261 10 Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks The legendary Chinese general Sun Tzu was a strategic military genius. In his classical book, The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the eld; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities…. 1 This book is still widely read by people from a diverse range of backgrounds including generals, politicians, businessmen, and even terrorists. A growing number of terrorist groups, some of whom are drawing at least in part from Sun Tzu’s strategies, have a common goal not only to undermine the political and economic structure of the West, but also to throw Western society into chaos. This being the case, what can Westerners do to prevent this nightmarish scenario from becoming a reality? The answer is obvious: to thwart their plans at every turn. This implies being at least one step ahead of them and perhaps a little more clever. As Sun Tzu might have counseled, this can be achieved by developing superior plans while disrupting their objectives. Plans can be developed for scattering and splitting the enemies of peace to “prevent the junction of their forces”; and perhaps most importantly, plans and security measures can be forged for constructing walled cities that cannot be besieged. 10.1 CAN PLANNING FOR A DISASTER PREVENT A DISASTER? Nearly all environmental statutes regulate or place substantive constraints on what may be done and how it is to be done. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is unique in that it neither regulates nor mandates substantive contraints. 1 NEPA provides the only comprehensive federal planning process that is applicable to virtually all federal actions. Its purpose is not to place strict limitations on what can be done, but instead provides a rigorous planning process for ensuring that actions and alternatives are appropriately considered before a nal decision is made, and before other highly prescriptive environmental laws and regulations are triggered that dictate precisely under what conditions actions may be carried out. NEPA is a planning process that might provide a 21st century framework for implementing Sun Tzu’s strategy. Performed correctly, NEPA and other similar planning processes can provide a cutting-edge tool for helping secure the Western homeland. 10.1.1 CATASTROPHIC EVENTS AND THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT Detractors may question the relevance of including potential terrorist acts or natural disaster sce- narios into what has been more traditionally and strictly an environmental analysis. Some might even question whether it is legal, let alone wise, to analyze such scenarios within a NEPA or similar planning process; for that matter, do potentially catastrophic events even fall within the scope of NEPA? CRC_7559_CH010.indd 261CRC_7559_CH010.indd 261 12/29/2007 11:54:50 AM12/29/2007 11:54:50 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 262 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners As prescribed in Section 102 of NEPA, an environmental impact statement (EIS) must be pre- pared for all “… major Federal actions signicantly affecting the quality of the human environment …” 2 (emphasis added). Consequently, federal actions that have the potential to signicantly affect the human environ- ment are potentially subject to the EIS requirement. According to the Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ), NEPA regulations (Regulations), the human environment shall be interpreted (§ 1508.14) … comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment … When an environmental impact statement is prepared and economic or social and natural or physical environmental effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will discuss all of these effects on the human environment. (Emphasis added.) Based on this, the phrase “human environment” is interpreted comprehensively to include not only the physical environment but also its relationship with people; thus, signicant socioeconomic impacts that are interrelated to environmental impacts must be evaluated within an EIS. Moreover, under the Regulations, the section of the EIS describing environmental consequences is to address (§ 1502.16[g]) … Urban quality, historic and cultural resources, and the design of the built environment, including the reuse and conservation potential of various alternatives and mitigation measures. This provision implies that if urban quality, historic and cultural resources, or the design of the built environment (i.e., human-made structure) could be signicantly impacted, such effects should be investigated in the EIS. Thus, it appears that potential terrorist acts, homeland security issues, and natural disasters might indeed fall within the scope of NEPA. 10.1.2 SIGNIFICANCE As described in Chapter 6, the Regulations dene 10 factors that are to be assessed in determining the signicance of a potential impact (§ 1508.27[b]). Depending on the particular circumstance, vir- tually each one of the 10 signicance factors could be triggered by various types of potential attacks or human-induced disasters. An EIS might be required if such events could trigger any one of them. Table 10.1 compares the relationship between potential terrorist acts and natural disasters, and NEPA’s 10 signicance factors. 10.2 NRC RULES TERRORISM REVIEWS ARE NOT REQUIRED What is an agency’s responsibility under NEPA to consider intentionally malevolent acts, such as those directed at the United States on 9/11? The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) addressed this question in four orders issued in 2002, each holding that NEPA did not require the NRC to consider impacts of terrorism in rendering licensing decisions. 