Part C Pricing Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling. Costas Courcoubetis and Richard Weber Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ISBN: 0-470-85130-9 7 Cost-based Pricing This chapter is about prices that are directly related to cost. We begin with the problem of finding cost-based prices that are fair or stable under potential competition (Sections 7.1 –7.2). We look for types of prices that can protect an incumbent against entry by potential competitors, or against bypass by customers who might find it cheaper to supply themselves. We explain the notions of subsidy-free and sustainable prices. Such prices are robust against bypass. Similar notions are addressed by the idea of the second-best core. The aim now differs from that of maximizing economic efficiency. We see that Ramsey prices, which are efficient subject to the constraint of cost recovery, may fail sustainability tests. In Section 7.3 we take a different approach and look at practical issues of constructing cost-based prices. Now we emphasize necessary and simplicity. Prices are to be computed from quantities that can be easily measured and for which accounting data is readily available. An approach that has found much favour with regulators is that of Fully Distributed Cost pricing (FDC). This is a top-down approach, in which costs are attributed to services using the firm’s existing cost accounting records. It ignores economic efficiency, but has the great advantage of simplicity. Section 7.3.5 concerns the Long-Run Incremental Cost approach (LRIC). This is a bottom-up approach, in which the costs of the services are computed using an optimized model for the network and the service production technologies. It can come close to implementing subsidy-free prices. We compare FDC and LRIC in Section 7.4, from the viewpoint of the regulator, who wishes to balance the aims of encouraging efficiency and competition, and of the monopolist who would like to set sustainable prices. The regulator may prefer the accounting-based approach of FDC pricing because it is ‘automatic’ and auditable. However, it may obscure old and inefficient production technology or the fact that the network has been wrongly dimensioned. These problems can be remedied by the LRIC approach, but it is more costly to implement. Flat rate pricing is the subject of Section 7.5. In this type of pricing a customer’s charge does not depend on the actual quantity of services he consumes. Rather, he is charged the average cost of other customers in the same customer group. We discuss the incentives that such a scheme provides and their effects on the market. 7.1 Foundations of cost-based pricing In Chapters 5 and 6 we considered the problem of pricing in a context in which social welfare maximization is the overall aim. We posed optimization problems with unique Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling. Costas Courcoubetis and Richard Weber Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ISBN: 0-470-85130-9 164 COST-BASED PRICING solutions, each achieved by unique sets of prices. However, welfare maximization is not the only thing that matters. A firm’s prices must ensure that it is profitable, or at least that it covers its costs. Cost-based pricing focuses on this consideration. Unfortunately, a fundamental difficulty in defining cost-based prices is that services are usually produced jointly. A large part of the total cost is a common cost, which can be difficult to apportion rationally amongst the different services. One can think of several ways to do it. So although cost-based prices may reasonably be expected to satisfy certain necessary conditions, they differ from welfare-maximizing prices in that they are usually not unique. One necessary condition that cost-based prices ought reasonably to satisfy is that of fairness. Some customers should not find themselves subsidizing the cost of providing services to other customers. If so, these customers are likely to take their business elsewhere. This motivates the idea of subsidy-free prices. A second reasonable necessary condition is that prices should be defensive against competition, discouraging the entry of competitors who by posting lower prices could capture market share. This motivates the idea of sustainable prices. If prices do not reflect actual costs or they hide costs of inefficient production then they invite competition from other firms. Since customers will choose the provider from whom they believe they get the best deal, a game takes place amongst providers, as they seek to offer better deals to customers by deploying different cost functions and operating at different production levels. Prices must be subsidy-free and sustainable if they are to be stable prices, that is, if they are to survive the competition in this game. Interestingly, the set of necessary conditions that we might like to impose on prices can be mutually incompatible. They can also be in conflict with the aim of maximizing social welfare maximization, since they restrict the feasible set of operating points, sometimes reducing it to a single point. 