Governing society in contemporary china

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Governing society in contemporary china

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governing society in CONTEMPORARY CHINA www.ebook3000.com 9262_9789814618588_tp.indd 29/6/16 2:20 PM May 2, 2013 14:6 BC: 8831 - Probability and Statistical Theory This page intentionally left blank PST˙ws governing society in CONTEMPORARY CHINA edited by YANG Lijun South China University of Technology, China SHAN Wei East Asian Institute, NUS, Singapore World Scientific NEW JERSEY • LONDON • SINGAPORE • BEIJING • SHANGHAI • HONG KONG • TAIPEI • CHENNAI • TOKYO www.ebook3000.com 9262_9789814618588_tp.indd 29/6/16 2:20 PM Published by World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Yang, Lijun, 1963– editor | Shan, Wei, editor Title: Governing society in contemporary China / edited by Lijun Yang, South China University of Technology, China, Wei Shan, East Asian Institute, NUS, Singapore Description: Singapore : World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd., [2016] Identifiers: LCCN 2016013679 | ISBN 9789814618588 Subjects: LCSH: China Politics and government | Civil society China | Social control China Classification: LCC JQ1516 G68 2016 | DDC 320.951 dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016013679 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd All rights reserved This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the publisher For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher Desk Editor: Dong Lixi Typeset by Stallion Press Email: enquiries@stallionpress.com Printed in Singapore Lixi - Governing Society in Contemporary China.indd 28-06-16 11:37:51 AM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China Contents Introduction Part I vii The State and New Social Forces Chapter The Chinese Leadership and the Internet LYE Liang Fook and YANG Yi Chapter Managing Social Media in China: A Fresh Campaign Against Internet Celebrities CHEN Gang 23 China’s Crackdowns on “Internet Rumours” and “Illegal” Internet Publicity Activities WU Mei 41 Non-Governmental Organisations and Government in China: Enemies or Allies? WONG Man Lai, Sonia 57 Chapter Chapter Part II The State and Social Reforms Chapter Chapter 73 Chinese Trade Unions: Development and Dilemmas QI Dongtao and HUANG Jingyang 75 China’s Hukou Reform: New Guidelines and Implications ZHAO Litao 91 www.ebook3000.com b2473_FM.indd v 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM b2473 vi Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A Chapter Improving Local Governance without Democratisation: Community-Building in Shanghai SHI Fayong Chapter Part III China’s Initiatives in “Social Management” SHAN Wei The State and Institutional Changes Chapter Chapter 10 Chapter 11 The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference: Co-opting Social and Political Forces in a One-Party State YEW Chiew Ping 109 123 141 143 Cultural Institutional Reform and the Changing Society in China ZHONG Sheng 159 Religions and Chinese Socialism: China’s Religious Policies Since the 1990s LAI Hongyi 181 Index 199 About the Editors 203 b2473_FM.indd vi 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China Introduction C hina’s rapid and sustainable economic growth in the past three decades has brought the country great wealth and changed the structures of its economy and society, and its people’s lifestyle and their behavioural patterns In terms of its economic structure, China has transformed itself from the Maoist planned economy to an increasingly market-oriented economy and from the domination of the state sector to a mixed economy with the coexistence of different forms of ownerships In terms of social structure, the country has transformed from a fixed society of rural-urban dualism to a mobile and pluralistic one and from an equal society where everyone was equally poor to a divided one where there exists increasingly large income inequality The benefits of the reform and open door policy have not been distributed equally; some social groups and regions have benefited tremendously while others have lost relatively The polarisation of economic interests has also led to pluralistic demands from different social groups The country has witnessed the rise of diverse social interests and social groups which resort to all means to increase their political participation This can be best exemplified by the expansion of religious groups, the development of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the rise of social protests Changes have also occurred in politics too China’s economic development has not resulted in political democracy, as many had expected when the country began its reform and open www.ebook3000.com b2473_FM.indd vii 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM