) Letter from Okya Ratchasuphawadi to Luang Anurakphubeth regarding the Vietnamese Emperor’s recognition of Ang Duang as the new king and ĐNTL (Volume 6), pp. 160, 946-947. 320 C.H.III/120/1209 (1847 C.E.) A copy of the Royal Program and ĐNTL (Volume 6), pp. 968-969. 321 John K. Whitmore, “The Thai-Vietnamese Struggle for Laos in the Nineteenth Century”, in Laos War and Revolution, ed. Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1970), pp. 53-55. 122 core of civilized culture. The differences of religion, norms, language and culture made the Nguyễn court feel obliged to changing the local culture of its vassals. The cultural influences from India, Sri Lanka, and China formed the complex cultures that evolved in Siam and Vietnam. These influences blended with indigenous practices and led to distinctly shaped Siamese and Vietnamese cultures. These constructed the identity of the state and shaped the nature of cultural expansion and political involvement that Siam and Vietnam employed to influence Cambodia and Lao tributaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Cultural strategies played a crucial role in their expansionism. The Vietnamese focused on the urging of their superior culture upon their vassals, particularly to Cambodia. The Siamese attempted to utilize their advantage of a similar cultural background, by employing Theravada Buddhism concepts in its propaganda campaigns.322 In contrast, the differences in culture led to the inculcation of cultural civilization through Sinicization by the Vietnamese towards the Cambodians in a short period of time. Both courts required the continued submission of Cambodia and Lao states in order to guarantee their suzerainty. They treated their vassals quite similarly in some respects, but not in all ways because their cultural policies were different. In the case of Lao kingdoms, the tribute system was regulated through a set of rituals such as tributepaying and investiture, which were performed to express and acknowledge Vietnamese supremacy.323 During the Anouvong incident, Vientiane even sent a 322 323 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 62. ĐNTL (Volume 3), pp. 631-632. 123 mission to Huế, acknowledging its vassal status and agreeing to send triennial tribute. 324 The Vietnamese did not adopt the policy of cultural assimilation towards the Lao. Emperor Minh Mạng preferred to choose diplomatic negotiations in dealing with the Lao. It was probably because Vietnam planned to expand more territory and its area in Cambodia. The Vietnamese clearly focused on dispatching troops to impose protectorates (“bảo hộ” policy) over vassals. The Siamese would do similar things in some cases when they thought it was necessary. The Bangkok court sometimes appointed a Siamese political advisor to their vassals’ courts. To Siam, the oath of allegiance from small vassals guaranteed Siam power and trust. The names and titles granted by the Chakri king and the Nguyễn emperor were part of their policies to signify their suzerainty over Cambodian and Lao rulers. Furthermore, Cambodia and Lao kingdoms were required to send tributes to Bangkok and Huế every year and three years, respectively. For example, Cambodia accepted to be a Siamese dependency since Rama I’s reign. King Chan, Ottey Racha, swore an oath to Rama I, that he would serve the Siamese king loyally and, not rebel in body, word, or thought, not belong to any foreign overlords and not participate in any treachery.325 In the war between Siam and Vietnam, cultural appeals were very useful in their propaganda campaign to the Cambodians. The Siamese and the Vietnamese disseminated propaganda to local people, stating that they were siding with the local people and exposing the ploys of the enemy. The propaganda strategy could be considered as an important channel for the two rival overlords to win local support. 324 Arthur J. Dommen, Laos: Keystone of Indochina (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), p.21. 325 C.H.I/4/1154(1792C.E.) The source is “the list of the oaths of allegiance by Muang Thawai’s ruler. 124 Both states claimed supremacy and the moral high ground in helping Lao kingdoms and Cambodia resisting the invasion, as well as pointing out the villainy of the other side as the invader. The Vietnamese officers attempted to appeal to the Cambodians and Laotians by highlighting Siamese violence. A ‘teaching paper’, which was a propaganda message, sent out to Lao kingdoms in 1834 states: “... Siam is unreasonable and unjust. There is no reason to bully yet they bring the army to assault the Vietnamese territory and to exploit the Lao vassals. Wherever the Siamese troops reach, [they] burn houses and burn cities; [they] herd your family and manpower to support their own force. They do this in every city. The Laotians are too trusting and do not discern, and are coaxed to serve them...”326 As for Cambodia, Thai account suggests that Minh Mạng tried to psychologically persuade the Cambodians who used to work for Siam to turn to the Vietnamese side. He also attempted to convince the locals by promoting economic development such as building markets for trade with Vietnam.327 The letter also claimed that the Cambodian nobility and populace were unwilling to be with Siam. If they changed their mind the emperor forgive all Cambodian infringements against Vietnam. Furthermore, the Cambodians would be rewarded when they killed or caught Siamese soldiers.328 The Huế court also proclaimed their willingness as the benevolent helper of humanity to support the existence of Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. 326 P.C.K.12, p. 636. C.H.III/5/1206 (1844 C.E.) Translation of a Vietnamese letter to Phraya Kalahom. 328 C.H.III/12/1207 (1845 C.E.) Translation of a Vietnamese letter regarding a Vietnamese expedition against Siamese troops. 