Harman, Gilbert , Professor of Philosophy , Princeton University Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind Print ISBN 0198238029, 1999 Contents Introduction 1 Part I. Reasoning 1. Rationality 9 2. Practical Reasoning 46 3. Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding what Hypotheses to Take Seriously 75 4. Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief 93 Part II. Analyticity 5. The Death of Meaning 119 6. Doubts about Conceptual Analysis 138 7. Analyticity Regained? 144 Part III. Meaning 8. Three Levels of Meaning 155 9. Language, Thought, and Communication 166 10. Language Learning 183 11. Meaning and Semantics 192 12. (Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics 206 Part IV. Mind 13. Wide Functionalism 235 14. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience 244 15. Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to Meaning and Mind 262 Bibliography 277 Index of Names 287 Index of Subjects 289 end p.ix Introduction show chapter abstract and keywords hide chapter abstract and keywords Gilbert Harman These essays have all been previously published. I have edited them substantially, putting them into a uniform format, reducing repetition, removing some errors, and tinkering with wording. In general, many themes are negative. There is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth. Logic is not a theory of reasoning. A theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning. A purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive. Theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects. Meaning depends on how words are used to think with, that is, on how concepts function in reasoning, perception, and action. The relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world. Translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning. Although the essays are highly interrelated, I have somewhat arbitrarily divided them into four groups, on (1) reasoning and rationality, (2) analyticity, (3) meaning, and (4) mind. Here are brief summaries of the essays. The first four are concerned with basic principles of reasoning and rationality. In Essay 1, 'Rationality', I sharply distinguish logic from the theory of reasoning, reject special foundationalism in favour of general epistemological conservatism, and discuss the role in reasoning of coherence and simplicity. (Simplicity is the main topic of Essay 3.) Throughout Essay 1 I am concerned with the difference between theoretical and practical reasoning and with the role that practical considerations play in theoretical reasoning, an issue addressed further in Essay 4. In Essay 2, 'Practical Reasoning', I argue for several conclusions. Intentions are distinct real psychological states, not mere constructs out of beliefs and desires. One intends to do something only if one believes one will do it. The various things one intends to do should be consistent with each other and with one's beliefs in the same way that one's beliefs should be consistent with each other. There is no similar consistency requirement on desires. Practical reasoning can lead one to the intention to do something only if one is justified in thinking that one's intention will lead to one's doing it. This is so for positive intentions, anyway, which are to be end p.1 distinguished from negative and conditional intentions. All intentions are self- referential and are to be distinguished from beliefs by means of differences between theoretical reasoning, which directly modifies beliefs, and practical reasoning, which directly modifies intentions. I discuss when conclusions are to be reached via practical reasoning and when they are to be reached via theoretical reasoning and make two further points. One can sometimes adopt intrinsic desires at will. One sometimes pursues a plan in order to give significance to earlier acts. Essay 3, 'Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding what Hypotheses to Take Seriously', begins by discussing curve fitting and Goodman's 'new riddle of induction'. Taking the simplicity of a hypothesis to depend entirely on the simplicity of the way it is represented does not work because simplicity of representation is too dependent on the method of representation, and any hypothesis can be represented simply. An alternative 'semantic' theory also has problems. I am led to propose a 'computational' theory that considers how easy it is to use a hypothesis to get answers in which one is interested. (This leads to issues about pragmatism that are addressed at length in the following essay.) I also discuss the use of calculators and tables in getting such answers and I compare (bad) parasitical theories with (good) idealizations in science. In Essay 4, 'Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief', I consider how to explain the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and conservatism. I discuss various sorts of practical reasons to believe things and argue that it is sometimes possible to decide to believe something on the basis of practical considerations. After noting difficulties with trying to explain epistemic reasons in terms of connections with truth or the goal of believing what is true, I discuss certain issues in the foundations of probability theory, suggesting that epistemic reasons connect with conditional probability in a way that nonepistemic reasons do not. Essays 5-7 argue against the once popular philosophical idea that certain claims are true by virtue of meaning and knowable by virtue of meaning. The original version of Essay 5, 'The Death of Meaning', was the first part of a two-part essay on W. V. Quine's early philosophical views. The essay begins by noting that the analytic-synthetic distinction presupposes an explanatory claim. I describe Quine's argument that logic cannot be true by convention but only by convention plus logic. In any event, the relevant 