40 chapter one a particular case is engaged to be married to a man who is on trial for theft, justice is at risk. Vested interests, emotional attachment, and close affinity threaten impartiality. When one is in charge of making decisions that affect others, an emotional attachment to only one (or a portion) of those affected puts justice at risk. This is not to suggest that emotional attachment or close affinity are vices—rather, they are virtues. In contrast, complete emotional detachment is a vice, as evidenced by psychopaths, who are a danger to animals (including humans). Emotional attachment need not cause bias in all situations, though such an effect is highly likely. Human beings, who create moral guidelines for human interactions with anymals, have vested interests, including an emotional attach- ment to themselves and to others of their kind. Human beings have a particular relationship with the human species over and against all other species, and are likely to have a vested interest in human life. It is not possible for Homo sapiens to move outside of this position of bias—it is inherent. However, in the interest of promoting justice, we must strive to be impartial in spite of our vested interests and personal connections. Since we are inherently biased, we must be wary of human assessments of other species, especially assessments that elevate our own ethical standing. We must critically examine the means we use to reach conclusions and regard moral assessments that favor humans as inherently suspicious. There are scores of examples of biased assessments of other species. Our first attempt to teach chimpanzees to speak is an example. Scientists concluded that chimps did not have linguistic ability, that they lacked the cognitive mechanisms necessary for all but the most basic forms of communication. Noted scholars concluded that speech is the exclusive realm of human beings, a defining characteristic shared by no other animal—and an important element in assessing moral status. It has since been discovered that chimps lack the phys- iology for verbal speech, but communicate effectively—beyond basic communication—via sign language. We are now finding that any- mals, such as whales, apes, dolphins, and vervet monkeys, have com- plex forms of communication (M. S. Dawkins 23–24, Warren 53). [Vervet] monkeys are able to pick up subtleties in their grunts that completely escape the human ear. To a human, a grunt is a grunt is a grunt. It takes technological aids in the form of tape recorders and sound spectrograph to show that, as far as the monkeys are concerned, methods and terms 41 there is far more to it than that We still do not fully understand what it is that the monkeys are responding to or exactly how they manage to detect the differences between the grunts. But do it they clearly do, and they leave their human observers slightly baffled. (M. S. Dawkins 23–24) Human investigations into anymal language appear to have carried an unspoken motive: “For a variety of economic, religious, or other ideological reasons, it has been important to many people to insist on an unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals, and language has seemed the most promising instrument for achieving this” (Dupre 331). Few contemporary ethicists consider language a necessary con- dition for moral standing; such an assessment is now broadly rec- ognized as a form of humanocentrism (Orlans 150). Similar to human investigations into language, human understandings of pain, intelligence, communication, thought, community, learning ability, and ethics necessarily stem from a narrow perspective, one gained from an inner understanding of these attributes as parts of our lives. Rene Descartes (1596–1650) is perhaps the best-known example of a human being incapable of fairly assessing anymals. He concluded that other species could neither think nor feel (Descartes 115). Sadly, while Descartes is a particularly flagrant example, he has not proven to be an exception to the rule: humans have concocted a plethora of tests to assess the intelligence, ethical tendencies, and sensitivities of anymals, with the hope and expectation of further exemplifying the special and preferable nature of human beings. Ongoing “scientific” assessments of anymals say more about the nature of science—and about human nature—than they do about anymals. Valuing one species over another is not consistent with scientific information. Darwin provides no hierarchy in the evolutionary con- tinuum, no progression toward perfection, yet even in this “scientific” age, long after Darwin’s discoveries, people continue to believe that human beings are the most “advanced.” Concurrently, we believe that we are the most worthy of moral consideration. But why should we believe that we are radically different from anymals? All animals exhibit adaptive behavior and have similar central nervous systems— we are all sentient. Animals, both Scandinavians and cocker spaniels, exhibit emotional responses and associate with one another in close- knit groups. If anymals fall short of our expectation, then we should avow that people do, too. 42 chapter one [A]ny reason we have to doubt the existence of the minds of animals also gives us reason to doubt the existence of the minds of other humans. We are faced with a choice between attributing mental states to animals and solipsism or skepticism concerning other minds gener- ally. As most of us are quite ready to accept that other human beings have minds, then we should accept that animals too have minds. The brains of all multicellular animals, including human beings, are made of the same matter. The fundamental characteristics of neurons and synapses are roughly the same [T]he brains of small whales, dolphins and porpoises are close in size to those of human beings, both absolutely and in relation to size of body. . . . the general truth that animal brains are anatomically similar