327 125 Similarly, Siam would use propaganda letters to expose, publicize and punish Cambodians who were spies or worked for Vietnam.329 The Siamese general attempted to show his sincerity to Cambodia by cutting off the hands of Siamese soldiers who oppressed or stole the local people’s property, so that Siam might gain support from the Cambodian noblemen and local people.330 The Siamese strategy was to make the Vietnamese distrust the Cambodian princesses whom the Vietnamese themselves had put on the throne. They thought that if Vietnam were not able to use the princesses to convince the local people, Siam could take advantages and gain the trust of the Cambodians.331 Their propaganda strategies focused on disseminating propaganda about each other oppressing and betraying the Cambodians and Laotians. The Siamese and Vietnamese also attempted to highlight that Cambodia and Lao kingdoms had lived in peace before the invasion by the other side. 332 The Vietnamese foreign policies towards Cambodia were much clearer than Siam’s as it made a lot of changes to Cambodian society in terms of politics, economic, and culture. With regards to the political system, the Vietnamese reorganized the political administration system, for example the formation of prefectures and districts, to follow that of Vietnam. They also trained a new Cambodian army and increased the conscription of locals. 333 Furthermore, Sino-Vietnamese bureaucratic titles and 334 official ranks were used in the government of the Cambodian puppet regime. The 329 Ibid. C.H.III/31/1207(1845 C.E.) Public notice in Cambodian language regarding the battle with Vietnamese troops and the lack of boats. 331 C.H.III/1(14)/1203 (1841 C.E.) Records of the Siamese army regarding the battle with Vietnam over Cambodia. 332 P.C.K.12, pp. 636, 774. 333 ĐNTL (Volume 4), p. 490. 334 P.C.K.12, p. 670 and Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 250. 330 126 Vietnamese court also sent Vietnamese administrators to maintain their power and presence in Cambodia.335 The Huế government used the Chinese practice of “using barbarians to rule barbarians” to rule Cambodia. At this point, Cambodian kings were treated as local barbarian governors.336 The Vietnamese attempted to control and rule over Cambodia from this time by reducing the number of provinces from fifty-six provinces to thirty-three and stationing Vietnamese troops in these provinces. In 1835, Cambodian places received Vietnamese names and the area around Phnom Penh was named “Trấn Tây (Western Protectorate).337 During this time, under the supervision of Vietnamese mandarins, Cambodia was not allowed contact with foreign countries.338 Under the Siamese previously, the Cambodian courts had more freedom in their foreign affairs and administration. Economically, the Vietnamese spread trade and settled the Chinese and the Vietnamese in Cambodia.339 The establishment of economic power brought benefits not only in terms of economic profits but also territorial expansion. The Vietnamese administrators in Cambodia officially introduced taxation on shipping and conscripted 340 labor from Cambodians for public works. Moreover, they encouraged the Vietnamese traders to establish markets in Cambodia.341 335 ĐNTL (Volume 4), pp. 27-29. Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 92 337 ĐNTL (Volume 6), p. 80. 338 Chandler, Cambodia before the French, p. 70. 339 ĐNTL (Volume 4), pp. 542-544. 340 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p.250 and David Chandler, p. 137. 341 C.H.III/5/1206 (1844 C.E.) Translation of a Vietnamese letter to Phraya Kalahom and C.H.III/6/1206 (1844 C.E.) Record of letters regarding the battle with Vietnam. 336 127 In the competition of cultural policies, the Vietnamese sought to impose what they believed to be their civilized culture. Trương Minh Giảng, an influential Vietnamese influential general in Saigon, played an important role in the cultural strategy of the Sinicization of Cambodia through the introduction of Vietnamese culture and Confucianism. Despite his attempt, he did not succeed in doing so. The Vietnamese conquerors imposed their civilized culture upon the Cambodians through the forced adoption of clothing and language, the application of Confucian forms of worship and 342 Mahayana Buddhism, and the enforcement of Vietnamese law. In the court ceremonies held between the Huế court and the Cambodian tributaries, it is mentioned that the kowtow was also practiced by the Cambodian ambassadors, following Chinese and Vietnamese court formalities.343 Cambodian officers had to wear shirts and trousers in Vietnamese bureaucratic styles twice a month.344 Cambodia was an example of how these practices symbolically affirmed the tributary status of Vietnam’s vassals. The vassals speak up The competition between Siam and Vietnam meant that the small states became the victims. Strategically, their geographical location as buffer territories frequently led to occupation by either the Siamese or the Vietnamese. From the point of view of Cambodia and Lao vassals, sending tribute to both states was the best solution for maintaining their independence. 342 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 60. ĐNTL (Volume 4), pp. 788-789. 344 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 91. 343 128 A. The Anouvong incident through Lao eyes In the eyes of the Lao, the war with Siam in 1827-1828 was a glorious fight in their history, although this incident can also be seen to mark the decline of the Lao kingdom. This war was an attempt to declare the independence of the country. Anouvong seemed to have been comfortable with using Nguyễn power to balance the patronage of the Chakri court. In a letter sent to Vietnam, he stated that “We urgently ask your court for permission to seek refuge in Vietnam like any other border people willing to pay tribute”.345 The reason why Anouvong was confident his revolt against the Siamese would succeed was that he presumed that the victory of the British over Burma would lead to British incursions into Siam. If it was not a rumor, this would be advantageous to him. As Anouvong stated, “the situation is becoming more than unbearable. We can no longer accept being a dependency of Siam”. 346 Furthermore, he hoped that he could rely on support from Vietnam. While Anouvong was under Vietnamese protection in Nghệ An, he made an oath of submission to Minh Mang. He stated that he was indebted to the Vietnamese for their generosity. He also claimed that in future he would never entertain relations with the Siamese court again and rely on the protection of the Vietnamese Court.347 Lao sources described Siam as evil from the beginning of the Chakri dynasty because the Siamese never gave up Vientiane, especially when Anouvong ascended his throne. Anouvong had to send tribute to Bangkok. In the eyes of Lao states, the Bangkok 345 QXVT, p. 50. Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, p. 7. 347 QXVT, pp. 124-125. 