P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 370 Leading Toward Peace The counsel about coming American weakness and European strength is unconvincing for reasons set outearlier in this book. For the present, Europe lacks the economic and military strength and the political cohesion neces- sary to suck others into its way of doing things, although it doesn’t lack the self-assurance to try. But in the longer run, should the European Union become increasingly like a nation-state, building cohesion and military strength, then it may well attempt to dictate the structure of global poli- tics, as it did during the centuries of European imperialism. The transatlantic trap invites America to deny some of the most evident risks in the world today. Denial isn’t responsible statesmanship. America must openly confront nuclear proliferation, the Crescent of Fire, the widen- ing gap between rich and poor nations, Russia’s dangerous unpredictability, and China’s rapid emergence as a military challenge – not simply presume that these sources of danger are going to disappear of their own accord in the way that harmonism and convergence do. In a situation of long-term and dramatic economic divergence between nations and regions, in which the United States is widening the gap between its economic and military strength and that of the rest of the developed world, the strategy of the weak is to show the United States that there is no politically acceptable way for it to exercise its superiority. All talk of the sanctity of international law, the legitimacy of the United Nations, and the moral imperative of multilateralism is simply the implementation of a strategy of this sort. The European approach to world problems is generally either a stern rebuke for bad behavior or an offer of incentives for better behavior. For example, a senior human rights envoy of the European Union to Rus- sia issued what the Financial Times called “a stern rebuke over judicial standards” to Russia on September 30, 2004. 16 It’s hard to believe the Rus- sians were much affected by a stern rebuke. Quite the contrary, private discussions with Russian officials indicate that this sort of thing provides the Russians with chuckler. In response, they adopt the role of the wounded innocent (“certainly we do nothing to be criticized for”), but laugh about the matter in private. How can the Europeans who do this sort of thing seriously expect anything but ridicule? As for incentives for better behavior, the European approach is on display in the controversy over the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Initially, the Europeans offered incentives to the Iranians to cease their program; the Ira- nians took the incentives and continued with their program. The Europeans protested, so the Iranians demanded more incentives. 17 P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 The Transatlantic Trap 371 Neither terrorists, insurrectionists, rogue states, the Russians, nor the Chinese will pay any attention to this sort of moral suasion at all (although they’ll accept any money the Europeans offer, without abiding by the agree- ments, of course), so it is dangerous for us to do so. ALL THE WAY VIA MULTILATERALISM TO A WORLD GOVERNMENT There is now much support in Europe and on the American left for multi- lateral decision making – a form of world government. Is the UN a tolerable vehicle for this? The UN wasn’t put together for this, but it’s all we have. If we are to contemplate full multilateral decision making – that is, world government – then we must redesign the UN or design something else. Immediately at the end of World War II, President Harry Truman spoke at the founding of the United Nations: “We all have to recognize – no matter how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as weplease.” 18 Revisiting this speech awriter for The Economist complained, “The contrast with the attitude of most subsequent American governments, and especially the current one [the George W. Bush Administration] could not be more stark.” 19 Ye t The Economist ignored two factors: Truman’s careful qualification of his endorsement of multilateralism – “to do always as we please.” The United States does not and should not always act as it pleases, including now. But when it is a matter of national defense, the country must act, even if it is not supported by other countries whose agendas are quite different. In addition, there is now a long history of foolishness and futility in the United Nations against which Americans must weigh our support for multilateralism. The confusion that characterizes European thought about the United Nations continues unabated. For example, “Why should Russia with a GDP smaller than the Netherlands have a permanent seat (in the United Nation’s Security Council) rather than Japan ?” ask the editors of The Economist,quite seriously. 