Tác động của AFTA đối với nguồn thu ngân sách chính phủ, thương mại quốc tế và đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài của CHDCND Lào (E)

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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRANING MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SPORT NATIONAL ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAOS LAOS ATHSAPHANGTHONG SIPHANDONE IMPACTS OF AFTA ON GOVERNMENT REVENUE, EXTERNAL TRADE, AND FDI OF LAO PDR A dissertation Submitted to the National Economics University, Vietnam and National University of Laos in fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics Supervisor: Prof Dr TRAN THO DAT VIENTIANE – 2014 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iii LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background 1.2 Problem Statement 1.3 Objective .8 1.4 Expected Outcomes .8 1.5 Significance of Study .8 1.6 Scope of Study 1.7 Organization of the Dissertation CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 11 2.1 Theoretical Literature Review 11 2.1.1 Definition and Levels of Economic Integration 11 2.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Economic Integration .13 2.1.3 ASEAN and AFTA .17 2.1.4 Challenges and Opportunity for Lao PDR after Joining ASEAN 28 2.2 Empirical Literature Review 30 CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 43 3.1 Analytical Methodology 43 3.1.1 Descriptive Approach 43 iv 3.1.2 Econometric Approach 44 3.2 Data Collection 51 CHAPTER 4: IMPACTS OF AFTA ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, GOVERNMENT REVENUE, EXTERNAL TRADE AND FDI 53 4.1 Lao PDR Economic Performance During 1990-2012 53 4.1.1 Growth Rate 53 4.1.2 Output Structure 58 4.1.3 GDP per Capita .61 4.2 Impacts on Government Revenue 63 4.2.1 Total Revenue .63 4.2.2 Tax and Non-Tax Revenue 66 4.3 Impacts on External Trade .71 4.3.1 Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, 1990-2012 71 4.3.2 Direction of Exports and Imports 77 4.3.3 Degree of Trade Openness 80 4.4 Impacts on Foreign Direct Investment 85 4.5 Empirical Evidence of Impacts of AFTA on Government Revenue, External Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment 91 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 103 5.1 Conclusion 103 5.2 Recommendation .106 REFERENCES 108 APPENDIX 115 v LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Schedule for Tariff Reduction under CEPT Agreements 21 Table 2.2: Timetable for Accelerating AFTA for the Regional Six ASEAN Countries 26 Table 3.1: Framework on Analyzing the Impacts of AFTA on Economic Performance, Government Revenue, Trade, FDI 43 Table 3.2: Summary of Expected Signs of Independent Variables .50 Table 3.3: Data Sources Used in Analysis 51 Table 4.1: Directions of Exports, 1900-2012 77 Table 4.2: Merchandise Exports of Lao PDR (% of Total Merchandise Exports) .78 Table 4.3: Directions of Imports, 1990-2012 79 Table 4.4: Merchandise Imports 80 Table 4.5: The World‘s most Opened and most Closed Economies in 1996 82 Table 4.6: Degree of Openness of ASEAN Member Countries, 1995-2012 .83 Table 4.7: Intra-ASEAN Trade 2009 & 2010 85 Table 4.8: FDI Net Flows to ASEAN 87 Table 4.9: Percent Share of FDI in ASEAN 87 Table 4.10: FDI as Percent of GDP 88 Table 4.11: FDI by Countries, 2001-2010 .89 Table 4.12: Results of Regressions by Using Lao Data 91 Table 4.13: Results of Regressions by Using the Weighted-Average Data (WAD) 95 Table 4.14: Comparing the regression results by using the Lao data and WAD 99 Table 4.15: Regression Results by Excluding INFR in the EXP, IMP, and FDI Equations and EXR in the GOVR Equation 101 Table 4.16: Regression Results by Excluding INF and EXR in All Equations 101 vi LIST OF FIGURES Fig 2.1: Fig 2.2: Levels of Economic