CHAPTER FOUR THE ‘ASEAN WAY’ AS A MODEL FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM: AN ASSESSMENT Synopsis Contrary to claims that the ASEAN Way of cooperative security is the most important factor in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism, this study found that it is only one of several determinants. The ASEAN Way has both strengths and weaknesses. The major criticism against the ASEAN Way (especially the ARF) is that it is a mere ‘talk shop’ and unable to progress to the more important stages of preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. But the ASEAN Way is seriously weakened by the constraints of sovereignty and non-interference. It is favoured by most of the ASEAN members and China, but opposed by the Western powers and Japan. The strength of the ASEAN Way is its important role in keeping channels of communication open among its great power members. It is able to play a useful role, by default, because of Sino-Japanese rivalry. The ASEAN Way is making a useful contribution by promoting ‘soft’ regionalism, where there is growing economic cooperation but no progress in regional political integration. Besides the ASEAN Way, there are five critical determinants that can explain the dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism over the past two decades. First, the end of Cold War antagonisms at the global level means that interstate competition is now mainly in the economic arena. Second, the rise of China and its priority of national modernization are likely to encourage Beijing to emphasize stability and responsible international behaviour. Third, Japan’s quest to be a “normal” great power and its strong support for multilateralism mean that Tokyo has to sensitively manage its relationship with a rising China. Fourth, the regional leadership role of a middle power like South Korea is a positive factor that contributes to the growth of regional integration. Fifth, US support for open regionalism has been strongly influenced by the determination of the East Asian states to further strengthen their regional cooperation, especially since the end of the Asian financial crisis in 1998. In the post- cold war era, US primacy also acts as an important regional stabilizing force by setting clear limits on Sino-Japanese rivalry. 184 Introduction For a region that is so synonymous with difference and diversity, it is remarkable that any progress towards formal regional institutionalization should have occurred If East Asia can develop effective institutional forums . this will be a development of long-term significance.1 The main aim of this chapter is to assess the major determinants of Northeast Asian security regionalism. First, it will re-examine a claim that the ‘ASEAN Way’ is the most important factor in promoting security regionalism in Northeast Asia. Second, it will assess the factors that have influenced the rise of a regional ‘security regime’ in postcold war Northeast Asia. It will conclude with observations on the main driving forces in Northeast Asia. This chapter is divided into following sections. In the first section, the nature of inter-state relations in post-Cold War Northeast Asia is highlighted. In the second section, I refer to a claim made by some scholars that ASEAN elites view the ASEAN Way of cooperative security as the main factor to shape the Northeast Asian security order. Examples of the ASEAN Way include the ARF, APT, and the EAS. The security challenges posed by the Korean peninsula will be discussed in section three. In section four, I will attempt an evaluation of the ARF’s contributions to the evolving security architecture in Northeast Asia. In section five, I will discuss the major driving forces currently shaping the pattern and dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Alan Dupont has claimed that the ARF had sown the seeds of a security community in the AsiaPacific. See Dupont, The Future of the ARF: An Australian View, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1998, pp. 2-5. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (2nd edition), London and New York: Routledge, 2009. 185 (A) The security environment in Northeast Asia A remarkable feature of post-Cold War Northeast Asia is the growth of economic interdependence among Japan, China, and South Korea, despite periodic tensions over the ‘history’ problem arising from the legacy of Imperial Japan’s aggression during the Second World War against its neighbours. Since 2005, China has overtaken the US to become the largest trading partner of Japan and South Korea. In the post-Cold War era, there have been a few occasions of regional political crises in Northeast Asia, but always short of a ‘hot war’. These range from the 1993 US-North Korean tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme, the 1995-96 testing of missiles by the Chinese military in the Taiwan Straits to intimidate Taiwanese voters not to support President Lee Teng-hui’s pro-independence policies, and a repeat of US-North Korean nuclear tensions when the first George W. Bush administration in 2002 accused the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea of seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability. All these geopolitical crises raised, for a time, concerns of escalation that could threaten East Asian stability and prosperity. Fortunately, such concerns did not turn into reality. Instead, in the post-Cold War era, Northeast Asia can be considered to have undergone what optimists would regard as a remarkable transformation into a regional ‘security regime’. East Asian economic interdependence, in terms of intraregional trade, and investment, has grown rapidly over the past twenty years. In a 2009 study, William Grimes found that there have been “substantial increases in intraregional trade” in East Asia between 1980 and 2005: as a percentage of total trade of the East Asian economies, William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: the Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009. pp. 42-49. 