allowed to offer evidence of their suitability for early release from INCARCERATION. The strict rules observed in a courtroom do not apply to these hearings, and the board’s decisions must acc- ount for the public interest as well as the rights of the prisoners. FURTHER READINGS Aman, Alfred C., Jr., and William T. Mayton. 2001 Aman and Mayton’s Hornbook on Administrative Law. 2d ed. Eagan, MN: West. Barksdale, Yvette M. 1993. “The Presidency and Adminis- trative Value Selection.” American Univ. Law Review 42. Diver, Colin S. 1987. “The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, Part II: Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Decisionmaking: Commentary: Presidential Powers.” American Univ. Law Review 36. Pierce, Richard J. 2002 (updated 2008). Administrative Law Treatise. 4th ed. Frederick, MD: Aspen. U.S. Government Manual Web site. Available online at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/index (accessed July 3, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Conference of the United States; Adminis- trative Law and Procedure; Bureaucracy; National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. See also entries for specific federal agencies (e.g., Food and Drug Administration). ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD A comprehensive phrase that can refer to any administrative agency but usually means a public agency that holds hearings. An administrative board is usually obligated to represent the PUBLIC INTEREST; courts, in contrast, must remain impartial between the two parties before them. A PAROLE board, for example, holds informal hearings where prison- ers are allowed to offer evidence of their suitability for early release from prison. The strict rules observed in a courtroom do not apply to board hearings like these, and the board’s decision must take into account the public’s interest as well as the prisoner’ s righ ts. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES Created in 1968, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) was a federal independent agency and advisory committee chartered for the purpose of ensuring the fair and efficient administration of various federal agencies. The ACUS studied administrative processes and recommended improvements in the procedures by which federal agencies administered regulatory, benefit, and other gov- ernment programs. It had no power to enact its recommendations into law, or to enforce them once they were enacted, but it did carry great weight in the formulation of procedures and policies of federal administrative agencies. The ACUS consisted of heads of adminis- trative agencies , private lawyers, university professors, various federal officials, and other experts in administrative law and government. These experts collectively conducted continuing studies of selected prob lems that existed in the procedures of federal administrative agencies. The specific charge of ACUS was to harness the experience and judgment of the administrative agency specialists to improve the fairness and effectiveness of administrative procedures and functions. From 1968 to 1995 the ACUS issued approximately two hundred recommendations, the majority of which were at least partially implemented. In 1995 Congress terminated funding for the ACUS, and it ceased operation. FURTHER READINGS “Administrative Conference of the United States” (Sympo- sium). 1998. Arizona State Law Journal 30 (spring). Funk, William. “R.I.P. A.C.U.S.” ABA Network: Adminis- trative & Regulatory Law News. Available online at www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/vol21no2/acus_rip. html (acc essed Mar. 31, 2010). “Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States.” ABA Administrative Procedure Data- base. Available online at www.law.fsu.edu/library/ admin/acus/acustoc.html (accessed Mar. 31, 2010). CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Agency; Administrative Law and Procedure. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION The exercise of professional expertise and judg- ment, as opposed to strict adherence to regulations or statutes, in making a decision or performing official acts or duties. A discretionary action is informal and, therefore, unprotected by the safeguards inher- ent in formal procedure. A public official, for example, has ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION when he or she has the freedom to make a choice among potential courses of action. ABUSE OF DISCRETION is the failure to exercise reasonable judgment or discretion. It might provide a CAUSE OF ACTION for an unconstitutional invasion of rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 108 ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE Administrative law is the body of law that allows for the creation of public regulatory agencies and contains all of the statutes, judicial decisions, and regulations that govern them. It is created by administrative agencies to implement their powers and duties in the form of rules, regulations, orders, and decisions. Administrative procedure constitu- tes the methods and processes before administra- tive agencies, as distinguished from judicial procedure, which applies to courts. The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706) governs the practice and proceed- ings before federal administrative agencies. The procedural rules and regulations of most federal agencies are set forth in the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). The fundamental challenge of administra- tive law is in designing a system of checks that will minimize the risks of bureaucratic arbitrar- iness and overreaching, while preserving for the agencies the flexibility that they need in order