10.2.1 NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE CASE The NRC provided a detailed rationale for its conclusion in an order involving a proposal by Private Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) to build an independent spent fuel storage installation on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah. The proposed facility was to store spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants pending disposal in a repository. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 262CRC_7559_CH010.indd 262 12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 263 TABLE 10.1 How Potential Terrorist Acts or Natural Disasters Might Trigger NEPA’s NEPA’s 10 Significance Factors Effects of Potentially Catastrophic Events 1. Impacts that may be both benecial and adverse. A signicant effect may exist even if the federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be benecial. A catastrophic event is obviously an adverse impact, potentially subject to NEPA’s requirements. 2. The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety. A catastrophic event can affect public health and safety, resulting in untold fatalities and casualties. For example, an attack on a dam, nuclear reactor, or petroleum storage facility might result in disastrous impacts. 3. Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, parklands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas. A catastrophic event can affect historic and cultural sites, particularly landmarks and national emblems as well as ecologically sensitive resources. For example, a new agricultural policy or decision might leave a major food source vulnerable to acts of agricultural terrorism, resulting in catastrophic impacts. 4. The degree to which the action effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial. The impacts of potentially catastrophic events are uncertain, which can raise signicant scientic controversy concerning the severity of the actual effects. 5. The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks. The impact of many potentially catastrophic scenarios is uncertain or involves unique or unknown risks. 6. The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with signicant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration. Many federal policies, plans, or decisions may establish precedents that could have far-reaching implications in terms of the risks of potential terrorism. For example, a decision to employ a new nuclear technology might result in setting a precedent that could have grave homeland implications in terms of future terrorist acts or natural disasters. 7. Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignicant but cumulatively signicant impacts. Signicance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively signicant impact on the environment. Signicance cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into smaller component parts. Obviously the impacts of a catastrophic event can result in signicant cumulative impacts. Moreover, segmented federal actions might result in signicant cumulative impacts if a terrorist attack was targeted at one or more of these segmented actions. For example, making a decision regarding an isolated border crossing without considering the larger context of border security might trigger this factor. 8. The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of signicant scientic, cultural, or historical resources. Evidence indicates that terrorists have actively considered attacking signicant national scientic, cultural, and historic icons and institutions (e.g., Pentagon, World Trade Tower, Statue of Liberty, and Congress). Natural disasters can also signicantly affect such resources. 9. The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. A terrorist attack or natural disaster can obviously result in grave impacts to endangered species. Some federal proposals and plans should be considered in terms of potential impacts on species because of a terrorist attack. For example, a biological terrorist attack might eradicate an entire species. 10. Whether the action threatens a violation of federal, state, or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the environment. A signicant terrorist attack or natural disaster could breach any number of safety and environmental laws. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 263CRC_7559_CH010.indd 263 12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 10 Significance Factors 264 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners In abbreviated orders issued for the three other companion cases, the NRC referred to its ration- ale expressed in the PFS order. One of the companion cases involved a proposed mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The NRC order in the MOX case reversed a decision of the Licens- ing Board to admit for licensing, after hearing an intervenor’s contention that NEPA required the NRC to evaluate terrorism impacts at the proposed MOX facility. The Licensing Board had stated Regardless of how foreseeable terrorist acts that could cause a beyond-design-basis accident were prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it can no longer be argued that terrorist attacks … are not reasonably foreseeable … 10.2.1.1 Basis for NRC’s Conclusion As explained in the PFS case, the NRC concluded that … the possibility of a terrorist threat … is speculative and simply too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require a study under NEPA … As a practical matter, attempts to evaluate that threat even in qualitative terms are likely to be meaningless and consequently no use in the agency’s decision-making. In reaching this conclusion, the NRC noted two federal court of appeals decisions that addressed the issue of terrorism and NEPA in the area of nuclear regulation. Both the decisions upheld an agency’s refusal to consider terrorism under NEPA as reasonable. 