186 intraregional trade has increased rapidly from a share of about one-third to over one half. This means that the Northeast Asian economies have a higher percentage of trade among themselves than the NAFTA economies. Since 2005, South Korea’s two top trading partners are China and Japan. Japan’s top two trading partners are China and South Korea. Japan’s and South Korea’s growing economic interdependence have spillover effects on their foreign policies towards China. China’s buoyant economy enabled Japan to recover from its decade-long economic stagnation of the 1990s. Over the past decade, China has become a key engine of economic growth for East Asian states. In her 2007 study, Evelyn Goh pointed out that between 1995 and 2004, China increased its proportion of trade with ASEAN by about four percent, while the US experienced a relative decline of 3-4 percent, and Japan lost about four percent from its share of imports by ASEAN. The China-ASEAN FTA is expected to lead to more than US$10 billion increases in mutual exports between China and ASEAN. Since the early 1990s, Northeast Asia has actually enjoyed an enviable period of relative peace and stability, despite the periodic roller-coaster fluctuations. How can this phenomenon be explained? In my view, there are two broad explanations. First, it is Ibid., pp. 43-44. A Japan Times editorial noted: “A strong alliance with the US is only a starting point for Japanese foreign policy. Asia, and China in particular, are equally vital partners.” (‘Mr Fukuda makes progress in Asia’, 23 November 2007). Cha Hak-bong, “Korea-Japan race to woo Chinese tourists a sign of changing times”, The Chosun Ilbo August 2010. CIA Factbook 2007, cited in Farizal Razalli, “East Asian Regional Integration: The Journey since the failure of the EAEG”, Journal of Management and Social Sciences, 5(1) Spring 2009: 30-50. Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing regional security strategies”, International Security 32(3) 2007/8: 113-57, cited in Tan See Seng ed. Regionalism in Asia, Volume II, London and New York: Routledge, 2009. 187 about whether the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the kind of security community model it represents, is exportable to Northeast Asia, and to what extent. Second, are there factors specific to Northeast Asia that offers plausible explanations? This chapter proposes five factors to attempt an explanation for the ‘relative peace and stability’ in Northeast Asia despite a legacy of historical animosities, contemporary ‘clash of Chinese and Japanese nationalisms’, and inter-state rivalries over territorial claims and regional influence. These five factors are the end of the Cold War antagonisms; the rise of China and its focus on domestic modernization; Japan’s quest to be a ‘normal’ country and its vision of regional integration; the leadership role of middle powers like South Korea; and the new and cautious US policy of support for open East Asian regional multilateralism. The major security challenges facing Northeast Asia are the Korean Peninsula (North Korean nuclear issue and Korean reunification), the Taiwan Issue (China’s territorial claim that Taiwan island is an integral part of Chinese territory), and ChinaJapan territorial disputes in the East China Sea and their regional leadership rivalry. The election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in March 2008 has led to intensified economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China and an improvement in their bilateral political relations. But the nuclear ambitions of an insecure North Korea is the most serious geopolitical threat to East Asian security, as seen in renewed tensions there following the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010 allegedly by a North Korean submarine. We now turn to an analysis of the North Korean challenge to Northeast Asian security. Goh, Sui Noi, “Sino-Taiwan uneasy embrace: signing of landmark trade pact has not reduced military distrust.” Straits Times 30 July 2010, p. A2. 188 (B) The Korean Peninsula as a major Northeast Asian security challenge An immediate and urgent security challenge facing Northeast Asia concerns the Korean Peninsula, in particular North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the related issue of Korean reunification. North and South Korea were separated at the 38th parallel at the end of World War Two and remained so after the Korean War (1950-53). North Korea is an international issue because of its domestic economic failures and its impact on the global nuclear proliferation issue. Domestically, the repressive Kim Jong-Il regime is presiding over a ‘failing state’: over the past decade, North Korea is facing famine. It is only Chinese food and economic aid that is propping up the Pyongyang regime. North Korea is one of the poorest states in the world. In contrast, South Korea has since the Korean War been transformed into a wealthy OECD state. Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula The second North Korean nuclear crisis started in 2002 after the newly-elected George W. Bush administration in the US accused Pyongyang of re-starting its nuclear weapons program, in violation of the 1994 US-DPRK Framework Agreement. The crux of the North Korean nuclear crisis can be traced to ‘regime-insecurity’ in Pyongyang, and the hard-line policy of the Bush administration. In October 2002, North Korea admitted to having developed a nuclear weapon. In December 2002, Pyongyang removed its freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear program, again refused to admit IAEA inspectors David Kang, “The security of the Korean peninsula”, in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow eds., The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, London and New York: 2010: 35-47. Marianne Hanson and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Nuclear weapons: Asian case studies and global ramifications”, in William Tow ed., Security Politics in the Asia Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 228-246. 189 and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT the following month. But President Bush’s inclusion in 2002 of North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’ state made the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il even more recalcitrant. North Korea had good reasons to feel threatened by President Bush’s use of force to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime in the Iraq War of March 2003. The Six-Party Talks (SPT) (involving North and South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) started in 2003 and has been marked by twists and turns since then. It is aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea. Washington wants the complete, irreversible, verifiable disarmament (CIVD) of North Korea’s nuclear capability. For an impoverished North Korea, a nuclear weapons capability is its last option. The fourth round of these negotiations held in Beijing, led to a ‘breakthrough’: Pyongyang agreed to abandon its civilian and nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT in exchange for economic aid and improved US-DPRK relations. Other members of the SPT promised security assurances, stronger economic relations and eventual political normalization. The US affirmed that it had no intention of attacking the DPRK with conventional or nuclear weapons, that it would respect North Korea’s sovereignty and work to normalize its relations with Pyongyang. After the US imposed sanctions on a Macau bank, accusing it of money laundering for the DPRK, plus the troublesome question of Japanese abductees, Kim Jong-Il revoked the September 2005 agreement. On October 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear device. In May 2009, North Korea tested another nuclear device and also two missile tests. US intelligence indicated that by 2006, North Korea had produced about 43 kilograms of Hanson and Rajagopalan ibid., pp. 238-239. Hanson and Rajagopalan, ibid. pp. 240-241. 