1 Chapter ONE: Literature Review and Methodological Approach Colonial studies witnessed a breakthrough with the examination of the language of encounter and engagement, seen in the works of Anthony Pagden and Joan-Pau Rubiés.1 Both historians explored the formal mechanics behind the relationship between colonizers and their subjects. Pagden made a key observation that trade was both more profitable and safer than conquest.2 This suggests an end to a prolonged debate on the reasons and intentions behind the advent of colonizers, which often unearthed common rhetoric such as ‘for Gold, Glory and Gospel’.3 The focus moves from examining why the colonizers went about expansion to how they managed to do it. The academic challenge delves into the mechanism of such engagements and addresses colonization in a more holistic manner. However, the abovementioned historians have focused largely on the Spanish encounter with the Native Americans in the New World. With regards to Asia, there were extensive studies conducted by Holden Furber, Leonard Blussé and António Saldanha concerning the various East India Companies in Asia. However, these occurred 1 Anthony Pagden’s “Dispossessing the Barbarian” in David Armitage (ed) Theories of Empire, 1450-1800, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) pp.78-98, and Joan-Pau Rubiés (ed), Voyages and Visions, (London: Reaktion Books, 1999). Both would focus on the language used by Europeans to justify their engagement with the respective indigenous population they encountered. 2 Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-1800, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) p.64. 3 In the Portuguese case, “feitoria, fortaleza e igreja” which means establishing the factory for trade, forts to ensure security and the Church for the propagation of Christianity. Uka Tiandrasasmita, “The Indonesian Harbour Cities and the coming of the Portuguese” in Indonesia-Portugal: Five Hundred Years of Historical Relationship, pp. 54-63, edited by Ivo Carneiro de Sousa and Richard Z. Leirissa, (Lisbon: Centro Português de Estudos do Sudeste Asiático (CPESA), 2001) p.54. 2 mostly in the later periods of the Colonial era.4 A luminary in the earlier period of ‘European Expansion’, Robinson suggested a comparative approach be used to assess the efficacy of colonial venture by the different European powers.5 For example, he contrasted the Dutch method of colonization to that of the Portuguese. However, separate colonial contexts situated in different time periods contain divergent ideologies, and one necessarily varies from the other. Even in the same era, distinct approaches to colonization were adopted in various parts of the world. The Portuguese asserted their own discourse on the ethical treatment of the indigenous population in the early sixteenth century, which differed from the practice of their Spanish counterparts.6 A vital contrast between the Iberian powers was that the Spaniards were widely thought to be up against chiefly petty tribes, who were constantly at war with one another. On the other hand, the variety of the Lusitanian encounters ranged from the Great Mughal Empire in India and the Emperor of China, down to the penghulus (village chiefs) on the island of Timor. The Portuguese could 4 Explicitly, one is referring to the United Netherlands East India Company (VOC) and the British East India Companies (EIC) in the Malay Archipelago from the seventeenth century onwards. In David Armitage’s Theories of Empire, one finds a collection of work largely focusing on Spanish, French and English empires, where the focus was on early modern era with the Spanish in America and in the modern era with the British Empire in India. Leonard Blussé (ed) Companies and Trade. Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Regime, (Leiden: Leiden Research School for Asian, African and Amerindian Studies, 1981) Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800, (Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 1976) and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, Iustus Imperium: dos Tratados como Fundamento do império dos Portugueses no Oriente, (Macao: Instituto Português do Oriente and Fundação Oriente, 1997) 5 Ronald Robinson, “An interview with Ronald Robinson” in Leonard Blussé (ed) Pilgrims of the Past, (Leiden: Leiden Research School for Asian, African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), 1996) p.9. 6 Charles Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of South East Asia, 1580-1600”, in South East Asia: Colonial History, vol. 1, edited by Peter Borschberg, (London: Routledge, 2001) pp.12640. See also J.H. Parry, “The Right to Conquest” The Spanish Theory of Empire in the sixteenth century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940) pp.12-26. 3 boast that they engaged every stratum of civilization in Asia by the end of the sixteenth century. Literature Review Comparatively, less material has been written on the Portuguese sea-borne empire. Considerably less ink was also spilt on the issues of the language of engagement even though the Portuguese were the first Europeans to have mingled with the communities of Asia and established meaningful trading relationships. Many of these relations were continued and adopted by the subsequent colonizers. Arguably, the Estado da Índia left behind a blueprint for both commercial and societal interaction with the inhabitants of Asia.7 However, little credit has been given to the Portuguese for being the foremost in establishing this link between Asia and Europe. This was a result of how the history of the Portuguese in Asia has been perceived and written. Firstly, the following questions had to be addressed: by whom is history written and for whom is history written? For example, most Dutch and English sources demonized the Portuguese as unrestrained, bigoted, promiscuous individuals, who possessed no order or rights to colonize. Victors wrote history with a skewed hindsight. It has been a conscious effort by the successors of Portuguese Malacca to claim that the port city was in ruins after the wars with Aceh and Johore. In this way, any subsequent developments were credited to these new colonizers. The Portuguese chroniclers did not 7 The term Estado da Índia literally means ‘State of India’. But it also represents the various Portuguese administrations in colonies east of India. 4 observe this. Tomé Pires, Fernão Lopes de Castanheda and Duarte Barbosa conferred in their writings that the Portuguese inherited a prosperous and thriving port.8 However, this dearth of historical coverage was partly the Portuguese own undoing. The Estado da Índia rapidly fell from grace by the middle of the seventeenth century to the Dutch in the Southeast Asia, losing Malacca in 1641. More importantly, they never recovered to regain the prominence experienced in the early sixteenth century, both in Asia and in Europe. This was one of the reasons why Portuguese presence in the region had been scantly examined. This period in history has been more commonly seen as a prelude to the ‘Age of European Expansion’. Many other prominent studies have focused on the introduction of the East India Companies as the beginning of ‘the Age of Commerce’.9 Some historians have even mocked the success of this Lusitanian ‘power’, asserting that any success must be due to a failure of the Asians than an achievement of the Portuguese. In Asia a willingness to accept intruders and the lack of any united opposition allowed Europe’s feeblest imperial state to establish itself amongst the great and ancient powers of civilizations. The Portuguese met no concerted resistance from a world so immense, and inhabited by peoples of such a diversity of races, religions and cultures as to preclude the emergence of any single dominant maritime authority.10 8 Duarte Barbosa, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vols.1 and 2, translated by Mansel Longworth Dames, (London: the Hakluyt Society, 1921) Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, vols. 1 and 2, (especially vol. 2 on Malacca) edited and translated by Armando Cortesão, (London: the Hakluyt Society, 1944) Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do Descombrimento e Conquista da India pelos Portugueses, Livros III and IV, (The Princeps editions – 3rd edition) revised and annotated by Pedro de Azevedo, (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 1928) 9 A term coined from Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 10 Geoffrey Scammell, The First Imperial Age, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) p.78. 5 It was true that the Asians did put up a relatively weak resistance to the Portuguese infiltration. But it was also their ability to illicit collaboration with the Asians, which allowed them to gain a foothold in the local markets. Portugal was the first European country to have colonies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. To the east, they established a chain of fortresses stretching from Mombassa in Africa to Nagasaki, Japan. The irony is that despite criticisms of the way they administered their empire, the Portuguese still had nominal control over her colonies for the longest period of time, with Macao only returning to China in 1999. For a relatively shorter time span of a hundred and thirty years, the Estado da Índia governed Malacca. The two other European colonizers ruled Malacca for a longer period of time with the Dutch from 1641 to 1824 and the British from 1824 to 1957. At the turn of the new millennium, Malacca has still been fondly remembered as the famed Portuguese colony. From the promotion of Portuguese food (egg tarts) to traditional song and dance in ‘mini Lisbon’ or A Famosa, the descendants marked their heritage. Speaking a Malayo-Portuguese Creolised language, Patuá, they were also Catholics who especially, celebrate the feast days of San Juang (John) and San Pedro (Peter) in June, on top of their Easter and Christmas commitments. The survival of the thriving ‘Portuguese settlement’ served as a nostalgic reminder to the locals of their past interactions with the first European settlers in Asia.11 The study of how their forefathers managed manage to leave behind this legacy is intriguing. The Estado da Índia appeared to display what was 11 For more information of the Portuguese settlement, see http://www.malaccacom.net/malaccaportuguese/ For an account of the survival of Portuguese culture in Southeast Asia, see Leonard Andaya, “THe Portuguese Tribe in the Malayo-Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in The Portuguese and the Pacific, edited by Francis A. Dutra and João Camilio dos Santos, (Santa Barbara: University of California, 1995) pp.129-47. 6 termed as ‘soft power’, or a power not overt enough to be seen as dominating, yet able to maintain a strong influence of the affairs of the city. In other words, the Portuguese achieved a different form of relationship with their colonies where they need not control them politically in order to benefit from them economically. Instead, they exploited the self-interests of collaborators to help serve their agenda and needs.12 With regards to Portuguese overseas expansion writings, a caveat is placed on the prejudice, which has been found in its official history. One of the foremost authorities, Charles Ralph Boxer, author of Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion and the Portuguese Sea-borne Empire and The Portuguese Sea Borne Empire 1415-1825, expressed this as ‘National Catechism’.13 Portugal had been under Fascist rule for about half of the twentieth century. During that period, many historians and publishers alike were accused of being cashiered by the dictator, António Salazar.14 Consequently, their version of history had been written with the aim of recapturing of the ‘Golden Age of Portugal’, with special attention paid to Brazil and the New World. This nationalistic overindulgence in the ‘Great discoveries’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to exaggerated assertions. A contention was the “secrecy theses” which claimed that the Crown managed to achieve these feats as early as the dawn of the fifteenth century.15 At 12 Ronald Robinson, “Imperialism of Free Trade” in the Economic History Review, vol. 6, (1953), pp. 1-55. Charles Boxer, “Some Considerations on Portuguese Colonial Historiography” in Anthony Disney (ed) Historiography of Europeans in Africa and Asia, 1450-1800 (London: Variorum, 1995) p.28. 14 B.W. Diffie, “Wise man from the West”, Pilgrims of the Past p.121. 15 ibid, p.120-1. 13 7 the time of authorship, incumbent political or ideological leanings had to be separated from the literature.16 More Portuguese scholars have moved their attention away from South America to examine Southeast Asia. This was an attempt at understanding the intricacies and trials of the Portuguese in starting an empire in the East. Luís Felipe Thomaz has written on Malacca and the southern Indonesian islands. Jorge Alves wrote on the North Sumatran port of Pasai, while Paulo Pinto explored the triangular relationship between Aceh, Malacca and Johore. Ana Maria Guedes and Manuel Lobato have focused on the outer areas of Pegu and Ava, as well as the Moluccas. 17 Autonomous history Nearing the end of the second millennium, a greater involvement of Asian scholars to write their own histories was witnessed.18 Greater collaboration has been seen with the involvement of Western institutions such as Leiden University and Cornell University. In 16 See also Rosa Maria Perez, “Portuguese Orientalism: some problems with Sociological Classification.” In The Portuguese and the Socio-cultural Changes in India 1500-1800. Edited by K.S. Mathew, Teotónio R. De Souza and Pius Malekandathil. (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2001) pp.8-11. 17 Alves, Jorge M. dos Santos, O Domínio do Norte de Sumatra: A História dos Sultanatos de SamuderaPacém e de Achém e das suas relações com os Portugueses 1500-1580. Lisboa: Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, 1999, Ana Maria Marques Guedes, “Burma” Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Portuguese and the Pacific, A. Dutra and João Camilo dos Santos (eds) (Santa Barbara: University of California October 1993), Maria Ana Marques Guedes, Interferência e integração dos Portugueses na Birmânia, c.1580-1630, (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1994) Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, “Melaka, Johor and Aceh” in Nouvelles Orientations de la recherche sur L’histoire de L’asie Portugaise (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997), pp.111-133, and “Captains, Sultans and liaisons dangereuses: Melaka and Johor in the late sixteenth century”, in Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century) pp. 131-146. Edited by Peter Borschberg. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004) 18 Collaborative efforts could be seen in books such as, Sunait Chutintaranond and Chris Baker (eds.), Recalling local pasts (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002) 8 addition, more funds from Fundação Oriente and Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, along with initiatives such as Towards A New Age of Partnership (TANAP), helped to push for better cooperation between Asian and Western scholars. New generations of historians were also reflecting on the colonial past from a more impartial standpoint. Now some distance has been gained from those days of European colonization. Hence, Asian scholars were more open to express certain concerns on the interpretation of their histories. They attempted to correct the misunderstandings, which occurred from years of historical misrepresentations. A benefit brought to the table has been the combination of the experience of being raised on a staple of traditional folklore with the Western mode of enquiry and methodology. The call had been sounded for Asian historians to rewrite their histories, but not in a nationalist way. The historian George Winius warns that, Starting out with their national history, they [Asian scholars] must go to European archives for it because history is a European concept, and European sources are often the best for studying their past. Once into their colonial past, they realized that they are treating something that is much larger than the history of their own country. 19 The studies made from European sources by Asian scholars also affected the way the Europeans were portrayed to have come to Asia. For the Europeans, these studies have emphasized the need for an overarching view and not simply a national view of what had 19 Georger D. Winius, “On Discovering the Expansion of Europe” (1991) Pilgrims to the Past, p.248. 9 been going on.20 Both the Europeans and Asians have recognized that European Expansion from the sixteenth century gave direction and helped shape the modern world. For if the modern Asian historian is writing History in the Western tradition, then there is no more possible for him than for the ethnically Western historian to escape from the Western “cultural heritage”, just as impossible for him to achieve an Asia-centric perspective in this philosophically fundamental sense. If this is so, either nobody at all can achieve an Asia-centric perspective, or everyone can.21 John Smail Smail’s challenge was for historians of all nationalities to avoid being ‘centric’ on any one form of history, like Nationalist history. A revision of nationalist history and a reshaping of the social and political maps of the past, minus the biases of the nineteenth century empire-builders and their twentieth century nation-state successors were required. The old national story served its purpose in establishing the nation and had over-run its course now. The key was to break away from the colonial framework through considering social and cultural histories.22 There has been a demand for the other stories, other narratives of the non-national subjects that appeared in abundance and waiting to be told. Subaltern studies were gaining popularity, with ‘more recent’ historical works like Professor James Warren’s study on rickshaw pullers gaining critical acclaim.23 It calls for a drive away from writing a national history that was constantly about unities, such as 20 ibid., p.250. John R.W. Smail, “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia” in Laurie J. Sears (ed) Autonomous Histories, Particular Truths, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Center of Southeast Asian Studies Monograph no.11, 1993), p.41. 22 Chris Baker, Recalling local pasts, p.169. 23 James Francis Warren, Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore, 1880-1940 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) ‘More recent’ also indicates the history that is closer to today. Professor Warren was still able to use oral history to substantiate his findings as the history was within a generation gap. The same cannot be said for this study of Portuguese history in the sixteenth century. 21 10 one nation, one race, one language, one capital, one crown, one culture and one story. On a larger scale, globalization has been considered as the union of all the affairs of one world. 24 But the reality was that when the Portuguese first achieved its maritime empire, they always needed to contend with the challenge of localization and the different languages and customs. The French had the school of thought, ‘mondialisation’, which literally means ‘worldization’. The key difference between this and globalization was that the latter often homogenizes. On the other hand, ‘mondialisation’ celebrated the amalgamation of different cultures and practices. Along with hybridization, more emphasis has been placed on the multiplicities produced by the collision between global trends and local particularities. All this meant that a better understanding of the history of sixteenth century Malacca was formed. The problem with nationalist histories was best observed in Portugal and Spain when they were under fascist control. The tight control on history resulted in opaque accounts of their greatness in the fifteenth century. Nationalist historians wrote with the purpose of reconstructing the “Golden Age” of the Portuguese Empire. They continued to give explanations for the subsequent decline. This legacy had unfortunately been passed down. The consequence was a gap seen in the writing of Portuguese history in Southeast Asia. Initially, there were the accounts of the conquests of the Great Alfonso de Albuquerque, then followed quickly by the corruption of the officials, which led to the demise of the Estado da Índia. The ‘middle’ parts of their engagement with the local communities and the problems in administration have been overlooked. Another disparity laid in the tone, which this history has been written. The Nationalists concentrated on 24 Chris Baker, Recalling local pasts, p.170. 11 their great discoveries and benevolent rule, while the post-Colonialists underlined the evils of Colonization and the barbaric nature of the first European encounter. Defining Southeast Asia The term ‘Southeast Asia’ is highly problematic. This expression only arose after the Second World War with the Allied powers defining this region, to combat the Japanese forces. In the history of earlier times, it was often used to refer to the areas bounded by the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The focus has primarily been on the Malay Peninsula and the major Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Java. Much of the classical Southeast Asian literature centered only on the success of certain ports or empires, such as Palembang in the Srivijayan period, which assumed representation of the surrounding areas. This totalizing mission created false unities and secretly reinforced the prominence of the region’s key port cities. Southeast Asia could not be crammed into fixed stereotypes of being tightly controlled from the center. 25 Southeast Asia is a political geography, which is more fractured, fluid and layered than the pattern suggested by the ‘state’. Malacca was more than just a port city of a few hundreds square kilometers. According to the geographer, Paul Wheatley, the boundaries of the Malacca Sultanate stretched as far in the southeast of Lingga, as far south as Jambi, 25 Chris Baker, Recalling local pasts, p.169. For more on the post-World War II writings of Southeast Asian history, see John Legge, ‘The Writing of Southeast Asian History’. Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol.1, (paperback edition) pp.1-50, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) especially pp.15-23. 12 to the west of Rokan and to the north of Kelantan.26 From the Portuguese historian Luís Thomaz’s perspective, Malacca was basically made up of three concentric circles of influence.27 The inner one, around the port of Malacca consisted of territories ruled directly by the sultan. The middle sphere had territories administered by the mandarins and mendelika appointed by the sultan. 28 And on the outermost ring were the tributaries, vassals and allied kingdoms, a few of which were ruled by kinsmen of the sultan. 29 It was an intriguing web of relationships, mixed with numerous marriage alliances. The people in these territories offered up crops and a variety of services including supporting the military in times of war. In return, Malacca provided its dominions with protection, a market for surplus crops and a share in its prosperity.30 Malacca was a port city where Tomé Pires found as many as eighty-four distinct languages were spoken.31 The study of the diversity in these networks reflected on the successive layers of historical experience that transgressed the well-established political and ethnic boundaries and allowed for a richer discourse on the past.32 More 26 Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500. (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961) p.310. Malacca region stretched from Kuala Lingi (Acoala Penajy) in the north of Kuala Kesang (Acoala Cacam) in the south and extending inland as far as the foothills of Gunong Ledang (Golom Leidam) the territory of Malacca comprised. p.317. See also Emanual Eredia’s description, Description of Malacca and Meridional India and Cathay, translated by Joseph Vivian Gottleib Mills, (Kuala Lumpur: Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1997) p.259. 27 Thomaz, “The Malay Sultanate of Melaka” in Reid, Southeast Asia in the Early Modern era. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993) p.76. These three concentric circles suggested by Thomaz, could be inspired by the Mediterranean model by Fernand Braudel , “The Expansion of Europe and the Longue Durée”, in Expansion and Reaction, edited by Henk L. Wesseling (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1978) pp.25-6. 28 Mendelika or Malay Mandarin was the hired help to collect tributes for the sultan, which was paid in tin. 29 Among these tributaries were Rokan, Siak, Purjm, Kampar, Indragiri, Pahang, Tongkal and Linga, as highlighted by the Portuguese chronicler, Tomé Pires, He would call them ‘seignories’ who would offer tribute and supply men to the sultan of Malacca. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, pp.262-4. 30 Thomaz, “The Malay Sultanate of Melaka”, p.77. 31 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.269. 32 Chris Baker, Recalling Local Pasts: Autonomous history in Southeast Asia, p.5. 13 considerations were made for the traders, warriors, artisans and seafarers, who made up this cosmopolitan city. A result was the examination of the significant role played by the market to undermine the dominating authority of the central state.33 This was clearly seen in Malacca, as the merchants were highly influential in dictating the policies in the town. However, the opposite was seen in the drive by the central state to stifle and control market forces in order to enhance its power. But in so doing, the authorities denied itself and its citizens the economic benefits, which flowed from trade and commerce. This resulted in the oppressed, or those who perceived themselves to be oppressed, realizing better opportunities to move elsewhere. 34 This was seen in the case of the foreign merchant communities residing in Malacca. Also, most of the people in Southeast Asia possessed the option to flee and enter into new relationships with the numerous kingdoms nearby. There were no strict land boundaries for these groups of migrants. A clear example was the orang laut, who were sea nomads with little allegiance to any land-based authority. Migrating and accepting the new obligations of the new patrons were part and parcel of the lives of these mobile inhabitants. Sometimes, this was done as a sign of protest over the existing regime. 33 ibid, p.7. Micheal Adas, “From Avoidance to Confrontation”, in Nicholas Dirks, (ed), Colonialism and Culture, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) p.103. 34 14 Methodological Approach Thomaz, an Orientalist, who was teaching a new generation of historians, showing them how Portuguese materials can be used to study Asian history. He is gradually creating a school of his own, not basically involved in discovery, roterios, or Governors-General but trying to find out what the place of the Portuguese in Asia actually was.35 George Winius Whilst many letters, manuscripts and documents about the Portuguese in Asia are still left available to historians, the call now is to “read across the grain” to sieve out nuggets of information. 36 They were then corroborated with the other sources to test its veracity. The nature and identity of the information has also come under greater scrutiny, with the knowledge of an author and the purpose behind the writing proving to be just as, if not more important than the facts that are in it. For example, Thomaz noted that the Sejarah Melayu focused on the dealings of the Court and not the merchant community or the populace.37 The same has been said for the official Crown chronicles like the Suma Oriental. On its own, these manuscripts cannot provide an exact portrayal of the conditions of Malacca, as they were probably written by and for the elites. But when the views and statements are corroborated with other European or Asian sources, then threads of consistency and accuracy could emerge in the description of Malacca. 35 Winius, “On Discovering the Expansion of Europe”, p. 250. A similar call was made be Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Polticial Economy of Commerce Southern India 1500-1650, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.254. 37 Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, 1511-1580, (Macau: Macau Territorial Commission for the Commemorations of the Portuguese Discoveries. 2000) p.11. 36 15 Another problem to note with the Portuguese manuscripts was that they have often been written with a variety of underlying objectives. While most of the accounts were official, some however, were personal stories of travelers and soldiers coming to this part of the world.38 Both forms of narration had its flaws and often, they were greatly exaggerated. A larger concern was the fair amount of hype seen in the official documents. This was because the Estado da Índia had been operating from a very tight budget. Thus, many officials in Malacca were understood to have blown up their accounts of the importance of the places they conquered, so that they received more resources and men to better enable their administration of the area. Another problem was with the translations of the Portuguese documents. This stemmed largely from the fact that Old Portuguese letter writing had disregarded most grammatical structures. The chroniclers and travel writers of the past largely wrote their accounts in the same way that they spoke. This brought about difficulties to translators in deciphering the text. There are two kinds of translation to consider, with one being literal and the other, interpretative. To effectively analyze sixteenth century Portuguese documents involves both these kinds of translation. On the one hand, it was necessary that the translator kept true to the original text. But on the other hand, considerations must be made to the context of the writing. More contentiously, imagination might be needed to better comprehend the message the author was conveying. This required a lot of effort on the translator to possess knowledge of the local conditions then. Hence, the translators must also be historians of that period and not merely linguists. 38 For example, Fernão Mendes Pinto, The Travels of Mendes Pinto, edited and translated by Rebecca D. Catz (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984) 16 In addition, when dealing with Portuguese history, there has been an issue of contention with the distance between the chroniclers from the scene of the action. In the words of the Portuguese scholar, Garcia da Orta, “long distances make long lies.”39 The premise was that the further away they were from the ground, the less accurate was their terminology. A dilemma arose when the official chroniclers like João Barros, Diogo Do Couto and Damião de Goes did not set foot in Southeast Asia. Yet from their base in Goa, their extensive access to a variety of first-hand material made their stories more reliable than the personal narratives of Mendes Pinto. There are three categories of written Portuguese history, namely official, unofficial (traders and soldiers’ accounts) and ecclesiastics. The reason behind this stratification was related to the funding these history writers to whom they were answerable. For example, the Christian missionaries focused mainly on the conditions of conversions in these parts as they were supported by the Papacy. Of greater importance was that a certain level of formality and different terminologies were attached to selected official documents. It was not sufficient to depend exclusively on Tomé Pires’ Suma Oriental to glean all the information on Malacca in the early sixteenth century. Granted that Pires has been widely regarded as the first Portuguese chronicler to travel throughout most of Asia, still there are some grave errors and inexplicable omissions in his writings as well as his 39 Garcia da Orta, Colóquios dos Simples e Drogas da Índia, (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, 1891) p.382. 