7.1.1 Fair Charges Consider the problem of a single provider who wishes to price his services so that they cover their production cost and are fair in the sense that no customer feels he is subsidizing others. Unfair prices leave him susceptible to competition from another provider, who has the same costs, but charges fairly. Customers might even become producers of their own services. Let N Df1; 2;:::;ng denote a set of n customers, each of whom wishes to buy some services. For T that is a subset N,andletc.T / denote the minimal cost that could by incurred by a facility that is optimized to provide precisely the services desired by the set of customers T . We call this the stand-alone cost of providing services to the customers in T . Assume that because of economies of scale and scope this cost function is subadditive. That is, for all disjoint sets T and U , c.T [ U/ Ä c.T / C c.U/ (7.1) In the terminology of cooperative games, c.Ð/ is called a characteristic function. The service provider wants to share the total cost of providing the services amongst the customers in a manner that they think is fair. Suppose he charges them amounts c 1 ;:::;c n . Let us further suppose that he exactly covers his cost, and so P i2N c i D c.N/. The charges are said to subsidy free if they satisfy the following two tests: FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BASED PRICING 165 ž The charge made to any subset of customers is no more than the stand-alone cost of providing services to those customers, X i2T c i Ä c.T /; for all T Â N (7.2) ž The charge made to any subset of customers is at least the incremental cost of providing services to those customers, X i2T c i ½ c.N/  c.N n T /; for all T Â N (7.3) The reason these conditions are interesting is that if either (7.2) or (7.3) is violated, then a new entrant can attract dissatisfied customers. If (7.2) is violated, then a firm producing only services for T and charging only c.T / could lure away these customers. Similarly, if (7.3) is violated, then a firm producing only the services needed by N n T could charge less for these services than the incumbent firm. This happens because the incumbent uses part of the revenue obtained from selling services to N n T to pay for some of the cost of the services wanted by T . Next, we investigate certain variations and refinements of the above concepts. 7.1.2 Subsidy-free, Support and Sustainable Prices Let reformulate the ideas of the previous section to circumstances in which charges are computed from prices. Suppose that a set of n services is N Df1;:::;ng and an incumbent firm sells service i in quantity x i ,atpricep i , for a total charge of p i x i . Suppose that x i is given and does not depend on p D . p 1 ;:::;p n /. We call p a subsidy-free price if it satisfies the two tests X i2T p i x i Ä c.T /; for all T Â N (7.4) X i2T p i x i ½ c.N /  c.N n T /; for all T Â N (7.5) Inequalities (7.4) and (7.5) are respectively the stand-alone test and incremental-cost test. They have natural interpretation similar to (7.2) and (7.3). For instance, if (7.4) is violated then a new firm could set up to produce only the services in T and sell these at lower prices than the incumbent. Note that, by putting T D N , these tests imply P i p i x i D c.N/. Thus the producer must operate with zero profit. Also, prices must be above marginal cost; to see this, consider the set T Dfig, imagine that x i is small and apply the incremental cost test. Example 7.1 (Subsidy-free prices may not exist) Consider a network offering voice and video services. The cost of the basic infrastructure that is common to both services is 10 units, while the incremental cost of supplying 100 units of video service is 2 units and the incremental cost of supplying 1000 units of voice is 1 unit. To be subsidy-free, the revenues r 1 .100/ and r 2 .1000/ that are obtained from the video and the voice services must satisfy 2 Ä r 1 .100/ Ä 12; 1 Ä r 2 .1000/ Ä 11; r 1 .100/ C r 2 .1000/ D 13 166 COST-BASED PRICING Thus, assuming that there is enough demand for services, possible prices are 0:006 units per voice service and 0:07 units per video service. Note that such prices are not unique and they may not even exist for general cost functions. Suppose three services are pro- duced in unit quantities with a symmetric cost function that satisfies (7.1). Let c.fi g/ D 2:5, c.fi; j g/ D 3:5, and