190 separated plutonium, which could result in the production of between five and fifteen nuclear weapons. Pyongyang is believed to have exported missile materials and technology to Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iran, Pakistan and Yemen. North Korea is also pressing ahead with modernizing its missile delivery systems, including a potential ability to reach the US mainland. 10 In February 2007, the SPT achieved a historic agreement: Pyongyang agreed to declare its activities and disable its nuclear facilities in exchange for security assurances and a series of political and economic incentives, especially the provision of one million metric tons of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK by the US, China, Russia and South Korea. Unfortunately, the February 2007 agreement unraveled because of continuing mistrust between Pyongyang and Washington and disagreements on how to implement the agreement. The unpredictable behavior of the Kim Jong-Il regime can be seen in the 26 March 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, allegedly by a North Korean submarine torpedo. A negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is in the overall interests of all the parties concerned. If a second Korean War were to break out, the consequences would not only devastate the economies of Northeast Asia, especially South Korea and China, but have an adverse spillover effect on Southeast Asia and indeed the rest of the world. The commander of US forces in Korea estimated that a war could result in US$1 trillion in industrial damage and over million casualties on the peninsula. 11 Seoul faces a complex dilemma: how to avoid a rapid collapse of the North Korean regime on the one hand, while deterring North Korea on the other. China faces a similar problem to South 10 11 Ibid., p. 240. David Kang 2010, op. cit. p.38. 191 Korea’s: how to avoid instability on its borders. 12 Japan’s role in the SPT negotiations is essentially that of a ‘bystander’, in that Tokyo is more fixated with the abductees’ issue and a reluctance to engage North Korea. 13 The US role on the Korean peninsula remains critical. Traditionally, the US adopts a ‘hub-and-spokes’ bilateral alliances approach with South Korea and Japan. Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun adopted the Sunshine Policy aimed at political reconciliation with North Korea. But this was opposed by the George W. Bush administration. In May 2008, ROK President Lee Myung-bak stated: “It is not desirable that Korea sides with a particular country. To maintain peace in the region, a balanced diplomacy is needed…Korea-US relations and Korea-China relations are not contrary to each other but mutually complementary.” 14 It is a plausible scenario that as South Korea increases its economic interdependence with a rising China, Seoul may increasingly opt to pursue a more equidistant policy with regards to relations with China and the US, which is likely to have implications for a peaceful solution of the Korean nuclear proliferation and reunification issues. 12 Kang, ibid., p. 39. Yufan Hao, “The Korean peninsula: a Chinese view on the North Korean Issue”, in Hao, C.X. George Wei, and Lowell Dittmer eds., Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next world power. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009: 155-172. 13 Ibid., p. 39. See also Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand, “Explaining divergent responses to the North Korean Abductions issue in Japan and South Korea”, The Journal of Asian Studies 19 (2) May 2010: 507-536. 14 Ibid., p.44. 192 C) Claims about extending the ASEAN Way as a model to shape the Northeast Asian regional order The ‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperative security reflects an ambitious attempt by the ASEAN states, a grouping of small and medium-sized states, to project their leadership credentials in extending their consensual and informal security culture to bigger and more powerful states in the wider East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions. Historically speaking, this is an audacious undertaking, given that it is usually great powers that provide the impetus for regional and global leadership. The examples of such ASEAN-led regional integration initiatives are the ARF, APT, EAS, and the notion of establishing an East Asian Community (EAC). The ASEAN elites know that regional stability and security in Southeast Asia are inextricably linked to developments and trends in the wider Northeast Asian region. The two sub-regions together form what Buzan and Waever call a ‘regional security complex’, where their security interests are interdependent. 15 The ARF is a multilateral discussion group focussing on dialogue and confidencebuilding measures as a first step to cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific. It is the first inclusive region-wide security arrangement. The ASEAN elites see the ARF as extending the peaceful norms of the ASEAN Way to the steady building of a security community in the wider East Asian region. In 1998, Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar stated that the ARF had become “a means of encouraging the evolution of a 15 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 193 of South Koreans has grown up who are resentful of US domination and demanding full national sovereignty. During the US-North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002-2007, opinion polls indicate that many Koreans viewed the provocative unilateralism of the Bush administration as the main cause of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. 77 Signs of growing South Korean assertiveness from US ‘control’ can be seen in Seoul’s growing economic ties with a rising China. In 2006, China became South Korea’s main trading partner, with US$118 billion in bilateral trade. This figure far exceeded the US$77 billion in US-South Korean trade for 2006. 