Integration 12 Tendency of ASEAN Members‘ Tariff Rates, 1993-2009 27 Fig 2.3: Fig 4.1: Fig 4.2: Tariff Rates of ASEAN-6 and ASEAN-4, 1993-2009 28 Economic Performance of Lao PDR, 1990-2012 55 Resource Sector Contribution to GDP Growth, 2004-2012 57 Fig 4.3: Fig 4.4: Structure of Output as Percent of GDP, 1990-2012 59 Growth Rates of Economic Sectors, 1990-2012 60 Fig 4.5: Fig 4.6: GDP per Capita of Lao PDR, 1990-2012 61 GDP per Capita of ASEAN Members In 2012 62 Fig 4.7: Fig 4.8: Fig 4.9: Fig 4.10: Total Revenue of GOL, 1990-2012 63 Annual Percent Change of Total Revenue and Grant, 1990-2012 65 Tax and Non-Tax Revenue, 1990-2012 66 Tax and Non-Tax Revenue and Grants as Percent Share of Total Fig 4.14: Fig 4.15: Revenue, 1996-2010 67 Components of Tax Revenue, 1995/60-2009/10 68 Growth Rate of Import and Export Duties, 1996/97-2009/10 69 Total Revenue, Tax Revenue, Total Expenditure, and Budget Balance as Percent of GDP, 1990-2012 70 Tax Revenue and Tariff Rate, 1998-2012 71 Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance, 1990-2012 73 Fig 4.16: Fig 4.17: Fig 4.18: Fig 4.19: Fig 4.20: Fig 4.21: Fig 4.22: Fig 4.23: Annual Change of Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance, 1990-2012 74 Exports and Imports as Percent Of GDP, 1990-2012 75 Lao Exports and ASEAN Averaged-Tariff rate, 1996-2013 76 Lao Imports and Averaged-Tariff rate, 1998-2013 76 Exports Shared by Countries, 1990-2012 78 Imports Shared by Counties, 1990-2012 80 Degree of Trade Openness, 1990-2011 81 Trends of Openness Degree of ASEAN Members, 1995-2012 84 Fig 4.11: Fig 4.12: Fig 4.13: Fig 4.24: Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR, 1990-2012 86 Fig 4.25: FDI Project Numbers by Sectors, 2002-2010 90 Fig 4.26: Values of FDI by Sectors, 2002-2010 90 vii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank AEC ASEAN Economic Community AFC Asian Financial Crisis AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN-4 Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam ASEAN-6 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, BOL and Singapore CEPT Bank of Lao PDR EXP Common Effective Preferential Tariff EXR Exports FDI Exchange Rate FTA Foreign Direct Investment FY Free Trade Agreement GDP Fiscal Year GDPF Gross Domestic Product GOL Foreign Income GOVR Government of Lao PDR GSP Government Revenue IMF Generalized Systems of Preferential IMP International Monetary Fund viii INFR Imports Lao PDR Inflation Rate LIB Lao People‘s Democratic Republic MPI Liberalization NSEDP Ministry of Planning and Investment NTRs National Socio-Economic Development Plan ODA Normal Trade Relations RTAs Official Development Assistance TAXA Regional Trade Agreements TAXL Tariff Rate of ASEAN Member Countries VAT Value Added Taxes WAD Tariff Rate of Lao PDR WB Weighted-Averaged Data World Bank CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Regional integration has become the main form of trade liberalization since the early 1990s After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, no significant progress has been made at multilateral liberalization By contrast, a new regional trade agreement (RTAs) is announced almost every month According to the World Trade Organization, more than 300 regional trade agreements (RTAs) are currently in force and all but one (Mongolia) of its 153 members participate in at least one of those arrangements Given the rising prominence of bilateral and regional trade liberalization, it is important to understand the implications for world trade This is even more important because, unlike multilateral liberalization, which most economists believe to be largely beneficial for both liberalizing countries and by standers, preferential liberalization is controversial The reason comes from its