346 129 court oppressed them even before the rise of Anouvong. Chao Ratsavong, Anouvong’s son, conscripted Laotians to work for Bangkok but the Bangkok court blamed him when there were not enough laborers. Chao Ratsavong angrily replied to Siamese officials. Later on Siamese court asked Luang Phrabang to send troops to invade Vientiane.348 The lack of solidarity among the various Lao kingdoms was critical for Vientiane rulers as it meant that Luang Phrabang helped Siam out their fear of Siamese power and a desire for revenge against Vientiane.349 Siam caused turmoil in Vientiane. They burnt all Lao houses and temples, and arrested all the Laotians in Bangkok.350 Siam took advantage by taking over other small states that had relied on Vientiane but desired to become Vietnamese dependencies after the destruction of Vientiane.351 Siam also seriously oppressed the areas on the left bank of the Mekong River and many Laotians also died on the way to Bangkok. The Muang Phouan chronicle gives another picture which mainly mentions the Vietnamese oppression of the Phouan people, especially after Chao Noi, the Phouan ruler, gave Anouvong to Siam, which led to Anouvong’s death in Bangkok. Minh Mạng sent his army to kill Chao Noi. Vietnamese troops harshly oppressed the Phouan people and claimed Phouan as a Vietnamese protectorate.352 This caused the Phouan rulers to ask for support from Siam to expel Vietnamese troops and move the Laotians to the right bank of Mekong River. After that Vietnam established a new Phouan state, named it as “Trấn Ninh” and instituted the Vietnamese administrative 348 PL, pp. 20-23. Ibid, p. 21. 350 Ibid., p. 22. 351 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 352 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 349 130 system.353 For the Laotians, Anouvong was a great example of an exceedingly capable who sacrificed himself for his country.354 The Phongsawadan Lao praised his martial ability in the battle with Burma and Chiangmai. In Laotian eyes, Anouvong was not the cause of his defeat by Siam. Rather it was due to the other brother states such as Luang Phrabang and Muang Phouan, which were concerned only with themselves rather than the independence of the country.355 The conflicts between Lao vassals and the two powerful states Siam and Vietnam were considered to be part of the problems Vientiane always had with Siam, just as Muang Phouan always had to contend with Vietnam. The result of the Anouvong incident was the invasion and obliteration of Vientiane. From the Lao’s perspective, Siam was an invader and also an enemy, while Anouvong was “a tragic hero”, a “revolutionary leader” and “a proud king” who struggled and sacrificed much during his crusade to fulfill the dream of Lao 356 independence. B. Seeing Cambodian factionalism though local eyes Like the Laotian states, the geographical location of Cambodia led to constant occupation by the two overlords. During this period, the Cambodian monarchs were supported at times by both Siam and Vietnam. Ideologically, Cambodians were 353 ĐNTL (Volume 4), p. 80 and PL, p. 31. PL, p. 88. 355 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 356 Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, pp. viii, 7. 354 131 subjects of the king. But when involved with both overlords, the Cambodian king became their subordinate and subject.357 As a small state, Cambodia was victimized. When there were the two factions of pro-Siamese and pro-Vietnamese Cambodian nobles, the neutral policy was important for Cambodia so that their identity, culture and also royal dynasty were not assimilated. The Cambodian royals and nobles balanced their relationship with Siam and Vietnam by sending tribute to both states and also by asking for support from both Siam and Vietnam. King Chan was the most important actor at this point. Cambodian responses to both Siam and Vietnam depended on the Cambodian monarchs and nobles. They successfully used one powerful state to balance the other. At this point, the bargaining power over overlordship was in Cambodian hands.358 Hence, the tributary relations benefited Chan in dealing with his powerful overlords, enabling him to build his new position and diplomatic rule.359 The competition between the two rivals enabled Chan to maintain the independence of Cambodia so it did not come under the absolute control of Siamese patronage and advice.360 Chan renewed communications with Bangkok to balance Vietnamese power after Snguon died in 1824. As Snguon’s brother, he requested Rama III to send Snguon’s ashes back.361 Although Chan again acceded to being under the Chakri’s and the Nguyễn’s authority, he was still more reliant on the Huế court than the Bangkok one. He accepted being under the two powers, although, when 357 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 61. Ibid., p. 68. 359 Ibid., p. 61. 360 Ibid., p. 92. 361 C.H.III/4/1192 (1830 C.E.) 358 132 comparing to Siam, Vietnam did not accord him the same honor and high status they did the Siamese. This did not please the Cambodian prince.362 However, the Cambodians also responded to these two states with internal struggles. They revolted against their overlords when they were oppressed with some issues, or when they devoted themselves to fighting for the Cambodian royal elites.363 This was especially important as a bulwark against the cultural assimilation strategy known as Sinicization or Vietnamization. The cultural differences between Indianized Cambodia and Sinicized Vietnam actually made it difficult for the Cambodians to accept Vietnamese protocol. Furthermore, the Cambodians' revolt was also linked to the issue of royalty. Buddhism was one of the main causes behind Cambodian uprisings against the Vietnamese mandarins. For instance, the Cambodian officials stated that they were willing to kill the Vietnamese without any fear because the Vietnamese did not respect, and tried to destroy, their Buddhist religion and beliefs.364 The rebels preferred being a Buddhist state like Siam to being a province of Vietnam.365 Taking the Cambodian princes and princesses hostage earned the ire of the Cambodians because they thought that the institution of monarchy was the symbol guaranteeing the existence of Cambodia. The selection of the Cambodian successor became a hot issue after the death of Chan. In this issue, the gender of the successor was a determinant of the Cambodian officials’ preference. In the eyes of Cambodians, 362 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 69. C.H.III/8/1210 Draft of an official document (1848 C.E.) and ĐNTL (Volume 5), pp. 886-888. 364 C.H.III/43/1202 (1840 C.E.) The records of the Siamese army regarding the battle with Vietnam over Cambodia 365 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 144. 