b2473 viii Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A door policy Its political structure remains intact and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues However, compared to the pre-reform era, changes to Chinese politics are visible, particularly in terms of state-society relations Without doubt, the transition China is experiencing today is unprecedented This transition is taking place in the second largest economy of the world and in the process of the world’s modernisation, globalisation and IT revolution Such a transition is important for not only China itself, but also the entire world Understanding this multifaceted and complicated transition has been a major intellectual challenge for the scholarly community Since its establishment in 1997, East Asian Institute (EAI) has made great efforts in promoting both academic and policy-oriented research on East Asian development, particularly the political, economic and social development of contemporary China and China’s growing economic relations with the region and the world at large This book reflects our latest efforts in understanding changing state-society relations in China In this book, we selected research papers which were previously circulated internally All the papers were updated by their respective authors The focus is on how the state has responded to changing state-society relations In selecting papers, we attempt to cover as many topics as possible with a particular emphasis on changing patterns of interactions between the Chinese state and society We aim to explore how changing state-society interactions have shaped and are reshaping the features of contemporary China Changing State-Society Relations During the era of Maoism, the power structure in China was highly centralised The central government controlled all possible resources Local governments, from the provincial level down to the township level, were weak layers in this structure Chinese society was completely dominated by the state through local governments and government-controlled organisations such as work units and grass-roots b2473_FM.indd viii 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China I N TR ODU C TI ON ix collectives and student organisations There was no autonomous social organisation Society in a Western sense did not exist and social forces did not have any resources to challenge state power Since the reform and open door policy, changes have occurred in state-society relations Three major structural changes are visible One is power decentralisation between the central and local governments, especially after the tax reform of 1994 While this reform centralised fiscal power, the local government has also gained more autonomous power and responsibility as a separate entity of the administration The second change is power decentralisation from the state to society The economic reform has changed the social structure In rural areas, the household responsibility system replaced collective agriculture In cities, the market system replaced the planned economy Collectives and work units no longer serve as the source of identity and function as a community to provide public goods.1 At the same time, society starts to become diverse, as a consequence of economic development Previously equally poor people are now divided into social groups of different income levels The coexistence of the middle class, the extremely rich and the poor makes China a normal society The urban-rural unitary structure no longer existed People now become mobile, floating between rural and urban areas, and between China and foreign countries In particular, internal migrant workers from rural to urban areas now become a remarkable group in the 21st century China Social organisations such as NGOs and religion groups now have attempted to appeal to different means to express their demands for freedom and individual rights The third change is the exponential rise of information and communication technologies (ICT) in China since the early 1990s This change is important since the state is now no longer able to monopolise information These three changes have inevitably restructured state-society relations in China The phenomenal economic growth has given birth to new Tong Yanqi and Lei Shaohua, Social Protest in Contemporary China, 2003–2010, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, pp 22–23 www.ebook3000.com b2473_FM.indd ix 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM b2473 x Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A social groups receptive to a plurality of ideas and norms The spread of the internet and process of marketisation allow them to better articulate their interests and organise themselves than ever before The myriad social issues, popular discontent, religious and ethnic tensions have forced