A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that in- telligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed poli- cy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelli- gence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to ex- plain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future fail- ures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelli- gence played in those decisions, and he demon- strates the negligible effect that America’s most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. pol- icy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, con- demning the 9/11 Commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch, to com- bat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties. Columbia Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy PAUL R. PILLAR is visiting professor and director of studies in the Security Studies Pro- gram at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He served in several senior positions with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council and is a retired army reserve officer. He is the author of Terror- ism and U.S. Foreign Policy and Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Cover design by Michael Gibson Praise for Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy “Writing with the authority of a distinguished practitioner and scholar, Paul R. Pillar pres- ents a blunt and candid assessment of the profound disconnect between intelligence and American national security policy. His pointed reflections expose the reality of the politi- cization and misuse of intelligence as well as the importance of the images of the world that policy makers bring to the table. His book is an invaluable corrective to the assumption that policy blunders and the inability to predict can be blamed simply on ‘intelligence failure.’” —Martha Crenshaw, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University “Paul R. Pillar has written a brilliant, lucid analysis of the evolution of U.S. national security intelligence in the decade since the 9/11 attacks. He shows how the intelligence agencies have been made scapegoats for the failures of our political leaders, how intelligence reform has become confused with bureaucratic reorganization, and how our foreign policy is driven by a psychological as well as political incapacity to accept the limitations of our knowledge about the plans and motivations of actual and potential adversaries. Pillar's book is erudite, thorough, and authoritative, yet accessible to anyone concerned with the gravest issues of national and global security.” —Richard A. Posner, author of Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps “The 9/11 attacks and the Iraq WMD estimate are both encumbered by erroneous legends. Paul R. Pillar, a senior intelligence analyst deeply involved in both issues, offers crucial cor- rectives, also applicable to the overly esteemed 9/11 Commission Report. These alone make this an important book. Pillar goes further, offering a unique history of U.S. intelligence and the issue of ‘intelligence reform.’ Not all will agree with his observations, but they come from substantial experience and deep thought and need to be seriously considered.” —Mark M. Lowenthal, president, The Intelligence and Security Academy, and former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production “Paul R. Pillar brings to his study of intelligence and foreign policy the skills of an accom- plished scholar and a wealth of experience as an intelligence officer. A brief endorsement cannot do justice to the richness and power of his arguments, which are essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what intelligence can and cannot do; why the appeal of reforms is often greater than their value; and how we can avoid repeating our past mistakes.” —Robert Jervis, author of Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Fall of the Shah and the Iraq War COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS / NEW YORK cup.columbia.edu Printed in the U.S.A. ISBN: 978-0-231-15792-6 9 780231 157926 INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform Paul R. Pillar COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2011 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pillar, Paul R., 1947– Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy : Iraq, 9/11, and misguided Reform / Paul R. Pillar. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-15792-6 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52780-4 (electronic) 1. Intelligence service—United States. 2. Iraq War, 2003– 3. September 11 Terrorist At- tacks, 2001. I. Title. JK468.I6P55 2010 327.1273—dc22 2010048141 Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book was printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. To Veronica, who puts her intelligence to good use LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IX PREFACE XI CHAPTER ONE Introduction: A Comforting Explanation for Calamity 1 CHAPTER TWO Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Iraq War 13 CHAPTER THREE Alternative Visions of the Iraq War 43 CHAPTER FOUR Congress and the Politics of the Iraq War 69 CHAPTER FIVE Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence 96 CHAPTER SIX Politicization 121 CHAPTER SEVEN Scapegoats and Spectator Sport 175 CHAPTER EIGHT The Never-Ending Issue 202 CHAPTER NINE Catharsis and 9/11 233 CONTENTS viii CONTENTS CHAPTER TEN Responses to Catharsis 281 CHAPTER ELEVEN The Illusion of Reform 293 CHAPTER TWELVE Real Reform 311 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Adapting Policy to Uncertainty 331 NOTES 357 INDEX 401 9/11 September 11, 2001 9/11 Commission National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ASAT antisatellite BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency CTC Counterterrorist Center DCI director of central intelligence DNI director of national intelligence DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam ExComm Executive Committee FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICA intelligence community assessment INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research MACV U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration ABBREVIATIONS [...]... ill—of intelligence on major decisions and departures in U.S foreign policy has been negligible Most notorious intelligence failures have similarly had almost no effect on U.S policy or U.S interests • Policy has shaped intelligence more than vice versa This relationship has entailed significant corruption of intelligence through politicization, but official inquiries have refused to recognize this influence... fosters blindness to the politicization that infects intelligence and to those possible reforms that would help to correct the problem Mistaken notions about the influence of intelligence on policy lead to inattention to what really influences policy and to changes that would have the best chance of making policy better guided in the future The mythology of intelligence ignores the much larger role of... not affect policy related to these events do not seem to matter The two tragedies are repeatedly invoked as a widely understood shorthand reference to the equally widely accepted common lore about how U.S intelligence is broken and needs fixing That lore, along with all of the associated perceptions about intelligence guiding policy and about bad intelligence being responsible for failed policies, functions... mythology about American intelligence provides a sense that the problems (in this case, destructive policies and shocking loss of life) and their causes (presumed faulty intelligence) are understood It provides a sense that everyone agrees that the problems should be fixed It offers assurance that as long as the fixes are made, the people will elect leaders who will follow sound policies and will protect... attribute the misguidance to failures of intelligence institutions, and to believe that the proper response is to fix intelligence A major refrain in discourse about making U.S foreign and security policy better is thus intelligence failure and intelligence “reform.” (I often put the term reform in quotation marks because as generally used it refers to any change to intelligence institutions not initiated... if it helps to get Americans away from blame games altogether and leads them to ponder how the making of their country’s foreign policy is really—not just theoretically or ideally—informed and guided and what this understanding implies for making that policy better guided I owe thanks primarily to the many colleagues inside and outside the intelligence community with whom I worked while a public servant... what intelligence influences, what it should be capable of knowing, and how it currently functions The theme of intelligence failure fits comfortably into characteristically American ways of thinking about politics, policymaking, the U.S encounter with the world, and the nature of the United States itself The theme is firmly entrenched in American political discourse—so firmly and so continuously that... outside world flow from preferences more than preferences flow from the images That is how worldviews and ideologies work Because the mythology further misses how policy influences intelligence more than intelligence influences policy (especially on high-profile foreign- policy issues regarding which sentiments 10 I N T R O D U C T I O N : A C O M F O R T I N G E X P L A N AT I O N F O R C A L A M I T... with intelligence and instead lie within the political strata of government Whatever solace the common beliefs about intelligence have provided to Americans looking for reassuring explanations for past setbacks, they have done almost nothing to make American policy better informed and more intelligently formulated Hence, the main message of this book is: Efforts to make U.S foreign and security policy. .. incentive for its own later contribution to the mythology about intelligence and the war Iraq is an especially strong example of the irrelevance of intelligence to the making of a major U.S foreign- policy decision, but it is hardly the only one Chapter 5 reviews how several of the other biggest departures of U.S policy since World War II, including successful as well as unsuccessful ones, exhibit the . of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties. Columbia Intelligence and U. S. Foreign Policy PAUL R. PILLAR is visiting professor. Michael Gibson Praise for Intelligence and U. S. Foreign Policy “Writing with the authority of a distinguished practitioner and scholar, Paul R. Pillar pres- ents a blunt and candid assessment. Intelligence for Analysis and Production “Paul R. Pillar brings to his study of intelligence and foreign policy the skills of an accom- plished scholar and a wealth of experience as an intelligence officer.