VNU Joum al of Science, Social Sciences and H um anities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 In the crossíìre: Vietnam’s relations with China and Soviet Union during the Vietnam W ar (1965-1972) Pham Quang Minh* College o f Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU 336 Nguyen Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hatioi, Viettĩatĩì Receivcd 13 November 2009 Abstract Although most điplomatic history is written as an a c c o u n t of relations between tvvo nations, in reality niany interactions in international rclations involve morc than simplc bilateral exchanges This paper is intcnded to rcmedy this weakness in the litcrature by analyzing thc strategic triangle created by Vietnam, Soviet Union, and the Pcoples' Repubhc of China during the Vietnam War (1965-1972) A tria n g u la r fra m e w o rk is a p p ro p ria te for ih is p u rp o se b e c a u s e e a c h o f th e b ila tc l lin k s - Vietnam - Soviet Union; Vietnam - China; China - Soviet Union was affcctcd by thc third membcr of ihe triangle Although both the Soviet Union and China claimcd to be "cioing their intemational proletarian duty" by supporting Vietnam in thc war against the United States, at the same time both countries folỉowed theirovvn policy and interests Based on Victnam ese sources, the paper tries to exam ine the com plexity o f this triangle relationship and argues that, although Victnam achieved its aim, it vvas a pawn in global ideological and pow cr struggle am ong big powers R ationalc Although m ost diplomatic history is written as an account o f relations betw een two nations, in reality many interactions in intem ational relations involve more than simple bilateral exchanges This proposal is intended to rem edy this vveakness in the liierature by analyzing the strategic tnangle created by V ietnam , Soviet Union, and the Peoplcs’ Republic o f China during the years o f heavy U.S involvement in the Vietnam W ar (1965-1872) A triangular íramevvork is appropriate for this purpose becausc each o f the bilateral links V ietnam - Soviet Union; Vietnam - China; China - Soviet U nion - was affected by thc third m em bcr o f the triangle China^s policy in V ietnam must be understood in the context o f its goals vis-à-vis the Soviet U nion and the U nited States China hoped the w ar w ould weaken the United States, vvhile sim ultaneously prcvcnting expansion o f Soviet-A m crican rapprochem ent China tricd, at the same tim e, to avoid both an enlargcd war and negotiations to end the war In fact, China ultim ately prom otcd a prolonged vvar o f attrition for all involvcd parlicipants For Vietnam, C hina w as an ally, a supplicr o f troops and supplies, and a deterrent against a U.S invasion o f thc Norlh, but also a much stronger ncighbor w ho might ultim ately begin P.Q Minh / V N U Ịouninl p f Science, Sồal Sciences and Hitmanities Hunumitíes 25, No.5E /2009/ 24-36 to take advantage o f its great size to push Vietnam into a clcarly subordinatc status In com parison to China and thc United States, the Soviet U nion’s position on Vietnam was more uncomfortablc bccause it was inlluenccd by two coníìicting intcrcsts: a desire to reach a detente with the U nited States, and an interest to gain VictnartTs support in its struggle with China In general, Sovict policy tovvards Vietnam dunng the vvar had several dim ensions Firsí, M oscow ilid not want to sacnfice its stratecy o f dctentc in its rclations w ith the u s Second, M oscow w as ready to provide all the necessary m ilitary and economic aid n e e d e d for Hanoi to pursuc its war Third, M oscow prcferrcd negotiating a sctticmcnt to the vvar rather than being draw n further into It[ 1J In other w ords, the S oviet U nion tried to have greai iníluencc in V ietnam in order to realize its foreign policy goals: to rcach an appropriate settlem cnt to thc vvar and to make the DRV a reliablc Sovict ally in thc world com m unist movement In short, during thc w ar, V ictnam was a pawn in a global ìdeological and pow er struggle am ong the U nited States, C hina, and thc Soviet Union W hile C hinese interests \vould only later becom e clear, both the Sovict U nion and the United States clearly show ed their interests in the V ietnam