17 portrayal of Malacca’s inhabitants. Pires was originally trained as a pharmacist and his forte was in describing the spices and drugs, not the people and their activities. Other detailed manuscripts, such as the letters of the Crown’s Italian envoy, Giovanni da Empoli, have found little attention.40 The historian’s craft requires constant questioning of the attained information. An example of questionable material written in the Suma Oriental was when Pires wrote that four shahbandars managed the harbor of Malacca. But in the Undang Undang Melaka (Laws of Malacca) the law states that the role of the shahbandar was a harbormaster and provision was made for only one.41 If there were four shahbandars, this implied that the conditions of the harbor then was so disorganized, that four people were needed. Pires was possibly mistaken and the term nakuda (captain) could have been used instead. In another instance, nakuda Begeau was a captain of the Gujarati merchants. Nakuda was his title of captain. Yet Pires referred to him as a shahbandar. It made little logic as to why nakuda Begeau was found away from his post in Malacca port, when he was supposedly the harbormaster there. Paying notice to the terms Pires employed, gives a more complete understanding of the events in Malacca. Titles of references were important points of study. Other names worth mentioning included Utimutaraja, who could not be treated as merely a Javanese leader. 40 See Giovanni da Empoli, Lettera, introduced with notes by A. Bausani, (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1970) and the unpublished dissertation by Laurence A. Noonan, The Travels of John of Empoli: a study of a Florentine Trader in the service of Portugal 1503-1517, (Perth: University of Western Australia, 1970) 41 Liaw Yock Fang, Undang Undang Melaka, a critical edition, (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1976) p. 63-5. 18 The word “raja” had a similar meaning to the word “royal” and it was a title bestowed upon only by a sultan.42 Etymologically, the other term muta (or muda) refers to young. Hence, in other words, Utimuataraja was probably a Javanese prince residing in Malacca. A fair amount of detriment has been brought about by these slight changes, which occurred during the chronicling by the authors or in the paleography and translation. Nonetheless, Pires’ work remains important to historians, as it still is one of the more comprehensive guides to the conditions of the times. The solution was to adopt a more critical eye to interpret the facts, especially in reflecting on the terms he used. Arguably, the first European contact with Asia commenced as early as the fifth century BCE with Herodotus. Or that the extensively recorded travels with Marco Polo in the late thirteenth century showcased the groundbreaking feats of European interaction with Asians. While one is not denigrating the success of the earlier encounters, the period of Portuguese maritime expansion has still more significance as it marked for the first time, mass numbers of Europeans, who uprooted themselves to travel to faraway places and settle down. It was with the establishment of this colony of Europeans, over a long period of time, that gradual changes in the political, economic and social structures slowly slipped into Asian society. 42 João de Barros, Decádas, selected, prefaced and notes by António Baião, (Lisboa: Livaria Sá da Costa, 1946) p.242. 19 To footnote this period of history, or worse, to combine the Portuguese colonization efforts with that of the Dutch and the British, was wrong. The Estado da Índia colonized in a different manner as contrasted with the other Portuguese settlements. It was remarked by the historian of Portuguese Brazil, B.W. Diffie, that About two years later, I realized how little I could ever know within the span of time I was supposed to complete the book about the Far East. It is a totally different aspect of Portuguese history, a different world to study.43 Hence, the comparative approach has been limited in its outlook and reflection of what was present in Malacca at that time. This work is an extension of an earlier thesis, “Collaboration and Co-dependence: Portuguese Relations with the Indian and Chinese Communities in Malacca”. This previous work explores the similar themes of cooperation between the Portuguese and the foreign merchants residing in Malacca. The main difference is the inclusion of the indigenous factor with the Portuguese engagement with the Malays, who saw themselves as the sons of the soil. Hence, this was the community that stood to lose the most in the emergence of a new foreign power. Further complications arose from the fact that most of these Malays were Muslims. This is by no means a definitive history, neither is it intended to be that way. From the explorations into the mechanisms of how the Portuguese engaged the local inhabitants, hopefully, a fresh insight to sixteenth century Malacca is achieved. 43 Diffie, “Wise Man from the West”, p. 121. 20 Chapter TWO: Background to Europe and Southeast Asia This chapter explores the context in which Portuguese began their expansion into Asia. By having a layout of the situation in Europe, as well as the setting in Southeast Asia, enables a better understanding of the motivations and intentions of the Crown in its quest for these territories. In addition, the Italians were already present and trading at the various regional ports, like in Sumatra.1 In 1128, Portugal gained her independence under relatively harsh circumstances. Afonso Henriques refused to pay allegiance to the kings of Leon and Castile and separated politically from them. Right from the outset, the new king of Portugal faced the primary challenge of limited territory. This led to further problems with the numerous wars they had with the Moors from North Africa, who fought for control over the south of present day Portugal. The products of Portugal were wine, olives, cork, salt and preserved fish. Hence, they relied on the sea trade of Lisbon to sustain most of the Portuguese economy. This declining state of affairs needed to be remedied immediately, thus prompting the Crown, in particular the rulers of the Aviz dynasty, to look overseas for expansion.2 Initial conquests and occupation of foreign lands not only brought in revenue for the Crown, but also prisoners who were used to assist in the Portuguese 1 The term, Italians, comprises mainly the Genoese, Florentines and Venetian merchants, who visited these areas for trade. As their numbers were few and they did not reside in these harbor towns, thus it cannot be argued that they were the ‘first Europeans’. Their presence was a fleeting one, unlike the Portuguese. 2 For the list of monarchs in the Aviz Dynasty, see appendix A. 21 overseas expeditions.3 In light of the constant lack of manpower faced by Portugal, these captives proved essential. At the turn of the sixteenth century, Portugal was still economically poor by European standards. Located along the southwestern coastlines, Portugal depended on its sea trade for its national revenue. But apart from their main port city of Lisbon, they enjoyed no other flourishing urban centers. This was not sufficient to sustain a population of approximately one and a half million people.4 Hence, there was a desire to search beyond their shores for more opportunities to trade. The nation faced a lack of monetary and labor resources, yet these adversities did not deter the Crown’s strive to expand overseas. The Portuguese achieved an unprecedented feat when they managed to scatter over ten thousand men to far-reaching outposts between Brazil and Japan by the end of the sixteenth century.5 This success had been attributed to the ambitions of the monarchs of that time. But, this was accomplished in tandem with the people of Portugal, who resiliently carried out these orders and searched for fresh prospects abroad. Eventually, these explorations and discoveries led to the occupation and colonization in various parts of the world. In the conquests of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, an attitude of reconquista and revenge had been prevalent. But as 3 An early example of this would be the conquest of Ceuta in Africa in 1415. In our study of the conquest of Malacca, we know that the Portuguese had six hundred Malabaris (from the captured Malabar) who joined forces with the Crown’s Army to fight against Sultan Mahmud’s men. Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do Descombrimento e Conquista da India pelos Portugueses, (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 1928) p.138. 4 Geoffrey Vaughan Scammell, “Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in the Indian Ocean” (unpublished seminar paper, International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History, Bombay: Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture, 1978) p.2. 5 Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, Expansion and Conflict, (London: Macmillan Press, 1993) p.39. 22 time wore on, this mindset changed and interest in the Crusades was replaced by an enthusiasm for commercial opportunities. The Christian kings of Portugal were not inclined towards the idea of a common war against the infidels.6 They realigned their focus on studying how to make profit from trading with these non-Christians. This further illustrated expansion as a way to solve Portugal’s economic woes. It has been said that ideas precede events. Hence, certain occidental schools of thought arising from the fifteenth century were reflected in the coming of the Europeans to Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, The Renaissance provided not only fresh perspectives, but also new ways of depicting what was seen. While it was mostly remembered for the Italian arts and style, for the purpose of this study, the focus is on a specific aspect of the Renaissance, namely Humanism. Theoretically, it was the technical skill belonging to the academics. At the heart of this was the call for the stripping away of externals and removal of redundant facts. Hence, it had been seen as a new approach to learning in terms of what was read and how it was interpreted and used.7 In reality, Humanism had been freely applied to a variety of beliefs, practices and philosophies that placed its core emphasis on the human realm. The term has been often used with reference to a system of education and mode of inquiry that developed in northern Italy during the fourteenth century and later spread through Europe.8 6 António da Silva Rego, Portuguese Colonization in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of the Royal Ordinances (Regimentos) (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1965) p.15. 7 Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, Expansion and Conflict, p.115. 8 Definition found in http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=109244&tocid=0&query=humanism&ct 23 By the sixteenth century, a mounting belief within academic circles in Portugal asserted that the Crown’s achievements, explorations and discoveries in South America and Africa, paralleled the Roman Empire of antiquity. However, representations of this “golden age” of Portuguese expansion were still trifling in most parts of Europe. This was disappointing as the later half of the fifteenth century witnessed the Portuguese successfully sailing across the Atlantic and to Asia. The chronicler, Damião de Goes vowed to highlight the Lusitanian achievements, which he thought were comparable to the Greeks and Romans. The difference was in the parochial thoughts of his fellow historians and authors, who failed to do justice to Portuguese achievements. In his opinion, the Portuguese undoubtedly surpassed the Ancients in their military and maritime feats, but no modern writer described these accomplishments as positively as the ancient authors had done.9 Similar comments were made by Camões, who in his epic poem, the Lusiads, challenged his contemporaries to write about the Portuguese discoveries in a lofty way, as it was meant to be.10 Hence, when reading these Portuguese literature and chronicles, it is pertinent to consider the agenda, which was set out by a few authors in those times. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Portuguese were required to grasp this new reality, which included a few incompatible emotions. For example, there was the pride in their scientific discoveries, yet humility towards the superior cultural heritage of 9 Hooykaas, R. “Humanism and the Voyages of Discovery in the 16th Century Portuguese Science and Letters Letter of Damião de Goes to Bembo, Oct. 14th, 1540.” (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979) p.152. 10 Luis de Camoes, Lusiads, Translated by William C. Atkinson. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1952) p.23. See also Geoffrey Vaughan Scammell, “The New Worlds and Europe in the Sixteenth Century” in History Journal, (1969) pp.396-400. 24 the Ancients, which made these discoveries possible. The Portuguese savored their political and cultural expansion, but had to deal with the shame with reference to the moral and social evils that came along with it. 11 But all these were deemed necessary evils that the Crown came to terms with. Still, these dissonant attitudes found its way into the Portuguese writings. The history of the Portuguese discoveries and conquests has been littered with stark contrasts. The stories told included characters varying from saints to pirates. Some yearned for paradise, while others mourned about a paradise lost. The description of the Lusitanian travelers ranged from the righteous and nasty, charitable and uncaring, open-minded and narrow. In all, a wide variety of Portuguese men sailed to these new lands to help create this new era of Lusitanian history. When Portugal was said to have equaled or even surpassed the feats of the Roman Empire, it was mainly inspired by two important facts. First, there was the advancement in scientific discoveries of their navigations. Second, the Crown managed to conquer and establish political power over vast territories in Africa, Asia and Brazil.12 The Portuguese were seen as the heir to the Roman Empire as a fractionalized Italy was not up to the task. The Italians largely identified themselves with the states, such as Florence, Genoa and Venice. But for the purpose of this thesis, they will be addressed as a collective term. The Italians played a significant role in the success of the Portuguese exploration and discoveries. The Portuguese collaborated with this equally small country with a strong seafaring tradition. The Italians possessed a wealth of experience in trading and 11 12 Hooykaas, “Humanism”, p.67. ibid., p.53. 25 traveling since the thirteenth century. The most notable icon of that period was Marco Polo. Approaching the end of the fifteenth century, the Italians were world renown for their nautical abilities and were of great service to the other Europeans. For instance, Spain’s most distinguished captains were Italians, namely Christopher Columbus, who was Genoese and Amerigo Vespucci, a Florentine. The most notable contribution was the discovery of the America in 1492. At the turn of the sixteenth century, the Italians had already voyaged through the ports in Southeast Asia. Initial records showed that Nicolò di Conti had an expedition, which lasted from 1416 to 1441. Then, there was Girolamo da Santo Stefano, who ventured into Sumatra between 1493 and 1499 and lastly Ludovico di Varthema traveled from Lisbon to Malacca between the years 1503 to 1508. The influence of the Italians was evident from the presence of an Indonesian kadi who could speak their language in 1485.13 Without any doubt, the Indies, like America, were revealed to Europe by Italians whose fate it was to hear later from such and such a Portuguese captain, such and such a Spanish captain, had discovered new territory and occupied it in the name of his sovereign, and to beseech princes to grant those rights, cut by half, which they had previously freely and fully exercised either in navigation or in travels by land.14 Angelo De Gubernatis 13 Girolamo da Santo Stefano noted that, “in that spot (in Sumatra) there was a kadi who was a great friend of mine, for he had the knowledge and notion of the Italian language.” Empoli, Lettera, p.89. 14 ibid., p.90. 26 This comment made by the Italian historian reinforces the belief that his countrymen were overlooked in the history of European Expansion. It was tempting then to consider the Italians as the primary agents of change in Southeast Asia, for they recorded the first contacts made with various ports in the region. However, the activities of a few Italian travelers and traders during the fifteenth century could not be compared to the impact of a continuous presence of the Portuguese soldiers, sailors, officials, priests and traders, who settled in Malacca for over a hundred and thirty years.15 Nevertheless, acknowledgement has been made of their earlier presence, but more importantly, for their assistance rendered in the collaboration with the Portuguese Crown. The earliest forms of Portuguese collaboration originated from their dealings with the Italians. The Crown depended on and desired to tap into their expertise and experience. For example, the kingdoms in Sumatra were familiar in trading with the Italian merchants, and that prompted the Crown to acquire a few Italians to lead their engagement with the peoples of Southeast Asia. As for the Italians, there were few options outside this arrangement to establish themselves as pioneers of European exploration. Moreover, the Portuguese and Spanish conquests in Asia received the papal blessing and approval. Along with the disunity seen in Italy at that time, therefore, those Italian states interested in Asiatic trade, like the Genoese Republic, the Florentine duchy 15 Chandra Richard de Silva, “Beyond the Cape: Portuguese Encounter with South Asian peoples”, in Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era. Edited by Stuart Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.296. 27 of the Medici and the Venetian Republic, made the best of the opportunities found in this collaboration with a foreign power.16 Giovanni da Empoli was a nobleman from Florence, who was employed by the Crown as an envoy on the fleet captained by Albuquerque to Malacca. At times, he is referred to as Joanes Impola in the Portuguese chronicles. His job was to undertake the very risky role of sounding out the reactions of the native rulers ahead of the coming of the Portuguese.17 For example, when they first arrived at Pedir, Empoli was sent to explore the possibilities and conditions of trade. He gathered information on the weights and measures used in these Sumatran ports. Another of Empoli’s task was to explain the purpose of the Portuguese expedition, which on the surface, was to establish friendly relations with the port cities. A deeper reading into the various chronicles would suggest that the aims were more inclined towards subjugating the enemies of the Crown and conversely, to be of profit to their friends.18 The Portuguese studied the experiences and setbacks faced by the Italians while they were in Southeast Asia. One of the key things learnt was the difficulty for them to adhere to strict religious doctrines and laws, if they were keen on forging relations with Islamic rulers, traders and societies. Thankfully for the Portuguese, a precedent was set when Pope Eugene IV granted an audience to a “sinner”. The aforementioned merchant Nicolò di Conti embraced Islam while in Egypt. This was deemed a grave sin at that time, 16 Empoli, Lettera, p.90. Laurence A. Noonan, The Travels of John of Empoli, p.98. 18 Alfonso Albuquerque, The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque. Translated by Walter de Gray Birch, (New York: Hakluyt Society, 1884) p.58, Castanheda, HDC, p.127. 17 28 yet he Pope absolved him of his wrongdoing. As a penance, the Pope asked him to relate in chronological order the things he beheld in India and Indonesia.19 Hence, it could be surmised that by the mid-fifteenth century, trade and other dealings with the Muslims, even up to a point of conversion, though frowned upon, was not irredeemably condemned. Another traveler who converted was Ludovico di Varthema. His motivation was not wholly for monetary gains. The Islamic religion was his fascination as a subject. He became a Muslim, so as to have a better grasp of the mentality of the peoples he visited. He entered Mecca to perform the Haj (Muslim pilgrimage) and recorded the details of what was witnessed there.20 By the sixteenth century, it appeared that there was a growing European interest in learning about the Muslim culture. Not least of the reasons was to discover new trading opportunities these places provided. The Portuguese examined the accounts of Varthema’s 1504 voyage from Malacca to Sumatra, so as to obtain a better appreciation of the conditions of this trade area. He described Malacca as a city on the Peninsula of present day Malaysia, which paid tribute to the Chinese Emperor. It was widely believed that in return, China offered protection to the sultans. In the 1430s, Sultan Iskandar was the first monarch to personally visit China to present this tribute. Subsequently, the other sultans also continued to pay obeisance to this mighty power. The reason behind this was that the kingdom of Siam had consistently claimed Malacca as their tributary state. Siam controlled several states nearby like Ligor and Patani, but it was the port city they desired most. This was because Malacca was 19 Empoli, Lettera, pp.87-8. Ludovico Di Varthema, The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema in Egypt, Syria, Arabia Deserta and Arabia Felix, in Persia, India and Ethiopia, AD. 1503-1508, translated from the original Italian edition of 1510 by John Winter Jones (London: Hakluyt Society, 1863) pp.xxxv-vi. 20 29 recognized as a principal port of the Indian Ocean trade.21 Hence, it was prudent to form an alliance with a stronger power seen in China. Varthema illustrated the extent of governance in the port, which principally was the sultan’s appointment of a harbormaster to administer justice for the foreign merchants. Emphasis was placed on the welfare of these traders, suggesting that they played a significant role in the affairs. The need for law and order became apparent when considering Varthema’s negative portrayal of the other inhabitants in Malacca. The Malay nation may be divided naturally into three classes: the civilized Malays, or those who possessed a written language, and have made a decent progress in the useful arts. The gypsy-like fishermen, called the sea-people, [are] also pirates. And the rude half savages, who for the most parts, live precariously on the produce of the forests. 22 Ludovico di Varthema The first encounter of the Europeans with the people of Southeast Asia was with the orang laut, as they lived along the coastlines of the Straits of Malacca. The impressions given had been negative, as these sea nomads did not always heed the laws of the landbased sultanate. They were groups of sea-people, who were only responsible to their chief and their activities often involve piracy. Varthema added that it was not possible to go about the town when it was dark, because people were killed like dogs and all the merchants who traded at the port, slept in their ships.23 21 Barros, Decádas, p.260. Varthema, Travels, p.227. 23 Varthema, The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502-1508, Edited by Norman Mosley Penzer and translated by John Winter Jones, (London: The Argonaut Press, 1928) p.84. 22 30 This description of Malacca suggested that it was in a state of chaos at the dawn of the sixteenth century. In addition, suggestions of people running amuck frightened away traders.24 Hence, it did not appear that Mahmud Shah possessed an effective control over the situation. Despite glowing reports made later by the official chroniclers, especially Tomé Pires and Duarte Barbosa, it was evident that the situation in the harbor town was already very much in disarray at the time of Varthema’s visit. This waning of the state was made more apparent when contrasted with the description given to the rival port city of Pedir. Varthema suggested that it was an advanced society with an established port that possessed its own currency of gold, silver and tin. All of the coins had an elaborate design of elephants struck on them. In his opinion, justice was strictly administered with their sultan setting up a council to settle commercial disputes. He describes the traders in Pedir as not warlike but attend to their merchandise and are very great friends of foreigners.25 Varthema witnessed the bustling trade in this port city with one street purportedly having five hundred moneychangers. These moneychangers were needed because of the great number of merchants who came to this city, where they carry on a very extensive traffic.26 In stark comparison, Varthema dedicated only a single chapter on Malacca while he wrote six to describe Pedir. This suggests that Malacca was not that prominent at that time. In addition, his depiction of Pedir was one of a superior thriving port with greater organization. Pedir also had the advantage of a close hinterland, which offered far more 24 Varthema, Travels, p.226. Varthema, Itinerary, p.84-5. 26 ibid., p.86. 25 31 products, such as pepper and gold. Thus, the status of Malacca as this chief emporium of the Malay Archipelago has been largely overrated.27 Religion supplies the pretext and Gold the motive. 28 Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq The Portuguese needed to address the prevailing ideologies in Southeast Asia, particularly, Islam. The Portuguese were prepared and knew who their enemies were likely to be. Their potential enemies were divided into two categories: Arabs or Muslims and all the others. For the Muslims and Arabs, there was no doubt that war must be waged against them. This feeling was mutual as the Muslims opposed the Portuguese wherever and whenever they met.29 These motives behind these wars were not separated into religious or national or commercial or political categories. It was a combination of all these reasons, which spurred the conflict. Besides, Islam was the avowed enemy of Christianity. In certain circles, any wars between the Christians and the Muslims need not be discussed. It was simply taken for granted.30 27 For further reading on the exaggeration of the importance of Malacca, please see Roderich Ptak “Reconsidering Melaka and Central Guangdong: Portugal’s and Fujian’s Impact on Southeast Asian Trade (Early Sixteenth Century)” In Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century). Edited by Peter Borschberg. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004) pp.1-9. 28 Busbecq, a Fleming, was the ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor at the Sublime Porte (the Turkish Sultan's court in Constantinople) from 1555 to 1562. In Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965) p.133. 29 Silva Rego, Regimentos, p.27. 30 ibid., p.28. 32 The Abbasid rulers of Baghdad from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries created a splendid image of Muslim kingship in which the ruler was God’s shadow on Earth.31 Hence, to rulers of Southeast Asian kingdoms, who sought for greater legitimacy, Islam was an attractive religion to ascribe to. Islam’s attractiveness not only pertained to the ruling elite, but also to those participating in the international trading network, whose feeders into the Mediterranean and the European markets went through the heartlands of Islam. The political cultures of the Malayo-Indonesian Archipelago (or ‘Malay World’) at this time were compatible in important respects with the prevailing political culture of medieval Islam, and that local rulers came to see their functions and objectives in Muslim terms. In the late thirteenth century, Islam was spread along the main trade routes that ply across the Indian Ocean. But the major transformation took place in Malacca in the second quarter of the fifteenth century when its third ruler converted to Islam and adopting the name, Sultan Iskandar Shah. Soon after he port city profited from the increased patronage from Arab traders. As Malacca emerged as an emporium of trade in the Malay World, many other port cities also took the cue and followed its example. They claimed to appreciate the egalitarianism purported by Islam, as opposed to the Hindu caste system.32 The greatest appeal of Islam, though, was clearly in its commercial benefits of possessing connections with merchants from the Middle East. This appeal of Islam was further highlighted in the attempt made by Sultan Mahmud to fashion Malacca 31 32 Virginia Matheson Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia, (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2003) p.61. Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History, (Berkley: University of California, 1982) p.234. 33 as a place of pilgrimage.33 He argued that two Muslim saints had once passed through the port. As with most pilgrimage sites, a commercial center was quick to follow so as to provide services to the worshippers. This in turn attracted more trade and enhanced the status of Malacca in the Muslim world. It remained arguable whether if this was legitimate claim or simply a ploy to derive more revenue for the sultan. In addition, as a patron of Islam, the ruler of Malacca was able to assume the title of sultan, placing himself on the same level as other sultans in the Middle East and India. He exploited the rich traditions of Persian leadership, which included claiming to have descended from Alexander the Great. Hence, Islam was seen as a useful tool for justification and cementing the position of the sultan.34 Incidentally, the rival port of Pasai was enjoying the benefits of being both a spiritual and commercial center. The fundamental difference was that Pasai possessed the right to call itself the first state to convert to Islam. Moreover, it continually stood at the forefront in the spread of Islamic teachings across the Malay Archipelago. Ironically, Sultan Mahmud’s kadis hailed from Pasai, yet, the relations he had with Pasai were strained. He constantly challenged Pasai’s status as a spiritual center through the questioning of their ulama there on points of theology. This almost led to these port cities close to war on several occasions. In some quarters, historians stated that war between them was imminent, and it was to occur regardless of the Portuguese appearance.35 33 Thomaz, “Malay Sultanate”, pp 88-9. Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia, p.62. 35 Thomaz, “Malay Sultanate”, p 88. 34 34 These are bad people who do not observe any rules; the infidel marries a Muslim woman and the Muslim the infidel woman. And the Muslims drink wine in public and do not pray before beginning a voyage.36 Ibn Majid The Islam observed in Malacca was not of the strict and ‘pure’ form as compared to the practices in the Middle East. 37 Although it was made the official religion, it was argued that the Muslims kept closely to adat (custom) instead of the hukum (law) of Islam. Hence, the Islam in this port city was adjudged to be open and permissive in character. Malaccan Sultanate In the structure of the Malacca Sultanate, every sultan was required to select, firstly, a bendahara (chief minister), secondly, a temenggong (police-chief), thirdly, a penghulu bendahari (treasurer) and fourthly a shahbandar (harbormaster). This was done to ensure that both ruler and his subjects lived in peace and security.38 Of particular interest, the shahbandar was given jurisdiction over all matters concerning foreign merchants, especially those who have suffered injustice in trade disputes. His authority covered on most of the trade matters pertaining to junks, cargo-boats and other vessels.39 To address the concerns of an external threat, the sultan also appointed a laksamana (admiral), who led the defense of port from sea-borne attacks. The second highest post next to the sultan was the bendahara and it was always chosen from a pool of highly regarded state 36 Ibn Majid was an Arab pilot hired by Vasco da Gama. Thomaz “Melaka and its Merchants Communities” p.34. 37 ibid, p.79. 38 Liaw Yock Fang, Undang Undang Melaka, a critical edition, (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1976) p.63. 39 Shahbandar = Shah – ruler, bandar – town or port, therefore shahbandar is the captain of the port. ibid. pp.63-5. 