Recent Threat Trends and a Look Ahead Buck Watia iDefense Security Intelligence Operations Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information Presentation Agenda I Today’s Threat Environment II Progression of Threat Motives & Impact I II III Recent Malicious Activity I II IV Statistics Notable Malcode Where Do We Go From Here? I A Look Back Current & Future Trends, Motivations Threats in Context Contains VeriSign Today’s Threat Environment + Enterprise Environment is Increasingly Complex ▪ Critical System Explosion ▪ Asset Criticality isn’t Enough to Prioritize ▪ Increase in Vulnerabilities ▪ Constant Updates and Patches + Sophistication of Threats ▪ Increasingly Advanced Malicious Code ▪ Increase in Communication/Teamwork Among Hackers ▪ Time to Exploitation Drastically Reduced ▪ Stealth Attacks Contains VeriSign Progression of Motives & Impact + 2003 Year of the Worm ▪ Notoriety ▪ Dawn of code for cash ▪ MSFT Bounty program established + 2004 Worm War & Criminal Code ▪ Bounty program curbs notoriety actors ▪ Bounty program hardens criminal gain actors ▪ Hundreds of variants, source code releases + NASA.GOV 2005 Year of the Bot & Ad/Spyware ▪ Criminalization and commoditization well developed ▪ Target Attacks: Espionage and hacker for hire quickly escalating + 2006 Threat of the Unknown: Stealth for Survival ▪ Increase in innovation, organization and sophistication ▪ Targeted attacks to defeat specific authentication protection Contains VeriSign Creating Code for Cash Millions of Stolen Account Credentials - Fedex Account #! Stolen CD Keys Phishing & Pharming Millions of Stolen Credit Cards Money Mules Extortion Ad/Spyware Industrial Espionage Contains VeriSign Hackers for Hire 2005: Vulnerability Activity Source: VeriSign iDefense Vulnerability Team + 2,954 unique vulnerability reports + 13,550 re-versioned reports + 598 new exploits Contains VeriSign Exploitation Frameworks + Metasploit Framework ▪ Open-source project created in mid-2003 by H.D Moore ▪ Created for pen-testing and research; a free alternative to others ▪ Widely used by hacking community since it is free + CANVAS ▪ Offered by Immunity Inc., started by Dave Aitel in 2002 ▪ Aimed at promoting exploit development and providing a penetration testing platform + Core Impact ▪ Core Impact was developed by CORE Security Technologies in 1996 ▪ Dubbed as the first fully automated penetration testing product ▪ Expensive product used mainly by corporations Contains VeriSign 2005: Top Exploited Vulnerabilities # of Codes Vulnerability Exploited 1,357 LSASS 526 WebDAV 469 Cumulative Update for Microsoft RPC/DCOM 404 Microsoft ASN.1 BERDecBitString() Buffer Overflow 368 Workstation vulnerability 357 Microsoft Plug-and-Play Buffer Overflow 220 Microsoft Windows DCERPC DCOM Heap Overflow 216 UPnP 172 SQL Server 113 IIS5 SSL DoS vulnerability **Multiple other Microsoft vulnerabilities exploited to a lesser degree Contains VeriSign 2005: Malcode Activity Source: VeriSign iDefense Malcode Team Contains VeriSign Notable Attacks and Vectors 10 + MS05-039/Zotob + Google Adword Attack + DNS Poisoning + WMF File Format Vulnerability + Metafisher Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Sophisticated Phishing Attacks + A Highly Sophisticated Bot for Financial Fraud ▪ The IceBerg threat – Under the radar for months – Encryption cracked ▪ Web-based command-and-control server – Large numbers of Bots ▪ professionally built – suite of tools – user-friendly administration interface ▪ Professional software lifecycle management comparable to many professional software products 16 Contains VeriSign 17 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Known Attack Structures to Date 18 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – PHP Configured Bots 19 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Searchable Stolen Log Files 20 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Form.txt – Keylogger and Phished Data 21 Contains VeriSign BrizTrojan Targets US Banks + Briz Trojan Family ▪ ▪ ▪ Not new, family has been around for several months Targets Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and US Banks in the US: Bank of America, wellsFargo + Sophisticated Attack ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ BHOs combine to make complex credential stealing unit Downloads configuration files to inject HTML and JavaScript into pages to steal credentials that otherwise would not be requested