to our own must be accepted. And this gives us reason for believ- ing that the mental events that take place ‘within’ them are in some degree similar to those which occur in our own brains. (Crisp, “Evolution” 310–12) More specifically, Dawkins argues that “we now know that these three attributes—complexity, thinking and minding about the world— are also present in other species. The conclusion that they, too, are consciously aware is therefore compelling” (M. S. Dawkins 177). Contemporary science reveals that human beings are not distinct from anymals in any morally relevant way, leading to the important and inescapable conclusion that “behavioral and emotional kinship with nonhuman animals” indicates “moral kinship as well” (Bekoff 360). Methods of assessing cognition and cognitive abilities lack depend- ability even among human beings. It is difficult to grasp how people might come to understand the diverse abilities and interests, psy- chological tendencies, and mental capabilities of even one other human. How much more difficult, then, is it for them to understand and appreciate the minds and feelings of anymals? The epistemological difficulties inherent in human assessments of anymals must remain at the center of any discussion of other species and ought to tem- per any conclusions we reach. Because we have proven partial, and because we remain inherently partial to our own species, human studies of anymals cannot reasonably be assumed to be adequately grounded to justify moral conclusions. The force and prevalence of speciesism among humans is fore- shadowed by the history of human partiality across the categories of race, sex, age, and sexual orientation. The assumption that all human beings have moral standing is a recent development. Romans “did not include in their moral community criminals, captives, foreigners, or nonhumans” (Marshal 80). When Europeans arrived in North methods and terms 43 America, they destroyed most of the inhabitants. Only recently has the United States legally granted African Americans equal moral consideration. Around the world, women have been (and are) denied equal moral consideration alongside men. In light of a demonstrated human tendency for those in power to be partial and unjust in assess- ing the moral standing of other human beings (particularly when the assessor has a vested interest), disparaging assessments of anymals is not surprising. Another example of human partiality and hubris relates directly to ethics. Humans have long assumed that only the human animal has a system of ethics. In spite of modern science and the similarities that we now know to exist among species, many still assume, without reference to empirical evidence, that only human beings are ethical animals. Since ethics is the subject of this book, we should consider whether or not ethics is exclusively the domain of human beings, or whether it is a more broad and biological phenomenon of the animal world (including humans). A minimal definition of ethics entails a system of behavioral norms that generate expectations of behavior and punish deviance. Anymals appear to comply with social expectations and to suffer social punish- ments for infringements. For instance, the vampire bat displays “ani- mal decision-making what looks like a system of morality based on the principle of reciprocation of favours given in the past, cou- pled with sanctions against those that do not live up to their oblig- ations” (M. S. Dawkins 57). Based on observations, the same might be true of nonhuman primates, canines, equines, felines, insects, and perhaps a host of lesser observed anymals (“Inside”). In the likely event that ethical systems are not exclusively human, two interesting possibilities arise: • Ethics, including human ethics, might be genetically encoded. • Human ethics are but one of many ethical systems in the animal world. If the first point is true, then what is esteemed as human ethics may be merely biology in action. E. O. Wilson argues that “moral senti- ments” might be better described as “moral instincts.” If we are to understand “deep springs of ethical behavior,” he argues that we must consider the “development of moral sentiments as products of the interactions of genes and the environment” (64). This argument makes moral behavior a genetic predisposition resulting from natural 44 chapter one selection, rather than a metaphysical truth to be discovered (E. O. Wilson 58–59). E. O. Wilson concludes that ethics are “far more a product of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded” (70). While it might prove difficult to explain all of human ethics through biological analysis, Wilson’s perspective heightens awareness of human beings as animals, not so very different from anymals. If ethics have a biological component, it would not be surprising that our morality is partial, favoring us and our own. Evolution suggests that if human beings are moral animals by nature, as has been supposed, other species are also likely to be genetically wired with an ethical code, or with a tendency to have moral standards that permit groups of individuals to function and prosper in commu- nities. If this is the case, if other species have and practice their own forms of morality, philosophers working in ethics have a much broader field to explore than has generally been assumed. Human morality is specifically the endeavor of human beings, but since anymals are also ethical agents in their communities, it is important that we strive to move outside of our narrow, human perspective of ethics to compre- hend a larger moral sphere. Like the judge with a vested interest, we cannot maintain impartiality, or adequately assess ethical principles and ethical theories, unless we are able to envisage morality from something of an “outsider’s” viewpoint. (This does not indicate that other animals, as moral agents in their own communities, are respon- sible for righting