An abstract comprises—or concentrates in itself—the essential qualities of a larger thing— or of several things—in a short, abbreviated form. It differs from a TRANSCRIPT, which is a verbatim copy of the thing itself and is more comprehensive. CROSS REFERENCE Abstract of Title. ABSTRACT OF TITLE A condensed history, taken from public records or documents, of the ownership of a piece of land. An abstract of title, or title abstract, briefly summarizes the various activities affecting ownership of a parcel of land. When a person or business agrees to purchase REAL ESTATE, that person or business arranges for an examination of the history of the property’s title. This examination is known as a TITLE SEARCH. A title search is conducted to determine that the seller of the property in fact owns the property and has a free-and-clear title. A free-and-clear title has no clouds on it, which means that no person or business other than the seller has an interest in, or CLAIM to, the property. The process of det ermining the precise ownership of a piece of land by searching an abstract is complex and laborious. Often, the title abstract does not contain every transaction or proceeding that may affect ownership of the land. The search conductor, or abstractor, usually a trained professional, must verify that the abstract is complete by reviewing recent certifications that the abstract is correct, check- ing for gaps in dates and certification numbers, and ensuring that a proper legal description appears with each entry. The abstractor con- ducts a credit and finances check on all the names appearing in the abstract to see if any of the parties has filed for BANKRUPTCY or has incurred other debts that may have caused a creditor to file a LIEN against the property toward payment of the debt. An abstractor must refer to many different sources to verify that the title to a parcel of land is true and correct. The abstractor verifies the original government survey, which should include gaps and overlaps in land ownership. Given improved technology, surveys have a margin of error of less than one foot. The abstractor must understand the various means of describing the exact BOUNDARIES of a piece of land and must recognize unacceptable methods. Claims on the title to a property are subject to time limitations, but the limitations have certain exceptions. For example, the Forty-Year Law holds that no party with a potential claim that arose over 40 years before can claim an interest in a property of which one person or business has been the recorded owner for at least 40 years. Exceptions are made, however, for those holding mortgages or contracts with terms that span more than 40 years and also for prior interests claimed as school or school district lands, parkland dedications, or the property of religious CORPORATIONS or associations. To perform a title search, the abstractor must obtain a copy of the abstract from the county recorder in the county in which the land is located. Then it takes time to make sense of the document. The accompanying sample abstract of title illustrates typical entries. 1. Entry 1 identifies the land in question. The sample abstract is for platted land, which is land described by lots and blocks. A platted parcel spans a certain number o f feet, on a certain lot, within a certain block, within a certain city. Another method of identifying a parcel of land is by METES AND BOUNDS . For metes and bounds land, a parcel is identified by its boundaries according to their terminal points and angles. Platted descriptions are used in urban areas, and metes and bounds descriptions are used mostly in rural areas. 2. Entry 2 is the original entry. It states the time and place that the U.S. government first conveyed this tract of land to a private individual. The description follows a progression from small to large. The parcel is identified first by its location within a certain section, which is located within a certain township, which is located within a certain range. Each range spans six miles and several townships, and each township contains several sections, which in turn are divided into quarters, which can also be divided into quarters. The last two lines of the right-hand column might read, for example, “Land Office Records, page 100. North 1 4 of Section 36, T. [Township] 32, R. [Range] 22.” The original de scription of any parcel of land comes from the measurements of the original government survey of the nineteenth cen tury. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 38 ABSTRACT OF TITLE 3. Entry 3 is the land patent, or John Doe’s title defense. The land patent is issued by the government to operate as proof of title for the first governmentally recognized owner of the land. The land patent shows the date of the land transfer, the date the patent was filed with the government, the particular book of deeds containing the patent, and the land parcel as de- scribed in the original entry. 