to act effectively. Administrative law thus seeks to limit the powers and actions of agencies and to fix their place in U.S. scheme of government and law. It contrasts with traditional notions that the three branches of the U.S. government must be kept separate, that they must not delegate their responsibilities to bureaucrats, and that the formalities of due process must be observed. Separation of Powers The U.S. Constitu tion establishes a three-part system of government, consisting of the Legis- lative Branch, which makes the laws; the EXECUTIVE BRANCH, which carries out or enforces the laws; and the Judicial Branch, which interprets the laws. This system of che cks and balances is designed to keep any one branch from exercising too much power. Administra- tive agencies do not fit neatly into any of the three branches. They are frequently created by the legislature and are sometimes placed in the Executive Branch, but their functions reach into all three areas of government. For example, the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) administers laws governing the registration, offering, and sale of securities, such as stocks and bonds. The SEC formulates laws like a legislature does by writing rules that spell out what disclosures must be made in a PROSPECTUS that descr ibes shares of stock that will be offered for sale. The SEC enforces its rules in the way that the Executive Branch of government does, by prosecuting violators. It can bring disciplinary ac tions against broker-dealers, or it The Securities and Exchange Commission administers laws governing the actions of these traders on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. The SEC is an independent agency that enforces its rules without need for approval from Congress or the executive branch of the government. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 109 can issue stop orders against corporate issuers of securities. The SEC acts as judge and jury when it conducts adjudicatory hearings to determine violations or to prescribe punishment. Although SEC commissioners are appointed by the presi- dent subject to the approval of the Senate, the SEC is an independent agency. It is n ot part of Congress, nor is it part of any executive department. Combining the three functions of govern- ment allows an age ncy to tackle a problem and to get the job done most efficiently, but this combination has not b een accepted without a struggle. Some observers have taken the position that the basic structure of the admini- strative law system is an unconstitutional violation of the principle of the SEPARATION OF POWERS . Delegation of Authority The first issue that is encountered in the study of administrative law concerns the way in which Congress can effectively delegate its legislative power to an administrative agency. Article I, Section I, of the U.S. Constitution provi des that all legislative power is vested in Congress. Despite early resistance, the U.S. Supreme Court gradually accepted the delegation of legislative authority so long as Congress sets clear standards for the administration of the duties in order to limit the scope of agency discretion. With this basic principle as their guide, courts have invalidated laws that grant too much legislative power to an administrative agency. President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT learned just how far the Court would go in allowing the delegation of authority, in two cases that stemmed from his administrative-agency actions to support his NEW DEAL program. The National Industrial Recovery Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq., 40 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. [1933]) authorized the president to prohibit interstate shipments of oil that had been produced in violation of state board rules that attempted to regulate crude -oil production to match consumer demand. The Panam a Refin- ing Company sued to prevent federal officials from enforcing the prohibition, known as the “hot oil” la w (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935]). The U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be unconstitutional. Congress could have passed a law prohibiting interstate shipments of hot oil, but it did not do so; instead, it gave that power to the president. This instance has been called a case of delegation run amok because the law had no clear standards defining when and how the president should use the authority that the statute delegated to him. Four months later, the Court invalidated a criminal prosecution for violation of the Live Poultry Code, an unfair-competition law that President Roosevelt had signed in 1934 pur- suant to another section of the National Industrial Recov ery Act. This was the case of Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935). The problem in this case was not that the delegation of authority was ill-defined, but that it seemed limitless. The president was given the authority to “formulate codes of fair competition” for any industry if these codes would “tend to effectuate the policy” of the law. Comprehensive codes were created, establishing an elaborate regula- tion of prices, minimum wages, and maximum hours for different kinds of businesses. But there were no procedural safeguards from arbitrariness or abuses by enforcement agencies. Someone who was charged with a violation was not given the right to notice of the charges, the right to be heard at an agency hearing, or the right to challenge the agency’s determination in a lawsuit. The Court struck this law down, stating that the unfair procedures helped strong indus- trial groups to use these codes to improve their commercial advantage over small producers. As a result of Panam a Refining and Schechter Poultry, when Congress delegates authority to agencies, it also sets out important provisions detailing procedures that protect against arbi- trary administrative actions. Resolving Conflicts of Authority On some occasions, the courts have to deter- mine which agency is the proper body to exercise authority over a certain action. For instance, in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, No. 07-984, 2009 WL 1738643 (2009), the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving the issuance of a permit that would allow a company to dump rock materials into a lake. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers originally issued the permit, but a citizens’ group argued that the ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY was the proper body to issue the permit. The Court determined that the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 110 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE CLEAN WATER ACT, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., had delegated authority in the specific instance presented by the case to the Corps of Engineers. Due Process of Law The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guaran- tee that the federal governmen t and the state governments, respectively, will not deprive a person of his or her life, liberty, or property without DUE PROCESS OF LAW. An administrative agency thus may not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without providing that person with a reasonable opportunity, appro- priate under the circumstances, to challenge the agency’s action. People must be given fair warning of the limits that an agency will place on their actions, federal courts routinely uphold very broad delegations of authority. When reviewing administrative agency actions, courts ask whether the agency afforded those under its jurisdiction due process of law as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has held it improper for a state agency to den y w elfare benefits to applicants who meet the conditions for entitlement to those benefits as defined by the legislature. The state must afford due process (in these cases, an oral hearing) before it can terminate benefits (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 [1970]). Likewise, when a state grants all child- ren the right to attend public schools and establishes rules specifying the grounds for suspension, it cannot suspend a given student for alleged misconduct without affording the student at least a limited prior hearing (Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 [1975]). Political Controls over Agency Action: Legislative and Executive Oversight Government institutions that set and enforce PUBLIC POLICY must be politically accountable to the electorate. When the legislature delegates broad lawmaking powers to an administrative agency, the popular control provided by direct election of decision makers is absent, but this does not mean that administrative agencies are free from political accountability. In many areas, policy oversight by elected officials in the legisl ature or the Executive Branch is a more important che ck on agency power than is JUDICIAL REVIEW. Federal agencies are dependent upon Con- gress and the president for their budgets and operating authority. An agency that loses the support of these bodies or overstep s the bounds of political acceptability may be subjected to radical restructuring. In the 1970s the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) took the politically unpopular position of promoting NUCLEAR POWER , while underemphasizing safety and environmental protection. It paid the price when some of its promotional functions were transferred to a newly created DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY , and the AEC was restructured into the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, which was responsible for the former agency’s regulatory duties. Federal administrative agencies must be responsive to legislative and executive oversight mechanisms. During the 1970s many members of Congress began to feel that the normal process of legislation was too cumbersome for effective control of administrative action. They devised a solution called the legislative VETO. Legislative vetoes took a variety of forms, but most of them directed agencies to transmit final administrative rules to Congress for review before they became effective. Just as this approach was gaining in popularity and use, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. This ruling involved the IMMIGRATION and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.), which allowed either house of Congress to nullify a decision by the attorney general suspending DEPORTATION of an alien. Jagdish Rai Chadha brought suit when the House of Representatives exercised this power in his case. The Court held, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983), that the legislative veto was essentially a one-house ve t o, and therefore it violated Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution, which states that no legislation is valid unless passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the president (or, if the president vetoes it, repassed by two-thirds of each house). The Court said that in Chadha, the House veto of the attorney general’s decision was a legislative action, and therefore Article I, Section 7, applied. The Chadha decision invalidated all of the nearly 200 legislative-veto provisions that were on the books. Another important legislative-oversight mech- anism is the annual appropriations process. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 111 Congress determines the budget and appro- priates money for the vari ous adm inistrati ve agencies. An administrative agency that angers Congress,orakeymemberofeitherhouse, could find itself with less money to work with in the next year, or could even see certain programs eliminated. A legislature may also enact a SUNSET PROVISION, which provides for automatic termination of an agency after a stated time unless the legislature is convinced that the need for the agency continues. Sometimes, a sunset provision is written into the statute that creates a particular agency, but a general sunset law may terminate any agency that cannot periodically demonstrate its effectiveness. A useful agency can always be revived or retained by the enactment of a new statute. Like Congress, the president uses a variety of powers and techniques to oversee and influence the operations of administrative agencies. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution (art. II, §2, cl. 2) states that the president may generally appoint all “officers of the United States,” with the ADVICE AND CONSENT of the Senate. Under the authority of this provision, presidents often appoint agency heads who share their political agenda. The president’s power to remove an agency head depends on whether the agency is an indepen- dent agency or a cabinet department. Indepen- dent agencies tend to be multimember boards and commissions, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC), and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB), which are run by officials who are appointed for a fixed period that does not correspond to the president’s term of office. There also may be statutes protecting the commissioners from arbitrary removal during their terms of office. The heads of cabinet-level agencies, called secretaries, serve at the pleasure of the president and may be removed at any time. Appointments of cabinet secretaries must be confirmed by the Senate. The president also reviews agency budgets, through the OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB). A president’s disapproval of agency initiatives can block appropriations in Congress. The president may also use an EXECUTIVE ORDER,a formal directive, to direct federal agencies or officials. One technique that has been used frequently is the president’s authority to modify the organizational structure of t he BUREAUCRACY. Under the Executive Reorganization Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912), the president may submit a REORGANIZATION PLAN to Congress, transferring functions from one department to another. This law recognizes that although responsibility for the organization and structure of the Execu- tive Branch is vested in Congress, the president needs flexibility to carry out executive duties. Public opinion is another forceful weap on against unbridled agency action. Some jurisdic- tions of the United States have created speci al public offices to investigate complaints about administrative misconduct. Investigators hold- ing these offices, called ombudsmen, usually have broad authority to evaluate individual complaints, to intercede on behalf of belea- guered victims of red tape, and to make reports or recommendations. The Development of Administrative Procedure Law Administrative agencies were established to do the government’s work in a simpler and more direct manner than the legislature could do by enacting a law or the courts could do by applying that law in various cases. Because they pursue their actions less formally, agencies do not follow the CIVIL PROCEDURE that is set up for courts. Instead, the law of administrative procedure has developed to ensure that agencies do not abuse their authority even though they use simplified proce dures. Although administrative agencies have existed since the founding of the United States, the early twentieth century saw a growth in the number of agencies that were designed to address new problems. During the Great Depression, a host of new agencies sprang up to meet economic challenges. Antagonism toward bureaucracy increased as existing dis- satisfactions were multiplied by the number of new bureau crats. In 1939 President Roosevelt appointed a committee to investigate the need for procedural reform in the field of adminis- trative law. Although the comprehensive and scholarly report of that committee was not enacted into law, a later version of it was enacted in 1946 when Congress unanimously passed the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S. C.A. §§ 551-706) (APA). The statute made agencies’ methods fairer so that there would be less reason to object to them. It also limited the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 112 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE power of the courts to review agency actions and to overturn them. Judicial review of agency action furnishes an important set of controls on administrative behavior. Unlike the political oversight controls, which generally influence entire programs or basic policies, judicial review regularly operates to provide relief for the individual person who is harmed by a particular agency decision. Judicial review has evolved over a period of years into a complex system of statu tory, constitutional, and judicial doctrines that define the proper BOUNDARIES of this system of oversight. The trend of judicial decisions and the Administrative Procedure Act is to make judicial review more widely and easily available. How far can a court go in examining an agency decision? The reviewing court may be completely precluded from testing the merits of an agency action, or it ma y be free to decide the issues DE NOVO, that is, without deference to the agency’s determination. In general, administra- tive