3 It should be pointed out that both of these court cases were rendered years before the attack of 9/11. Further, the NRC observed that the risk of a terrorist attack (generally thought of as the product of the probability of an occurrence and the consequences) cannot be adequately determined because “the likelihood of attack cannot be ascertained using any state-of-the-art methodology.” An intervenor in the PFS proceedings asked the Commission to assume an attack with a large jumbo jet and to analyze the consequences without the consideration of probability. The NRC, how- ever, concluded that such an analysis … amounts to a form of ‘worst case’ analysis, which the Supreme Court, in Robertson v. Methow Val- ley Citizens Council [490 U.S. 332 (1989)], determined is not required under NEPA. The NRC went on to write … presumably all other kinds of terrorism, if conceivable, would require NEPA review as well … Such an open-ended approach to NEPA is unworkable … As the Supreme Court noted in Robertson, it is always possible to ‘conjure up’ progressively more disastrous scenarios. In further arguments that NEPA is not an appropriate forum for considering terrorism, the NRC noted The public aspect of NEPA processes conicts with the need to protect certain sensitive information … In our view, the public interest would not be served by inquiries … into where and how nuclear facili- ties are vulnerable … The NRC did not entirely close the door to analyzing terrorism in NEPA documents, as men- tioned in a footnote: This is not to suggest that an environmental review should never consider [the] threat of terrorism … In fact, the NRC has briey considered, as a matter of discretion, the issue of terrorism in generic environ- mental reviews [for nuclear power plant license renewal]. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 264CRC_7559_CH010.indd 264 12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM12/29/2007 11:54:51 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 265 Yet, some local critics maintain that planning for events such as terrorist acts are precisely the types of scenarios and issues that Congress intended agencies to consider when it passed NEPA. Although potential terrorist events may not have been reasonably foreseeable prior to the attack of 9/11, such an argument is more difcult to defend in a post-9/11 world. 10.2.1.2 Court Rejects Reasoning More recently, plaintiffs petitioned the court to review NRC’s approval of the proposed dry cask storage facility of spent nuclear fuel. The plaintiffs’ NEPA claims challenged the 2003 decision by NRC not to evaluate terrorism-related impacts in an environmental assessment (EA) completed for the proposed storage facility. On June 2, 2006, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that NRC erred in its determination that NEPA does not require an analysis of impacts resulting from a potential terrorist attack. 2 The court did not provide direction on how NRC was to evaluate terrorism-related impacts and instead left this matter to the agency’s discretion. The court concluded that NRC’s justication for not considering impacts of potential terrorist attacks “… either individually or collectively, do not support the NRC’s categorical refusal to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist attack.” On January 16, 2007, the Supreme Court declined to review the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As is common for this type of action, the Supreme Court provided no explanation for its denial of the appeal request. It is recommended that the reader consult legal counsel in deter- mining to what degree the impacts of potential terrorist attacks be considered in NEPA analyses. 10.2.2 DOE PRACTICE The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sometimes nds it appropriate to consider potential envi- ronmental impacts of intentional destructive acts (e.g., sabotage or terrorism) in its NEPA docu- ments, although the Department has not expressed a conclusion regarding whether or not such analyses are required under NEPA. In its guidance document, Recommendations for Analyzing Accidents under NEPA (July 2002), the DOE stated In identifying the reasonably foreseeable impacts of a proposed action and alternatives, past DOE NEPA documents have addressed potential environmental impacts that could result from intentional destructive acts. Analysis of such acts poses a challenge because the potential number of scenarios is limitless and the likelihood of attack is unknowable. The guidance further states that Intentional destructive acts are not accidents. Nevertheless … the consequences of an act of sabotage or terrorism could be discussed by a comparison to the consequences of a severe accident …. When intentional destructive acts are reasonably foreseeable, a qualitative or semi-quantitative discussion of the potential consequences of intentional destructive acts could be included in the accident analysis. DOE’s guidance provides two examples of qualitative discussions of intentional destructive acts that might be appropriate in an EIS. Regarding security concerns, DOE conducts reviews of its environmental documents to ensure that security-sensitive information is protected. For example, some DOE EISs have contained a nonsensitive summary of the results of an analysis of intentional destructive acts; in such cases, details of the analysis, which may contain nonclassied security-sensitive information, have been segregated into a separate EIS appendix whose distribution was appropriately limited. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 265CRC_7559_CH010.indd 265 12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 266 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners 10.2.2.1 DOE Litigation In a recent case involving a challenge to the DOE, EA for construction and operation of a biosafety level-3 facility in which the impacts of a potential terrorist attack were not addressed, the court concluded: 3 Concerning the DOE’s conclusion that consideration of the effects of a terrorist attack is not required in its Environmental Assessment, we recently held to the contrary in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In Mothers for Peace, we held that an Environmental Assessment that does not consider the possibility of a terrorist attack is inadequate. Similarly here, we remand for the DOE to consider whether the threat of terrorist activity necessitates the preparation of an Environ- mental Impact Statement. As in Mothers for Peace, we caution that there “remain open to the agency a wide variety of actions it may take on remand [and] … [w]e do not prejudge those alternatives” (cita- tions omitted). As a result of such court decisions, the DOE issued an interim guidance on December 1, 2006, indicating that all DOE EISs and EAs, whether for nuclear or nonnuclear proposals, should include explicit consideration of the potential environmental impacts of sabotage and terrorism. The DOE is currently developing additional guidance on considering sabotage and terrorism in NEPA documents. 10.3 WHY NEPA CAN PROVIDE AN IDEAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING TERRORIST AND NATURAL DISASTER SCENARIOS? NEPA is the only federally mandated planning process that is applicable to virtually all major fed- eral proposals. There are many advantages of using NEPA as a comprehensive planning process for screening actions in terms of potential terrorist attacks or other high-consequence events. Planning processes such as NEPA, State Environmental Policy Acts (SEPAs), and other similar impact assessment processes provide an ideal framework for ensuring that a rigorous analysis of potential threats is performed. As depicted in Table 10.2, the NEPA planning process incorporates every essential element necessary for ensuring that a comprehensive, scientic, rigorous, and ana- lytical process is used in evaluating threats such as terrorist acts or natural disasters. 10.4 USING NEPA TO PLAN FOR POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS NEPA is sometimes perceived as just another obstacle that federal ofcials must surmount before implementing a proposal. Yet, executed in a streamlined manner, NEPA presents an ideal frame- work for providing a decision-maker with information regarding the consequences of potential ter- rorist attacks. Table 10.3 describes how NEPA and NEPA-like impact assessment processes can be applied to safeguard communities, and government projects and installations. 4,5 10.4.1 STRATEGIC AND PROGRAMMATIC REVIEWS A NEPA analysis can be prepared to actively identify the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of an entire program or mission. Here, a strategic, programmatic, or site-wide EIS can be prepared to assess the risks of an entire program. Experts can be consulted and the public can be actively engaged in seeking comments that would help the agency identify potential risks and weaknesses, as well as terrorist and natural disaster scenarios. In some cases, these comments and the information obtained might need to be restricted from public distribution. This input would then be evaluated to determine threats and impacts. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 266CRC_7559_CH010.indd 266 12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 267 TABLE 10.2 Why NEPA Provides All Essential Elements Necessary for Comprehensively Evaluating and Countering Potential Terrorist Threats Essential Elements Description of How NEPA’s Elements Support a Successful Analysis Rigorous planning process NEPA requires that a rigorous process be used in assessing impacts of potential actions. Scoping NEPA requires a thorough scoping process to identify the range of actions, impacts, and alternatives that need to be considered. NEPA’s procedures can help ensure that a reasonable range of potential terrorist threats, and all signicant issues are identied and ushed out for investigation. Scope of decision-making NEPA is applicable to the adoption of ofcial policy, formal plans, programs, and approval of specic projects. Consultation A successful analysis of potential terrorist acts typically necessitates consultation with other agencies and experts (e.g., cognizant agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Defense) possessing special expertise with respect to these issues. Interdisciplinary An interdisciplinary approach is typically required to successfully identify and assess potential terrorist scenarios. Systematic A logically ordered and systematic process is typically required to successfully identify and assess potential terrorist scenarios. Scientically-based process NEPA provides a scientically based process for rigorously ensuring that all impacts and threats are appropriately analyzed. Impact analysis Requires analysis of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts that could result from a potential terrorist attack. Alternatives All reasonable alternatives and