The political and moral legacy of international society in relation to the moral purpose of advancing world order values. The ethics of constructing others Anthony Pagden cogently argues that the ‘need to make some sense of the beliefs and the ethical lives of others’ sometimes ‘resulted in an attempt to construct “others” better suited to the observers, own partic- ular ethical life’. 1 Others are, as we have seen before, counter images constructed in ways that define us by what we are not. 2 The construc- tion of this image involves imagination and may not accord with reality. Nevertheless, the ‘other’ that is constructed is assumed to exist and to be representative of a culture. Once the ‘other’ – ‘this or that real “savage” or “barbarian” ’ – has been set up as a counter image and given a cultural identity ‘his or her moral existence becomes a matter of real concern’. This leads Pagden to assert that ‘[t]he discoveries by modern Europe of a huge range of “other” worlds, of which America was merely the first, if also the most striking, has made this the most deeply troubling, the most unsettling of modern cultural and ethical dilemmas’. 3 The construction of people, which often fails to understand them in their own terms, complicates cross-cultural understanding. In European encounters with non-Europeans it meant that ‘conquest and annihilation was the only way in which cultures could deal with the differences between them’. 4 There has thus always been a lot riding on the way others are constructed. My concern here is with the nature of the ethical dilemma that is part of and results from constructing others. The essence of the dilemma is that we cannot avoid constructing others but in so doing we may do them a variety of harms. What is more, these harms are not confined to the past but are ones that continue to result from the practices of contemporary international politics. This has been brilliantly demon- strated by Greg Fry in a searching critique of Australian images of the South Pacific. Fry is concerned with the implications and consequences of Australian media, officials and academics asserting the right to speak 1 Pagden, European Encounters,p.184. 2 Ivar B. Neuman and Janet M. Walsh, ‘The Other in European Self-definition: an adden- dum to the literature on international society’, Review of International Studies,17(1991), 327–48, and Ivar B. Neuman, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations,2:2(1996), 139–74. 3 Pagden, European Encounters,p.185. 4 Ibid., p. 187. 157 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the peoples of the South Pacific and to lead and manage them. 5 His interest is that one region, but his analysis is one that applies equally to all situations involving the construction of others. It should be abun- dantly clear from earlier chapters that the construction of non-European others by Europeans has frequently meant that the latter ascribed to the former characteristics that degraded and represented them as less than fully human. The images constructed by Europeans have been ones that disempower non-Europeans and are used to justify practices of domi- nation. Fry opens his critique by pointing out that Australian images of South Pacific peoples are two-edged. Not only do they provide an insight into the minds of those who hold them, they also ‘affect the lives of the people they depict’: It has mattered for Pacific islanders when, at various times over the past two hundred years, influential Australians have viewed them collectively as savages, noble savages, children, or full human beings, and whether the region was depicted as a defence shield, a frontier, empty or unstable.Each of these lensesallowed or encourageddifferent Australian behaviour towards Pacific islanders: from colonial control and exploitation, to protection, development, and the encouragement of self-determination. 6 In explainingand developingthis argument Frydraws onEdwardSaid’s critique of orientalism. 7 Said argues that the depiction of others is integral to the structure of power that binds those others into an inferior role and status. The way others are depicted or represented is part of the ‘knowledge’ that rationalises the exercise of power. His ‘method for assessing whether knowledge practices might be regarded as inherently subordinating is to examine the unacknowledged epistemological premises’ embedded in them. Consequently, Fry focuses on the concern Said has with ‘first, the tendency to create a mythical collective identity – the Orient – and a mythical essentialised person – the Oriental – which it then becomes possible to characterize, and second, the tendency to consistently pro- mote belittling, negative images of those identities’. Said argues that this knowledge affects those depicted ‘not just because it informs and justifies colonial or neo-colonial practices through providing the lenses 5 Greg Fry, ‘Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of “the South Pacific” ’, The Contemporary Pacific, 9: 2 (1997). 6 Ibid., p. 306. 7 Edward Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985). 158 The political and moral legacy through which Europeans see the orient, but because it begins to be taken on as a self-image by those so depicted’. 8 Fry iscareful notto uncritically acceptSaid’s analysis and draws atten- tion to three different traps that the unwary can be led into by Said. The first is that of mirroring Orientalism with the concept of ‘Occidentalism’ and speaking of ‘the West’ as if it were a single entity. With the sup- port of James Clifford 9 and Nicholas Thomas, 10 Fry argues that this ‘simply does not reflect the complexity of Western approaches to the non-Western world’. It is not the case that all ‘Westerners’, or in the case of the Pacific, all Australians, should be seen as supporting struc- tures of knowledge and power concerned with domination. Second, Said’s critics have expressed concern about ‘his ambivalence on the question of whether a critique of Orientalist practices implies that there is a true Orient which is missed by the distorting lenses of European preconceptions’. 11 What is interesting about this for Fry is the implica- tion that those who believe European lenses are distorting, themselves ‘think there can be one true reality’. The third trap or set of issues iden- tified by Fry is Aijaz Ahmad’s argument that ‘the critique of Western representations of the non-European world becomes a new form of de- pendency theory, an attempt to place the blame for wrongs firmly on the outside world rather than sheet responsibility home to local elites’. Taking care to avoid these traps Fry proceeds to uncover and rebut four epistemological premises suppressed in a series of influential me- dia, policy and academic representations of the South Pacific. Each of the premises he examines points to the way harm can result from the construction of others. Fry himself is particularly interested in the eth- ical judgements that can be made about the exercise of power inher- ent in the practices associated with each. The first is the way mythical persons who are supposedly representative of all who resemble them are constructed and assumed to exist. Instead of, for instance, Pacific Islanders being seen as diverse peoples, they are essentialised and seen as one; diversity is suppressed. Pacific Island states are treated as if they were all alike and all facing the same problems. What is presented as knowledge actually ‘bears little resemblance to the experience of any so- ciety, [and] this has implications for the claim to truth’. 12 Second, with 8 Fry, ‘Framing the Islands’, pp. 310–11. 9 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). 10 Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture. 11 Fry, ‘Framing the Islands’, p. 312. 12 Ibid., p. 313. 159 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples regard to whether others are consistently dehumanised or belittled Fry finds a mixed record but concludes that, with regard to the South Pacific at least, there has been a return to ‘subordinating images’. 13 Third, he deals with ‘the relationship that the framers of the knowledge define between themselves and the frame’. His argument concerning this is that ‘the construction of a division between a superior “us” and an in- ferior “them” is accentuated by the degree to which there is a denial of shared humanity on the part of the framer, in the sense of a prepared- ness of placing its own experience and problems up for depiction along- side the others about which it is constructing knowledge’. Finally, Fry considers ‘preconceptions concerning certainty of knowledge . . .’. He is troubled in particular about ‘the extent to which Australian represen- tations claim to provide the one true reality of Pacific Island experience rather than a perspective built on particular epistemological and ideo- logical preconceptions’. 14 To recap, Fry’s major argument is that the practices associated with each of these premises adversely affect the lives of the people they con- cern. They influence, even determine, both how those who frame the im- ages behave towards those framed and the self-image of those framed. Each of the premises identified by Fry can be linked to either potential or actual harm; and because of this the construction of others is neces- sarily an act that has ethical implications. Stereotyping and the denial of diversity leads to the unjust treatment of some, if not a great many, indi- viduals and whole social and cultural groups. It can involve the denial of rights and results in the perpetuation of false images used to jus- tify oppression and domination. People are harmed by the false images and the denial of rights based on them. Similarly the dehumanisation of others has historically harmed those seen as ‘uncivilised’, ‘savage’ or less than fully human. Such terms undermine the self-esteem of indi- viduals so categorised and can be used to justify the denial of rights. In extreme cases, the dehumanisation of others leads to cultural if not physical genocide. The presumption of superiority, including the ways of knowing of those who believe themselves to be superior, discounts or denies the belief systems of those named as inferior peoples. It is a further justification for a variety of harms. Last, claims to know reality compound the harm to others by disempowering them from determin- ing the nature of the conditions that affect their lives. 13 Ibid., pp. 313–14. 14 Ibid., p. 314. 