20 The answer is very simple – Russia is a fully armed nuclear power covering almost one-seventh of the landmass of the globe and should therefore be on the Security Council. The size of GDP is immaterial when the question is Russian participation in world affairs. The major point is that asking the question reveals both European myopia (they just ignore the nuclear power of Russia) and the European confusion of consumer economics with military power – they are not alwayssynonymous. The United Nations Security Council is about war and peace, it shouldn’t be P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 372 Leading Toward Peace another world trade organization. The confusion is of consumer economies with military strength, and of the present with the future (Russia is about to fully modernize its forces while Japan has not yet chosen its course in the future). If we retain the United Nations in a significant role, then we must shift our position to one of multilateralism generally, for otherwise we are asserting both independence and dependence and there are certain to be different expectations of us by our allies, and when we disappoint them, there is certain to be a major controversy with our allies and more harm than would otherwise be done. Disappointed expectations embitter people and create tension and conflict. They are a sure trap to fall into, and are the result of our not having sufficiently adjusted our policy for the end of the Cold War. This is the core of what’s happening now over Iraq. The argument is being made that it was the attitude of the American government – allegedly unilateralist and arrogant – that undercut and made ineffective the efforts of the United Nations to disarm Iraq. “ the entire process of trying to avert a war through inspections and negotiations was undercut by the mil- itary buildup,” wrote Richard C. Holbrooke, American ambassador to the United Nations in the Clinton Administration, “that the United States said was necessary to force Iraq to comply – a buildup that some officials later argued could not be reversed without the United States losing face. ‘In ret- rospect, the military buildup and the diplomacy were out of sync with each other.’ ‘The policies were executed in a provocative way that alienated our friends.’” 21 As beguiling on thesurfaceasmultilateralism is the notion ofinternational law. “In a lawless society the only natural right is superior might.” 22 We can do better than that, goes the argument. Rather than force as an arbiter of controversy, there would instead by a rule of law. That’s how a modern democracy works, and so should the world. It’s a compelling vision. The core of the matter is that other nations have learned how to use the United Nations to handcuff the United States procedurally and moralisti- cally. They claim to do this in support of justice and other such verities. More often, they do it in support of their own interests. 23 Multilateralism and international law used this way are a sham, and hold that we should be bound to them is to believe that we should sacrifice our security for an idealist fiction. It is a mistaken notion that diplomacy is a win-win process; and that overt conflict is only win-lose. This confuses characteristics of means with charac- teristics of results. Diplomacy is often lose-lose when needed actions do not occur (as today, for example, in the continued diplomatic ineffectiveness P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 The Transatlantic Trap 373 in stopping nuclear proliferation) and overt conflict can be win-win when an evil is eradicated. The American Civil War, for example, was an overt conflict that put an end to a great evil, slavery, which the southern states couldn’t end for themselves; in this way it was win-win. The same is true of World War II, which put an end to Nazism, which ultimately benefited both Germany and its enemies. Similarly, it’s an illusion to think that diplomacy is an expression of harmony; it often is not; it’s frequently a form which conflict takes. Just as individuals can be in conflict who are not actually at blows, so nations are sometimes in conflict even when there is not war between them. Diplomacy can, when it is successful, preserve the peace; but a war can reestablish peace. They are both, in that sense, a road to peace. The advantage of diplomacy is that it is not war, and can sometimes avoid war. But the absence of war is not the absence of conflict; and in diplomacy conflict often simmers until war breaks out. Hence, it’s also an illusion to think that diplomacy is somehow different than conflict; it’s different from war, but it’s often simply another form of rivalry between nations. It’s a mistake, therefore, to think that diplomacy provides win-win solutions, while war is always a win-lose. More often, both diplomacy and war are lose-lose for the parties engaged. Diplomacy can be a means of problem solving with an attempt to reach win-win solutions, but it need not be. And war can sometimes create an environment in which problem-solving takes over. But it is an error to associate diplomacy with problem-solving in all cases – it isn’t that. “Politics is war by other means,” wrote Will and Ariel Durant in their study of world history. 24 The politics of the United Nations is no different. MULTILATERALISM AS AN END Forsome, multilateralism has become an end in itself – that is, a device, a method, has become an objective itself. Some seem tocelebratemultilateralism explicitly for failing to serveAmer- icas interests. In this concept, multilateralism is a device by which America champions principles and norms that serve to bind itself, and this seems to them only fair, because, in this view, the United States would play by the rules it asked others to accept. This, it seems, is fair, and so the rules of the game become as important as the game itself, of which sight is lost. The game is the national security of the United States, reacting at this moment to the most serious loss of life from a foreign attack on its own soil in more than one hundred and fifty years. But of this sight has been lost. “Cooperation P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 374 Leading Toward Peace was contingent on the United States itself playing by the rules,” wrote Lisa Martin implying that France didn’t cooperate with us in suppressing terror because we didn’t play by the rules of multilateralism. 25 This is a complete reversal of the actual causality. Rather, we rejected multilateralism because France didn’t cooperate in combating terror, but pursued private and hidden agendas instead. The error is to look no deeper than methods in determining the objective of our policy. Multilateralism, like unilateralism, is only a device to other ends a device that may or may not be valuable depending on what it can accomplish to the larger ends. What does multilateralism really mean in today’s environment? It means not acting without the imprimatur of the United Nations – which is only obtained by the support of China, Russia, and France. It means subordinating our own interests to theirs. Multinationalists support this. In making multilateralism an objective, its supporters risk straying into a shadowy zone in which they have become a fifth column for Americas rivals serving the interests of our rivals while pretending that they are serving America. Multinationalists seem to glory in the notion that America should now make sacrifices to return to multilateralism. It will take time and resources to rebuild the U.S. reputation for multilateralism. It will require making concessions and accepting compromises on a wide range of issues. Thus, to get others to support us, we must give them what they want at cost to ourselves. The baby of American interestsishere thrown tothemultilateralist wolves, our interests are sacrificed to other nations, some of which are often hostile, and some of which are disguisedasour allies, but who are allies only on a situational basis and are as often our rivals and antagonists as our friends and supporters. “To argue that the United States should always work through the UN is to argue that China, Russia,orFrance should haveaveto over our use of military force,” wrote Stanley Michalak. “Neither the Clinton administration nor any previous administration accepted that position. Nor will any administration in the future, or any other member of the Security Council, do so. Were Ta iwan to declare its independence, the last thing China would do is ask UN Security Council for permission to use military force.” 26 Amitai Etzioni noted that “Many champions of the United Nations treat the organization as if it were already some kind of democratic world government. Hence, they attribute enormous importance to whether the United Nations approves of a course of action. They confuse what the United Nations one day can be with the way it is ” 27 We are less hope- ful. There is no reason to believe that the United Nations can be effectively P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 The Transatlantic Trap 375 reformed, although proposals to do so will remain part of the diplomatic game played by the nations. Nor can the United Nations be disbanded, the political consequences are too great, and there is sometimes a use for an international forum. It is a partisan forum of mostly nondemocratic soci- eties (whatever label they wear), pursuing an agenda largely at odds with our own, while promoting a humanitarian image for cover. It should not be invested with dignity by our government, but can be used as an instrument of convenience if and when opportunity arises. UNILATERAL PARTIAL DISARMAMENT Wishful thinking has reached deeply into the American mentality and may in fact bring about a great divide in American politics. For those Americans who wish to abandon assertive defense in favor of multilateralism, the force of logic will propel them to advocacy of substantial disarmament. This will be a primary alternative to Strategic Independence, impelling America toward a great choice: military dominance combined with Strategic Independence, or disarmament combined with multilateral- ism. Any other combinations have at their hearts a contradiction, and so will ultimately fail and be abandoned. Briefly, to attempt Strategic Independence with disarmament is to become areckless adventurer in the world, attempting things we cannot achieve, and challenging others we cannot defeat. To attempt multilateralism while militarily dominant is to make us a target because of our military strength, and simultaneously deprive us of an effective response by subordinating our response to the interests and concerns of others. Multilateralism requires reduction in armaments for the same reason that military dominance requires Strategic Independence (namely, the dominant power becomes a target). Over time this intimate connection between domi- nance and independence, and between multilateralism and arms reduction, will become evident toeveryone. Apolicyin which America would largely stop being the world’s sole super- power is now being proposed. We would disengage and let others police their regions of influence. The United States would reduce its commitments around the world, letting other powers maintain their own spheres of influ- ence. “The very preponderance of American power may now make us not more secure but less secure.” 