78 Overall, South Korea is playing an important role as a “bridge-builder” in promoting closer regional integration, especially in the economic and political fields. (E) Cautious US support for Open, Inclusive Multilateralism in East Asia Since the end of World War Two, the US has traditionally preferred a bilateral hub-andspokes’ approach towards East Asia, with Washington enjoying undisputed primacy. But the geo-strategic landscape is changing, and the US is being forced to make necessary adaptations. Northeast Asia is in strategic transition, marked by the rise of China, and the 77 David Kang, “South Korea’s Not-So-Sharp Right Turn”, Current History, September 2008, Vol. 107, Issue 710. 78 Kang 2008 op cit. Kim Jin-Young 2008 op cit. Rozman 2007 op cit. Hyungdo Ahn, “The FTA policies of China, Japan and Korea and prospects for a CJK FTA: Korea’s perspective”, in Jeehoon Park eds. 2008, op cit. Choi Young Jong, “Northeast Asian regional integration: regional theories, current realities and future prospects”, in Jehoon Park eds. op cit. 2008. In a 2009 study, Evelyn Goh argued that “while the US-ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea’s fundamental acceptance of the US as the region’s primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China.”, in William Tow ed. 2009, op cit., p.117. 229 normalization of Japan. After 50 years, the era of US dominance of Northeast Asia is shifting perceptibly. While the US remains first among equals, new and consequential regional players are emerging: China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, India and Australia. The rise of China over the past two decades is steadily affecting regional perceptions of Pax Americana. The issue is whether it will be replaced by a new Pax Sinica, or what has been called a new “Beijing Consensus”. But historically, the relationship between an incumbent hegemon and a rising global power has often led to strategic uncertainty and potential instability. The careful management of US-China strategic relations will shape not only the regional order in East Asia, but global order. David Lampton argues that the prospect for US-China strategic relations is: fundamentally more stable than it has ever been. This is so because power is more equally distributed between them and each needs to cooperate with the other to address problems it deems critical to its own future. The common necessities of the United States and China have made them hostage to each other and, in many respects, competitors, principally in the economic and intellectual domains. This world is not to be feared inasmuch as America’s diversity and inherent innovative capacity confer advantages; but Americans need to rediscover and intelligently deploy these advantages. The vision that should guide the two nations going forward is one of partnership in building the coalitions necessary to address the challenges of global economic, environmental, and security stabilization. China is a prominent stakeholder in the international system. The question now is what burdens is China able and willing to assume to enhance and maintain that system? In many circumstances the ‘responsible course’ may be unclear and what constitutes a ‘fair’ distribution of burdens is not selfevident. In short, it will be difficult to produce the cooperation that the ‘fierce urgency’ of the present requires. 79 79 David M. Lampton, “The United States and China in the Age of Obama”, November 2009, op cit.: 727. 230 The gradual US policy of cautiously supporting a nascent post-Cold War trend towards regional cooperation is another reason why Northeast Asia is a zone of peace. 80 Since 1945, the US has been the undisputed hegemon of Northeast Asia. In terms of economic and military power, none of the Northeast Asian states can compare with US might. In particular, the US still has about 100,000 troops stationed in Japan and South Korea under their bilateral security alliance treaties. For the past half century, it is this preponderant American power that has maintained a stable balance of power, and kept the peace in Northeast Asia. 81 In the post-Cold War era, the PRC has learned to live with the continuation of the US-Japan Security Alliance. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the US-Japan Security Alliance has served a number of useful purposes. A credible US nuclear umbrella has reduced the need for Tokyo to seriously consider the nuclear option. It also means that the US has oversight rights over the degree and pace of Japan’s military modernization. It is also not in the US national interest to see a return of Japanese militarism. 80 Bruce Cummings, “The History and Practice of Unilateralism in East Asia”, in Calder and Fukuyama eds., 2008 op cit., pp. 40-57. G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 2008: 217-233. Bisley 2007-2008, op cit., p. 611. 81 Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Asian Survey 38, May 1998. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills eds. Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, Seattle and Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research 2005: 19-20. Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds., 2008, op cit. 231 The strong support of a Great Power is an important determinant in promoting security regionalism (Chapter Two). Washington’s strong support was important in jump-starting the process of West European integration in the 1950s, as part of Washington’s global anti-communist strategy. 82 Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer argued that in contrast to Western Europe, racism was partly a reason for Washington’s decision to adopt a divide-and-rule bilateral strategy in the East Asian region, and to focus on building up a US-centric “hub-and-spokes” alliance strategy, clearly delineating US foes and allies. Hence the US role as the world’s sole superpower is an important factor shaping the Northeast Asian security architecture. The US is motivated by its primary goal of maintaining its post-1945 regional and global dominance. The George W. Bush administration made it clear that it will not tolerate the rise of any regional ‘peer-competitor’. During the life-and-death struggle of the Cold War, the US used its bilateral, “hub-and-spokes” alliance systems with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines to contain the spread of communism in Asia. In the post-Cold War era, the US and China have shown greater interest to develop mutually beneficial ties. Washington and Beijing have established high-level economic and military exchanges. In August 2006, President Bush and President Hu Jintao agreed to the launch of a highlevel US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue at the level of vice-premier. The US side was headed by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the Chinese side by Wu Yi. 83 But 82 83 Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International Organization, 56(3) Summer 2002: 575-607. The China Daily, 20 September 2006. 