35 officials. At most times, the bendahara oversaw the daily administration of Malacca. In addition, he also possessed family ties with the sultan and was from the lineage of the previous bendaharas.40 Hence, a prominent merchant such as Nina Chatu would never get an opportunity to hold this post, had he not collaborated with the Estado da Índia. The Portuguese continued this practice by not only bestowing the office of bendahara to Nina Chatu, but also decreed that he was to be succeeded by his sons. 41 There was very little social mobility up the political hierarchy. This was slightly akin to a form of caste system. There were few ways of entering the royal circle unless in the form of marriage alliances.42 The officials in the Malaccan administration worked closely with the royal family. They were considered the pillar of support for the sultan and were part of the bureaucracy that ran the machinery of the day-to-day governance and administration. Only a few of these loyal officials who after many years of service, managed to join the ranks of the elite through marriages into the sultan’s family.43 But, in general, family ties played a pivotal role in the selection and appointment of these high state officials in Malacca. Movement up the hierarchy was not based on an individual’s performance. But, it was his relations with those in power, which mattered most. Hence, this resulted in a lot of gift giving to the sultan from both officials and merchants alike. 40 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca: a study of various aspects of Malacca in the 15th and 16th Centuries in Malaysian History. Translated by D.J. Muzaffar Tate, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 1992) p.217. 41 See Appendix C. 42 Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, p.229. 43 ibid., p.216. 36 O Gold, you are not God, but yet you can accomplish whatever you please.44 Khwajeh Hassan During the sultan’s reign, gift giving, especially in bahars of gold, was a common practice in Malacca. It was also very organized in the way which gifts were passed in the port city. They were usually done through the intermediaries of the bendahara and temenggong. It could be termed as corruption in today’s language, but bribery and gift giving was common practice then. On several occasions, the gifts were a form of custom duties paid to those in charge of the port. This was the way business was conducted in Malacca at that time. The merchants needed to consider what amounts and what kinds of gifts the sultan desired. This had to be done, as the latter was known to have raided merchant ships, whose owners displeased him with the lack of gifts. It was noted by the Portuguese historian, Jorge Alves that anyone who aspired to make a fortune needed to be careful of the sultan, as the latter ever ordered the imprisonment of a merchant for treason and had his riches confiscated.45 Several preceding sultans had taken an active part in trading, so much so that they became very wealthy.46 The sultan's efficiency in managing the foreign merchants' activities, as well as the efficient collecting of customs duties and the sultan's own trade, 44 The last Malay laksamana of Malacca mentioned this, when he saw the gold presented to him by Raja Mendaliar. John Leyden, John Leyden’s Malay Annals, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2001) p.340. 45 Alves, Jorge M. dos Santos, “The Foreign Traders’ Management in the Sultanates of the Straits of Malacca: The cases of Malacca, Samudera-Pasai and Aceh, 15th and 16th Centuries”. In From the Mediterranean to the China Sea, pp.131-142. Edited by Claude Guillot, Denys Lombard and Roderich Ptak, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998) p.140. 46 Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca. p. 228. 37 enabled the sultanate to concentrate all commercial transactions in one port.47 This also suggests that he had a direct hand in affecting the regional trade through monopolizing certain goods. Other instances of treason also appeared in the state just prior to arrival of the Portuguese. All these pointed to a crisis of confidence in the administration of Malacca, as the success of bribery on various levels was corroding the ability of the officials to efficiently carry out their duties. The most noteworthy example was the trade dispute between Naina Sura Dewana and Raja Mendaliar, which led to the execution of the bendahara Sri Maharaja. The two prominent merchants were rivals and they constantly tried to gain an upper hand on each other. Naina Sura Dewana went to bribe the bendahara with a bahar of gold while Raja Mendaliar did likewise with the laksamana Khoja Husain. Because laksamana Khoja Husain and his kinsmen were in high favor with Sultan Mahmud Shah, the latter believed the story concocted by Raja Mendaliar that the bendahara along with Naina Sura Dewana was planning to usurp his throne. Sultan Mahmud rashly ordered them to be executed.48 From this example, we witness the court intrigues of that time involving influential merchants and how gift giving helped caused changes in leadership in the central administration. There was also a level of distrust amongst the key members of government, which was exploited by the merchants to serve their needs. These Southeast Asian economies also witnessed traditional competition for power, as land-based rivals continued to pool resources in their attempts to build new 47 Alves, “Foreign Traders’ Management” p.137. Sĕjarah Mĕlayu or Malay Annals, an annotated translation by Charles Cuthbert Brown (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970) pp.155-6. 48 38 cultural centers. It has to be borne in mind that the legitimacy of the ruler was not due to his control over a piece of territory. 49 In Southeast Asia, it was largely borderless, and if there were to be boundaries, it was more likely to be border seas. The strength of the sultanate was measured not by the territories, but by the allegiance and loyalty of the people living in the area. Trade was significant in this competitive process as a source of material wealth that endowed the leaders with power and bestowed economic and psychological well being to those who chose to become subordinate to the center.50 Merchants and not political elites would control market networks. But there was a blurring of those lines as prominent merchants often through marriage alliances and bribery, bought themselves offices and positions in the nobility class. The market was largely in the hands of commercial specialists, whose behavior was largely inconsistent with traditional values.51 The Portuguese in India India was seen as a precursor as to how the Portuguese intended to administer Malacca. There were similarities in that they were also dealing with Muslims and Hindus. In the regimentos given to the Viceroy of India, Francisco Almeida, he was tasked to study the best way to attract Indian princes and Rajahs. He recommended and carried out the policy that those rulers who showed friendship to Portugal were given knighthood and military 49 Legitimacy was also tied to ancient Hindu beliefs of the genealogy of rulers to be some descendent of some deity. 50 Kenneth R. Hall, “Economic History” in Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: from c.1500 to c.1800 vol.2, edited by Nicholas Tarling. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.271. 51 ibid. p.272. 39 honors, with the corresponding remuneration of three thousand cruzados a year.52 But a more pro-active engagement of the Indians was seen with the appointment of the Governor Alfonso Albuquerque in 1509, who promoted the policy of casado and mixed marriages. Believe me, the married men here are not those that Your Highness wish to be married. They are men of low birth who have married their slaves in order to get the advantages of the dowries bestowed by Your Highness.53 António Real But the casado policy had been a popular policy amongst the Portuguese in India. It was also controversial, as many Portuguese exploited the opportunities this policy provided. The most significant group of merchants dealt with by the Portuguese in India was the Gujaratis who traded extensively with Malacca. It was said, “Malacca could not live without Cambay, nor Cambay without Malacca.” 54 One of Gujarat’s most important trade routes was that linking Aden and Malacca. Situated in the Gulf of Cambay, the Gujarat merchants were seen as the middlemen of this distant traffic. Firstly, the merchants of Cairo and Jiddah brought goods and money from Italy, Greece and Damascus down the Red Sea to Aden. Then, they were exchanged for goods from west Asia and Europe and that carried on in Arab ships to the Gulf of Cambay. These rich cargos included gold and silver, quicksilver, vermilion, copper, rosewater, wools and 52 Silva Rego, Regimentos p.34. Letter of captain António Real to Dom Manuel with regard to the casado policy. Raymundo António de Bulhão Pato, Cartas de Alfonso de Albuquerque, I, (Lisboa: Typographica da Academia Real das Sciencias, 1884) p.351-2. 54 Donald Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, (Reprint) (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993) p.20. 53 40 brocades. 55 The Gujarati merchants bartered for these with their indigenous goods, such as cotton cloths. But the key commodity desired by most traders was the spice from Southeast Asia. Hence, this led to the Gujarat merchants having to focus on their trade with Malacca. They accomplished this very well as they were the favored merchants of the sultanate and spices sent to the West were handled almost entirely in Gujarati ships. A majority of the Gujarat traders resided in Malacca, where they exchanged these accumulated wares for Chinese goods, especially silks and porcelains. Other goods in this thriving market were rubies and lacre from Pegu, cloths from Bengal and Coromandel, and cloves, nutmeg and mace of the Banda Islands. Malacca’s merchants relied on the textile trade with the Gujarat to further her trade. For the Gujarat, it needed an outlet for its indigenous goods. Statistically, it was cited that there were a thousand Gujarat merchants living in Malacca, and up to four to five thousand Gujarat seamen, who stopped over to trade.56 55 Pearson, M.N. Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p.11. 56 Donald Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, p.20. 41 Chapter THREE: Encounter and Engagement We come in peace, for anyone who wanted peace, or in war for anyone who so wanted. 1 Alfonso Albuquerque This captures in a nutshell the self-perception of the Portuguese in their approach to engage the people of Southeast Asia. An air of apprehension of not knowing what to expect in their encounter with the inhabitants of Malacca was experienced. The locals, who saw the Portuguese as ‘Faranghis’ or ‘White Bengalis’, shared that same feeling.2 The European leaders of this expedition were experiencing for the first time, having to deal directly with the Asians, after previously having traded through the Arab and Venetian middlemen. But just prior to their arrival, the Crown acquired vital background information through their close partnership with the Italians, who had been traveling extensively throughout Asia from the fourteenth century. However, the writings of Marco Polo, Nicolò Di Conti and Ludovico Varthema, despite being detailed, remained descriptive and theoretical. In reality, the Estado da Índia was required to address the practical considerations, which included problems such as the resurgence of hostility against the Muslims.3 Throughout their expedition to the East, the Portuguese were on 1 Castanheda, HDC, p.132. For further description on how the locals saw the Portuguese, see the Sĕjarah Mĕlayu or Malay Annals, an annotated translation by Charles Cuthbert Brown (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970) pp.151-2 and John Leyden, John Leyden’s Malay Annals, (Reprint) introduction by Virginia Matheson Hooker and M. Barry Hooker, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2001) pp.324, 352-3. The problems faced in any initial encounters are captured in the essay by Felipe Fernánde-Armesto, “The Stranger-Effect in Early Modern Asia”, in Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia, edited by Leonard Blussé and Felipe Fernánde-Armesto, (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), 2003) especially pp.181-6. 3 In particular, the Portuguese were at odds with the Muslim Gujarat traders. Both parties had their conflicts in Cambaya and the Gujarat traders residing in Malacca were wary of the Portuguese intentions in 2 42 their guard, with the anticipation of a possible war. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they went out looking for one either. Proof of this cautious approach had been witnessed as the Estado da Índia often sent envoys such as nakuda Ismael and Empoli to test the level of acceptance of the Crown’s fleet in Southeast Asia. There are two main time periods involved in the study of the Portuguese encounter and engagement strategies. Namely, it was before and after the conquest of Malacca on 10 August 1511. It is imperative to observe the earlier period, as it uncovered the Portuguese goals for the port city and beyond. This could be done through an analysis of the regimentoes (royal ordinances) issued to the captains of overseas expeditions. In post-1511, an inquiry into the execution of such orders revealed the difficulties faced by the Estado da Índia, as many of the subsequent events often did not go according to plaan. Before Conquest: Stated Intentions of Portuguese Admittedly, intentions were difficult to ascertain and at times, appeared contradictory especially when the ensuing actions did not correspond with the purported aims. The execution of plans had been an arduous task, more so when the Portuguese were dealing with a distant culture so different from Europe. Yet, certain steps were taken towards Southeast Asia. It was noted that the Portuguese were initially well received by the Sultan of Malacca, who allowed them to set up a factory in Malacca. But under the instigation of the Gujarat merchants, the Sultan was then swayed into disfavour against the Portuguese. “The Javanese and the Gujaratis who had more to lose, wished great evil to the Portuguese and desired to destroy them.” Notably, the Muslims from Cambay and their Kadis (religious teachers) were most vociferous in their opposition towards the Portuguese. Castanheda HDC, p.133. 43 preparing for their encounter with the Malacca Sultanate, and this was credit to the Portuguese. For instance, from as early as 1508, they dispatched ambassadors like Diogo Lopes Sequiera to establish diplomatic ties.4 They were aware of the necessity of these goodwill missions, which laid the essential groundwork before the emergence of the ominous Crown’s naval fleet. The directive given to Sequiera and the future leaders of the Portuguese missions, was to use violence only as a last resort.5 Under most circumstances faced, the Portuguese undertook efforts not to antagonize the indigenous communities. The rationale behind such a policy has been that any war drained what little resources and manpower the Crown possessed. The men were strictly tasked to pursue the main objective of these expeditions, which was namely to find and establish close working relations with the various regional ports. This was derived from the standing orders given to the captains of the ships departing Goa for Malacca.6 In particular, the captains of the ships needed to acquaint themselves quickly with the issues of the new ports they arrived at. They were instructed to take note of the following. 1) 2) 3) 4) 4 of their wealth, products, their area, and whom they belong to, who their overlord is, and whether any place belongs to the Muslims, whether there are races from another country and with whom do they trade, The orders were given to Sequeira on 12th February 1508. Sequeira would be delayed in India, missing the monsoon that would have taken him direct to Malacca. Hence, he only arrived there in 1509. See also orders from King Manuel to Viceroy Francisco Almeida. The importance of this mission could be seen in the King’s orders to Almeida that “you yourself should go to Malacca and fix this matter and establish trade and build a fortress in a place you think most suitable.” It was also vital to establish a base in Malacca so as to trade with rich ports of Pasai and Pedir. Alfonso Albuquerque, Cartas para el-rei Dom Manuel I, selected, prefaced and notes by António Baião, (Lisbon: Livraria Sá Da Costa, 1942) p.54. 5 Castanheda, HDC, p.134. 6 Basílio Sá, Documentação para a História das Missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente, Insulíndia, (Lisboa: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1956) pp. 17-8. 44 5) and whether the goods are dearer than here (India), 6) which are the best goods in such places and their prices, 7) and which people are at war and the weapons they use, 8) and whether traders from other countries live there and from which countries, 9) whether there are many ships in the place and their sizes, 10) whether there are sufficient supplies and what sort, 11) whether they supplied from abroad or locally, 12) whether they have kings amongst themselves and the way of life, 13) whether there is an administration of justice and their kind of laws. These regimentoes highlighted the detailed and careful considerations made in explaining what to look out, when engaging the inhabitants of these port cities. There appeared to be an emphasis placed primarily on trade, followed closely by the understanding of the political structures and war. Particularly on points 3 and 4, it appears that the Crown was wary of the Malay Muslims. Hence, this justified their initial search for alliances with the other races, like the Indians and Chinese merchants who resided in the port city. There had also been a desire to exploit any local warring situation to their advantage. In addition, the captains were ordered to keep the Viceroy of India constantly updated through written correspondence. This task was well adhered to, going by the existence of the vast collection of letters that survived today and are presently kept in the Goan archives.7 The Portuguese were wary of the Islamic influence in the Southeast Asian region. On the one hand, the Estado da Índia aspired to gain a foothold into this predominantly Muslim trading network. Yet on the other, the Christians were distrustful of the Muslims. This stemmed from a history of conflict they had in the Azores and against the Ottoman 7 Desmond Nazareth in his “Souls and Spices” presentation at Fundação Oriente, Goa. He mentioned that there are up to five hundred boxes of letters and manuscripts, which are left unread, stored at the Goa Archives. 45 Empire. The same could be said about the Muslims, who were skeptical of doing trade with the Christian Portuguese, as they were reminded of the Crusades. Most of the Islamic inspiration in Southeast Asia originated from the Middle East and Turkey. These Muslim kingdoms still held close trade and spiritual links with each other. In times of war, Turkey sent men and arms while Persia provided the logistical support in the form of horses. These efforts were aimed at retaining Muslim leaders in control of these ports against foreign, non-Muslim influences.8 Above all, Malacca enjoyed special favor in the Muslim world, as it remained the main transit port for Muslims in the region to go on their Haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). In light of this Islamic influence, the Estado da Índia turned to the promotion of the benefits of commerce, so as to hopefully, overcome any prejudices the Muslims had, in engaging the Portuguese. Before Conquest: Missions of Goodwill and Diplomacy On the first-ever Portuguese diplomatic mission to Asia, the ambassador Sequeira threaded cautiously in his engagement with the inhabitants of Southeast Asia. His primary task was to pronounce the Lusitanian objective of establishing trade with the masses. He had also been commissioned to build trust by inviting the people of Southeast Asia to come aboard his ship. As Sequiera’s vessel was formally on a diplomatic mission, it did not carry much almazem, as compared to those in 8 Other foreign infidels would include the Siamese who desired to reclaim Malacca as its tributary in the fifteenth century. 46 Albuquerque’s war fleet.9 Sequiera had been urged to do everything within his power to accommodate to the needs of the sultan and his envoys. These were all aimed at propagating the goodwill of the Crown. It was stressed in the regimentoes that this was very important at the start of their engagement with the sultanate and its people.10 Sequeira brought along many presents, collected en route from various parts of the world. For example, the gifts which the Portuguese ambassador presented to Sultan Mahmud consisted of a length of cloth dyed in grain, three pieces of printed Indian linen of a brown and white color, four pieces of velvet, a length of colored satin, a large mirror framed in gold, a Persian sword with a gold-plated hilt, a dagger and a lance, and six flasks of French perfume; all of which reportedly pleased the sultan immensely.11 This also showcased the array of commodities, local merchants would enjoy if they chose to trade with the Portuguese. Sequeira was also instructed to observe the port’s customs and practices, for the purpose that he must respectfully follow them.12 Initially, these actions elicited a positive response from the inhabitants of Malacca. The chronicler, Correa, stated that many local merchants were delighted with the inception of Portuguese trade. 13 This could be due to the greater profits generated when dealing, or even exploiting, a new player in their trading network. It had been apparent that it was the more experienced foreign traders who resented the Portuguese. 9 Almazem refers to the artillery carried on board the Portuguese ships. Later, they were used to pressure the Sultan Mahmud for the release of the Portuguese captives. Hence, Albuquerque arrived in a war fleet with many weapons, which was intimidating to many in the region. Castanheda, HDC, p.131. 10 Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p. 18. 11 Gaspar Correa, Lendas da Índia, (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade Coimbra, 1923) p.59. 12 Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p. 19. 13 Correa, Lendas da Índia, p.61. 47 Mainly, they were the Gujarati and Javanese, who lost out to this new competitor and at the same time, feared for their status as the sultan’s favored merchants in the port city. According to several sources, it was these foreign merchants and not the locals, who instigated the bendahara Sri Maharaja and Sultan Mahmud to challenge the Portuguese entry to the Muslim-dominated trading network.14 To further support this argument, initially in 1509, the Crown managed to set up a factory in a suburb near the harbor to trade. This arrangement sustained the Lusitanian expedition for about a year before the foreign merchants’ accusation of treason, which led to Sultan Mahmud’s order for the Portuguese indictment. In this instance, questions were raised as to whether the sultan had been a puppet of these prominent traders. The relationship between the foreign trade communities and the royal administration had always been greatly interconnected and interdependent. Most significantly though, we witnessed the extent of this influence wielded by these foreign traders on the affairs of the state. Upon arrival in 1511, Albuquerque had to address this concern and he planned to entice these traders to further his cause. He urged his officers in his speech on the eve of their attack, that If the traders who normally came to Malacca and who were accustomed to living under the tyranny of the Malays, liked our ways of justice, truth, sincerity, and clemency, and if they were to see the standing orders of the King, Dom 14 In a letter from the bendahara Sri Maharaja to Sequeira, it read, “My son, I am very sorry for what was done in this town against your people, for which I was not responsible, neither am I aware why it was done. Please believe me, it was done by the Javanese and the Gujarati.” Found in Pintado, Early Portuguese Documents, p.33. The chroniclers like Barros and Castanheda have summarized this correspondence in their works and questioned the sincerity of the bendahara. Nonetheless, when corroborating this with the Sĕjarah Mĕlayu, it appears there is some truth as the bendahara did adopt the Portuguese captain as his son and reportedly, was very kind to them. John Leyden, John Leyden’s Malay Annals, p.324. 48 Manuel, our Lord, in which he orders that all his vassals in this part of the world should be well-treated, I assure you that all of them will come to live here and build their homes with bars of gold. 15 The Estado da Índia realized that it could win over the traders, both Muslims and nonMuslims, by emphasizing the positive changes associated with their arrival. They asserted that there would be an increase in profits for the merchant if they chose to trade with the Portuguese, as they were willing to pay a higher price for their goods. The Estado da Índia also played the role of liberator to certain groups of merchants such as the Chinese and the Hindus, who appeared to suffer under the tyranny and unfair trading practices by the Malacca Sultanate.16 On the other side, Albuquerque was also alert to the concerns of traders, who might perceive Portuguese presence as a threat to their interests. Albuquerque had also been clear in his instructions above that the Crown’s army must carry out these specific commands of King Manuel to ameliorate conditions of trade in the port. Evidence of the Portuguese resorting to violence only as the final option, was seen when Albuquerque postponed the attack on Malacca. This allowed for diplomatic wrangling to take its due course. His fleet arrived in the harbor on 28 June 1511, and hovered around the harbor. Reportedly, they anchored off on an island called “Chinese island”. They arrived without firing any artillery and waited patiently for an envoy from Sultan Mahmud. In spite of his anger and desire to quickly rescue his compatriots held 15 Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.119. The Chinese merchants, for example, felt aggrieved with the offences committed by the Sultan, such as robberies and oppressive actions with regard to their merchandise. The situation was so bad that they came to offer Albuquerque their men and ships to assist him in war, ibid, p.98. In an earlier letter by Ruy Araújo to Albuquerque in 1510, he also described Sultan Mahmud as tyrannical. Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.24. 16 49 hostage by the sultan, Albuquerque followed protocol by not rashly going into war. Moreover, Albuquerque gave Sultan Mahmud many opportunities to have the war averted. Both were constantly in correspondence, with the former requesting for the release of the Portuguese captives and to settle the disputes amicably.17 The negotiations spanned for more than sixteen days.18 This time offered was considerable in light of the remark by Sultan Mahmud that he half-expected the Portuguese to catch the Northwest monsoon to India, due to their apparent lack of supplies, men and artillery. Apparently, he interpreted Albuquerque’s patience as a sign of weakness and lack of spirit to wage a war.19 However, it was rather the patience and restraint displayed by Albuquerque from acting on impulse and attack Malacca. The Portuguese did not want to be classified as conquistadors. Instead, they hoped to be portrayed as concerned traders who went the distance to protect their trading interests. This was a selling point that the Portuguese would go similar lengths to protect their collaborators. The Portuguese placed the fault of these failed negotiations for peace squarely on the sultan and his advisors. It was made clear that the Portuguese did not exact revenge on the Malays in general. It had been the mistake of their leaders, who committed the unlawful imprisonment of Ruy de Araújo and his men. Interestingly, Araújo who must have felt most aggrieved, was the one who wrote to Albuquerque that If they were to capture any of the Malay junks wherein they found Malays, the latter should not be treated without any cruelty. Instead, he (Albuquerque) should send one of them 17 It could assume that the correspondence were exchanged every three to four days as it was noted by Castanheda, HDC, p.136. 18 Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.117. 19 Castanheda, HDC, p.134, and Barros, Décadas, pp.239-40. 50 in advance to hand over a message to the bendahara informing him of the Portuguese intention of not coming to wage war against Malacca nor take anything away from them, provided the sultan accepts peace and is ready to hand the Portuguese captives back to him (Albuquerque).20 Information gathering. From their operations base in Goa, where they established themselves since 1508, the viceroy Francisco de Almeida dispatched emissaries to find out more about the trade and culture in Malacca. They knew that there was much profit to be made in Malacca, as it had been the chief redistribution center for the spices from the Moluccas. This information was derived from their collaboration with Italian travelers such as Varthema who remarked, More ships arrive here [Malacca] than any other place in the world, and especially there come here all sorts of spices and an immense quantity of other merchandise.”21 However, the Crown wanted first hand accounts of the situation in Malacca. Hence, they dispatched Sequiera on the expedition of 1509 to 1510. Sultan Mahmud upended this mission with an imprisonment order. Nevertheless, even when captured, the Portuguese factor Araújo still managed to be in frequent correspondence with the Crown and later, Albuqueruqe, through his ally, Nina Chatu. The letters gave good indication on the conditions of the harbor town. In one such letters from Araújo to Albuquerque, it stated, 20 Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.24. The closest accounts to the Portuguese arrivals in Malacca were that of Varthema who was travelling in Malacca and Sumatra from 1504 to 1505. Varthema, Travels, pp.224-5. 21 51 Even the very men whom I said he [Sultan Mahmud] would use as his soldiers, I believe the majority of them will stand up against him, for they are Javanese and Chetties, the principal merchants of the land and a large number of whom have been hurt by him.22 This letter from the Portuguese factor offered glimpse into the state of affairs in the sultanate and allowed Albuquerque to prepare for an appropriate response to win over these merchants. The merchants were apparently displeased with the sultan for their lack of participation in the administration of Malacca, despite their significant contributions in terms of money and men. Sultan Mahmud only appointed his kinsmen to handle the important matters and left these prominent merchants out of the hierarchy. This aroused feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation, especially for the foreign merchants like the Hindus. Hence, the Portuguese realized that they could entice these individuals to support their cause against the sultan. It also served as a reminder to the Estado da Índia to seek involvement of these influential merchants in future. In addition, treatment of all merchants in a fair and equitable way was necessary, so as not to incur their wrath. The significance of such assistance was best seen when Albuquerque engaged five Chinese captains, who were fleeing from the supposed tyranny of the sultanate.23 In this collaboration, he elicited vital military intelligence that enabled him to devise an effective war strategy. Albuquerque was conveyed with the statistics, that from a total of 26,000 men-in-arms commanded by the sultan, only half of them were trained soldiers.24 22 Letter from Ruy de Araújo to Alfonso Albuquerque, dated 6 February 1510, Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.23. Damião de Goes, Terçei: raparted a chronica do Feliçissimo Rei Dom Emanuel, (Lisboa: Casa de Françisco Correa, 1567) p.5. 24 The Portuguese forces was so small, only one-nineteenth the size of the Malacca forces. “ferem as desanoue partes”. Albuquerque’s force consisted of eight hundred Portuguese soldiers and six hundred 23 52 The governor was also warned of the imminent influx of additional support from the Turks and Persians, who usually supported their Muslim brethren in times of war. More importantly, Albuquerque had been fed with other key facts, such as on the location of their enemy’s weapons at bridges and mosques. All of this served him well in organizing a successful plan of attack, as he maneuvered around these potential pitfalls. The governor also found out that the sultan’s army was without their revered war leader, the bendahara Sri Maharaja, who had earlier been executed in 1510. In his place as the head of the ‘war party’ stood an inexperienced prince, who found it difficult to command the bulk of these forces. Hence, despite the distinct shortage of men in the Crown’s army, Albuquerque was still confident in confronting and defeating the defense put up by Sultan Mahmud. A key reason behind the swift Portuguese victory had been largely due to their access to information on the weapon placements and vulnerabilities of the sultan’s soldiers. Sultan Mahmud ordered artillery along the different posts on the street, which led from the bridge through the town to the adjacent suburb, Upeh. And along the coastlines, where they assumed the Portuguese were landing, they planted many caltrops filled with poisonous herbs. However, these plans were made known to Albuquerque through the supply of Chinese information, and he led the Portuguese attack from the harbor. The Portuguese also managed to maneuver around the military emplacements in Malabaris, totalling one thousand, four hundred men. Based on this calculation, the Sultan’s army would have amounted to twenty six thousand and six hundred men. This figure appears exaggerating, but possible when considering that groups of orang laut often came to the Sultan’s aid in times of war. Castanheda, HDC, p.138. 