the party-state to respond to social changes Despite radical social changes, the Chinese state continues to be more capable than many other states in the developing world in managing society Among many other strategies, we have identified three main strategies that the Chinese state has responded to social changes First, the Chinese state has pro-actively searched for new control strategies over newly rising social forces Second, it has also searched for new modes of governance over existing social forces and organisations by engaging social institutional reforms Third, it has attempted to reform its own institutions to accommodate social changes In other words, we include in this book three thematic clusters to examine three different types of strategies that the Chinese government has responded to society In the following sections, we narrate these strategies by summarising the papers included in this book The State and New Social Forces Our first thematic cluster looks at how the state has dealt with new social forces Since the reform and open-door policy, Chinese society has experienced unprecedented transition and witnessed the emergence of new social phenomenon and social forces With the rise of new types of social organisation and social phenomenon, the CCP has to formulate new management policies to respond to new challenges from society given the incapacity of conventional social management policy in responding to the new challenges A good example is the government’s responses to online social activities According to the December 2015 CNNIC report, by December 2015, China had 688 million internet users, with a total of 39.51 million new ones The internet penetration rate reached 50.3%, rising 2.4% over the previous year Mobile phone internet users hit 620 million Rural internet users accounted for 28.4% of the total in China, reaching b2473_FM.indd x 7/1/2016 3:01:46 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China R E L I G I ON S A N D C H I N E S E S OC I A L I S M 189 Activities of Foreigners Inside the PRC” The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued “Methods for Registration of Sites for Religious Activities” in 1994 and “Methods for Annual Inspection of Sites for Religious Activities” in 1996 Together with the State Administration of of Foreign Experts Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security, the SARA issued “Methods for Employment of Foreign Professionals in Religious Colleges and Schools” in 1998 Since 1991 provinces in China have also issued local laws and regulations on religious affairs By 2001 the legislatures of 18 provinces including Xinjiang, Shanghai, Sichuan, Liaoning, Guangdong, Hubei, Shaanxi, Shandong and Beijing, had approved and promulgated the provincial regulations on religious affairs The local government had issued similar regulations for six other provinces including Tibet, Guangxi, Ningxia, Yunnan and Jiangxi.11 According to the law, regulations and policies on religions in China, non-believers are protected Citizens have the right not to believe in any religion In order to prevent conflict between religious believers and non-believers, non-believers cannot preach their atheist beliefs or Marxism at the religious sites On the other hand, religious activities should take place on legally approved religious sites and no preaching and conversion activities should take place outside them These two requirements are observed by non-believers as well as the five major and officially recognised religious associations, i.e Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism The only exceptions are underground churches and private meetings at the homes of believers National and local religious associations are required by the regulations to first seek the approval of the SARA (or its local branch usually called Bureau of Religious Affairs [ᇇᮉһ࣑ተ] (BRA in short)) before applying for registration with the Ministry or Bureau of Civil Affairs Religious associations are subject to annual inspection and registration renewal 11 Wang Zuo’an, Zhongguo de Zongjiao Wenti he Zongjiao Zhengce, pp 141–42 b2473_Ch-11.indd 189 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM b2473 190 Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A Religious sites are also expected to be registered with the SARA or BRA and permanent residents and temporary residents at the sites are subject to hukou regulations The SARA or BRA at or above the county level have to supervise the implementation of “Methods for Registration of Sites for Religious Activities” “Self-Reliance in and Self-Management of Religious Affairs” Another important principle of China’s religious policy is “selfreliance in and self-management of religious affairs” (⤜・㠚ѫ㠚࣎ ᇇᮉһ࣑) This principle was firmly installed by the Party-state in the 1950s Encouraged by