09/20/content_693347.htm. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006232 Taiwan remains a politically sensitive issue. In early October 2008, Beijing strongly warned the Bush administration not to go ahead with a proposed US$6.5 billion arms sales to Taiwan (which included advanced Patriot missile defenses, attack helicopters, and submarine-launched anti-ship missiles). In response to the US going ahead with the arms sale, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman announced that Beijing was postponing the planned bilateral military exchanges. 84 Since the early 1990s, there has been a steady US acceptance of regional security multilateralism, rather than US-led bilateralism, as a result of three factors, that is, the dramatic changes and ‘critical junctures’ in the world economy; attempts by some East Asian states to establish closer East Asian regional integration; and the rise of new powers like China and India. In the early 1990s, the first Bush administration strongly resisted attempts by some East Asian states, especially Malaysia, to promote East Asian regionalism, specifically, to establish an exclusively East Asian-only regional framework, the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG). A German scholar, Heribert Dieter, has argued that this specific US policy actually hindered the growth of East Asian regionalism. 85 In December 1990, Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed setting up the EAEG, excluding Western powers like the US, Australia, and New Zealand, as a regional self-help grouping to counter the danger of protectionism in 84 “China cancels, postpones military exchanges with the US”, AFP, October 2008. 85 Heribert Dieter, “Anti-Americanism and Regionalism in East Asia”, in Richard Higgott and Ivona Malbasic eds., The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism, London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 233 the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Mahathir’s logic was that if the Europeans and the Americans can set up their own exclusive, protectionist economic grouping, there was no reason why East Asians could not follow suit to defend their own legitimate national and regional interests. In the manner of political visionaries like Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer, Hallstein, Gaspieri and De Gaulle, Mahathir strongly pushed the need for a strong, independent Asian voice on the world stage. Japan and South Korea showed some initial interest. But firm US opposition was underlined by Secretary of State James Baker’s reminder to Tokyo and Seoul that it was American ‘blood and sweat’ that protected and preserved their independence (from the threat of communist expansionism). The American veto marked the formal end of Mahathir’s EAEG proposal. During this period, the US was still strong enough to easily demolish Mahathir’s idea, but this would change fundamentally by July 1997 during the AFC crisis. A ‘critical juncture’ that continues to shape the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism was the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1997-98. Financial speculative attacks by hedge funds from the developed economies against perceived cronyism and corruption brought about the rapid collapse of currencies and stock-markets in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia. The Clinton administration and the US-dominated IMF and APEC were perceived by the affected Asian economies to be very tardy to aid in their economic recovery, seriously undermining US credibility with the East Asian elites. This serious political miscalculation by the Clinton administration not only breathed new life into Mahathir’s idea of the urgent need to foster closer intra-ASEAN and intra-East Asian economic and political cooperation, but also enabled an ambitious China to gain new 234 ground in its rivalry with the US and Japan for regional leadership with ASEAN and the wider East Asian region. Perceived American insensitivity also led Japan and South Korea to push forward the momentum of APT activism. A major achievement of the APT is the establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000: this is an arrangement where the APT members set up a standby financial facility to provide need financial liquidity in case any of its members face short-term speculative attacks. 86 The CMI was established in December 1997 at the height of the AFC crisis. It is historic in the sense that it is an exclusively Asian regional grouping, contrary to earlier US preferences. The CMI is important in that its establishment has led to more discussions among East Asian elites into the possibility of setting up an integrated Asian Bond Market (capital markets’ development) and also an initiative to consider the setting up of an Asian Currency Unit (ACU), following in the footsteps of the Euro. 87 The determination of APT leaders to steadily increase their regional financial cooperation can be seen in the agreement on a US$120 billion currency pool at their meeting in Phuket, Thailand, in February 2009. 88 The APT framework has been broadened into other areas of Northeast Asian regional cooperation: avian flu; food security; and the cultivation of a stronger sense of East Asian regional identity. 89 Despite obstacles and delays, the fact is 86 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “The Chiang Mai Initiative and the Prospects for Closer Monetary Integration in East Asia”, in Betrand Fort and Douglas Webber eds. Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence? London and New York: Routledge, 2006; Kim Jin-Young 2008, op cit., pp. 111-129. 87 Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 149-182. 88 Straits Times, 23 February 2009. 89 Dent 2008, op cit., p. 150. 