inherent discriminatory nature: when forming an RTA, members agree to lower trade barriers to each other but their tariffs on imports from outsiders remain unconstrained This can induce members to substitute inefficiently produced imports from bloc members for imports previously sourced efficiently from nonmember countries Such trade diversion harms the nonmembers through lost markets, as well as the members through reduced tariff revenue However, like broader trade liberalization, the RTA is also likely to enhance trade of the goods that are efficiently sourced within the bloc This trade creation will enhance welfare These two forces suggest that preferential liberalization can in principle be either welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing Ultimately, the result must be empirical, and may be different for different trading blocs Trade creation forces may prevail over trade diverting ones in some cases, but the reverse could be true in other cases Progress of the integration has been very impressive in recent decades for a number of developing countries in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America These countries have become successful because they chose to participate in regional and global trade, helping them to attract the bulk of foreign direct investment in developing countries This is true of China and India since they embraced trade liberalization and other market-oriented reforms, and also of higherincome countries in Asia—like Korea and Singapore—that were themselves poor up to the 1970s (IMF, 2001) It has been realized since Viner (1950) that the formation of a free trade agreement (FTA) can lead to trade creation and/or trade diversion The former arises when the FTA promotes trade among the members without disrupting trade with nonmembers, and tends to be efficiency-enhancing By contrast, trade diversion arises when the FTA promotes trade among members at the expense of trade with bloc outsiders, and tends to be efficiency-reducing There have been attempts to pin down theoretically the characteristics that make FTAs more trade creating or more trade diverting Frankel (1997) develops the ―natural trading partners‖ hypothesis, which states broadly that agreements between countries that already trade significantly (in particular geographically close countries and those that share cultural characteristics that reduce transaction costs, such as language) are the ones most likely to be trade creating Although theoretically this does not need to always hold, as Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999) point out, Frankel (1997) finds evidence consistent with the natural trade partners hypothesis in a number of regression analyses based on the gravity equation with country-level trade flows Lee and Shin (2006) extend the approach of Frankel (1997) and estimate a gravity model with year dummies and with both random and fixed effects to assess trade creation and trade diversion in 175 countries using data from 1948 to 1999 The key trade creation variable is a dummy that is one if both countries are members of a common RTA; the key trade diversion variable is a dummy that is one if one country belongs to an RTA and the other does not belong to that RTA Lee and Shin interact these variables with geographical and common language variables to identify whether trade creation and trade diversion are different for ―natural‖ trade patterns In most specifications, Lee and Shin (2006) confirm that RTAs increase bilateral trade between members The magnitudes are around 50 percent, but if the countries share a common border this effect increases to up to 200 percent Similarly, the closer the countries are from each other, the larger is trade creation On the other hand, RTAs are never