the wrongs that human beings cause. We are the animals causing untold suffering and death to other species. We are the animals who have an ethic that speaks of the importance of con- sistency and fail to deliver. We need to critically examine our morality and how we behave, and then change our actions to coincide with ideals like consistency, justice, and compassion.) Do genetically encoded morals justify speciesism? History suggests that morality changes over time, and this may be related to evolu- tion. Our ongoing effort to foster a more inclusive morality indicates that partiality need not be a permanent part of our genetic code for moral behavior. If it were, then racism, sexism, ageism, and het- erosexism would be equally biological, and we could not expect to make any moral progress toward a more impartial ethic. History reveals that this is not the case. Inherent difficulties, epistemological and personal, indicate that sound ethical theories are not likely to stem from common human assumptions or standard human comparisons of themselves with any- methods and terms 45 mals. We must be diligent if we are to be impartial. Moral philoso- phers must carefully examine all assumptions and conclusions sug- gesting that attributes are exclusively human, especially if people link such an attribute to moral standing. It would be wise, given our partiality, to assume that basic interests across species are the same unless proven otherwise. Animals of every species maintain and pro- tect their physical existence. Even a bacterium, the simplest life form, responds to its surroundings “to preserve and protect its form” (Margulis 13, 50). Evelyn Pluhar comments: Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me, who respond in complex, relative ways to stimuli that elicit similar responses in me, are probably conscious just as I am. This is an extraordinarily strong inductive argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case analogical reasoning, licensing one to infer that another, be the other human or nonhuman, is not merely a cleverly contrived “machine.” Those who are skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not persuaded by the argument, but they also cannot be persuaded about the existence of their own bodies, let alone anyone else’s. Short of solipsism, one seems not to be irrational in putting one’s confidence in the argument from analogy. (13) Impartiality requires us to look anew at anymals. There are at least four reasons for assuming that anymals have the same basic inter- ests as human beings. Such an assumption • avoids inherent epistemological difficulties of assessing cognitive or emotional states external to ourselves; • maintains consistency, granting anymals that which we grant other human beings but cannot prove to be true; • avoids partiality and bias, common flaws of assessments between species; • is consistent with science (shared biology), which indicates that basic interests among living entities are fundamentally the same; • is consistent with ethology, which also indicates that basic interests among living entities are fundamentally the same. In the absence of any established morally relevant distinction between all human beings and anymals, the burden of justifying different moral guidelines for different species lies with those who posit such distinctions. Partiality has proven a dangerous stumbling block in shaping human morality. It is critical that we learn from history and not repeat the 46 chapter one offenses of our past. For instance, in the Southern United States two hundred years ago, immigrants from Europe developed and enforced an ethical code that held only their kind to be morally considerable: “Caucasians” were more powerful and passed laws that deprived African immigrants to the United States of basic rights that we freely granted to immigrants from Europe. Though just one species among many, humans are no less power- ful with regard to anymals than Caucasians were in North America in relation to African immigrants two hundred years ago. Then, deci- sions were made that hurt those of African descent, but were to the advantage of Caucasians. Today humans make decisions that affect blue-footed boobies and black-tailed deer—and the world in its entirety—because these decisions seem to be to the advantage of humans. But as history suggests, a biased, self-aggrandizing ethic is not to anyone’s advantage, and neither can such an ethic establish or demonstrate human superiority—on the contrary. Most current citizens of the United States share a sense of shame at the human moral shortcomings associated with the slavery of Africans. However, powerful slave owners had much to gain financially by assuming that blacks were ethically irrelevant. Today the same is true of the human attitude toward and relationship with anymals. If we are to fairly assess our ethical obligations with respect to anymals, we must move beyond our narrow circle of personal, vested interests. We have assumed that we are the only ethical animals, yet in relation to anymals our “ethic” translates into little more than “might makes right.” Bernard Rollin writes: [W]hy does intelligence score highest? Ultimately, perhaps, because intelligence allows us to control, vanquish, dominate, and destroy all other creatures. If this is the case, it is power that puts us on top of the pyramid. But if power provides grounds for including or exclud- ing creatures from the scope of moral concern, we have essentially accepted the legitimacy of the thesis that “might makes right” and have, in a real sense, done away with all morality altogether. If we do accept this thesis, we cannot avoid extending it to people as well, and it thus becomes perfectly moral for Nazis to exterminate the Jews, muggers to prey on old people, the majority to oppress the minority, and the government to do as it sees fit to any of us. Furthermore, as has often been pointed out, it