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RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. PROJECT AIR FORCE Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East Dangerous But Not Omnipotent Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Frederic Wehrey • David E. Thaler • Nora Bensahel • Kim Cragin Jerrold D. Green • Dalia Dassa Kaye • Nadia Oweidat • Jennifer Li The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. R AND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract FA7014-06-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dangerous but not omnipotent : exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian power in the Middle East / Frederic Wehrey [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4554-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Iran—Politics and government—1997– 4. Iran—Military policy. 5. Political culture—Iran. 6. State-sponsored terrorism—Iran. 7. Terrorism— Middle East. 8. Weapons of mass destruction—Iran. 9. Iran—Foreign relations— Middle East. 10. Middle East—Foreign relations—Iran. I. Wehrey, Frederic M. E183.8.I55D355 2009 327.73055—dc22 2009009797 iii Preface Canvassing a range of global threats, the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy warns: We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. 1 Indeed, following the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Ira- nian threat to U.S. interests has taken on seemingly unprecedented qualities of aggressiveness and urgency. Defying international con- demnation, the Islamic Republic appears inexorably committed to the pursuit of nuclear energy that will, at the very least, allow for a break- out weapon capability. Its longstanding support to Levantine terrorist groups earned it newfound acclaim in the Arab world following Hez- bollah’s 2006 war with Israel. Within its conventional arsenal, Iran is developing new and worrisome naval capabilities for impeding mari- time access to the Strait of Hormuz, as well as longer-range ballistic missiles that would put U.S. military assets and American allies in the region at risk. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran’s clandestine para- military wing, the Qods Force, has been implicated in supplying lethal technology to insurgents and paramilitaries. Added to these immediate provocations is the sense that Iran is trying to effect far-reaching changes on the regional and even global stage. Iran has long exercised broad-ranging influence inside Iraq, 1 National Security Council, e National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: e White House, March 2006, p. 1 of opening statement. iv Dangerous But Not Omnipotent spreading alarm among Sunni Arab states and raising the specter of Iran filling the power vacuum following the departure of U.S. forces. Similarly, the cascading sense of regional insecurity arising from its nuclear ambitions has spurred warnings of proliferation among Arab states. Further afield, Tehran has worked assiduously to leapfrog U.S. encirclement by courting partners as diverse as Latin American dema- gogues, the post-apartheid government of South Africa, and the Shang- hai Cooperation Organization. Yet the U.S. ability to gauge the extent and totality of these chal- lenges is ultimately handicapped by the lack of official relations between the two states since the Islamic Revolution and, more subtly, by a lin- gering sense of national trauma from the hostage crisis of 1979–1981. Working within this context, this study aims to provide U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Department of Defense (DoD) planners a new framework for anticipating and preparing for the strategic challenges Iran will present over the next ten to fifteen years. We adopted as an analytical point of departure the observation that although Iranian power projection is marked by strengths, it also has serious liabilities and limitations. We survey the nature of both by assessing four critical areas—the Iranian regime’s underlying perception of itself in the world as a regional and even global power, Iran’s conventional military capa- bilities and aspirations for asymmetric warfare, its support to Islamist militant groups, and its appeal to Arab public opinion. Based on this assessment, we offer a new U.S. policy paradigm that seeks to manage the challenges Iran presents through the exploitation of regional barri- ers to its power; we also identify the sources of caution in the regime’s strategic calculus. e bulk of the research for this monograph was completed in late 2007. To the extent practicable, the authors have updated descriptions of major events and conditions described throughout the monograph through early 2009. e research reported here was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Director of Operational Plans and Joint Matters (A5X), Headquar- ters USAF, and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE for a fiscal year 2007 study “Persia Rising: Meeting Future Security Challenges Presented by Iran.” is Preface v monograph should be of interest to U.S. security policymakers, military planners, and analysts and observers of regional affairs in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Cor- poration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and