conílict for thc first tim c in 1950 The U nited States íeared a rapprochem ent betw een the tw o com m unist pow ers China, in turn, w as afraid o f a Soviet-A m erican dctcnte w hile the Soviet Union w as concem ed about any im provem ent o f Sino-A m crican rclations T he E m e rg e n c e of th e tria n g le The G eneva A ccords recogm zed the baỉance o f these powcrs B oth the Sovict Union and C hina agreed to cnd the First Indochina 25 w ar, bul for diffcrcnt reasons W hilc the Soviet U nion prefcrrcd dctcnte with the United States in order to kecp a status quo in Europe, China tblloNvcd its Hve principles o f peaceíul coexistence in Indochina, with two Vietnams and a protracted strugglc in the country’s South Howcver, both the Soviet Union and China continued to support N orth Vietnam in reconstructing its econom y, in order to build up Vietnam as an “advance p o st” o f socialism China was a main supporter as well as a beneficiary o f the G encva A ccords o f 1954[2] On M arch 3, 1954, the C hinese N ews Agency announced that C hincse govem m ent accepted the invitation o f Sovict Union to participate in the G eneva confcrcnce on Korea and Indochina[3] Jcan Chauvel called the Geneva Conferencc as thc íirst m ceting betw een the East and the W est with participation o f Beijing[4Ị R ealizing thc importance o f the confcrencc China had preparcd very carefully, and sent to G cneva a largc delegation o f 200 persons[5] D uring thc G eneva conference, Chou Enlai show ed his skills as a diplom at and negotiator B ased on the fact o f détente among powers, China tried to pcrsuade Vietnam to sign the G eneva A ccord by accepting a division o f the country into tw o parts the N orth and the South along the 16th parallcl However, China suggested that if France will not accept this proposal, V ietnam w ould makc Hai Phong a free port allow ing Francc to settle a certain forces In w orst case, Victnam could propose that the H ighw ay N o and Hanoi and Hai Phong cities to becom e an arca o f common conlrol and non-m ilitary purposes[3] As a main ílgure in shaping the Geneva agreem cnt, the Sino-V ictnam rclationship was very close in thc sccond h a lf o f the 1950s and at the beginning o f thc 1960s A bout one year aíter the G eneva conĩcrcnce H o Chi Minh led a high ranking govcm m ental delegation from 26 P.Q Minh /V N U Ịoum al o f Science, Soàal Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 Vietnam to pay an official visit to C hina from June 24 to July 7, 1955 D uring this visit two sides signed some agrcem ents on econom ic, cultural and education exchanges C hina also agrecd to provide Vietnam w ith a grant o f 800 millions Yuan (200 m illion USD)[3] In this pcriod, both C hina and Soviet Union were o f the same opinion on Vietnam ese revolution that DRV had to concentrate on construction o f socialism in thc North o f Vietnam The consensus o f China and Soviet Union was cxplaincd by several factors First, alter years o f conírontation thc intem ational relations entered in the period o f détente betvveen big powers Second, both Soviet Union and China wanted to take this opportunity to c o n s o lid a te th e ir in te m a l affa irs Third , the conflict bctwccn Sovict Union and C hina still did not appcar serious The harmonized relations betw een Soviet Union and China were clear during the Geneva confcrence In a speech delivered on M ay 12, 1954, Chou Enlai relerrcđ to Soviet Union as a guarantee for solving the conílict in Indochina: “It is also necessary to m ention the peaceful policy o f Soviet Union - Soviet U nion is alvvays patient to sole the conílict in Indochina in peaceful way, and to support the national selfdetcrm ination o f Indochinese people.”