Premier Zhou Enlai the Protestant and Catholic leaders in China declared their independence from foreign influence They promoted the principle of “self-governance, self-finance and selfpreaching” (㠚⋫ǃ㠚ޫǃ㠚Ր), or the so-called “three-self ” principles (й㠚৏ࡉ) The CCP supported this drive as it promoted nationalism and viewed invasion and interference by the West and Japan as “one of the three mountains” burdening the Chinese people It also saw the Protestant and Catholic churches outside China as forces hostile to communist China Since then the Party-state has continued to endorse the “three-self ” principles In the recent decade it has apparently applied this principle to other religions, including Islam (especially in the state’s fight against radical Islam and Islamic extremism) and Buddhism (especially in Beijing’s fight against the influence of the Dalai Lama who is based outside China) In line with this principle the state encourages its religious communities to develop their theologies, elect and appoint their own leaders, train their own clergy and generate their own revenue It also permits normal exchanges with foreign religious communities but constantly reminds the communities of the risks of political subversion by unfriendly foreign missionaries and religious beliefs www.ebook3000.com b2473_Ch-11.indd 190 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China R E L I G I ON S A N D C H I N E S E S OC I A L I S M 191 The appointment of bishops for the Catholic Church sanctioned by the state in China (the so-called “three-self ” Catholic Church) has been contested by the Vatican The latter tends to view the elected bishops of the “three-self ” church as unrepresentative of the Catholics in China The Vatican subtly supports the underground Catholic Church that has been restricted by the state in China The state’s regulations also impose tight restrictions on religious activities by foreigners While foreigners can participate in activities on stipulated religious sites in China, they can only promote religion and preach at the invitation of religious associations at the provincial or national level They are prohibited from setting up religious organisations, religious schools and offices of their religious associations, converting the people to their faith and appointing religious clergy The regulations stipulate that foreign organisations or foreigners cannot control any religious sites in the PRC However, in the recent two decades many foreign visitors to China ignore these rules by preaching their religion in private settings Boom of Religions and the Crackdown on Falun Gong Since the 1990s religious following has been gaining increasing popularity in China This is largely due to the need for spiritual satisfaction and peace amidst rapid social change For example, a nationwide survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2008–9 found that 1.8% of the population, or 23 million, were Protestants, more than twice as many as the official estimate of 10 million Among them, 42% turned to Protestantism during the 1993–2000 period, followed by 31% during 2003–9 and 18% during 1982–92 Those who were converted to Protestantism before 1982 were only 8.7%.12 Other religions, especially Buddhism and folk religions, have 12 A Project Team of World Religion Research Institute, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “An Investigative Report on the Household Survey on Protestantism b2473_Ch-11.indd 191 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM b2473 192 Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A also experienced a similar boom in the number of believers Famous temples in coastal China are often thronged with worshippers One of the gravest and most unexpected challenges faced by the Party-state since 1978 from religions has been the Falun Gong On 25 April 1999 over 10,000 practitioners of Falun Gong surrounded Zhongnanhai, the office and residential compound for the top leaders of China They demanded official recognition from the state This move alarmed President Jiang Zemin who regarded the protest as the gravest challenge to the state since 1989 as Falun Gong had tens of millions of followers throughout the country On 22 July 1999 the Ministry of Public Security banned the activities of Falun Gong which was later declared illegal by the Ministry of Civil Affairs Legal documents targeted at evil cults (䛚ᮉ) were subsequently passed by the National People’s Congress, Ministry of Public Security and Supreme People’s Court The formal Buddhist associations in China regarded Falun Gong as an evil cult as the latter’s founder Li Hongzhi claimed to be far superior to Buddha Falun Gong was slapped with the criminal code against evil cults,13 along with several similar sects, notably Zhong Gong (ѝ࣏) and Xiang Gong (俉࣏) and Christian heretical sects