'conventions' are merely postulates. We can conceive of them failing to hold end p.2 just as we can conceive of any other postulates failing to hold. Failing to hold is not the same as having a false negation. It may be that certain terminology must be rejected as committing one to false presuppositions. Analyticity is often explained in terms of synonymy, but this requires an explained technical notion of synonymy, not the more ordinary notion. Some philosophers have been tempted by a paradigm case argument for analyticity: we can teach students how to use the term 'analytic', so there must be analytic truths. A similar argument would show that there really were witches in Salem. The philosophical use of these notions depends upon a proposed explanation of the difficulty some people have at imagining certain things. As one's imagination improves, it becomes more difficult to accept the analytic-synthetic distinction. I go on in Essay 5 to discuss the postulation of language-independent meanings and other intensional objects. I discuss Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation, using the example of various ways to translate number theory to set theory. (However, I argue against indeterminacy of radical translation in Essay 10.) Finally, I discuss the positive Quinean theory of meaning, which puts weight on translation, where translation is a similarity relation, not a strict equivalence relation. Essay 6, 'Doubts about Conceptual Analysis', is a brief response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain 'analyses' as analytic or a priori truths, I point out that such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Jackson says that the rejection of the analytic- synthetic distinction rests on biased samples of hard cases. That is just wrong. The historical rejection of analyticity was based on consideration of central cases. After making these points I go on to summarize a few of the arguments against analyticity of Essay 5. In Essay 7, 'Analyticity Regained?', I comment on a defence of analyticity by Paul Boghossian. The next five essays are directly concerned with meaning. Essay 8, 'Three Levels of Meaning', distinguishes three conceptions of meaning —meaning as conceptual role, meaning as communicated thought, and meaning as speech-act potential. At one time, these were conceived as competing conceptions, but it is better to see them as potentially compatible theories that are concerned with different aspects or levels of meaning. Essays 9 and 10 discuss the idea that a natural language like English is in the first instance incorporated into the system of representation with which one thinks. This 'incorporation' view is compared with a translation end p.3 or 'decoding' view of communication. Essay 9, 'Language, Thought, and Communication', develops the basic argument, and argues that compositional semantics only makes sense given the implausible decoding view. Essay 10, 'Language Learning', discusses what it might be for thoughts to include instances of sentences of a language and notes that children can understand more than they can themselves say. Essay 10 ends by arguing that, even though Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation should be rejected, considerations of translation do not argue against the incorporation view. Essay 11, 'Meaning and Semantics', critically examines the popular suggestion that a theory of meaning ought to take the form of a theory of truth. After rejecting several arguments of the suggestion, I sketch a conceptual role semantics in which the meanings of logical constants are determined in large part by implications involving those logical constants, where implication is to be explained in terms of truth. Although truth conditions are sometimes relevant to meaning, this is only the case for the meanings of logical constants. Essay 12, '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics', further elaborates the suggested approach to meaning. I distinguish the use of symbols in calculation and other thinking from the use of symbols in communication. I note that Grice's analysis of speaker meaning fails for certain uses of symbols in calculation. Following Ryle, I note that words and concepts have uses, but sentences or whole thoughts do not. I sketch some of the uses or functional roles of concepts —in perception, inference, and practical reasoning. I discuss issues of indeterminacy and what it is for aspects of a description of functional role to correspond to reality. I stress that functional roles must be understood in terms of ways an organism functions in relation to a presumed normal environment, applying the point to discussions of Twin Earth and inverted qualia. The final three essays (13-15) are more directly concerned with the nature of mind, although they carry on themes developed in the previous essays. Essay 13, 'Wide Functionalism', argues that psychological explanation is a kind of functional explanation, like some biological explanation, where the relevant functions tend to have to do with perceiving and acting in relation to the environment. Pain serves as a kind of alarm system; perception allows an organism to get information about the environment; and so on. Although there are defenders of a narrow, more solipsistic psychological functionalism, I offer a brief history of the subject that indicates that the dominant trend has involved the wider version. In any event, the wider end p.4 functionalism is clearly more plausible, and methodological solipsism in psychology is actually incoherent. Essay 14, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', discusses three related arguments against the sort of functionalism I have been defending. The first argument says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for such an awareness in a purely functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third holds