c.fi; j; kg/ D 5:5, where i; j; k are distinct members of f1; 2; 3g.Then we must have 2 Ä p i Ä 2:5, for i D 1; 2; 3, but also p 1 C p 2 C p 3 D 5:5. So there are no subsidy-free prices. The problem is that economies of scope are not increasing, i.e. c.fi; j; kg/  c.fi; j g/>c.fi; j g/  c.fig/. How can one determine if (7.4) and (7.5) are met in practice? Assume that a firm posts its prices and makes available its cost accounting records for the services. It may be possible to check (7.5) by computing and then summing the incremental costs of each service in T (though this only approximates the incremental cost of T because we neglect common cost that is directly attributable to services in T ). Condition (7.4) is hard to check, as it imagines building from scratch a new facility that is specialized to produce the services in the set T . This cost cannot in general be derived from the cost accounting information of the firm which produces the larger set of services N . In practice, one tries to approximate c.T /, as well as possible given the available information. There is another possible problem with the above tests. Although individual outputs may pass the incremental cost test, combinations of outputs may not. For example, suppose N Df1; 2; 3g. It is possible that the incremental cost test can be satisfied for every single good, i.e. for T Dfig,foralli, but not for T Df2; 3g. This could happen if there is a fixed common cost associated with services 2 and 3, in addition to their individual incremental costs, and each such service is priced at its incremental cost. Thus, the tests can be difficult to verify in practice. In defining subsidy-free prices we assumed that services are sold in large known quantities (the x i s in (7.4) and (7.5)) using uniform prices, as happens when incumbent communications firms supply the market. In practice, individual customers consume small parts of each x i and a coalition of customers may feel that it can ‘self-produce’ its service requirements at lower cost. In this case, it is reasonable to require (7.2) and (7.3). Clearly, such a ‘consumer subsidy-free’ price condition imposes restrictions on the cost function. For instance, imagine a single service has a cost function with increasing average cost. Selling the service at its average cost price violates (7.3) if individual customers request less than the total that is produced, although (7.4) and (7.5) are trivially satisfied for N Df1g.An appropriate definition is the following. Let us now write c.x/ as the cost of providing services in quantities .x 1 ;:::;x n /. We say the vector p is a support price for c at x if it satisfies the two conditions X i2N p i y i Ä c.y/; for all y Ä x (7.6) X i2N p i z i ½ c.x/  c.x  z/; for all z Ä x (7.7) Note these imply P i2N p i x i D c.x/. We can compare them to (7.2) and (7.3). For example, (7.6) implies that one cannot produce some of the demand for less than it is sold. They imply (7.4) and (7.5) (but are more general since they deal with arbitrary sub-quantities of the vector x, instead of looking just at subsets of service types), and hence a support price has all the nice fairness properties mentioned above. A last concern is whether such prices FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BASED PRICING 167 are achievable in the market, where demand is a function of price. Suppose p is the vector of support prices for x and, moreover, x is precisely the quantity vector that is demanded at price p. We call such prices anonymously equitable prices. Clearly, if they exist, these have a very good theoretical claim for being an intelligent choice of cost-based prices. If prices affect demand By allowing demand to depend upon price, we introduce subtle complications. Customers may feel badly treated even if the incremental cost test in (7.7) is passed. For example, if two services are substitutes then introducing one of them as a new service can reduce the demand for the other and the revenue it produces. Prices may have to increase if we are still to cover costs and this could mean that the price of the pre-existing service has to increase. This runs counter to what we expect: that adding a new service should allow prices of pre-existing services to decrease because of economies of scope in facility and equipment sharing. If the prices of pre-existing services increase then customers of these services will feel that they are subsidizing the cost of the new service. To see this, let T be a subset of N, and define p 0 i D1, i 2 T ,and p 0 i D p i , i 62 T . Thus, under price vector p 0 we do not sell any of the services in T (because their prices are infinite). If services in T are substitutes for those in N n T , then we can have, (recalling p 0 i D p i for i 2 N n T ), X i2N nT p 0 i x i . p 0 /> X i2N nT p i x i . p/ i.e. when p 0 is replaced by p, the introduction of services in T reduces the demand for (and revenue earned from) services in N n T . Noting that P i2N nT p i x i . p/ D P i2N p i x i . p/  P i2T p i x i . p/, we see that it is possible for c.Ð/ to be such that X i2T p i x i . p/>c.x. p//  c.x. p 0 // > X i2N p i x i . p/  X i2N nT p 0 i x i . p 0 / Here the incremental cost test (7.7) is passed (by the left hand inequality), but net additional revenue does not cover additional costs (the right hand inequality). Thus, the additional costs must be covered (at least in part) by increasing the charges levied on customers who were happy when only services in N n T were offered, rather than only making charges to customers who purchase services in T . These former set of customers may feel that they are subsidizing the later set of customers, and that these new services decrease the overall efficiency of the system. We conclude that, as a matter of fairness between customers, the second test condition (7.7) should take account of demand, and reason in terms of the net incremental revenue produced by an additional service, taking account of the reduction of revenue from other services. In other words, services are fairly priced if when service i is offered at price p i the customers of the other services feel that they benefit from service i. They are happy because the prices of the services they want to buy decrease. This is called the net incremental revenue test. Let us look at an example. Example 7.2 (Net incremental revenue test) Suppose a facility costs C and there is no variable cost. It initially produces a single service 1 in quantity x 1 D a at price p 1 D C=a. Then, a new service is added, at no extra cost, and at a price p 2 that is just a little more than 0. As a result, demand for service 2 increases at the expense of demand for service 1. To cover the cost, p 1 must increase, making even more customers switch to service 2. 168 COST-BASED PRICING At the end, suppose that an equilibrium is reached where p 1 D 10C=a, x 1 D 0:1a and x 2 D 0:9a C b. Note that, by our previous definition, these prices are subsidy-free, and (almost) all the revenue is collected by charging for service 1. These customers (the ones left using service 1) are right to complain that they subsidize service 2, since they see their prices increase after the addition of the new service. Indeed, choosing such a low price for service 2 results in an overall revenue reduction if prices of existing services are not allowed to increase. A fair price would be to choose p 2 in such a way that the overall net revenue (keeping the other prices, i.e. p 1 , fixed) would increase. Then, the zero profit condition may be achieved by reducing the other prices and hence benefiting the customers of the other services. In our example, suppose that by setting p 2 D p 1 and keeping p 1 at its initial value, x 1 becomes a=2andx 2 D a=2 C b=2. In other words, half the customers of service 1 find service 2 to suit them better at the same price, and so switch. There are also new customers that like to use service 2 at that price. Then the net revenue increase becomes p 1 b=2 > 0; so it is possible to decrease p 1 and allow customers of service 1 to benefit from the addition of service 2. Finally, consider a model of potential competition. Imagine an incumbent firm sets prices to cover costs at the demanded quantities, i.e. X i2N p i x i . p/ ½ c.x . p// (7.8) Suppose a competitor having the same cost function as the incumbent tries to take away part of the incumbent’s market by posting prices p 0 which are less for at least one service. Suppose x E . p; p 0 / is the demand for the services provided by the new entrant when he and the incumbent post prices p 0 and p respectively. Suppose that there is no p 0 and x 0 such that X i2N p 0 i x 0 i ½ c.x 0 /; and p 0 i < p i for some i ; and x 0 Ä x E . p; p 0 / (7.9) That is, there is no way that the potential entrant can post prices that are less than the incumbent’s for some services and then serve all or part of the demand without incurring loss. Prices satisfying this condition are called sustainable prices.Wehaveyetonemore ‘fairness test’ by which to judge a set of prices. The above model motivates the use of sustainable prices in contestable markets. A market is contestable when low cost ‘hit-and-run’ entry and exit are possible, without giving enough time to the incumbent to react and adjust his prices or quantities he sells. Such low barrier to entry is realized by using new technologies such as wireless, or when the regulator prescribes that network elements can be leased from incumbents at cost. In the idea of sustainable prices we again see that price