[3] In a tclcgram datcd o f M ay 30, and in a spcech o f June 8, 1954, Choư Enlai m entioned again and again about Soviet Union that shared the idca o f China in the issue o f intem ational control in Indochina ìer Geneva coníerence W ithout the agreement betwcen Soviet Union and China, the Geneva confcrence vvould have taken morc time It was Soviet U nion and C hina who played an important role in settlem ent o f the conílict in Indochina N ot only in Vietnam ese issucs, but also in solving thc questions o íL a o s and Cambodia, both C hina and Soviet Union shared the same idcas The đifference w as in the vvay that China dealt w ith Laos and Cambodia A ccording to C hina all parties, including V ietnam , had to vvithdravv th eir íorces from Laos and C am bodia W hile, in Laos, the revolutionary forces could m ove to the north oi the country in the border arca vvith C hina and Vietnam ,[3] in C am bodia, there was no di Vision o f conlrolled area for revolution and national forces[3] Until N ovem ber 1956, the split betvveen China and Soviet U nion had not em erged The relationship betw een tvvo countries becam e worse as N ikita K hrushchev denounced Stalin at the Tenth Party congrcss o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet Union in early 1956 During the visit o f C hinese govem m ent and Com m unist Party o f C hina delegation led by Chou Enlai to V ietnam on N ovcm ber 18-22, 1956, Chou Enlai had a long discussion vvith Victnam ese leaders on several important questions First, according to Chou Enlai, the recent intcm ational situation, especially after events in Algeria and Hungary, became seriously com plicatcd The situatiơn in Hungary and in other countries in Eastem Europe shovved that, dcspite the fact that Soviet Union invested many resources in Eastem Europe, but the people there vvere still against Soviet Union The reason for their protest was, according to China, Soviet hegem ony Chou Enlai said: “The principles o f M arxism -Leninism are universal truth, but one cannot forcc a country to accept these principles - One has to com bine with the practice o f those countries.” [3] According to Chou Enlai, C hina w as especially displeased \vith hegem ony in the relationship between countries Although hegcm ony was not a major trend Chou continued, it existed in some relations, and could iníluence badly on the masses Secotĩd, on the question o f Vietnam unification, Chou advised Vietnam to follow a protractcđ struggle A ccording to Chou, Victnam should regard the principle o f reunification through free election as a slogan P Q Minh / VNU lounm l o f Science, Social Sciences and Hunmiúties Humanities 25, No.5K (2(X)9) 24-36 for political struggle rathcr than as a guidcline for daily actìon D iscussing thc issue o f economic policy, cspccialiy thc land reíbrm, Chou was o f thc opinion that thc program was esscntially succcsslul, w hilc m istakes and shortcomings Nvere isolated and local Using this opportunity Chou Enlai dcfcndcd Stalin IVom the attack o f Sovict leadcrship: “Comrade Stalin made scrious m istakes, but it is to contìrm that in thc m ain his policics vvere the coưect and victorious."[3] In 1957, thc split bctw een Sovict Union and China becam e more open NVhilc dcfcnding Stalin, China becam e criticize Soviet policy tow ard building Socialism through focusing on heavy ìndustry In A pril 1957, Prcm icr Ministcr Pham Van Dong lcd a delegation to visit China to discuss on situation and plan o f dcvcloping the North o f Vietnam During a mceting with Victnam ese collcagues on April 22, 1957, Mao Zcdong advised: “C om rades, it wi!l be dangerous if you go by the recent vvTong way o f brothcr countnes in Eastem Europc Hungary madc m istake bccausc it docs not dcvelop agnculture, because o f loo fast dcvelopm cnt o f industry, developing w ithout a markct Poland has paid m uch attention to industry, while the country did not have enough food, and even had to ìm port to feed itself.” [3] (It should be noted thai, like the othcr countnes in Eastem liurope, China had also followed the dircction from Soviet U nion that m eans to focus on heavy industry w ithout paying attention to rcsources and m arkets The results wcre a w asle o f billions U SD [3].) The othcr issue conccm ing both C hina and Soviet U nion was how V ictnam csc revolution in the South o f V ietnam should bc continucd In D ccem ber 1955 there w as a visit o f a delegation frotn the M ilitary C om m ission o f thc Party Central C om m ittec (Quan uy T rung uong) to China D u n n g the m eeting betw een tw o sides 27 on D eccm ber 8, 1955 D cng Xiaopm g \vas the opinion that V ietnam had to prepare for a prolonged war o f 10 or 20 years[3] In general, in thc period from 1954-1963, China w ieldcd cnorm ous intluence