Screenshots taken on every initial page load and at each mouse click Logged data is stored with time stamps to determine user usage profiles to trick anti fraud devices Trojan injected verification questions after a successful login Challenges banks customized authentication systems + US Banks were not previously a threat to sophisticated financial attacks ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 22 Increasing Trend Intelligence, Sophistication, Custom code injection Similar path as MetaPhisher Used in combination with money mule operations to move money to off shore accounts Contains VeriSign Browser Helper Object Initial Compromise Spammed links via fake windows update sites/porn Installs BHO in IE +Trojan can take on multiple layer authentication systems +i.e Site Key- BOA + Steals all forms +Injects custom code for targeted attacks against specific banks Home User 23 Contains VeriSign Biz Trojan Initial Compromise Command and Control Servers Downloads Javascript to inject SSL verified pages Installs BHO Home User 24 Screen Shots Taken, Data Logged and saved Contains VeriSign US Banking Servers SNATCH: Russian Advanced Banking Malcode 25 + Sophisticated malicious code targeting financial services + Created by Russian SE-Code’s #Rock group + Sophisticated threat similar to Metaphisher and Briz Trojans Contains VeriSign SNATCH: Russian Advanced Banking Malcode + Targets European and American transactions + Grabs: ▪ SSL Forms and Logs ▪ E-gold, ebay, paypal, Casino accounts, bank accounts ▪ TANs ▪ ITANS + Search Engine ▪ Spoofs queries to redirect users to sites of its choice + Currently being sold for profit as a sophisticated tool for financial gain, here is the pricing ▪ Enhanced Builder Version for $600 – AV Updates for $50 to get around all new anti-virus engine builds to extend the life of the product 26 Contains VeriSign Threat Context is King: MS05-039 & MS05-051 MS05-039 (UPnP) + Unprecedented Underground Activity and Chatter + Public exploit code in days + Rooters and bots within days + Leading bot author, Diabl0, releases first bot on day 5, ZoTob.A + Workarounds and Emergency Patch Procedures Implemented MS05-051 (MSDTC and COM+) + No Underground Activity or Chatter + Privately Traded Exploit Code ▪ Not in the hands of known actors Not in the wild + No Functional Malicious Code in the Wild + Deploy MS05-051 at normal speed (ID# 425064) + Do Not Go into Emergency Patch Procedures 27 Contains VeriSign Threats in Context + Vulnerabilities ▪ Is this a real threat to my critical systems? ▪ Example: What exactly is vulnerable to MS06-001 WMF exploitation? + Malicious Code & Exploit Code ▪ Is there malicious code or exploit code in the wild? ▪ Is it public or private? ▪ Is it limited to a specific operating system or application? ▪ Is it highly functional or only work part of the time? + Threat Environment ▪ Where did the malicious code come from? ▪ What actors or groups are responsible? ▪ Is there underground chatter? ▪ Is the exploit code being traded or sold? 28 Contains VeriSign iDefense Background + The Leading Security Intelligence Research Team ▪ iDefense provides pro-active notification of impending threats, including vulnerabilities and malicious code + Industry-Leading Services Offerings ▪ Intelligence is all the iDefense team does ▪ Completely vendor-agnostic + Marquee Customer and Partner Base ▪ Government, financial services, insurance, healthcare, retail ▪ Security software and services + Experienced Intelligence Teams ▪ VAT, Labs, Malcode, RRT, Threat + Actively Gathering Cyber Intelligence Since 1998 29 Contains VeriSign Thank you If you have any questions regarding this presentation please contact Buck Watia at bwatia@verisign.com Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information ... Microsoft vulnerabilities exploited to a lesser degree Contains VeriSign 2005: Malcode Activity Source: VeriSign iDefense Malcode Team Contains VeriSign Notable Attacks and Vectors 10 + MS05-039/Zotob... software products 16 Contains VeriSign 17 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Known Attack Structures to Date 18 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – PHP Configured Bots 19 Contains VeriSign Metafisher – Searchable... Intelligence Since 1998 29 Contains VeriSign Thank you If you have any questions regarding this presentation please contact Buck Watia at bwatia @verisign. com Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary