[...]... imitating’ Fossheim’s interest in the learning processes that are involved in acquiring the virtues is shared by Adam Morton In his chapter ‘Moral Incompetence’, Morton’s thesis is the very Aristotelian claim that there is much more to being a good person than meaning well We also need what Morton calls ‘moral competence’, and he uses a series of engaging examples to diagnose and describe moral incompetence—a... underlines the truth of Aristotle’s famous remark (NE 1103b24) that in ethics ‘education is the main thing—indeed, it is the only thing’ If Fossheim is right, moral education has to involve imitation—‘practical mimesis’, as he calls it—because the point of the process is as it were for the actor to grow into his mask: ‘we end up being— bringing fully to reality—what we began by merely imitating’ Fossheim’s... reference to Aristotle’s main discussion of mimesis, in the Poetics He concedes, of course, that this instinct can only be a beginning: in particular, it does not account for the intellectual understanding that comes with practical wisdom, which for Aristotle is a crucial component of full virtue He also admits the obvious point that the human instinct to imitate can set us in the direction of vice,... doctrine of particularism I reject both responses: they do not help us to understand the nature of practical wisdom, and anyway are implausible in themselves I then offer my own response This involves me in rethinking the relation of belief and desire in motivation (cp Brewer’s discussion in Chapter 14) In most recent philosophy, this relation has been understood in Humean terms—desire as the engine;... to ‘stand outside’ one’s previous understanding of what it is that one is desiring One of Brewer’s own examples is Augustine The ‘longing that serves as the unifying thread of Augustine’s Confessions, and that he eventually comes to regard as the desire for God’, takes very different forms during Augustine’s life: ‘Yet Augustine thinks that we would lose sight of the possibility of conversion (and the... away that what his Ethics is a theory of is not at all what either Principia Ethica or The Right and the Good purports to be a theory of It is interesting to see how Albert Schweitzer, long ago and from a somewhat different tradition, had also got the message A running head in his Civilization and Ethics rather startlingly proclaims: ‘Aristotle Substitutes his Doctrine of Virtues for Ethics (Schweitzer... of ethical understanding, and an accompanying stress on the use of the imagination as an essential part of the exercise of practical wisdom, has become very in uential in virtue ethics The in uence is obvious in Karen Stohr’s chapter, ‘Manners, Morals, and Practical Wisdom’, in which she develops a rich account of some important but often-neglected aspects of practical wisdom by looking closely at the... labels and emphases to distinguish too much modern virtue ethics from other approaches Moreover, virtue ethics as now mostly practised has, Coope believes, been in uential in spreading some important errors: above all, as he puts it, ‘the cardinal virtue of justice, ‘‘more glorious than the morning or the evening star’’, has become damagingly marginalized’ While Coope criticizes modern virtue ethics. .. between the good and the noble or admirable, and the places and relative functions of pleasure, desire, belief, and reason in ethics Russell focuses on Hume’s foundational notions: ‘virtue’ and ‘moral sense’ He shows that Hume regards virtue as continuous with our other admirable qualities, including our natural abilities such as intelligence, and even including physical beauty Unlike Aristotle, Hume... am assuming we exclude things only wanted through ignorance) It would be unnatural and confusing to insist that this fulfilment could not be independent of his flourishing and must instead be counted a part of it That said, an account of the difficult concept of flourishing must be an important step in answering the broader question as to fortune The notion of good sense in acting must be related to the . to grow into his mask: ‘we end up being— bringing fully to reality—what we began by merely imitating’. Fossheim’s interest in the learning processes that are involved in acquiring the virtues. Wisdom and Moral Imagination in Sense and Sensibility’, forthcoming in Philosophy and Literature; ‘Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue’, The Journal of Ethics (2003); ‘Virtue Ethics and. Arguments Problems and Prospects Edited by Robert Stern Reason and Nature Essays in the Theory of Rationality Edited by Jos ´ eLuisBerm ´ udez and Alan Millar Values and Virtues Aristotelianism in Contemporary