[...]... pre-reflectively adopt the view that the quality of painfulness can inhere in a physical thing as we adopt the view that the quality of heat can (though it may not in fact) inhere in it The reason that we are not tempted to think that pain inheres in external objects as we are tempted to think that heat does is not entirely clear I suggest that it has do with the fact that the quality of being painful does... conceive of a qualitatively similar sensation of a lower intensity, a sensation that as a result lacks the quality of painfulness Feeling and Being Aware of Feeling The fact that a sensation possesses this supervenient feature of painfulness leads to its having characteristic effects A sensation of pain exercises an in uence on attention that is roughly proportionate to the intensity of its painfulness: the. .. normally a sign, for example the withdrawal from the source of the pain and the keeping still of the limb injured Others may seem to be designed to fit neither of these ends, but they may all the same have at least the function of mitigating the sensation of pain There is experimental evidence indicating that, if the stimulation of other receptors increases, the sensitivity of the ones that originally caused... regimented, and to contend that, despite this conflict, neither aim is irrational A consequence of this dilemma is that, in the intra-personal sphere of prudence, there is no kind of life that everyone has best reason to have Nor is there, in the inter-personal sphere of morality, any kind of life that we all have best reason to see others have (such as, the kind of life that contains as much satisfaction as... sphere of morality This 10 Introduction follows from my analysis of personal identity in the first half of Part IV which reveals it to be rationally insignificant Since the distinction between ourselves and others is rationally insignificant, we may in the moral domain handle the life and desires of another (relevantly alike) individual as in the prudential domain we may rationally handle our own life and... instance, as we may contravene the inter-temporal maximization of our own fulfilment in the name of some ideal, we may contravene the inter-temporal fulfilment maximization of another In itself, the fact that it is another rather than oneself is irrelevant Hence, we see that the conflict between prudentialism and rationalism in the realm of prudence spills over into the moral realm Individualism, having... never the case that a sensation is just painful: a pain must also be cutting, or stinging, burning, throbbing, ripping, etc A sensation’s possessing the quality of painfulness is dependent upon its possessing some quality of the latter kind in a way that 20 The Nature of Para-cognitive Attitudes its possessing a quality of the latter range is not dependent upon its being painful Suppose that you have a. .. having gained a foothold in prudence, can march into the moral domain as well, since personal identity is rationally unimportant The fact that inter-personal maximization is not rationally required in the moral sphere or, alternatively expressed, that idealism is admissible, shows that a moral individualism is true There is, in neither of these spheres, any aim that we all have most reason to adopt as there... maximizes satisfaction, especially in our own life The examination of the rationality of attitudes in Part II dissolves this air of paradox by distinguishing between rational attitudes in the sense, roughly, of attitudes being based on an adequate representation of everything there is reason to believe true, and attitudes that it is rational to have given this body of beliefs and certain intrinsic aims or... (1984, 1985) Pain as a Sensory Quality 21 A light becomes dazzling by reaching a certain intensity, and there must be some underlying quality that has this intensity Similarly, I propose, a sensation acquires the property of being painful by reaching a certain intensity—usually the intensity that is correlated with the stimulus beginning to do harm to the body In the case of every painful sensation, it . implications for the business of living. An understanding of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, of conditionals, of their role in the analysis of causation, of the relation between. may in the moral domain handle the life and desires of another (relev- antly alike) individual as in the prudential domain we may rationally handle our own life and desires. For instance, as we. Cataloging in Publication Data Persson, Ingmar. The retreat of reason : a dilemma in the philosophy of life / Ingmar Persson. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Life. 2. Thought and thinking.