160 The political and moral legacy At stake in all of these is an underlying question of human dignity. Given that we cannot escape constructing others, the onus is on us to make sure we understand each other as well as possible. If the past and present harms associated with constructing others are to be dealt with and addressed there must be an effort to understand others in their own terms. However, in the final analysis this may be an impossible goal to attain. Apart from anything else, encounters between cultures can involve a clash of values that may be an insurmountable barrier to full comprehension of the other. Finally, in concluding this section it should be recognised that the construction of others need not be negative but can have positive outcomes. Just as others have been constructed in ways that denigrate, dehumanise or demonise them, it is possible to construct others in ways that praise, value and empower them. Collective responsibility and historic injustices Whether present generations have any responsibility for past wrongs to first nations is a complex and sometimes bitterly contested question. It can be approached from a number of standpoints, with some of them shaped by the historic circumstances of the country in which the ques- tion is being debated. In this section I propose to canvass four different approaches without in any way wanting to suggest that these are the only ones. The first is Tzvetan Todorov’s discussion of responsibility as the obligation to understand others. The second is one provoked by recent developments in Australia in which Rob Sparrow grounds a de- fence of collective responsibility on a view of history that can be applied to other contexts and issues. The third is Chandran Kukathas’ denial of collective responsibility as part of his concern to articulate a liberal the- ory of responsibility. Finally, Jeremy Waldron’s argument that historic injustices can be superseded is canvassed. Towards the end of The Conquest of America,Todorov refers to what he calls the ‘half prophecy and half curse’ Las Casas uttered when he asserted that the Spaniards had a collective responsibility for the death and destruction they had inflicted on the Indians of the Americas. It was, he said, a responsibility for all time and not just the past or the present. Todorov takes Las Casas’ pronouncement as a cue for himself, suggesting that Spain can be substituted by ‘Western Europe’. It is not only Spaniards who have a collective responsibility but also the peo- ples of all other European powers that formerly controlled overseas 161 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples colonies – Portugal, France, England, Holland, Belgium, Italy and Germany. All of these states, he suggests, have collective responsibil- ity for their former colonised peoples. 15 What he means by ‘collective responsibility’ is not entirely clear and needs clarification. The idea that the Spaniards have a collective responsibility to Amerindians for all time is meant to convey, first, that it is not just the Conquistadors and colonists who had direct contact with the Indians who had this responsibility. It was the whole of the Spanish people – or the whole of the people of any other European former colonial power. The claim is that each and every Spaniard was responsible for actions taken in the name of Spain. Second, it was not just the responsibility of all Spaniards at a particular time in the past but remains a responsibility for Spaniards today and for those yet to be born. Third, it is not just the Spaniards who have this responsibility but ‘Western Europe’, which re- ally amounts to the membership of international society at the outset of the twentieth century. Curiously he appears not to be concerned about the responsibilities of non-European colonisers, but that need not detain us here. Todorov’s claims concerning responsibility would clearly be extraor- dinary if they referred to dispossession, to intentional killing or to the deaths caused by the introduction of diseases such as smallpox, but they concern the more diffuse and continuing problem of knowing others. His concern is with the ability of Europeans to use knowledge of others to manipulate them, coupled with a paradoxical failure to attempt to understand those very same others in their own terms. As he puts it, the other remains to be discovered: Since the period of the conquest, for almost three hundred and fifty years, Western Europe has tried to assimilate the other, to do away with an exterior alterity, and has in great part succeeded. Its way of life and its values have spread around the world; – This extraordinary success is chiefly due to one specific feature of Western civilisation which for a long time was regarded as a feature of man himself, its de- velopment and prosperity among Europeans thereby becoming proof of their natural superiority: it is paradoxically, Europeans’ capacity to understand the other. 16 This passage comes after an extensive analysis intended to demonstrate that Cort´es used language to gain knowledge of Indian beliefs which he then used to manipulate Indians,Montezuma in particular, into thinking 15 Todorov, Conquest of America, pp. 245–6. 16 Ibid., pp. 247–8. 