Hernandez, Martinez, & Kohnert, 2000; Illes et al., 1999; Kim, Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997; Paradis, 1999; Perani et al., 1998). This research suggests that the notion of a localized language faculty described by the minimalist program is not viable. Such a large lateral region of the cerebral cortex is in - volved in language processing that we cannot even state that the left hemi - sphere is the “language center” with much accuracy (Bhatnagar et al., 2000; Ojemann, 1983). As Fabbro (2001) reported, the right hemisphere “is cru - cially involved in the processing of pragmatic aspects of language use,” espe - cially during second-language learning (p. 214). Fabbro also noted that “when a second language is learned formally and mainly used at school, it ap - parently tends to be more widely represented in the cerebral cortex than the first language, whereas if it is acquired informally, as usually happens with the first language, it is more likely to involve subcortical structures (basal ganglia and cerebellum)” (p. 214). These findings are supported by a variety of studies of children who at birth were diagnosed as having one diseased hemisphere that would lead to death if left alone. In some cases, the entire left hemisphere was removed, but these children nevertheless developed language function with only minor deficits (Day & Ulatowska, 1979; Dennis & Kohn, 1975; Dennis & Whitaker, 1976; Kohn, 1980). The right hemisphere “rewired” itself to assume responsibility for language processing. Also worth noting is that neurological language function differs from person to person to a significant degree even among monolinguals. When people undergo surgery to remove brain tumors, the operation must be per- formed with the patient awake so that the medical team can map the loca- tions of the various language areas by asking him or her to respond orally to questions. If the language faculty is a bodily organ, as Chomsky (1995, 2000) argued, it seems reasonable to expect it to be located pretty much in the same place for everyone. In this light, the assessment of the Society for Neuroscience takes on added significance: “The neural basis for language is not fully understood” (2002, p. 19). Certainly, one could claim that a theory of grammar or a theory of language does not need to be congruent with the findings in medicine and neurosci - ence, but is any theory relevant that is lacking empirical validation? Conse - quently, Chomsky’s (1995, 2000) claim for a centralized language function—a “biological organ,”as he called it (2000, p. 117)—appears insup - portable. Unless evidence to the contrary emerges through brain research, we are left to conclude that “language faculty” is, at best, a poor choice of words to describe an array of cognitive processes that together allow us to produce and process language. NOAM CHOMSKY AND GRAMMAR 193 194 CHAPTER 5 Acquisition and Innateness When discussing the MP’s model of language acquisition, we saw that our un - derstanding of how children acquire language is based on the claim that chil - dren develop language even though they experience impoverished input, qualitatively and quantitatively deficient. This claim is so powerful that it has shaped the majority of all research and thought associated with acquisition. But just what is the basis for this claim? Relatively few studies have investi - gated this facet of language acquisition, and they report little evidence to sup - port the poverty of stimulus model. Pullum (1996) and Sampson (1997), for example, found no indication that parental language was deficient in any re - spect. Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1977) reported that “the speech of mothers to children is unswervingly well formed. Only one utterance out of 1,500 spoken to the children was a disfluency” (p. 89). Hendriks (2004) con- cluded after reviewing various studies that “the language input to the child seems to be neither ‘degenerate’ nor ‘meager’” (p. 2). Perhaps this conclusion would be obvious to anyone who is a parent or who has observed parents, other adults, and children interacting, for even a casual assessment indicates that par- ents and other adults talk to children frequently and clearly. Indeed, a variety of research leads one to suspect that some sort of biological imperative is at work, motivating parents not only to immerse infants in language but also to modify intonation and rhythm to ensure that each utterance is articulated clearly (e.g., Fernald, 1994; Fernald, Swingley, & Pinto, 2001). The difficulty here is subtle. The MP’s universal grammar was proposed, in part, to solve the logical problem created by the poverty of stimulus assump- tion. If this assumption is false—or at least unsupported by the data—the ratio- nale for universal grammar becomes questionable. Whether language is the product of universal cognitive processes rather than a specific faculty with a universal grammar again becomes an important issue. In the next chapter, we look more closely at language acquisition, but at this point we should note that alternatives to Chomsky’s formalist model do exist. Rumelhart and McClelland (1986), for example, suggested that lan - guage acquisition is linked to the human talent for pattern recognition, not to any innate device related to grammar. Grammar, from any perspective, is a pattern of word combinations. Chomsky’s (1995) argument is that our ability to internalize this pattern and use it to produce language is not only specific but also distinct from all other pattern-recognition processes. In this view, language represents a perfect system fundamentally different from all other mental faculties (Chomsky, 2000). Generally, human mental abilities are understood to have evolved through a process of