The State’s Responses to Religious Commercialisation and Degradation Since the 1990s, the boom of religions has led to their commercialisation and promotion by multiple agents Local governments see famous local religious sites as one of the major avenues for tourism and an easy source of revenue as well as economic growth in China”, in Jin Ze and Qiu Yonghui, eds Zhongguo Zongjiao Baobao (Annual Report on China’s Religions) 2010, Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, pp 192–93 13 Wang Zuo’an, Zhongguo de Zongjiao Wenti he Zongjiao Zhengce, pp 392–99 and pp 389–90 www.ebook3000.com b2473_Ch-11.indd 192 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China R E L I G I ON S A N D C H I N E S E S OC I A L I S M 193 They impose high charges (as high as RMB150-200 per entry to famous religious sites such as the Wutaishan Buddhist temples) and work with businessmen to develop resorts around religious sites, bypassing relevant religious associations that own these sites Even clergy of many religious sites are actively commercialising the sites and activities and generating revenue from worshippers Clerics at some well-known temples charge visitors a hefty fee for religious items or activities, such as striking a bell on Chinese New Year’s eve At a temple along popular tourist routes in western China visitors are coaxed to have their fortune told at the temple and subsequently charged a stiff sum to avoid their “imminent misfortune” There were even reports that as many as 90% of monks in certain coastal areas were married and had children.14 A good number of them probably work as religious clerics during the daytime and return home to live with their wife at night These developments have severely tarnished the image of religious clergy in China In response, Chinese leaders have urged religious communities to provide moral examples for society In August 2013, in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Buddhist Association of China, the officially recognised association for Buddhism, Liu Yandong, a Politburo member in charge of the united front, urged the association to resist commercialisation, strengthen “self-construction” and social responsibility and build a serious and clean image for Buddhism.15 In recent years the state has also allowed religions to engage in charitable work For example, many noted that Buddhist temples and Christian churches in coastal China have sent relief goods to people in disaster areas 14 “Statistics Show in Some Coastal Developed Areas Ninety Percent of Monks Violate Rules by Having a Wife and Children”, http://www.zaobao.com/gj/ zg060808_506.html, accessed August 2006 15 “A Commemoratory Meeting Was Held in the Great Hall of People in Beijing to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Buddhist Association of China”, http://www zjypw.com/news/ 2013/08/112684.htm, accessed 28 August 2013 b2473_Ch-11.indd 193 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM b2473 194 Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A The Fight Against “Separatist” Religious Forces in Tibet and Xinjiang The most persistent religious challenges for the Party-state in China come from pro-Dalai Lama Tibetan Buddhists and radical Islamic groups in Xinjiang In both provinces prior to the Communist takeover in the 1950s religion permeated local governance and education What complicates matters is that religion is also intertwined with ethnic identity In response the state has continued to stress the separation of religions from politics in China Therefore, the state prohibits interference of religion in affairs managed by the state and legitimises its suppression of illegitimate religious activities In Xinjiang the state sees underground Islamic activities by especially radical and extreme sects as a threat to national unity In Tibet the state has regarded the demands of the Dalai Lama for independence or full autonomy of a greater Tibet as political interference In protest against Beijing’s management of Tibetan affairs the Dalai Lama joined a failed armed rebellion against the People’s Liberation Army in 1959 Since then he has been living permanently in India and travelling worldwide Since 1980 Beijing has been in talks with his representatives The Dalai Lama rejects the radical wing of the Tibetans in exile including the prominent forces behind the overseas Tibetan government, which argue for Tibet’s independence and support violence against Beijing He continues to openly preach for non-violent means On the other hand, Beijing continues to view the Dalai Lama as the instigator of major riots in Tibet in 1987–89 and spring 2008, as well as demonstrations and self-immolation of Tibetan monks in protests in recent years Beijing also sees him as a collaborator with the West in condemning human rights abuses in China and with pro-independence