53 the town. 25 Thus, it appears that this information proved decisive in the defeat of the sultan’s army. To further highlight the extent of this cordial relationship between the Portuguese and the Chinese, the latter even offered military advice to Albuquerque suggesting that the enemy could be defeated by siege, as they were dependent on food arriving from the sea. Hence, if the sea-borne supplies were cut off, the sultan’s forces would be starved into submission.26 This offer of counsel indicates the closeness of cooperation shared between the Portuguese and the Chinese. The military information, provided by the Chinese merchants to Albuquerque, was also far more reliable than what had been provided by Araújo. The latter was of the opinion that once their army took the bridge, Sultan Mahmud would surrender. This was not so. Araújo was not in the best position to offer advice as he spoke from a captive’s viewpoint. Hence, the directions delivered to Albuquerque about the layout of the town must have been derived from his recollection of what he saw about a year prior to his incarceration in 1509. Hence, the Chinese captains gave a better update and fresh insights to the positioning and strength of the sultan’s men.27 Besides information, the Chinese offered themselves and their ships to the Portuguese for use against the sultan.28 As it had been reported, the sultan’s army outnumbered the Portuguese at nineteen to one. Thus, it made sense to accept any offer of 25 Albuquerque knew the details of the town’s defence, such as the number of men the Sultan had and where the artillery was placed. Castanheda, HDC, p.137. 26 ibid., p.160. 27 Araújo also made another error when he informed Albuquerque in his letters “ there was no stone in Malacca with which to build a fortress, as the land was marshy.” Barros, Décadas, p.257. 28 Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.98. 54 men from the Chinese merchants. The latter felt aggrieved by the actions of the Sultan Mahmud, whom they accused of stealing their goods to sell in the market.29 However, Albuquerque exhibited the pragmatic side of the Portuguese, as he stated that did not wish any of them to be injured or die on their account.30 He expressed concern that if he did not achieve victory, and if the Chinese fought on his side, they would incur the wrath of the sultan upon their return to Malacca. In so doing, he gained greater admiration from the Chinese. After all, the Chinese best served as merchants to trade with the Portuguese. They promised Albuquerque that if the Portuguese managed to establish themselves in Malacca, many junks dully loaded with goods would come from China every year.31 It could be that Albuquerque was already confident of victory with forces already available at his disposal and he did not want to unnecessarily risk Chinese involvement in this matter. The extent of this self-belief was best seen in his invitation to the Chinese to leave a few men behind to witness their victory. While the Portuguese appeared to manage their relations with the Chinese well, it was not so for the other communities in Malacca and the region. Many a times, it required considerable time to get the engagement strategy right. It became apparent that the Portuguese were adapting and responding to the situation as they went along. Take for instance, Albuquerque’s earlier expedition in North Sumatra. He raided eight Gujarati ships from Cambaya, which were on the way to Pasai and Pedir.32 In their first encounter 29 Castanheda, HDC, p.132. ibid, p.139, and Barros, Décadas, p.245. 31 Castanheda, HDC, p.136. 32 “Albuquerque had eight Gujarati ships that he had seized en route to Malacca, as they were enemies to the King of Portugal, and they had many rich stuff and merchandise, and arfion that they called tabaic opium which they eat to keep cool and which he would sell the sultan for three hundred thousand ducats in buying from the Moors, and much lower price at what was offered by the Gujarat.” Empoli, Lettera, p.128. 30 55 with the sultan of Pedir, he instructed them that in order to start the friendship, they were required to surrender the goods and ships seized. Albuquerque refused and soon his fleet chased out of the port. Upon their next destination, Pasai, Albuquerque was quick to inform the sultan of the eight ships that were seized and offered to sell the merchandise at a lower price. Again, the sultan requested that the Portuguese return the seized ships, as the merchandise was due for their port. The Portuguese learnt that the sultans stood by a code of ethics. Evidence of this was seen in the orders given by the sultan of Pasai to the Portuguese envoy, Empoli to tell the Captain General [Albuquerque] that his law forbade him to buy things that were stolen from his neighbor and in particular from his friends and therefore he wished to buy nothing from the Portuguese.33 Albuquerque relented and he even went ashore for two days to visit the sultan to establish a peace treaty with him. 34 A good reception was given to the Portuguese, with the sultan offering supplies and refreshments. Hence, from this episode, it can be surmised that the Portuguese adapted their engagement strategy to the conditions presented to them, in order to attain their goal of friendship and commerce in this trade area. 33 34 ibid., p.129. Barros, Décadas, p.221. 56 After Conquest Albuquerque’s conquests are described in detail in literature, but his unobtrusive work to encourage local people to trade in Portuguese areas, and to reassure merchants that they were safe to come and live in Portuguese towns, goes largely unheralded.35 Michael N. Pearson The primary intent of the Portuguese coming to Southeast Asia was in search of spices and other commodities of trade. They knew that the main spice producing area was further east at the Moluccas. They were also keen on exploring into the rich China trade and saw Southeast Asia (and its spices) as a gateway into the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, it was important that they displayed signs of staying put in Malacca. For instance, the construction of the fortress, A’ Famosa began almost immediately following the conquest with assistance from the locals in finding materials for its construction. The fortress was to serve as a deterrent for any counter attacks by Sultan Mahmud’s men. Impressively, the fortress was completed in a relatively short time of two years.36 In addition, this brought the Portuguese great admiration from ambassadors of neighboring ports, who showed their eagerness to trade with the Crown.37 It was an obligation to reward those who contributed to the success of the Crown’s army in the conquest. This was done to show the others in Malacca the tangible 35 Michael Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: the response to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) p.33. 36 Relative to the fact that the fortress in Goa was not finished in its construction even though the Portuguese captured it earlier. Albquerque, Commentaries, p.168. 37 Ambassadors from Siam, Pegu, Kampar, Aru all came to visit the Estado da Índia in Malacca. Barros, Décadas, pp.281-3. 57 benefits and rewards of collaboration. Previously, Nina Chatu had extensively helped the Portuguese in mediation between them and the sultan. He even went as far as risking his life, smuggling Araújo’s letters to Albuquerque. For his efforts, Nina Chatu was granted the rents and the post of bendahara, which now obtained jurisdiction over the kafir. 38 This prestigious office had previously been reserved only for Malays. Another key issue on Albuquerque’s post-war agenda was to appoint both Muslim and non-Muslim officials from a pool of collaborators. This was done to offer a sense of continuity and stability in the political hierarchy. He realized that this was necessary for the effective governance of the town’s inhabitants. These local representatives provided liaison to the Estado da Índia by voicing its policies. They also rendered feedback to the Portuguese authorities of any potential treason and uprisings led by certain individuals. More importantly, special attention had been paid to the foreign merchants, who had fled from Malacca during wartime. The Estado da Índia attempted to lure them back to trade at the port. In order for a return to a familiar situation, Albuquerque assigned the management of the non-Muslims to Nina Chatu and the Muslims to Utimutaraja. These were two prominent community leaders during Sultan Mahmud’s reign. The Estado da Índia made efforts to govern Malacca according to their existing laws and customs, so as not to alarm the foreign merchants with massive changes to the status quo. 39 The only minor difference was that all the inhabitants were now made aware that they were under 38 In Malacca, the kafirs (unbelievers of the Islamic faith) would include all the people who are not Jew, Muslim or Christian. Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca 1511-1580, (Macau: Macau Territorial Commission for the Commemorations of the Portuguese Discoveries, 2000) p.113. 39 Damião de Goes, Crónica do Felicissimo Rei Dom Manuel, parte III, annotated and prefaced by J.M. Teixeira de Carvelho and David Lopes, (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1926) p.77. 58 the sovereignty of the Crown.40 In other words, the only reserve had been the right of appeal and jurisdiction to the courts of Portugal. The merchants probably long sought for a kind of nominal equality before the law and readily accepted the Crown’s authority. As a result, many merchants returned to Malacca. Another key component in the creation of good public relations had been about the treatment of the ousted officials of the Malacca Sultanate. This was illustrated in the Estado da Índia’s approach to the former laksamana, Khwjael Hasan. He had been regarded as a man of military experience and of good repute and great knowledge. Hence, he was in the mould of a person whom they required in their administration. From an earlier account, Khwjael Hasan had proven that he was susceptible to ‘gift giving’ and hence, his allegiance could be easily won over. His loyalty to Sultan Mahmud was not that firm as shown when he perceived that the latter had lost the battle to the Portuguese, the laksamana fled south. But soon after the Estado da Índia had been established in Malacca, he came back up the Muar River and asked for a safeguard, declaring that he was willing to return and serve the Crown.41 Albuquerque responded positively by acceding to his request. However, Khwjael Hasan failed to show. Apparently, Utimutaraja secretly wrote to the laksamana to dissuade him from coming.42 He died and was buried at Gunung-pantai.43 40 ibid., p.78. Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.90. 42 Utimutaraja was later charged for treason and executed. Goes, Crónica, p.107. 43 Gunung-pantai means shore-hill in Malay and it refers to a location in the present day state of Johore. John Leyden, John Leyden’s Malay Annals, p.360. 41 59 Nonetheless, the Estado da Índia already displayed an act of goodwill to the inhabitants of Malacca by extending an olive branch to these ex-administrators. They respected and understood the importance of their prevailing influence, as many of them still had a loyal following. The rationale behind this was that if the new authorities managed to convince these leaders to identify with their cause, subsequently they helped widen the Portuguese base of support as well. At most times, the Estado da Índia’s policies were inclusive, with the objective of not marginalizing certain groups of people. This was because those left on the outskirts usually caused trouble and detriment to the Crown’s trade. Through co-opting of these selected few into their administration, not only did they lend legitimacy to their new administration, those co-opted were also less of a potential threat. For the other members of society who appeared to have earlier sided with the sultanate, Albuquerque also offered assurances that no harm will befall upon them in their return to Malacca. For example, he sent safe conducts to some Gujarat traders, who came back after following the sultan south. He also welcomed back those who were in debt bondage to the sultan and offered payment for their services.44 Regional relations Once the dust began to settle, the Estado da Índia began to look beyond its shores to reestablishing vital relations amongst the neighboring kingdoms. They displayed a keen interest in the study of culture and customs in the region. Their willingness to learn drew more people into an exchange of ideas with the Portuguese. Albuquerque dispatched Manuel Fragoso to Siam to prepare a book upon the manners, dress, trade and the latitude 44 Goes, Crónica, p.78. 60 of the harbors of the Kingdom.45 In this mission, Duarte Fernandes also laid the foundations of a good relationship when he handed over to the king the gift of a rich sword, the hilt of which was studded with jewels. This was symbolically a good gesture for a king who had constantly been at war with neighboring Pegu 46 . This was accompanied with a letter signed by Albuquerque on behalf of the Crown, lending support to Siam. The Siamese king treated Duarte Fernandes with great courtesy, and inquired all about Portugal and Albuquerque’s capture of Malacca. He also expressed his great satisfaction at the prospect of punishing the rebellious Sultan Mahmud, who he was in dispute with the latter. 47 In addition, numerous interactions were made between the Portuguese and the kings in the neighboring countries. For example, the King of Java sent his ambassadors to Malacca to establish peace and friendship with the Portuguese. The latter replied to the Javanese king with the gift of an elephant, which had been highly treasured in this part of the world.48 Java was especially important for its food supply to Malacca.49 The Portuguese also sent ambassadors to nearby countries such as Pegu and Siam to explain the motives of their coming. The offer of gifts and pleasantries had been a common practice to buy their friendship and hopefully, a fruitful trade relationship.50 45 Ronald Bishop Smith, The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations and Peregrinations to the Kingdoms and Islands of Southeast Asia 1509-1521, (Bethesda: Decatur Press, 1968) p.11. 46 Albuquerque, Cartas, pp.65-6. 47 Smith, Siam, vol.1, (Bethesda: Decatur Press, 1966) p. 71. In addition, Albuquerque had sent Duarte Fernandes to Siam to inform the King of Siam of the defeat of Sultan Mahmud. And he knew that this news would please the King as the latter had refused to be a vassal of Siam. Barros, Décadas, p.256. 48 ibid. p.283. 49 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol.2, p.173-4. 50 For the list of gifts presented to the King of Siam, see Albuquerque, Commentaries, pp.157-8. 61 In the engagement policy of the Estado da Índia, local envoys, like nakuda Ismael, were always sent in advance to these neighboring ports to prepare them for the arrival of the Lusitanian fleet.51 These nakudas, who were also captains of the various trading communities, possessed the experience of rallying the people’s support. They also made clear the ‘peaceful intentions’ of the Portuguese. These delegations not only publicized the victory of the Portuguese, but more importantly, informed merchants that the fighting in Malacca had ceased and welcomed them back to trade. Many of them fled during the war with Sultan Mahmud, fearing for the loss and destruction to their goods. Many returned on condition that the Portuguese offered protection for their ships and cargo against the alleged lawlessness and plundering that followed in Malacca. In addition, for the few merchants left on hearing the news that Utimutaraja was executed, the Portuguese took actions to clarify their stance. This had been an unpopular decision, which cost the Estado da Índia dearly. The situation needed to remedied hence, these goodwill missions were dispatched. 51 Barros, Décadas, pp.283-4. 62 Chapter FOUR: Collaboration - Theory and Mechanism The definition of collaboration is the united labor and co-operation towards a common goal. It suggests the work in conjunction with another different group of people. The more insidious overtone of collaboration is the traitorous cooperation with an enemy.1 The etymology of the word is derived from the Latin prefix cum- (with) and the noun labor (work).2 In the case of the Portuguese collaboration with the inhabitants of Southeast Asia, it was more a relationship of cooperation for mutual benefits. There were many separate forms of collaboration, which affected the different people ranging from the traders to noblemen. The facets of collaboration involved included the transfer of capital, information, intelligence, goods and public offices. Most of the collaborators resided in Malacca. However, some trading partners did not dwell in the port, instead, they came and went as the monsoons dictated. Nevertheless, they were all important to the Estado da Índia. They provided invaluable aid in the provision of food, expertise, funds and services which allowed the Portuguese to retain control of this colony for a hundred and thirty years. The Estado da Índia collaborated mainly with the prominent foreign merchants who resided in the port city. Foreign merchant communities, such as the Kelings and Javanese were amongst those whom the Portuguese tried hard to co-opt even before their 1 http://dictionary.oed.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/cgi/entry/00043846?single=1&query_type=word&queryw ord=collaboration&edition=2e&first=1&max_to_show=10 2 http://www.bartleby.com/61/60/C0476000.html 63 conquest of Malacca. 3 A couple of examples can be seen with the close relationship the Portuguese had with the chief Keling merchant, Nina Chatu and the prominent Javanese merchant, Utimutaraja. Adopting the practical business sense of exploiting opportunities, these merchants changed their allegiance to the Estado da Índia, who appeared to be able to provide for their interests. Upon conquest, Albuquerque was swift in his order to construct a fortress as an indication of their emphasis on security and protection of trading interests. The suburbs of Upeh and Hilir, which were inhabited by Keling and Javanese merchants, also had their defenses reinforced. This further highlights the Estado da Índia’s intention to guard the traders. Moreover, the Crown’s army had proven that they were the stronger power in the war against the sultan. It was therefore easy to understand why the merchants were prepared to trade their allegiance from the sultan to the Crown, based on the security and benefits gained. This form of collaboration was similar to the fruitful partnership with the Chinese merchants, and the Portuguese continued working along these lines towards common causes and goals beneficial for both the Estado da Índia and their associates. But the benefits offered by the new administration did not stem merely from direct trading concessions and security. The Estado da Índia also granted official positions in the new organizational hierarchy to its allies. They did their best to realize and fulfill the needs and desires of Malacca’s population. 3 Kelings came from the regional port cities along the Coromandel coast in South India. 64 Collaboration mechanism Collaboration with the Portuguese in Southeast Asia entailed the Estado da Índia’s response to the demands of the Malacca’s society and the corresponding assistance by their partners to achieve this. Hence, collaboration was seen like a mechanism that had its inputs and outputs. The inputs came from both the Portuguese and the various parties involved. These include adjusting to pre-existing trade practices and customs to minimalize disruption. Thus, the outputs were the benefits derived from each party in this collaboration. This differed for the various trade communities, from the grant of official posts to the lease of cartazes. Before tackling the demands of Malacca’s society, the Estado da Índia knew that it had to first address the basic needs of the town. For instance, they had to see that the food supplies to Malacca were restored. Albuquerque had prepared for this even before defeating Sultan Mahmud and his army. Immediately following the conquest, he sent his agents to follow Chinese and Peguan merchants to Siam and Pegu respectively to establish ties with these rice-producing countries.4 Albuquerque also granted safe conduct passes to Utimuturaja to send ships to Java to ensure a steady supply of food. 5 This was essential as it was noted that in the exiled Sultan Mahmud’s camp in Muar suffered a severe food shortage and this led many of his followers to desert him and return to Malacca.6 4 Barros, Décadas, p.256, Castanheda, HDC p.145 and Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.1, p.107. Castanheda, HDC, p.143. The importance of Java as primary supplier of food to Malacca could be seen in Pires, Suma Oriental, p.180. 6 Castanheda, HDC, p.154. 5 65 On the Lusitanian end of the bargain, they offered technological, military and diplomatic aid. This came in the form of the provision of weapons like muskets and cannons, and soldiers for the kings involved in local rivalries and dynastic wars. They also became mediators of peace, sending ambassadors to regional kings to sign treaties of friendships. Some relations between Malacca and the neighboring states had tarnished under Sultan Mahmud’s reign and the Estado da Índia took efforts to resolve them. The Crown’s soldiers also spent a great deal of time safeguarding the interests of traders in Malacca, such as protecting the ships from piracy and attacks from rival merchants. They also provided administrative services such as minting of coins and the settlement of traders’ disputes. Military Assistance Before the advent of the Portuguese, the more common weapons used in Malacca were the kris, bows and blowpipes. Some of the other weapons included lances and swords, which were obtained from trading with the Gores.7 The Crown’s forces used their weapons and military knowledge to barter for commodities from regional leaders or even rich merchants. They used more long-range weapons in their arsenal such as muskets and cannons, which inflicted more harm on their opponents. While there was evidence that Sultan Mahmud had such weapons too, however, they were poorly utilized and not placed strategically, such that the Albuquerque-led forces easily neutralized them. This was another feature of the Crown’s success in conquering Malacca despite being vastly 7 The Gores are either the modern day equivalents of Taiwanese or Japanese from Ryukyu Islands, explored in Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East p.276-7. Information on weapons gathered by Ruy Araújo’s letter to Albuquerque. Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.21. 66 outnumbered. The Portuguese exchanged military expertise and encourage the use of their weaponry. An output benefiting the Estado da Índia was the boost of its bargaining clout, by creating a demand for European-made weapons. But it also brought about positive benefits to the local kings, as the weapons made them less reliant on soldiers. There was a change in the way war was fought and the Portuguese provided the distinct advantage with the offer of their weapons and expertise to whichever king who collaborated with them. It is worthwhile to remember that the Portuguese, like those in Malacca, produced few goods of its own, save for these weapons. An example of this was seen in the mission report of António de Miranha, who was dispatched to Java to establish diplomatic relations. In it, he claimed to have furnished the Javanese with soldiers, artillery and clothing. These accommodations were arranged so that trade and profit will be secured. 8 The Estado da Índia was aware that Sultan Mahmud failed to maintain good relations with many leaders of Southeast Asia. The most significant was the conflict against the King of Siam as it meant that many seaports and tributary states like Patani remained closed to trade with Malacca. The sultanate was also at war with Deli.9 One of the first tasks Albuquerque undertook was to dispatch ambassadors to these port cities to re-establish friendly ties with them. Duarte Fernandez went to Siam, Fernão Peres de Andrade to Patani, João Pereira to Deli, Jorge Botelho to Kampar, Jorge de Brito to Pasai, Ruy Nunnez de Acunha to Pegu and António 8 On Captain Rui de Brito’s command, these things were brought to Java through the Portuguese captain António de Miranda, in an attempt to woo traders back to Malacca. Smith, The First Age, p.44. 9 As reported by the Chinese merchants who claim that Sultan Mahmud wanted to confiscate their boats and men to fight a war against the King of Deli. Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.22. 67 de Abreu to Java.10 These missions were meant to spread goodwill and understanding that the Portuguese came to the Malay World with the ‘peaceful’ intentions of establishing commerce. In addition, if there had been ill feelings with Malacca due to bad relations with Sultan Mahmud, the ambassadors reassured them of fresh beginnings attached with the inception of the Estado da Índia. Emissaries were dispatched to invite their counterparts back to Malacca where they showcased the construction of the fortress as emphasis of the Portuguese priority towards security of the traders’ investments in this commercial haven. In the months following the conquest of Malacca, all the inhabitants faced a massive food shortage. Initial fighting had scared away many merchants, who brought food supplies to this dependent harbor town. Malacca’s rice supply was derived from the traffic with Pegu, Siam and Java. In these dire situations, the Estado da Índia was willing to do business with anyone regardless of religious affiliations. The extent of the Portuguese desperation for food supplies and revenue was exemplified by the pardon of their enemy, Pate Unus, as long as he was able to provide them with the necessary food supplies. In late 1511, Pate Unus led a great fleet to Malacca in an attempt to wrestle power away from the Portuguese in Malacca. In slightly over a year, in 1513, the factor João Lopes de Alvim accepted his friendship and agreed not to inflict harm on his junk.11 The Estado da Índia collaborated with the Muslims, such as the Javanese and the king of Kampar. Restoring trade was just as important as sourcing for food because the 10 Albuquerque, Commentaries, pp.156-63 and António Galvano, Discoveries of the World, corrected, quoted and published by Richard Hakluyt (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1601) pp.112-5. 11 Castanheda, HDC, p.275. 68 Portuguese needed commodities to exchange for food supplies. As they offered few goods from their homeland, they needed to trade with a far-reaching number of ports to ensure a sufficient staple of different goods for their balance of trade. For example, King Abdullah of Kampar bartered with Albuquerque, giving him eight bags of aloes and sapwood and two bags of lacquer, and the Portuguese traded this for other goods and food for Malacca. From King Abdullah’s perspective, he was concerned in searching for a powerful patron. The Estado da Índia also readily accepted the latter’s offer to become a vassal of the king of Portugal. In reciprocity, it offered protection and even, the position of bendahara in Malacca to King Abdullah.12 Incidentally, King Abdullah was also the son-in-law of the exiled Sultan Mahmud, which hinted at the Estado da Índia’s astuteness, as this opened the floodgates for other Muslim kings to engage the new colonial power. It created a ripple effect as many envoys came from the mainland and islands on both sides of the Straits of Malacca. Albuquerque testified that he personally witnessed so many emissaries coming to Malacca that he began to doubt their motives. He suspected that some came more to spy on the new administration instead of a genuine desire for peace and friendly relations.13 Nonetheless, the desperate need for assistance and trade compelled the Portuguese to collaborate, even with these suspicions in mind. Collaboration with the Indian and Chinese Both the Indian and Chinese trading communities saw their respective countries as their homelands where they pledged their allegiance. Hence, they cared little for the change of 12 This could be seen more a political manoeuvre as the King was also the son-in-law to the ousted sultan of Malacca. 13 Castanheda, HDC, p.159. 69 administration from the Malacca Sultanate to that of the Estado da Índia. They were more receptive to the coming of the Portuguese, especially when they perceived that the change meant better trading conditions for them. For the Indians, the Portuguese had the advantage of previously entertained dealings with the elites of India. The Crown’s fleets had made their way into the subcontinent at the turn of the sixteenth century. Their most significant contribution was their exercise to balance the conflict and trade concerns of the populace. Various parts of India were renowned at that time for being at war with one another. But the Portuguese had, with relative success, found a common goal in trade to minimize these regional conflicts. The decrease in fighting paved the way for better trading opportunities for India. The Portuguese intervened through the supply of firearms and horses to the Hindu rulers in South India. 14 These were essential for both war and transport. The result was that the Maharajas soon became dependent upon the foreigners. This was especially beneficial to the Portuguese balance of trade. Hence, the Estado da Índia was keen on conducting a similar policy in Southeast Asia. The Keling, Gujarati and Chetti, who formed the bulk of the Indian merchant community, wished for a similar nonviolent solution in Southeast Asia, as it was known that armed rivalries amongst the ports like Malacca, Deli and Pasai was quite common. In addition, as traders, they desired for peaceful situations where their goods are protected and traded for the best price. Hence they were agreeable to the offer of funds and resources to the Estado da Índia to ensure security in the region. 14 Rego, Regimentoes, p.210. 70 The Portuguese had less trouble in co-opting the Chinese, as they were already furious at the way they were being treated under the Malacca Sultanate. It was reported that Sultan Mahmud went so far as to have impounded and robbed the Chinese goods in the harbor.15 When at war with the other rival ports, the sultan forced the Chinese to fight for them, such as the war against Deli. This was not in the intentions of the Chinese merchants to be involved in political conflicts. It was understandable that the overarching emphasis of the Chinese was placed on trade. After all, they came to Southeast Asia primarily in search for trading opportunities and not war.16 Hence, they preferred not get involved in any country’s politics. The Chinese were also unhappy with the apparent bias shown towards Muslim merchants, in particular the Gujarati and Javanese. The Portuguese tried to provide equitable trading conditions for all and not to solely benefit its own country traders. It did not want to upset the Chinese, as they recognized that there was a lot of potential to unearth in the China trade. The Estado da Índia also knew of vast numbers of Chinese merchants trading in Northeast Java, who were enticed to come to Malacca instead. There were also the Gores, who traveled to Malay Archipelago but stopped short of calling at Malacca, as they were unsure of the stance of the port’s new overlord. The Estado da Índia sent a safeguard down the Muar 15 In addition, the letter from Ruy Araújo’s to Albuquerque stated that the Sultan Mahmud helps his own kind and has contempt towards other believers who are not of his faith. Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, p.24. 