natural selection. How the language faculty could develop in isola - NOAM CHOMSKY AND GRAMMAR 195 tion from other mental faculties, therefore, is a bit of a mystery. Language is, as far as we know, a relatively recent phenomenon, having emerged between 100,000 and 40,000 years ago. Chomsky (1972), Gould (1991), and others ar - gued on this basis that there was insufficient time for language to evolve as an adaptation through natural selection and thus is an exaptation, a term that de - scribes the coopting of previously evolved functions to do new things. How - ever, if Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) are correct, language not only developed through evolutionary processes but also is a specialized adaptation of the general cognitive function of pattern recognition. In this case, language is innate in the same sense that our abilities to recognize patterns and establish cause–effect relations are innate. Calvin (2004), drawing on his work in neurobiology, made a compelling ar - gument that the origin of language was associated with improved planning among early hominids. Planning involves structured thought, particularly with respect to cause–effect relations. For this reason, it was popular a few decades ago to propose that language developed as a result of organized hunting—“un- til it turned out that chimps had all the basic moves without using vocalizations. Now it is supposed that much of the everyday payoff for language has to do with socializing and sexual selection, where ‘verbal grooming’ and gossip be- come important players” (p. 50). In Calvin’s view, the evolution of language is related to general cognitive development through an expanded neocortex, which began with Homo erectus 1.8 million years ago. The cognitive apparatus necessary for language would have significantly predated actual language, if Calvin is correct. Improved socialization and sexual selection had evolutionary consequences that tapped existing abilities. The roots of Chomsky’s (1995) view extend to Plato, who believed that a wide range of human behaviors and attributes were innate. Prior to the 17 th century, virtue, morality, mathematical ability, even the concept of God, were thought to be innate. Failures in virtue or morality, and even disagreements about what con - stituted “the good,” were explained on the basis of functional capacity. The virtu - ous person had a grasp of right and wrong and behaved appropriately, whereas his or her counterpart was deemed to be mentally defective in some way. If we consider language as an innate “perfect system,” we are led ineluctably to the conclusion that the problems in language that we can observe on a daily ba - sis—such as ungrammatical sentences in writing—are the result of a defective functional capacity. A perfectly functioning language faculty would not produce errors. This is difficult terrain. Can we legitimately conclude that the numerous errors we see in speech and writing, particularly that of our students, are the result of defective functional capacity? Would not such a conclusion lead inevitably to another—that many students simply cannot be taught? APPLYING KEY IDEAS Quietly observe adults interacting with infants and toddlers in two or three dif - ferent contexts. Malls and grocery stores won’t be good choices. As best you can, record how the adults use language with the children. What conclusions can you draw from your observations? 196 CHAPTER 5 6 Cognitive Grammar WHAT IS COGNITIVE GRAMMAR? The previous chapter offered an overview of transformational generative gram- mar and the minimalist program, allowing us to examine some of their strengths and weaknesses. T-G grammar was characterized as “formalistic” be- cause it employs a set of rigid rules that must operate in an equally rigid se- quence to produce grammatical sentences. Although the MP is different in many respects, it, too, is formalistic: It has fewer rules, but they operate in much the same fashion as T-G rules. The issue of formalism is important because it led several scholars to ques- tion whether T-G grammar or the minimalist program truly help us understand the nature of language. Recall that Chomsky revolutionized linguistics in 1957 by arguing that language study should reflect a theory of mind. As a result, all modern grammars are concerned with and influenced by studies of cognition to one degree or another. This characteristic is one of the more important factors that differentiate modern grammars from traditional grammar. Although Chomsky laid the groundwork for the connection between grammar and cogni - tion, many would argue that he did not build on this foundation. Some would even argue that his approach is fundamentally flawed: Rather than exploring what the mind can tell us about language, his work has focused on what lan - guage can tell us about the mind. Such an approach may have made sense be - fore technology gave us the means to increase our understanding of the brain’s operations, but is it reasonable today, given the advanced state of science and technology? The answer to this question seems clear when we consider that the minimalist program describes a system of cognitive operations that appear to 197 have little connection to how the brain actually works. On this account, various scholars do not consider Chomskian grammar to be cognitive (Taylor, 2002). We also saw in chapter 5 that the question of meaning cannot be addressed ad - equately in a formalist grammar. Meaning, when considered at all, is understood to reside in mentalese, the lexicon, or the sentence. Neither T-G grammar nor the MP take into account that we use language to communicate with other people in a meaningful context. We might be able to claim that meaning resides in sentences if we limit our understanding