4. Entry 4 reveals that John Doe platted his quarter of section 36—that is, he subdivided the land and dedicated it to the public for sale. The beginning of the entry might read, “Plat of Stoneybrook Addition to the City of New Heidelberg.” Note that township 36 has become, or has been incorporated into, what is now New Heidelberg. The entry continues with the date John Doe received approval from the city of New Heidelberg, the date the subdivision was filed with the county, the particular book of plats in which the subdivision is entered, and the original description of the land. The subdivision is entered in the county’s book of plats because New Heidelberg has chosen to identify its land parcels by plats, and not metes and bounds. Other means of identifying land parcels are sometimes employed. Land is sometimes identified by acres in rural areas, and by government lots for land adjacent to meandering lakes, but most of the land in the United States is identified by either plats or metes and bounds. 5. Entry 5 shows that Joh n Doe sold a parcel of the subdivision to Richard ROE.Roe received a WARRANTY DEED, which serves as evidence of Doe’s title. A warranty deed means that Doe has warranted to Roe that Doe is the rightful owner of the land. This type of deed has legal ramifications that benefit the purchaser, here Roe. There are other types of real ESTATE deeds. A purchaser receives a TAX DEED, for example, when he or she buys real estate sold for nonpayment of taxes, and this purchase involves procedures that differ from those of other land purchases. A sheriff’s deed is given to the purchaser of land sold by court order such as in a MORTGAGE FORECLO SU RE , and this transaction also has special legal ramifications for the purchaser. Because the land in the sample abstract is platted, the parcel i s assigned a lot number, within a certain block, within the city of New Heidelberg—for example, this entry might read, “Lot 1, Block E, Stoneybrook Addition to City of New Heidelberg.” The entry also contains infor- mation on when the warranty deed was signed and when it was filed with the county. 6. Entry 6 shows that Richard Roe and Ruth Roe have mortgaged their property to John Smith. With an interest in lot 1 of block E as COLLATERAL,SmithhaspaidfortheRoes’ property, and the Roes have undertaken to repay Smith. The entry shows the date the mortgage agreement was signed and the date the mortgage was filed with the county. The remainder might read, “Book 1 of Mortgages, page 10, to secure $10,000, due January 10, 1910. Lot 1, Block E, Stoneybrook Addition.” 7. Entry 7 shows that John Smith has assigned the mortgage on lot 1, block E, to William White. In other words, Smith has sold to White his mortgagee interest in lot 1, block E. An assignment can occur for any number of reasons, but often it is a sale made to satisfy debts. T his particu lar action is entered in the book of assign- ments in the county seat. 8. Entry 8 shows that Richard Roe and Ruth Roe have paid off, or satisfied, the mortgage (et ux is Latin for “and wife”). This entry is filed in the book of assign- ments in the county seat. 9. Entry 9 reveals that Richard Roe has died. This “ Will and Probate” entry reports that, u pon his death , Roe seeks to transfer ownership of lot 1, block E, in New Heidelberg, to his wife, Ruth Roe. 10. Entry 10 i dentifies Ruth R oe as the sole owner of the parcel. The PROBAT E court, which tends to property matters sur- rounding the death of an individual, has approved the assignment of lot 1, block E, contained in Richard Roe’s will. 11. Entry 11 shows that Ruth Roe has taken out a mortgage on lot 1, block E. She has borrowed money from Samuel Brown, using the real estate as collateral. The entry is identical to the first mortgage agreement with John Smith, entry 6. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ABSTRACT OF TITLE 39 A sample abstract of title Abstract of Title 11. Abstract of Title to north 500 feet, front and rear, of Lot 1 , Block 2 , in NW Addition to the City of New Heidelberg . 22. United States Entry No. 1 . to Dated Jan. 1 , 1889. John Doe. Land Office Records, page 100 . North 1/4 of Section 36 , T. 32 , R. 22 . 23. United States Patent. to Dated Jan. 1, 1889 . John Doe Filed Jan. 1, 1889 . Book 1 of Deeds, Page 100 . North 1/4 of Section 36 , T. 32 , R. 22 . 14. John Doe et al. Plat of Stoneybrook E Addition to the City of New Heidelberg . to Dated Feb. 1, 1889 . The Public. Filed Feb. 1, 1889 . Book 1 of Plats, page 200 . North 1/4 of Section 36 , T. 32 , R. 22 . 25. John Doe, unmarried, Warranty Deed. to Dated Feb. 1, 1890 . Richard Roe. Filed Feb. 1, 1890 . Book 3 of Deeds, page 300 . Lot 1 , Block E , Stoneybrook Addition to City of New Heidelberg . 26. Richard Roe and Mortgage. Ruth Roe, his wife, Dated Feb. 1, 1890 . to Filed Feb. 1, 189 0 . John Smith. Book 1 of Mortgages, page 10 , to secure $10,000 , due January 10, 1910 . Lot 1 , Block E , Stoneybrook Addition. 27. John Smith Assignment of Mortgage No. 6. to Dated Jan. 1, 1895 . William White Filed Jan. 1, 1895 . Book 5 of Assignments, page 100 . 28. William White Satisfaction of No. 6. to Dated Jan. 1, 1910 . Richard Roe et ux. Filed Jan. 1, 1910 . Book 3 of Satisfactions, page 200 . 