363 133 the princes were more popular than the princesses because they possessed the greater strength required to rule the country. They felt the princesses would easily fall in the trap of both powerful overlords. Therefore, the Cambodian officials preferred Princes Im or Duang to Princess Mei.366 Duang was the most important actor for the Chakri court’s restoration of power in Cambodia. As the best choice for resolving the conflict, Duang was the middleman who initiated diplomatic negotiations with Vietnam. He informed the Vietnamese mandarins in Saigon to pass his letter on to Thiệu Trị. In the letter he wrote that he accepted the Siamese and the Vietnamese proposition so that his people could live happily. He was also willing to send tributes to Bangkok and Huế. He finally apologized for the Cambodians who opposed the Vietnamese, claiming that they were stupid and blustered.367 Duang successfully proved to his people that he deserved to govern Cambodia through his kingliness, legitimacy and charisma.368 The new Cambodian authorities reestablished their state with no foreign supervision and troops. The communities, villages and temples were rebuilt after the destruction by the Vietnamese. Cambodians lived peacefully after the Siamese and Vietnamese rivalry for decades. 366 WPK, pp. 85, 93 cited in Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, pp. 127, 129. Kulap, Anam-Sayam Yuth, p. 1077. 368 Chandler, “Cambodia before the French”, p. 182. 367 134 Conclusion The “competing centers” of Siam and Vietnam both exhibited paternalism towards the “overlapping peripheries” of Cambodia and Lao tributaries. They always claimed to be the benevolent protectors of all their tributaries. Cultural policies towards their vassals were an important feature of the two overlords’ competition for hegemony; this led to tensions and conflicts between the two, and much suffering among the vassals like the Cambodians. Their shared Theravada cultural backgrounds made the Siamese view the Lao and Cambodians differently from the Sinicized Vietnamese in their claims over these polities. The Bangkok court saw itself as a patron and its vassals as junior relatives, while the Nguyễn court considered itself to be a civilized suzerain and its vassals to be barbarians. The different cultural ideologies played a crucial role in creating the political, economic and cultural policies that were employed during the contestation between Siam and Vietnam and implemented in Lao kingdoms and Cambodia. It clearly happened in case of Cambodia. The protracted contestation between the two rival overlords brought the conflicts to an end after a long war of resistance in 1845, when Siam and Vietnam agreed to balance their power over Cambodia by jointly reestablishing the monarchy and co-hosting the coronation of the Cambodian King. In return, Cambodia accepted a tributary relationship by sending tribute every year to Siam and once every three years to Vietnam. However, the contest of tributary expansionism over the region ended with the arrival of the West. Vietnam had to struggle for her own sovereignty and independence against the French. While Siam sacrificed its peripheral territories in order to preserve its independence against the 135 British and the French, Cambodia and Lao kingdoms were finally ruled by the French colonialists after they took over Vietnam. Chapter V concludes the overall arguments regarding the Siamese and the Vietnamese shared worldview in foreign affairs. The two kingdoms’ political ideologies and cultural foundations are meaningful in explaining their perception among the two overlords and also their vassals. 136 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION The diplomatic relations between Siamese and Vietnamese courts over seven decades, from the 1780s to the 1850s, evolved from amicable to antagonistic perceptions that were driven by several political and cultural factors. Their different cultural backgrounds shaped their perceptions, attitudes and courtly protocol as well as stimulated some characteristics of their political and diplomatic worldviews, especially at the state-to-state level. Siam and Vietnam had no different worldviews in the inter-state relations even though both countries hailed from dissimilar cultural backgrounds. The Siamese and Vietnamese shared similar worldviews of interstate relations affected their interaction. Both Siam and Vietnam centered themselves as powerful authorities over the mainland Southeast Asian and as legitimate suzerains over the other peripheries. In Siamese and Vietnamese diplomatic history, the conduct of their foreign relations with other countries followed politically and culturally hierarchical patterns, where their court practices and political rituals emphasized their superior positions. However, the seventy-year period of Siam-Vietnam foreign affairs studied in this thesis was exceptional. Both countries defined each other as equal great kingdoms, and did not treat each other as an overlord like China or as vassals like the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms. Siam received better and special treatment from the Nguyễn court than the other Indianized states in the region such as Burma, Cambodia and Lao 137 kingdoms, which actually were perceived as “man” or “barbarians”. The Vietnamese emperor had to deal with this pattern of relations where Siam did not fit into his understanding of the region’s balance of power. Siam, on the other hand, may have had less difficulty accepting Vietnam as an equal because they were used to dealing with Burma on equal terms. They attempted to maintain relations on equal terms, and both eventually as also became joint-overlords over their tributaries. The dissimilarities of court rituals between Siam and Vietnam were perhaps one of the main elements that shaped the form of their relations. Different court rituals sometimes led to diplomatic conflicts because of the different interpretations held by the two courts. It was also an important factor that affected the way they designed their inter-state status, either hierarchical or unhierarchical. For Siam and Vietnam, court protocol and ceremonies had a dual function: they could show honor to someone, but also be used to reinforce a hierarchical relationship. In their relations, the Bangkok and the Huế courts struggled with this special type of status because they had never treated any other foreign states as equal. The