16 For a deeper insight to the causal factors for the arrival of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Chang PinTsun’s “The first Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in the fifteenth century” in The Global Opportunity, edited by Felípe Fernandez Armesto, (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1995) p.112. For more on Chinese trading patterns from the fifteenth century onwards, see Fei Hsin, Hsing-Ch’a Sheng-Lan: or the Overall Survey of the Star Raft, edited by Roderich Ptak and translated by Joseph Vivian Gottleib Mills, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996) and Ma Huan, Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan: or the Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, translated by Joseph Vivian Gottleib Mills, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 71 River to reassure the Gores of the goodwill and desire for a trading relationship with them.17 Collaboration with the Malays By definition of “Malays”, this includes not only those residing in Malacca, but also former ousted leaders and the Islamic rulers of neighboring ports, like Kampar and Deli. For the majority, they have been converted in the earlier period of Islamization in Southeast Asia. The religious dimension made the collaboration with the Malays was a slightly more complicated affair. Dealing with the elite Malay leaders, even if they were resistors, was necessary as they served as the mediators to the masses. By and large, hatred and prejudice often stem from fear and ignorance. Hence, propaganda to the masses that the Portuguese did not just come to exploit and conquer the Malays was required. The Estado da Índia appealed to their practical side and convinced those who traded, to consider the benefits, such as a greater variety of trade. Undoubtedly too, the local traders also made a greater profit selling their wares to the Portuguese than the more experienced traders in the region. But this was extremely tricky as the Muslims were the most vociferous of opponents of the Portuguese in the wake of the latter’s attack on Malacca. And by Muslims, this included both the local Malay population as well as traders from the Middle East and India. They had earlier challenged the European in the fight for Malacca 17 Albuquerque, Commentaries, pp.89-90. 72 and had lost money and manpower in it. For instance, the rich Gujarati traders offered forty cannons to Sultan Mahmud to repel the Crown’s attack. Muslims have usually banded together in times of war. Earlier, the Muslims also pressed Sultan Mahmud for their Kadis had preached to them that the Portuguese were renegades and thieves who wished to dominate the whole world. Some saw it as their religious duty was to fight these invaders. They claimed that the Portuguese, who conquered and begun proselytizing in India, must not be allowed to spread their influence eastwards.18 Certain tales of the Crown’s Army desecrating and destroying mosques in India and Malacca further infuriated the Muslims. The Portuguese had to overcome this anger and prejudice towards them. Hence, it was imperative to find a “higher ideology” to surpass this Islamic one. The Estado da Índia addressed the Muslims’ pragmatic concerns, such as their livelihood and trade. This was required as the spiritual power of Islam endowed the Muslim world with great unity and strength. It made every Muslim merchant not only a follower of Islam but also the propagator of the doctrine and a defender of the faith.19 They needed to highlight the benefits of trade and offer of more services to the Malays. The Estado da Índia was hopeful that the ancient maxim ‘pecunia non olet’ (money doesn’t smell) prevailed. On numerous occasions, the Estado da Índia required the services of Muslims. Since the early times, the maritime economy of Asia revolved around trade with the Arab 18 19 Castanheda, HDC, p.133. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, pp.122. 73 countries. Historically, the Arabs were world renowned for their navigational skills. The collection of notable sailing directions from Sulaimān al-Mahri and Ibn Mājid gave proof of the prominence of Arab pilots along the west coast of Malaysia, before the onset of the Portuguese.20 The extent of the Estado da Índia reliance on these services was obvious by the end of sixteenth century, when it was noticed that the bulk of the nominally Lusitanian vessels in the East were, to all intents, manned and financed by Muslims.21 As this continued into the seventeenth century, it also suggests that the Portuguese efforts at religious conversion were not successful. Perhaps, they were not pressing this on their agenda as hard as some sources had led many to believe. An instance of the Crown’s collaboration with the Muslims was seen when Albuquerque left Malacca on the 1st December 1511, on the Flor de la Mar manned by sixty Javanese Muslims. These Javanese were held in high esteem on account of their knowledge of the sea. Unfortunately, it was a misjudgment on Albuquerque’s part and the crew mutinied.22 This shows the over-dependence the Crown on this ‘questionable’ group of people.23 The Estado da Índia was left with no choice but to hire them. As the expertise of the Javanese in the field of navigation was greatly desired, suspicions of their loyalty were temporarily set aside. This was an uneasy collaboration, to say the least. 20 For more on the navigational skills of the Arabs, see “The Master Navigators, 1450-1550” in Paul Wheatley The Golden Khersonese, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961) pp.233-243 21 G.V. Scammell, “Seafaring in the Estado da India. c1500-1700” for the 7th International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History. (Goa, January 20-24, 1994) p.4. 22 Roland Braddell, A Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1980) p.485. 23 Duarte Barbosa had described the Javanese to be very cunning in every kind of work, skilled in every depth of malice, with very little but very stout hearts, and was ready for every kind of wickedness. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. 2 p.177. 74 Often, there was not much of a choice and much of this support could be washed away in one stroke of misfortune. The Estado da Índia continued, probably more from necessity than convenience, to utilize locals so as to gain favorable trade and tap into their navigational expertise. The nakudas continued to raise crews for the Portuguese and Sarangs ran the Crown’s ships, exercising so much authority, and it amazed the Italian, Francisco Carletti, who traveled from Macau to Goa, they [the nakudas] make their understanding with him [sarang], recognize and obey him, so that even the Portuguese captain, the master and the pilot of the ship is commanded.24 The Estado da Índia had a policy of sending out envoys ahead of their arrival to sound out the inhabitants there. One of its collaborators was the Malay nakuda Ismael, who was sent about four days ahead of the Portuguese captain António de Abreu’s crew to announce the successful conquest of Malacca.25 Ismael, who was born in Malacca, was a very useful intermediary. He possessed a wealth of experience in the Malay World spice trade, having shipped cloves from Moluccas to Java. He was reputed to be a sea captain who knew the location of the cheapest spices.26 Hence, the Portuguese for both his knowledge as well as role of disseminating information valued Ismael. As a respected 24 Carletti called these hired pilots ‘Saranghi’ in My Voyage Around the World, translated by Herbert Weinstock (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964) p.186. 25 Barros, Décadas, p.284. 26 “In the first mission to the Moluccas in December 1511, Albuquerque sent António D’Abreu as the commander of three galleons. There was only a hundred and twenty Portuguese this fleet and the rest of the crew was made up of Malay soldiers and other sea-men.” Malay seamen were also hired as pilots for the Portuguese to navigate to lands of spices. Goes, Crónica , p.109. 75 captain of the Malay World, many inhabitants of the region listened and trusted him. Perhaps, the Estado da Índia hoped that if the people saw that Ismael trusting the Portuguese, so similarly would they be open to engagement with the Europeans. The first captain of Malacca, Ruy de Brito, noted that he relied a lot on such nakudas to help source out for more spice and food trade routes. 27 The Estado da Índia also understood the important role of the nakuda in the Southeast Asian context. Not only was he tasked with piloting his ship, the nakuda was also responsible for the transaction of all goods in his vessel when trading in other places. Hence, he was well aware of the trading network and practices in Southeast Asia. In the complex system of distribution of goods in the Malay Archipelago, it was imperative that he knew where and when to trade in certain goods, like spices, which were harvested seasonally. The Estado da Índia recognized that it relied on this wealth of expertise possessed by the nakuda, so as to advance it’s trading interests in the region. 27 Smith, The First Age, p.57 “it appeared to me a good thing to dispatch some navios (nakudas) to Java in search of spices” In 14 March 1513, Captain Rui de Brito found a need to look further out to get more trade, sending three ships and a caravela there. They returned on 22 June with 1200 quintals of clove. Goes, Crónica , p.109. 76 Chapter FIVE: Collaboration - Assessment and Justification This is how Malacca appears to us in the era of the sultans, a cosmopolitan environment where primitive conditions and poverty are coupled with great luxury, a melting pot of peoples of many races at different cultural levels.1 Marie Meilink-Roelofsz This chapter explores the ideological differences in Islam and Christianity and how the Estado da Índia accommodated with these challenges. Collaboration was essential for both parties, as it appears that the Muslim associates were better off, while it has been established that the Estado da Índia required assistance to advance itself. Initially, the Estado da Índia ventured in the alliance with the Chinese and Hindu merchants. There had been little conflict of interests, as all parties were concentrating on the amelioration of trade. A similar re-enactment was witnessed with the Malay population, which formed a majority of Malaccan society. In addition, the idea that people of the same religion traded exclusively with each another was flawed. Upon examination of the various participants of this relationship, two main categories of collaborators emerged. One group consisted of those who acted as intermediaries. These were usually high-level officials, some of whom were from the former nobility in the Malacca Sultanate. They were attractive partners as they used their considerable influence over the masses to lend credibility to the Portuguese occupation. These intermediaries went along with the Lusitanian ideology and provided them the mouthpiece for disseminating their official policies. These collaborators include Tuan 1 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, p.59. 77 Colascar and Utimutaraja, both of whom possessed their own strong, loyal following. It was observed that these men were largely opportunistic in taking advantage of changes and the subsequent prospects made available to them. In the previous administration, plenty of political tussles were apparent in the sultan’s courts. Similarly, under the leadership of Estado da Índia, there were still numerous problems concerning the contestation of key positions of government. One such case was when the charges of treason brought about by the sons of Nina Chatu against the ‘viceroy’, Abdullah. They had a bone to pick with the latter as it was widely perceived that he was the cause for their father’s removal from office, which led to his subsequent death. This paralleled with a similar, earlier episode when the Hindu merchants accused Utimutaraja of treachery. Notably, this tussle for greater power in the political hierarchy only occurred at the top rung of society involving high-ranking officials and rich merchants. This left the tough decisions of judgment on the shoulders of the new imperial powers. As much as the Estado da Índia attempted to stay clear of politics, they were constantly sucked into domestic disputes in Malacca. To the north and south of the port city, the Portuguese did not manage to stay away from controversies either, with their involvement in rivalries with Aceh and the Johore Sultanate. There were other times when the Portuguese was involved in the role of kingmaker. Many leaders from faraway ports like Ternate and Tidore, appealed for the Crown’s support to protect or even install them as sultans of their respective port cities. In return, they promised extensive trade with the Portuguese and some were even ready to commit themselves to be vassals of the 78 Lusitanian power.2 There was a slight shake up in the powers that used to dominate regional politics, with the entry of the Crown’s naval force. Smaller kingdoms took advantage of this change and latched on to the coattails of the Portuguese to further their own survival interests. There was a secondary group of collaborators, who were not political and did not resist the Lusitanian presence in Malacca. These people operated on a lower level in the social hierarchy and they provided services such as navigation to the Portuguese. As an active group, they neither affected nor influenced to the way the Estado da Índia governed the town, These “non-resistors” were focused more on their livelihood and in many ways, resistance only jeopardized their source of income. This group of assistants consisted largely of the Malays, who mostly made their living as fishermen and petty traders in the Archipelago. They were involved in what Ronald Robinson termed, the ‘historicist’ form of collaboration.3 In other words, they accepted fate and the conditions that were dealt to them. This was an easier step to take, through tolerating coercive power and recognizing their inability to change things. This gives justification to their actions that they were just swimming with the tide and moving on with the times. Although they did not actively participating in collaboration in the form of engagement with the Estado da Índia, they were still important. By not resisting 2 Letter from the King of Ternate to King Manuel, in Basílio Sá, Insulíndia, pp. 85-7. Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration”, in Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, edited by Henry Jr. Turner, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976) pp.136-46. 3 79 and making trouble for the new government, they provided one less worry for the authorities. Both groups were seen as conformists, having placed obedience to the new authorities because of their desire for order, hierarchy and stability through discipline. Collaboration was thus based on a calculation of tangible benefits in a situation of necessity and not strictly adhering to the belief in the morality or even the superiority of their occupiers’ ideas. Moreover, the Crown had proven to be worthy victors in overcoming of the numerical odds to beat the sultan’s army. This was used as justification for the collaborators. Their military prowess and apparent eagerness to use force if negotiations fail, made the decision of collaborating with them a more viable option. 4 Hence, an element of fear was recognized in certain social arrangements. The Malays, who stayed on in Malacca fell under this category. The Portuguese had relations with them in terms of hired labor. They helped perform tasks such as the transportation and storage of commodities around the town. These individuals were separate from those, who had fled south with Sultan Mahmud after his defeat to the Crown’s army. A few staunch loyalists, who came from the Muslim Gujarat merchant class, followed the sultan in a bid for fresh opportunities in a new port. Those Malays who remained in the port town were by no means, disloyal to the previous monarch, but practical concerns took priority. Hence, for these people they looked to stability in their 4 ibid. pp.136-7. 80 everyday lives, despite largely cosmetic changes at the top with the Portuguese King’s symbolic replacement of the sultan. Most of the Malays were fishermen and laborers in the ports, offered little political weight to affect change in the economy. Hence, it was understandable, that they saw their attitude being dictated by circumstances that was beyond their control. At best, they were in quiet hope that Sultan Mahmud reassembled his forces one day and return to rule Malacca. They saw themselves as merely conforming to directions of the new administrators. The anxiety of wanting to engage this group of people stemmed from the fear that they were planning to incite violence and disrupt the trade. A problem when dealing with this topic of collaboration is that neither of the parties wished to concede their weakness and dependence vis-à-vis the other. The local collaborators did not want to acknowledge that they profited from the foreign trade. But trading with foreigners brought the locals a considerably better livelihood. They tended to charge more to the less knowledgeable European traders, who were prepared to pay higher prices. Thus, they gained more profit from trading with the Estado da Índia than with the established traders in the region. But when they were committed to this, these local traders and collaborators failed to realize that they have inadvertently assisted the foreigners in gaining access into the market. After some time, they were driven out of trade routes or had certain commodities, like pepper, monopolized. 81 For the Portuguese, they did not expend too much effort, justifying to their King on why they collaborated with the Muslims. In particular with Dom Manuel, he was known to be less prejudiced of the Muslims. In his courts, he already hired Muslim musicians, dancers and artists to entertain him. It was said that he possessed sympathy for them following the wars in the Algarve.5 Historians described the Emmanueline style developed in architecture, as a combination of influence from the overseas discoveries and the Muslims.6 Hence, the analysis of King Manuel’s reign was not tied tightly to Christian propagation, as it was seen in his successor King John III. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the threat of Protestantism and the Reformation had yet to resonate around Europe. The Estado da Índia was more focused on the agenda of making money and not religious conversions. The outcome was that the Portuguese were open to collaboration with the Muslims. Their king had personally set the precedent for such necessary contacts to be made. The merchants, who formed the third essential group of collaborators, practiced conditional cooperation. They stuck to the partnership only if it remained advantageous to their trade. The main focus was solely driven by the prospects of maximizing profits. Within this category of traders, there were two main groups, namely those who were chose to dwell in the harbor town and those who returned to their homelands. In the latter group, the most prominent were those from China and India. They were not involved in the politics of administration in Malacca, as they still paid their loyalties to their respective homelands. These traders were fleeting in and out the port, but their presence 5 6 Silva Rego, Regimentoes, p.8. Goes, Terçei, p.3. 82 was still vital to Malacca as they brought in precious commodities. They also provided a vital link in the passage of trade to these foreign lands as the Portuguese used these connections to break into the China market, for instance. However, the other significant group of traders who chose residence in Malacca, was more important to the Estado da India. These merchants had a clear stake in the port city with valuable investments, which the Portuguese could not overlook. A majority of these merchants were Muslims who arrived from the regional ports, and through marriage alliances made with members of the previous sultanate, they found a home in Malacca. These religious ties remained strong as Tomé Pires observed, Malacca was surrounded by Mohammedans who could not be friends with us [Portuguese] unless Malacca was strong.7 Tomé Pires Officials of the Estado da Índia took heed and tried to maintain and enhance the wealth and prosperity of these merchants in the port, so as to garner their loyalties. For most of the inhabitants of Malacca, collaborating with the Portuguese was not an issue as long as their welfare and livelihoods were not adversely affected. But the drawback with collaborating with merchants was that the business of trade in spices was often risky, with seasons of bad harvests often changing market conditions. This in turn affected relationships that were built on these foundations. Hence, possessing a business association with this volatile group of traders with no fixed loyalty was a challenge for the Estado da Índia. Moreover, it was witnessed that traders had conveniently shifted 7 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.286. 83 allegiance from the sultanate to the Portuguese. Thus it showed that no guarantee was given that they would not do the same in the event of the emergence of another power. But it was not that the Estado da Índia had a choice of disengaging itself from ‘potential traitors’. The food situation in Malacca reached a critical stage. According to accounts by Empoli, it was mentioned that the Crown’s soldiers had nothing to eat soon after they occupied Malacca. 8 This resulted in many of them falling sick, so much so that in one month, about seven hundred of them died. The Estado da Índia was also unable to support the Gujarat seafarers who they seized earlier and many of them died. The severity of the death toll was summed up by Empoli’s remarks that There was not a man who did not fall sick of a devilish fever, wherefore the dead lay in the captains’ quarters two or three days, for no one to bury them could be found. 9 This added to the already severe shortage of manpower. The number of Portuguese men stationed in Malacca was, at most, five hundred. But, at times, it was as few as twentynine.10 And if the figures were to be taken at face value that Malacca consisted of about two hundred thousand men, then a small team of Portuguese men would find it very difficult to effectively control the entire population. 11 Moreover, the sphere of influence 8 Empoli, Lettera, pp.138-9. ibid., p.139. 10 Thomaz, “ The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago”, European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia, edited by Om Prakash (Brookfield: Variorum, 1997) p.25. See also, Ian MacGregor, “The Portuguese in Malacca”, in Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 28, pt.2, (Kuala Lumpur: 1955) p.6. 11 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.279. This is possibly an exaggerated figure, as there are many versions of the limits in the city of Malacca, which according to Pires, was from Kuala Linggi to the hinterland and Kasang. At times, one thinks that these borders had been extended to include the people south of Malacca in Johore and orang laut out at sea who also paid allegiance to the sultan of Malacca. 9 84 stretched far and wide into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which made the Lusitanian control extremely difficult. This manpower shortage was such a grave problem, that it compelled Tomé Pires to write in the Suma Oriental, “great affairs cannot be managed with few people. Malacca should be well supplied with people” 12 This was a desperate call to King Manuel for more men to be sent over to this part of the world. Thus, it was unable to spare men to effectively conquer and control this vast region. There were even fewer fidalgos who were prepared to make the grueling journey to the East. 13 Those who served as soldiers on these missions were mostly degradados (social outcasts) or criminals back in Portugal. They had a hard life and saw better opportunities in venturing abroad to explore new lands with the missions.14 Many of these soldiers were not loyal to the Crown and soon became lançados, deserting the army to serve as mercenaries to rich Asian merchants.15 This contributed to the manpower shortage faced by the Estado da Índia in administering the colony. To make matters worse, every year, when the northeast monsoon steadied, the King often ordered the ships in Malacca to be loaded up with goods to sail back to Goa and the West. This meant that colony was drained of manpower to guard it well. In addition, the Lusitanian merchants who traveled the long distance here seldom stayed in 12 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.286. Fidalgos referred to the nobles and gentlemen in the Portuguese society. The etymology of the word is derived from ‘fideo’ which means ‘son of’ ‘lagos’ – ‘of somebody’ 14 Correa, Lendas, pp.159-160. 15 Lançados literally means ‘thrown-out’. The term was used to describe elements of Portuguese society that by their own free will or were expelled from the centres of empire, to seek their fortunes independently from Crown efforts in different parts of Asia. 13 85 Malacca. The only times they did so was when they missed the monsoons. Often, many Portuguese merchants used it as a launch pad to venture to places like the Moluccas, Makassar, China and Japan. With the lack of manpower to effectively administer the harbor town, the Portuguese relied heavily on the local help. The Estado da Índia moved swiftly to resolve this manpower problem. The solution was seen in the encouragement of assimilation with the casado policy. Albuquerque thought of this plan to encourage Portuguese men to take local Malay wives, so as to give birth to a new class of Eurasian mestiços, who would remain loyal to the Crown’s cause.16 Initially, this was an uncommon practice at that time, but Albuquerque continued to promote these mixed marriages through the offer of land grants. It showed that he did not have a religious bias against these Muslim inhabitants, as the majority of his soldiers chose Muslim women to be their wives. This policy was first practiced with great success in India. In addition to land, the Estado da Índia also provided houses, cattle and horses. Albuquerque was impressed by these policies.17 He was quick to realize that because of their lack of manpower, they relied on collaboration with the local communities, so as to firmly establish themselves there. Hence, the Estado da Índia sought to learn the culture and perception of these inhabitants, in order to conjure up assimilation policies that helped alleviate persisting labor problems. Discovering that there were numerous marriage alliances made in the Malay World, Albuquerque was encouraged to promote the casado policy. 16 Mestiços here refers to the hybrid, mixed group of Portuguese and indigenous (Malay) people. A common union was between the Portuguese soldiers and indigenous Malay women. 17 Albuquerque, “Albuquerque informa El-Rei sobre o inicio dos casamentos entre Portugueses e indigenas” (Goa: 22 December 1510) in Silva Rego, Documentação para a História das Missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente, p.118. 86 Many a times the Crown was on a tight budget, as they did not manage to even pay their own soldiers, who chose to desert the military service for better monetary gains from protecting the traders’ ships and cargo.18 The overheads of administering a fortified settlement took its toll on the royal exchequer, and the reality was that they needed to suspend their prejudices and work together with the merchants of various religions, regardless of whether they were Muslims or Hindus. The Estado da Índia was unable to survive without these rendered loans and services. The Estado da Índia understood the mindset of the collaborator it wanted to entice. The episode of the trial and execution of Utimutaraja was also a prime example of Portuguese collaboration with a Javanese, Khoja Ibrahim. He was a friend of Utimutaraja, who was baited into court. The Estado da Índia knew of Khoja Ibrahim’s desire for an official position in the new administrative hierarchy. Hence, the Portuguese officials told Khoja Ibrahim that he needed to organize an assembly of all principal inhabitants, in order for the Crown to confer office appointments. Utimutaraja, who served as the temenggong, was persuaded by Khoja Ibrahim to be present at the assembly. This laid the trap for Utimutaraja, who showed up only to find out the charges of treason were meted out against him. 19 This highlighted the Estado da Índia’s awareness of the political aspirations of certain members of the elite merchant community. 18 MacGregor, “The Portuguese in Malaya” pp.8-9. Further proof of the limited resources of the Crown was also witnessed as the fleet which was sent to rescue the captives in Malacca had to be funded by a Florentine merchant Jerónimo Seringi. Thomaz, Nina Chatu and the Portuguese trade in Malacca, (Bandar Melaka, Luso-Malaysian Books, 1991) p.25 19 Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.148. 87 Assessment of Portuguese Collaboration Many traders in Malacca were contented with the justice administered by the Estado da Índia. In the past, robberies and oppression of the people were frequently witnessed.20 Albuquerque maintained integrity when he also punished his own officers, who in their over zealousness, had set fire to the few Muslim officials’ houses.21 Albuquerque decreed stiff laws and heavy penalties against those who caused destruction to property and goods within the port. Malacca already had limited resources, and having lost much in the war, measures had to be taken to prevent further loss. The traders were unhappy over the currency used for trade in the entrepôt. The Portuguese readily addressed this issue and minted new coins for them. It was important to note that the Crown’s agents were also of service to the key members of the Malacca society. It was said that the role of any colonizer was assigned and defined by conditions of the inhabited land. 22 Hence, the Estado da India was required to cater to the needs of indigenous society and the regional commerce. Importantly, though, it was recognized that the goals of collaboration were not always met. Fluctuations in this collaboration mechanism emerged, as both parties constantly realigned their loyalties as time passed and fresh opportunities emerged. Relationships were fluid and alliances could sway either way. In the following two case 20 ibid, pp.154-5. ibid, p.152. 22 The example given by Ronald Robinson was about Tswana society, but it can be similarly applied to Malacca, in “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism”, p.134. 21 88 studies, acts of betrayal were seen; firstly on the collaborator’s initiative, then with the Estado da Índia who also turned its backs on its associates when they were not useful to the Crown. The first instance was with Prince Zainal, who the ‘Great’ Albuquerque misjudged. He was an exiled heir apparent of Pasai, who requested for Portuguese help to return to his throne. Upon listening to the concessions Albuquerque was willing to partake to the Portuguese on ascension to the throne.23 Part of this bargain initially entailed that Prince Zainal accompanied the latter to Malacca to act as an intermediary between the Portuguese and Sultan Mahmud. The prince aided the Governor’s fleet by leading them through a safe passage. There were many dangerous routes, as they lay across shoals, which required more time and maneuvering. The chosen course enabled Albuquerque to reach Malacca, in a relatively shorter time, on the 28th June 1511. 24 However, upon disembarkation, Prince Zainal secretly dispatched a few men to warn the Sultan Mahmud of the Portuguese arrival. This shows that loyalty lines run deep and allegiance was still afforded to this Muslim monarch. For decades, the sultans in the Malay Archipelago paid their respects the sultan of Malacca, and they preferred to conspire with him than with foreign powers. Albuquerque only managed to find this out with information coming from Ruy Araújo through Nina Chatu.25 The prince’s retribution for deceiving them was delays in fulfilling the promise to help him gain his kingship. It was only eight years later that Prince Zainal became sultan. This transpired, amongst 23 Barros, Décadas, p.227. Empoli, Lettera, p.131. 25 Castanheda, HDC, p.135. 24 89 other things, from the order of António Correa dated 28 July 1519, that presents were to be bestowed to the new sultan of Pasai, Sultan Zainal.26 . Let it be known to all that the King our Lord lost more through the death of the bendahara [Nina Chatu] than his own sons lost, for he was a true and loyal servant of his Highness. 