Global Financial Stability Report, April 2010 Global Financial Stability Report Global Financial Stability Report World Economic and Financial Surveys I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D 10 A P R IMF A P R 10 Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System World Economic and Financial Surveys Global Financial Stability Report Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System April 2010 International Monetary Fund Washington DC ©2010 International Monetary Fund Production: IMF Multimedia Services Division Cover: Creative Services Figures: Theodore F. Peters, Jr. Typesetting: Michelle Martin Cataloging-in-Publication Data Global financial stability report – Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2002 – v. ; cm. — (World economic and financial surveys, 0258-7440) Semiannual Some issues also have thematic titles. ISSN 1729-701X 1. Capital market — Developing countries –— Periodicals. 2. International finance — Periodicals. 3. Economic stabilization — Periodicals. I. International Monetary Fund. II. Title. III. World economic and financial surveys. HG4523.G563 ISBN: 978-1-58906-916-9 Please send orders to: International Monetary Fund, Publication Services 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A. Tel.: (202) 623-7430 Fax: (202) 623-7201 E-mail: publications@imf.org Internet: www.imfbookstore.org EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iiiInternational Monetary Fund | April 2010 iii Preface ix Joint Foreword to World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report xi Executive Summary xiii Chapter 1. Resolving the Crisis Legacy and Meeting New Challenges to Financial Stability 1 A. How Has Global Financial Stability Changed? 1 B. Could Sovereign Risks Extend the Global Credit Crisis? 3 C. e Banking System: Legacy Problems and New Challenges 11 D. Risks to the Recovery in Credit 24 E. Assessing Capital Flows and Bubble Risks in the Post-Crisis Environment 28 F. Policy Implications 34 Annex 1.1. Global Financial Stability Map: Construction and Methodology 42 Annex 1.2. Assessing Proposals to Ban “Naked Shorts” in Sovereign Credit Default Swaps 45 Annex 1.3. Assessment of the Spanish Banking System 49 Annex 1.4. Assessment of the German Banking System 54 Annex 1.5. United States: How Different Are “Too-Important-to-Fail” U.S. Bank Holding Companies? 58 References 60 [The following supplemental annexes to Chapter 1 are available online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ gfsr/2010/01/index.htm] Annex 1.6. Analyzing Nonperforming Loans in Central and Eastern Europe Based on Historical Experience in Emerging Markets Annex 1.7. Credit Demand and Capacity Estimates in the United States, Euro Area, and United Kingdom Annex 1.8. e Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs Annex 1.9. Methodologies Underlying Assessment of Bubble Risks Annex 1.10. Euro Zone Sovereign Spreads: Global Risk Aversion, Spillovers, or Fundamentals? Chapter 2. Systemic Risk and the Redesign of Financial Regulation 63 Summary 63 Implementing Systemic-Risk-Based Capital Surcharges 64 Reforming Financial Regulatory Architecture Taking into Account Systemic Connectedness 76 Policy Reflections 84 Annex 2.1. Highlights of Model Specification 86 References 87 Chapter 3. Making Over-the-Counter Derivatives Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties 91 Summary 91 e Basics of Counterparty Risk and Central Counterparties 93 CONTENTS iv International Monetary Fund | April 2010 GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM e Case for Over-the-Counter Derivative Central Clearing 96 Incentivizing Central Counterparty Participation and the Role of End-Users 100 Criteria for Structuring and Regulating a Sound Central Counterparty 105 How Should Central Counterparties Be Regulated and Overseen? 111 One versus Multiple Central Counterparties? 