Chapter Conclusion: Experiences and Implications The Difference between Political Survival and Breakdown is a Question of “Political Crafting”. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan1 Democracy can be crafted to be attractive. Giuseppe Di Palma2 The idea of elite as a democracy-promoting actor has attracted vast interest in the past several decades in Western academia. This study has concentrated on the political elites at several levels as the primary actors in process of village elections in China: national, provincial, county and township, and village. This thesis therefore has traced the roles of political elites in Chinese village elections via an examination of their crafting and manipulation, and demonstrated that the elite perspective does capture the important elements of the process of rural democratization and may provide important insight into village democracy and even into the future of democratization in the whole country of China. After years of village self-governance, it has been increasingly and obviously recognized that the role of political elites at different levels is a critical determinant of the democratic quality of village elections. Thus, without the forward oriented efforts of insightful political elites’ democracy may remain a remote goal for rural Chinese people. Alfred Stepan, “Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons,” (with Juan Linz), in Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 138. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), 156. 247 6.1 Main Findings There is no doubt that village elections and self-governance are based on the experiences of the peasants in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, who established villagers’ committees on their own. But, as an institution, village self-governance and its improvement could not have occurred without a reformist leadership that initiated institutionalizing Guangxi farmers’ experience, formulating the laws, rules and regulations concerned, making relevant policies, and pursuing them; in other words this could not have occurred without the crafting of political elites at different levels. Political elites in China function as a “helping hand” for village elections, and thereby promoting rural democratization. 6.1.1 Path toward Democratization: Political Elites Lead China’s Rural Democratization This study can come to the conclusion that China has and will continue to move towards democracy along the elite-led road, whereas neither the model of liberal democracy nor the model of popular democracy is realistic choices. Although the term elitism sounds more like an accusation than recognition of superior qualities, the way to democracy led by the elite is realistic and feasible. The achievements up to the present with rural democracy in China have been obtained mainly through the endeavours of elites. This, however, does not mean that this study denies the contributions of peasants and other actors to village democracy. The success of democracy in rural China defies some prevailing theories that stipulate preconditions for democracy: rural China is not an industrialized, developed economy; rural China is short of civic culture and especially short of democratic 248 tradition. Chinese democracy is thus best understood by focusing, not mainly on its socioeconomic determinants, but on how it is crafted by political elites. The Chinese experience is not completely unique. Terry L. Karl finds that democracies that came about through elite-directed compromise have tended to be the most stable.3 Andrew Nathan thinks, “Elite democracy in many countries was a step toward full democracy because it allowed competitive institutions to become established before mass participation began.” Taiwan’s democratization illustrates the points that the prospects for a competitive system are best when a democracy is the result of transition through government-led transformation.5 Tien Hungmao argues that Taiwan had all the necessary conditions for democracy, but the democratic transition had to await the ruling elite’s support for further reforms and the opposition leadership’s willingness to cooperate with these reforms. Chiang Ching-Kuo, the paramount leader of the KMT, is generally acknowledged for his critical role in implementing Taiwanese liberalization reforms and democratization. His flexible tactics in responding to challenges of democratization are very important to Taiwan’s democratic development.6 This elite-led transition to democracy is limited; on one hand “while elites may have been self-motivated by power struggles or concerns with inner party legitimacy at the start of the reform crisis, over time the dominant role of central decision makers Karl, Terry Lynn, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” in Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, eds. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 180-1. Andrew Nathan, “Chinese Democracy: the Lessons of Failure,” in China and Democracy: the Prospect for A Democratic China, ed. Zhao Suishen (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 27. Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins eds., The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy (Harwood academic publishers, 1999), 338. See Tien Hung-mao, “Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave, eds. Charles Chi-hsing Ching et al (Armole, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 3-26. 249 in the reform process declines.” On the other hand this model usually bears a striking characteristic of artificialness, changing with the change of leaders’ understanding, attention, and willpower. People would believe “other factors begin to play a more important role in forcing change.” However, to transcend the elite-led democratization, there is still a long way to go. 6.1.2 Major Roles The roles of political elites at different levels are summarized in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 Political Elites’ Roles at Different Levels in Their Crafting Village Democracy in China Elites at different Major representatives Major tasks Types of Politics levels Senior National Elites Peng Zhen Institutional choices, Symbolic Politics Bo Yibo Political support. Elites at National Li Xuejue Crafting, engineering Reform Politics Level (MCA) Bai Yihua new institutions, Wang Zhenyao democratic Zhan Chengfu institutional design and summing up the local experiences and then spreading them Elites at Provincial Zhang Xiaogan Crafting, diffusing, Distributive politics Level Zhang Zhenlang distributing, summing up the local experiences and then spreading them Elites at CountyFeng Yongcheng Crafting, Loyal Politics Township Level Zhou Lianjun manipulating, Local Politics Liu Zhenlong distributing, operating Li Guomin Elites at Village Level Han Xingfu Organizing, Citizenship Politics Han Mingsen manipulating creating, Zhu Qiming crafting, challenging, Li Si doing democracy Zhang Baijiang etc.