stability is related to efficiency. If prices are sustainable, a new entrant cannot take away market share if his cost function is greater than that of the incumbent. Hence sustainable prices discourage inefficient entry. However, if a new entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, and so has a smaller cost function, then he can always take away some of the incumbent’s market share by posting lower prices. Thus an incumbent cannot post sustainable prices if he operates with inefficient technologies. It can be shown that for his prices to be sustainable, an incumbent firm must fulfil a minimum of three necessary conditions: FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BASED PRICING 169 1. He must operate with zero profits. 2. He must be a natural monopoly (exhibit economies of scale) and produce at minimum cost. 3. His prices for all subsets of his output must be subsidy free, i.e. fulfil the stand-alone and incremental cost tests. The last remark provides one more motivation to use the subsidy-free price tests to detect potential problems with a given set of prices. Ramsey prices Unfortunately, there is no straightforward recipe for constructing sustainable prices. Constructing socially optimal prices that are sustainable is even harder. However, under conditions that are frequently encountered in communications, Ramsey prices can be sustainable. Recall that Ramsey prices maximize social welfare under the constraint of recovering cost. Again we see a connection between competition and social efficiency: in a contestable market, i.e. under potential competition, incumbents will be motivated to use prices that maximize social efficiency with no need of regulatory intervention. However, Ramsey prices are not always sustainable. They are certainly not sustainable if any service, say service 1, is priced below its marginal cost and there are economies of scale. To see this, note that revenue from service 1 does not cover its own incremental cost since by concavity of the cost function x 1 p 1 < x 1 @c=@ x 1 < c.x/  c 0; x 2 ;:::;x n //.So a supplier who competes on the same set of services and with the same cost function can more than cover his costs by electing not to produce service 1. After doing this, he can slightly lower the prices of all the services that are priced above their marginal costs, so as to obtain all that demand for himself and yet still cover his costs. Example 7.3 (Ramsey prices may not be sustainable) Whether or not Ramsey prices are sustainable can depend on how services share fixed costs, i.e., on the economies of scope. Consider a market in which there are customers for two services. The producer’s cost function and demand functions for the services are c.x 1 ; x 2 / D 25x 1=2 1 C 20x 1=2 2 C F ; x 1 . p/ D x 2 . p/ D 10 4 .10 C p/ 2 The Ramsey prices are shown in Table 7.1. When the fixed cost F is 6 the Ramsey prices are not sustainable even though they exceed marginal cost. The revenue from service 2 is 169:45 and this is enough to cover the sum of its own variable cost and the entire fixed cost, a total of 162:76. This means that a provider can offer service 2 at a price less than the Ramsey price of 2:76 and still cover his costs. In fact, he can do this for any price greater than 2:62. However, if the fixed cost is 30 this is now great enough that it is impossible to cover costs by providing just one of the services alone at a lower price. 1 Hence, in this case, the Ramsey prices are sustainable. The lesson is that Ramsey prices may be sustainable if all services are priced above marginal cost and the economies of scope are great enough. 1 The other possibility for a new entrant is to provide both services at lower prices. But it is impossible to lower both prices and still cover costs. If all prices are lower the consumer surplus must increase. Since we require the producer surplus to remain nonnegative, and it was zero at our Ramsey prices, this would imply that the social welfare — which is the sum of consumer and producer surpluses — would increase; this means we could not have been at the Ramsey solution. 