agencies make either formal or informal decisions, and courts have different standards for reviewing each type. Informal Agency Action Most of the work done by agencies is accomplished with informal procedures. For example , a person who applies for a driver’s license does not need or want a full trial in court in order to be found qualified. So long as the motor vehicle department follows standard, fair procedures, and processes the application promptly, most people will be happy. Agencies take informal action in a variety of settings. The SOCIAL SECURITY Administration reviewsoverfourmillionclaimsforbenefits annually, holding hearings or answ ering chal- lenges to their decisions in only a small number of cases. Most transmitter applic ations before the Federal Communications Commis- sion are approved or disapproved without any formal action. The INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE processes most tax returns without formal proceedings. It also will provide informal opinions to help people avoid making costly mistakes in their financial planning. Anyone who objects to the informal deci- sions made by a government agency can invoke more formal procedures. Someone may believe that standards are unclear and that they should be promulgated through formal agency rule making. Or someone may feel that the decision in a particular case is unfair and may demand a formal adjudicatory hearing. If one of these formal procedures does not satisfy a party, the agency’s decision may be challenged in court. Formal Agency Action Most formal action taken by administrative agencies consists of rule making or adjudication. Rule making is the agency’s formulation of policy that will apply in the future to everyone who is affected by the agency’s activities. Adjudication is for the agency what a trial is for the courts: It applies the agency’s policies to some act that already has been done, so that an order is issued for or against a party who appears for a decision. Rule making looks to the future; adjudication looks at the past. Where either of these formal procedures is used, the agency will usually give interested or affected persons notice and an opportunity to be heard before a final rule or order is issued. Rule making Administrative agencies pro- mulgate three types of rules: procedural, interpretative, and legislative. Procedural rules identify the agency’s organization and methods of operation. Interpretative rules are issued to show how the agency intends to apply the law. They range from in formal policy statements announced in a press release to authoritative rules that bind the agency in the future and are issued only after the agency has given the public an opportunity to be heard on the subject. Legislative rules are like statutes enacted by a legislature. Agencies can promulgate legislative rules only if the legislature has given them this authority. Employees of the Internal Revenue Service process tax returns using informal procedures that make their jobs easier and less time- consuming. If a taxpayer objects to a decision made in this way, he or she may initiate more formal review procedures. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 113 The Administrative Procedure Act sets up the procedures to be followed for administra- tive rule making. Before adopting a rule, a federal agency generally must publish advance notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER, the govern- ment’s daily publication for federal agencies. Most states have similar publication require- ments. This practice gives those who have an interest in, or are affected by, a proposed rule the opportunity to partic ipate in the decision making by submitting written data or by offering views or arguments orally or in writing. Before a rule is adopted in its final form, and 30 days before its effective date, the agency must publish it in the Federal Register. Formally adopted rules are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, a set of paperback books that the government publishes each year so that rules are readily available to the public. Adjudication The procedures that admin- istrative agencies use to adjudicate individual claims or cases are diverse. Like trials, these hearings resolve disputed questions of fact, determining policy in a specific factual sett- ing and ordering compliance with laws and regulations. Although often not as formal as courtroom trials, administrative hearings are extremely important. Far more hearings are held before agencies every year than are trials in courts. Adjudicative hearings concern a variety of subjects, such as individual claims for worker’s compensation, welfare, or Social Security benefits, in addition to multimillion- dollar disputes about whether busines s mergers will violate antitrust rulings. These proceedings may be called hearings, adjudications, or adju- dicatory proceedings. Their final disposition is called an administrative order. Many administrative proceedings appear to be just like courtroom trials. Most are open to the public and are conducted in an orderly and dignified manner. Typically, a proceeding begins with a complaint filed by the agency, much as a civil trial begins with a complaint prepared by the PLAINTIFF. After the RESPONDENT answers, each side may conduct discovery of the other’s evidence and prehearing confer- ences. A HEARING EXAMINER, sometimes called an administrative law judge (ALJ), presides over the hearing, giving rulings in response to a party’s applications for a particular type of relief. The agency presents its evidence, usually through counsel, either by a written report or in the question-and-answer style of a trial, and then the respondent offers his or her case. WITNESSES may be called and cross-examined. The examiner gives a decision, usually with written findings and a written opinion, shortly after the hearing. The Executive Branch of the federal govern- ment employs federal ALJs. When Congress originally enacted the APA, it addressed con- cerns about the relationship between ALJs and their respective agencies by providing indepen- dence to the ALJ. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) makes most of the deci- sions regarding the tenure and compensation of ALJs, and ALJs are exempted from many of the performance reviews that apply to other CIVIL SERVICE employees. An agency may remove an ALJ only for cause and after a hearing conducted by the MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD. Because administrative hearings do not use juries, an ALJ makes both factu al determina- tions and legal decisions based upon the evidence presented and the law governing the dispute. The specific duties of an ALJ in an individual agency depend upon the powers delegated to the agency in the respective ENABLING STATUTE and procedural regulations promulgated by the agency. For instance, the Office of Inspector General is empowered to impose civil penalties against a person who makes false statements or representations with respect to Social Security benefits. Under regulations promulgated by the Social Security Administration (20 C.F.R. § 498.204 [2009]), the ALJ may make a number of decisions regarding the submission of evidence or the examination of witnesses; rule on motions and other procedural matters; and render a SUMMARY JUDGMENT where appropriate. However, the ALJ may not rule as invalid a federal statutory or regulatory provision, enjoin agency officials, or review discretionary acts by the inspector general. An ALJ’s decision is often subject to review by a board or commission of the entire agency before parties may appeal the decision to a federal court. For example, labor disputes governed by the National Labor Relatio ns Act are first heard by ALJs of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The ALJ’s decision may be appealed to the five members of the NLRB for review. Only after review by the NLRB, upon which it renders a decision and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 114 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE issues an opinion, may a party appeal the decision to a U.S. court of appeals. Unlike a trial, an administrative hearing has no jury. The hearing examiner, or administra- tive law judge, is usually an expert in the field involved and is likely to be more concerned with overall policies than with the particular merits of one party’s case. The Administrative Procedure Act affords parties who appear in administrative hearings involving federal agen- cies the right to notice of the issues and proceedings, the RIGHT TO COUNSEL , and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Judicial Review of Agency Actions When individuals believe that they have been the victim of administrative error or wrongdo- ing and seek to have the actions of the responsible agency reviewed in a court of law, the reviewing court is faced with two principal issues: (1) the court must determine whether it has a right to review the agency action, and (2) if the court does, the court must determ ine the scope of that court’s review. The Right to Have a Court Review an Agency’s Decision Whether someone has the right to ask a court to review the actio n taken by an agency depends on the answers to several questions. The first question is whether the person bringing the action has standing (i.e., the LEGAL RIGHT ) to bring the suit. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act allows court review for any person who is adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. When the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed section 702 in Associa- tion of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970), the Court said that for the plaintiff to have standing to seek judicial review of adminis- trative action, two questions must be answered affirmatively: (1) Has the complainant alleged an “injury in fact”?; and (2) Is the interest that the complainant seeks to protect “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question”? Even though an agency’s decision is review- able and the plaintiff has standing to litigate, the plaintiff still may be unable to obtain judicial review if he or she has brou ght the action at the wrong time. The aggrieved person must exhaust all other avenues of relief before the dispute is ripe for judicial determination. The doctrines of EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES and RIPENESS require a person who deals with an agency to follow patiently all of the available steps within the agency’s procedures before resorting to court action. These rules are essential to prevent overloading the courts with questions that might not even be disputes by the time the agencies determine what their final orders or rulings will be. The Scope of a Court’sReview If an AGGRIEVED PARTY can convince a court that he or she has standing, that all available administrative reme- dies have been exhausted, and that the case is ripe for judicial review, the court will hear the case, but the scope of its review is limited. The law seeks to give agencies enough freedom of action to do their work, while ensuring that individual rights will be protected. The Admin- istrative Proced ure Act provides that courts may not second-guess agencies when the agencies are exercising discretion that has been granted to them by statute. A court is generally limited to asking whether the agency went outside the