28 Schwarz told an interviewer, “The tremen- dous power we have presents us with an opportunity to somewhat dis- engage militarily from the world.” Also, he said, “the United States has never wanted Europe to play a powerful and independent role in world politics, or P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 376 Leading Toward Peace develop the kind of military capabilities it would need to police its sphere.” He argues that Europe doesn’t keep house in Europe or the Middle East because the United States doesn’t want it to. Freed by the United States, Europe would, he implies, develop the decision-making competence and military strength to police its sphere of influence. 29 Were we to disarm to the status of other powers, then we’d be part of aworld in which Russia, China, ourselves, France, and Britain would be superpowers, and the rivalry of nations would return to something like that of the early part of the twentieth century. We might be able to maintain peace, and we might not. But we’d certainly have to make the attempt in combination with other countries – in a frankly multilateralist way.We could tryagain to be isolationist, and let others attempt to preserve the peace, as we did early in the 1930s; and then join with others more directly, as we did later in the 1930s, in our failed attempt to dissuade Hitler and Imperial Japan from war. But we might not fail this time, since there is now no counterpart for Hitler and for the Japanese militarists on the world scene. We can be truly multilateralist, indeed, we’d have no other choice, if we were no longer the dominant power. This used to be our tactic. After a war, we’d disarm, signaling the world that we were no threat to any significant power, and forcing ourselves to act with other countries (multilateralism) or not at all (we did in fact try to work with the western European powers in the 1930s to reduce the risk of war, despite our not being part of the League of Nations). We could return to this approach, this time being fully engaged in the United Nations. We could substantially reduce our military strength and become another of the several great powers. Then we couldn’t act unilaterally and expect success, and so we’d be forced to be multilateral. In fact, so strong is this logic – the intimate connection of multilateralism with disarmament – that those who today advocate multilateralism will find themselves tomorrow advocating disarmament. The logically consistent alternative to Strategic Independence involves three imperatives: 1. Reduce our arms to the level of other great powers – Russia, China, England, France – so that we won’t be a target of terrorists or aggressive great power rivals (this occurs in part because without sole superpower status, we won’t be pulled into all conflicts in the world); 2. Actmultilaterally – so that we won’t be resented; and 3. Play a constructive role in the world – so that we’ll be appreciated. Then, so goes the argument, we’ll be left in peace. In a sense, the United States would be acting as if it had become a member of the European Union, P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 The Transatlantic Trap 377 turning to our transatlantic allies for help in deciding about major interna- tional issues, and acting without the high level of military power the United States now exercises. We would voluntarily renounce our leading role in the world, and let others play a much more significant part. Already the Chinese have three times the troop level of our forces, and the Russians have more nuclear weapons (more than officially declared), so that, were we to disarm to the status of the European powers, then we’d become asubpower. We would be much endangered if we joined the Europeans in weakness. The rivalry of nations would return to something like that of the early part of the twentieth century, with China and Russia in the part of Germany and Japan. We might be able to maintain peace, and we might not. But we’d certainly have to make the attempt in combination with other countries – in a frankly multilateralist way. We could try again to be isolationist, and let others try to preserve the peace, as we did early in the 1930s; and then join with others more directly, as we did later in the 1930s, in our failed attempt to dissuade Hitler and Imperial Japan from war. The choice between these two alternatives is likely to become a critical fault line in American politics. Its fundamental cause is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left America the world’s sole superpower, and so a target and with responsibilities that it alone can shoulder. Thus, history forced us to achoice that has been very hard for our political process to recognize and articulate. But slowly it is emerging, and at this point it appears that some politicians may embrace partial disarmament and multilateralism, turning to the Europeans for support; and others, may embrace preparedness and some form of Strategic Independence. Already the Clinton administration took a large step in the direction of partial disarmament, reducing our military forces under the banner of a peace dividend (declared at the end of the Cold War) to be directed toward domestic concerns. The result is a force structure that seems more suited to a small America than to one that is asserting dominance, and a force structure that is sorely