162 The political and moral legacy that events were unfolding in conformity with the signs essential to their view of the world. Todorov’s concern is then that ‘Western Europe’ has a responsibility not to use knowledge as power for the purpose of oppression and domination; a responsibility not to simply assimilate the other and soobliterate difference but to truly discover and to understand the other in his or her own terms. The introduction to his later book, On Human Diversity, 17 suggests that his concern is closely connected with his personal experiences of otherness and the systematic abuse of knowledge and power in his homeland. One reason for understanding others in their own terms is that it may be necessary for sustaining international society. David Blaney and Nameen Inayatullah 18 compare Todorov’s work with that of Ashis Nandy in relation to the challenge cultural pluralism poses for interna- tional society. They point out that in a world of many cultures there may not be agreement about the ‘common assumptions, values, ways of life, and modes of communication’ presupposed by the idea of international society. There is then the problem of how agreement can be reached, and their suggestions are drawn from ‘Todorov’s idea of “nonviolent com- munication” and . . . Nandy’s notion of a “dialogue of visions”.’ Both of these are concerned with the process of ‘othering’ by means of which ‘a self understands the relationship between itself and some other’ and it is ‘an understanding with practical implications’. 19 Their argument is that while both Todorov and Nandy offer richly rewarding insights into cross-cultural understanding and ‘othering’ their narratives are ‘not sit- uated within a complex of global cultures’. They then show how these narratives can be constructively situated in the framework of interna- tional society. For them the possibility contained in Todorov and Nandy is one that does not surrender to ‘incommensurablity, disabling of con- versation and international society’, but is instead a conversation ‘in the face of difference and in confrontation with power and domination’. 20 Together Todorov and Nandy provide ways of understanding self–other relations that ‘make possible a conversational process in which partici- pation by thepostcolonial and non-European periphery does not require its inevitable subordination to the European core’. 21 Through a dialogue 17 Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought (Harvard University Press, 1993). 18 David I. Blaney and Nameen Inayatullah, ‘Prelude to a Conversation of Cultures in International Society? Todorov and Nandy on the Possibility of Dialogue’, Alternatives 19 (1994), p. 24. 19 Ibid., p. 41. 20 Ibid., p. 42. 21 Ibid., p. 42. 163 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that does not assume ‘Western’ superiority it is possible to achieve a conversation between cultures and, if Blaney and Inayatullah are right, the degree of mutual understanding needed to sustain international society. In essence, the responsibility that concerns Todorov is that of engag- ing in dialogue with ‘the other’ in order to understand those who are different in their own terms and that means avoiding repeating the same form of pastinjustices. The second senseof responsibility to be discussed uses an Australian example and requires some background. At the beginning of the twenty-first century in Australia the ques- tion of responsibility for past injustices arises not only in relation to land rights but also the so-called ‘stolen generations’. This refers to the practice of routinely removing half-caste babies and children from their families over a period that extended from the early 1900s down to the late 1960s. The intention underpinning this practice is debated but there is compelling evidence that during the 1930s in the Northern Territory and Western Australia it amounted to genocide. At that time it was be- lieved that ‘full blood’ Aborigines were a doomed race and that if they were prevented from intermarrying with whites they would die out. By removing half-caste children from their families aboriginality could be bred out of them, resulting in an end to the ‘problem’ of Aborigines. 22 Regardless of whether or not genocide was intended, thousands of chil- dren were removed from their families. 23 Many were never reunited with their families and are today able to testify to the pain and suffering they have endured. As one result of an inquiry into the Stolen Genera- tions released in 1997, 24 both Aboriginal leaders and concerned white Australians continue to call for an apology from the prime minister of Australia for the wrongs done to Aboriginal people throughout white occupation. So far, Prime Minister Howard and his government have refused to go further than to express regret for past harms. 22 Robert Manne, ‘The Stolen Generation’, Quadrant,42(January–Februrary 1998), pp. 53– 63. 23 Australia was not the only country to have removed children from their families. In aid of assimilation indigenous Canadian children were also subjected to forcible removal and taken to residential schools set up and run by the churches. Like their Australian counterparts they were prohibited from using their own language and were deprived of their cultural heritage. As in Australia the effects on the individuals and their families was profound. See Maggie Hodgson, ‘Rebuilding Community after Residential Schools’, Bird, Land and Macadam (eds.), Nation to Nation, pp. 92–108. 