170 COST-BASED PRICING Table 7.1 Ramsey prices may or may not be sustainable F D 6FD 30 i D 1iD 2iD 1i=2 Ramsey price, p i 3.18 2.76 3.46 2.64 Demand, x i 57.58 61.44 55.18 58.96 Marginal cost 1.65 1.28 1.68 1.30 Revenue, x i p i 183.02 169.45 191.02 178.26 Variable cost 189.70 156.76 185.71 153.57 Variable cost C F 195.70 162.76 215.71 183.57 To show how the existence of common cost plays a vital role in the sustainability of Ramsey prices, we can construct a simple example out of Figure 5.5. Example 7.4 (Common cost and sustainability of Ramsey prices) Suppose that two services are produced with same stand-alone cost function A C bx. First, consider the case in which there is no economy of scope, and hence the total cost is the sum of the stand-alone cost functions. Since both services are produced at equal quantities x i D x j D x we have x. p i C p j / D 2. A C bx/ which implies xp i < A C bx < xp j . But A C bx is the stand-alone cost for service j, which violates the sustainability conditions. Now suppose that there are economies of scope and the fixed cost A is common to both services. Then x. p i C p j / D AC2bx, and since p i > b we obtain xp j Cbx < AC2bx.This implies xp j < A C bx, which is the stand-alone cost for service j. Hence, the existence of common cost is vital for Ramsey prices to be sustainable. Observe that, in this particular case, any amount of common cost, A, will make Ramsey prices sustainable. In general, as suggested by Example 7.3, large values of A ensure sustainability. 7.1.3 Shapley Value Let us now leave the subject of prices and return to the simple model at the start of the chapter, in which cost is to be fairly shared amongst n customers. The provider’s charging algorithm could be coded in a vector function  which divides c.N / as .c 1 ;:::;c n / D   1 .N /;:::; n .N / Ð . Let us suppose that .T / is defined for an arbitrary subset T Â N , and codes the way he would divide the cost of c.T / amongst the members of the subset T if he were to provide services to only this subset of customers. Clearly, .fig/ D c.fig/ being the stand-alone cost for serving only customer i. Suppose that T Â N and i; j are distinct members of T .If j .T /   j .T nfig/>0, then customer j pays more than he would pay if customer i were not being served. He might argue this was unfair, unless customer i can counter-argue that he is at least as disadvantaged because of customer j. But then if customer i is not to feel aggrieved then he must see similarly that customer j is at least as much disadvantaged. Putting this all together requires  i .T /   i .T nfjg/ D  j .T /   j .T nfig/ (7.10) On the other hand, if  j .T /   j .T nfig/<0, then customer j is better off because customer i is also being served. Customer i might feel aggrieved unless he benefits at least as much from the fact that customer j is present. But then customer j will feel FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BASED PRICING 171 aggrieved unless he benefits at least as much from customer i’s presence. So again, we must have (7.10). Surprisingly, there is only one function  which satisfies (7.10) for all T Â N and i; j 2 T . It is called the Shapley value, and its value for player i is the expected incremental cost of providing his service when provision of the services accumulates in random order. It is best to illustrate this with an example. Example 7.5 (Sharing the cost of a runway) Suppose three airplanes A, B, C share a runway. These planes require 1, 2 and 3 km to land. So a runway of 3 km must be built. How much should each pay? We take their requirements in the six possible orders. Cost is measured in units per kilometer. Adds cost Order ABC A, B, C 111 A, C, B 102 B, A, C 021 B, C, A 021 C, A, B 003 C, B, A 003 Total 2511 So they should pay for 2=6, 5=6 and 11=6 km, respectively. Note that we would obtain the same answer by a calculation based on sharing common cost. The first kilometer is shared by all three and so its cost should be allocated as .1=3; 1=3; 1=3/. The second kilometer is shared by two, so its cost is allocated as .0; 1=2; 1=2/. The last kilometer is used only by one and so its cost is allocated as .0; 0; 1/. The sum of these vectors is .2=6; 5=6; 11=6/. This happens generally. Suppose each customer requires some subset of a set of resources. If a particular resource is required by k customers, then (under the Shapley value paradigm) each will pay one-kth of its cost. The intuition behind the Shapley value is that each customer’s charge depends on the incremental cost for which he is responsible. However, it is subtle, in that a customer is charged the expected extra cost of providing his service, incremental to the cost of first providing services to a random set of other customers in which each other customer is equally to appear or not appear. The Shapley value is also the only cost sharing function that satisfies four axioms, namely, (1) all players are treated symmetrically, (2) those whose service costs nothing are charged nothing, (3) the cost allocation is Pareto optimal, and (4) the cost sharing of a sum of costs is the sum of the cost sharings of the individual costs. For example, the cost sharing of an airport runway and terminal is the cost sharing of the runway plus the cost sharing of the terminal. The Shapley value also gives answers that are consistent with other efficiency concepts such as Nash equilibrium. The Shapley value need not satisfy the stand-alone and incremental cost tests, (7.2) and (7.3). However, one can show that it does so if c is submodular,i.e.if c.T \ U / C c.T [ U / Ä c.U / C c.T /; for all T ; U Â N (7.11) The reader can prove this by looking at the definition of the Shapley value and using an equivalent condition for submodularity, that taking the members of N in any order, [...]