29. Richard Roe Will and Probate. to Dated July 1, 1915 . Ruth Roe Probate July 1, 1915 . Filed Aug. 1, 1915 . Book 10 of Miscellaneous, page 100 . Testator leaves all of his property, real and personal, to his wife, Ruth Roe. 10. Richard Roe Final Decree. to Probate Court, Munich County. Ruth Roe Dated Aug. 1, 1915 . Filed Aug. 1, 1915 . Book 10 of Miscellaneous, page 300 . Adjudged and decreed that Lot 1 , Block 2 , NW . Addition is hereby assigned to Ruth Roe. 11. Ruth Roe, widow, Mortgage. to Dated Jan. 1, 1920 . Samuel Brown. Filed Jan. 1, 1920 . Book 10 of Mortgages, page 100 , to secure $20,000 , due Jan. 1, 1930 . Lot 1 , Block 2 , NW Addition. 12. Ruth Roe, widow, Foreclosure of No. 11. by Sheriff of Notice of sale, Feb. 1, 1930. County, Affidavit of publication, Feb. 1, 1930 to Proof of service, Feb. 1, 1930. Samuel Brown. Sheriff's certificate of sale, March 1, 1930. Filed March 1, 1930. Book 15 of Miscellaneous, page 300 . Lot 1 , Block 2 , NW Addition, sold March 1, 1930, to Samuel Brown, for $10,000 . [continued] GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 40 ABSTRACT OF TITLE 12. Entry 1 2 reveals that Ruth Roe was unable to make her mortgage payments to Samuel Brown, and Brown has sought payment by exercising his right to force a sale of the property by foreclosing on the mortgage. The FORCED SALE was published in a newspaper. The dates of public notice, the publication AFFIDAVIT, and the service of notice to Roe are all entered in the abstract. The certificate of sale and the date the forced sale was filed with the county are also included. This entry shows that Brown has purchased lot 1 at the resulting sheriff’s sale of the property. The amount Brown paid would depend on the value of the real estate and the amount of the mortgage. The “No. 11” following “Foreclosure of” simply refers to the court document number of the foreclosure. 13. Entry 13 shows that Samuel Brown and Sophy Brown have sold a part of lot 1 to James Jones by QUITCLAIM DEED. Generally, a quitclaim deed transfers title to property without warranties that the title is free and clear. Owing to Ruth Roe’s financial troubles, the Browns are probabl y uncer- tain of their title’s completeness, so they have chosen to sell parts of their lot by quitclaim deed instead of warranty deed. Jones now owns a northern piece of lot 1, block E, of Stoneybrook Addition. 14. Entry 14 shows the taxes paid on the property, except for the current year. An entry of taxes paid is listed every time a tax ASSESSMENT is made or paid in relation to the property of the abstract. Taxes listed in the abstract may include estate taxes, inheritance taxes, capital gains taxes, and local government property taxes. The abstract should include the current amount of these taxes and certification that they have been paid. 15. Entry 15 reveals that, to avoid financial disaster, James Jones has filed bankruptcy. The northe rn piece of lot 1, block E, Stoneybrook Addition, New Heidelberg, is now being used to secure protection from creditors. Jones has given to the bank- ruptcy court a TRUST DEED,whichthecourt retains until Jones has fulfilled his obliga- tions under the financial rehabilitation plan approved by the court. Should Jones default on this arrangement, the court could order a forced sale of the property, with proceeds going to Jones ’s creditors. The land covered by this particular abstract has now been defined; it is a certain northern piece of lot 1 of block E in the Stoneybrook Addition of New Heidelberg. The land to the south of this piece would h ave its own abstract, which would be identical to this abstract up to the point that lot 1 was divided up and part of it sold to Jones. Likewise, the abstract for the adjacent lot 2 on block E would have an abstract identical to this abstract up to the point that John Doe sold to Richard Roe the ne wly platted land of section 36 in township 32, range 22. FURTHER READINGS Galaty, Fillmore, Wellington J. Allaway, and Robert C. Kyle. 2002. Modern Real Estate Practices. 16th ed. Chicago: Dearborn Real Estate Education. Jacobus, Charles J. 1998. Real Estate Law. 2d ed. Florence, KY: South-Western Education. Koenig, R. Harry. 1991. How to Lower Your Property Taxes. New York: Fireside. Abstract of Title 13. Samuel Brown and Quitclaim Deed. Sophy Brown, his wife, Date April 1, 1940 . to Filed April 1, 1940 . James Jones. Book 27 of Deeds, page 100 . North 250 feet, front and rear, of Lot 1 , Block 2 , NW Addition. 14. Taxes paid, except for year 1940, amounting to $15,000. 15. In re James Jones Petition of Debtor for arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, Bankruptcy as amended (§ 301 et seq.) filed Jan. 1, 1950 in U.S. District Court for No. the District of New Hampshire. A sample abstract of title (continued) ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ABSTRACT OF TITLE 41 CROSS REFERENCES Deed; Property Law; Real Property; Recor ding of Land Titles; Tor rens Title System. ABSTRACTION Taking from someone with an intent to injure or defraud. Wrongful abstraction is an unauthorized and illegal withdrawing of funds or an APPROPRI- ATION of someone else’s funds for the taker’s own benefit. It may be a crime under the laws of a state. It is different from embezzlement, which is a crime committed only if the taker had a lawful right to