27 Tomé Pires The zenith of collaboration was reached in Nina Chatu’s unconditional support of the Estado da Índia. Firstly, his Hindu religion was open to collaboration with believers of other faiths. This was similarly done in India with the Kelings residing along coast of the Coromandel. Generally, the Portuguese collaboration with the Hindus evoked little ideological conflict. Initially, there was a strong dependence on Nina Chatu, so much so that Albuquerque remarked, “I tell you it only requires Nina Chatu to remain, with his relatives and friends,” for the Malacca economy to stabilize.28 Besides trade concessions, Nina Chatu was seen as craving for the prestige and social status in Malacca. Already the leader of the Keling community under the sultanate, Nina Chatu advanced under the new administration and claimed the highest position bestowed to a non-Portuguese with the role of bendahara, which he served till his death. The previous regime did not offer this to merchants and often appointed their own family members to prominent posts in Government. As it was widely known then, in order for 26 MacGregor, 1515-1520: Malacca, p.165. (Unpublished papers, found in the National University of Singapore Library. The episode of the relationship between Prince Zainal and the Portuguese wa a complex affair, considering that the preceding Sultan of Pasai had a change of heart and wooed the favour of Albuquerque on his return to Cochin. For further details, see Barros, Décadas, pp.287-8. 27 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.288. 28 Castanheda, HDC, p. 147. 90 someone to move up the social hierarchy, he was required to marry into prominent families such as the sultan.29 Having helped the Crown between the years 1509 and 1511, Nina Chatu reaped the rewards from the victors. He had been indispensable in his mediating role to seek for the release of the Lusitanian captives. This was seen in the testimony given by Rui de Araújo, that If it were not for Nina Chatu, who provides us with much alms and has taken care of our affairs, without any doubt, we would have passed through much greater danger during our captivity and would have suffered much hunger. To him do we owe much more what he has done for us than any person here. 30 Nina Chatu continued this mediating role in Malacca, dealing with both the traders and laborers on behalf of the Estado da Índia. Immediately after the Portuguese conquest, Nina Chatu gathered up to seven hundred men from his Keling community to aid the Crown in destroying the stronghold of Sultan Mahmud in Muar.31 He probably did this to ensure that his position as bendahara was consolidated against any possible returning threats like the disposed sultan’s army. Nina Chatu also participated actively in the production of new coins, through the provision of information and assistance to 29 See the case of Pate Adem from Gresik, who married into prominent families in Malacca, linked to the bendahara and the Sultan, so as to be given the title of “Chief of Surabaya”. He translated this into better concessions for his trade and soon, was seen as having a virtual monopoly of the Moluccan spice trade. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, p.109. 30 Basílio Sa, Insulíndia, pp.24-5. 31 Castanheda, HDC, p.153. 91 Governor. He helped in the suggestion of a suitable location for the mint as well as the gathering the raw materials of gold, silver and tin for the production of the coins. Earlier in 1511, Nina Chatu also assisted the Portuguese in the construction of the fortress. His friend, Araújo made the error when he informed Albuquerque in his letters “there was no stone in Malacca with which to build a fortress, as the land was marshy.”32 But the Hindu leader directed the Portuguese to marble that were found in the Muslim mosques and cemeteries, which was good material for the building of the defense structure. Commercially, Nina Chatu was a crucial figure to the Crown as he equipped and provisioned ships for their voyages to China and Pegu. He aided the Estado da Índia in the fitting of the first junk to China, ferrying the Portuguese agent, Jorge Alvarez. It was known that between 1513 and 1514, under the patronage of the Portuguese Crown, Nina Chatu dispatched a junk to Pegu.33 He also assisted the Portuguese in arranging for their ships to travel to Banda and the Moluccas.34 This was an essential collaboration, as the Estado da Índia was lacking in both knowledge and capital, which showed dependence on the expertise of Nina Chatu. On the flip side, the Estado da Índia understood and exploited the psychology of Nina Chatu. He was hungry for more power and influence in the affairs of Malacca. And he was duly given the prestigious office of bendahara. He coveted the title so much that 32 Barros, Décadas, p.257 and p.269. Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, pp. 113-4. 34 Barros, Décadas, p.283. 33 92 on realization of his post being offered to the King Abdullah of Kampar, the former committed suicide in 1514 in a dramatic display of bitterness.35 King Abdullah was executed later on for treason, a charge brought about by the sons of Nina Chatu. Hence, this fueled more speculation on the fickleness of the Estado da Índia in its choice of collaborators. Apparently, these judgments about who to collaborate were dependent on their desire to appease one group of partners over the others. Amongst their own, they did not agree on the merits or faults of certain individuals as João de Barros highlighted Nina Chatu was a Gentile of little quality, who in employing his office badly depopulated the city, and without to be judged, condemned himself to death. While King Abdullah, who restoring the ruins of the other, without fault, died by the condemnation of another.36 In previous accounts by Pires and Castanheda, there were glowing reports on the conduct of Nina Chatu. However, it appeared that he had outlasted his usefulness to the Portuguese and they had turned their attention to courting the Malay support. By endorsing King Abdullah of Kampar as the bendahara, the Estado da India was hoping to bridge the gap between the Christians and the Muslims. A key reason behind the failure in establishing long-term partnerships between the Portuguese and their collaborators was due to the issue of confidence in each other. Both parties came from diverse backgrounds and hence, had different perspectives and 35 “Nina Chatu was so chagrined at this that he committed suicide by burning himself on a pile after delivering a solemn speech to his people.” R.B. Krishnan, Indians in Malaya: a Pageant of Greater India, (Singapore: Malayan Publishers, 1936) p.12. Nina Chatu also wanted his sons to inherit this prestigious post as was promised by the Portuguese. See Appendix C. 36 João de Barros, Da Asia de João de Barros: dos feitos, que os Portuguezes fizeram no descubrimento, e conquista dos mares, e terras do Oriente: Decada Segunda, Parte Segunda, (Lisboa: Na Regia Officina Typografica, 1777) p.395. 93 expectations on matters pertaining to trust. For example, a basic difference in the attitudes to the status of treaties was observed. Misunderstanding often occurred because the Europeans believed in the letter of the law and the fine print of their treaties. On the other hand, the local officials did not view the contracts in the same way. For them, solemn sworn oaths were the most binding form of agreement. 37 Hence, to overcome these barriers required time and effort from both parties. Part of this problem consisted of convincing themselves and their respective communities that such collaboration was essential for the accomplishment of a common goal. Malay and Muslim Justification Malacca’s conversion to Islam in the fifteenth century was borne out of economic and political considerations. Economically, it was about trade with Arab merchants. The sultanate also wanted the establishment of good relations with Pedir and Pasai, which were the principal ports found in neighboring Sumatra. It was noted that among the rich and powerful in Malacca, the primary social stratification lay between the Malay nobility and the Muslim merchants, who increasingly came to take up residence in the port city.38 The Estado da Índia drew inspiration to use commercial benefits to coax the minds of the Malay traders. 37 Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia, p.79. C.H. Wake, “Melaka in the Fifteenth Century: Malay Historical Traditions and the Politics of Islamization”, in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (eds) Melaka: the Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980 vol. 1, p.144. 38 94 On dealing with secondary level of the Muslim traders, such as the Gujarat and the Javanese, the Estado da Índia knew that they had become uneasy with the sudden rise of prominence enjoyed by the Kelings. The Muslims preferred to enter into an agreement with the Portuguese, so as to at least safeguard the commercial freedom they enjoyed. It was not necessary to expect to recoup the political influence that they once possessed under the sultan. The Estado da Índia was required to balance these Muslim concerns with its continued support of the Keling merchants, led by their chief agent, Nina Chatu. Their dilemma faced in the removal of Nina Chatu from the bendahara post was indicative of this. In order that Malacca returned to the status of a commercial emporium, the Estado da Índia had to first reconcile with the Muslim traders.39 In the end, the Portuguese chose to part with their principal advisor in the hope of securing greater returns through appeasing the majority of Muslim merchants. Religious conversion As the Crown ventured further to the East, the Portuguese saw less relevance of conquering territories in the name of God. The search for Prester John and his flock of Christian subjects was distracting them from their primary objective of trade. Initially, there was hope from the Catholics to join forces and encircle the Muslims in the Middle East. But from their encounters in Africa and the Middle East, the Lusitanian soon realized that they stood to gain more from peaceful cooperation and trade. In concentrating on trade issues and slowly infiltrating Muslim trade networks they hoped to deny the Muslims of trade revenue. There were simply too many practical considerations, 39 Thomaz, Nina Chatu and the Portuguese trade in Malacca, p.36. 95 like balancing their tight budgets, to be concerned about. This made ideals, such as ‘conquest in God’s name’ immaterial. In addition, the Crown were arriving to a part of Asia, which was steeped with many animistic beliefs coupled with a variety of prevailing religions such as Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism and Islam. Some of these Indian religions predated the birth of Christianity. They realized that any religious conversion was to be a long rigorous process over many years. This was because the task at hand was not merely religious conversion of an individual mind, but an entire change in the cultural climate. This was last seen in the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago, which was a result of more than a hundred years of changes to the trading and political structures, as well as marriage and religious practices. For the immediate period following the Portuguese victory in the battle for Malacca, these daunting and long-term thoughts were not foremost of their concerns. The Portuguese merchants and soldiers who came here early did not have that zeal of intent to convert and change the people’s mindset, with regards to issues of faith. In the initial phase of colonization, an insufficient number of priests were available to facilitate any mass conversion in Malacca. Thus, many clergymen wrote to the King and their brethren back home to assist in dispatching more men. One such priest was Domingo of Sousa, who on 22 December 1514, wrote to King Manuel requesting for more clergy and provisions to be sent to harbor town.40 Even until Francis Xavier arrived at Malacca in 1545, there was still a vast shortage of priests. This prompted him to 40 Rego, Regimentoes, p.247. 96 constantly write to the Society of Jesus in Portugal requesting for more of his brothers to come over and assist him in his missionary work.41 An early form of ‘missionary work’ was seen in the setting up of a confraria de Nossa Senhora da Misericordia (the confraternity of Our Lady of Mercy) and hospitals. These were meant to address the immediate social needs of Malacca. Missionary activity in the form of religious propagation such as the setting of schools did not happen until much later in the sixteenth century. The Misericordias were initially founded in Portugal, where they were comprised of laypeople. They thrived to fulfill the goals of Christian charity, as seen in their works of almsgiving, visits to the sick, the needy and prisoners. A key component of the Misericordias was to oversee the administration of hospitals and the assistance given to families in poverty. The confraternity was the answer to the crying needs of the day.42 In Malacca, the Misericordia, though independent of the Crown’s ambitions, was still seen as an arm of the Estado da Índia, which offered social service to the local residents. The Misericordia soon occupied the similar status as it did in Portugal, as the provider of basic public assistance. Initially, this was afforded only to the Portuguese soldiers wounded in the battles with rival groups. But as time wore on, it was extended to aid the poor in the town. This was an integral part of the three institutions, which formed the mainstay and foundation of any Portuguese settlement, namely, the factory (Estado 41 Henry Coleridge, The Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier, [Letters dating September, November 10 and December 5, 1545] (2nd edition, New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 1997) pp. 352-6. 42 Silva Rego, Regimentos, p.10. 97 da Índia), the fortress and the Misericordia.43 It also reflected the concerns of the new colonial masters that were trade, security and social interests respectively. All of this were interlinked and was vital to the Crown’s main focus of enhancing its coffers through trade. Bearing in mind that the Portuguese were fresh from a war with the Sultan Mahmud, hence there was a growing need to address the social concerns of the homeless and those wounded in war. This was taken as an act of kindness, which was necessary in the ‘larger war’ to win over the hearts and minds of the local inhabitants. With regards to religious conversions in the early days of Portuguese administration in Malacca, firstly, it was noted that very few priests accompanied the Crown’s war fleets or merchant ships. Secondly, when the clergymen did follow, they were part of the crew tasked more to render assistance to the Portuguese soldiers, instead of trying to convert the local population.44 This situation had prompted the second captain, Jorge de Albuquerque, in 1514 to request from King Manuel good priests, rich vestments, hymnals and an organ for the Church of Our Lady of Annunciation.45 This suggests that the church, which was constructed swiftly after Portuguese occupation, was still lacking resources for the function of evangelization. Thus, the initial emphasis of the Estado da Índia was clearly on establishing trading relations and not to convert the local population. 43 ibid, p.11. R. Cardon Catholicism in the East and the Diocese of Malacca 1511-1888 (Reprinted from the Malaya Catholic Leader. Christmas issue. 1938) p.1. 45 ibid. p.2. 44 98 The few conversions that occurred were seen as just another form of collaboration. Conversions, either by an individual’s free will or through marriage was materially beneficial for the local inhabitant. The converts were associated with the new dominant force and such affiliation allowed them to rise above the old hierarchy of the sultanate. Thus, such conversions were more of a change of the mind and not of the heart. Any missionary activities of the evangelical sort came under the command of King John III, who ruled from 1521 onwards. The presiding monarch during the initial phase of Portuguese colonization was King Manuel and he was more inclined towards assimilation and trade. The first signs of indoctrination occurred with the conversions led by the Catholic missionaries in the mid sixteenth century. The most significant was the Society of Jesus, which was only founded on 27 September 1540 in Portugal.46 Their renowned missionary Francis Xavier only arrived in Malacca in September 1545. He reported a weak faith in the new converts thus suggesting that early proselytizing was not as ambitious and effective.47 These missionary activities slowly became more organized with the help and direction of the Papacy, which enacted Bulls to guide the missionary activities in the East. The first few acts were to set up an education system to woo and indoctrinate the young. Parish schools were the first of its kind in Asia, with the focus of teaching European languages like Latin and Português. Many local inhabitants sent their children 46 This was according to the Bull, Regimini Militantis ecclesiae. João Pedro Ferro, “A Epistolografia no Quotidiano dos Missionários Jesuítas nos Séculos XVI e XVII.” Lusitania Sacra, Lisboa: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1993, p 137. 47 Coleridge, St. Francis Xavier, p.349, and Noonan, The First Jesuit Mission in Malacca,(Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos daa Junta de Investigações Científicas de Ultramar, 1974) p.2. 99 to these schools not to follow Christianity. Instead, they hoped that their children gained opportunities they did not receive previously. For example, the learning a new language, Português, was useful for trade with the various Portuguese colonies and beyond. While Melayu remained the lingua franca of the trading world in the Malay Archipelago, Português was fast becoming widely used across the Indian Ocean. However, these movements in language and education evolved slowly and came to fruition only in the later half of the sixteenth century. Chapter SIX: Continuity and Change For a long time, there was a tendency to see the arrival of the Europeans as the beginning of Southeast Asian history. 1 Wang Gungwu Historians of early Southeast Asian history have mostly been Europeans or Australians and their perspectives ‘from the outside looking in’ were well accepted within academic circles.2 Based on the widespread changes brought about by the latest colonizers- the British, it has been perceived that similar shifts were made when the Portuguese conducted their operations in Southeast Asia. But this was not so. As witnessed, the Estado da Índia relied heavily on the collaboration with the locals to achieve its goals, which were centered on trade in Asia. It was necessary for any strategies of the Estado da Índia to correspond to the conditions in Malacca. Furthermore, it took time for any new ideas to filter through to the masses. It was one thing to possess a proper process to disseminate information and another, to actually convince the people. Hence, changes, if any, took a very long to take root. When the Estado da Índia is contrasted with the sultanate, only minor differences were observed in its policies, institutions and systems of government. This paralleled the development in the other Lusitanian centers of Ternate and Tidore. The Estado da Índia 1 Wang Gungwu, “Southeast Asia between the 13th & 18th Centuries: some reflections on political fragmentation and cultural change” in Historia, edited by Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali, (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Historical Society, 1984), p.6. 2 These were mostly broad, all encompassing histories of the region, namely John Bastin, Malayan and Indonesian Studies, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964) and Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999) provided those who collaborated, the opportunities to advance themselves, from different classes or races. These fresh prospects came in form of positions in the administrative hierarchy or joint trade ventures. The Estado da Índia also gave its collaborators autonomy to carry on their businesses as usual. Significantly, protection had been offered for all the goods and investments in the harbor. It was noticed that there were more continuities than changes occurring in Malacca. The notion that the emergence of the Portuguese was a turning point would thus be challenged. Instead, it appeared more of a continuation of a decline of the port city, which had been present even before the coming of the Europeans. Malacca’s economy during the sultanate was already deteriorating and the Portuguese, who was criticized for Malacca’s demise, were only partly to blame for providing the death knell to an already ailing state. In doing this comparison of ‘before and after’, it also appears to be an ‘Asian way’ of governing the state and trade, which was adapted and adopted by the Estado da Índia. Addressing first, the few changes witnessed in the Malay World. Rivalries and politics saw a slight paradigm shift as collaboration with the Estado da Índia in the military field, resulted in the use of more powerful cannons and better ships, which greatly influenced the outcome of armed disputes.3 But these technical changes involved only the major players in the surrounding kingdoms and the effects remained peripheral 3 For example, the cannon was already integrated into a command structure and served to extend the influence of a regimé beyond its previous limits. The guns were not beyond the reach of the Asian as they traded for them, but subtler was the way the Portuguese incorporated cannon in their own societies, and taught Asians how to maximize its potential. Winius, Pilgrims to the Past, p.258. to the vast majority of the people in Southeast Asia.4 Previously, many instances of dynastic wars and regional rivalry were observed such as between Malacca and Pasai. The minor advances made in the new methods of warfare were not sufficient enough to tip the balance of power strongly in favor of one party over another. Apart from the rise of the Johore Sultanate, there were no more new political centers. This also did not lead to any substantial institutional changes in the adjacent states and societies. The port cities of Malacca, Pasai and Java remained the major centers of trade, as they were before. Continuity in Trade Portuguese shipping in this region was merely one more thread in the existing warp and woof of the Malaysian-Indonesian inter port trade.5 Charles Boxer The advent of Portuguese trade did not alter the commercial dynamics in the region. In Southeast Asia, the people were deeply affected by the second wave of Islam more than the coming of the Lusitanian fleet.6 By and large, their arrival was not as momentous as it was thought out to be. The merchants already adopted trading practices from the Arabs and Indians, who were just as, if not more, advanced than the Europeans, if not more. The former had established flourishing trade routes that spanned throughout the Malay Archipelago and beyond. Some routes stretched long distances, such as the Malacca4 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of California, Press, 1982) p.235. 5 Charles Boxer, The Portuguese Sea Borne Empire 1415-1825 (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1969) p.49. 6 Second wave of Islam refers to the Southeast Kingdoms embracing Islam in 1400s. Jorge Manuel Flores, “The Asian Seas (1599-1800): local societies, European expansion and the Portuguese” in Revista de Cultura (Macau: 1991) p.18. Gujarat-Aden run. The Arab merchants in particular, played a vital role in developing the art of navigation, which was studied by the Portuguese explorers too. The local Malays were already organized in society and the introduction of the Europeans made little impact to their way of life. Thus, the image of an Asia drastically changed with the coming of the Portuguese did not fit in with this reality. In addition, the Asians had experienced interacting with the Europeans with the Italian traders in the preceding fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Although the Italians traveled to Asia, they did not stay for long, as their merchants found no residence in the port cities. The Venetian traders, for example, acted out as middlemen. They arranged to meet the Asian traders at the ‘crossroads’ at Alexandria and along the Syrian coast to buy Southeast Asian spices, which they later resold in Europe. The Estado da Índia merely cut into this trading arrangement by getting around these ‘middlemen’, like the Venetians and Arabs, and traded directly with the spice-producing areas.7 Continuity in taxation. Let us not give them more duties. So if they ask you to give it free, listen to it and favour it accordingly to their deserving needs.8 Alfonso Albuquerque This was a prudent policy adopted by the Estado da Índia. Increasing tax rates at the expense of trade volume was not advisable, especially given the highly competitive 7 Wolf, Europe and the People without History, p.236. Albuquerque’s speech to his council (of captains) sixteen days after the conquest of Malacca. Castanheda, HDC, p.147. 8 nature of commerce in the region. Notably, the challenges came from the north and south of Malacca in the ports of Pasai and Java respectively. Hence, much of the taxation system remained the same as before the Estado da Índia took over. Moreover, at an average of three percent tax on the cargo, the revenue collected from any tax increase did not amount to much if this resulted in the merchant not bringing a substantial amount of cargo to trade. In general, all trade policies needed to be inclusive and enticing to all merchants to patronize Malacca over the other ports. Preferably, the policies were also kept the same, so as to give the traders the assurance that their positions were not threatened by changes and that they continued to invest in the harbor. Hence, similar to the previous official policy of the Sultanate, the Estado da Índia focused on the promotion the settlement of foreign traders in the city. Those merchants, who had families residing in Malacca, enjoyed a reduction in import duties. They paid only three percent ad valorem instead of the usual six percent.9 The Estado da Índia went a further step by sending out emissaries to neighboring port cities to lure more merchants to Malacca for both residence and trade. For example, Captain Jorge de Albuquerque proclaimed around the ports of the Coromandel Coast that remuneration was granted to every merchant who decided to migrate and settle in Malacca.10 In the same vein, Captain Garcia da Sà dispatched a messenger in 1521 to persuade merchants in Pahang to come over. By creating an influx of more merchants, this meant a greater volume of trade and subsequently, more revenue for the Estado da Índia in the long run. Thus, discouraging participation in trade through high tax rates was 9 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.273. Thomaz, “Malay Sultanate”, p.78. 10 not beneficial to any party. Having little produce of its own, the Malacca population was not dependable for investments. Hence, it was necessary to entice new settlers, as they brought with them fresh capital and investments. This generated greater returns for the new overlords. The Portuguese also tapped into the knowledge of the foreign merchants, which was vital. The Estado da Índia positioned itself nicely to discover more about the regional markets and their political conditions. The Portuguese hoped to establish a network of trust amongst these merchants in Malacca and form a link to their compatriots back in their respective homelands. The Estado da Índia inherited a favorable taxation system. Previously, those coming from the west of Malacca paid a six percent tax on their goods.11 In addition, gifts were presented to the sultan and his key officials, which amounted to approximately two percent. This form of ‘gift giving’ had been done to facilitate a smooth transaction of the traders’ goods, as they had the authority of granting permission to sell their cargos freely in the market. It also appeared that if these dues and gifts did not satisfy the authorities, the Malaccan officials were at liberty to confiscate the goods of the merchants.12 From the East, the merchants did not pay any tax on their merchandise, but they were required to provide gifts.13 This was based on the understanding that the gifts were of great value, especially those from China. This had generated considerable revenue for the sultan, as many Chinese came to exchange their silk for Indian cloth. To ensure fairness, tax 11 By West, we are referring to those who arrived from the countries in the Middle East, India, Pegu and Siam. Those coming from the port cities of Pedir, Pasai and Kedah were also considered part of the West. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.273. 12 The Chinese merchants had complained to Albuquerque of the Sultan stealing their ships and goods. Castanheda, HDC, p.133. 13 By East, the places include Pahang, Java, Banda, Moluccas, Palembang and China. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.274. administrators were present to place a valuation on these gifts. These gifts were then used as a medium of trade for other commodities. This was an attractive policy to the Estado da Índia. Having brought few indigenous products that were in demand, the Portuguese required these gifts for barter. Hence, this practice was adopted as it coincided with their trading objectives. In taxing the communities of Malacca, the Estado da Índia was mindful that it must not outwardly show favor to its reinol (European born Portuguese). In comparison, the Muslim and Hindu merchants paid just six percent in customs duties to the customhouse, whereas the Christians paid ten percent. The Crown wished to prevent the Portuguese soldiers from becoming merchants, fearing that their increased involvement in trade meant more soldiers deserting its armed forces.14 It was only near the end of the century when this policy was reversed and the Muslims paid more taxes than the Christians.15 Hence, possessing a fair system of taxation was important on the Crown’s agenda in creating a good image for itself in the colony. They hoped to appeal to more merchants through displaying their fairness in trade matters. Having disrupted trade activities in the preceding war for Malacca, the Portuguese had to restore the confidence back in the port. 14 Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, p.119. This was seen in the instructions given by the Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque on 14 April 1595, which the Muslims were to pay double the taxes of the Christians. Panduronga Sacarama Sinai Pissurlencar, Regimentos das Fortalezas da Índia, (Bastorá, Goa: Tipografia Rangel, 1955) pp.225. For further details on the various taxes at the end of the sixteenth century, see Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, p.166. 15 Cartaz system The primary reason for having cartazes (safe conduct passes) was to establish strategic control over the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent seas. This was done through the creation of an embargo of the spice trade on specific routes. In redirecting merchant ships through Malacca, it also resulted in greater tax revenue gained at the customs house. Furthermore, there was the advantage of possessing better fiscal management in the protection of the Crown monopolies and implementing forcible taxation on these lines of commerce. 16 Towards its own people, the cartazes helped monitor and restrict the number of Portuguese private traders and discouraged soldiers from trading and possible desertion. It was widely believed that the Portuguese were the first to introduce the use of cartazes in Southeast Asia. However, a lot of cartazes existed well before their emergence. Reportedly, the Crown’s officials respected the authority of the existing cartazes, even if they were not the issuing authority. For example, a Gujarati merchant from Malique-Gupi showed Albuquerque a safe-conduct pass that the Lord of Baroche had given him to allow his ships to sail freely.17 Even though Albuquerque had earlier raided eight Gujarati ships en route to Malacca, he spared this ship on account of this pass.18 16 Thomaz, “Precedents and Parallels of the Portuguese Cartaz System”. In The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads, pp. 67-85. Edited by Pius Malekandathil and Jamal Mohammed. (Kerala, India: Institute for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities of MESHAR, 2001) p.67. 17 Barros, Décadas, p.151. 