that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. I argue that all three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object. The final essay, 'Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to Meaning and Mind', distinguishes two approaches to the understanding of the experiences and uses of language of others. One emphasizes Verstehen or translation. The other restricts itself to an objective description of use and function. I argue that each approach by itself must leave something out. We need both approaches. end p.5 end p.6 Part I Reasoning end p.7 end p.8 1 Rationality show chapter abstract and keywords hide chapter abstract and keywords Gilbert Harman Introduction What is it for someone to be rational or reasonable, as opposed to being irrational or unreasonable? Think of some examples in which someone is being rational or reasonable as well as examples in which someone is being irrational or unreasonable. What do you think makes the difference? Think also of some examples in which someone makes a mistake but is not therefore irrational or unreasonable. 1.1.1 Some Examples Here is one kind of example: Giving In To temptation Jane very much wants to do well in history. There is a crucial test tomorrow and she needs to study tonight if she is to do well in the test. Jane's friends are all going to a party for Bill tonight. Jane knows that if she goes to the party, she will really regret it. But she goes to the party anyway. It is irrational for Jane to go to the party, even if it is understandable. The rational thing for her to do is to stay home and study. Many examples of giving in to temptation involve a bit of irrationality. For example, smoking cigarettes while knowing of the health hazards involved is at least somewhat irrational. The rational thing to do is to give up smoking. Here is a different sort of example: Refusing To Take a Remedial Course Bob, a college freshman, takes a test designed to indicate whether students should take a useful remedial writing course. Students do not write their names in their examination booklets but write an identifying number instead, so that graders will not know the identity of end p.9 the students whose answers they are grading. Bob does poorly in the test and is told he should take a remedial writing course. He objects to this advice, attributing his poor score on the test to bias on the part of the grader against his ethnic group, and does not take the remedial writing course. Bob's belief that his score is the result of bias is irrational. It would be more rational for Bob to conclude that he got a poor score because he did poorly on the test. Refusing a Reasonable Proposal Three students, Sally, Ellie, and Louise, have been assigned to a set of rooms consisting of a study room, a small single bedroom, and another small bedroom with a two-person bunk bed. Sally has arrived first and has moved into the single. The other two room-mates propose that they take turns living in the single, each getting the single for one-third of the school year. Sally refuses to consider this proposal and insists on keeping the single for herself the whole year. Sally's room-mates say she is being unreasonable. (Is she?) Confusing Two Philosophers Frieda is having trouble in her introductory philosophy course. Because of a similarity in their names, she confuses the medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas with the twentieth- century American philosopher W. V. Quine. This is a mistake but does not necessarily exhibit irrationality or unreasonableness (although it may). Failing To Distinguish Twins Harry has trouble distinguishing the twins Connie and Laura. Sometimes he mistakes one for the other. That by itself is not irrational or unreasonable, although it would be unreasonable for Harry to be over-confident in the judgement that he is talking to Connie, given his past mistakes. Adding Mistake Sam makes an adding mistake when he tries to balance his chequebook. A mistake in addition need not involve any irrationality or unreasonableness. end p.10 Consider mistakes about probability. Under certain conditions some people assign a higher probability to Linda's being a feminist and a bank teller than to her merely being a bank teller. The probabilities that people assign to certain situations can depend on how the situation is described, even though the descriptions are logically equivalent. Are mistakes of this sort always irrational or unreasonable? Are some of them more like mistakes in addition? What is the difference between the sort of mistake involved in being irrational or unreasonable and other mistakes that do not involve being irrational or unreasonable? Does it matter what the difference is? Do you think it is irrational or unreasonable to believe in astrology? To be superstitious? To believe in God? To believe in science? To be moral? To think that other people have mental experiences like your own? To suppose that the future will resemble the past? These questions increasingly raise a question of scepticism. A sceptic about X is someone who takes it to be irrational or unreasonable to believe in X. Is scepticism sometimes itself irrational or unreasonable? 