to example sentences that lack a context, but we cannot do so if we are to consider actual language use. People frequently do not say what they mean, and they often construe statements in ways that are different from what was intended. It seems reasonable to propose that any viable study of language and grammar should take these factors into account. These issues have troubled some linguists for years, motivating them to seek an alternative to Chomskian formalism. A significant step forward occurred in the 1980s when Ronald Langacker, a linguist, and David Rumelhart, a cognitive scien- tist, came into contact at the University of California, San Diego. What emerged in two important books by Langacker (1987, 1990) was cognitive grammar. As with the discussion of transformational grammar and the minimalist pro- gram in the previous chapter, what follows necessarily is an overview rather than an in-depth analysis. This chapter aims merely to present some of the more important principles of cognitive grammar. It is crucial to note at the outset that cognitive grammar does not consist of a new set of grammar rules. Nor does it involve new sentence diagrams, new classifications, or new grammatical anal- yses. Instead, cognitive grammar involves a new way of looking at language and its relation to mind. The sections that follow examine what this means. MODULARITY Transformational-generative grammar and the minimalist program emphasize formal rules and treat language as a self-contained system that is largely unre - lated to other cognitive operations and mental capacities. This approach is based on the idea that the brain is modular, divided into discrete processing units that function independently of one another. There is no doubt that the brain is modular to a significant degree. For example, the senses—sight, hear - ing, smell, and taste—operate as independent modular systems. Whether lan - guage also is modular, however, is controversial and uncertain (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Calabretta, Nolfi, Parisi, & Wagner, 2000; Carruthers & Chamberlain, 2000; Chomsky, 2000; Fodor, 1983). Cognitive grammar accepts a limited view of modularity, proposing that language is intricately connected to other cognitive functions and is an impor - 198 CHAPTER 6 tant part of the social, cultural, biological, and psychological dimensions of hu - man existence. Language processing is recognized as involving a complex interaction among different areas of the brain—the temporal lobe associated with receptive speech, the parietal lobe with writing, the frontal lobes with mo - tor speech, and so forth. Consequently, language is deemed to be embedded in a variety of interconnected cognitive operations and is necessarily influenced by them. As mentioned in the previous chapter, we can see this interconnectivity through brain imaging, but we don’t need to rely exclusively on technology here: We need only consider how a person’s emotional state affects language. 1 Thus, cognitive grammar strives to explain language and its structure in terms of both brain function and communication. Lamb (1998), for example, noted that all cognitive activity, including language, consists of complex patterns of neural firing and inhibition, like switches turning on and off. Attempts to de- scribe these patterns in terms of rules and transformations, Lamb noted, seem farfetched. He argued that the study of grammar and language should be linked to the study of neurocognitive processes. As we see later in this chapter, this approach lends itself to helping us understand some of the problems we encounter when teaching language. DETERMINING MEANING Recall that T-G grammar and the MP maintain that language is computational and compositional; a cognitive mechanism performs various language opera- tions, such as inducing grammar rules and combining small linguistic units into larger ones. On this account, the language module is said to consist of submodules that are responsible for a range of different processes. Computa- tion is related to the idea that language—specifically, grammar—is largely in- dependent of language use. In T-G grammar, for example, the language acquisition device induces the rules of the grammar with minimal input; in the MP, universal grammar is innate, and input does nothing more than set certain parameters. Also, both T-G grammar and the MP deal with example sentences rather than utterances. Neither addresses the fact that such sentences lack a context that includes someone with an intention to communicate a message to someone with the ability to understand (or misunderstand) the message, and neither makes any attempt to examine units of discourse beyond the sentence. The idea of independence is especially problematic for those of us who teach reading, writing, and speaking because it does not consider issues of rhet - oric. Chomsky’s approach to grammar always has been plagued by his ambiva - COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 199 1 Emotions involve several areas of the brain, especially the limbic system and the frontal lobes. lence and ambiguity regarding meaning. In Syntactic Structures, he noted that transformational grammar “was completely formal and non-semantic” (1957, p. 93). None of his work with grammar has considered language’s rhetorical di - mension. As teachers, we need to be able to draw on theory and research to in - form our work with students. We need tools that allow us to understand more clearly how students use language, the nature of their errors, and how to help them become more proficient readers and writers. Language as a Social Action: Metaphor and Symbol Cognitive grammar, much like rhetoric, views language as a social action. Meaning, therefore, emerges out of language in a social