235 that Northeast Asian economic and financial regionalism is steadily gaining momentum. All the three Northeast Asian economies have shown great interest in accelerating the pace of regional economic integration for their mutual benefit. There are two reasons why the US has shifted from a policy of strong bilateralism to cautious support for Asian regional security multilateralism since the mid-1990s. The relative economic decline of the US is an important consideration. Unlike in the early 1990s, Washington is no longer in a position to veto efforts by East Asian elites to forge stronger intra-East Asian cooperation. This is a clear sign of relative US decline within a growing multi-polar world, especially the rise of China and India on the world stage. The outbreak of the AFC in 1997 was also critical. In contrast with China and Japan, the Clinton administration was seen to be very slow in coming to the assistance of the devastated Asian economies. In effect, the US signaled to the East Asian elites that they were entirely on their own. As a result, the US lost political capital and credibility with many East Asian elites. This standoffish US behavior forced East Asian elites to act in concert to prevent a repetition of the AFC. The US is not fighting a clear regional integration trend among Northeast Asian states themselves, especially after the trauma of the Asian Financial Crisis. The US has chosen not to fight a futile battle against the ongoing momentum of greater regional institutionalization in East Asia. Instead, Washington has decided that it will give support provided it is one of ‘open regionalism’ which would not harm US regional interests. Recent US support for closer East Asian 236 regional integration is supplementary to its basic preference for bilateralism, and the ‘hub-and-spokes’ approach. 90 Summary of Major Findings Three major findings are highlighted. First, there is the strong realization of the benefits of greater economic interdependence among the Northeast Asian governments, especially so in the case of China. Particularly important is the emergence of China’s Open Door Policy in the late-1970s. The start of Deng Xiaoping’s era in Chinese politics, with its focus on China’s internal modernization and prosperity, marked a key turning point in the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism. Its origins are totally internal, and there is nothing that the US can to stop this Chinese drive for growth, stability, prosperity and global influence. Increases in the volume of intra-regional trade, financial and monetary linkages lead to higher levels of prosperity among the Northeast Asian states. Higher living standards in China will boost the domestic political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the Beijing government, which is important given the declining appeal of communist ideology. In turn, this will boost the confidence of the CCP leadership in maintaining the Open Door Policy and continued engagement with the outside world. Seen in this perspective, there is a strong ‘demand’ for regional integration (to borrow a phrase from Walter Mattli) among all the Northeast Asian elites in the post-Cold War era. China’s Open Door Policy is also an integral part of its foreign 90 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen Milner eds. The Political Economy of Regionalism, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1997. G. John Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s postwar World Order in Transition”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific (2005): 133-52. Pempel 2008, op cit., pp. 11-29. 237 policy strategy of preventing the formation of US-led anti-China coalitions, as seen in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. It highlights Beijing’s policy of ‘reassurance’ to its immediate neighbours, including the ASEAN states. In so doing, the Open Door Policy also contributes to the expansion of China’s friendship and influence with an increasingly vibrant bloc of states, represented by ASEAN. 91 Second, Japan has its own reasons for its turn towards East Asian regional integration and multilateralism. It is related to Japan’s status as the world’s second largest economy, its junior status within the US-Japan Security alliance, and its determination to become a ‘normal’ nation with its own national military forces. Simply put, Japan wants to gain international recognition as a Great Power. Economic factors are also relevant. China has overtaken the US as Japan’s largest trading partner. This has compelled Japan to steadily re-orient its foreign policy and give greater weight to East Asia vis-à-vis the US. It is also in line with Japan’s quest to become a ‘normal nation’, including an equal alliance partnership with the US, not as a junior partner. Third, the activist role of ASEAN has played an important role in promoting closer integration between Southeast and Northeast Asia. The ASEAN elites are motivated by the realization about the growing linkages and interdependence between the two sub-regions, especially the danger of potential conflicts arising from the conflicting claims to the South China Sea, and the implications of a rising China for regional peace and stability. ASEAN opposed any idea of joining a US-led anti-China coalition. Instead, 91 Guogang Wu and Helen Lansdowne eds. China turns to multilateralism: Foreign policy and regional security. London and New York: 2008. 238 ASEAN adopted a pragmatic hedging strategy: economic-political engagement to take advantage of the booming China market, and strengthening ASEAN’s links with the US and other Western powers should Beijing turn aggressive and expansionist. In this regard, the peaceful norms embodied by the ASEAN Way played a positive role in assuring China that ASEAN is non-threatening. Like China, Japan and South Korea also found that the ASEAN Way is non-threatening and indeed serves their national interests by promoting greater regional solidarity and integration. 92 Conclusions First, the peaceful norms and inclusiveness of the ‘ASEAN Way’ has been an important driving force contributing to the rise of a culture of consultation and dialogue within the broader Asia-Pacific region. This is done in a number of ways. The ASEAN Way of cooperative security provides a mechanism for the 28 ARF members to maintain open channels of communications among member-states with widely divergent interests and strategic priorities, especially between the US and China. By enabling members to remain in contact with one another, the ASEAN Way prevents national positions from hardening and becoming ossified, rendering them incapable of adapting to changing circumstances. For example, the confidence-building orientation of the ARF has expanded to include meetings of ASEAN Defence Ministers, enabling them to steadily build up their own networks of ever closer personal and institutional bonds of friendship and greater levels of trust. Learning lessons from their common history of colonialism, 92 Hiro Katsumata, ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 239 these elites are determined to stay relevant so as not