24 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997). 164 The political and moral legacy An important question in the debate about this is whether non- Aboriginal Australians can be held ‘collectively responsible’ for the past wrongs done to Aboriginal people. Robert Sparrow argues from the nature of history to persuasively argue that they can. 25 Essential to his argument is the idea that we are not able fully to comprehend the present. It is only at some time in the future that historians are able to look back, separate the important from the unimportant and better un- derstand complex events. Historical knowledge is in this sense a social construction. Not only that, in looking back to our present, future histo- rians will not distinguish our present from our past as we do. They are instead more likely to see our present and past as just the one contiguous past. In his words, ‘the distinction between our past and our present is not necessarily a historically significant one. – From the perspective of the future, our past and present are both merely the past. The backwards gaze of the future may well treat much of what we regard as the past as part of our present.’ 26 A second crucial element of the argument is that not only is Australia’s past racist and replete with injustices towards Aboriginal Australians, there has been no fundamental change in the contemporary treatment of them by non-indigenous Australians. Their life expectancy is consid- erably lower, as are their levels of income, health and education. At the same time, they have a higher rate of unemployment, they represent a greater proportion of those in prison, 27 suffer more alcoholism and are more likely to commit suicide. It remains ‘essentially continuous with a racist history’ 28 with respect to dispossession, extermination and forced assimilation. So long as present day injustices are tolerated and there is no decisive break from past practices, ‘our actions will be associated with those who have gone before’. Those ‘who look back . . . will not see us independently of our history’. 29 By implication we have the capacity to bring about a fundamental change and it is by not doing so that we will be seen by future historians as sharing responsibility for historical injustices with those who have gone before us. Sparrow anticipates that for some this merely prompts the question of why we should care about how we will be seen by future generations. 25 Robert Sparrow, ‘History and Collective Responsibility’, Australasian Journal of Philos- ophy, 78: 3 (2000). 26 Ibid., p. 348. 27 For a comparison of indigenous rates of incarceration in Australia, Canada and New Zealand see chs. 9, 10 and 11 of Haverman (ed.), Indigenous People’s Rights. 28 Sparrow, ‘History and Collective Responsibility’, p. 350. 29 Ibid., p. 350. 165 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples His answer to this appeals to the effects of our actions on the future cou- pled with the ethical character of those actions. ‘The future’, he argues, ‘represents the continuation of our ethical projects.’ If the earlier argu- ment that the future determines ‘the nature of past and current events’ is accepted, then it ‘transform[s] our understanding of our current ethical predicament’. 30 The knowledge that we are likely to be judged in the same light as those of our forebears who were responsible for injustices should bring us to the realisation that unless we effect a decisive break we will share collective responsibility for historic injustices. Kukathas focuses on who has or otherwise should be assigned, re- sponsibility for historic injustices within states. In order to answer this he contrasts individualist and collectivist views of responsibility and re- jects collective responsibility as not only problematic but ultimately un- desirable. Early on he states the individualist position that past wrongs are not the fault of people living today and since it is not their fault they bear no responsibility for such wrongs. The individualistposition denies any responsibility for past injustices and in setting out the arguments that can be deployed in support of this position Kukathas rehearses a number of concerns similar to those examined by Jeremy Waldron, which are discussed below. Kukathas next sets out objections to denying the significance of the past and pays attention to the symbolic impor- tance of demands to address past injustices, with specific reference to Australian Aborigines. ‘For many Aborigines, justice in contemporary terms is inextricably linked with an acknowledgement of the past. And doing justice now requires recognising and repudiating past injustice.’ 