* * This list of names is from Daniel V. Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Shen Mingming, “The Prospects for Democratization in China: Evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study,” in China and Democracy: the Prospect for A Democratic 250 The above table can be represented in another way (see following figure). Figure 6.1 Political Elites’ Roles at Different Levels in Their Crafting of Village Democracy in China National Policy Guidance Ministry of Civil Affairs -------------> Outlines central government relevant Laws, rules and regulations on village Self-governance | | Provincial Policy Guidance Provincial Department Of Civil Affairs County and Township Authorities Village --------------> Diffuses National polices and laws; provides provincial laws of implementing “the Organic Law”, measures, policies | | County and Township Policy Guidance ---------------> ---------------> Set out policies for village self-governance at Locality; specify measures and ways | | Doing Democracy Employs all of the laws, policies, measures provided by superiors, and resources, means to practicing village democracy In the case of village elections, party-governmental officials have contributed to the process of crafting village democracy. This study finds that the internal structure and composition of political elites are crucial to our understanding of how political elites may contribute to democratic development in rural China. The emergence and implementation of village elections in rural China is best described as one initiated and guided by political elites at different levels of governments. After the implementation, village elites and other actors appeared on the scene, being an important power for crafting village democracy. China, ed. Zhao Suisheng (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 190. 251 National: Building Democratic Institutions and Making Laws and Policies Among the top Chinese leaders, Peng Zhen in league with Bo Yibo and Song Ping were the most important people who strongly supported village self-governance. Their roles imply symbolic politics. The reform-oriented officials at MCA were empowered to administer the village elections and self-governance work under the support of national top leaders. Of them, Wang Zhenyao and his colleagues played a crucial role. The elites clustered around the Civil Affairs system were the core for the implementation and promotion of village self-governance. Without these officials, there would not be fruitful achievements in rural democracy. This study regards the role of political elites at national level as an engine on the way to rural democracy, a designer and promoter for rural democratic institutions. In crafting village democracy within administrative levels, political elites at the national level play the role of reforming rural politics. They designed electoral laws, supplied policies concerned, arranged relevant institutions, summed up and spread grassroots experiences and innovations, and guided and supervised the implementation of village elections and self-governance at lower levels. Their crafting is reform politics. Provincial: Delivering and Implementing the Policies The unevenness of democratic quality of village elections among provinces effectively demonstrates the importance of provincial elites’ roles. This thesis has noted this phenomenon: the process of village self-governance in the past two decades has been characterized by a variety of levels of democratic quality of village elections amongst the provinces. The geographic basis of the village self-governance situation is clearly tied to which provincial political elites are supportive and how they craft 252 village democracy. A core group of provincial officials worked together to develop election practices; their capacity became a crucial factor in implementing village selfgovernance. This study finds that the leading officials at provincial departments of Civil Affairs and their networks play a vital role in implementing village selfgovernance. The core role is to diffuse central law and relevant rules and policies. Crafting at this level belongs to distributive politics. The core role is to diffuse central law and relevant rules and policies. Crafting at this level belongs to a distributive politics. County and Township: Implementing the Policies and Organizing Elections County and township authorities have played complex and diverse roles, which can not be classified simply as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. All things considered, crafting and manipulating are two main performances of elites at county or township level when they are faced with implementing village elections and self-governance. Obviously, local authorities play a role of forming a connecting link between leaderships above and the masses below, from national and provincial governments all the way down to the villages. They are the crucial piece in the political elites’ chain of crafting village democracy, operating as a “hinge” at the meeting point of state and society. If the national and provincial elites are the makers and providers of the laws and institutions concerned, the officials at county and township levels are the carriers. As the carriers, they mainly send out the instructions, policies, and laws from higher authorities. Therefore, their most important role is to implement the laws, rules and regulations concerned. In essence, local elites’ crafting village democracy is a loyal politics, because whether and how they can implement village self-governance is an indicator of 253 whether they are loyal to higher authorities. Meanwhile, local elites’ crafting village democracy is a local politics, because the process of the implementation is obviously characterized by localism, either active or nonexistent construction of village democracy. Village: Handling and Operating Elections After the implementation of village elections, village elites and other actors appeared on the scene as an important power for crafting village democracy. There is a considerable degree of regional variation of village elites’ functions and attitudes toward village elections among village elites. Village elites are the spokespersons of villagers and of community interests, practitioners and operators of village elections, and the creators of the new political participation mechanisms. They have some channels and abilities for helping safeguard peasants’ legitimate interests and