authority granted to it; whether it followed proper procedures in reaching its decision; and whether the decision is so clearly wrong that it must be SET ASIDE. The court also may set aside an agency decision that is clearly wrong. The court usually will accept the agency’s findings of fact, but it is free to determine how the law will be applied to those facts. It will look at the whole record of the administrative proceeding and will take into account the agency’s expertise in the matter. The court will not upset agency decisions for harmless errors that do not change the outcome of the case. If the question at issue has been committed to agency discretion, the court may consider whether the agency has exercised its discretion. If the agency has not done so, then the court may order the agency to look at the situat ion and make a decision. The Administrative Procedure Act allows courts to OVERRULE an agency action that is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an ABUSE OF DISCRETION, or otherwise not in accor- dance with law.” FURTHER READINGS Aman, Alfred C., and William Mayton. 2001. Administrative Law. 2d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group Beerman, Jack M. 2006. Administrative Law. New York: Aspen. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 115 Lubbers, Jeffrey S., ed. 2003. Developments in Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice (annual). Chicago, Ill.: Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association. Mezines, Basil J., Jacob A. Stein, and Jules Gruff. 2009. Administrative Law. New York: Matthew Bender & Co. Rosenbloom, David H. 1997. Public Administration and Law. 2d ed. New York: M. Dekker. Weaver, Russell L., and William D. Araiza. 2006. Adminis- trative Law. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Conference of the United States; Adminis- trative Discretion; Federal Budget; Veto; See also entries for specific federal agencies (e.g., Food and Drug Administration). ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS The Administrative Office of the United States Courts is the administrative headquarters of the federal court system. It was created by congres- sional act on August 7, 1939 (28 U.S.C.A. § 601), and since November 6, 1939, it has tended to the nonjudicial business of the U.S. courts. The Administrative Office helps Congress monitor the state of affairs within the federal judiciary. The Administrative Office arranges clerical and administrative support to federal district courts and their subdivisions, and it provides for the various benefits available to the federal judiciary. Furthermore, by gathering and analyzing statis- tics and data and reporting the findings to Congress and the JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES , the Administrative Office plays an important part in determining the extent and character of the very support it provides. The Director The director of the Administrative Office is the administrative officer of all the federal courts except the Supreme Court. The Judicial Confer- ence of the United States—the federal agency charged with overseeing federal judicial matters— supervises and guides the director’swork.The director and the deputy director are appointed by the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. The director is required to perform a variety of tasks. First and foremost, the director must supervise all administrative matters relating to the offices of clerks and other clerical and administrative personnel of the federal courts. These administrative matters can range from performance policies and pay scales to guide- lines on clerical procedures. The director is charged with providing many reports to various governmental bodies. With the aid of the deputy director and the Audit Office and other operatives, the director must examine court dockets, determine the needs of the various courts, and report the results four times per year to the chief judges of the circuits. These reports allow the federal courts to analyze and plan for their own clerical and administrative costs. This information is also used when the director prepares and submits to Congress the budget of the federal courts. The director must submit a report of the Administrative Office to the annual meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States. At least two weeks before the conference, the director prepares an overview of the activities of the Administrative Office and the state of the business of the courts, together with certain statistical data submitted to the chief judges of the circuits. This report also contains the director’s recommendations on administrative efficiency. The director submits the report, data, and recommendat ions to Congress and makes all these materials availa ble to the public. The director is responsible for many finan- cial matters of the federal courts. The director must fix the compensation of employees of the courts whose compensation is not otherwise fixed by law, regulate and pay annuities to the surviving spouses and dependent children of judges, disburse monies appropriated for the maintenance and operation of the federal courts, examine accounts of court officers , regulate travel of judicial personnel, and provide accommodations and supplie s for the courts and their clerical and administrative personnel. The director must also establish and main- tain programs for the certification and utiliza- tion of court interpreters and the provision of special interpretation services in the courts. Other duties may be assigned to the director by the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference of the United States. As of 2009, a total of seven individuals have served as