to be marginalized by the challenges arising from globalization, and Great Power manoeuvrings for regional influence and possibly dominance. Over the past twenty years, ASEAN has skilfully positioned itself to remain as a hub of an evolving East Asian regional architecture. Importantly, the ASEAN Way has contributed to the spread of the socialization of peaceful norms of inter-state behaviour in the region, especially that of China’s turn towards multilateral integration with its neighbours. However, the ASEAN Way has weaknesses too. There is an urgent need for the ARF to make proactive efforts to move from confidencebuilding measures to preventive diplomacy (PD). This next step is likely to depend on ASEAN’s responses to critical junctures like developments in domestic politics, regional and international events. The rise of China’s economic and military power since the early 1980s and its focus on international modernization has been a key driving force behind the evolution of a more peaceful and integrated East Asia. China’s Open Door Policy is driven by internal imperatives of regime-survival, quest for national unity, stability and the generation of wealth and prosperity. There is little that the outside world, especially the US, can to stop China’s rise into a Great Power. Based on its own pragmatism, China’s turn to multilateralism started first with its engagement with international economic institutions like the WTO (2002), but has since expanded to include regional economic and security institutions, including APEC (1989), ARF (1994), APT (1997), EAS (2005), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A related point worth reiterating is that a more assertive China does not necessarily mean a more aggressive or expansionist China. Instead, the PRC has over the past sixty years used force cautiously 240 and as a last resort to safeguard its vital national interests, and not for national aggrandizement. On balance, the PRC has often opted to settle territorial conflicts with its neighbours, including Russia, India, Vietnam, through peaceful negotiations and compromise. Japan’s quest for ‘normal country’ status and its strong support for East Asian multilateralism is the third driving force behind a more integrated and peaceful region. Perceptible changes in Japan’s foreign policy will impact the US-China-Japan triangular relationship. For most of the Cold War era, Japan served as the junior alliance partner of the US. However, in the post-Cold War era, Japan is actively seeking a more equal partnership with the US, commensurate with its status as the world’s second strongest economic power. This is evident in the election platform of the DPJ and pronouncements by former Prime Minister Hatoyama. A major contributory factor to an evolving reorientation of Japanese foreign policy has to with the fact that China has become Japan’s most important trading partner. It was the booming China market that enabled Japan to recover from its decade-long economic stagnation of the 1990s, as well as Tokyo’s recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis. Japan’s strong support for East Asian multilateralism over the past two decades is an integral part of Japan’s overall quest for a major leadership role in the region. This can be seen from Japan’s ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and its membership of the Group-of-7 (G7) of leading industrial powers of the world. To achieve its goal of being a Great Power, Japan has to come out of the shadow of US control and dominance. Japan has to earn international respect as fully-autonomous Great Power in its own right, not as an appendage of the US. But growing Japanese assertiveness has led to competition and 241 rivalry with a rising China. In post-Cold War Asia, Japan has responded to a rising China in three ways: continued modernization of its military power; intensification of Japan’s alliance with the SU; and constructively engaging China by supporting greater regional multilateral dialogue and cooperation. South Korea’s activist role is the fourth driving force shaping the growth of East Asian regional integration. As a nation with OECD status, South Korea has aspirations to play a major role in East Asian affairs. One stand of South Korean foreign policy seeks to play the role of regional ‘bridge-builder’ in fostering closer Northeast Asian integration. Historically, the Korean Peninsula was the battleground for the geopolitical power struggles involving China, Japan, Russia, and the US. Over the past thirty years, South Korean elites have become more determined that their country will not become the helpless victim of the ambitions of external Great Powers. Seoul’s strategic priorities are the achievement of peaceful Korean Re-unification, and a higher international profile for South Korea. An activist South Korean foreign policy was partly influenced by the trauma caused by the 1997-98 AFC. A lesson learned by South Korea was the urgent need for self-reliance and the active promotion of greater intra-East Asian multilateral integration. South Korea is also actively involved in establishing free-trade agreements with the ASEAN states and the US. President Roh also spoke publicly of his intention to act as a ‘balancer’. The surge in Korean nationalism led to serious tensions in the USSouth Korea alliance relationship. Under conservative President Lee Myung-Bak, South Korea is again seeking closer US-Korean relations, and continuing its regional “bridgebuilding” role. 242 The US policy preference is the fifth driving force shaping Northeast Asia’s regional architecture. For the most part of the post-World War Two era, Washington’s preference is to build a US-centred “hub-and-spokes” alliance with friendly East Asian states. The US commitment can be seen in the continued stationing of an estimated 100,000 US troops in Japan and South Korea. There is no change in the basic US goal of maintaining its regional primacy. But with the rise of China over the past twenty years, the degree of US dominance in East Asia is clearly declining. The US strongly opposed then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s Asians-only EAEG proposal of 1990. But the momentum of growing intra-East Asian economic integration is unstoppable. Closer East Asian economic integration was boosted by the trauma of the AFC and the perception of US inactivity and indifference to the sufferings of regional states during the financial crisis. The establishment of the APF (1997), CMI (2000), CAFTA (2002), Bali Concord II (2003) and the EAS (2005) highlighted to Washington that the East Asian states are very serious about accelerating