rights. Since they have popularity, power, and various resources for political mobilization village elites are considered the main practitioners and operators of village democracy. They have more information channels, are more articulate in explaining their interests, and can skillfully follow the democratic procedures. Of what they do, election campaigns are probably the most worth noticing in village elections. Village elites have definitely played a crucial role in crafting village democratic participation mechanisms although we cannot attribute all these mechanisms to them alone. Among the innovations, the most significant and influential were “sea election” and “the villager-representative assembly”. Meanwhile the village party branch secretaries have made a strong impact on village elections because of their special position in the village power structure. Their basic attitude toward village elections is passive, while control or manipulation is the 254 secretary’s main act. However, with the introduction of village elections, as the core leadership position, the party branch authority is being challenged. 6.1.3 Crafting Strategies The picture of village democracy varies from one place to another and depends on the political elites as the artists. The quality of village elections and the fate of village self-governance and democracy are affected at length by political elites’ deeds and strategies. Localities with remarkable achievement in village elections and selfgovernance usually have gained strong support from provincial or county or township authorities. In addition, the political elites that comprise these authorities can employ suitable strategies to implement village elections. Rural democracy is a “fraudulent” one, meaning it is the result of the strategic choice by the political elites who have been in charge of the rural elections and self-governance, and have adopted some tactics which are beneficial to rural democratic development, so as to lessen the resistance from opponents and the kinds of worries for rural stability and the party’s control of rural communities. National Level Three kinds of resources the elites employed have been identified and analyzed: top leaders’ support, expectations and pressures from peasants, and their own interest in the pursuit, through which they can and have effectively constructed a sound environment, formulated the law, rules and regulations, and policies, built institutions, and trained the executors for village elections and self-governance. All in all, these elites have efficiently used various means, methods, and strategies to build a momentum for village self-governance, and then force the issue onto local agendas. 255 Political elites at national levels crafted village democracy mainly through (1) Building a sound circumstance; (2) Making laws, rules and regulations, and polices; (3) Institutional building; (4) Relying on the China Council for the Promotion of BasicLevel Governments and Mass Organizations; and (5) Three co-operation projects: Chinese Rural Cadres Training Center Programme, Chinese Village Affairs Management Training Programs: the Co-Operation between MCA and EU, and the Standardization of Villagers’ Committee Election Procedures. Provincial Level Although political elites’ initiative and innovation are a political precondition for developing village self-governance, they need some agents to implement the policies concerned and develop village democracy. Whether this type of network exists and how strong it is, in a sense, are also important to the democratic quality of village elections. The political elites at the provincial level have employed five major strategies to craft village democracy: (1) Elite cooperation; (2) Local legislature; (3) Political responsibility; (4) Political programming; and (5) the Art of balancing between the party leadership and village elections. County-Township Level These authorities can be a positive force if they feel sure that village elections will help with their work rather than erode their power. To a large extent, the success of the village election depends on whether or not county and township leaders can see the benefits of rural democratization. Positive Acts Local leaders at county and township levels are capable of a more positive role, and can be a necessary and indispensable force for rural elections 256 Bai Yihua, a former official in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, summarized village selfgovernance as “four democracies”.20 This pragmatism is called “democratic Machiavellianism”. One of the central arguments of this study revolves around the idea of “democratic Machiavellianism”. This notion denotes a special behaviour and attitude on the part of local leaders: they try to learn the new rules of the game under the hegemony of electoral procedure although they personally may hate and resist electoral laws. It is “democratic” because local leaders and particularly the township leaders have to follow electoral laws and their working style must be accommodated to the new democratic rule. It is “Machiavellian” because they have to ensure stability through clever and resourceful political skills. It is the combination of democracy and Machiavellianism because local elites are forced to strengthen authority through certain liberties, and to achieve unity within diversity. The practice of village elections has produced or called for the man of “democratic Machiavellianism” who is fundamentally concerned with stability, authority and unity through skilful employment of democratic procedure or means. This is because some elections indeed promote stability, but others may lead to chaos; increase the tension between the party secretary and elected village heads and between different lineages, and mass tyranny could be created. In other words, while authoritarian control and corruption may favour the village election and democracy, a badly organized village election may lead to chaos and mass tyranny. Thus a balance between liberty and authority, diversity and unity is needed and the man of “democratic Machiavellianism” is called for to strike such a balance in the practice of village elections. 20 Bai Yihua, “Lun zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi” (“On China’s Village Self-governance”), Zhezhixue yanjiu (Journal of Political Science), no.1 (Jan., 1997): 14-19. 