found to reduce trade between members and nonmembers significantly In fact, in most specifications RTAs are estimated to increase trade between members and nonmembers, from to 15 percent Trade with nonmembers grows more for RTAs with a smaller average distance between their members and when more members of the RTA have common borders or share a common language Having the trade creation and trade diversion estimates in hand, Lee and Shin then predict the average trade impact of several proposed RTAs in Asia They find in particular that the trade effects of AFTA are significantly positive There is a sizeable theoretical literature that explores the optimal external tariff response of countries following the formation of FTAs In a standard model, with a welfare-maximizing government, optimal external tariffs are likely to fall in a free trade area precisely to limit the welfare costs of trade diversion [Bagwell and Staiger (1999), Freund (2000), Bond et al (2004)] The intuition is that the welfare cost of trade diversion induces governments to lower external tariffs to recapture tariff revenue and improve economic efficiency When political-economy motives are incorporated, the results are ambiguous For example, Richardson (1993) and Ornelas (2005) find that, upon the formation of a free trade area, lobbying will decline and external tariffs fall, as the 143 Dependent Variable: ln(IMP) Method: Least Squares Date: 05/28/14 Time: 14:50 Sample: 1990 2012 Included observations: 23 Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -9.230 2.108 -4.379 0.000 ln(GDP) 2.152 0.226 9.516 0.000 ln(TAXL) 1.368 0.302 4.528 0.000 LIB -0.415 0.154 -2.701 0.014 R-squared 0.947 Mean dependent var 9.286 Adjusted R-squared 0.939 S.D dependent var 0.868 S.E of regression 0.214 Akaike info criterion -0.084 Sum squared resid 0.874 Schwarz criterion 0.113 Log likelihood 4.971 F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 1.376 Prob(F-statistic) Table G.2: Estimated Results of Import Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2013) 113.785 0.000 144 Dependent Variable: ln(FDI) Method: Least Squares Date: 05/28/14 Time: 14:53 Sample: 1990 2012 Included observations: 23 Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob -13.906 6.533 -2.128 0.047 ln(GDP) 3.536 0.701 5.043 0.000 ln(TAXL) 2.286 0.937 2.440 0.025 LIB 0.084 0.477 0.177 0.862 R-squared 0.878 Mean dependent var 17.002 Adjusted R-squared 0.859 S.D dependent var 1.772 S.E of regression 0.665 Akaike info criterion 2.178 Sum squared resid 8.397 Schwarz criterion 2.376 F-statistic 45.778 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 C Log likelihood -21.048 Durbin-Watson stat 1.132 Table G.3: Estimated Results of FDI Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2013) 145 Dependent Variable: ln(GOVR) Method: Least Squares Date: 05/28/14 Time: 15:05 Sample: 1990 2012 Included observations: 23 Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -4.791 1.779 -2.693 0.014 Ln(GDP) 2.200 0.404 5.450 0.000 Ln(TAXL) 1.265 0.380 3.334 0.004 LIB -1.025 0.422 -2.429 0.025 R-squared 0.795 Mean dependent var 6.582 Adjusted R-squared 0.762 S.D dependent var 0.821 S.E of regression 0.400 Akaike info criterion 1.163 Sum squared resid 3.044 Schwarz criterion 1.361 Log likelihood -9.379 F-statistic 24.502 Durbin-Watson stat 1.092 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Table G.4: Estimated Results of Government Revenue Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2013) 146 Appendix H: Regression Results of Lagged Model Dependent Variable: EXP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/26/14 Time: 15:50 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -1.604 2.937 -0.546 0.602 GDPF -0.241 0.787 -0.307 0.768 GDPF(-1) 1.399 0.791 1.768 0.120 