18 In general, Gujarati merchants on account that they were Muslims, were initially deemed as enemies of the Portuguese. Empoli, Lettera, p.126. The word, cartaz, was derived from the Arabic word qirtâs, and it was a common practice amongst the Arab merchants.19 The Chinese also conducted a similar practice seen in their issues of Chinese licenses for their ships to leave China.20 It was only slight change in the implementation, as after initially giving paper passes as cartazes, the Estado da Índia adopted the provision of flags, so as to easily identify its enemies. An objective was to avoid the destruction of friendly vessels, which were valuable to the Estado da Índia. In this respect, the requirements for clarity in the identification the ships belonging to rival merchants were observed. Flags were seen flying from afar, which was a safer way of conducting inspections. Checking paper cartazs meant that the officials were at risk of boarding the enemy vessels. Any ship found without a cartaz was deemed uncooperative and was susceptible to seizure by the Crown’s navy.21 Ultimately, the effectiveness of cartazes was closely tied to the ability to police the surrounding waters. The Portuguese possessed an advantage in naval superiority and used it to impose the cartaz system on the ships plying the Straits of Malacca. The Muslim author, Sheikh Zeen-ud-Deen pointed out that cartazes were the main instruments used by the Portuguese in their attempts to control trade carried out by local people in Asian waters.22 However, these passes were not foreign to the Asian merchants. The main difference was that the Portuguese cartaz focused on prohibited items as opposed to encouraging trade of certain goods in the port. This was in line with 19 Thomaz, “Portuguese Cartaz System”, p.76. ibid. p.78. 21 ibid. p.75. 22 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p.40. 20 the main trading policy of the Estado da Índia, which was aimed at promoting trade with friends and restrict the commerce of foes.23 Through the formalization of trade agreements and treaties, the Estado da Índia justified these actions with a legal underpinning. The new approach was in the strict enforcement of its usage, as any ship without a cartaz was confiscated as fair prize.24 This stringent implementation drew criticism from a few trading quarters. It was perceived that the Estado da Índia used the cartaz as a means to form a monopoly on certain goods such as pepper. For example, there was a restriction on the number of cartazes given to ships carrying pepper. Hence, the likelihood of the Crown’s navy seizing cargoes of pepper was high. However, this was similar to the Sultan Mahmud’s attempts to dictate the trade conditions. He relied on the orang laut to help raid the ships, which were owned by his competitors. Piracy and Protection The Portuguese arrived in the East with the medieval tradition of piracy, having experienced privateering and maritime war in the Mediterranean. But piracy was different from that practiced in Europe. The pirates in Southeast Asia were part of a group of orang laut, some of whom held ties with the Malacca Sultanate. The term, orang laut simply refers to the people of the sea. They were not a homogenized ethnic group and they took orders from their chief, who interacted with the leaders of the regional polities. 23 24 Thomaz, “Portuguese Cartaz System”, p.78. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p.41. The fundamental relationship between these orang laut and the maritime Malay polities was determined by economic interdependence on one another.25 The orang laut was probably the first group of people to greet the Portuguese even before the latter set foot on Southeast Asian land. This was because these sea nomads lived on houseboats found scattered across the Straits of Malacca as well as along the shores of the Malay Archipelago. The first few remarks made about the orang laut (or Saletes) were from Tomé Pires who described, Pujam as almost a country of Saletes, whose ruler was obedient to Malacca. While Lingga consisted of four large islands had a king who was called Raja Limgua. The people were more warlike than the others in Malacca, or in its kingdoms and dominions, and the Raja Limgua was greatly loved by the Saletes.26 From this abstract, it appeared that the orang laut traversed throughout the Malay Archipelago, some as far south as Lingga. They were involved in piracy and became troublemakers to the early Portuguese settlers. Early descriptions of them often emphasized their warlike behavior.27 Pires wrote about " the Saletes" as one ethnic group, but differentiates their locality, their status and their allegiances.28 Basically, they were sea nomads, who paid allegiance to whoever was able to cater to their needs. 25 Virunha, “Power relations between the orang laut and the Malay Kingdoms”, in Recalling Local Pasts, (Chiangmai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002) p.149. 26 The term orang laut, was a convenient catch-all term which obscures the reality of numerous tribes and status groups subsumed under the rubric of sea-faring peoples in the Malay World. Simply translated, it refers to “sea people”. The word Saletes was probably derived from the Malay word, selat, which meant straits. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.264. 27 Varthema, The Travels Ludovico di Varthema, p.227. 28 Virunha, “the Orang Laut and the Malay Kingdoms”, p.156. Certain groups of the orang laut had a long history of relations with the Malay rulers of Malacca. Their tasks included fishing and foraging the forests for the sultan, who purchased these products. Whenever war erupted, the orang laut war fleet was mobilized to support the sultan’s army.29 Some of these loyalties remained strong, even after the Lusitanian conquest of Malacca. This was seen with several orang laut, who continued to assist the exiled Sultan Mahmud in Banten.30 Their revised task was now focused on raiding the Crown’s ships. The orang laut was a significant group of people as they posed a threat to the Portuguese trade in the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent seas. The Estado da Índia wanted to bring them under their control lest it was going to suffer in lost revenue from future piratical activities. The Estado da Índia knew that piracy was a way of life for the orang laut. Hence, ignorance of the activities and location of these sea nomads was not an option. In addition, the orang laut constantly patrolled the Straits to either raid ships or ‘escort’ merchants to trade at ports where they placed their allegiance. The Portuguese exploited this system of ‘institutionalized piracy’ as it corresponded with their efforts at collecting of protection rent from the merchants of the port. The revenue was substantial as there was no other group to come close in challenging the Portuguese naval superiority, save the orang laut.31 The Estado da Índia undertook broad efforts to find out more about this group of sea-people. It also tried to co-opt them into Malacca’s new administrative hierarchy. 29 ibid., p.147. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.264. 31 Dietmar Rothermund, Asian Trade and European Expansion in the Age of Mercantilism, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981) p. 19. 30 One of the key reasons why the Portuguese wanted to collaborate with the orang laut was because they possessed all the required expertise and knowledge of the surrounding waters. Not only did they make their livelihood from the sea, they also knew where to find the cheapest goods in the archipelago.32 A majority of them relented and collaborated with the Estado da Índia. For the orang laut, aligning themselves with a powerful state meant protection from attack from other warrior groups, such as the Arus.33 In addition, there was economic stability based on trade with increased possibilities of gain from royal bounty and ‘justifiable piracy’. The latter entailed the orang laut operating under the directives from the central administration to attack specific rival ships. Hence, the link between the piracy and commercial shipping was apparent. Shipping practices The practice of hiring pétak (compartments) in junks belonging to other merchants was widely practiced in Malacca.34 These pétak often contained valuable, compact commodities such as musk, ambergris, precious stones and bezoars. All the members of the crew enjoyed the right to use certain pétak freely or at a reduced rate. This system was continued under the Portuguese rule. 32 Virunha, “The Orang Laut and the Malay Kingdoms”, pp.143-4. The Arus were a different tribe of warriors, who had challenged and defeated the Malacca Sultan out at sea. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, pp.250-1. 34 Thomaz, “Melaka and its Merchant Communities at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century”, Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.33. 33 The key advantage of such a system was that it provided for an assembly of small financial savings and investments in trade. This enabled the poor, like the Lusitanian soldiers, to participate and share as peddlers in the benefits of Malacca commerce. Many soldiers invested their wages in the cargo ships of Hindu and Luzon merchants. When they did not have enough money, which was often the case, the soldiers then traded in their weapons or offered protection on these cargo ships to their destinations. Sometimes the merchants paid them through the offering of pétak in return for the protection of their ships. The soldiers had little qualms working under these merchants of different religious persuasions. The result was a large number of soldiers who deserted the poor-paying Lusitanian army to serve these wealthy private merchants.35 Hence, this also displayed another level of collaboration occurring amongst the lower classes of the Portuguese men and the wealthy merchants of Malacca, who enjoyed a dominant position. Trading patterns Due to the advancements in shipbuilding, there appeared to be an increase in emphasis given to long distance trade from Europe to Asia. But this was only so for the Europeans, as the Asians saw little profit in this long distance trade. This was prominent in the example of the China ban on the long distance trade and travel in the fifteenth century, after the Cheng Ho explorations. The Europeans saw many new trading opportunities in Asia, and had a strong demand for spices and silk. However, Asian merchants found little worth in trading with Europe. 35 MacGregor, “The Portuguese in Malacca” p.11. The basis of Malaccan trade was always an exchange of the staple products of the Malay Archipelago, for the manufactured goods from the wider areas of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Essentially, it was a collection center for the spices found in the Moluccas and Banda as well as a re-distribution center for the textiles from India, mainly coming from the states of Gujarat and Coromandel.36 These patterns of trade remained largely the same along the Straits of Malacca. Most of the traders in the Malay Archipelago preferred to concentrate on intra-regional trade. A lot of risks were involved in the open seas, with turbulent conditions often causing shipwrecks. There was also unequal competition from government-sponsored ventures like from the Crown. The Portuguese traders soon realized this pattern and followed suit. As the years passed, fewer ships headed back to Portugal. Currency In 1511, on the request of the merchants of Malacca, Albuquerque ordered the minting of new coins for them in the form of Catholícos (gold coins) and the Malaqueses. (silver ‘Malacca pieces’)37 Even though they introduced these coins to the currency market, the flow of bullion was not novel. Tomé Pires noted that, gold and silver was traded extensively in Malacca, as they were imported from Pegu, Siam and China.38 Malacca had its own tin coins in circulation. The name of the reigning sultan was inscribed on the surface of these coins, which were used in commercial transactions. This use of mebtal 36 Paul Wheatley, “A City that was made for Merchandise” in The Golden Khersonese,(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961) pp.313-5. 37 Albuquerque, Commentaries, p.139. 38 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.276. coins as a form of exchange was a result of the direct influence of the trading practices of Pasai.39 As it was with the other neighboring ports, there existed two kinds of trading. Firstly, trade was conducted by the means of barter. Secondly, there was the process of buying and selling using coins, with values that were pegged probably to the weights of common, frequently transacted goods as rice or pepper.40 “Slavery” Malacca is a place like no other. One [Portuguese captain] has to take care of everything of the slave; to rear his son; to provide him clothing for his wife and for himself; one has to pamper him so that he does not run away from Your Majesty.41 Pero de Faria Hence, as witnessed in the above letter, the definition of the slave in Malacca is a complicated issue. It was not a simple master-servant dialectic, which governed the relations between the authorities and a large extent of the local population.42 During the reign of the sultans, there were diverse categories of slaves with different degrees of debt bondage. These slaves also were of different skill levels. The court musician, for example, was considered a skilled slave. Some of the more high level servants of the sultan even possessed their own slaves. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest, 39 Hashim, The Malay Sultanate of Malacca, p.194. On the different coins used in Malacca, see Barros, Décadas, pp.271-2. 40 An example of this was the price of musk rendered in the equivalent of pepper. Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.1, p.124. 41 This was a letter was from the Portuguese Captain, Pero de Faria to the King, dated 25 November 1539, Malacca. See Pierre-Yves Manguin, “Manpower and Labour categories in Early Sixteenth Century Malacca”, in Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia, edited by Anthony Reid, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p.209. 42 The local population formed a bulk of the slaves to serve both the royalty and rich merchants in the Malay Sultanate era. Barros mentions that the Sultan alone had more than three thousand slaves. Barros, Décadas, vol. 4. pp. 87-8. Albuquerque recognized the need to abide by the local adat (custom) and he decreed that all the slaves bonded to the sultan or his officials were to serve their new masters in the same way.43 The treatment of the slaves was also similar. The Estado da Índia offered the skilled and unskilled laborers different wages in the form of rice. Mobility within the slave classes was sometimes witnessed too. When there was a large category of impoverished or captive aliens became available as slave labor, indigenous slaves moved up the social ladder to form a junior part of the dominant group, even if still under bondage.44 Besides following these practices, the Estado da Índia also adopted the same structure and hierarchy of the sultan. The Portuguese merely replaced the sultan and his kinsmen as the ruling elite in Malacca. Previously, the sultan had a nobility class under them to do their bidding. Many officials maintained marriage alliances with members of the royal family so as to be part of the administrative structure of the state. Likewise, the Portuguese mixed in their nobility class, the fidalgos. But often, it was seen that these were few in numbers and the Estado da Índia needed to supplement its number of officials with trusted members of society. These collaborators took up posts ranging from administrative staff to the top job of bendahara. In addition, Albuquerque urged for promotion of the casado policy to help create a class of people they trusted to run their bureaucracy. In future, they also needed the offspring of these casados to help defend the fortress. This policy appeared similar to the orang kaya of the sultanate, who offered their 43 Manguin, “Manpower and Labour categories in Early Sixteenth Century Malacca”, pp.209-10. Anthony Reid, Slavery, Bondage and Dependency, p.3. See also Thomaz, “Slavery in Malacca in the Sixteenth Century”, Early Portuguese Malacca, 1511-1580, pp.127-78. 44 slaves to the Malay monarch at times of attack.45 In return, they enjoyed concessions from the sultan and his officials. In the context of trade, the Estado da Índia kept the system of appointing an official to be attached to the each of the four main groups of traders in Malacca, namely the Chinese, Javanese, Gujarat and Hindus. This ensured continuity, which was wholly appreciated by the traders. These groups’ trading concerns remain foremost in the new administration’s priorities. They also kept intact the post of the bendahara and the temenggong. These two posts were the most highly regarded by the communities, who were accustomed to dealing with these two separate figures. The Estado da Índia conducted a brief experiment to amalgamate both posts to form a vice regal position to accommodate King Abdullah of Kampar. But this proved short-lived, as the merchant communities were uneasy with this arrangement. This showed that any structural changes were difficult to do. Hence, it was observed that, while the personnel changed, the system remained intact. There were only minor changes to the composition of the prominent groups with Portuguese emphasis placed on their relations with the Hindu merchants, instead of the Gujarat. Nonetheless, the way of governing Malacca and the trade rules remained fundamentally the same. This was essential to ensure stability especially following the disruption with the war in the years from 1509 leading to the Portuguese capture of 45 Orang Kaya literally translated is “rich people”, which in this case refers to the groups of collaborators who benefited from their close relations with the sultan. Thomaz, “Melaka and its Merchant Communities” p.36. Malacca in 1511. The Estado da Índia placed priority on ensuring that the trading conditions returned to the same favorable setting as they were before the war. Political Intrigues It was already prevalent during the times of the sultanate was deceit and ambition seen in certain individuals like Utimutaraja. In the chronicles compiled by Damião de Goes, Utimutaraja was described as such a rich and powerful man in Malacca that he could choose not to obey the sultan. It was alleged that Utimutaraja possessed the desire to become sultan of Malacca, and on several occasions, attempted to forge secret alliances among the enemies of Sultan Mahmud together with his contemporaries from Java, like Pate Unus, in a bid to depose the ruler. But these efforts remained fruitless until the emergence of the Portuguese. By taking Albuquerque’s side in ousting Sultan Mahmud, Utimutaraja positioned himself as the most influential Muslim in Malacca. He probably thought that with his Muslim support from many towns in Java, he was able oust Albuquerque and the Estado da Índia in the same manner as they did to the sultan. He knew that the Portuguese needed to wait a long while before military reinforcements arrived from India, and fancied his chances against them.46 Regional continuities On the whole, the Estado da Índia influenced the Malay-Indonesian trading area to a slight extent. Apart from a few changes in direction and scope, it retained the general 46 Goes, Crónica, p.106. characteristics as during sultanate period.47 Merchants, whose loyalties proved volatile, still heavily influenced this trade region. Portuguese Malacca faced similar conflicts between other port cities such as Aceh and Johor. Arguably, this was attributed to the obvious religious differences. However, it was also probably due to the competitive, economic issues pertaining to trade, which motivated the various parties to go into war. The Estado da Índia allowed for more autonomy to the traders to run their business, in order to attract more commerce in. The rationale was that the traders knew what was best for them and the marketplace. The Portuguese was also not yet sufficiently established in Malacca to be able to revamp the trading system. The trading arrangement was kept flexible with few rigid rules, which was appreciated by the merchants supporting the Estado da Índia. Hence, the traders continued exploiting the advantages of the gaps that came along with it. As with the previous regime, the merchants were more content with the lack of control and enforcement enacted by Sultan Mahmud. Free trade rules and lenient regulations facilitated a greater flow of traffic. Titles In the past, Sultan Mahmud bestowed titles and positions to prominent traders. For example, the title “raja” was attached to the Javanese leader of Upeh, Utimutaraja, while Tuan was given to his contemporary in Hilir, Tuan Colascar.48 In times of war, the sultan entrusted the defense of these respective areas to the two foreign leaders. Thus, this 47 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, p.136. ‘Raja’ which meant royal was equivalent to the title of ‘Count’ given by the Portuguese. ‘Tuan’ corresponds to the Portuguese word ‘Dom’ which came before the first name. Barros, Décadas, p.242. 48 highlighted the level of trust shared amongst these individuals. Notably, it showed a deliberate lack of control and autonomy provided to these foreign merchant communities to protect and govern themselves. The Estado da Índia, due to the lack of manpower, adopted these similar measures to the optimal effect and relied on every bit of help garnered for a common cause. There were not many changes to this practice of bestowing titles and positions to encourage more collaboration with prominent traders. By giving them recognition for their efforts with the prestige of titles, the Estado da Índia gave them a stake in the hierarchy and administration of Malacca. The only slight variation was that it was different groups of people, which enjoyed the central authority’s preference. In the past, the Gujarat Muslims and the Javanese were the more prominent traders while the Hindu Keling merchants were of a lower standing. That sort of discrimination occurred openly. Many Muslim merchants took title of adiraja. The Hindus were only given the bourgeois titles of naina, which appears to be of equivalent to the Persian khoja. 49 When it came to the Portuguese administration, this order was reversed. Titles and offices continue to be bestowed on collaborators to ensure that they remain satisfied with the ruling regime. In this chapter, by doing a comparison of the situation before and after the emergence of the Portuguese shows that not much change occurred in Malacca and the adjacent districts. This was the way the Crown conducted their empire. It also showed that the Estado da Índia did not intend to disrupt any system that was already functioning well. Instead, it borrowed and worked on the existing laws and customs to establish a 49 Thomaz, “Melaka and its Merchant Communities”, p.28. foothold in the regional trading network. It made little economic sense to alter the status quo. The Estado da Índia merely mended and adjusted certain parts of the system to suit its needs. At no time, did the Portuguese want to come across as usurpers, who revolutionized the existing structure and introduce new approaches to trade in Asia. 122 Chapter SEVEN: Conclusion – Collaboration in Colonization At the dawn of the sixteenth century, the situation in Malacca suited the coming of the Lusitanian fleets. Malacca, without many indigenous products to trade, had its focal selling point as a cosmopolitan city, which opened it doors to traders from all walks of life. On the flip side, the port city depended heavily on foreign merchants, who wielded great influence in the affairs of the state. This interconnectedness and cooperation was deemed a requirement to bolster the Malaccan economy. The Portuguese entered into the regional markets, not only through the display of their military strength. But, this was coupled with the sale of weapons and military knowledge, which was coveted in a region plagued with rivalries and piracy. As time passed though, collaboration like most relationships were volatile and unpredictable. It required a lot of effort from both parties to make it work effectively. Trust and loyalty were key concerns, which affected the bond between the Estado da Índia and its subjects. In addition, the parameters of this ‘give and take’ relationship were often adjusted to suit the changing conditions of the times. From the cases mentioned, it is safe to surmise that no matter how blissful the relationship appeared to be, an air of doubt often persisted in Asian minds when dealing with the Europeans. After all, they were considered strangers from a strange land. By and large, the Estado da Índia often had to make up its rules as it went along, adjusting to the changing conditions of the times. This adaptability includes being able to improvise to the vagaries of any situation. 123 For collaboration to succeed, just like any patron-client relationship, a balance between the demands and supplies of the joint partners must exist. If any of the conditions change, one party could appear irrelevant and be done away with. Hence, there were clear attempts made by the Estado da Índia not to disrupt the status quo in Malacca. Their most crucial concern was trade. An anxiety of the Portuguese was to ensure that they not only preserve, but also expand on the existing traffic to and from the regional ports. This was seen in the example of initial customs concessions made to ships arriving from Coromandel, as well as in other compromises to the kelings, who traded on this route. 1 The Crown as a merchant among merchants.2 Luís Filipe Thomaz In the first decade of Portuguese occupation in Malacca, the Fazenda Real (Royal Treasury) of Portugal entered into exploratory commercial enterprises, which took the form of single-venture partnerships with Malacca’s merchants. No attempts were made at creating multiple links or at dictating the existing trading system. They were still finding their way around in the foreign lands and hence, were not confident in their knowledge of affairs in the region. The Estado da Índia had been aware of the history of 1 Albuquerque, Cartas para el-rei Dom Manuel I, vol.3, selected, prefaced and notes by António Baião, (Lisbon, Livaria Sá Da Costa, 1942) pp.222-3. 2 See the example of Sao Joao, the Portuguese Crown ship sent to Marteban in August 1512. Its cargo space divided equally between the Portuguese Crown and Nina Chatu, reflecting the cooperation shared in this joint venture. Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, pp.113-4. 124 rivalry amongst certain groups of merchants and hence, threaded carefully, so as not to antagonize any one party. This cautious stance had been adopted when dealing with the inhabitants throughout Southeast Asia. Whilst governing Malacca, they witnessed political changes in the adjacent regions with the rise of the Johore Sultanate as well as Aceh. The Portuguese tried to avoid being drawn into any political intrigues. Having been involved in the costly war of 1511, the Estado da Índia realized that it was bad for business, as resources were expended needlessly on conflicts. However, this non-involvement in politics, whilst enjoying a lucrative trade arrangement was difficult to attain. The Estado da Índia ’s method of administering Malacca has not always been a top down approach. It focused on addressing the concerns of the people. After all, it was a port city with a tradition of its merchants holding considerable influence in the policies made by the central authorities. At certain times, these traders’ clout caused adverse changes to the political hierarchy, like in the removal of the bendahara Sir Maharaja and temenggong Utimutaraja. This could be viewed as a level playing field, with checks and balances on any power, which advanced at the expense of another. In other words, anytime an individual, like Utimutaraja or Nina Chatu, became too influential, the other foreign merchants would likely place a restraint upon them. Hence, no single authority, the Portuguese included, could impose itself over another, or they too risked having their powers curbed. 125 Subsequent Colonizers The other European colonizers, namely the Dutch and the English, meaningfully built on the foundations left behind by the Portuguese and streamlined their operations with greater efficacy. They continued a similar pattern of dealing with foreign merchants, who felt disenfranchised by the vast numbers of privileged Muslim traders in the past. The United Netherlands East India Company (VOC) collaborated with the Chinese in Indonesia, while the East India Company (EIC) had close ties with the Indians. Taking a leaf from the Portuguese book, these future colonizers acquired these foreign merchants’ assistance to infiltrate the dominantly Muslim trading network. Throughout Malacca’s history, continuity in the patterns of governance was practiced in the port city. This brought about some form of stability. There were more instances of continuity than change. The Portuguese had carried on certain practices, which were still useful from the sultanate. Likewise, during Dutch colonialism, there were signs of inheritance and copying of certain Portuguese policies. For example, the Dutch in the seventeenth century had the pascedullen, which was roughly identical to the cartaz. It was modeled upon that same idea, as the Dutch had similarly claimed mastery of the seas upon the defeat of the Portuguese navy.3 The first known example was a sea pass issued at Malacca came just three weeks after the Dutch conquered it from the Portuguese. 3 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, p.120. 126 The cartaz system adopted by both the Dutch and English was essential as they used this system of channeling ships through Malacca, hence ensuring that it remained as one of the focal points of trade. 4 It was the Portuguese, who laid the foundations for the colonialist policies of the Dutch and the English. The latter improved and expanded on these policies to suit their interests and demands. In their diplomatic relations with the Malay rulers and the resulting conclusion of treaties, both the later colonizers followed the example set by the Portuguese. In a direct comparison, the difference between the Portuguese and the Dutch was that the latter were more organized in generating company profits for the VOC. It was succinctly remarked by the historian, Niels Steensgaard that The important points was that the Estado da Índia did not sit down and count their money at the end of the year and account for the results of that year. The VOC did.5 By the time, the EIC took over the administration of Malacca, they began to dump their manufactured goods into the Asian market, thus bringing about adjustments to the trading conditions. It was only then in the 1780s that the balance of trade began to shift in the favor of the Europeans. Previously, nothing the Europeans offered to the Asians was 4 Robert S. Wolff, “Da Gama’s Blundering: Trade Encounters in Africa and Asia during the European ‘Age of Discovery’, 1450-1520, in The History Teacher, volume 31 Number 3, (The Society for History Education, May 1998) p.312. 5 Niels Steensgaard, “Tourists, Tents and Traders” in Pilgrims to the Past, (1994) p.307 127 either cheaper or desired.6 Principally, the subsequent colonialists were more incisive in entering the markets and dictating demand and supply. Malacca’s status The port diminished in stature from the days of its “golden age” in the mid-fifteenth century, under the reign of Sultan Muzzaffar Shah (1445-1458).7 Some historians argued that Malacca by the late fifteenth century was not as remarkable as it was made out to be in the sixteenth century Portuguese chronicles.8 However, Malacca was still recognized as one of key regional centers, along with the other port cities of Pasai, Pedir and Java. It was evident that trade did not solely center on Malacca as there were other trade routes, such as through the Sunda Straits, which bypassed Malacca completely. Hence, the comments made by Tomé Pires that “Malacca is surrounded and lies in the middle, and the trade and the commerce between the nations for a thousand leagues on every hand must come to Malacca.”9, borders on hyperbole. Neither was it a case where “whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice”10 as the Portuguese on conquering the port city, did not emerge as the sole provider of spices to Europe. Still, many avenues were available to the Europeans to get their spices, albeit the higher prices since the goods were passed through the hands of Arab middlemen. 