267 The notion of democratic Machiavellianism is against democratic idealism that sees democratization as a process of achieving democratic ideas without being polluted by the consideration of material interests. It shows that Chinese pragmatism is at work in the sense that local elites are “seduced” into the “democratic camp” for the utilitarian rewards that elections bring. They are now trying to learn how to exercise new political control, and how to “technically deal with” local democracy issues, while they their best, at least on the surface, not to violate electoral laws and regulations. “Democratic Machiavellianism” has improved political techniques of control. Behind this new development electoral democracy triumphed, and the hegemony of electoral laws which local leaders not dare to challenge, and from which villagers can take advantage. 6.2.4 Lack of Civil Society and Party Politics In the Western literature, many works show the importance of civil societies during transition to and consolidation of democracy, but, usually, civil society is not a sufficient condition, just a necessary condition. “Civil society is as essential to democracy, be it direct or representative, as air for a human being.”21 For example, the democratization experiences in developing countries clearly demonstrate the importance of civil society to democratic transformation. However, China’s rural democratization proceeds under the lack of civil society, which is different from other countries’ democratization and at same time highlights the crucial role of political elites’ crafting. On the other hand, it is commonly known that in a sense, democratic politics is a political competition by way of elections. According to the history of world 21 Andreas Auer, “General Conclusion,” in Direct Democracy: the Eastern and Central European 268 democracy, election campaigns need organizations, financial support, administrative programmes, and voters’ trust, and only then can political parties meet these demands. Thus, modern democratic politics is usually inseparable from party politics. For instance, village elections held in India and Indonesia are permeated with party campaigns. Due to the low institutionalization of political party, there exist few party models to support democratic competition in East Asia, however.22 In rural China, there is currently no other political party except the CCP, and there are no agents of democratic parties, since the Chinese Youth League and Women Association are not independent political organizations. Village elections currently held in rural China not have any connection with multi-party politics. In view of this situation, one scholar regards Chinese grassroots elections as a “non-party political competitive democratic model”. 23 In fact, the CCP does not see the elections as a threat to its rule in rural China. On the contrary, now the CCP mobilizes and encourages villagers to participate in village elections, regarding the elections as a means and opportunity to strengthen and improve its leadership, and regain its legitimacy in rural China. The crafting of rural democracy in China without real political competition between different parties and the lack of civil society are probably among the most noteworthy in world democratization models. 6.2.5 Gradualism or Incrementalism Many scholars have pointed out the importance of gradual transition to democracy. Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, for example, emphasized the importance of Experience, eds. Andreas Auer and Michael Butzer (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), 354. 22 See James Cotton, “East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits,” In Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Chu Yun-han, and Tien Hungmao (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 100-105. 23 See Cui Ziyuan, Di er ci sixiang jiefang yu zhidu chuangxin (The Second Ideological Emancipation 269 pacing for the success of a political reform, saying “in the process of political change, much depends on pacing. Sometimes small steps create an expectation of change in reasonable time, and the incremental process of change can sustain that expectation even though the change itself might be small. A packed process can reduce both and the fears of those afraid of change and the impatience of those demanding immediate change. One of the most difficult tasks for politicians is to find the right pace for their actions, neither fast nor too slow, and preferably one step ahead of the expectation of their opponents.”24 The rural democratization in China has proved their point. S. R. Arnstein points out that participation was a progressive concept, regarding it as “rungs in a ladder”, with non-participation at the bottom, through manipulation, therapy, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and ultimately full citizen control.25 Zhao Suisheng also said, “We could see the advent of a gradual, elite-led democratization not unlike what happened in South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s”.26 In all likelihood, further democratization in China will be the result of an ongoing evolution of Chinese politics rather than a sudden revolution in the political sphere. Advocates of village elections believe that gradual reform is the only means to democratize China without major violent upheaval and a long period of destructive political chaos. Wang Zhenyao argues that only a gradual pace can push on the development of village elections, “We have established some very detailed electoral procedures during over the past ten years; otherwise rural democracy would not be and System Innovation), Hong Kong Oxford University Press (1999). 24 Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 76. 25 S. R. Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” American Institute of Planners Journal 35 (1969): 206-214. 26 Zhao Suisheng, “Three Scenarios,” Journal of Democracy 9, no.1 (Jan., 1998): 58. 270 stable, just being a political slogan”. 27 The gradualism here not only refers to the process or stages of rural democratic development, and but also to the strategies and measures chosen during the process. Whereas, the incremental change of rural democratization in China has unexpectedly paved the way for genuine democracy. 6.2.6 Autonomy: A Double-edged Sword Many local elements have been put into village self-governance. Thus, “local autonomy” is an indispensable concept for understanding the diversity of the quality and performances of village elections and self-governance. Local leaders have certain autonomy in implementing village self-governance. Autonomy can leave more room for locality to formulate laws, rules and regulations, and ways of village elections that more consistent with local situations. Village elections vary widely because first of all different regions have their own rules and regulations, some of which are different and even contradictory. Currently there are four levels of laws and rules governing village elections: national Organic Law, provincial implementation laws, county/city and township’s rules and regulations, and villages’ own regulations. However, it is argued that the local autonomy leads to an increase in control or manipulation of and even thwarting of the implementation of village elections. This may also lead to the emergence of political localization. In view of this variation, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter urged the Chinese government to revise the Organic Law, and adopt a national election law to standardize voting procedures for village committee heads.28 27 Wang Zhenyao, “Cunmin xuanju daoliao jiwei guanjian di shihou” (“Village Elections at a Critical Juncture”), Zhongguo gaige (China Reform, rural edition), no.1 (2002): 7. 