on Vietnam csc dom estic issues Following this stralegy, Beijing tricđ to convince the Norlh Vietnam to acccpt a dcfinitive division o f Vietnani by advising it to consolidate thc revolutionary achicvcm cnts in the North[6] Unlike Chm a thc Soviet Union recognized the role o f Victnam csc rcvolution rather late in its global stratcgy Even aftcr 1954 Soviet aid to Vietnam was far behind that o f China[7] In order to help Victnam to carry out the íìrst five vear plan (1961-1965) Soviet Union provided Vietnam a rcnt o f 430 million rubles with íavorable conditions and anothcr 350 million rubles to cultivate Iropical trees in agricultural, state-run farms In addition, a grant o f 20 m illion rublc was providcd for combating m alaria[8] Until 1964, with assistance o f Soviet Union about 90 important projects were renovatcd or ncw built up Among these there were projccts in thc íiclds o f hydroelectricity, m ining, m cchanics, chcm istry, light industry, and education A ccording to Prem ier M inister Pham V an D ong, thesc prọjects played very important rolc in building up initial m atenal and technical foundation o f socialism in Vietnam[8] A lthough Sovict Union continued helping Vietnam in building up ihe country and íìghting against A m erica, its assistance during this period charactcrizcd as at “an indifferent level” There were no Sovict high ranking delegations to visit Victnam The highest official who visited Vietnam w as M oukhidinov, Politburo m em ber and Sccrctary o f the Central committee o f CPSV who attcnd the Third Party congress o f V ietnam ’s W orkers Party in 1960 Nikita K hrushchev did not pay any visit to Vietnam, 28 P.Q Minh / VNL1 Ịoum aì o f Science, Social Sciences and Hunuììĩities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 but had done so in Indonesia, Indìa, M yanmar and A lghanistan during February and M arch 1960, dcspite the fact that Presidcnt Ho Chi M inh extcnded an invitation to him severa! tim es[8] T he attitude o f Soviet U nion tovvard V ietnam becam e worse in the m id-1963 after V ietnam publicly statcd its opinion on intem ational affairs and after thc visit o f Liu Shaoqi in M ay 1963 Although thc Vietnam W orkers Parly recognized the conílict betvveen the Soviet U nion and C hina early on, It w as too late in expressing its attitudes about the problem On Fcbruary 12, 1963, thrce years after the conílict had opened, the polilburo o f the V ietnam ’s W orker Party callcd the íratem al parties to stop attacks against each other in the m ass m cdia, and called for a m ecúng to solve the disunity w ithin the w orld’s com m unist and w orkers m ovem ent T he silcnce o f thc V ietnam ’s W orkers Party can be explained by its w ish to w in thc support from both sides for its o\vn struggle against thc How ever, silence was not alw ays the bcst policy The late reaction o f the V ictnam ’s W orker Party made both sides unhappy, especially C hina, and vvas criticized by Icadcrs o f other socialist c o u n tn es|9 ] M oreovcr “the politics o f neutrality exacted a high pricc on H anoi’s war eíĩort [10] us In M ay 1963, President Liu Shaoqi decidcd to pay an o íĩicial visit to Victnam The niain objective o f this visit w as to discuss with the V ietnam ’s W orker Party on the unity and solidarity am ong socialist countries as well as relationship betw een V ictnam -Soviet UnionC hina B eíore going to Victnam, Liu raised som e question to Vietnam cse leaders: why there is disagrcem ent am ong socialist countries? W hat is the charactcr o f this conílict? C an this conílict bc overcom e? Is this dangerous if the contlict will be continued?