follows from this claim that if an extrater- restrial alien civilization were intellectually, technologically, and mili- tarily superior to us, it would be perfectly justified in enslaving or eating or exterminating human beings. (8) methods and terms 47 On the other hand, intelligence may also be a benefit. We can use our intelligence to subjugate others or to establish a consistent moral- ity. Western moral theories are capable of inspiring compassion. Our intelligence may help us to apply our complex moral outlook across species. Chapter 8 attempts the daunting task of presenting an impartial moral theory. This chapter offers an ethic in which humans are equal members in a menagerie of morally considerable animals. This is a morality in which might does not make right, and in which the value of life does not change according to species, race, or sex. For the sake of impartiality, a central moral tenet, we must rigorously question “morally relevant differences” assumed to exist between humans and anymals. We should rather assume sameness because we are all animals, evolved from common ancestors, and because moral- ity requires that we strive for impartiality. Where no morally rele- vant distinction can be demonstrated, we ought to extend our ethical code to include other creatures. Method 7. Casuistry Casuistry is central to this text; it is a method used by moral philoso- phers whereby a specific instance is compared with rulings in other similar cases to reach a comparable and therefore presumably just verdict. Casuistry entails reflection on a given problem in light of relevant accepted maxims and similar cases from the past, with intent to reach an informed moral judgment regarding a given problem ( Jonsen 1991). The word “casuistry” comes from the Latin casus, which means “case.” Casuistry is the study of cases, a process of resolving specific moral problems by applying general principles of ethics, religion, or moral philosophy. Casuistry usually requires the assessment of specific details, such as the degree of guilt or measure of responsibility. These are deter- mined by weighing the specific circumstances of a given case. Motive and consent are often critical (Runes 46). In turn, that particular scenario becomes part of a case history, which sets a precedent by which future moral judgments might be made in similar cases. Casuistry is important to moral philosophy, and to this book, for at least four reasons: Casuistry 48 chapter one • focuses on particular circumstances in specific situations, • depends on like cases being treated in a like manner, • holds both motive and consent to be important considerations, and • entails an informed moral judgment. First, casuistry avoids abstractions that may plague moral theory and analytical philosophy; casuistry acknowledges the importance of the individual case. “Casuists are skeptical of principles, rules, rights, and theory divorced from history, circumstance, and experience. One can make successful moral judgments casuists say, only when one has an intimate understanding of particular situations and an appreciation of the record of similar situations” (Orlans 43). In simple terms, rules like “do not shove or push” cannot adequately guide morality. If someone is drowning, and a passerby swims in and pushes that indi- vidual toward the shore, has the passerby done wrong by pushing? The passerby may have broken a moral rule (“do not shove”) but they have not done wrong. Similarly, other moral maxims do not apply in all instances. This is why casuists believe that the specific instance is critical to any moral assessment. Second, casuistry assumes the principle of equality, whereby com- parable instances are treated in a comparable manner, and the prin- ciple of universality, whereby a decision made in one instance will hold for all comparable cases (Buning 20). All things being equal, a case of theft ought to be treated like another case of theft. One who steals an ear of corn ought to be treated the same as one who steals an eggplant, all things being equal. Casuists reason from one particular case to another case that is similar in morally relevant ways; previous cases set a precedent by which similar cases will be judged in the future. “The casuistic method is to start with cases whose moral fea- tures and conclusions have already been decided, and then to compare the salient features in the paradigm case (that is, the case with morally settled dimensions) with the features of cases in need of a decision” (Orlans 43). However, the qualification, “all things being equal” often doesn’t hold, which leads to the third element of casuistry noted above: motive and consent are critical. One often-cited philosophical conun- drum is the thief who steals food to feed the starving. Let us assume that the one who steals the ear of corn does so simply because she does not want to pay for her food. In contrast, the one who steals the eggplant does so to feed her starving husband (who is ill and incapacitated) because she is too poor to buy food. Casuistry acknowl- methods and terms 49 edges a morally relevant distinction between a thief who steals out of indifference or for self-gain, and one who steals for a higher ideal (in the hope of preserving life). No one argues with the importance of the general maxim “stealing is immoral,” but casuistry acknowl- edges the importance of circumstances, motive, and intent for assess- ing the morality of individual acts. Finally, casuistry entails an informed moral judgment. Casuistry is not about majority opinion or common practices being written into legal codes. Casuistry is a rigorous process of examining actual prob- lems in specific instances, in light of relevant moral theory and other similar cases that have been previously examined, in order to reach an informed moral judgment on that particular situation. Casuistry is critical to this text because this text compares moral- ity