28 Jimmy Carter, “Jimmy Carter Congratulates Essay Contest Winners,” Speech at the Essay Contest Award Ceremony (September 8, 2003, Beijing). 271 To village democracy, autonomy or discretion of local leaders is indeed a double-edged sword. The autonomy can have a variety of consequences and meaning, not all of them positive. The model of elite-led democracy has characteristics of actors crafting mainly as “insiders of the system”, gradual development, pragmatism and “Democratic Machiavellianism”, the weakness of civil society and a lack of non-party political competition. Then, what can we learn from the case of village elections in rural China? What implications can be acquired from this study? Let us turn to the discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of Chinese village elections. 6.3 The Implications: Theory and Practice Village elections and self-governance represent one of the most highly significant political developments in the last two decades of twentieth-century China. China’s case has important implications, because it represents a significant attempt to achieve political transformation through village elections and self-governance. The empirical questions discussed in this study point toward larger theoretical issues. I will conclude with some theoretical and practical implications. 6.3.1 Village Elections and New Rural Politics During Mao Zedong’s era, pan-politicizing was a striking characteristic. At that time, all peasants were mobilized and drawn into different political movements. They were tools in a class struggle. Different from Mao’s era, the process of reform and opening-up is in a sense one of de-politicization, while the implementation of village elections and self-governance has re-shaped rural politics. This new politics includes new political culture, new foundations of village power legitimacy, new 272 relationships between peasants and government, society and state, and village and township, and a new public sphere. A significance of village elections is that village elections are a learning process for all concerned, from common villagers to the rulers, and to political and intellectual elites. It is in this process that a new political culture has emerged in rural China. There are some encouraging signs of forming a new political culture. First of all, peasants’ and particularly village elites’ political awareness has increased. For example, villagers’ attitudes toward democracy have been changing: from ignorance to awareness, from passion to reason, from clumsiness to adeptness, and from aloofness to attachment. Election competition is another example. The level of electoral competition gradually rises. Some areas of China, in particular the coastal areas, have fierce competition in village elections. The ratio of re-elected officials declines, since a re-election now becomes more and more difficult. We can say that village elections have been transforming peasants’ clientelism into citizenship. Huntington once pointed out, democracy is not a guarantee of good governance, but is a set of procedures for selecting leaders and holding them accountable. The rural economic development and the nearly two decades of village elections and self-governance have institutionalized the values and “rules of the game” in terms of democratic participation and competition. Li Lianjiang once argued that “Free and fair balloting may first become an accepted way of political life in the village, and then an established political value that villagers wish to see apply to all political authorities”.29 To be made accountable has become part of China’s official discourse, whereas “the concept of political accountability seems to be taking root”30 29 Li Jianjiang, “The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China,” Asian Survey, Vol.XLIII, no.4 (July/August, 2003): 660. 273 in villages. “Rightful resistance” is becoming a legitimate model of peasants’ behaviour when they encounter local leaders’ illegal commitment to village elections. However, these signs not infer that rural China appears to be a mature democratic culture. China’s village elections have to a great extent changed the foundation of rural power legitimacy. “In the long run, repeated elections may gradually induce a farreaching change in villagers’ understanding of political legitimacy.” 31 Rural democracy based on fair access and procedural morality but not on control or manipulating should have a strong base of legitimacy. The authority of villagers’ committee and its head comes from village elections and villagers’ ballots, whereas village party branch secretary’s authority comes from the party’s position in the whole political system, which is obviously an inborn authority. Thereby there is always a tension between these authorities. Have village elections diminished or extended the legitimacy of the CCP in rural China? The answer is partly yes, because one significant aspect of village elections is to weaken legitimacy of the latter by the election authority, and gradually make the party authority approve election logic. The answer is also partly no, because the party remakes itself by democratic elections and then consolidates its legitimacy. Two-balloting system is an important step, which can not only enforce and improve the performance of grassroots party units, but broadened the support base for the party leadership and its legitimacy at the village level. The final outcome is that elections will set up new foundations of the legitimacy of rural power and authority. Also, village elections have changed grassroots’ fundamental relationships. Most importantly, village elections have changed village cadres’ duty sequence. 30 Pei Minxin, “‘Creeping Democratization’ in China,” Journal of Democracy 6, no.4 (1995): 76. 