possession of the money when it was first taken. ABUSE Everything that is contrary to good order estab- lished by usa ge. Departure from reasonable use; immoderate or improper use. Physical or mental maltreatment. Misuse. Deception. To wrong in speech, reproach coarsely, dispar- age, revile, and malign. ABUSE EXCUSE Description of efforts by some criminal defendants to negate criminal responsibility by showing that they could not tell right from wrong due to abuse by their spouses or parents. Although this defense is not specifically recognized in substantive criminal law, it has been used successfully in some cases to prove, for example, the insanity defense. Using prior sex ual or other physical abuse as evidence in a criminal defense is largely a result of research regarding mental disorders caused by such abuse. Psychologists and other researchers have identified disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder and battered woman syndrome, as causes for severe emo- tional instability that can lead to violent acts by the victim against his or her abuser. Some writers have advocated more widespread use of such evidence to mitigate the PUNISHMENT of victims who commit violent acts. Other scholars and writers disagree, noting that substantive CRIMINAL LAW does not recognize the ABUSE EXCUSE as a legitimate defense except in some limited circumstances, such as those involving the INSANITY DEFENSE. Harvard law professor ALAN DERSHOWITZ coined the term in his 1994 book, The Abuse Excuse, where he deems the studies regarding psychological disorders caused by abuse as “psychobabble”. Dershowitz and other critics disagree not only with the use of abuse as mitigating evidence of criminal intent, but also with the results of the studies themselve s. According to these critics, especially Dershowitz, the abuse excuse fails to distinguish between the reasons why a person committed a crime and the responsibility for committing the crime. In a few high profile cases during the late 1980s and 1990s, defendants sought to avoid criminal responsibility for their crimes by introducing evidence of prior abuse. In 1989 Lyle and Erik Menendez, ages 21 and 18 respectively, brutally killed their parents in the family’s California home. At their first trial for MURDER in 1993, the brothers’ defense team introduced evidence that the men’s father, Jose Menendez, had sexually abused his sons for a number of years. Because of this abuse, Lyle and Eric, according to the defense, killed their parents out of fear. In raising the evidence of abuse, the defense sought to reduce the conviction from murder to voluntary MANSLAUGHTER. The defense won a victory of sorts when the first trial ended in a HUNG JURY because the jurors could not agree whether the brothers were killers or whether they acted out due to the years of alleged abuse they had suffered. In a second trial in 1995, however, the jury convicted the brothers of first-degree murder notwithstanding the evidence of abuse, and the judge sentenced them to life in prison without the possibility of PAROLE. In 1993 Lorena Bobbitt was indicted for MALICIOUS wounding after cutting off her sleeping husband’s penis during the middle of the night. At her trial, her defense team introduced evidence of a history of sexual and physical abuse committed by the husband, John, against Lorena. Unlike the Menendez case, where the defense conceded that the brothers were criminally responsible for their actions, Lorena’s defense team used the evidence to prove the insanity defense. In 1994 a jury found her not guilty of the crime by reason of insanity. Scholars have noted that the employment of the abuse excuse as a defense is more viable if it is used to prove insanity, which happened in the Lorena Bobbitt case. Commentators have also noted that evidence of prior abuse, whether substantiated or not, has been used in settings other than criminal defense. For instance, a wife may accuse a husband of SEXUAL ABUSE during GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 42 ABSTRACTION DIVORCE proceedings or an adult woman may SUE her father for sexual abuse that allegedly occurred when the woman was a child. FURTHER READINGS Arenella,Peter.1996.“Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 19. Becker, Mary E. 1998. “The Abuse Excuse and Patriarchal Narratives.” Northwestern Univ. Law Review 92, vol. 4. Dershowitz, Alan M. 2000. “Review Essay: Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?” Buffalo Criminal Law Review 3, vol. 2. ABUSE OF DISCRETION A failure to take into proper consideration the facts and law relating to a particular matter; an arbitrary or unreasonable departure from prece- dent and settled judicial custom. Where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding a question, it must do so in a way that is not clearly against logic and the evidence. An improvident exercise of discretion is an error of law and grounds for reversing a decision on APPEAL. It does not, however, necessarily amount to BAD FAITH, intentional wrong, or misconduct by the trial judge. For example, the traditional standard of APPELLATE review for evidence-related questions arising during