111 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 113 References 116 Chapter 4. Global Liquidity Expansion: Effects on “Receiving” Economies and Policy Response Options 119 Summary 119 Overview of the 2007–09 Global Liquidity Expansion 120 Effects of the Global Liquidity Expansion on the Liquidity-Receiving Economies 121 Policy Response Options for Liquidity-Receiving Economies 124 Effectiveness of Capital Controls 128 Conclusions 132 Annex 4.1. Econometric Study on Liquidity Expansion: Data, Methodology, and Detailed Results 136 Annex 4.2a. Global Liquidity Expansion—Capital-Account-Related Measures Applied in Selected Liquidity-Receiving Economies 142 Annex 4.2b. Global Liquidity Expansion—Policy Responses Affecting the Capital Account in Selected Liquidity-Receiving Economies 143 Annex 4.3. Country Case Studies 144 References 149 Glossary 152 Annex: Summing Up by the Acting Chair 157 Statistical Appendix 159 Boxes 1.1. Explaining Swap Spreads and Measuring Risk Transmission among Euro Zone Sovereigns 7 1.2. Nonperforming Loans in Central and Eastern Europe: Is is Time Different? 18 1.3. Asian Residential Real Estate Markets: Bubble Trouble? 35 1.4. Could Conditions in Emerging Markets Be Building a Bubble? 38 1.5. Proposals to Address the Problem of “Too-Important-to-Fail” Financial Institutions 41 1.6. Estimating Potential Losses from Nonperforming Loans for Spain 51 1.7. Loan Loss Estimation for Germany 56 2.1. Proposals for Systemic Risk Prudential Regulations 66 2.2. Assessing the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets, and Instruments 72 2.3. Computing an Aggregate Loss Distribution 74 2.4. Regulatory Architecture Proposals 77 2.5. Contingent Capital—Part of the Solution to Systemic Risk? 83 3.1. e Mechanics of Over-the-Counter Derivative Clearing 95 3.2. e Basics of Novation and Multilateral Netting 98 3.3. e Failure of Lehman Brothers and the Near-Failure of AIG 99 3.4. Central Counterparty Customer Position Portability and Collateral Segregation 104 3.5. History of Central Counterparty Failures and Near-Failures 108 vInternational Monetary Fund | April 2010 CONTENTS 3.6. e European and U.S. Regulatory Landscapes 112 3.7. Legal Aspects of Central Counterparty Interlinking and Cross-Margining 114 4.1. Global Liquidity Expansion and Liquidity Transmission 122 4.2. Capital Controls versus Prudential Measures 127 4.3. Capital Controls on Outflows versus Inflows 128 4.4. Reserve Requirements and Unremunerated Reserve Requirements 129 4.5. Capital Account Measures—Event Study Results 133 4.6. Market Participant Views Regarding Effectiveness of Capital Controls 135 Tables 1.1. Sovereign Market and Vulnerability Indicators 5 1.2. Estimates of Global Bank Writedowns by Domicile, 2007–10 12 1.3. Aggregate Bank Writedowns and Capital 15 1.4. United States: Bank Writedowns and Capital 15 1.5. Spain: Bank Writedowns and Capital 16 1.6. Germany: Bank Writedowns and Capital 17 1.7. Projections of Credit Capacity for and Demand from the Nonfinancial Sector 27 1.8. Asset Class Valuations 32 1.9. Global Financial Stability Map Indicators 42 1.10. Ten Largest Sovereign Credit Default Swap Referenced Countries 46 1.11. Spain: Baseline and Adverse-Case Scenarios 53 1.12. Spain: Calculations of Cutoff Rates for Banks with Drain on Capital 53 1.13. Estimates of German Bank Writedowns by Sector, 2007–10 55 1.14. Germany: Bank Capital, Earnings, and Writedowns 57 2.1. Comparison of Some Methodologies to Compute Systemic-Risk-Based Charges 65 2.2. System-Wide Capital Impairment Induced by Each Institution at Different Points in the Credit Cycle and Associated Systemic Risk Ratings 70 2.3. Capital Surcharges Based on the Standardized Approach 71 2.4. Systemic-Risk-Based Capital Surcharges through the Cycle 74 2.5. Systemic-Risk-Based Cyclically Smoothed Capital Surcharges across Countries 76 2.6. Sample Systemic Risk Report 76 3.1. Currently Operational Over-the-Counter Derivative Central Counterparties 94 3.2. Incremental Initial Margin and Guarantee Fund Contributions Associated with Moving Bilateral Over-the-Counter Derivative Contracts to Central Counterparties 101 4.1. Relation between Equity Returns, Official Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation, and Liquidity under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes 124 4.2. Fixed-Effects Panel Least-Square Estimation of the Determinants of Asset Returns— 41 Economies, January 2003–December 2009 137 4.3. Fixed-Effects Panel Least-Square Estimation of the Determinants of Asset Returns— 34 Economies, January 2003–December 2009 138 4.4. Fixed-Effects Panel Least-Square Estimation of the Determinants of Equity