GDPF(-2) -0.130 0.637 -0.205 0.844 TAXL -0.072 0.423 -0.169 0.870 TAXL(-1) 0.307 0.634 0.484 0.643 TAXL(-2) -0.177 0.615 -0.287 0.782 INFR -0.861 0.084 -10.245 0.000 INFR(-1) 0.245 0.179 1.367 0.214 INFR(-2) -0.202 0.194 -1.043 0.332 EXR 1.268 0.649 1.954 0.092 EXR(-1) -0.991 0.968 -1.024 0.340 EXR(-2) 0.090 0.402 0.223 0.830 LIB 0.417 0.194 2.147 0.069 R-squared 0.998 Mean dependent var 5.678 Adjusted R-squared 0.994 S.D dependent var 0.664 S.E of regression 0.051 Akaike info criterion -2.879 Sum squared resid 0.018 Schwarz criterion -2.183 Log likelihood 44.235 F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 1.434 Prob(F-statistic) Table H.1: Estimated Results of Export Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 260.447 0.000 147 Dependent Variable: IMP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/26/14 Time: 16:03 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C 0.784 1.886 0.416 0.690 GDP 0.206 2.059 0.100 0.923 GDP(-1) -0.136 1.971 -0.069 0.947 GDP(-2) 1.534 1.130 1.358 0.217 TAXL -1.744 2.193 -0.795 0.453 TAXL(-1) 0.930 4.217 0.220 0.832 TAXL(-2) 0.735 2.177 0.338 0.746 EXR 0.620 0.867 0.716 0.497 EXR(-1) -0.819 1.293 -0.633 0.547 EXR(-2) -0.398 1.415 -0.281 0.787 INFR -0.021 0.161 -0.133 0.898 INFR(-1) -0.221 0.374 -0.591 0.573 INFR(-2) -0.326 0.260 -1.255 0.250 LIB 0.418 0.646 0.648 0.538 R-squared 0.975 Mean dependent var 4.098 Adjusted R-squared 0.928 S.D dependent var 0.323 S.E of regression 0.087 Akaike info criterion -1.820 Sum squared resid 0.053 Schwarz criterion -1.123 Log likelihood 33.106 F-statistic 20.887 Durbin-Watson stat 1.732 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Table H.2: Estimated Results of Import Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 148 Dependent Variable: FDI Method: Least Squares Date: 05/26/14 Time: 16:17 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -0.797 0.809 -0.985 0.357 GDP 2.372 0.884 2.684 0.031 GDP(-1) -0.138 0.846 -0.163 0.875 GDP(-2) 0.024 0.485 0.050 0.962 TAXL 0.258 0.941 0.274 0.792 TAXL(-1) -0.712 1.810 -0.393 0.706 TAXL(-2) 0.717 0.934 0.767 0.468 EXR -0.048 0.372 -0.130 0.901 EXR(-1) 0.479 0.555 0.863 0.417 EXR(-2) -0.422 0.607 -0.695 0.509 INFR -0.915 0.069 -13.258 0.000 INFR(-1) -0.052 0.160 -0.323 0.756 INFR(-2) -0.020 0.112 -0.178 0.864 LIB 0.138 0.277 0.496 0.635 R-squared 0.999 Mean dependent var 7.514 Adjusted R-squared 0.997 S.D dependent var 0.666 S.E of regression 0.037 Akaike info criterion -3.512 Sum squared resid 0.010 Schwarz criterion -2.815 Log likelihood 50.871 F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 2.538 Prob(F-statistic) Table H.3: Estimated Results of FDI Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 493.666 0.000 149 Dependent Variable: GOVR Method: Least Squares Date: 05/26/14 Time: 14:44 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C 1.511 3.704 0.408 0.700 GDP 3.212 4.770 0.673 0.531 GDP(-1) -3.330 4.406 -0.756 0.484 GDP(-2) -0.441 3.968 -0.111 0.916 TAXL 1.982 4.126 0.480 0.651 TAXL(-1) -8.864 9.533 -0.930 0.395 TAXL(-2) 5.670 5.006 1.133 0.309 IMP 1.662 1.453 1.144 0.305 IMP(-1) -0.339 2.252 -0.151 0.886 IMP(-2) 1.647 2.272 0.725 0.501 EXR(-1) 1.870 3.115 0.600 0.575 EXR(-2) -3.497 2.918 -1.199 0.284 INFR -1.022 0.344 -2.974 0.031 INFR(-1) -0.181 0.800 -0.226 0.830 INFR(-2) -1.143 0.887 -1.288 0.254 LIB 1.502 1.295 1.160 0.299 R-squared 0.982 Mean dependent var 6.757 Adjusted R-squared 0.927 S.D dependent var 0.608 S.E of regression 0.164 Akaike info criterion -0.691 Sum squared resid 0.134 Schwarz criterion 0.105 Log likelihood 23.253 F-statistic 18.044 Durbin-Watson stat 1.961 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002 Table H.4: Estimated Results of Government Revenue Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 150 Appendix