trial is the “abuse of discretion” standard. Most judicial determin ations are made based on evidence introduced at LEGAL PROCEEDINGS . Evidence may consist of oral TESTIMONY, written testimony, videotapes and sound recordings, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE such as exhibits and business records, and a host of other materials, including voice exemplars, handwriting samples, and blood tests. Before such materials may be introduced into the record at a legal proceeding, the trial court must determine that they satisfy certain criteria govern- ing the admissibility of evidence. At a minimum, the court must find that the evide nce offered is relevant to the legal proceedings. Evidence that bears on a factual or legal issue at s take in a controversy is considered relevant evidence. The relevancy of evidence is typically measured by its PROBATIVE value. Evidence is generally deemed probative if it has a tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable. Evidence that a MURDER DEFENDANT ate spaghetti on the day of the murder might be relevant at trial if spaghetti sauce w as found at the murder scene. Otherwise such evidence would probably be deemed irrelevant and could be excluded from trial if opposing counsel made the proper objection. During many civil and criminal trials, judges rule on hundreds of evidentiary objections lodged by both parties. These rulings are normally snap judgments made in the h eat of battle. Courts must make these decisions quickly to keep the proceedings moving on schedule. For this reason, judges are given wide latitude in making evidentiary rulings and will not be overturned on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the trial judge abused his or her discretion. For example, in a NEGLIGENCE case, a state appellate court ruled that the trial court did not ABUSE its discretion by admitting into evidence a posed accident-scene photograph, even though the photograph depicted a model pedestrian blindly walking into the path of the driver’s vehicle with the pedestrian’s head pointed straight ahead as if she was totally oblivious to the vehicle and other traffic (Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662 [Ky. 2000]). In upholding the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence, the appellate court observed that the photograph was only used to show the pedestrian’s position relative to the vehicle at the time of impact and not to blame the pedestrian for being negligent. The appellate court also noted that the LAWYER objecting to the photograph’sadmissibility was free to remind the jury of its limited relevance during CROSS-EXAMINATION and closing arguments. An appellate court would find that a trial court abused its discretion, however, if it admitted into evidence a photograph without proof that it was authentic (Apter v. Ross, 781 N. E.2d 744 [Ind.App. 2003]). A photograph’s authenticity may be established by a witness’s personal observations that the photograph accu- rately depicts what it purports to depict at the time the photograph was taken. Ordinarily the photographer who took the picture is in the best position to provide such testimony. FURTHER READINGS Cohen, Ruth Bryna. 2000. “Superior Court Affirms Non Pros for Failure to Subpoena Own Witness; Trial Court Did Not Abuse Discretion in Its Application of Civil Procedure Rule 216.” Pennsy lvania L aw Week ly (October 9). Hamblett, Mark. 2001. “Circuit Panel Issues Recusal Guidelines; Says Rakoff Acted Properly In Not Stepping Down.” New York Law Journal (February 26). Riccardi, Michael A. 2002. “Polygraph Evidence OK to Prove Probable Cause, Circuit Judges Say; No Abuse of Discretion in Relying on ‘Lie Detector’ for Limited Purpose.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 29). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ABUSE OF DISCRETION 43 CROSS REFERENCES Appeal; Bad Faith; Error; Evidence; Precedent; Probative; Relevancy. ABUSE OF POWER Improper use of authority by someone who has that authority because he or she holds a public office. ABUSE OF POWER is different from usurpation of power, which is an exercise of authority that the offender does not actually have. ABUSE OF PROCESS The use of legal process to accomplish an unlawful purpose; causing a summons, writ, warrant, mandate, or any other process to issue from a court in order to accomplish some purpose not intended by the law. For example, a grocer rents a small building but complains to the LANDLORD about the inadequate heating system, leaks in the roof, and potholes in the driveway. When the landlord fails to make the required repairs, the grocer decides the property is worth less and deducts $100 a month from his rent payments. The landlord starts a lawsuit to either recover the full amount of rent due or to oust the grocer and regain possession of the premises. The law in their state is fairly clear on the question: A tenant has no right to force a landlord to make repairs by withholding a portion of the rent. The landlord knows that she has a good chance of winning her case, but she also wants to teac h the grocer a lesson. On the first three occasions that the case comes up on the