1.1.2 Rationality and Cognitive Science Issues about rationality have significance for cognitive science. For example, one strategy for dealing with cognition is to start with the assumption that people think and act rationally, and then investigate what can be explained on that basis. Classical economic theory seeks to explain market behaviour as the result of interactions among completely rational agents following their own interests. Similarly, psychologists sometimes explain 'person perception', the judgements that one makes about others, by taking these judgements to be the result of reasonable causal inferences from the way others behave in one's presence. In ordinary life, we often base predictions on the assumption that other people will act rationally (Dennett, 1971), as we do when we assume that other drivers will act rationally in traffic. Such strategies require assumptions about rationality. Economics assumes that the rational agent maximizes expected utility (for example, von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Classical attribution theory identifies rationality with the scientific method (for example, Kelley, 1967). It is less clear how we identify what is rational in our ordinary thinking. (One possibility is that each person asks what he or she would do in the other person's shoes and identifies that imagined response as the rational one.) end p.11 Some research has been interpreted as showing that people often depart systematically from the ideal economic agent, or the ideal scientist. People often ignore background frequencies, tend to look for confirming evidence rather than disconfirming evidence, take the conjunction of two claims to have a higher probability than one of the claims by itself, and so on. There is more than one way to try to explain (away) these apparent departures from ideal rationality. One type of explanation points to resource limits. Resource Limits Reasoning uses resources and there are limits to the available resources. Reasoners have limited attention spans, limited memories, and limited time. Ideal rationality is not always possible for limited beings: because of our limits, we may make use of strategies and heuristics, rules of thumb that work or seem to work most of the time, but not always. It is rational for us to use such rules, if we have nothing better that will give us reasonable answers in the light of our limited resources. A second way to explain apparent departures from rationality is to challenge the view of rationality according to which these are departures even from ideal rationality. If people depart from what is rational according to a particular theory, that may be either because they are departing from rationality or because that particular theory of rationality is incorrect. Some of the cases in which people appear to depart from ideal rationality are cases in which people appear to be inconsistent in what they accept. They make logical mistakes or violate principles of probability that they also seem to accept. How could these cases not be cases of irrationality? Two ways have been suggested. First, it may be that people are not actually being inconsistent in their judgements. Different Concepts People may be using concepts in a different way from the experimenter. When people judge that Linda is more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a bank teller, they may be using 'more likely' to mean something like 'more representative'. When people make apparent mistakes in logic, that may be because they mean by 'if' what the experimenter means by 'if and only if'. Given what they mean by their words, they may not be as inconsistent as they appear to be (Cohen, 1981). Second, even if people are sometimes inconsistent, that does not show they are being irrational. end p.12 Reasonable Inconsistency It is not always irrational or unreasonable to be inconsistent (Pollock, 1991; Nozick, 1993). It is an important question just what connection there is between being inconsistent and being unreasonable or irrational. In this essay, I look more closely at rationality and reasonableness. I consider both actions and beliefs. What is it to act rationally or reasonably and what is it to act irrationally or unreasonably? What is it to have rational or reasonable beliefs and what is it to have irrational or unreasonable beliefs? 1.2 Background 1.2.1 Theoretical and Practical Rationality Let us begin by contrasting two of the examples mentioned above, 'Giving in to temptation' and 'Refusing to take a remedial course'. Jane goes to a party knowing she should instead study for tomorrow's exam. Bob thinks his grade on the writing placement exam is due to prejudice against his ethnic group even though he knows the grader does not have any way to discover the ethnic backgrounds of those taking the exam. One obvious difference is that Jane's irrationality is manifested in a decision to do something, namely, to go to the party, whereas Bob's irrationality is manifested in his belief, whether or not he acts on that belief. Bob does go on to make an irrational decision to refuse to take the writing course that he needs, but the source of that irrational decision is Bob's irrational belief. The source of Jane's irrational decision is not an irrational belief. Jane knows very well that she should stay home and study. In deciding to go to the party knowing she should instead study for tomorrow's exam, Jane exhibits a defect in practical rationality. In believing that his grade on the writing placement exam is due to prejudice against his ethnic group, Bob exhibits a defect in theoretical rationality. Theoretical rationality is rationality in belief; practical rationality is rationality in action, or perhaps in plans and intentions. Just as we can distinguish theoretical from practical rationality, we can distinguish theoretical reasoning, which most directly affects beliefs, from practical reasoning, which most directly affects plans and intentions. The upshot of theoretical reasoning is either a change in beliefs or no change, whereas the upshot of practical reasoning is either a change in plans and intentions or no change. Bob's irrationality arises from a problem with his end p.13 theoretical reasoning. There may be nothing wrong with his practical reasoning apart from that. Jane's irrationality arises entirely from a defect in practical reasoning and not at all from anything in her theoretical reasoning. Theoretical and practical reasoning are similar in certain respects, but there are important differences. One important difference has to do with the rationality