I: Regression Results by Excluding Inflation in GOVR Equation and Exchange Rate in EXP, IMP, FDI Equations Dependent Variable: EXP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:36 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -6.782 10.481 -0.647 0.532 GDPF 0.455 2.148 0.212 0.837 GDPF(-1) 0.111 2.346 0.047 0.963 GDP(-2) 1.709 3.337 0.512 0.620 TAXA 0.249 1.453 0.171 0.867 TAXA(-1) 1.108 1.903 0.582 0.573 TAXA(-2) 0.034 1.736 0.019 0.985 EXR 1.855 1.004 1.847 0.095 EXR(-1) -1.086 1.696 -0.640 0.537 EXR(-2) -0.180 0.814 -0.221 0.829 LIB 0.604 0.776 0.778 0.455 R-squared 0.949 Mean dependent var 5.678 Adjusted R-squared 0.897 S.D dependent var 0.664 S.E of regression 0.213 Akaike info criterion 0.049 Sum squared resid 0.453 Schwarz criterion 0.596 Log likelihood 10.489 F-statistic 18.486 Durbin-Watson stat 2.449 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Variable Table I.1: Estimated Results of Export Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 151 Dependent Variable: IMP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:44 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C 0.396 1.263 0.313 0.761 GDP -1.151 1.555 -0.740 0.476 GDP(-1) 0.602 1.659 0.363 0.724 GDP(-2) 1.988 0.906 2.193 0.053 TAXL -1.726 1.348 -1.281 0.229 TAXL(-1) 3.211 2.546 1.261 0.236 TAXL(-2) -1.446 1.358 -1.065 0.312 EXR 0.153 0.767 0.200 0.846 EXR(-1) -1.283 1.044 -1.229 0.247 EXR(-2) 0.659 1.074 0.614 0.553 LIB 0.338 0.420 0.805 0.440 R-squared 0.967 Mean dependent var 4.098 Adjusted R-squared 0.934 S.D dependent var 0.323 S.E of regression 0.083 Akaike info criterion -1.839 Sum squared resid 0.069 Schwarz criterion -1.292 Log likelihood 30.312 Durbin-Watson stat 1.990 Fstatistic Prob(F-statistic) Table I.2: Estimated Results of Import Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 29.495 0.000 152 Dependent Variable: FDI Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:52 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C 1.092 0.766 1.425 0.185 GDP 1.517 0.828 1.834 0.097 GDP(-1) -0.494 0.867 -0.570 0.582 GDP(-2) 1.190 0.617 1.930 0.083 TAXL 1.222 0.974 1.254 0.238 TAXL(-1) -1.297 1.425 -0.910 0.384 TAXL(-2) -0.083 0.463 -0.180 0.861 INFR -0.787 0.102 -7.733 0.000 INFR(-1) 0.350 0.195 1.794 0.103 INFR(-2) -0.024 0.204 -0.117 0.909 LIB 0.648 0.274 2.360 0.040 R-squared 0.996 Mean dependent var 7.514 Adjusted R-squared 0.993 S.D dependent var 0.666 S.E of regression 0.056 Akaike info criterion -2.613 Sum squared resid 0.032 Schwarz criterion -2.066 Log likelihood 38.434 F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 2.034 Prob(F-statistic) Table I.3: Estimated Results of FDI Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 279.768 0.000 153 Dependent Variable: GOVR Method: Least Squares Date: 06/16/14 Time: 13:30 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic C -2.316 2.111 -1.097 0.309 GDP 2.081 1.961 1.061 0.324 GDP(-1) 0.211 2.117 0.100 0.923 GDP(-2) -3.251 2.131 -1.525 0.171 TAXL -1.854 2.800 -0.662 0.529 TAXL(-1) 4.105 3.952 1.039 0.333 TAXL(-2) -1.084 1.064 -1.018 0.342 INFR -1.355 0.330 -4.100 0.005 INFR(-1) -0.608 0.702 -0.866 0.415 INFR(-2) 0.985 0.525 1.876 0.103 IMP 2.388 0.783 3.048 0.019 IMP(-1) -1.279 0.769 -1.663 0.140 IMP(-2) 1.530 0.593 2.581 0.036 LIB -1.209 1.014 -1.192 0.272 R-squared 0.985 Mean dependent var 6.757 Adjusted R-squared 0.956 S.D dependent var 0.608 S.E of regression 0.127 Akaike info criterion -1.053 Sum squared resid 0.113 Schwarz criterion -0.357 Log likelihood 25.057 F-statistic 34.713 Durbin-Watson stat 2.182 Prob(F-statistic) Table I.4: Estimated Results of Government Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) Prob 0.000 154 Appendix J: Regression Results by Excluding Inflation and Exchange Rate in All Equations Dependent