between human beings with morality across species. Since there are no adequately established morally relevant distinctions between all human beings and anymals, casuistry is an effective tool for making moral assessments of situations involving animals of different species. We have a wealth of cases involving interactions among human beings that can assist us in knowing what we ought to do with regard to an oryx or echidna. Term 8. Living Entity For the purposes of this book, all species of animals and plants are to be regarded as living entities (or life-forms). Cells qualify, though viruses do not. “Nature,” Aristotle observes, “proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to deter- mine the exact line of demarcation” (Margulis 26). The Russian sci- entist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky refers to life as “living matter.” What exactly is life? If we are to respect life, protect life, or cherish life, we need to have some notion of what constitutes life. “Living entities are best understood as ongoing processes of a cer- tain sort” (L. Johnson 205). Life is “less a thing and more a happening, a process; even the simplest life form respond[s] to its surround- ings to preserve and protect its form” (Margulis 45, 50). A living entity strives to maintain its existence as the type of entity that it is. Even the simplest living beings have complex regulatory, that is cyber- netic, systems that maintain the being within an acceptable range of state of being. In the face of widely varying environmental conditions, [...]... harmonious satisfaction of one’s desires, purposes, and the like, taking account of one’s biological, social, and psychological interests More generally, animals (including humans) live well relative to the degree to which (1) they pursue and obtain what they prefer, (2) they take satisfaction in pursuing and obtaining what they prefer, and (3) what they prefer and obtain is in their interests (Case 117)... spotted-tailed quoll is incapable of suffering, then ethical teachings on the matter of suffering are irrelevant to the spotted-tailed quoll In some ways, biology is critical to morality, particularly in protectionist philosophy Academic disciplines do not exist in a vacuum The moral dilemma entailed in patenting farmed animals will be decided in light of such diverse disciplines as genetic engineering, theology,... reality; in this case, what people generally believe about mozzarella and hot dogs, and what is true, are very different matters Information from various fields is critical both to determine and to support any given moral outlook, but incorrect information can be misleading Diligence in exploring and incorporating information from outside the field of ethics is critical to sound morality A host of disciplines... cells, “come to life” when they enter another living organism, but “lack sufficient genes and proteins to maintain themselves” (Margulis 23 24 ) Yet even the smallest cells, those of the tiniest bacteria, are selfmaintaining entities, and thereby qualify as living entities (Margulis 23 24 ) Term 9 Western Morality /Ethics The terms “Western morality,” and “Western ethics, ” are used with the knowledge that there... beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently... ethic in which all of creation is treated with self-sacrificing service out of respect for the intentions of a divine creator We determine “facts” about the world around us, for better or for worse, through mathematics, science, scripture, art, faith, and our senses Each is important in determining how we understand and interact with the larger world; each is important to any human understanding of what... subject -of- a-life (Case 308–09) For instance, in the above mining scenario, if blasting out the single miner could be avoided by digging a tunnel to access the other fifty—but they would have to go without food for several days—one ought to dig The harm of prolonged hunger is a lesser harm for each of the fifty people than killing would be for the single individual in the adjacent shaft c Loss of Innocence... as joy 62 chapter two or unhappiness, satisfied wants or thwarted desires In this way dogs indicate their preferences, demonstrating “preference autonomy.” c Benefits and Harms Welfare is determined by “benefits” and “harms” in the Rights View In the above case the dog benefits by going for a walk if a walk satisfies her biological, social, and psychological interests, and if her interests are genuinely good... hundreds of years “Our attitudes toward nature and other animals are deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny—that is, by religion” (L White 23 ) methods and terms 55 Ethics and religion are inextricably linked For centuries Christianity has in uenced moral philosophy, while “religion arose on a foundation of ethics (E O Wilson 65) For many Christians and Jews, the Hebrew Scriptures and/ or... they do wrong (Case 1 52) A variety of animals, including human infants and imbeciles, fall into the moral-patient category Regan notes that “normal adult humans are moral agents” (Case 1 52) Regan affirms that both moral patients and moral agents have inherent value To grant inherent value only to moral agents would violate the basic philosophical principle of consistency and impartiality, which requires . but incorrect information can be misleading. Diligence in exploring and incorporating information from outside the field of ethics is critical to sound morality. A host of disciplines shape individual. “lack sufficient genes and proteins to maintain themselves” (Margulis 23 24 ). Yet even the smallest cells, those of the tiniest bacteria, are self- maintaining entities, and thereby qualify as living entities. outside of this position of bias—it is inherent. However, in the interest of promoting justice, we must strive to be impartial in spite of our vested interests and personal connections. Since we