forces in Taiwan and Xinjiang Beijing is also wary of the Dalai Lama’s control of other leaders of Tibetan Buddhism and blames him for instigating the flight of the 17th Karmapa, the third most influential leader of Tibetan Buddhism www.ebook3000.com b2473_Ch-11.indd 194 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China R E L I G I ON S A N D C H I N E S E S OC I A L I S M 195 outside China Beijing also accused the Dalai of designating a separate successor (“incarnation”) of the deceased Panchen The Panchen is the second most influential Buddhist leader in Tibet after the Dalai Beijing insisted on a designation process that was installed way back to the Qing Dynasty After its attempts to work with the Dalai Lama on the process failed, Beijing chose a successor to the Panchen who is different from the one designated by the Dalai Lama It has deprived the Dalai Lama’s chosen candidate of public recognition In the recent years Beijing has taken several measures to contain the influence of the Dalai Lama in monasteries Through the Tibetan provincial government it tries to ensure that leaders of monasteries accept the leadership of the CCP, manage the monasteries in line with laws and regulations, and introduce and publicise internal rules for monasteries It has introduced new rules to register monks and nuns, and ousted monks and nuns who stage anti-Beijing activities It has also allocated funds to renovate monasteries and improve the residential areas of monks and nuns Finally, Beijing has started to keep a closer eye on self-proclaimed “living Buddhas” of other Tibetan Buddhist leaders.167 In Xinjiang Beijing has kept a wary eye on “three evil forces”, namely, separatism, international terrorism and extremism Separatists embrace radical Islam and have staged numerous acts of violence and sabotages The most threatening group is the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) which aims to revive the three-month-long independent state called East Turkestan set up in the 1930s Beijing holds it responsible for over 200 violent acts during 19902001 that claimed 162 lives There has also been illegal preaching of radical Islam among Uighurs Radical Islamic groups have been blamed for a spate of violence in Xinjiang that had claimed scores of lives Critiques, especially the exiled Uighur groups, tend to place the full blame on the government’s restrictions on Islamic preaching and social Wang Zuo’an, Zhongguo de Zongjiao Wenti he Zongjiao Zhengce, pp 272–81 and pp 281–84 16 b2473_Ch-11.indd 195 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM b2473 196 Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A grievances such as discrimination and influx of Han people into Xinjiang On its part, Beijing has taken several measures First, it has sought international cooperation In 2002 it succeeded in having the ETIM listed as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations It has also won the support of Central Asian member states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to crack down on these forces Second, it tries to win over Islamic leaders and officially recognise mosques in Xinjiang, making considerable headway in these directions Third, it has imposed severe restrictions on the building of mosques, setup of religious schools and even pilgrimage to Mecca.178 Fourth, it has stepped up public security in Xinjiang In the wake of a spate of deadly violent incidents in Urumqi, as well as cities in the north and the south in recent years, Beijing has deployed many troops and police to the region Making a visible presence on the streets of major cities, the armed forces are ready to inspect households in pursuit of possible suspects Challenges of China’s Religious Policies in a Changing World Religions in China have experienced impressive revival as reflected in the growth of worshippers for five officially recognised religious associations, namely, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism, as well as folk religions, new sects and house churches The state faces several ongoing challenges in formulating its religious policy First, commercialisation has made the management and appeal of religions potentially difficult The state tries to encourage religious communities to maintain their integrity and to provide good services to society, but more need to be done Second, the state feels threatened by movements that demand for full autonomy and even independence and embrace religions in Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as defiant sects such as Falun Gong 17 Wang Zuo’an, Zhongguo de Zongjiao Wenti he Zongjiao Zhengce, pp 290–1 and pp 295–303 www.ebook3000.com b2473_Ch-11.indd 196 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China R E L I G I ON S A N D C H I N E S E S OC I A L I S M 197 The state has continued