context and is usage based. More often than not, the language we use is metaphorical and symbolic, for we rarely assign a literal meaning to our words. This concept is not particularly difficult, but it creates significant problems for the idea of compositionality, at least in its strict sense. Let’s take a simple word like run. Compositionality indicates that we form the word by combining its constituent parts: r+u+n. The result is the word run, but nothing in the pro- cess of composing the word or in the word itself tells us much about the word’s meaning. Without a context, it can mean any number of things, as the following short list of possibilities illustrates: 1. the act of moving swiftly on foot so that both feet leave the ground during each stride 2. a score in baseball 3. a snag in a woman’s stocking 4. a string of good luck 5. a scheduled or regular route 6. to move at a gallop on horseback 7. to retreat 8. to flee 9. to emit pus or mucus 10. to melt On this basis, we see that run is both metaphor and symbol. Processing the meaning of run requires not only that we recognize its symbolism but also what it signifies. Signification, in turn, requires a speaker/writer with an intention to designate one thing in terms of another. Thus, we cannot separate the meaning of the word from the person who uses the word. Equally important, we cannot separate the meaning of the word from the audience. 200 CHAPTER 6 COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 201 The situation becomes more complex as soon as we move from individual words to entire expressions. We can say that someone is cool, and mean, most of the time, something other than a description of body temperature. We can say that someone is hot with a similar effect. Indeed, we can use both expres - sions to describe a single person, as in: • Macarena is cool. • Macarena is hot. Interestingly, these statements are not contradictory but can be easily under - stood as complementary: Macarena’s coolness may, in fact, make her hot, and vice versa. With these and countless other statements, the meaning cannot readily be calculated on the basis of the words themselves. Taylor (2002) ex- pressed the problem neatly when he wrote: “complex expressions nearly al- ways have a meaning that is more than, or even at variance with, the meaning that can be computed by combining the meanings of the component parts” (p. 13). The most well-known expressions of this type are idioms, such as The goon kicked the bucket, Rita needs to come down off her high horse, Every- thing’s turning up roses, and so forth. The metaphorical nature of language prompts many cognitive grammarians to argue not only that meaning does not reside in individual words but also that the meaning of individual words is conceptual rather than specific. Conceptual meaning relies on a network of associations for each word that radiate in nu- merous directions. The word tree, for example, designates a generic concept, or category, that serves as a prototype. In isolation, the word means very little. However, its network of associations radiates outward to palm trees, oak trees, maple trees, poplar trees, apple trees, and so on, allowing us to use tree in mean- ingful ways. Especially interesting is the fact that the human mind is so good at identifying and abstracting patterns that we can apply the term tree to catego - ries that have nothing at all to do with natural organisms like apple trees. We ac - cept the sentence diagrams in chapters 4 and 5 as tree diagrams even though they have only one feature in common with actual trees—a branching structure. On this account, we can say that the conceptual nature of meaning in cognitive grammar underscores language as a symbolic system. This approach to meaning allows for a better understanding of the relation among cognition, grammar, and semantics. Function words, such as preposi - tions, provide interesting illustrations: 1. The book was on the table. 2. The book was under the table. 202 CHAPTER 6 Sentences 1 and 2 are grammatically identical, consisting of a noun phrase, a linking verb, and a prepositional phrase. Their opposite meanings result from their conceptually different prepositions, not from their grammar. Our ability to formulate these sentences is based on our ability to establish logical proposi - tions for the mental model of the book and the table through what Fauconnier and Turner (2002) called conceptual blending. Meaning in this case is not re - lated to grammar but to the underlying logical propositions, which define the location of the book with respect to the table. On this basis, cognitive grammar suggests that some language errors, as well as misunderstandings, are related to different experiences, backgrounds, or knowledge. The English prepositions on and in, for example, are notoriously difficult for nonnative speakers of English: We get in a car, but we get on a train, bus, and airplane. Many languages, such as Spanish, have a single preposition (en) that serves as both on and in. As a result, native Spanish speakers will not have different conceptual categories for these prepositions. Teaching the gram- mar of prepositions and prepositional phrases will have only a modest effect on performance because the mental model related to being inside a car, train, or bus does not build the necessary concepts. Teaching Tip An effective strategy at the elementary level, where we find most of our nonna- tive English speakers, is to use pictures to help students visualize (and thereby internalize) the conceptual relations associated with the prepositions “in” and “on.” For vehicles, the conceptual relation involves not only size but also whether the transport is public or private. Thus, we get in small, personal vehi- cles—cars, trucks, SUVs, and