[8] A lthough he stated that “ this visit is friendly visit bccause tw o countrics are brothers and socialist com rades," but in fact C hina critĩcízed V ietnam ese attitudc to the split betvveen Soviet Union and C hina, and askcd V ietnam to support China in this conílict Liu Shaoqi stated: “ Let m e talk about principlc issue 'I*he problem s arise \vhcn therc is discussion on the principles, there is n o m id-\vay and com prom ise choice T his is not attitude o f M arxism Lenimsm - Ít is nccessary to have a clear stable opimon on problem s, such as questions o f p rin cip les W e have never hcard Ihat you are consistent in principle T he unity vvithout p rin c ip le 1S c o m p r o m is e l l n i t y m u st b e b a s c d on pnnciple o f M arxism -Leninism , o f the tvvo M oscow statem cnts C ontm uing unity w hile refusing these principlcs wou!d be not acceptable.” [8] A ccording to V ictnam cse sources, during the period bctw ecn 1960 and 1964, the Central C om m ittce o f V ictnam ’s \Vorker Party rcceived more than ten letters and announcem ents o f Central C om m ittce and 1’olitburo o f CPSV m entionm g Sovict-C hina split, and callm g for a Soviet-V ietnam ese m eeling regarding bad V ietnam csc attitudes toward Sovict cxpcrts in Vietnam M ore over, Central C om m ittee o f CPSV insisted that V ietnam “change vievvpoints'' (thay doi lap truong) In a meeting with Le D uan, First Sccrctary o f V ietnam ’s W orker Party in Fcbruary 1964, Khrushchcv even thrcatened to cut o ff m ilitary assistance for Vietnam [8] In D ccem bcr 1963, V ietnam ’s Central C om im ttee decidcd to call its N inth Plenum to discuss dom cstic and intcrnational p o lic y [ll] In the context o f dccpcned conflict betwecn China and Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh rem inded thc participants to pay special attention to the problcm o f unity betvveen Vietnam and C hina, on the one sidc, and P.Q Minh / VN U Ịoum al of Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Hunmnities Humanitics 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 betvvccn Victnam and Soviet U nion, on the other side, considering Ít to bc thc íìrst priority o f thc V ictnam ’s W orker P arty's torcign policy Hc emphasized: “O ur goal is unity For umty wc ve to struggle T o strugglc is to serve umty, not to spcak badly about anyone (VVc m ust somc) hovv so so that vvithin our party and pcoplc thcre is lovc and gratitudc to thc íratem al brothcr countries.”[ 12) Hoxvcver, duc to diffcrcnces in stratcgics bctw ccn thc VietnarrTs VVorkcr Party and the Soviet Union, the relationship bctw cen V ietnam and ihc Soviet U nion aftcr thc N inth Plcnum bccam e vvorsc V ietnam callcd its students s tu d y in g social s c ie n c c s in thc Sovict Union back to VietnanV A ftcr thc N inth Plenum , sounng rclationshíps not only cxisted betw een the tw o parties but also betvvccn thc tw o states The Soviet U nion had thrcatcncd and íorccd Victnam to follovv its policy direction, interfering in the intcm al politics and sovcrcignty o f VietnamỊ 13] In a letter datcd o f July 6, 1964 thc Central C om m ittee o f CPSV \vrote: “ In recent tim e som e activities o f m cm bers o f Central C om m ittee o f V ietnam ’s W orker Party made us w orry and unhappy, bccausc thcsc actions have clearly gonc in a contrary direction to the statcm ent o f V ictnam ese Thẽrẽ wcrc about one thousand studcnts w crc callcd back to Victnam during 1963-1964 A ccording thc intcrvicw conductcd by thc author in A ugusl 2004, all studcnts (most o f thcm w cre second or third ycars studcnts in ihc Sovict U nion) had to lcavc th c Sovict U nion for V ictnam as soon as possiblc w iihout knovving w hcther thcy could com e back to Sovict Union T hcrcíorc, thcy had to go back w ithout taking an>ihing with Ihcm A íìcr a m vai in V ictnam , thcy faccd m any difficultics T h cy did no! know \vhat to do, and w hat to study In co m p a n so n to thc studcnts w ho cam c back from C h in a, Ihcy wcrc ncglcctcd and did not rcccivc any support o r attcntion Until today these studcnts still havc an inícriority com plcx and dissatisfaction A m ong thcm thcrc vvcrc o n ly thrcc pcrsons w h o could rctum !0 thc Sovict U nion, and íìnished thcir study thcrc A m ong thcsc lucky pcrsons, thcrc w as Dang X uan Ky, thc son o f Truong Chinh 29 delegatcs on Soviet-V ietnam fricndship A recent uníncndly cam paign against Soviet U nion \vas carricd out morc and m ore w idely and actively within D cm ocratic R epubhc o f Vietnam In secrct m cctings o f the Party and am ong population thcrc w as a vvidc dissem ination o f falsification to sprcad suspicions about the country o f Lenin, to stir bad sentim ent tow ard thc country o f Lenin.” The letter concludcd: “ Rightly wc believe that íriendship m ust bc rcciprocated with fhendship.” [8] In short, thc trianglc V ictnam -Soviet-U nion relations werc