274 Before the implementation of village self-governance, village cadres were held responsible only for the higher authorities, whereas village elections force the elected cadres to hold themselves responsible to their own villages, not just for the higher authorities. The current debate on the dual roles of agent and master played by a village committee head is a good case for showing the impact of village elections on village cadres’ behaviours. Theoretically, village self-governance has transformed the leadership relationship between townships and villages into the guidance relationship, and more and more township governments depend on village cadres to fulfil government affairs that are not greeted by villagers. In fact, not only has the relationship between villages and townships changed, but the relationship between the common villagers and village cadres has also changed greatly. As Michael Coppedge said, there are meaningful differences between life in a democracy and life under an authoritarian regime, while at the most basic level, democracy gives public officials incentives to treat ordinary people well, since everyday citizens have the power to take away their authority.32 If a candidate hopes to be elected or re-elected, s/he must care about village and villagers’ interests, or “treat ordinary people well”. When faced with village elections, it is very necessary for village cadres to alter them from complete instruments of the implementation of higher authorities’ polices and tasks, either social or economic or political, to the defenders of villages and electoral competitors. Furthermore, it seems that villages have gradually formed a new public sphere. As a public sphere, village self-governance provides opportunities for average villagers and particularly village non-governing elites to participate in the administration of village affairs, and join the political contest in village elections. For 31 Li Lianjiang, “The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China,” 660. 32 Michael Coppedge, “Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why Competition Matters,” Comparative Politics 23, no.2 (April 1993): 266-267. 275 example, the villagers’ representative assembly becomes “new centers of rural public sphere, in which villagers can exchange information and ideas, development consensus and community spirit, and make their voices heard on vital local affairs”.33 6.3.2 Peasantry and Democratic Politics Many scholars assume that countryside is a conservative backwater, which serves as a brake on democracy, while the society with an abundance of peasants cannot establish a democracy. For example, Barrington Moore argues that there would be no democracy without capitalists or middle class. He argues that peasants are major obstacles to a transition to democracy.34 But, some cases such as the Indian case show that a society with abundance of peasants can still establish democratic politics. Regarding the relationship between peasants and democracy in China, there are two issues that needed to be made clear. One is to make a difference between whether Chinese peasants are able to practice democracy and how village democracy appeared and developed in rural China. The Chinese empirical evidences reveal that Chinese peasants have their capacity to perform village elections. They demand democracy and have a capability to put it in practice. The crucial issue is that whether political elites can supply the relevant democratic participation mechanisms to the peasants. Furthermore, Chinese peasants have created many democratic participation mechanisms in the process of rural democratic practices. A simple fact is that the residents of rural areas are less well educated than the residents of urban areas, but the former, peasants, have been much more deeply involved in the democratization 33 Wang Xu, “Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Village Self-Government in Rural China” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, January 2001): 224. 34 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418. 276 process. The statement that government should not currently implement village elections because of the peasants’ low level of literacy and education or illiberality is thus obviously wrong. Therefore, “It is unwise to assume that China’s peasants will play the same passive role in democratization as their counterparts in Europe and America”, because “elections are also enhancing the organizational capability of the peasantry”.35 However, how village democracy appeared and evolved is another issue. Village democracy was indeed initiated, driven, and guided by political elites at different levels. Another issue is that village elites are no longer traditional peasants. It is hard to find very traditional peasants in current rural China. As Barrington Moore pointed out that the landed elites in Britain made a successful transition to engagement in commercial agriculture, which was one factor favorable to the future development of liberal democracy. Like British landed elites, village elites in China not only are key actors in village elections, but also have actively created some democratic participation mechanisms. 6.3.3 Which Model is Workable in China: Elitism or Populism? The new leftists in China advocate “populist democracy” which emphasizes participation, equality, and people’s sovereignty. They are concerned with the polarization of political participation, the disadvantaged position of women, and the weaker position of minority clans. A populist stresses the fairness and substance of election. We should not neglect the voice of populist democracy in the process of rural democratization; an implementation of some ideas of populist democracy is necessary. 35 Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 219. 277 Nevertheless, on the one hand their voice is very weak, and it has been confirmed by Chinese history that the radical model of democracy won’t be workable. This study does not adopt radicalism or populist approach, for neither of them can be successfully carried out in reality, and neither would be beneficial to the development of rural democracy in China. China’s history has fully proved that populism is hardly beneficial to democracy in China. Populists have not given a detail for that point yet. These elites regard themselves as spokesmen for the populace. The process of village elections shows that under the current Chinese political system this elite-led democratization can supply a constructive political resource for rural democracy, and guarantee village elections develop smoothly and orderly. Only under this situation can populism’s demands with its focus on quality and participation of the masses be realized. Yet there are two points that need to be made. First, this study’s focus on the elites and their crafting does not necessarily mean that the author advocates elitist democracy.36 Rather, exploring how political elites craft village democracy in rural China, the study is an attempt to objectively illuminate that the elite-led model is much more practical and feasible for describing the realities of rural democracy, because it coincides with the actual situation in rural China. Second, the political elite’s crafting of village democracy in this study is different from the elitist strategy for Chinese democratization some scholars have presented 37 . Those who hold the view of the elitist strategy for Chinese 36 Different scholars use different terms, some, for example, Peter Bachrach uses the term “democratic elitist theory”, others use elitist democracy theory, and Etzioni-Halevy even uses the term “demo-elite perspective” (as part of democratic elite theory), but their meanings are the same or similar. See Etzioni-Halevy Eva, The Elite Connection: Problems and Potential of Western Democracy (Polity Press, 1993), 53. 