court calendar, the grocer closes his store and appears in court, but the landlord does not show up. On the fourth occasion, the landlord comes to court and wins her case. The grocer, in a separate action for ABUSE OF PROCESS, claims that the landlord is using the court’s power to order him to appear simply to harass him. The court agrees and awards him money damages for lost income and inconvenience. Abuse of process is a wrong committed during the course of LITIGATION. It is a perversion of lawfully issued process and is different from MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, a lawsuit started witho ut any reasonable cause. ABUSIVE Tending to deceive; practicing abuse; prone to ill- treat by coarse, insulting words or harmful acts. Using ill treatment; injurious, improper, hurtful, offensive, reproachful. Using ABUSIVE language, even though offen- sive, is not criminal unless it amounts to fighting words that, by their very utterance, tend to incite an immediate BREACH OF THE PEACE. ABUT To reach; to touch. To touch at the end; be contiguous; join at a border or boundary; terminate on; end at; border on; reach or touch with an end. The term abutting implies a closer proximity than the term adjacent. When referring to real property, abutting means that there is no intervening land between the abutting parcels. Generally, properties that share a common boundary are abutting. A statute may require abutting owners to pay proportional shares of the cost of a street improvement project. v ABZUG, BELLA SAVITSKY Bella Savitsky Abzug served as a Democratic congresswoman in the 1970s and became one of the most outspoken advocates for women’s rights in the United States. After she left Congress in 1976, she remained involved in political and social issues both nationally and internationally. With her raspy voice, New York accent, and trademark floppy hat, Abzug was one of the most recognizable public figures in recent U.S. history. Bella Savitsky was born on July 24, 1920, in New York City and was raised in the Bronx. The daughter of Russian immigrant Jews, her father was a butcher who operated the “Live and Let Live” meat market. As a young girl, she raised and collected money on behalf of Zionism. After she graduated from high school, she attended Hunter College, where she was presi- dent of the student government. Following graduation in 1944, she attended Columbia Law School, where she was the editor of the LAW REVIEW and an outstanding student. In 1946 she married Martin Abzug, who would go on to become a successful stockbroker. After graduating in 1947, Abzug concentrat- ed her legal practice in the fields of LABOR LAW and CIVIL RIGHTS, while also becoming active in left-wing politics. As an ATTORNEY for the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Abzug went to Mississippi in 1950 to argue the APPEAL of Willie McGee, an African American man who had GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 44 ABUSE OF POWER been convicted of raping a white woman. She also defended individuals whom Senator JOSEPH R . MCCARTHY (R-Wisc.) had ACCUSED of Commu- nist subversion. During the 1950s Abzug managed to juggle her legal and political careers, while being a mother to two daughters. In the 1960s Abzug organized opposition to nuclear arms testing by founding Women’s Strike for Peace. In 1970 she was elected as a Democratic congresswoman from New York City. She was an outspoken critic of the VIETNAM WAR and the policies of President RICHARD M. NIXON. After the WATERGATE scandals erupted in 1973, Abzug was the first public official to call for Nixon’s IMPEACHMENT. Although Abzug antagonized many of her male colleagues in Cong ress by insisting on gender equality inside and outside of the Capitol, in 1974 she served as an assistant whip to House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-Mass.). She chaired a subcommittee on government information and individual rights and co-authored the FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT and the PRIVACY Act. Abzug also worked on behalf of the ill-fated EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT , which failed to acquire the necessary number of states for RATIFICATION. A national figure by the mid-1970s, Abzug sought the DEMOCRATIC PARTY nomination for the Senate in 1976. She lost a close race to Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). Several campaigns for New York City mayor and Congress followed, but Abzug never served in elective office again. Despite these defeats, she remained active in efforts for women’s rights. She was president of the National Commission on the Observance of International Women’sYear,cofounderofthe National Women’s Political Caucus, and the founder of the International Women’s Environ- mental and Development Organization. In 1995 she played a major role in a world conference on women’s issues, held in Beijing, China. Abzug remained active in the women ’s movement despite numerous health problems that began in the mid-1980s. She died on March 31, 1998, in New York City following heart surgery. FURTHER READINGS Abzug, Bella S., with Mim Kelber. 1984. Gender Gap: Bella Abzug’s Guide to Political Power for American Women. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Abzug, Bella S. 1972. Bella! Ms. Abzug Goes to Washington. New York: Saturday Review Press. Bella Abzug. AP PHOTOS. Bella Savitsky Abzug 1920–1998 ▼▼ ▼▼ 1920 1995 1970 1945 ❖ ❖ 1920 Born, New York City, NY 1947 Graduated from Columbia University Law School 1961–70 Founded and chaired Women's Strike for Peace 1971–76 Served in the U.S. House of Representatives ◆ 1974 Co-authored Freedom of Information Act; served as assistant whip to House Speaker Tip O'Neill ◆ 1978 Appointed to President Carter's Advisory Committee on Women; fired in 1979 for criticizing Carter ◆ 1984 The Gender Gap published ◆ 1990 Co-founded the Women's Environment and Development Organization ◆ 1995 Led delegation to Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing, China 1998 Died, New York City 1939–1945 World War II 1966 The National Organization for Women (NOW) founded ◆ ◆ 1961–73 Vietnam War 1982 State ratification of Equal Rights Amendment failed ◆ 1972 Equal Rights Amendment passed Congress ◆ ◆ 1976 Lost Democratic nomination for the Senate WOMEN HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A LIPSTICK .THOSE DAYS ARE OVER . —BELLA ABZUG GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ABZUG, BELLA SAVITSKY 45 Faber, Doris. 1976. Bella Abzug. New York: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard. Intimate Portrait: Bella Abzug (videotape). 1998. Lifetime Productions. Rogers, Kathy. 1998. “Bella Abzug: ALeader of Vision and Voice.” Columbia Law Review 98 (June) 1998. CROSS REFERENCE Equal Rights Amendment. ACADEMIC FREEDOM Academic freedom is the right to teach as one sees fit, but not necessarily the right to teach evil. The term encompasses much more than teaching- related speech rights of teachers. Educational institutions are communities unto themselves with rules of their own, and when conflicts arise, often times the most common and compelling arguments involve freedom. As a result, the academic community energetically explores the nature of freedom in society at large, and it is often forced to confront its own concepts of freedom in the process. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has long led efforts among educators to define the concept of ACADEMIC FREEDOM in U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVER- SITIES . In 1940 the AAUP, in conjunction with the Association of American Colleges (now the Association of American Colleges and Uni- versities), drafted and approved the Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.The statement’spurposeisto“promote public understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to ensure them in colleges and universities.” According to the statement, educational institutions should afford full freedom for teachers to conduct resea rch and publish their results, subject to their adequate performance in other academic duties. Teachers should also have freedom in the classroom to discuss their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce controversial matter that has no relation to their subject. Institutions may place limitations on academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution, though these limitations should be stated clearly in writing at the time of the teacher’s appointment. Although the position of the AAUP is not binding upon colleges and universities, it has had an important impact on the tenure policies of these institutions. Tenure, according to the AAUP, promotes freedom of teaching, research, and other educational activities and also pro- vides a “sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.” Tenure is based upon a contractual relationship between the educational institution and the teacher, and this agreement provides private rights between the two. Academic freedom was first introduced as a judicial term of art (a term with a specific legal meaning) by Supreme Court Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS.InAdler v. Board of Education of City of New York (342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517 [1952]), the Supreme Court upheld a New York law (N.Y. Civ. Service Law § 12-a) that prohibited employment of teachers in public institutions if they were members of “subversive organizations.” In a scathing dissent joined by Justice Hugo L. Black, Douglas argued that such LEGISLATION created a police state and ran contrary to the FIRST AMENDMENT guarantee of free speech. Justice Douglas equated academic freedom with the pursuit of truth. If academic freedom is the pursuit of truth and is protected by the First Amendment, reasoned Douglas, then the New York law should be struck down because its potential effe ct was to produce standardized thought. According to Douglas’s dissent, the New York law created an academic atmosphere concerned not with intellectual stimulation but with such questions as “Why was the history teacher so openly hostile to Franco’s Spain? Who heard overtones of revolution in the English teacher’s discussion of The Grapes of Wrath?” And “What was behind the praise of Soviet progress in metallurgy in the chemistry class?” Douglas conceded