vcry com plicated and covered by intem ational, rcgional and intem al íactors This relation also reĩlcctcd the split in relationship betvvecn Soviet U nion and China B oth o f them tricd to have morc inllucnces on V ietnam , and used this for their purposes T h e trỉa n g lc in th e p crio d o f 1964-1968 The ycar o f 1964 w as a tum ing point in the triangle rclations bctw ecn V ielnam -Soviet Union-China There wcrc som e reasons to explain this change F irsty in O ctober 1964, K hrushchev w as rcm ovcd from the position o f the First Secrctary o f thc C PSV by Leonid Brezhncv Second, thc escalation o f the V ietnam W ar forccd Sovict U nion and othcr socialist countries lo provide m ore assistance for Victnam Third, thc com plexity and incrcase o f conflict betw ccn Sovict U nion and C hina iníluenced grcatly on V ietnam —the third parly The Victnam policy o f Soviet U nion was m odified in thc Brczhnev cra C hinese aid to N orth V ietnam increased dram atically evcn after 1963 T here vvere a num ber o f rcasons for this increase First, the escalation o f m ilitary conílicts in South Vietnam lcd to an cxpansion o f the w ar to N orth V ictnam and dccpcned C h in a’s fear that 30 P.Q M inh / V N il Ịournnì o ị Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Hurm nities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 24-36 the war could threaten its security Thereíbre, China dccidcd to o íĩc r additional forces, consisting o f 230 battalions, to North Victnam[2Ị Second, M ao uscđ the intem ational situation and support to Vietnam to win the upper hand in an intem al strugglc for povver among C hincse Com m unist Party leaders Third, C hina’s m otivation for increasing support to Victnam was rclatcd to the split betw ecn China and the Soviet Union that took placc in 1956 after the 20lh C ongress o f the Sovict Com m unisl Parly Through its support to Victnam, thc Chincsc leadcrship tricd to shovv that China was the country that could provide Vietnam with sĩìcient support for its national libcration movcmcnt, and that C hina w as a Irue com m um st country in com parison to Soviet Union Fourth, C hina’s support to Victnam can also bc cxplained through its desire to play a lcading rolc in hclping rcvolutionary m ovements in thc third vvorld In sum , through support to Vietnam, C h in a’s leadcrship tried to achicvc both intcrnational and dom cstic goals As part o f this proccss, during A ugust 1964, China cam cd out changcs to its military presencc in thc South o f China, such as the redcploymcnt o f its air forcc and anti-craft artillcry, as well as thc construction o f new airportsỊ 14] In political and social life, there was a trcm cndous movemcnt know n as “ Resist Am erica and Assist Vietnam " which was organizcd throughout thc country w ith the parlicipation o f morc than 20 m ilhon people(2) In latc 1964 and carly 1965, China even madc clear that it was rcady to scnd its arm y to fight together with thc Victnamcse pcople, and that it would offer all rnanner o f support to Victnam (3) In the pcriod 1964-1968, China*s supporl to Victnam was cxpresscd in thrcc main forms: the construction and m aintenance o f deíense ^ Rcnmin ribao (1965), and 12 August (ỉ) Rcnmin nbao (1965), 25 March inírastructurc, air íĩclds, roads and railvvays; the use o f C hinesc anli-aircraft artillery troops in the dcícnse o f imporlant strategic areas of North V ietnam ; and the supply o f military equipm ent and civil m aterials A ccording to onc statistic, o v cr 320,000 C hinese cnginccring and anti-aircralì artillcry forccs w ere in Vietnam at the tim e[ 15] In com parison to ihe previous period, during 1964-1968, Sovict U nion had m odified their policy towarđ V ictnam The nevv lcadership o f Sovict Union has reconfìrmed their role o f co-chair íbr G eneva conlercnce 1954 for V ictnam The lcttcr o f M inister o f Foreign A ftầirs G rom yko to M inister Xuan Thuy datcd o f D ccem ber 12, 1964 stated: The states participating in Geneva conícrcnce could not be oulside, vvhcn security o f nations and peace in Indochina vvas thrcatcnccl.,, The tum ing point in thc relationship bctvvecn the Sovict Union and N orth Victnam was in 1965 when Soviet Prem ier Kosygin visitcd H anoi in early February The