Returns— Regional Disaggregation, January 2003–December 2009 139 4.5. Fixed-Effects Panel Least-Square Estimation of the Determinants of Capital Flows— 34 Economies, January 2003–December 2009 140 4.6. Granger Causality Relations between Global and Domestic Liquidity 140 4.7. Determinants of Equity Returns, EGARCH (1,1) Specifications, January 2003–November 2009 141 vi International Monetary Fund | April 2010 GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM Figures 1.1. Global Financial Stability Map 1 1.2. Macroeconomic Risks in the Global Financial Stability Map 2 1.3. e Crisis Remains in Some Markets as Others Return to Stability 3 1.4. Sovereign Debt to GDP in the G-7 4 1.5. Sovereign Risks and Spillover Channels 4 1.6. Contributions to Five-Year Sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads 6 1.7. e Four Stages of the Crisis 6 1.8. Sovereign Credit Default Swap Curve Slopes 9 1.9. Sovereign Risk Spilling over to Local Financial Credit Default Swaps, October 2009 to February 2010 10 1.10. Regional Spillovers from Western Europe to Emerging Market Sovereign Credit Default Swaps 10 1.11. Realized and Expected Writedowns or Loss Provisions for Banks by Region 11 1.12. U.S. Bank Loan Charge-Off Rates 13 1.13. Global Securities Prices 14 1.14. U.S. Mortgage Market 16 1.15. Banks’ Pricing Power—Actual and Forecast 20 1.16. Bank Debt Rollover by Maturity Date 20 1.17. Government-Guaranteed Bank Debt and Retained Securitization 21 1.18. Euro Area Banking Profitability 21 1.19. Net European Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Credit Default Swap Spreads 22 1.20. Bank Credit to the Private Sector 22 1.21. Bank Return on Equity and Percentage of Unprofitable Banks, 2008 23 1.22. Banking System Profitability Indicators 23 1.23. Real Nonfinancial Private Sector Credit Growth in the United States 24 1.24. Average Lending Conditions and Growth in the Euro Area, United Kingdom, and United States 24 1.25. Contributions to Growth in Credit to the Nonfinancial Private Sector 25 1.26. Nonfinancial Private Sector Credit Growth 26 1.27. Total Net Borrowing Needs of the Sovereign Sector 26 1.28. Credit to GDP 27 1.29. Low Short-Term Interest Rates Are Driving Investors Out of Cash 29 1.30. Emerging Market Returns Better on a Volatility-Adjusted Basis 29 1.31. Cumulative Retail Net Flows to Equity and Debt Funds 30 1.32. Refinancing Needs for Emerging Markets and Other Advanced Economies Remain Significant 31 1.33. Emerging Market Real Equity Prices: Historical Corrections 31 1.34. Incentives for Foreign Exchange Carry Trades Are Recovering 34 1.35. Real Domestic Credit Growth and Equity Valuation 34 1.36. All Risks to Global Financial Stability and Its Underlying Conditions Have Improved 43 1.37. Evolution of the Global Financial Stability Map, 2007–09 45 1.38. Net Notional Credit Default Swaps Outstanding as a Share of Total Government Debt 47 1.39. Correlation of Daily Changes in Five-Year Greek Credit Default Swap and Bond Yield Spreads 47 1.40. Sovereign Credit Default Swap Volumes 48 1.41. Spain: Nonperforming Loans 50 1.42. Spain: Real Asset Repossessions 50 1.43. Germany: Loan Loss Rates 57 1.44. Germany: Loan Losses 57 viiInternational Monetary Fund | April 2010 CONTENTS e following symbols have been used throughout this volume: . . . to indicate that data are not available; — to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist; – between years or months (for example, 2008–09 or January–June) to indicate the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; / between years (for example, 2008/09) to indicate a fiscal or financial year. “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion. “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point). “n.a.” means not applicable. Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding. As used in this volume the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis. e boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 2.1. Network Structure of Cross-Border Interbank Exposures 67 2.2. Simulation Step 1: Illustration of the Evolution of Banks’ Balance Sheets at Different Points in the Cycle 68 2.3. Simulation Step 2: Illustration of Contagion Effects at Different Points in the Credit Cycle 69 2.4. An Illustration of the Computation of Incremental Value-at-Risk for Bank 1 71 2.5. Simulation of Systemic Risk Capital Surcharges 73 2.6. Regulatory Forbearance under a Multiple Regulator Configuration 80 2.7. Regulatory Forbearance under a Multiple Regulator Configuration with Systemic Oversight Mandate 81 2.8. Regulatory Forbearance under Multiple and Unified Regulator Configurations with Oversight Mandate over Systemic Institutions 82 3.1. Global Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 93 3.2. Outstanding Credit Default Swaps in the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Data Warehouse 97 3.3. Derivative Payables plus Posted Cash Collateral 102 3.4. Typical Central Counterparty Lines of Defense against Clearing Member Default 107 4.1. Global Liquidity 121 4.2. Change of Central Bank Policy Rates 121 4.3. Liquidity-Receiving Economies: Composition of Capital Inflows 123 4.4. Emerging Markets Equity Indices 123 4.5. Brazil 145 4.6. Colombia 145 4.7. ailand 146 4.8. Croatia 147 4.9. Korea 149 ixInternational Monetary Fund | April 2010 ix e Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) assesses key risks facing the global financial system with a view to identifying those that represent systemic vulnerabilities. In normal times, the report seeks to play a role in preventing crises by highlighting policies that may mitigate systemic risks, thereby contributing to global financial stability and the sustained economic growth of the IMF’s member countries. Although global financial stability has improved, the current report highlights how risks have changed over the last six months, traces the sources and channels of financial distress, and provides a discussion of policy proposals under con- sideration to mend the global financial system. e analysis in this report has been coordinated by the Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM) Department under the general direction of José Viñals, Financial Counsellor and Director. e project has been directed by MCM staff Jan Brockmeijer, Deputy Director; Peter Dattels and Laura Kodres, Division Chiefs; and Christo- pher Morris, Matthew Jones and Effie Psalida, Deputy Division Chiefs. It has benefited from comments and suggestions from the senior staff in the MCM department. Contributors to this report also include Sergei Antoshin, Chikako Baba, Alberto Buffa di Perrero, Alexandre Chailloux, Phil de Imus, Joseph Di Censo, Randall Dodd, Marco Espinosa-Vega, Simon Gray, Ivan Guerra, Alessandro Gullo, Vincenzo Guzzo, Kristian Hartelius, Geoffrey Heenan, Silvia Iorgova, Hui Jin, Andreas Jobst, Charles Kahn, Elias Kazarian, Geoffrey Keim, William Kerry, John Kiff, Annamaria Kokenyne, Van- essa Le Lesle, Isaac Lustgarten, Andrea Maechler, Kazuhiro Masaki, Rebecca McCaughrin, Paul Mills, Ken Miyajima, Sylwia Nowak, Jaume Puig, Christine Sampic, Manmohan Singh, Juan Solé, Tao Sun, Narayan Suryakumar, and Morgane de Tollenaere. Martin Edmonds, Oksana Khadarina, Yoon Sook Kim, and Marta Sanchez Sache provided analytical support. Shannon Bui, Nirmaleen Jayawardane, Juan Rigat, and Ramanjeet Singh were responsible for word processing. David Einhorn of the External Relations Department edited the manuscript and coordinated production of the publication. is particular issue draws, in part, on a series of discussions with banks, clearing organizations, securi- ties firms, asset management companies, hedge funds, standard setters, financial consultants, and academic researchers. e report reflects information available up to March 2010 unless otherwise indicated. e report benefited from comments and suggestions from staff in other IMF departments, as well as from Executive Directors following their discussion of the Global Financial Stability Report on April 5, 2010. How- ever, the analysis and policy considerations are those of the contributing staff and should not be attributed to the Executive Directors, their national authorities, or the IMF. PREFACE xiInternational Monetary Fund | April 2010 xi EXECUTIVE SUMMARYFOREWORD JOINT FOREWORD TO WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT T he global recovery is proceeding better than expected but at varying speeds—tepidly in many advanced economies and solidly in most emerging and developing economies. World