that the public school systems need not become “cells for Communist activities,” but he reminded the court that the Framers of the CONSTITUTION “knew the strength that comes when the mind is free.” Shortly after the Adler decision, a similar case arose in New Hampshire that received very different treatment by the Supreme Court. On January 5, 1954, Paul M. Sweezy was sum- moned to appear before New Hampshire attorney general Louis C. Wyman for inquiries into Sweezy’s political associations. Under a 1951 New Hampshire statute, the state ATTORNEY general was authorized to investigate “subversive activities” and determine whether “subversive persons” were located within the state (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 [1957]). Wyman GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 46 ACADEMIC FREEDOM was especially interested in information on members of the PROGRESSIVE PARTY, an organiza- tion many politicians suspec ted of nurturing COMMUNISM in the United States. Sweezy said he was unaware of any violations of the statute. He further stated that he would not answ er any questions impertinent to the inquiry under the legislation and that he would not answer questions that seemed to infringe on his FREEDOM OF SPEECH. Sweezy did answer numer- ous questions about himself, his views, and his activities, but he refused to answer questions about other people. In a later inquiry by the attorn ey general, Sweezy refused to comment about an articlehehadwrittenandaboutalecturehehad delivered to a humanities class. When Sweezy persisted in his refusal to talk about others and about his lecture, he was held in contempt of court and sent to the Merr imack County Jail. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction, and Sweezy appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court went on to reverse the decision. The basis for the reversal was the New Hampshire statute’s improper grant of broad interrogation powers to the attorney general and its failure to afford sufficient criminal protections to an ACCUSED. The Court commented strongly upon the threat such a statute posed to academic freedom. The principal opinion, written by Chief Justice EARL WARREN, questioned the wisdom of Wyman’s LEGISLATIVE inquiry. With regard to the questions on Sweezy’s lecture to the humanities class, Warren stated that “[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.” Justice FELIX FRANKFURTER wrote a separate concurring opinion. To Frankfurter, the call of the Court was to decide the case by balancing the right of the state to self-protection against the right of a citizen to academic freedom and political PRIVACY. Frankfurter concluded that Wyman’s reasons for questioning Sweezy on academics were “grossly inadequate” given “the grave harm resulting from governmental intru- sion into the intellectual life of a university.” Neither of the PLURALITY opinions in Sweezy would have found all congressional inquiries into academia to be unconstitutional. However, both opinions helped free educators in later cases by recognizing and emphasizing the danger of restricting academic thought. In Keyishian v. BOARD OF REGENTS of the University of New York (385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 629 [1967]), the Supreme Court finally awarded to teachers and professors the full complement of free speech and political privacy rights afforded other citizens. Political “loyalty oaths” required of New York State employees (including educators) under state CIVIL SERVICE laws were declared VOID, and New York education laws against “treasonable or seditious speech” were found to violate the First Amendment right to free speech. According to the Keyishian decision, “[A]cademic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” The tension between academic oversight and academic freedom did not end with the Keyishian case. The Supreme Court has also held that if school authorities can show additional independent grounds for discharge, they may terminate a teacher for disruptive speech even if a substantial motivation for the termination was speech on issues of public concern (Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 [1968]; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 In 1954 Paul M. Sweezy, a New York magazine editor and former Harvard professor, refused to answer questions about his political associations from New Hampshire attorney general Louis C. Wyman. Sweezy was jailed for contempt of court but later won on appeal. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ACADEMIC FREEDOM 47 . Jan. 1, 19 30 . Lot 1 , Block 2 , NW Addition. 12 . Ruth Roe, widow, Foreclosure of No. 11 . by Sheriff of Notice of sale, Feb. 1, 19 30. County, Affidavit of publication, Feb. 1, 19 30 to Proof of. entry 6. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ABSTRACT OF TITLE 39 A sample abstract of title Abstract of Title 11 . Abstract of Title to north 500 feet, front and rear, of Lot 1 , Block. . Book 3 of Satisfactions, page 200 . 29. Richard Roe Will and Probate. to Dated July 1, 19 15 . Ruth Roe Probate July 1, 19 15 . Filed Aug. 1, 19 15 . Book 10 of Miscellaneous, page 10 0 . Testator