devel- opment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the devel- opment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train- ing; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site at http://www.rand.org/paf vii Contents Preface iii Figures ix Table xi Summary xiii Acknowledgments xxv Abbreviations xxvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction: Understanding the Iranian Challenge 1 CHAPTER TWO Assertiveness and Caution in Iranian Strategic Culture 7 CHAPTER THREE Asymmetric Ambition and Conventional Reality: Iran’s Evolving Defense Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities 39 CHAPTER FOUR Iran and Its Non-State Partners: Assessing Linkages and Control 81 CHAPTER FIVE Arab Perceptions of the Iranian reat 129 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion: U.S. Strategy and the Islamic Republic 153 References 181 [...]... Government Printing Office, July 26, 2004, p 60 xiii xiv Dangerous But Not Omnipotent that ideology and bravado frequently mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik—the qualities that define “normal” state behavior Similarly, when we canvassed Iran’s power projection options, we identified not only the extent of the threats posed by each but also their limitations and liabilities In each case,... the event of a xx Dangerous But Not Omnipotent U.S strike Yet our own field research on this issue reveals these worries are overblown: Most Shi’ite groups have worked peacefully within the system for political change and reject Iran as a political patron (See pp 131–144.) Arab opinion on Iran is often split between publics and their regimes Arab regimes fear Iran’s nuclear aspirations but are cognizant... Program,” Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2004 xxii Dangerous But Not Omnipotent natural disaster relief, refugees, and other humanitarian crises The United States should identify and exploit areas where genuine collaboration can be productive and profitable, without harboring expectations for broader diplomatic breakthroughs These morelimited efforts should not be trivialized by over-hyping them News of... Lieutenant Commander Anthony Butera (U.S Navy) and RAND colleagues Derek Eaton, David Frelinger, and Bruce Pirnie Pardee RAND Graduate School Fellow Second Lieutenant Dave Shulker, USAF, added valuable suggestions for the concluding section Outside RAND, we benefited from the insights and comments of Karim Sadjadpour, Michael Eisenstadt, and Barbara Slavin xxv xxvi Dangerous But Not Omnipotent Several people... indispensable regional power, but not necessarily a revolutionary hegemon There is the further belief that the Islamic Republic is a model for Islamic enlightenment everywhere and the preeminent Islamic state in the region, providing a geopolitical bridge between Asia and the Middle East As a result of these perceived attributes, the Iranian leadership has shown a marked tendency not only to push for a greater... theological challenge stemming from Shi’ite seminaries in Iraq The learning centers of Najaf and Karbala long dominated Shi’ite discourse before being suppressed by Ba’athist regimes in Iraq; they xvi Dangerous But Not Omnipotent are now reemerging with the potential to overshadow their Iranian counterparts in Qom Finally, the Iranian leadership continues to perceive an existential threat posed to the Islamic... This reliance on asymmetric capabilities can threaten Western interests in a variety of ways, particularly on the naval front Iran’s mining capability, antiship cruise missiles, and inno- xviii Dangerous But Not Omnipotent vative “swarming” tactics could impede maritime access in the Strait of Hormuz (See pp 64–70.) The Revolutionary Guard also possesses a significant arsenal of short- and medium-range... Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods (Jerusalem) Force IRIAF Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting xxvii xxviii Dangerous But Not Omnipotent ISCI Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance LEF Law Enforcement Forces MANPADS man-portable air defense system MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs... Arms Sales in the Middle East,” Washington Post, July 31, 2007, p 15 2 The White House, “President Bush Addresses the 89th Annual National Convention of the American Legion,” August 28, 2007 1 2 Dangerous But Not Omnipotent capability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz Elsewhere in the region, Tehran continues to sponsor terrorist groups such as Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah—an organization... Vol 58, No 2, Spring 2004, p. 187 7 Farsan Shahidi, “Unsuccessful U.S Policies in the Middle East,” Sobhe Sadegh (weekly magazine of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), in Persian, n.d 4 Dangerous But Not Omnipotent and deter Iranian aggression This role is all the more critical in times when the regional security environment is in flux and local states are rethinking old paradigms of confrontation . Power in the Middle East Dangerous But Not Omnipotent Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Frederic. Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dangerous but not omnipotent : exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian power in