its high-handed approach to dealing with these religious movements, especially in Xinjiang Tension and confrontation can be triggered easily in a volatile climate of social grievances and influence of radical religions Third, despite an understanding in China that there is a real need for a law on religion, there is no sign that such a law will be implemented in the near future b2473_Ch-11.indd 197 7/1/2016 3:00:55 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China Index ACFTU (All China Federation of Trade Unions), xv, 76–85, 87–88, 90 anti-rightist campaign, 150 censorship, 16, 23–26, 31, 34–35, 37–39, 43, 135, 165 Central Politics and Law Commission, 125 Chinese leadership, 3, 6–7, 16, 30 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, xviii, 12, 143, 146, 150 Chinese politics, viii, xii, 19 Chinese trade unions, 75, 77–79, 82, 84–85, 87–88, 90 Chinese working class, 81 civil society, xi, xiii, 39–40, 124–125, 128, 130, 139 Colour Revolution, 58, 65 community-building programmes, xvi, 116 community-building, 109–110, 114, 117–118, 120–122, 129 co-optation, xx, 148–149 co-opting social and political forces, xvi, 116 crackdowns, xiii, 23–24, 26, 29, 31, 38–41, 43–44, 48, 54–56, 69, 184, 191 cultural industries, 159, 162, 166, 168–171, 177–180 cultural institutional reform, xviii–xix, 159, 163, 166–168, 170–172, 175, 177, 179–180 cultural production, xviii, 159–160, 162, 165, 168–172 ideological and political implications, 159, 175, 178–180 Cultural Revolution, xix, 79–80, 150, 158, 183 www.ebook3000.com b2473_Index.indd 199 7/1/2016 3:02:04 PM b2473 200 Governing Society in Contemporary China GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A democratic parties, xviii, 144, 148–150 democratisation, xii, 19, 109, 121 democratising tool, 3, 18 Deng Xiaoping, 30, 152, 183 double management system, 62, 64, 68 ethnic groups, 185 ethnicities, 68, 165, 183, 186–187 evil cults, 192 family migration, 93, 95, 99–100 floating population, 92–93, 97, 99, 106 freedom, ix, 17, 138, 151 religious, xix, 65, 183–185, 187–188 of speech, 15, 30, 43 press, 25 of demonstration, 87 government agencies, 61, 78, 111, 115, 119 grass-roots democracy, 109, 118–119, 121 Green Dam, 17, 25–26, 32 household registration system, xv, 92, 106, 110 see also hukou Hu Jintao, 3–4, 6, 11–12, 128, 179–180 hukou, xiv–xvi, 91–94, 99–108, 110, 112, 190 see also household registration system hukou reform, xv–xvi, 91–94, 99–104, 106 b2473_Index.indd 200 “9x6” ideological purification campaign, xii, 29–30 illegal internet public relations (IIPR), 42–44, 46, 48–49, 55 illegal internet publicity, xiii, 41 informal relations between NGOs and government, 67–68, 70 internet celebrities, xii, 23, 29–30, 47 internet control, xi–xii, xvii, 6, 17, 38, 135 internet management, xii–xiii, 12, 17, 32, 34, 134 internet powerhouse, 3, 7–8 internet public relations, 42–44, 54 internet revolution, viii, internet rumours, 41–43, 50–51, 55 internet, the, x–xiii, xvii, 3–20, 22, 24–32, 34, 38–56, 124, 131, 134–136, 138 as a tool, xii, penetration rate, x labour disputes, xv, 75, 77–78, 81, 83–84, 88–90, 131 labour NGOs, 90 labour organisations, 75, 77, 87, 90 labour relations, 78, 81, 84–85, 87, 89 legitimacy, xii, xvi, 3, 7, 10, 14, 18, 66, 87, 109, 115, 121–122, 149, 151 Li Keqiang, xvi, 91, 93–94, 102, 104 lianghui, 146 local governance, xvi, 13, 109–110, 116, 118–122, 194 7/1/2016 3:02:05 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China I N DE X maintaining social stability, xx, 66, 81, 88, 124, 125–127 see also weiwen mandarin duck navy, 51–52 media management, 24 middle class, ix, 124, 140, 161, 163–164 migrant workers, ix, xvi, 28, 69, 75, 89–92, 94–95, 97, 100–101, 105–106, 108–113 multi-party cooperation, xviii, 144, 150–152, 155, 158 national defence expenditure, 124 National New-Type Urbanisation Plan, xv, 91–93, 102 neighbourhood, xvi, 110–111, 113, 115–119, 121–122 neighbourhood organisations, xvi, 110–111, 121 NGOs (non-governmental organisations), vii, ix, xiii–xiv, 57–71, 75, 90, 125, 131–132 control system, 57–59, 65, 70–71 government’s attitude, xiv, 58, 64–66 grass-roots, 60 regulations and centralised controls, 59 survival strategies, 68 non-hukou migration, 92, 100 one-party state, 143, 151–152 online censorship, 6, 23–25 online expression, opinion leaders, 23–26, 51, 136 201 peasant workers, xiv, 94–98, 101, 105–106 performance community-building programmes, 116 local governments, 116 local government leaders, 86 public cultural institutions, 162 social organisations, 132 Street Office officials, 117 political change, xi, 18–19 political propaganda, xviii, 159 political space, xii, 182 political system building, 155 popular non-enterprise units, 60–61 Population Census Data, 92–93, 97, 99, 106, 149 poverty reduction, 114, 117 public cultural institutions (PCIs), xviii, 159–162, 166–167, 169, 171, 