mcaning o f the visit w as m ultidim cnsional Firsty the Soviet U nion w anted to makc clcar its eíĩorts to đcfend lỉan o i from A m erican air attacks by eqưipping ihe DRV with anti-aircrì vveapons Second, thc Soviet U nion vvanted to c m p h a s iz e its position in Southeast Asia Third, the Soviet Union intcnded to w am Victnam not to undcrestim atc the us plans regarding com m unism in Asia L ast bui not ỉeast, the Soviet U nion planned to comc to an agrcement with Chincse lcadcrship on thc Vietnam W ar, taking into account K osygin’s two visits to Beijing[16] D uring this pcriod, Sovict Union vvas intcndcd for V ictnam a strong politica! support On May 8, 1965, thc First Sccretary Leonid Brezhncv stated: “T o support Victnam in the strugglc against aggrcssion o f American impcrialism is an honorahlc cause, and vital P.Q M inh / VN U Ịournal o f Science, Soàal Sciences and Humanities Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 31 intcrest o f all people deíending íreedom and indcpcndcnce.” [8] íratem al solidarity and socialist intem ationalism during M arch 1965[4] Soviet Union also established official rclations vvith National Liberation Front (NLF) On January 13, 1965, thc representative offìce o f N LF was founded in M oscow In M ay o f 1965 this offĩce gained diplom atic status On lune 13, 1969 Soviet U nion offĩcially recognized Provisional R evolutionary Government o f Rcpublic o f South Vietnam (PRG) The high point o f the cooperation between the Soviet U nion and Vietnam was the official visit o f the V ietnam 's W orker Party delegation, headed by Le Duan, to M oscow from April 10 to 17, 1965 In the jo in t com m uniq drìed by the end o f the visit, both sides stated: “ If the us intensifies its aggression against the DRV, in a necessary case and i f the DRV requires it, the Soviet U nion govem m ent would permit the departure to V ictnam o f those Soviet citizens who expressed their w ish in accordance with the feelings o f intem ational proletarian spirit to struggle for the ju st cause o f Vietnamese people, for defense o f socialist achievcm ents o f the DRV ” [17] In term o f economy, like during the previous period, Soviet support continued playing an important role In February 1965, Soviet Union decided to defer Vietnam ese debts A fter the visit o f K osygin, S oviet aid to Vietnam increased every year Hovvever, Moscovv (lid not want to risk its relations with the u s and the W est As a result, M oscow ’s foreign policy was in a dilem m a O n the one hand, the Soviet Union had to show its intemational prolctarianism to its V ietnam ese fricnds On the other hand, it did not like to block its com m unication w ith the W est In addition, the m eeting vvith C hina did n o t bring positive results China rcíused to coordinate support to V ietnam All these factors gave an im p r e s s io n that the Soviet U nion, despite its statement to support V ietnam , still tried to avoid involvem ent in the V ietnam c o n ílict and to cooperate w ith the u s in m aking a political settlement From M arch 1965 on, due to the escalation o f the w ar and the failure o f a diplom atic settlemcnt to the conílict, M oscow decided to strengthen cooperation w ith V ietnam in economic and m ilitary areas Soviet aid was mostly in form o f food and equipm ent, and was transported initially by sea, but after M arch 30, 1965 through C hinese territory Soviet leaders made several sừong public statem ents on As a result, the Soviet Union agreed to provide Vietnam with surface-to-air missile batteries for the area around Hanoi, Hai Phong and other im portant cities, in addition to fighter aircraft, pilots, and technicians The April 1965 visit also solved problem s o f the transportation o f Soviet aid through C hinese teưitory The íìrst fifteen M IG 15/17s and one hundred arm ored personnel carriers were sent to V ietnam Later som e light IL-28 bombers arrived in Vietnam as well[[7] D uring 1965 both W ashington and Hanoi were in no hurry to negotiate, preferring to gain m ilitary victories, and then to negotiate from a position o f strength Thereíore, during 1965 the w ar in Vietnam approached a nevv and dangerous phase, though there vvere several attem pts to prevent it The Soviet U nion