the process of regional integration. The new Obama administration has decided to more actively engage East Asian states. The US became the latest country to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at an ASEAN Summit meeting in Thailand in July 2009. Recent proposals by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama for an ‘East Asian Community’ and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ highlight the accelerating momentum in East Asian regional economic and political integration. The focus of these two proposals is on building greater mutuallybeneficial cooperation. Their premise is that there is more to gain from multilateral cooperation rather than relying on counter-productive zero-sum mentality. A key 243 obstacle has to with the issue of US membership. The Rudd proposal puts a premium on US membership and participation. As for Japan, during the long-reign of LDP rule, Tokyo also strongly favoured US membership (The LDP lost by an electoral landslide in parliamentary elections in August 2009 to the DPJ). Prime Minister Hatoyama appears to be rather ambivalent about a potential US role; he appears to want to first establish a core East Asian grouping consisting of ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea, before considering the membership of Australia, New Zealand, India, and then the US. Publicly, Beijing has expressed support for the Hatoyama proposal. But China is basically wary of Japan’s ambitions to establish any Tokyo-centred East Asian community. ASEAN’s concern, as in the past, will be to ensure that it remains at the hub of the evolving regional architecture, so as not to be marginalized by the stronger economies of Northeast Asia. To remain relevant as the hub of East Asian regional integration, ASEAN will have to stay united. The ratification of the ASEAN Charter in December 2008 is an important step in ensuring ASEAN’s key role in the forging of an East Asian security community. 244 [...]... about the importance of extending the ASEAN Way’ to promoting and shaping the Northeast Asian regional order Writing in 1997, Amitav Acharya noted that the ASEAN elites saw the extension of the ASEAN Way to the broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions as an integral part of East Asian regional- identity building: The emergence of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region raises a question...more predictable and constructive pattern of relations between major powers with interests in the region.” 16 The effectiveness of ASEAN and the ASEAN Way’ in promoting Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian regionalism are highly contested between ASEAN- boosters’ and ASEAN- sceptics’ The wide range of divergent views about the efficacy of the ASEAN Way as an extension to the wider East Asian region is... Asian regionalism Finally, the limitations of the ASEAN Way as a model for Northeast Asian regionalism points to a real need to address a related question: what are the crucial drivers of Northeast Asian regionalism? The short answer is that the key drivers here are the key states/actors (China, Japan, Korea, and the US) and their calculations of their respective ‘national interests’ This related question... for their region Moreover, Southeast Asian leaders and intellectuals speak of an ASEAN way’ of regional cooperation, which is being promoted by them as the organizing framework of multilateralism at the wider Asia-Pacific regional level…” 18 An assessment of the ARF’s contributions to Northeast Asian regionalism My argument is that the ASEAN Way of cooperative security is only one of several factors... will be analyzed in the next section What are the main driving forces of Northeast Asian Regionalism? (A) The end of Cold War antagonisms and its Implications for Northeast Asian Regional integration At the global level, the end of superpower Cold War antagonism by the early 1990s was an important factor which allowed the thawing of East- West ideological divisions and a more relaxed international environment... cogently captured by Alex Bellamy: The ARF and APT mechanisms…were created with the express aim of enhancing regional security The ARF has been variously described as the basis for a broader Asian security community, a model for Northeast Asian politics and a failing experiment ‘built on sand’ 17 But is that a fair evaluation of the ARF? I will focus attention on the claims made by the ASEAN- boosters’ about... in the promotion of Northeast Asian regionalism The ASEAN Way has played a useful contributory ‘minimalist-assurance’ role, but there are clear inherent limitations on its ability to push forward Northeast Asian regionalism These limitations have to do with what China, Japan, and South Korea regard as their core national interests which may or may not be particularly susceptible to the norms of the ASEAN. .. China’s drive for regional leadership and responsible behaviour Similarly, David Kang has argued that a strong China is a stabilizing force in Asia China’s Asian neighbours have accommodated rather than balanced against a rising China Kang posits that: East Asian states see substantially more advantage than danger in China's rise, making the region more stable, not less Furthermore, although East Asian. .. the regional security order in Northeast Asia is that between Japan and China They are the two pre-eminent East Asian powers Sino-Japanese rivalry will be a key strategic challenge determining the shape of the East Asian security order The rise of China’s economic and military power since the late 1990s has complicated the triangular relationship among the US, China, and Japan, exhibiting the patterns... diplomacy’ (PD) and the final stage of ‘conflict resolution’ (CR) Criticisms against the ARF came in very early As pointed out by Rizal Sukma, barely two years after its formation, the ARF was already seen as “in danger of being fractured and bypassed by events in Burma and other parts of Asia that it cannot handle” 22 The ARF consists of a total of 27 states, including the ASEAN states and the major . Acharya noted that the ASEAN elites saw the extension of the ASEAN Way to the broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions as an integral part of East Asian regional- identity building: The. Burma and other parts of Asia that it cannot handle”. 22 The ARF consists of a total of 27 states, including the ASEAN states and the major powers, US, Russia, China, and Japan. How do the non -ASEAN. the major driving forces currently shaping the pattern and dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism. 1 Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,