growth is now expected to be 4¼ percent. Among the advanced economies, the United States is off to a bet- ter start than Europe and Japan. Among emerging and developing economies, emerging Asia is leading the recovery, while many emerging European and some Commonwealth of Independent States economies are lagging behind. is multispeed recovery is expected to continue. As the recovery has gained traction, risks to global financial stability have eased, but stability is not yet assured. Our estimates of banking system write-downs in the economies hit hardest from the onset of the crisis through 2010 have been reduced to $2.3 tril- lion from $2.8 trillion in the October 2009 Global Financial Stability Report. However, the aggregate picture masks considerable differentiation within seg- ments of banking systems, and there remain pockets that are characterized by shortages of capital, high risks of further asset deterioration, and chronically weak profitability. Deleveraging has so far been driven mainly by deteriorating assets that have hit both earn- ings and capital. Going forward, however, pressures on the funding or liability side of bank balance sheets are likely to play a greater role, as banks reduce lever- age and raise capital and liquidity buffers. Hence, the recovery of private sector credit is likely to be subdued, especially in advanced economies. At the same time, better growth prospects in many emerging economies and low interest rates in major economies have triggered a welcome resurgence of capital flows to some emerging economies. ese capital flows however come with the attendant risk of inflation pressure and asset bubbles. So far, there is no systemwide evidence of bubbles, although there are a few hot spots, and risks could build up over a longer- term horizon. e recovery of cross-border financial flows has brought some real effective exchange rate changes—depreciation of the U.S. dollar and appre- ciation of other floating currencies of advanced and emerging economies. But these changes have been limited, and global current account imbalances are forecast to widen once again. e outlook for activity remains unusually uncer- tain, and downside risks stemming from fiscal fragili- ties have come to the fore. A key concern is that room for policy maneuvers in many advanced economies has either been exhausted or become much more limited. Moreover, sovereign risks in advanced economies could undermine financial stability gains and extend the crisis. e rapid increase in public debt and deteriora- tion of fiscal balance sheets could be transmitted back to banking systems or across borders. is underscores the need for policy action to sus- tain the recovery of the global economy and financial system. e policy agenda should include several important elements. e key task ahead is to reduce sovereign vulner- abilities. In many advanced economies, there is a pressing need to design and communicate credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategies. ese should include clear time frames to bring down gross debt-to-GDP ratios over the medium term as well as contingency measures if the deterioration in public finances is greater than expected. If macroeconomic developments proceed as expected, most advanced economies should embark on fiscal consolidation in 2011. Meanwhile, given the still-fragile recovery, the fiscal stimulus planned for 2010 should be fully imple- mented, except in economies that face large increases in risk premiums, where the urgency is greater and consolidation needs to begin now. Entitlement reforms that do not detract from demand in the short term— for example, raising the statutory retirement age or lowering the cost of health care—should be imple- mented without delay. Other policy challenges relate to unwinding mon- etary accommodation across the globe and manag- ing capital flows to emerging economies. In major advanced economies, insofar as inflation expectations remain well anchored, monetary policy can con- [...]