37 Harold Waterman, “Which Way to Go? Four Strategies for Democratization in Chinese Intellectual Circles,” China Information 5, no.1 (Summer 1990): 14-33. 278 democratization think that popular participation in democratic politics is unsuitable for Chinese people based on their assessment of the political culture and national conditions (guoqing), where a major problem is that China has a large population with low literacy. They argue that elitist democracy is a necessary stage of political development before the realization of popular participation can be institutionalized. My view is contrary to theirs. To this study, any form of political participation is politically progressive, and we should encourage the masses to participate in politics. Elite-led democratization does not advocate depriving the masses of participation in politics. In addition, those who hold the view of the elitist strategy for the democratization in China mainly focus on the roles of intellectual elites, the “outsiders of system,” while this study has paid much more attention to political elite, the “insiders of the system”. 6.3.4 Village Democracy and National Democratization At this stage a couple of questions naturally arise regarding whether political elites will extend village elections to the higher levels and how they think of this point. One of the crucial problems with China’s political reform is how to start. It seems that village election is the ideal launch pad.38 Creating local self-governance is considered a fundamental part of Chinese democracy. As Pei Minxin said, gradually reforming checks and balances against the ruling party’s monopoly of power, 38 However, a few Chinese scholars have denied that there is a logical progression from village selfgovernance to national democratization. For example, Dang Guoying does not think that village selfgovernance is the starting point of China’s political democracy, arguing that village democracy cannot survive alone in a country where the other key components of democracy are lacking. He further points out that it is naïve to argue that village elections will lead to direct township, county, provincial, and even national elections. See Dang Guoying, “Cunmin zizhi shi minzhu zhengzhi de qidian ma?” (“Is Village Self-governance the Starting Point of Political Democracy?”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no.1 (1999): 88-96; Dang Guoying, “Xiangcun zhengzhi fazhan tiaozhan chuantong de zhengzhi lingdao yishi” (“Rural Political Development is Challenging Traditional Awareness of Political Leadership”), Zhongguo Shehui daobao (China’s Social Guide) (April 2000): 14-17. 279 strengthening the rule of law, and village self-governance will gradually lay the institutional foundations for the eventual democratization of China. 39 In fact the village elections’ experiences are currently influencing election practices and democratic governance in urban communities, higher-level township governments, and within the Chinese Communist Party, among other political arenas. Moreover, some themes such as the complementary nature of political and economic reforms and the intimate relationship between democracy and the rule of law when introducing village democracy are now being repeated in a national context, suggesting a shift toward more openness and pluralism. Although village elections are just a grassroots democracy, rural democracy in turn forms the building block of China’s national democratization. “A little democracy was better than no democracy, and a little each time would amount to a great deal over time. The important thing for them was to start a process. Each step in the right direction, however small, could be a significant contribution.”40 This argument is perceptive and insightful. Indeed, village elections can prepare China to “embrace a more democratic political system”, and create “a safe path for the current system to evolve into a less centralized and more autonomous structure”.41 Since peasants can elect their own leaders, why cannot people in cities? Since there can be local elections, why not for the central government? Since elections can be held outside the party, why not inside it? What’ more important is the village election has been expanded from rural China to the urban part of the country, resulting in the expansion of the grassroots democracy in China and an important breakthrough 39 Pei Minxin, “‘Creeping Democratization’ in China,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, no.4 (1995): 66. 40 Edmund S.K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 19291949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 344. 41 Liu Yawei, “Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China,” China Perspective 31 280 in China’s construction of democratic politics. Because the villagers’ political interest in village election remains immediate and local rather than national, of great importance to the democratization of China is how to promote the success of democracy at the grassroots level to the national level. A multitude of evidence demonstrates that there is a contradiction in the fact that democracy is developing, though slowly and unevenly, at villages, the bottom of China’s political hierarchy, whereas higher officials are subject to no democratic control at all. Hence, extending direct elections can resolve this contradiction. More important is that an increasing number of villagers have demanded to directly elect township government leaders after approximately two decades of village self-governance. Will the direct village election possibly become the driving force of national democratization? Logically, elections should spread to the higher echelons of government. In fact, as early as the drafting of the Organic Law, some top leaders were defining the relationship between village self-governance and national democratic politics in this manner: as a grassroots democracy, village election is just a training ground for town, county and national democracies.42 Nevertheless, some factors including the relevant laws and regulations prevent enlarging the electoral arena to the township and the county. “One thing is certain-that China will undertake a democratic breakthrough in the future”, He Baogang, at the conclusion of his The Democratization of China, said “it is not clear what model of democracy, liberal, paternalistic or popular, will be implemented in practice.” 