was the only m ediator that could negotiate a settlement, b u t it íailed to so because such a settlem ent could isolate the Soviet Union from coĩnm unist and national liberation movements Soviet aid to V ielnam grew steadily from 1965 to 1968 By 1967 total socialist-country aid to the DRV accounted for about 1.5 billion 32 p Q M inh / V N U Ịournnì o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 24-36 rubles (more than 1.5 billion USD), among vvhich M oscow ’s share was 36.8 percent (608 million USD) By the cnd o f 1967, Soviet supporl grcw to 50 pcrccnt o f total socialistcountry aid Among this, m ilitary aid comprised two-thirds o f all Soviet assistance, and accounted for 396.7 m illion USD in 1968 In addition in Septem bcr 1965 thcrc vvcrc betwecn 1,500 to 2,500 Sovict m ilitary pcrsonnel serving in V ietnam T hey w ere m ostly tcchmcians, pilots and SAM opcrators In addition thcrc vvas a spccial group rcsponsible for obtainm g sam plcs o f American vveapons to lcam about up-to-datc u s arm s[7] In 1968, the Soviet Union took ovcr thc top position in supporting Vietnam from China HoNvever, it was a bitter m om ent for the Soviet Union, according to one rcport from thc Soviet em bassy in H anoi, as the Sovict U nioi^s ìníluence in Vietnam did not grow accordingly \vith their support By 1965, faceđ with escalation o f the war in Vietnam and sim ilarly cscalating com m itm ents, the Sovict Union proposed a plan to unify activities among socialist countries to support Vietnam This plan w as t\vofold: to strengthen support for Vietnam, and at the same time to put China in on the defensivc D uring his visit to Vietnam in Fcbruary 1965, Prcsident Kosygin suggestcd that thrcc countries Victnam, Soviet Union and China issue a common statem cnt on a uniiìed plan Suggestions on a com m on statcm cnt o f socialist countrics regarding Victnam made by Soviet Union on January 12, 1966 and in March 1967 vvere again rẹịected by China The split betvvecn Sovict U nion and China has badly influcnccd on transportation o f aid goods from Sovict Union and other socialist countries through C hinese tcrritory Using its position as a transit tcrm inal, China tried to manipulatc this aid to lim it big m ilitary attacks by thc V ictnam csc Bcginnm g in 1965, Soviet U nion suggcstcđ a scrics o f plans, su ch as the cslablishm cnt o f a n air basc for S ovict airplanes in H ainan province, or cstablishnìcnt o f airbridgc through China, using H oa N an porl to scnd Sovict goods to V ietnam , o r organizing a specialisl group in Binh T uong Iỉo\vevcr, all these initiatives o f Soviet U nion w ere rcjcctcd by China[8] In the context o f the dccp split bctvvecn Soviet U nion and China, the atm osphcre o f the triangle relationship was charactcrized by distrust Both China and Sovict U nion vvere w orried about thc position o f Vietnam A lthough Soviet Union providcd V ietnam with hea\ support during this period, it w as still w o m cd that V ictnam vvould m o ve from thc Sovict side to Chincse onc T he S ovict Union was o f thc opinion that V ietnam w as biascd tow ards C hina During high ranking ncgotiations in A ugust 1966, the Sovict Union did not hesitate to raise questions regarding vvhat C hina had advised V ictnam to do, and w hat V ietnam had agreed w ith C hina Sovict Union also suspected that V ietnam w as too depcndcnt on C hincse International policy, and that V ietnam had scparatc talks w ith C h im to oppose ihc Sovict Union M orc over, according to the Soviet U nion, V ictnam had treatcd Soviet specialists coolly, prevented V ietnam esc pcoplc from contacting thc specialists, and limited thcir travel V ictnam did not allow Sovict spccialists, but rathcr C hinese ones to visit a missilc basc that had bcen built by thc Soviet U nion Also, V ietnam , according to Sovict U nion, w as silcnt when China slandercd thc Sovict Union[8] All thcsc inHucnccd badly on relations betw ecn the Sovict Union and V ietnam The Soviet U nion required V ietnam to make clear choice: total depcndence on Sovict Union, or continucd dcpcndcncc on C hina It vvas not surprise that Soviet Union did not confirm P.Q Minh / VNL1 ịo u rm l o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Humanities Hunuinities 25, No.5L