trouble of their diplomatic relations resulted not from differing, but actually similar geopolitical worldviews. This equal relationship did not match their worldviews which were based on hierarchical relationships with their own kingdom as the center. Particularly with regards to the issues in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms, Siam and Vietnam balanced their status with difficulty and, at the same time, competed to be the center of the region, by making the latter two states their peripheries. In the contestation for the expansion of sphere of influence, the Siamese and Vietnamese forms of bilateral relations were interesting as neither could totally claim that they 138 alone had suzerainty over surrounding kingdoms. Conceptually and practically, the Siamese and Vietnamese as paternal overlords over tributaries never reached a state of equilibrium in the history of the region. Based on their ideological and cosmological foundations whereby both claimed to be a centre surrounded by tributaries, the Siamese Chakravartin king and the Vietnamese Son of Heaven were accustomed to acting as overlords over others. However, both states needed to adopt specific positions in their negotiations to share suzerainty over their vassals. The principle of one vassal having two different overlords could be accepted by both courts as long as their vassals could pay tribute to both. Although this special form of relations led to some difficulties between the two courts, it was suitable for both kingdoms, especially in the first stage of their diplomacy before 1834. Both sides accepted the principle of one vassal having two different overlords. A very important concession for Bangkok and Huế was to accept that their vassals could pay tribute to the other power. Both allowed their vassals to send tribute to each overlord as long as both were accepted as joint-overlords and not opposed to each other by, for example, refusing to send reinforcement troops to the other in time of need. This was traditionally possible in Southeast Asia and only the colonial conception of sovereignty and clearly-demarcated state boundaries brought this fluid form of tributary relations to an end. With regards to Siam-Vietnam bilateral relations, the cordial period of their diplomacy was before 1820s. The Rama I (1782-1809) and Gia Long (1802-1820) period was a time of smooth relations for both sides. The stability of both kingdoms was one factor that supported this peace. Personal relations between the two rulers was also important in maintaining friendly diplomacy and rendering negotiations 139 effective. The importance of inequality or hierarchy increased only when contention over the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms intensified. The clash over territory and influence exposed the tensions and contradictions between the imagination of their equality with the practice of unequal relations. The expansionist policies of Siam and Vietnam caused changes in diplomatic policies, leading to an antagonistic phase in their history. Cambodia and Lao vassals played important roles in their diplomacy as they provoked clashes that damaged friendly relations. Both Siam and Vietnam were clearly competing to expand their sphere of influence and territory, especially during reigns of Rama III (1824-1851) and Minh Mạng (1820-1840). This was especially the case during the period from the Anouvong uprising in 1828 until the Siamese invasion of Hà Tiên in 1834, which caused both kingdoms to become real enemies. The warfare between Siam and Vietnam over Cambodia was actually a stalemate as the two courts competed not only with military forces but also with cultural and propaganda campaigns to win support from the local people. After the war ended in 1847, the Bangkok and the Huế courts did not resume their friendship like before the war since there was no evidence that the two courts sent missions to each other. It was not until 1876, during the reign of Rama V, that Emperor Tự Đức attempted to restore the relationship by sending a letter from Huế, but the French intercepted it before it reached Bangkok.369 Although the conflict over Cambodia was over, the two states appeared more concerned with the coming of 369 Trương Sĩ Hùng and Nguyễn Thịnh Sơn, “Một bằng chứng tôt đẹp trong quan hệ Xiêm – Việt dưới thời Nguyễn (A Fine Evidence of the Thai-Vietnamese Friendship under the Nguyen Dynasty)”, in Tạp Chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 4(1991), 60-64. The 1874 Franco-Vietnamese treaty allowed the French to claim authority over Vietnam’s foreign relations. 140 colonialism. Furthermore, the last letters that Rama III and Thiệu Trị sent to commemorate Duang’s coronation in 1847 showed that both still did not get along with each other. Both courts accepted to re-establish joint overlordship and to co-host the coronation of the new Cambodian king, Ang Duong. The neutral policy of Cambodian court was the best solution for maintaining its identity and culture and the survival of the royal dynasty itself. However, the contestation over tributary expansionism ended with the arrival of the West. In the late 1850s, Vietnam had to struggle for its own sovereignty and independence against the French, while Siam eventually had to cede all rights and claims over territory in the south and the northeast to the British and the French to preserve its independence. Cambodia and Lao states were eventually occupied by the French colonialists after their takeover of Vietnam, thus marking the end of the tributary system. By way of conclusion, it would be interesting to consider the possible evolution and outcomes of the diplomacy between the two overlords, and between them and their tributaries, had the French not shown up. Further study on the related issues would possibly require deeper research into more primary sources, especially from the Vietnamese side. Vietnamese sources which were written in Chinese would provide a stronger basis for comparative studies between Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ discourse. Other research topics such as the perception and attitude of Siamese and Vietnamese vassals towards the two overlords for their policies in the same period could also be studied through original Cambodian and Lao accounts. The inter-state relations between Siam and Vietnam after the beginning of French colonization is a possible research issue, particularly the attempts of the Vietnamese court during Tự Đức’s reign to re-establish friendly relations with 141 Siam in Rama V’s reign. 