direc tor of the Administrative Office . James C. Duff took over the position in 2006 from Leonidas Ralph Meachum after the latter had served as director for 21 years. Probation Officers The Probation Division of the Administrative Office supervises the accounts and practices of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 116 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS the federal probation offices. However, primary control of probation practices and procedures is left to the district courts served by the probation offices. The Probation Division establishes pre- trial services in the federal district courts according to the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3152). The pretrial service offices report to their respective courts with information on the pretrial release of persons charged with federal offenses. These offices also supervise criminal defendants released to their custody. With the Bureau of Prisons of the DEPART- MENT OF JUSTICE , the Administrative Office publishes the magazine Federal Probation. The magazine, issued four times per year, is a journal “of correctional philosophy and practice.” Bankruptcy Act The Administrative Office has special responsi- bility for BANKRUPTCY courts. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (28 U.S.C.A. § 152) established bankruptcy judges as distinct units of the federal district courts. Under the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, all cases under Title 11 of the United States Code and all proceedings related to federal statute 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 are to be brought before federal district courts. Such a case arises when a person seeks to discharge his or her debts through judicial proceedings. When a suit is filed under Title 11, the federal district court will refer the case to its bankruptcy judges, as authorized by 28 U.S.C.A. § 157. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the federal courts of appeals and serve a 14-year term as judicial officers of the district courts. The number of bankruptcy judges is controlled by Congress, but the bankruptcy courts are overseen by the Administrative Office. The director of the Administrative Office has specific duties related to the ba nkruptcy courts. The director must make recommenda- tions to the Judicial Conference on logistical concerns such as the geographic placement of bankruptcy courts. The director must consider whether additional bankruptcy judges should be recommended to Congress; the director is also in charge of determining the staff needs of bankruptcy judges and clerks. Federal Magistrates Under the Federal Magistrates Act as amended in 1979 (28 U.S.C.A. § 631), the director of the Administrative Office must answer to Congress and the Judicial Conference on the affairs of federal magistrates. Federal magistrates are appointed by federal district court judges, and their job is to reduce each case to its essence before it reaches the district courts. Federal proceedings are expensive; by ruling on pretrial motions and issuing various orders at the pretrial stage, federal magistrates help preserve judicial resources. Federal magistrates do not have the full range of judicial powers available to other federal judges. For example, they cannot preside over FELONY trials. Federal magistrates may conduct civil or MISDEMEANOR criminal trials, but they normally conduct pretrial proceedings in both criminal and civil cases. Owing to their special function, federal magistrates operate separately from the district courts and maintain a separate budget. With the guidance of the Judicial Confer- ence, the director supervises the administrative matters of federal magistrates through the Magistrate Divis ion of the Administrative Of- fice. The director prepares legal and adminis- trative manuals for the use of the magistrates. In addition, the Administrative Office must con- duct surveys of the federal judiciary to ask questions on court conditions. With these surveys, the director makes recommendations as to the number, location, and salaries of magistrates. The expansion of magistrate offices depends significantly on the availability of funds appropriated by Congress. The director of the Administrative Office compiles and evaluates information on the magistrate offices and reports the findings to the Judicial Conference. The director must also report to Congress every year on the general affairs of federal magistrates. Federal Defenders The Administrative Office also assists and oversees the offices of federal public defenders. Under the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A [1964]), the federal district courts are required to appoint counsel to criminal defen- dants who are unable to afford adequate representation. The act also authorizes the district courts to establish federal PUBLIC DEFENDER and federal community defender organizations. Establishing these organizations can be done in districts where at least 200 persons annually GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 117 . 21 years. Probation Officers The Probation Division of the Administrative Office supervises the accounts and practices of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 11 6 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE. Process Clause of the Constitution. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 10 8 ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE Administrative law is the body of law that allows for. limited the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 11 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE power of the courts to review agency actions and to overturn them. Judicial review of agency action