173–174, 177 public interests, 68 public welfare, xviii, 159, 161 purification, xii, 24, 29–30 re-education through labour system, 123, 136 reforms, vii–x, xiii–xix, 7, 12, 19–20, 30, 76, 79–81, 88–94, 99–100, 102–104, 106–107, 109–110, 112–114, 118, 123, 125, 130–131, 134, 136, 138–139, 143, 151, 153, 155, 159–163, 165–180 religious freedom, xix, 65, 183–185, 187 www.ebook3000.com b2473_Index.indd 201 7/1/2016 3:02:05 PM b2473 202 Governing Society in Contemporary China GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A religious commercialisation, xix, 182, 192–193, 196 religious policies, 181, 196 residential permit, 94, 99, 104, 106 separatist movements, xix, 182, 194–195 social and political stability, 78 social development, viii, 90, 92, 155, 187 social governance, xi, 123–125, 129, 139–140 social groups, vii, ix–x, xiii, xviii, 59, 69 social management, xvii, 123–130, 134, 139 policy, x–xi, xvi social media, xii–xiii, 23–26, 28–30, 32, 34, 38–40, 42–43, 47, 55–56 social networking sites (SNS), xiii, 42, 46, 48 social organisations, ix, xvi–xvii, 59–61, 67, 123, 125, 129–133, 139 social stability, xiii, xx, 66, 81, 86, 88, 115, 124–127 social tensions, 65, 123–124 society, vii–xv, xvii, xix–xx, 3, 6, 25, 31, 38–40, 49, 55, 58, 65, 69, 79, 118, 123–125, 127–130, 134, 137, 139–140, 143, 152, 159, 163–166, 168, 178–180, 186, 188, 190 spiritual-civilisation building, 115–116 b2473_Index.indd 202 “9x6” supervision, xii, 14, 64, 81, 130 survival strategies, 68 “three-self ” principles, 190–191 Third Plenum, 93, 102, 123 Tibet, xvii, xix, 6, 32, 96, 181–183, 185, 189, 194–196 see also Xizang trade unions, xv, 75–90, 133, 140, 155–156 grass-roots, 89, 78–79, 82 tuishou, xiii, 41–51, 55–56 unionisation, xv, 75, 78–79, 81–82, 84, 86 universal values, 23, 25, 30 urban reform, 113 urbanisation, xiv–xv, 91–93, 102–105 water army, 51–52 weiwen, xvi, 88, 126–128 see also maintaining social stability Wen Jiabao, 3–4, 11–13, 15, 30, 100, 124 worker’s rights, xv, 75, 77, 83, 88–90 Xi Jinping, xii–xiii, xvi, 3–4, 7–8, 24, 29–31, 91, 93–94, 102, 104, 123, 125, 128, 136 Xinjiang, xvii, xix, 21, 96, 181–183, 189, 194–197 Xizang, 21 see also Tibet 7/1/2016 3:02:05 PM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China About the Editors Dr YANG Lijun is Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology (SCUT) She has studied social changes and social movements in contemporary China, particularly the Cultural Revolution and nationalism Her research papers have appeared in academic journals such as The China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, The Review of History, Asian Studies and Chinese Affairs Her book titled Social Structure and the Cultural Revolution in China: Citizenship and Collective Violence was selected as one of the five best books in all social science subjects in the Asia-Pacific region, and for this she received the Ohira Memorial Foundation Award in 2005 She has also edited and co-edited many volumes on contemporary China Dr Yang received her BA in media studies from Beijing Broadcasting College, now The Communication University of China, her MA in politics from Yokohama City University, Japan and her PhD in sociology from Hitotsubashi University, Japan Before joining SCUT, she held various research and teaching positions in the State Language Work Committee of the State Council China, Hitotsubashi University, Aochi Prefectural University, Aoyama Gakuin University, Waseda University (Japan) and the National University of Singapore www.ebook3000.com b2473_About the Editors.indd 203 7/1/2016 3:01:28 PM b2473 204 Governing Society in Contemporary China “9x6” GO V E R NING S O CIE T Y IN C ON T E M P OR A R Y C H I N A Dr SHAN Wei received his BA and MA in International Studies from Peking University and PhD in Political Science from Texas A&M University His research focuses on the political behaviour of citizens and the elite in the context of political and economic development Topics he has covered include Chinese citizens’ political participation, changes in political culture, mass-elite relations, political leadership and factional politics within the elite group His research papers appeared in China Quarterly and other academic journals He is the co-editor of The State of Rural China: Peasants, Agriculture and Rural Society in the Reform Era b2473_About the Editors.indd 204 7/1/2016 3:01:29 PM ... enquiries@stallionpress.com Printed in Singapore Lixi - Governing Society in Contemporary China. indd 28-06-16 11:37:51 AM “9x6” b2473 Governing Society in Contemporary China Contents Introduction Part I... editor Title: Governing society in contemporary China / edited by Lijun Yang, South China University of Technology, China, Wei Shan, East Asian Institute, NUS, Singapore Description: Singapore :... 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