mini-vans—but we get on trains, buses, trolleys, and airplanes. When students see the pictures and appropriate example sen - tences underneath, they form mental models of the conceptual relations. Language Is Grounded in Experience Although language appears to be innate in many respects, we cannot say the same about communicative competence, particularly with regard to how we convey and interpret meaning. Cognitive grammar endorses the Lockean per - spective that ideas and meaning are grounded in experience, which varies from person to person. Differences exist because people have different histo - ries. Children, for example, may be born with an innate sense of morality, but it must be developed through input and guidance, which may explain why the first several years of parenting involve intense focus on appropriate versus in - appropriate behavior, on the moral education of the child. The fact that par - ents in all cultures, without any conscious consideration of what they are doing, devote so much attention to helping their children develop language [...]... processing because they do not account for a variety of factors associated with language as a communicative act that conveys meaning Consider the following sentences: 3 The house had a three-car garage 4 The House approved the minimum-wage bill 5 The Louvre and the National house many of the world’s great treasures The meaning of the word house in these sentences derives from our experience with the world Producing... that there are two dominant models of language acquisition, the induction model and the association model The differences between these models is central to cognitive grammar and mark a clear departure from COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 207 formalist approaches Let’s examine the process of acquisition and the two dominant models more closely The Induction Model The question that has fascinated researchers for the. .. device that induces grammar rules from limited and distorted data In this account, for the first 2 years of life, children’s language acquisition device is processing input and developing the grammar rules of the home language There are fits and starts, but then the induction is completed and the child applies those rules consistently The minimalist program focuses on the role of universal grammar in acquisition,... the neural network there are many similar patterns of regularity with numerous overlapping features, and these patterns are activated simultaneously by an intention In the case provided (Fig 6.1), the model would propose that the patterns for these 216 CHAPTER 6 two structures coexist in the network owing to the fact that they both appear in speech Whether a person uses one or the other depends not on... to grammar Children use their innate ability to organize the world around them to identify the patterns of regularity the grammar that appear in the language they hear during every waking hour (Williams, 1993) Chomsky (1957, 1965) argued that this process is not possible because language has an infinite possible number of grammatical utterances and that the human brain is incapable of remembering them... merely look for the meaning of the words—we commonly try to recognize and understand the intentions underlying the words With regard to oral discourse, understanding the intentions is often more important than the words themselves Using this analysis, we see that there are two reasons why formalist grammars cannot explain how we understand that sentences 7 and 8 have different meanings: (a) the computational... understood to work Formalist grammars propose that regular past tense is governed by a rule-based submodule When producing a sentence like Fred walked the dog, the submodule is activated; it then takes the verb form to walk from the lexicon and applies something like the following rule: “Add the suffix -ed to the untensed verb.” Irregular verbs are handled differently Between the ages of 2 and 3, we observe... difference here is significant Let’s note first that these patterns begin establishing themselves at birth.5 When children encounter the world, their parents and other adults provide them with the names of things Children see dogs, for instance, and they immediately are provided the word “dog,” with the result being that they develop a mental image, or model, related to “dog-ness”: four legs, hairy, barks,... the last 50 years is not whether language is grammatical but rather how children grasp the full complexities of grammar with little effort and without being taught Parents and other adults do not teach infants grammar they just talk to them Nevertheless, without any explicit instruction, children can utilize most possible grammatical constructions by age 4 By age 10 or 11, they can utilize all Production... that activates the neural network The network produces logical propositions in the form of images in many instances, Explaining Language Errors 6 We often hear the assertion that people only use 10% of their brain The reality is that people use all their brain all the time, even when sleeping This does not mean, however, that they use it to capacity We find an illustrative analogy in the act of lifting . thing in terms of another. Thus, we cannot separate the meaning of the word from the person who uses the word. Equally important, we cannot separate the meaning of the word from the audience. 200. three-car garage. 4. The House approved the minimum-wage bill. 5. The Louvre and the National house many of the world’s great treasures. The meaning of the word house in these sentences derives. of the home lan- guage. There are fits and starts, but then the induction is completed and the child applies those rules consistently. The minimalist program focuses on the role of universal grammar