... section we describe a pricing scheme that has been proposed as an alternative to LRICC , and which does take account of the incumbent’s opportunity cost This is known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) for network elements As we will see, such a pricing scheme has serious inefficiencies compared to LRICC 7.3.6 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) is... bottom-up models Due to its simplicity and the ability to audit the price constructing procedure, FDC pricing has been popular with network operators and regulators, at least in the early days of the price regulation process in the communications market However, there are a number of problems with FDC pricing First, there is no reason that the prices constructed are in any sense optimal or stable A major... bottleneck to providing service AB For example, A might be the local-loop part of a telephone connection and B PRICING IN PRACTICE 189 Long distance network of new ILEC a Service A b c Service B Access network Long distance network of new entrant Figure 7.5 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule for pricing network services Service A connects a to b; service B connects b to c and service AB connects a to... cost-based pricing The net incremental revenue test is due to Baumol (1986) Activity based costing is discussed in the book of Hilton, Maher and Selto (2003) A thorough discussion of the merits of LRIC for pricing access network services is in Economides (2000) For definitions of the ECPR see Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983) The inefficiency of ECPR is discussed by Economides (1997) The discussion on flat rate pricing. .. traditional accounting systems and is rather complex to obtain Recent trends show that many large communication companies are in favour of constructing such advanced top-down costing models that allow the accurate calculation of incremental costs, mainly due to auditability requirements imposed by regulators and for PRICING IN PRACTICE 187 comparing the resulting prices Most of these models employ current... Although these can increase competition and lead to lower prices to consumers, they have some serious drawbacks They do not provide incentives for alternative access networks of newer technologies to be built by other operators, since such networks will have to charge higher prices (based on current costs), and so be less competitive Also such low prices may not provide enough incentives to the incumbent... There are several ways to do this The activity-based costing approach defines several intermediate activities that contribute to the production of the end products Examples of activities related to communication networks are repair, operation, network management, consumer support, and so on The cost of each such activity can be computed from accounting information about the amounts of the input factors... results in even lower prices, and is mainly used to detect network inefficiencies This is the case if the prices constructed by the top-down and bottom up models differ significantly 7.5 Flat rate pricing In flat rate pricing the total charge that a customer pays for a service contract is fixed at the time the contract is purchased That is, it is determined a priori, even though the actual cost of the contract... prefer the predictability of a flat fee However there are also serious drawbacks Flat rate pricing tends to produce high social cost because of the waste of resources It is unstable under competition because if light users subsidize heavy users, the light users are likely to switch to a competitor who offers them a fairer pricing scheme It is easy to see that flat rate charging may produce prices that are... The resource consumed by a customer during one month is approximated by x, the total monthly volume of bytes 192 COST-BASED PRICING $ $ SW = A − W SW = A A A A′ MC MC W W′ waste x* x flat p = MC q x* x flat x flat q ′ flat price (p = 0) Figure 7.6 Social waste under flat rate pricing If a user is charged a price p D MC then he consumes x Ł and the social welfare is the area A However, if he is charged . Part C Pricing Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling. Costas Courcoubetis. maximization is the overall aim. We posed optimization problems with unique Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling. Costas Courcoubetis