of arbitrary choices. Arbitrary Belief Jane is trying to decide which route Albert took to work this morning. She knows that in the past Albert has taken Route A about half the time and Route B about half the time. Her other evidence does not support one of these conclusions over the other. So, Jane arbitrarily decides to believe that Albert took Route A. Clearly, Jane should suspend judgement and neither believe that Albert took Route A nor believe that he took Route B. It is irrational or unreasonable for her to adopt one of these beliefs in the absence of further evidence distinguishing the two possibilities. On the other hand, consider the practical analogue. Arbitrary Intention Albert is trying to decide how to get to work this morning. He could take either Route A or Route B. Taking either of these routes will get him to work at about the same time and the balance of reasons does not favour going one way over going the other way. So, Albert arbitrarily forms the intention of taking Route A. This arbitrary decision is quite reasonable. In fact, it would be quite irrational or unreasonable for Albert not to decide on one route rather than the other, even though his decision in the case must be completely arbitrary. Someone who was [...]... are added If A and B logically imply Z, so do A, B, and C, and so do A, B, C, and D, and so on On the other hand, reasoning is nonmonotonic in this sense: Reasoning Is Conclusions that are reasonable on the basis of specific Nonmonotonic information can become unreasonable if further information is added Given the announced schedule for your course, your experience of the last few weeks, and that today... there are not two mutually exclusive kinds of reasoning, deductive and inductive Deduction has to do with implication and consistency and is only indirectly relevant to what you should believe 1.4.5 Nonmonotonic Reasoning Unclarity about the relation between deduction and induction may be responsible for the occasional description of induction as 'nonmonotonic reasoning' in alleged contrast with deduction,... be distinguished from issues about implication and consistency Inference and reasoning are psychological processes leading to possible changes in belief (theoretical reasoning) or possible changes in plans and intentions (practical reasoning) Implication is most directly a relation among propositions Certain propositions imply another proposition when and only when, if the former propositions are true,... induction and deduction are not two kinds of anything Deduction is concerned with certain relations among propositions, especially relations of implication and consistency Induction is not concerned with those or any similar sort of relation among propositions Induction is a kind of reasoning But, as we will see, deduction is not a kind of reasoning 1.4.1 Induction and Deduction as Two Kinds of Reasoning. .. proofs, arguments do seem relevant to reasoning It is not just that you sometimes reason about deductions in the way you reason about the weather or how much tax you owe It is an interesting and nontrivial problem to say just how deductions are relevant to reasoning, a problem that is hidden by talk of deductive and inductive reasoning, as if it is obvious that some reasoning follows deductive principles... reason to believe P over and above the extent to which the probability of P given R is greater than the probability of P given not-R These definitions leave open the important question whether all practical end p.17 reasons for belief are nonepistemic reasons, a question we come back to below 1.2.2 Inference and Reasoning Versus Implication and Consistency Issues about inference and reasoning need to be... and either I believe in God or I do not So there are four possibilities with the Pascal's argument for belief in God following payoffs: (I) If I believe in God and there is a God, then I go to heaven and have infinite bliss (II) If I believe in God and there is no God, then my costs are whatever is involved in believing in God (III) If I do not believe in God and there is a God, then I go to hell and. .. part of the original theory T Nonparasitic Explanation Why does E occur? Because of initial conditions C and laws L Given C and L and the following calculation , we expect E Parasitic explanation Why does E occur? According to theory T, it is because of initial conditions C, and laws L Given C and L and the following calculation , we would on theory T expect E Our theory is that things will occur... have to be distinguished from issues about rationality and irrationality Consistency and inconsistency are in the first instance relations among propositions and only indirectly relations among propositional attitudes Propositions are consistent when and only when it is possible for them all to be true together Propositions are inconsistent when and only when it is not possible for them all to be true... rules and reasoning that proceeds temporally in the same pattern as the proof in accordance with those rules You do not reason deductively in the sense that your reasoning has the pattern of a proof You can reason about a deductive proof, just as you can reason about anything else But your reasoning is not well represented by anything like a proof or argument in the sense above 1.4.2 Implication and . Inference and Reasoning Versus Implication and Consistency Issues about inference and reasoning need to be distinguished from issues about implication and consistency. Inference and reasoning. on (1) reasoning and rationality, (2) analyticity, (3) meaning, and (4) mind. Here are brief summaries of the essays. The first four are concerned with basic principles of reasoning and rationality. In. concerned with meaning. Essay 8, 'Three Levels of Meaning& apos;, distinguishes three conceptions of meaning meaning as conceptual role, meaning as communicated thought, and meaning as speech-act