strained by our involvement in Iraq. Were the American public to divide closely on this issue, the unilateralist position might become untenable – that is, the country requires greater unity of purpose to be dominant than to be one of a group of powers relying very much on others. So if the controversy over which way we should go becomes too intense, then we will lack a key condition for being the world’s sole superpower. Put differently, unilateralists have to win the national debate on our direction in the world by a larger margin than multilateralists if their position is to prevail. So a unilateralist presidential candidate has to P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 378 Leading Toward Peace make a better case; has to be more articulate and persuasive, than his or her opponent. Is this likely? The present president is having difficulty measuring up to the challenge – not of the policy he has embraced, but of persuading his countrymen and women of its correctness. AN INDEPENDENT AMERICA America has attempted to follow the multilateralist prescription. Secretary of State Colin Powell tried to sponsor a multilateral approach to the Iraq issue, but was undermined by the French position and by opposition of other nations partly driven by the financial incentives offered by Saddam Hussein. The core of the French position was a desire to drivea wedge between Europe and the United States in the interest of European unity. Hidden agendas of this sort make the United Nations ordinarily an impossible mechanism for multilateralism for America. Still, we often accept a role continually being thrust on us by others, the world’s policeman, making peace and keeping peace in the trouble spots of the world. We often have difficulty refusing demands to intervene in a scene of turmoil, but it must be done very sparingly, since our own interests are not directly involved, since there are usually neighboring nations who should intervene, and since too many of these involvements can stretch our forces and the attention of our leaders so much that we cannot effectively pursue our own higher priority concerns. Forustocontinue to pay for military to police the world, and allow others to dictate its use, makes the United States an instrument of the interests of others. It’s the worst solution for our country. And we are finding ourselves in exactly that position. Why, for example, are American troops still in Kosovo? Whydoesn’t the European Union take over this pacification role in its own backyard? Our continued involvement in Kosovo shows our willingness to play the international sucker. If we chose to strengthen ourselves and avoid being victimized by oth- ers, then Strategic Independence is our best strategic posture because it leaves us in charge of the use of our own capabilities. If we disarm, then multilateralism is appropriate. But to keep armed and allow others to dic- tate our policy is to get the worst of both worlds – that we won’t be permitted by others to defend ourselves, and yet that we make ourselves a target by our continual interventions which others will require when it’s in their interests (as for example in Bosnia and Kosovo). An America that declines the multinational fetters in which Europe wishes to bind it, need not be alone as a result. An America that adopts Strategic P1: FCW 0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18 The Transatlantic Trap 379 Independence, and so eschews multilateralism at the highest levels of deci- sion, will still want to act multinationally most of the time. When the United States stayed out of the League of Nations at the end of World War I, it was to preserve independence in decision but not in action. We should decide after consultation with others what it is necessary for us to do in our own defense, but we must decide independently; we should act multi- laterally, via security cooperation, if at all possible. That is, we will not be bound by decisions of others, but we will act with them. The Bush admin- istration has been ineffective in making this distinction convincing in the debate over the Second Gulf War although it has often tried to articulate it persuasively. We could choose to be fully multinationalist, as many urge on us, ceding decision making as well as tactical cooperation to a multilateralist process. Indeed, we’d have no other choice if we were no longer the dominant power. George Washington advised our nation to “avoid entangling alliances.” The modern variant is “entangling multilateralism” including the United Nations, which is behind multiple efforts to dilute American influence but retain influence over the use of American power. For example, the United Nations now seeks to expand Security Council membership, reducing our role, a proposal that draws strong support from some American commen- tators. “ [T]he United States,” wrote Walter Russell Mead, “has spent more time and energy resenting the inadequacies of the current interna- tional architecture than in leading the way to its renewal. We should be moving to promote the restructuring and reform of the United Nations. We should be seeking dynamic and flexible single-purpose and regional institutions. Ideally, the United States should support the candidacies of Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Germany, Indonesia, and Japan to permanent, veto-wielding seats on the Security Council. It would be harder to get a consensus but when a consen- sus was achieved, it would be seen as a much more legitimate and binding expression of the global political will than anything the Security Council can now produce.” 