... few,ifany,institutionswithahighratingfailedwithinayearafter the ratingswerepublished.Althoughnotalllow‐ratedinstitutionssubsequentlyfailed, the failurerateoflow‐ratedinstitutionswasveryhigh,validatingourviewthattheyareatriskoffailure,especially in adeeprecessionor depression. In 1987,WeissResearchpurchased the Holt bank ratingsdatabase and quantitativemodels,incorporatingelementsofitsownqualitative bank ratingsmethodology and publishingtheseunder the bannerofWeissSafetyRatings. In its1994study,InsuranceRatings:ComparisonofPrivateAgencyRatingsforLife/HealthInsurers,3 the U.S.GeneralAccountabilityOffice(GAO)reviewed the Weissratingsscale(fromAtoF) and determinedthataWeissSafetyRatingofD+orlowerdenotesinstitutionsthatare“vulnerable”tofuturefinancial failures. Further, the highpercentageofcompaniesratedD+orlowerthatsubsequentlyfailedagainvalidated the generalaccuracyofthatdesignation.Although the GAOwasreferringtoadifferentindustry(life and healthinsurers), the Weissratingsscalewasdesignedtoconvey the samesignificanceacrossvariousfinancialindustries,includingcommercialbanks,savingsbanks, and savings and loanassociations. In 2006, the NewYorkmediafirmTheStreet.compurchased the WeissRatings,nowcalledFinancialStrengthRatings.However,TheStreet.comratingsscale(AthroughF)is the sameas the earlierWeissratingsscale,while the ratingsmethodologyhasremainedvirtually the sameaswell.Now,for the purposesofthispaper,TheStreet.comhasprovidedalistofallrateddepositoryinstitutionswithaFinancialStrengthRatingofD+(weak)orlower.4 And basedon the backgroundcitedabove,webelieve the listisbothmorecomprehensive and moreaccuratethan the FDIC’s.5From the list,WeissResearchfindsthat: ... In sum,atotalof1,568banks and thriftsareatriskwithassetsof$2.32trillion.That’s6times the numberorinstitutions and 15times the assetsofbanks and thriftson the FDIC’sfourthquarter2008ProblemList. Given the deterioration in banks and in the economyreportedby the FDIC and the CommerceDepartment,itislikelythatmorebanks and thriftswillbeaddedto the listoncefourthquarterratingsbecomeavailable.3Available in pdfimageformatprovidedby the GAOathttp://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152669.pdf.4TheStreet.com’sdatasourcesare the FederalFinancialInstitutionsExaminationCouncilCallReport and the OfficeofThriftSupervision’sThriftFinancialReportsfor the thirdquarterof2008,asprovidedbyHighlineFinancial,Inc.,withreferenceto the fourthquarterCallReportsstrictlytodeterminewhichbankswerestill in businessatyearend.5 The opinionsexpressedhereregardingTheStreet.comratingsareexclusivelythoseofMartinWeiss and WeissResearch.11 The precisedifferencesbetween the FDIC’smethodforflaggingproblembanks and the methodusedherearenotknown.However, the aggregateresultsshouldmakeitclearthat the magnitudeof the bankingtroubles in the U.S.todaycouldbefargreaterthanwhat the FDICispubliclyrecognizing.12PartIIU.S.CommercialBanksHaveTakenMassive,OftenUnquantifiable,Risks in TheirDerivativesHoldings The collapseofmajorfinancialinstitutionssince2008hascomeasashocktobothWallStreet and Washington.Butnearly15yearsago, the U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)explicitlywarnedofthispossibility.OnMay18,1994, in alandmarkstudy,FinancialDerivatives,ActionsNeededtoProtect the FinancialSystem,6itstatedthat:1. ... The federalgovernmentwouldnotnecessarilyintervenejusttokeepamajorOTCderivativesdealerfromfailing,buttoavertacrisis, the FederalReservemayberequiredtoserveaslenderoflastresorttoanymajorU.S.OTCderivativesdealer,whetherregulatedorunregulated.” In responseto the GAO’s1994warningsabove, the financialindustry’sresponsewasbothaudible and caustic.MajorWallStreetfirmspushedbackwithconcertedlobbyingeffortstoblockanyregulatorychangesat the pass,while“ChickenLittle”accusationswereleveledat the authors,Congressionalrequestersof the study, and anyindependentfirm,suchasWeissResearch,thatmadeforecastsbasedonitsconclusions.7 The industry’sprimaryargument in defenseofderivativeswasthattheyhelpedtoreduceriskthroughhedging, and thateachderivativespositionwasgenerallybalancedagainstoffsettingpositions.However,manylargefinancialinstitutions—suchasBearStearns,LehmanBrothers,MerrillLynch and the AmericanInsuranceGroup(AIG)—wentfarbeyondhedging,transformingtheirderivativesdivisionsintomajorprofitcentersbasedonspeculativetrading.Moreover,theydidnotadequatelyprotectthemselvesagainstdefaultsbytheirtradingpartnersoranticipate the severityof the systemriskstressedby the GAO.Subsequently,asdetailed in the GAO’sfollow‐upreport,FinancialDerivatives:ActionsTakenorProposedSinceMay1994,8some,mostlycosmetic,changesweremade.Buttheydidnothingtoslow the meteoricgrowthof the veryinstruments and practicesthat the GAOidentifiedasposing the greatestthreatstofinancialinstitutions and the financialsystem.Specifically, In its1994study, the GAOreported, The bestavailabledataindicatethat the totalvolumeofworldwidederivativesoutstandingasofyear‐end1992wasatleast$12.1trillion in termsof the notional,orprincipal,amountofderivativescontracts.”Although the GAOrecognizedthat the $12.1trillionoverstated the actualrisk,italsostatedthat“firmsthatusederivativescansustainsignificantlosses,”implyingthat$12.1trillionwasalreadyconsideredadangerouslylargenumber.However,thatnumberpales in comparisonto the latesttallyofnotionalOTCderivativesby the Bank ofInternationalSettlements(BIS).9Atmid‐year2008, the BISreported$683.7trillion,or56.5times the levelreportedby the GAOfor1992.Worse,amongthesewere$57.3trillion in creditdefaultswaps,orbetson the failureofnamedcorporations.Thesecontractsarewidelyrecognizedas the highestriskcategoryofderivatives and aredirectlyresponsibleforthedemiseofAIG,oneof the largestthreatsto the globalfinancialsystemtoday.7 In SafeMoneyReport,Issue#294,October2,1998,wewrote“Evenas the Dowmakesnewhighs,WallStreet and the world’sfinancialmarketssitatopagiganticmountainofderivatives—high‐riskbets and debtsthattotalamind‐boggling$285trillion.”http://www.martinweiss.com/images/PDF/SMR/SMR294.pdf.Similarly, in SafeMoneyReport,Issue#391,November2006,wewrote“It’saglobalVesuviusthatcoulderuptatalmostanytime,instantlythrowing the world’sfinancialmarketsintoturmoil...