43 Since what individual and social movement will be involved is partially unpredictable, it is indeed very hard to predict national democratization. However, the course of rural democratization shows that the path of (September-October 2000): 34. 42 Wang Zhenyao, “Cunmin xuanju daoliao jiwei guanjian di shihou,” 6. 281 elite-led democratization is perceptive and realistic for leading to national democracy. Put in another way, the historical signification of the rural democratization of China lies in directing towards the right path for the national democracy of China. In conclusion, one of the most important lessons we can learn from the Chinese experiences with village elections and self-governance is that local actors have successfully implemented and consolidated village democracy through crafting strategies. Under the “political elite’s crafting model”, thousands of millions of peasants have witnessed the advances of democracy in rural China. The rural democratization in China is a matter of political crafting. The future of Chinese national democratization is also ultimately a question of political crafting. Nevertheless, Chinese reform-minded political elites need to utilize more skilful strategies and practical and effective measures to promote a national democracy in China. 43 He Baogang, The Democratization of China (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 231. 282 [...]... representatives and the control of the process of policy -making 6. 1.4 Two Regularities From the trajectory of political elites crafting village democracy, we can find two patterns there One is the higher the position of political elites in governmental hierarchy, the more willing they are to craft and promote village democracy, conversely, the lower the position, the more possible controls of manipulating village. .. constrain village elites process of practicing village democracy Village elites have taken the following strategic acts to protect villagers’ democratic rights and promote rural democracy They make use of laws and institutions, the masses’ emotion and interest in public issues, external forces, and even peasant’s complaints and protest In fact, at the village level, the crafting of rural democracy. .. political elite’s crafting model”, thousands of millions of peasants have witnessed the advances of democracy in rural China The rural democratization in China is a matter of political crafting The future of Chinese national democratization is also ultimately a question of political crafting Nevertheless, Chinese reform-minded political elites need to utilize more skilful strategies and practical and. .. ( Village Self-governance and the Uniqueness of China’s Rural Democracy ), Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji (China’s Rural Economy), no.12 (1998): 57 -61 261 6. 2.1 Actors: the “Insiders of the System” instead of the “Outsiders of the System” Many of the transitions to democracy in Latin American countries and Eastern European countries were driven by “forces outside the system” (ti zhi wai) Theoretically the. .. township officials Manipulation can be found during the election and after the election, first in the control of the electoral procedure, and then in the control of the elected village cadres This study here mapped the various 257 means local elites chose to control or manipulate village elections (1) Putting emphasis on local rules and regulations at the expense of national ones, and the control of information... there are many strategies employed by the party branches to meet the challenge of village elections Among them, some are active, and some passive The followings are indicative of this change Now party members or party secretaries would run for the positions of villager’s committees; the practice of manipulating the candidates of villagers’ committees has given way to manipulating the selection of villagers’... through the setting up of leading groups for the village election (3) Holding meetings to let village cadres know the township government’s view of who are the ideal candidates for the committee; (4) Influencing villagers’ attitudes and behaviours Local leaders and particularly township officials do their best to influence the attitude and behaviour of the villagers through their authority and personal... concerned with the polarization of political participation, the disadvantaged position of women, and the weaker position of minority clans A populist stresses the fairness and substance of election We should not neglect the voice of populist democracy in the process of rural democratization; an implementation of some ideas of populist democracy is necessary 35 Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in... of the elitist strategy for the democratization in China mainly focus on the roles of intellectual elites, the “outsiders of system,” while this study has paid much more attention to political elite, the “insiders of the system” 6. 3.4 Village Democracy and National Democratization At this stage a couple of questions naturally arise regarding whether political elites will extend village elections to the. .. political leaders contributed to the rural democratization in China The very fact is that many Chinese intellectuals and “democratic elites did not care about village elections Thereby, as “insiders of the system”, political elites crafting village democracy are mostly driven by policies concerned; thereby this democracy can be called a “policy-driven democracy In the meantime, this 10 Chu Yun-han, . manipulating the selection of villagers’ representatives and the control of the process of policy -making. 6. 1.4 Two Regularities From the trajectory of political elites crafting village democracy, . leaderships above and the masses below, from national and provincial governments all the way down to the villages. They are the crucial piece in the political elites chain of crafting village democracy, . crafting village democracy. There is a considerable degree of regional variation of village elites functions and attitudes toward village elections among village elites. Village elites are the