30 It’s hard toimagine a proposalmorelikely to lead tothefurther embarrass- ment of the United States in world politics and to handing more influence over the employment of American power to other nations. The Commis- sioner of the United Kingdom to the UN, commented on the British Broad- casting System on July 21, 2004, “It’s silly to talk about the UN as if it had aseparate existence from the great powers.” Yet idealists of multilateralism do just that. [...]... better protection of supply columns The Iraqi war has had its effect on the opinions of others America’s demonstration of the reality of the Revolution in Military Affairs has persuaded the Chinese, probably among others, that China cannot win a conventional war against the United States outside mainland China This is exactly the opposite of the military situation prevailing at the time of the Korean War... liberal establishment (with the EU as its ally) and the rapidly growing part of our business community (especially WalMart) who have investments in China – all ensconced in the public culture; on the other side the current administration, the military-industrial complex, the Japan and Taiwan-oriented part of the American business community (the old “China lobby) now estranged from the public culture; and... Strategic Independence requires that United States should cease trying to cogovern with others including the United Nations and the European Union As a substitute, we should co-coordinate The difference is that we are compelled to seek consensus in the first instance, risking the kind of obstructionism we encountered with Iraq, but can operate independently in the latter case The advantage of co-coordination... underreach in the current international situation 7: 18 P1: FCW 052 185 7449c17 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85 744 9 November 6, 2006 seventeen The Middle Course We are living in contentious era of probes and provocations without the ideological crispness of the Cold War There will be a new wave of dominance seeking in various regions of the world, and clashes over the control of natural... way to adjust to these changes Maintaining the status quo is a likely recipe for war caused by frustrating growing powers Hence, the United States should sponsor change But there is a paradox The necessary changes are likely to strengthen the emerging powers, like China, so that we face the danger of strengthening our adversaries before a conflict and tempting them thereby to conflict via the opportunity... When the autocrat is weak, as were Gorbachev and Yeltsin, opportunism comes to the fore Asset-grabbing (so-called privatization), racketeering (the Russian “mafia”) and countless other swindles become the order of the day Russia’s leaders desire the advantages of Western industrial modernization as they did during the Soviet era, and seek the benefits of partial marketization, but still cling to the authoritarian... FCW 052 185 7449c16 Printer: cupusbw 380 CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85 744 9 November 6, 2006 Leading Toward Peace Further examples are as discouraging The Internet is now run by a committee of private individuals under the oversight of the U.S Department of Commerce The UN wants to displace the United States running it To other countries, according to press reports, the central problem is that [the current... component of wishful thinking The advocates of world government in the present context seem mindless of the corruption and authoritarianism that permeates the world’s governance Do such people really want a majority of countries composed of or pandering to Muslim fundamentalists to determine gender status? Do they want the Chinese communist party, as part of a coalition of countries seeking to limit American. .. other people.”13 The answer to the question of shoulder or shed lies in the suitability of the American nation to leadership in the world Are we are able to be the sole superpower, to act in leadership of the world? Have we the national characteristics to do it? The supreme issue is what role American can play successfully? This formulation of the issue may seem an error to some, who ask if the supreme... realism in American political thinking; Mrs Roosevelt represents the strain of economic and social wishful thinking Both notions play a strong role in American thinking Fortunately they are not inconsistent with one another The proper course for America is to adopt a policy of Strategic Independence as the keystone of our defense, to support economic growth and political freedom abroad, but to reject trying . consensus in the first instance, risking the kind of obstructionism we encountered with Iraq, but can operate independently in the latter case. The advantage of co-coordination is that we can garner the. making peace and keeping peace in the trouble spots of the world. We often have difficulty refusing demands to intervene in a scene of turmoil, but it must be done very sparingly, since our own interests are. All talk of the sanctity of international law, the legitimacy of the United Nations, and the moral imperative of multilateralism is simply the implementation of a strategy of this sort. The European