142 APPENDIX A: A POEM DESCRIBING THE VIETNAMESE BY THE SIAMESE ภาพญวนเยี่ยงทูตเว เวียดนาม นี้พอ เครื่องแตงยรรยงขบวน แบบงิ้ว องนายนั่งเปลหาม คนแห นานา ถือพัดดําด้ําจิ้ว วาดวี มายาเหลือแหลลน หลายลบอง ชมแตฝมือชาญ ชางไม เสพยสัตวจรเขของ เขาชอบ ใจนา เมืองเรียดริมน้ําใช เชี่ยวเรือฯ ผูประพันธ: กรมขุนเดชอดิศร Translation from Thai: This is a picture of a Vietnamese mandarin from the court of Huế. He wears a gorgeous dress in the procession, like a scene from Chinese Opera. The Vietnamese mandarin sits on a sedan and is followed by many people in the procession. He carries a black handled-fan and fans himself. [The Vietnamese] are a race with many faces and they have many tricks up their sleeves. They are very skillful in carpentry. They like to eat crocodile meat. And they settled along the river and were expert about boats. Author: Krom Khun Det-adison (An Official Title in the Siamese Court) Taken from Davisak Puaksom, Khon Plaekna Nanachat Khong Krung Sayam (The Strangers of Siam) (Bangkok: Matichon Publishing, 2003), p 42. 143 APPENDIX B: “Nguyễn Ánh paying tribute pledge allegiance to Rama I” “Nguyễn Ánh paying tribute pledge allegiance to Rama I,” painted by Phra Chang in 1887, Waropat Phiman Hall, Bangpain palace, Ayutthaya, taken from Aphinan Posayanon, Chittakam lae pratimakam beab tawantok nai ratchasamnak (Western-style painting and sculpture in the Thai Royal Court) (Bangkok: Bureau of the Royal Household, 1993), p. 31. 144 BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Thai Language Sources 1. Chotmaihet (Records) - Chotmaihet Ratchakan Thi Neung (Records of the First Reign) Chulasakkarat 1156 (1794C.E.) No. 2, 7 Chulasakkarat 1158 (1796C.E.) No. 3 Chulasakkarat 1164 (1802C.E.) No. 3 Chulasakkarat 1167 (1805C.E.) No. 2 Chulasakkarat 1168 (1796C.E.) No. 2, 4 Chulasakkarat 1171 (1809C.E.) No. 1/1, 1/2, 1/3 - Chotmaihet Ratchakan Thi Song (Records of the Second Reign) Chulasakkarat 1171 (1809C.E.) No. 1/4 Chulasakkarat 1172 (1810C.E.) No. 8/2, 10/1, 10/2, 11/1, 11/2 Chulasakkarat 1173 (1811C.E.) No. 17, 18/1, 19, 22/1, 22/2, 22/3, 23 Chulasakkarat 1174 (1812C.E.) No. 9/1, 9/2, 9/3, 9/4, 25 Chulasakkarat 1175 (1813C.E.) No. 9/6, 19/1, 19/2, 23/1, 23/2 Chulasakkarat 1176 (1814C.E.) No. 9/1, 9/2, 9/3, 9/4, 18 145 Chulasakkarat 1177 (1815C.E.) No. 9/4, 9/5, 11, 12/2 Chulasakkarat 1178 (1816C.E.) No. 9, 13/1, 13/2, 13/3, 13/4 Chulasakkarat 1179 (1817C.E.) No. 21, 18, 10/1 Chulasakkarat 1182 (1820C.E.) No. 15/1, 15/2, 15/3, 15/4, 16/2 Chulasakkarat 1183 (1821C.E.) No. 4 - Chotmaihet Ratchakan Thi Sam (Records of the Third Reign) Chulasakkarat 1187 (1825C.E.) No. 23/4, 23/5 Chulasakkarat 1188 (1826C.E.) No. 23/6 Chulasakkarat 1189 (1827C.E.) No. 1 Chulasakkarat 1190 (1828C.E.) No. 6/1, 6/2, 6/3 Chulasakkarat 1191 (1829C.E.) No. 5 Chulasakkarat 1192 (1830C.E.) No. 2 Chulasakkarat 1193 (1831C.E.) No. 25 Chulasakkarat 1194 (1832C.E.) No. 49 Chulasakkarat 1195 (1833C.E.) No. 7 Chulasakkarat 1196 (1834C.E.) No. 11, 14 Chulasakkarat 1197 (1835C.E.) No. 3 Chulasakkarat 1199 (1837C.E.) No. 1 Chulasakkarat 1200 (1838C.E.) No. 94, 94/ko Chulasakkarat 1201 (1839C.E.) No. 1, 2, 3, 3/2, 4, 6 146 Chulasakkarat 1202 (1840C.E.) No. 25, 27/1, 27/2, 27/3, 27/4, 27/5, 28/1, 28/2, 28/3, 28/4, 35/1, 35/2, 35/3, 36, 38/2, 38/3, 38/4, 40/1, 40/2, 40/3, 40/4, 40/7, 40/8, 40/9, 40/10, 40/11, 42/1, 42/3, 42/4, 42/5, 42/6, 43/5, 44, 47, 48 Chulasakkarat 1203 (1841C.E.) No. 1, 1/ko, 1/kho, 3/1, 6/3, 8/2, 9, 10, 11, 11/ko, 12, 13, 14/1, 14/2, 89, 104/1, 105 Chulasakkarat 1204 (1843C.E.) No. 1, 1/ko, 1/kho, 1/khor, 1/ngo, 1/co, 1/cho, 8/2, 11/1, 12/1, 12/2, 77/3, 78/2 Chulasakkarat 1205 (1844C.E.) No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4/ko, 4/kho, 4/khor, 5/1, 6, 7/1, 10/1, 11/2, 12, 13/2, 15, 16/1, 16/3, 16/6, 16/7, 32/4, 32/5, 48/1, 128/4 Chulasakkarat 1206 (1845C.E.) No. 1/1, 2/1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13/2, 138 Chulasakkarat 1207 (1846C.E.) No. 2, 7, 9, 10/2, 10/3, 10/5, 11/1, 11/5, 12, 13/1, 13/2, 16/2, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 31/3, 33/1, 33/2, 33/3, 33/4, 33/5, 33/6, 34/1, 37/1, 38, 39/1, 39/2, 54/1, 54/2, 81, 234/1, 241/1 147 Chulasakkarat 1208 (1847C.E.) No. 1, 2, 3, 5/2, 6, 6/1, 9 Chulasakkarat 1209 (1848C.E.) No. 2/2, 4/1, 4/2, 5, 6, 7/5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16/1, 19/1, 19/2, 19/3, 19/4, 20/1, 21, 22, 23/2, 24, 25/1, 26, 31, 32, 120, 123, 168/ko, 169, 170/1, 170/2, 170/3 Chulasakkarat 1210 (1849C.E.) No. 1, 2, 4/1, 4/2, 5, 6, 8/1, 10, 11, 24, 38, 204/2 Chulasakkarat 1211 (1850C.E.) No. 1, 2/1, 3, 4, 7, 109/1, 109/4 Year (not occur) No. 25, 55, 56, 57, 58 2. Phongsawadan (Chronicles) Damrongrachanuphap. Phongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan thi song, Lem 1(Chronicles of the Second Reign of the Rattanakosin Period, Volume 1). Bangkok: Silapakorn, 1962. Damrongrachanuphap. Phongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan thi song, Lem 2(Chronicles of the Second Reign of the Rattanakosin Period, Volume 2). Bangkok: Khurusapha, 1968. Thammawat, Jaruwan (translator), Lae Lot Phongsawadan Lao (Luang Phrabang, Vieng Chan, Muang Phuan, lae Champasak). Research Institute of Northeastern Arts and Culture, Srinakharinthrawirot Mahasarakham, 1980. Kulab. Anam-Sayam Yuth (The Vietnamese-Siamese War). Bangkok: Khosit, 2007. 148 Krom Silapakorn (Fine Arts Department). Nangsu Prachum Phongsawadan Chabap Kanjanaphisek, Lem 12 (The Collection of Thai Chronicles Kanjanapisek Edition, Volume 12). Bangkok: Khanakammakan Chalongphithi Kanchanaphisek, 2006. Thipakornwongse. Phraratchapongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi Neung (Chronicles of the First Reign of the Rattanakosin Period). Bangkok: Khlang Wittaya, 1962. Thipakorawongse. Phraratchapongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi Song (Chronicles of the Second Reign of the Rattanakosin Period). Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1961. Thipakorawongse. Phongwadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan thi 2 (tua khien) (Chronicles of the Second Reign of the Rattanakosin Period (manuscript version), edited by Naruemon Thurawat. Bangkok: Amarin, 2005. Thipakorawongse. Phraratchapongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi Sam (Chronicles of the Third Reign of the Rattanakosin Period). Bangkok: Khurusapha, 1961. Krom Sinlapakorn (Department of Fine Arts). Prachum Phraratchaniphon Phrabatsomdet Phranangklao Chaoyuhua (Collected of Rama III’s Royal Writings). Bangkok: Sophonphiphatthanakorn, 1929. Krom Sinlapakorn (Department of Fine Arts), Ratcha Phongsawadan Krung Kamphucha (The Chronicle of the Kingdom of Cambodia). Bangkok: Phrae Wittaya, 1962. Yong. Phongsawadan Yuan (Vietnamese Historical Records). Bangkok: Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalai Publishing House, 1966. 