... risks to the financial system can be mitigated International Monetary Fund | April 2010 xv c h a pter 1 RESOLVING THE CRISIS LEGACY AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL STABILITY Chapter 1  RESOLVING THE CRISIS LEGACY AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL STABILITY A How Has Global Financial Stability Changed? The health of the global financial system has improved since the October 2009 Global Financial. .. uncertainty and are relatively small in relation to both overall banking system capital and, importantly, International Monetary Fund | April 2010 15 global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system Table 1.5 Spain: Bank Writedowns and Capital (In billions of euros, unless otherwise shown) Commercial Savings Banks Banks Baseline scenario Tier 1/RWA ratio... adequate capitalization (Table 1.6 and Annex 1.4) In contrast, Landesbanken, other banks, and, to a lesser degree also savings banks, are yet to incur a substantial part of total estimated writedowns and are projected to have a net drain on capital Raising additional capital could prove particularly difficult for the Landesbanken, many of which remain structurally unprofitable and thus vulnerable to further... nonamortizing) and, as leases terminate in the next few years, many owners are unlikely to find new tenants International Monetary Fund | April 2010 13 global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system Financial healing and market normalization have led to a substantial improvement in securities prices, further pushing down overall writedown estimates... high-quality capital now in anticipation of the more demanding standards International Monetary Fund | April 2010 17 global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system Box 1.2 Nonperforming Loans in Central and Eastern Europe: Is This Time Different? At what levels and when could nonperforming loan ratios be expected to peak in central and eastern Europe,... the backdrop for portfolio capital inflows to Asia (excluding Japan) and Latin America (see Section E of Chapter 1, and Chapter 4) International Monetary Fund | April 2010 xiii global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system While the resumption of capital flows is welcome, in some cases this has led to concerns about the potential for inflationary... The estimation sample consists of annual data between 1994 and 2008 for Asian and Latin American economies, as well as South Africa and Turkey.2 The data reveal that emerging market NPL ratios tend to rise rapidly in a crisis, and remain more than twice as high as before the initial shock for more than four years (first figure) The technical details on the data and the estimations are given in Annex 1.6... simulations indicate that NPL ratios would increase by around one-third during 2010 in all subregions except the CIS, and would remain elevated in 2011 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 19 global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system Few banks can expect retained earnings alone to lift them to the new capital standards Figure 1.15 Banks’... economies that are coping with structural challenges Keim, William Kerry, Vanessa Le Lesle, Andrea Maechler, Rebecca McCaughrin, Paul Mills, Ken Miyajima, Christopher Morris, Jaume Puig, Narayan Suryakumar, and Morgane de Tollenaere 1Annex 1.1 details how indicators that compose the rays of the map in Figure 1.1 are measured and interpreted The map provides a schematic presentation that incorporates a degree... the euro area; the higher proportion of securities on U.S banks’ balance sheets; accounting differences between International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and U.S Generally Accepted Accounting 13Differences International Monetary Fund | April 2010 11 global financial stabilit y report  meeting new challenges to stabilit y and building a safer system Table 1.2 Estimates of Global Bank Writedowns . D 10 A P R IMF A P R 10 Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System World Economic and Financial Surveys Global Financial Stability Report Meeting New Challenges to Stability. International Monetary Fund | April 2010 GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM Figures 1.1. Global Financial Stability Map 1 1.2. Macroeconomic. LEGACY AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 1International Monetary Fund | April 2010 11 1 C HA PT E R A. How Has Global Financial Stability Changed? e health of the global financial