mitigation measures must be considered for avoiding or reducing signicant impacts of potential terrorist acts. Review and commenting The NEPA regulations establish specic procedures (i.e., reviewing and commenting on the draft EIS) for ensuring that a scientically competent analysis has been performed. A procedural process is also established for addressing and responding to internal and public comments concerning the adequacy of the analysis. Handling classied information The NEPA regulations establish procedures for ensuring that any sensitive information is appropriately classied to prevent harm to national security. Decision-making NEPA established a formal and procedural process for ensuring that the analysis is considered by the appropriate decision-maker in reaching a nal decision. Such information can be used to identify and evaluate programmatic alternatives and mitigation measures for addressing potential threats. 10.4.2 PROJECT-SPECIFIC REVIEWS As witnessed earlier, virtually all federal proposals are subject to a NEPA review. At the minimum, a cursory review of potential terrorist acts should be an integral element of any proposal involv- ing potentially high-value targets or high-consequence events. As described below, this can be efciently implemented for the three principal levels of NEPA review. 10.4.2.1 Environmental Impact Statements If an EIS is prepared, a task force should be selected to screen the proposal for potential terrorist and natural disaster threats. NEPA acts as an umbrella planning process for integrating relevant threats that need to be considered comprehensively during the early planning process. As appropri- ate, experts should be consulted to consider potential scenarios and their potential impacts. If this CRC_7559_CH010.indd 267CRC_7559_CH010.indd 267 12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 268 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners screening process concludes that a reasonable threat exists that could pose a signicant impact, a detailed analysis of the threats would be performed. An EIS analysis of potential threats would typically be carried out in much the same way that accident analyses are performed on high-prole proposals such as nuclear reactors, hydroelectric dams, and chemical or radioactive processing facilities. If the analysis nds that the impacts could indeed be signicant, an effort should be launched to identify and evaluate alternatives and mitiga- tion measures that could reduce or eliminate potential threats. Section 9.2 provides specic guid- ance for assessing mitigation measures. 10.4.2.2 Environmental Assessments As appropriate, the proposed action described in an EA should be briey screened for potentially signicant terrorist acts or threats from natural disasters. As appropriate, experts should be con- sulted to consider potential scenarios and impacts. If there is a reasonable possibility that a terrorist threat related to the proposal could result in a signicant impact, an EIS can be prepared. Conversely, if the screening process concludes that there is no reasonable scenario for a signicant terrorist or natural disaster threat and that there are no other signicant environmental impacts, the proposal qualies for a nding of no signicant impact (FONSI). 10.4.2.3 Categorical Exclusions Where a categorical exclusion appears to be appropriate, the action should be screened in terms of any signicant impact that could result from a potential terrorist attack or natural disaster. In the vast majority of cases, this would not be the case. However, if the screening review concludes that such a threat could result in signicant impacts, this would meet the criteria for extraordinary cir- cumstances, and an EA or EIS can be prepared. For instance, moving a tank of chlorine gas from a fortied building onto an outdoor pad might appear to be an innocuous activity until one considers that a terrorist act might easily breach the tank, resulting in potentially catastrophic results for the nearby workers or inhabitants. TABLE 10.3 How NEPA, SEPA, and Other Similar Planning Processes Can Be Used in Assessing Potential Terrorist Acts and Natural Disasters Properly integrated and executed planning processes such as NEPA provide an ideal tool not only for analyzing traditional impacts of proposed projects, but also for evaluating terrorist and natural-disaster scenarios associated with proposed projects. Alternatives and mitigation measures can be assessed for reducing or eliminating such threats. Federal agencies can prepare strategic or programmatic EISs for developing master plans for identifying and securing high- value targets across new or existing broad programs. These analyses can be used in evaluating programmatic alternatives and mitigation measures for countering or reducing such threats. Nearly one-half of the states in the US have a NEPA-like process (SEPA), a number of which contains a requirement to prepare an analysis of potentially signicant proposals. These planning processes can be used by states in preparing programmatic counter-terrorist plans for fortifying potential terrorist targets or mitigating the impacts of natural disasters. At the city and community level, a NEPA-like process can be applied in identifying targets and evaluating potential threats. For example, the analysis can be used to identify and prioritize high-risk terrorist scenarios (water reservoirs, chemical factories, national monuments, airports, etc.). Here again, the results of such studies can be used in developing alternatives and measures for mitigating potential impacts. Most Western governments already have an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process in place similar to that of NEPA. From the standpoint of the international community, EIAs can be prepared to identify potential threats, evaluate their impacts, and consider alternatives and measures for mitigating them. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 268CRC_7559_CH010.indd 268 12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 269 10.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USE OF AN EA AND AN EIS As described below, there is a distinct difference in the way potentially catastrophic events should be analyzed in an EA versus an EIS. 10.5.1 MAXIMUM REASONABLY FORESEEABLE EVENTS An analysis of a maximum reasonably foreseeable event or a maximum credible event represents potential acts of nature or accidents (or acts of terrorism) at the high-consequence end of the spec- trum. A maximum reasonably foreseeable accident is therefore an event with the most severe con- sequences that can reasonably be expected to occur for a given action. Typically, this kind of event has a very low probability of occurrence. Most facilities or operations have operational lifetimes measured in decades. Therefore, accident scenarios having frequencies less than 10 –6 per year are so unlikely to occur during the lifespan of such facilities or operations that they are generally not considered important in making decisions. Nevertheless, analysis of scenarios in the range of 10 –6 to 10 –7 per year may need to be considered if the consequences could be catastrophic. As a practical matter, events with frequencies less than 10 −7 per year rarely need to be examined. In contrast to a standard accident analysis, an investigation of intentional destructive acts (terrorism or sabotage) poses a challenge because the number of potential scenarios is virtually limitless, and the likelihood of attack is correspondingly unknowable. Fortunately, the situation is not hopeless. The physical effects of an intentionally destructive act—whether caused by a re, explosion, missile, or something else—are frequently nearly the same as, or bounded by, the effects of accidents, particularly maximum reasonably foreseeable events. That is, the impacts (release of radioactivity, hazardous materials, explosions, res) of an act of sabo- tage or terrorism on operations and facilities frequently do not exceed those of a severe accident. 10.5.1.1 Bounding Under a bounding approach, the impacts of a potential event are generally bounded by the effects of a maximum credible event; likewise, since experience indicates that the consequences of an inten- tionally destructive act are generally “bounded” by those of a severe accident scenario. The same approach may also apply to the analysis of natural disasters. Prudence must be exercised in performing a bounding analysis, as the decision-maker may be unable to make a reasoned choice among alternatives. This is because a bounding analysis tends to mask their differences. A similar procedure to that described above can also be followed in preparing SEPA, environ- mental impact assessments (EIA), or other related planning analyses. 10.5.2 AN EA VERSUS AN EIS ANALYSIS Since an EA can be used primarily to determine if an action (e.g., a terrorist attack, an accident, or a natural disaster scenario) could result in a signicant impact, the maximum credible event may need to be evaluated. Once various scenarios have been screened in an effort to identify the event, it can then be evaluated in detail. Where the maximum credible event can be shown to be nonsignicant, no further review of such events is warranted. However, if the maximum credible event is deemed to be potentially signicant, two options exist: 1. Mitigate the potential impacts to the point of nonsignicance. 2. Prepare an EIS to evaluate potential alternatives that might reduce these signicant impacts. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 269CRC_7559_CH010.indd 269 12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM12/29/2007 11:54:52 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 270 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners In contrast, the purpose of an EIS is to provide the decision-maker with information on which to base informed decisions. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that planning for and evaluating potentially signicant terrorist or natural disaster events in an EIS would be performed in a differ- ent manner from an EA. As shown in Figure 10.1, various scenarios are screened in the EIS process in an effort to identify a spectrum or reasonable range of potentially signicant threats. The reason- able range of potentially signicant threats normally includes low-probability high-consequence scenarios as well as high-probability low-consequence events. As appropriate, a reasonable range of these scenarios should be evaluated. 10.6 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY With little or no modication, methodologies currently used for evaluating potential accidents (e.g., nuclear reactors, hazardous facilities, dams) can also be adopted to screen terrorist and natural disaster scenarios, evaluate their potential consequences, and, if appropriate, develop alternatives and measures for mitigating potential threats. 