6 Only in the late eighteenth century, when the English derived a cheaper method in producing textiles, the balance of trade then slowly shifted in favor of the Europeans. Mentioned by Leonard Blussé in seminar “1780-1830” at the National University of Singapore, 25th January 2005. 7 Liaw Yock Fang, who found that most of the laws that governed the Malaccan Sultanate was written during that period of prosperity. Undang Undang Melaka, p.38. 8 Roderich Ptak, “Reconsidering Melaka and Central Guangdong: Portugal’s and Fujian’s Impact on Southeast Asian Trade (Early Sixteenth Century)” in Peter Borschberg, (ed.) Iberians in the SingaporeMelaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004) p.1-2. 9 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol.2, p.286. 10 ibid. p.287. 128 Varthema articulated it more bluntly that “it is not necessary to trade here [Malacca] in anything except in spices and silken stuff”11 This raises more questions on the credibility of the Portuguese sources which all claim apparent greatness of the port city. However, it was undoubtedly known that Malacca had few indigenous products and depended on its geography. One of the key reasons for its success was the absence of another established port on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula to rival its position. This advantage was slowly lost with the emergence of the port in Johore Lama at the end of the sixteenth century. By the next century, this rise marked a parallel decline of Malacca. This highlighted the fragility of any harbor town, whose entire economy depended on the sea trade. The lack of Portuguese efforts to change the way trade was conducted in Malacca, allowed for it to plummet even further. Crucially, their efforts to venture inland to source out for more resources and goods to trade in markets were not extensive enough. 11 Varthema, Intinerary, p.84. 129 Portuguese Legacy Although the Portuguese community in Malacca has been separated from us for [over] three hundred years, it is still attached to us, still loves us so much. After two hundred years of Dutch rule, a hundred and fifty years of English rule, the language of Malacca has remained, the Parpia Cristão, the Portuguese language of the sixteenth century. Now if they get married and I ask them: “What is your religion?” they answer ‘Portuguese’. They don’t say Roman Catholic. Portuguese is synonymous with Catholic. They still retain our dances, songs, folklore, everything.12 The Portuguese expansion into Asia did not always account to an equal and balanced relationship for both the Portuguese and its collaborators. Rarely have any other colonizers managed to succeed in achieving this with their subjects. Nonetheless, to deny any enhancement of administration of Malacca and the molding of the cultural fabric of Malacca was injustice to the efforts and endeavors of the Portuguese pioneers. For example, the establishment of the Misericordias, in particular the hospital, was beneficial to the society at large. The later development of schools provided the future generations better opportunities to advance themselves. By learning the Português language, inhabitants of Malacca were able to move away from resource-limited Malacca to work for the Portuguese in their other colonies in India, Africa and China. The ghosts of the Portuguese legacy still lurk behind every tiled roof and more significantly in any word, which sprung from their language. Reportedly, up to four hundred words in Bahasa Melayu originated from Português. For example, the Malay word for church “geraja” is 12 Interview with Father Manuel Teixeira in 1982, “The Phantom of the Seminary” in Pilgrims to the Past, pp. 109-10. 130 derived mainly from the word, “igereja”. This all played a significant role in the survival of a Portuguese past. One of the more significant success stories was the creation of a people of Portuguese culture, who were loyal to the Crown’s cause. The casados were proud of their Portuguese heritage. When the Estado da Índia was not in control of Malacca from 1641, many of them still kept their Portuguese names during the Dutch occupation.13 After more than three centuries of various colonial administrations, many in Malacca at the turn of the millennium, still look on themselves as Portuguese. Thus, it proved that the good name of the Portuguese endured.14 It was probably because most of them, who ventured to these parts, were poor and some even destitute. These travelers were not fidalgos, Instead, they were simple country people, who were desperately searching for new opportunities. The English and French made a show of being rich and powerful, but the Portuguese did not. At most times, they humbly sought for indigenous assistance. They also accepted the conditions laid out to them. Through their activities in trade and collaboration, they also had more direct contact with the local inhabitants of Southeast Asia.15 However, it was also noted that the Portuguese did engage in bloody wars with the local inhabitants. The difference though, was that from the earliest times, the Estado da Índia did not believe that they were more violent than the inhabitants of the lands they 13 Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, p.58. Interview with Father António da Silva Rego in 1983 “The Last Lusitanian”, Pilgrims of the Past, p.143. 15 ibid. p.144. 14 131 conquered.16 To a certain extent, the locals felt the same way too. For example, Sultan Mahmud was not overawed by the presence of Albuquerque’s war fleet and his army, which outnumbered the foreign legion, was confident of victory. There appeared to be the idea of ‘fair game’, when the Crown defeated the sultan’s forces in 1511. The spoils of the war were given to the Portuguese. Although they gained the port city, the Estado da Índia still had to stake a sizeable share of its own resources towards maintaining Malacca. The changes to the political, social and economic conditions of Malacca occurred over a long period of time and they were mostly unintended. Considering the orders and objectives that the Crown initially set out to accomplish, it appeared that the Portuguese were contented with the status quo as they were merely hopeful for a slice of the trading pie. From the texts and manuscripts, there was little indication that the Portuguese intentionally tried to revamp the system of governance or introduce new practices in Malacca. No attempt was made to fix a wheel, especially when it was not broken. Any changes were probably due to the prolonged presence of any dominant group of people, which resulted in a transformation of the city. On the other hand, substantial evidence suggests that the Estado da Índia made a proactive effort to adapt and assimilate into the prevailing modus operandi in Malacca. By keeping conditions the same, they brought about familiarity and continuity mainly for 16 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Polticial Economy of Commerce Southern India 1500-1650, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.254. 132 the traders to conduct their business unimpeded. Hence, economically, the harbor town carried on, as it was, regardless of the coming and settlement of the Portuguese. Unlike the cliché “they came, saw and conquered”, the Portuguese worked hand in hand with their Asian counterparts, in order to achieve common goals. Hence, it is pertinent to reconsider the perception that these Europeans necessarily came to pillage and take advantage of the abundant goods and resources. This imperialist ideology and the methods of accomplishing such aims were developed centuries later. The Portuguese came to Southeast Asia chiefly to trade. At most times, they were being charged at higher, more profitable prices, which benefited the locals. The latter also benefited from the grant of certain benefits and privileges, like offices, titles and trade concessions. This was a fair exchange agreed upon by both parties, who only undertook this collaboration if their interests were satisfied. With regards to a bulk of the indigenous population in Malaya, only a few signs pointed to the Estado da Índia possessing an agenda or vendetta against the Muslims. Admittedly, some engagements developed into heated exchanges, especially those involving Albuquerque during his initial encounters. But in general, there were numerous other positive interactions between these seemingly irreconcilable adversaries. If there were to be a greater common good to be achieved, then these smaller differences were overlooked. It was also apparent that religious conversions did not take precedence over trade benefits. It was only in the middle of the sixteenth century that more emphasis was placed on Christian evangelization, which was due more likely to the events in Europe. In 133 the end, Portugal will go down in the annals of history as one of the smallest nations ever to have stretched its empire to cover nearly the entire globe. And they managed to do so through the collaboration with the indigenous inhabitants of the various lands. This was a feat that was unlikely be replicated ever again. 134 Bibliography Primary Sources Albuquerque, Alfonso, The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, translated by Walter de Gray Birch, New York: Hakluyt Society, 1884. Albuquerque, Alfonso, Cartas para el-rei Dom Manuel I, vol.3, selected, prefaced and notes by António Baião, Lisbon: Livraria Sá Da Costa, 1942. 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Shirodkar, P.P., Portuguese Paleography, Goa: Maureen and Caveet Publishers, 1997. Spallanzani, Marco, Giovanni da Empoli: un Mercante Fiorentino nell’Asia Portoghese, (a Florentine merchant in Portuguese Asia) Firenze: Studio per Edizioni Scelte, 1999. Smith, Ronald Bishop, The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations and Peregrinations to the Kingdoms and Islands of Southeast Asia 1509-1521, Bethesda: Decatur Press, 1968. Smith, Ronald Bishop, Siam, vol. 1, Bethesda: Decatur Press, 1966. Spruyt, John, History of Indonesia: the timeless islands, Sydney: Macmillan, 1973. Stephens, H. Morse, Rulers of India: Albuquerque, originally published in Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897 and in New Delhi: Asian Educational services, 2000. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, Improvising Empire: Portuguese Trade and Settlement in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1700, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, a political and economic history, London: Longman, 1993. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, Aldershot: Variorum, 1995. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, Nina Chatu and the Portuguese trade in Malacca, Bandar Melaka (Malacca Town): Luso-Malaysian Books, 1991. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, Early Portuguese Malacca, 1511-1580, Macau: Macau Territorial Commission for the Commemorations of the Portuguese Discoveries, 2000. Wheatley, Paul, The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961. Winius, George D., Studies on Portuguese Asia 1495-1689, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorium, 2001. Wolf, Eric, Europe and the People Without History, Berkeley: University of California, Press, 1982. Wolters, Oliver William, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian perspectives, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. 141 Published Articles in Books Adas, Michael, “From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Pre Colonial and Colonial Southeast Asia”, in Colonialism and Culture, pp.89-134, edited by Nicholas B. Dirks, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. Alves, Jorge M. dos Santos, “The Foreign Traders’ Management in the Sultanates of the Straits of Malacca: The cases of Malacca, Samudera-Pasai and Aceh, 15th and 16th Centuries”, in From the Mediterranean to the China Sea, pp.131-42, edited by Claude Guillot, Denys Lombard and Roderich Ptak, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998. Andaya, Leonard, “The Portuguese Tribe in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in The Portuguese and the Pacific, pp.129-47, edited by Francis A. Dutra and João Camilio dos Santos, Santa Barbara: University of California, 1995. Boxer, Charles Ralph, “Some Considerations on Portuguese Colonial Historiography”, in Historiography of Europeans in Africa and Asia, 1450-1800, pp.27-38, edited by Anthony Disney, Brookfield: Variorum, 1995. Boxer, Charles Ralph, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of South East Asia, 1580-1600”, in South East Asia: Colonial History, vol. 1, pp.126-40, edited by Paul Kratoska, London: Routledge, 2001. Braudel, Fernand, “The Expansion of Europe and the Longue Durée”, in Expansion and Reaction: Essays on European Expansion and Reactions in Asia and Africa, pp.17-27, edited by Henk L. Wesseling, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1978. Chang Pin-Tsun, “The first Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in the fifteenth century” in The Global Opportunity, pp. 105-20, edited by Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Brookfield: Ashgate, 1995. Das Gupta, Arun, “The Maritime Trade of Indonesia: 1500-1800”, in South East Asia: Colonial History, vol. 1, pp. 91-125, edited by Paul Kratoska, London: Routledge, 2001. Fernánde-Armesto, Felipe, “The Stranger-Effect in Early Modern Asia”, Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia, pp.181-202, edited by Leonard Blussé and Felipe Fernánde-Armesto, Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), 2003. Hall, Kenneth R., “Economic History of Early Southeast Asia” in Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: from early times to c.1800, vol. 1, (paperback edition) pp.183-272, edited by Nicholas Tarling, London: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 142 Legge, John D., ‘The Writing of Southeast Asian History’. Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1, (paperback edition) pp.1-50, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Manguin, Pierre-Yves, “Manpower and Labour categories in Early Sixteenth Century Malacca”, in Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia, pp. 209-15, edited by Anthony Reid, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. Pagden, Anthony, “Dispossessing the Barbarian”, in Theories of Empire, 1450-1800, pp.78-98, edited by David Armitage, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. Perez, Rosa Maria, “Portuguese Orientalism: some problems with Sociological Classification”, in The Portuguese and the Socio-cultural Changes in India 1500-1800. pp.7-19, edited by K.S. Mathew, Teotónio R. De Souza and Pius Malekandathil, Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2001. Pinto, Paulo Jorge de Sousa, “Melaka, Johor and Aceh”, in Nouvelles Orientations de la recherche sur L’histoire de L’asie Portugaise, pp.111-33, Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997. Pinto, Paulo Jorge de Sousa, “Captains, Sultans and liaisons dangereuses: Melaka and Johor in the late sixteenth century”, in Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century), pp. 131-46, edited by Peter Borschberg, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004. Ptak, Roderich, “Reconsidering Melaka and Central Guangdong: Portugal’s and Fujian’s Impact on Southeast Asian Trade (Early Sixteenth Century)”, in Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century), pp. 1-21, edited by Peter Borschberg, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004. Robinson, Ronald, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration”, (original essay in 1972) Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, pp. 128-51, edited by Henry Jr. A. Turner, New York: New Viewpoints, 1976. Rubiés, Joan-Pau, “New Worlds and Renaissance Ethnology”, in Facing Each Other, the World’s Perception of Europe and Europe’s Perception of the World, pp.81-112, edited by Anthony Pagden, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1999. Smail, John R.W., “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia” (reprinted in) Autonomous Histories, Particular Truths, (University of Wisconsin Center of Southeast Asian Studies Monograph no.11) pp.39-70, edited by Laurie J. Sears, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1993. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, “Melaka and its Merchant Communities at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century”, in Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the 143 China Sea, pp.25-39, edited by Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin, Oxford University Press, 2000. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, “Precedents and Parallels of the Portuguese Cartaz System”, in The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads, pp. 67-85, edited by Pius Malekandathil and Jamal Mohammed, Kerala, India: Institute for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities of Malabar Educational Society for Human Resource Development and Research (MESHAR), 2001. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, “The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the Sixteenth Century”, in European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia, pp.2542, edited by Om Prakash, Brookfield: Variorum, 1997. Tiandrasasmita, Uka, “The Indonesian Harbour Cities and the coming of the Portuguese” in Indonesia-Portugal: Five Hundred Years of Historical Relationship, pp. 54-63, edited by Ivo Carneiro de Sousa and Richard Z. Leirissa, Lisbon: Centro Português de Estudos do Sudeste Asiático (CPESA), 2001. Villiers, John, “Doing Business with the Infidel: Merchants, Missionaries and Monarchs in Sixteenth Century Southeast Asia”, in South China and Maritime Asia, vol. 2, pp15170, edited by Roderich Ptak and Karl Anton Sprengard, Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz Verlag, 1994. Virunha, Chuleeporn, “Power relations between the Orang Laut and the Malay Kingdoms of Melaka and Johor during the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries”, in Recalling Local Pasts: Autonomous history in Southeast Asia, pp. 143-66, edited by Sunait Chutintaranond and Chris Baker, Chiangmai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002. Wang Gungwu, “Southeast Asia between the 13th & 18th Centuries: some reflections on political fragmentation and cultural change” in Historia: Essays in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Department of History, University of Malaya, pp.1-12, edited by Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali, Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Historical Society, 1984. Wake, Christopher H. “Melaka in the Fifteenth Century: Malay Historical Traditions and the Politics of Islamization”, in Melaka: the Transformation of a Malay Capital c.14001980, vol. 1, pp. 128-61, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983. Winius, George D., “Embassies from Malacca and the ‘Shadow Empire’ ”, in The Portuguese and the Pacific, pp. 64-71, edited by Francis A. Dutra and João Camilio dos Santos, Santa Barbara: University of California, 1994. 144 Journal Articles Andaya, Leonard, “A History of Trade in the Sea of Malayu”, in Itinerario, vol. 24, no.1, pp.87 –110, Leiden: Grafaria, 2000. Cardon, R., Catholicism in the East and the Diocese of Malacca 1511-1888 (Reprinted from the Malaya Catholic Leader), Malacca: ________, 1938. De Souza, Teotonio R., “A Tentative Check-list of Abbreviations in Portuguese Archival Records”, in Indica, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.118-24, Bombay: Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture, 1977. Ferro, João Pedro, “A Epistolografia no Quotidiano dos Missionários Jesuítas nos Séculos XVI e XVII.”, Lusitania Sacra: Revista do Centro de Estudos de História Religiosa, Tomo V, 2° Série: Jesuíta na Cultural e Sociedade Portuguesa. Lisboa: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1993. Flores, Jorge Manuel “The Asian Seas (1599-1800): local societies, European expansion and the Portuguese” pp.15-20, in Revista de Cultura (Review of Culture – English Edition) Macau: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1991. Hooykaas, R. “Humanism and the Voyages of Discovery in the 16th Century Portuguese Science and Letters” in Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, AFD. Letterkunde: Nieuwe Reeks Deel No.4 (New Series, vol. 42) pp.98-59, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979. MacGregor, Ian Alistair, “The Portuguese in Malaya”, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 28, pt.2, pp.5-47, Singapore: Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS), 1955. Unpublished dissertations and papers Macgregor, Ian Alistair, unpublished papers. “Malacca, 1500-1530” Imprints: 1950-55. Found in the National University of Singapore, Library. Noonan, Laurence A. The Travels of John of Empoli: a study of a Florentine Trader in the service of Portugal 1503-1517, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Perth: University of Western Australia, 1970. Found in the personal collection – A/P Peter Borschberg. 145 Scammell, Geoffrey Vaughan, “Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in the Indian Ocean” Bombay: Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture, International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History (ISIPH), 1978. Found in the Xavier Center of Historical Research, Goa, India. Scammell, Geoffrey Vaughan, “Seafaring in the Estado da Índia. c1500-1700” for the 7th International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History (ISIPH), Goa, January 20-24, 1994. Found in the Xavier Center of Historical Research, Goa, India. Thomaz, Luís Filipe F. Reis, “King’s Officers, Merchants and Privateers: the Dynamics of the Portuguese Expansion in the East”. Paper presented at the International Symposium on Maritime History (3-6 February 1989) at Pondicherry University, India. Found in the Xavier Center of Historical Research, Goa, India. Internet articles Scammell, Geoffrey Vaughan, “The New Worlds and Europe in the Sixteenth Century” in The Historical Journal, vol. 12, no.3, pp.389-412, 1969. Web version, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018246X%281969%2912%3A3%3C389%3ATNWAEI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H Wolff, Robert S., “Da Gama’s Blundering: Trade Encounters in Africa and Asia during the European ‘Age of Discovery’, 1450-1520, in The History Teacher, volume 31 Number 3, pp.297-314, (The Society for History Education, May 1998) Web version, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00182745%28199805%2931%3A3%3C297%3ADGBTEI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T Websites: http://dictionary.oed.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/cgi/entry/00043846?single=1&query_typ e=word&queryword=collaboration&edition=2e&first=1&max_to_show=10 http://www.bartleby.com/61/60/C0476000.html http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=109244&tocid=0&query=humanism&ct http://www.malaccacom.net/malaccaportuguese/ 146 Appendix A: List of Kings, Viceroys and Captains Kings of Aviz dynasty Afonso V 1438-1481 John II 1481-1495 Manuel I 1495-1521 John III 1521-1557 Sebastian 1557-1578 Cardinal Henrique 1578-1580 Viceroys of India Vice-Rei Francisco de Almeida, 1505-1509 Governador Alfonso de Albuquerque 1509-1515 Governador Lopo Soares de Alvarenga ou de Albegaria 1515-1518 Governador Diogo Lopes de Sequiera 1518-1522 Governador Duarte de Meneses 1522-1524 Captains of Malacca Ruy de Brito Patalim 1512-1514 Jorge de Albuquerque 1514-1516 Jorge de Brito 1516-1517 Nuno Vaz Pereira 1517-1518 Afonso Lopes da Costa 1518-1519 Garcia da Sá 1519-1521 nd Jorge de Albuquerque (2 appointment) 1521-1525 147 Appendix B: Chronology Date Key Events 12 February 1508 Orders are given to Sequeira to explore Malacca. 5 April 1508 Sequeira leaves Lisbon for Cochin. August 1509 Sequeira leaves Cochin for Malacca. November 1509 Peace agreement between Sequeira and Sultan Mahmud fails. January 1510 Sequeira, on seeing the failed negotiations for the lives of the Portuguese captives, sails back to India. 6 February 1510 Letter of captured factor, Ruy Araújo reaches Albuquerque. 16 May 1511 Albuquerque arrives at the port of Pedir. 28 June 1511 Albuquerque’s fleet arrives at Malacca. 25 July 1511 On the day of Santiago, attack on Malacca commences. 10 August 1511 Portuguese Conquest of Malacca is accomplished. November 1511 Francisco Serrão is dispatched to explore the Moluccas. 1 December 1511 Albuquerque departs on the Flor de la Mar for Goa. February 1512 Albuquerque arrives at Cochin. 1513 Full construction of the fort ‘A Famosa’ is completed. 1515 Death of Albuquerque. 1516 Book of Duarte Barbosa is published. 1521 Death of King Manuel, succession of King John III. 148 Appendix C: Letter of Grant to Nina Chatu Dom Manuel, To whomsoever may see this our letter we make it known that Nina Chatu, an Indian, is a leading person and trader residing presently in this town of ours, Malacca, before Alfonso de Albuquerque ... went with our men to capture Malacca, and thus wrested from our enemies the Muslims... and set free our men held in captivity, with whose help we had wished to establish commerce, peace and friendly relations, The said Captain-Major granted to him in perpetuity the post of Governor of all the Kaffirs now residing in the said town of Malacca. Albuquerque speaks “ I have great consideration for the many outstanding and much appreciated services of Nina Chatu, an Indian trader, an important person, now resident of the most populous town of Malacca, for the good that he has done, as well as for all the alms that he has given in his benevolence to the Christians held captive there [by the Sultan of Malacca] during the time of Diogo Lopez, and for help rendered to them by giving them many goods belonging to him as though they were his compatriots, and also for the sincerity, truthfulness, and loyalty which I have always found in him, not only before I had conquered the town, but for which conquest he was instrumental in that he conveyed some messages between me and the King (Sultan of Malacca), but also for helping us to come to terms of peace. As he was in the service of the said Lord when I conquered and took over the said town and placed it under the command and government and authority of the said Lord, I assigned certain duties to him, and as regards to the matters I put him in charge of, he executed them efficiently and loyally. As the negotiator, he solved the many problems as though they were also his own concern, and as a vassal and true servant of the King, our Lord, and apart from many other matters the said Nina Chatu is a worthy trader, deserving much honour and such a grant as this, and I deem it well that, on behalf of His Majesty, I have the honour to recognize his esteemed merits and services, and to grant him in perpetuity all the power, command, and government of all the Kaffirs living in the said town of Malacca, whatever their nature and condition may be, as well as all those living in other places subordinate and in fealty to the said town ... and not only will he have under him all the persons mentioned above, but also all the foreigners that may come to live here, thus taking up residency here and starting to buy, sell and trade in their goods. Others also will be considered Kaffirs, namely all people who are not Muslims. By virtue of the powers vested in him, the said Nina Chatu has the power to give jobs to all those capable of doing them as bailiffs, alcaides, xabandares (shahbandars) as well as to men capable of doing civil jobs, and to any other officers to do any jobs within their capacity; and he has the power to retain or dismiss them as he thinks best for the general well-being in the service of the said Lord, in order that everything be fulfilled as necessary, and thus he may dispatch them as he sees fit, for the good of the community and in accordance with the laws and customs of the place.” (Translated by Luís Filipe F. Reis Thomaz, Nina Chatu and the Portuguese trade in Malacca, Bandar Melaka (Malacca Town): Luso-Malaysian Books, 1991) [...]... Orientalist, who was teaching a new generation of historians, showing them how Portuguese materials can be used to study Asian history He is gradually creating a school of his own, not basically involved in discovery, roterios, or Governors-General but trying to find out what the place of the Portuguese in Asia actually was.35 George Winius Whilst many letters, manuscripts and documents about the Portuguese. .. assistance rendered in the collaboration with the Portuguese Crown The earliest forms of Portuguese collaboration originated from their dealings with the Italians The Crown depended on and desired to tap into their expertise and experience For example, the kingdoms in Sumatra were familiar in trading with the Italian merchants, and that prompted the Crown to acquire a few Italians to lead their engagement... definitive history, neither is it intended to be that way From the explorations into the mechanisms of how the Portuguese engaged the local inhabitants, hopefully, a fresh insight to sixteenth century Malacca is achieved 43 Diffie, “Wise Man from the West”, p 121 20 Chapter TWO: Background to Europe and Southeast Asia This chapter explores the context in which Portuguese began their expansion into... its way into the Portuguese writings The history of the Portuguese discoveries and conquests has been littered with stark contrasts The stories told included characters varying from saints to pirates Some yearned for paradise, while others mourned about a paradise lost The description of the Lusitanian travelers ranged from the righteous and nasty, charitable and uncaring, open-minded and narrow In all,... Portuguese in Asia are still left available to historians, the call now is to “read across the grain” to sieve out nuggets of information 36 They were then corroborated with the other sources to test its veracity The nature and identity of the information has also come under greater scrutiny, with the knowledge of an author and the purpose behind the writing proving to be just as, if not more important... Scammell, “Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in the Indian Ocean” (unpublished seminar paper, International Seminar on Indo -Portuguese History, Bombay: Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture, 1978) p.2 5 Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, Expansion and Conflict, (London: Macmillan Press, 1993) p.39 22 time wore on, this mindset changed and interest in the... translators must also be historians of that period and not merely linguists 38 For example, Fernão Mendes Pinto, The Travels of Mendes Pinto, edited and translated by Rebecca D Catz (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984) 16 In addition, when dealing with Portuguese history, there has been an issue of contention with the distance between the chroniclers from the scene of the action In the words of the Portuguese. .. muta (or muda) refers to young Hence, in other words, Utimuataraja was probably a Javanese prince residing in Malacca A fair amount of detriment has been brought about by these slight changes, which occurred during the chronicling by the authors or in the paleography and translation Nonetheless, Pires’ work remains important to historians, as it still is one of the more comprehensive guides to the... Rokan and to the north of Kelantan.26 From the Portuguese historian Luís Thomaz’s perspective, Malacca was basically made up of three concentric circles of influence.27 The inner one, around the port of Malacca consisted of territories ruled directly by the sultan The middle sphere had territories administered by the mandarins and mendelika appointed by the sultan 28 And on the outermost ring were the... the sea trade of Lisbon to sustain most of the Portuguese economy This declining state of affairs needed to be remedied immediately, thus prompting the Crown, in particular the rulers of the Aviz dynasty, to look overseas for expansion.2 Initial conquests and occupation of foreign lands not only brought in revenue for the Crown, but also prisoners who were used to assist in the Portuguese 1 The term, ... History of Singapore, 1880-1940 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) ‘More recent’ also indicates the history that is closer to today Professor Warren was still able to use oral history to. .. its way into the Portuguese writings The history of the Portuguese discoveries and conquests has been littered with stark contrasts The stories told included characters varying from saints to pirates... presence, but more importantly, for their assistance rendered in the collaboration with the Portuguese Crown The earliest forms of Portuguese collaboration originated from their dealings with the