149 3. Dissertations Puaksom, Davisak. “Karn prabtua thang khwan ru khwan jing lae amnaj khong chon chan nam Siam Phutthasakkarach 2325-2411 (The Readjustment of Knowledge, Truth and Power of the Elites in Siam, 1782-1868)”. Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1997. Vareechanont, Veeranant. “The Importance of the Annamese-Siamese War to Siam, Cambodia and Annam”. Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1970. 4. Other sources Eoseewong, Nidhi. Waduoy karnmuang khong prawattisat lae khwamsongcham (Dealing with a Politics of History and Memory). Bangkok: Matichon, 2002. Krasuang Suksathikan (Ministry of Education). Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa, ton thi 1 thung 2: Raw lae Phuenban khong Raw (Social Studies Textbook, Volume 1-2: We and Our Neighbors. Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1963. Krasuang Suksathikan(Ministry of Education). Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa Wicha Prawattisat Chan Matthayomsuksa Pi thi 1 (Social Studies Textbook in History, Secondary School Grade 7). Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1961. Osatharom, Warunee and La-ongsri, Kanchanee (Ed). Lao Hu Yang-Thai Ru Araj: Wikhraw Beaprean Sangkhom Suksa (Laos and Thailand: What do we learn?: Analysis of Social Historical Textbook). Bangkok: Five Area Studies Project, 2001. 150 Mahakhan, Chot et.al. Tamrakhumue Prawattisat Rieprieng tam Laksut khong Krasuang Thammakan samrap Matthayom Plai: Buraphaprathet, ton Yuan Khamen Mon Phama (The Historical Textbook following the Course of Ministry of Education for Secondary School: Orient Countries (Việtnam, Cambodia, Mon, Burma). Bangkok: Thaikhasem, 1931. Posayanon, Aphinan. Chittakam lae pratimakam beab tawantok nai ratchasamnak (Western-style painting and sculpture in the Thai Royal Court). Bangkok: Bureau of the Royal Household, 1993. Puaksom, Davisak and Wongthet, Suchit (Ed.). Khonpleakna Nanachat Khong Krung Sayam (The Strangers of Siam). Bangkok: Matichon, 2003. Anamwat, Thanom. Khwam Samphan Rawang Thai Khamen Lae Yuan Nai Samai Rattanakosin Torn Ton (Relations Between Siam, Cambodia, and Vietnam during the First Part of the Rattanakosin Period). Bangkok: Khurusapha Publishing, 1973. Werawong, Sila. Prawattisat Lao [Lao History]. Bangkok: Matichon, 1997. Mettarikanon, Dararat. Kan Khian Prawattisat Kan Songkhram Rawang Sayam KapTay Son Khritsakkarat 1783-1785(Historiography of a warfare between Siam and Tây Sơn in 1783-1785). Art and CultureMagazine, 30, 9(July, 2009). 151 II. Vietnamese Language Sources 1. Chronicles Bưu Cảm (ed.). Nhu Viễn (The Harmonious Management of Distant Peoples), translated into modern Vietnamese by Tư quang Phai (2 Volumes). Sàigòn: n.p., 1965. Lê Quý Đôn. Phủ biên tập lục (Miscellaneous Records of Pacification in the Border Area). Hànội: Social Sciences Publishing House, 1977. Ngaosyvathn, Mayoury and Ngaosyvathn, Pheuiphanh. Vietnamese Source Materials concerning The 1827 Conflict between the Court of Siam and the Lao Principalitues (Vol. I Introduction, Translation, Han-nom text). Tokyo: Komiyama Printing Co., Ltd., 2001. Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam (Institute of History Studies, Department of Social Sciences of Việtnam). Đại Nam Thực lục, tập 1-6 (Veritable Records of Đại Nam. Volume 1-6). Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007. Viện Sử học, Trung tâm Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn Quốc gia (Institute of History Studies, The National Center of Social Sciences and Humanities). Khâm Định Đại Nam hội điển sự lệ (Administrative catalogue of the Đại Nam established by imperial order). Huế: Thuận Hóa Publishing House, 2005. Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam (Institute of History Studies, Department of Social Sciences of Việtnam). Đại Nam liệt truyện (The Đại Nam Court Biography). Huế: Thuận Hoá Publishing House, 1993. Unpublished paper. Đại Nam Nhất Thống chí, Quốc sứ quán Triều Nguyễn (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam, The missions of the Nguyễn Dynasty). 152 2. Dissertations Đặng Văn Chương. “Quan hệ Xiêm-Việt từ 1782 đến 1847 (The Relationships between Siam and Việtnam from 1782 to 1847). University of Pedagogy, Hanoi, 2003. 3. Other sources Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (Ministry of Education and Training). Lịch sử 7 (History 7). Đồng Tháp: Education Publishing House, 2003. Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (Ministry of Education and Training). Lịch sử 8, tập 2 (History 8, Volume 2)( Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2003a. Hoàng Tân. Lê Văn Duyệt với vùng đất Nam Bộ (General Lê Văn Duyệt and the southern of Việtnam). Hồ Chí Minh City: Sàigòn Culture Publishing House, 2008. Đặng Văn Chương. “Quan hệ Xiêm với các nước láng giềng phía Đông dưới thời Taksin (1767-1782)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 5(2001): 47-52. Đặng Văn Chương. “Việt Nam trong quan hệ với Xiêm về vấn đề Lào và Campuchia đầu thế kỷ XIX (Vietnam in the Relations with Siam about the Problems in Laos and Cambodia in the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 4(55), 2002: 64-68. Đặng Văn Chương. “Về cuộc tấn công của Xiêm vào Hà Tiên và Châu Đốc cuối năm 1833 đầu năm 1834(The Attack of Siam to Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc from the End of 1833 to the Beginning of 1834)”, in Journal of History Research, 3(2002). 153 Đinh Xuân Lâm. “Quan hệ Việt – Campuchia thời Nguyễn trong nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX (The Relationships between Việtnam and Cambodia in the Nguyễn Period in the First Half of Nineteenth Century)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 6(2002). Đỗ Thanh Bình and Nguyễn Am. “Quan hệ Đại Nam – Xiêm nữa cuối thế kỷ XIX (The Reltaions between Đại Nam and Siam in the second half of the Nineteenth Century),” Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á (Journal of Southeast Asian Research), 2(1994). Nguyễn Khắc Viện, Việtnam: A Long History. Hànội: Thế Giới Publishing House, 2007. Nguyễn Quang Ngọc (Ed). Tiến trình lịch sử Việt Nam (The Process of Việtnam History). Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007. Nguyễn Sỹ Tuấn, “Nam Bộ trong mối quan hệ giữa chúa Nguyễn với Chân Lạp và Xiêm từ thế kỷ XVII đến thế kỷ XIX (Trong cách nhìn của một số tác giả Campuchia) [The South in the relationship between the Nguyễn lord with Cambodia and Siam from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century (From the view of some Cambodian scholars)]”, in Một số vấn đề lịch sử vùng đất Nam Bộ đến cuối thế kỷ XIX [Some issues about Southern history up to the end of nineteenth century]. Hanoi: Thế Giới Publishing House, 2009. Phạm Nguyên Long. “Cuộc khởi nghĩa chống ách thống trị Xiêm La của chân dân Lào dưới sự lãnh đạo của Châu A-Nu (1827-1828) (The Liberation of Laos under the Leading of Anouvong from Siamese Domination)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử (Journal of History of Research, 1(1972): 11-21. 154 Trần Trọng Kim. Việt Nam Sử Lược (A Historical Summary of Việtnam). Hanoi: Culture and Information Publishing House, 2008. Trương Hữu Quýnh, et.al. Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam toàn tập (General History of Việtnam - Complete work). Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2008. Swangpanyangkoon. Thawi. “Cách đây hơn 100 năm, một bộ chính sử Việt Nam bằng chữ Hán được dịch sang chữ Thái (Nearly 100 years, A collection of Vietnamese History in Chinese Language, Thai Translation)”, in Tạp chí Xưa Nay (Journal of Past and Present), 110, 2(2002). III. Western Language Sources 1. Dissertations Chandler, David P. “Cambodia Before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom. 1794-1847”. 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New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1982. 160 [...]... for the following chapters which will look at the reciprocal Siamese and Vietnamese perceptions By the turn of the 19th century, the rise of a new dynasty and the decline of an old kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia resulted in a shift in the balance of power The Chakri Dynasty of Siam and the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam became the new powerful ruling families Throughout the seventy years of diplomacy in. .. opposed to the Mạc, in the southern part of the Vietnamese kingdom It led to the division of the country The resulting civil war in Vietnam between the northern court under the control of the Mạc dynasty and the southern court under the control of the Lê dynasty led to turmoil and strife However, in 1545, Nguyễn Kim, who was the actual power behind the puppet Lê emperor, was assassinated, and his son -in- law,... extend patronage to the Cambodian king and nobility and expand their occupation of Cambodian land, in hope of cultivating 22 Cambodia as a buffer between south Vietnam and Siam In Laos, the revolt by the Vientiane ruler, Anouvong, against Bangkok between 1 827 and 1 828 troubled the relationship between Siam and Vietnam During the reign of Rama I, Vientiane was under the vassalage of Siam However, when... diplomacy in the reigns of the first three Chakri kings and Nguyễn emperors, the two courts’ relationship changed from amity to enmity The reign of Rama I (18 72- 1809) and Gia Long (18 02- 1 820 ) represented the most cordial period in the relationship, while the reigns of Rama II (1809-1 824 ) and Rama III (1 824 -1851) in Siam, and Minh Mạng (1 820 1840) and Thiệu Trị (1841-1847) in Vietnam, was the period when there... sanctioning and causing an invasion of Vietnam They concluded that the victory of Nguyễn Ánh later on was because of the death of Quang Trung For the Huế and Sàigòn scholarship, their historiography of Thailand reveals similar prejudices These historians tried to show the Nguyễn court as a great imperial kingdom They suggested that the dominance of the Huế court and the weakness of Siam, led the Siamese king... basing these on the model of Ayudhaya The pomp of the Siamese court signified the status of the state and its power over vassals and challenged other states, in particular Vietnam, which was a major competitor striving to claim overlordship over small neighboring kingdoms in the first half of the nineteenth century 32 Vietnam5 9 Vietnam in the sixteenth century was divided into two dynasties, the southern... These worldviews and cultural perceptions of both states might raise the question of how we could compare the Siamese and the Vietnamese’s mentalities with regards to their bilateral relations with each other and with their Cambodian and Lao vassals The Siamese and the Vietnamese conceived of and imagined their empire hierarchically They viewed their own system as superior and dominant, and that of 20 the. .. original and rewritten sources, especially in terms of terminology In chapter three will elaborate on this in more detail 27 The study, therefore, aims to demonstrate how a wide range of individuals and groups interpreted the diplomatic relationship between Siam and Vietnam, and reinterpreted and represented this relationship in different ways in the diplomatic correspondence and court records These... approached in two different ways — first, from the points of view of both Siam and Vietnam, in terms of the continuity of local institutions such as kingship, patronage, warfare, domestic and inter-state policy; and second, through the history of Cambodia and Laos as clients, the image of an overlord over a tributary In chapter two, I analyze the evolution of Siam- Vietnam relationship from the 1780s to the 1850s. .. power and raised troops to fight with the Mạc court The southern court came under the power of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families, while the Lê kings functioned as figureheads After sixty years of fighting, the war between the southern and northern courts finally ended in 15 92. 60 The southern court under the control of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families had defeated the Mạc ruler However, Vietnam remained ... opposed to the Mạc, in the southern part of the Vietnamese kingdom It led to the division of the country The resulting civil war in Vietnam between the northern court under the control of the Mạc... 1813 during the reign of Gia Long and 1 823 during the reign of Minh Mạng, asking for Vietnamese cooperation in its attack on Siam In the letter, the Burmese King mentioned that Siam and Vietnam. .. Cultural influences from India and China formed and evolved different cultures in Siam and Vietnam The Siamese state was Indianized while the Vietnamese state was Sinicized The Indianization of Siam