31 The third part of his argument articulates the case for collective respon- sibility and points out that in an example such as the Stolen Generations mentioned above this requires bringing about a meeting of minds be- tween the victims of injustice and the descendants of the perpetrators of it. Fourth, he mounts a case against collective responsibility. Central to this is the argument that collective responsibility presupposes that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia are represented by two un- differentiated communities, but that it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish that they are undifferentiated. There is no Aboriginal nation as such but instead a mix of urban and rural Aboriginal peoples with disparate interests and this is mirrored by non-Aboriginal communities. 30 Ibid., p. 349. 31 Chandran Kukathas, ‘The Politics of Responsibility: How to Shift the Burden’, unpub- lished paper (1999), p. 9. 166 [...]... but rights over the same piece of land can be exercised simultaneously by holders of different land rights Waldron’s assumptions – that rights over land must be assigned wholly to one or another party and that all value in land is readily commensurable – oversimplify the value placed on land and the rights that can be held over land within a shared schema of land rights. 48 As the aftermath of the Wik... Britain or to the actions of non-Europeans against other non-Europeans In addition to the circumstances of the origin of particular states, the current treatment of indigenous peoples within states is a further dimension of moral legitimacy The treatment of Tibetans within China has already been mentioned Other examples include the genocide of Ache Indians in Paraguay55 during the 1 970 s and the current... ‘A politics of group difference shares the goal of enhancing individual well-being, but does so while recognising that individual well-being is often dependent on the well-being of groups.’ Eisenberg, The Politics of Individual and Group Difference, p 12 179 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Norman take up the question of ‘how emerging theories of minority rights and multiculturalism... racial inequality’ ,77 and that in some cases they are rights gained at the expense of individual rights and so value the group over the individual 74 76 75 Ibid., p 175 Young, Justice and the Politics, p 170 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p 258, and see Amy Gutmann in Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1994) 77 Kymlicka, Liberalism,... resolve the differences between communities that see themselves as the victims of injustices and the descendants of those accused of having perpetrated them Where the injustices are to do with the appropriation of land, the destruction of culture or genocide, there may be no way of correcting them The only possibility may be a frank admission that these things 48 Susan Dodds, ‘Justice, Indigenous Rights and. .. 1 976 ) 173 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples cases all differ and it is useful to think of the variation as a spectrum of qualitative differences Each case is different but involves, in common with the others, some degree or combination of subjugation, dispossession, and cultural or even physical genocide The moral legitimacy of a state is thrown into question by the presence of. .. one that ‘generates a logic of difference as hierarchical dichotomy ’ Whether it is the opposition of masculine and feminine or civilised and savage, the second term always denotes negative or 71 Taylor, ‘Politics of Recognition’, p 40 72 Ibid., p 42 73 Ibid., p 43 177 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples inferior qualities Consequently ‘[t]he marking of difference always implies... with its indigenous peoples, to secure their rights and ensure the survival of indigenous cultures in accordance not only with the wishes of those that belong to them, but also international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights I want to suggest that the achievement of moral legitimacy requires recognition and mutual agreement between indigenous peoples and the majority... For Taylor the contrast is between the politics of universalism and of difference The politics of universalism emphasises the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements’. 67 According to this notion of ‘universal dignity’ there should be no discrimination between citizens; all should be treated alike The politics of difference... 68 Ibid., p 39 Taylor, ‘Politics of Recognition’, p 37 Steiner and Alston (eds.), Human Rights in Context, pp 10 17 19, and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, p 101 70 Eisenberg, The Politics of Individual and Group Difference’, p 3 176 The political and moral legacy Granting indigenous rights appears to entail abandoning the principle of equal dignity and the idea that all people should be treated alike A justification . Relations’, European Journal of International Relations,2:2(1996), 139 74 . 3 Pagden, European Encounters,p.185. 4 Ibid., p. 1 87. 1 57 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the peoples. but also the peo- ples of all other European powers that formerly controlled overseas 161 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples colonies – Portugal, France, England, Holland, Belgium,. 350. 165 European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples His answer to this appeals to the effects of our actions on the future cou- pled with the ethical character of those actions. The future’,