Variable: EXP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:22 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob -22.563 5.112 -4.413 0.001 GDPF 1.196 1.923 0.622 0.545 GDPF(-1) 1.425 1.931 0.738 0.474 GDPF(-2) 1.632 1.760 0.927 0.371 TAXA 0.253 1.410 0.179 0.861 TAXA(-1) 0.375 1.990 0.188 0.853 TAXA(-2) 3.134 1.342 2.336 0.036 LIB 0.297 0.212 1.400 0.185 R-squared 0.905 Mean dependent var 5.678 Adjusted R-squared 0.854 S.D dependent var 0.664 S.E of regression 0.254 Akaike info criterion 0.376 Sum squared resid 0.836 Schwarz criterion 0.774 Log likelihood 4.047 F-statistic 17.735 Durbin-Watson stat 1.246 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 C Table J.1: Estimated Results of Export Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 155 Dependent Variable: IMP Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:19 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient C Std Error t-Statistic Prob 1.165 0.842 1.383 0.190 GDP -0.314 1.046 -0.300 0.769 GDP(-1) -0.001 1.160 -0.001 0.999 GDP(-2) 1.667 0.845 1.973 0.070 -0.787 0.829 -0.949 0.360 TAXL(-1) 0.910 1.231 0.739 0.473 TAXL(-2) -0.631 0.322 -1.961 0.072 0.477 0.320 1.492 0.160 TAXL LIB R-squared 0.96 Mean dependent var 4.098 Adjusted R-squared 0.94 S.D dependent var 0.323 S.E of regression 0.08 Akaike info criterion -1.917 Sum squared resid 0.08 Schwarz criterion -1.519 F-statistic 44.157 Log likelihood 28.13 Durbin-Watson stat 1.66 Prob(F-statistic) Table J.2: Estimated Results of Import Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) 0.000 156 Dependent Variable: FDI Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:27 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C -0.125 1.938 -0.064 0.950 GDP -2.253 2.409 -0.935 0.367 GDP(-1) 1.723 2.670 0.645 0.530 GDP(-2) 2.756 1.945 1.417 0.180 -0.731 1.908 -0.383 0.708 TAXRLAO(-1) 1.208 2.835 0.426 0.677 TAXRLAO(-2) -0.434 0.740 -0.586 0.568 LIB 0.360 0.737 0.488 0.633 R-squared 0.950 Mean dependent var 7.514 Adjusted R-squared 0.923 S.D dependent var 0.666 S.E of regression 0.185 Akaike info criterion Sum squared resid 0.447 Schwarz criterion TAXRLAO Log likelihood 10.620 Durbin-Watson stat 2.663 F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Table J.3: Estimated Results of FDI Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014) -0.250 0.148 35.019 0.000 157 Dependent Variable: GOVR Method: Least Squares Date: 05/27/14 Time: 17:24 Sample (adjusted): 1992 2012 Included observations: 21 after adjustments Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob C 0.364 2.744 0.133 0.896 GDP -2.427 3.411 -0.712 0.489 GDP(-1) 1.384 3.780 0.366 0.720 GDP(-2) 3.312 2.753 1.203 0.251 TAXL -0.399 2.702 -0.148 0.885 TAXL(-1) 0.693 4.013 0.173 0.865 TAXL(-2) -0.677 1.048 -0.645 0.530 LIB 0.583 1.043 0.559 0.586 R-squared 0.879 Mean dependent var 6.757 Adjusted R-squared 0.814 S.D dependent var 0.608 S.E of regression 0.263 Akaike info criterion 0.446 Sum squared resid 0.896 Schwarz criterion 0.844 Log likelihood 3.321 F-statistic 13.484 Durbin-Watson stat 1.946 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Table J.4: Estimated Results of Government Revenue Equation Source: Author’s Calculation (2014)
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Xem thêm: Tác động của AFTA đối với nguồn thu ngân sách chính phủ, thương mại quốc tế và đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài của CHDCND Lào (E), Tác động của AFTA đối với nguồn thu ngân sách chính phủ, thương mại quốc tế và đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài của CHDCND Lào (E), Tác động của AFTA đối với nguồn thu ngân sách chính phủ, thương mại quốc tế và đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài của CHDCND Lào (E)

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