10.6.1 EVALUATING POTENTIAL THREATS The purpose of scoping is to solicit input so that the analysis can be more clearly focused on issues of genuine concern. Experience has shown that a well-orchestrated scoping process provides a Initiate EIS process Identify credible terrorist or natural disaster scenarios Screen credible terrorist or natural disaster scenarios for significant impacts Analyze alternatives and mitigation measures for reducing potential impacts Complete EIS and reach a final decision regarding the course of action Eliminate nonsignificant scenarios from further review Are the terrorist scenarios potentially significant? Analyze a spectrum of potentially significant scenarios (low-probability high-consequence to high-probability low-consequence events) No Yes As appropriate, continue the analysis, evaluating other potentially significant environmental impacts FIGURE 10.1 Using an EIS to evaluate potential terrorist and natural disaster threats. CRC_7559_CH010.indd 270CRC_7559_CH010.indd 270 12/29/2007 11:54:53 AM12/29/2007 11:54:53 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC [...]... consequences For this reason, a set of potential scenarios should be considered, representing a range or spectrum of reasonably foreseeable events, including both • low-probability/high-consequence events, and • high-probability/low-consequence events © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC_7559_CH 010. indd 271 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 3 AM 272 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners. .. estimate the frequency and probabilities or consequences of reasonably foreseeable events (§ 1502.22) © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC_7559_CH 010. indd 273 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 3 AM 274 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners For events where the consequences are relatively low or for which numerical probability estimates are unavailable or difficult... with longterm effects, and/ or major loss of human life Human: Loss of less than 10 lives and/ or small-scale severe human injury or illness Environmental: Moderate (medium-scale and short-term) damage to ecosystems, infrastructure, or property Human: Minor human injury or illness Environmental: Minor (small-scale and short-term) damage to ecosystems, infrastructure, or property Human: No reportable human... review continues down to the final question: “Is the analysis of reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts?” The final question is reviewed with respect to three distinct but related tests A response © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC_7559_CH 010. indd 277 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 4 AM 278 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners of “yes” to all the three... unique to a particular mission TABLE 10. 5 Frequency Scale for Assessing the Risk–Uncertainty Significance Criterion Category Level Frequency (f ) Descriptions A B C D E F f>1 1 > f > 10 1 10 1 > f > 10 2 10 2 > f > 10 3 10 3 > f > 10 6 10 6 > f Expected one or more times per year Once in 1 10 years Once in 10 100 years Once in 100 100 0 years Once in 100 0–1,000,000 years Less than once in 1,000,000 years... illness Environmental: Negligible or no damage to ecosystems, infrastructure, or property TABLE 10. 7 Guidance for Determining Significance Based on the Severity and Frequency of an Event A: Frequent (f > 1) (IV) Catastrophic (III) Critical (II) Subcritical (I) Negligible Significant Significant Significant Nonsignificant B: Likely C: Occasional D: Unlikely E: Remote F: Very Remote (1> f >10 1) (10 1 > f >10 2)... Table 10. 7, while the severity scales are depicted in the first column Originally advanced by March, Table 10. 7 has been TABLE 10. 6 Severity Scale for Assessing the Risk–Uncertainty Significance Criterion Severity Scale Description of Consequences Catastrophic IV Critical III Subcritical II Negligible I Human: Loss of 10 or more lives and/ or large-scale and severe injury or illness Environmental: Large-scale... LLC CRC_7559_CH 010. indd 272 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 3 AM Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 273 of a NEPA analysis As in determining the applicability of other (albeit less complex) actions and impacts, NEPA s public scoping requirement also provides a useful procedure for determining if an analysis of a severe event needs to be performed Reasonably Foreseeable Adverse... counter terrorism, Journal of Environmental Practice: Special Issue on the National Environmental Policy Act, Vol 5(4), December 2003 5 Eccleston C H., NEPA and terrorism: is it time for a paradigm shift? Federal Facilities Environmental Journal (Lead journal article), Vol 13(2), Summer 2002 6 Eccleston C H., Effective Environmental Assessments: How to Manage and Prepare NEPA s EA, Lewis Publishers,... innovative approaches that can be used to elicit input and inform interested American citizens while preventing sensitive information from falling easily into the hands of terrorists In particular, methods for enlisting public involvement, scoping terrorist scenarios, circulating the analysis for review, and classifying sensitive information may need to be modified from the way NEPA or related planning . 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 1 AM12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 1 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 10 Significance Factors 264 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners In. 269CRC_7559_CH 010. indd 269 12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 2 AM12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 2 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 270 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners In. AM12/29/2007 1 1:5 4:5 0 AM © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 262 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners As prescribed in Section 102 of NEPA, an environmental