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This chapter reviews the effects of fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration patterns on aging in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. Population aging is attributable primarily to declines in fertility rather than to improvements in life expectancy, which have lagged behind what most other regions have achieved. The region is moving toward a more balanced age structure, which will imply increases in the ratio of older dependents to the workingage population (that is, the oldage dependency ratio1) going forward. Outward migration flows have also contributed to aging in the region, and immigration is unlikely to make a significant contribution to maintaining the size of workingage populations.
1 The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia Introduction This chapter reviews the effects of fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration patterns on aging in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region Population aging is attributable primarily to declines in fertility rather than to improvements in life expectancy, which have lagged behind what most other regions have achieved The region is moving toward a more balanced age structure, which will imply increases in the ratio of older dependents to the working-age population (that is, the oldage dependency ratio1) going forward Outward migration flows have also contributed to aging in the region, and immigration is unlikely to make a significant contribution to maintaining the size of working-age populations The Aging Populations of Europe and Central Asia The average age of the population of Europe and Central Asia rose from 29 years in 1950 to 37 years in 2015, and the share of the population over 64 rose from 5.8 This chapter uses results from two background papers commissioned for aging work in the Europe and Central Asia Region of the World Bank: Starting or Enlarging Families? The Determinants of Low Fertility in Europe (2014) by Angela Greulich, Olivier Thộvenon, and Mathilde Guergoat-Lariviốre; and Fertility in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania: How to Deal with a Potential Low-Fertility-Trap? (2014) by Angela Greulich, Aurộlien Dasre, and Ceren Inan 39 40 BOX 1.1 Golden Aging Nearing the End of a Demographic Transition to Stable or Declining Populations in Europe For most of human history, high rates of mortality (in part generated by periodic famines, wars, and epidemics) kept population growth low, despite high birth rates People could not expect to live beyond 25 or 30 years of age (Bogue 1969) The decline in mortality, particularly at early ages, began in northwestern Europe in the second half of the 18th century and then spread to the rest of Europe Population growth rose to 0.5 percent per year from 1700 to the advent of the Industrial Revolution in 1820 and then to about percent per year (excluding the two world wars) until the 1970s (figure B1.1.1) FIGURE B1.1.1 Europes population has stabilized after a period of unprecedented growth 900 Population, millions 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 47 16 20 86 20 55 19 25 19 19 82 17 13 17 43 17 74 18 04 18 35 18 66 18 94 51 16 21 16 90 16 60 15 29 15 15 15 00 Year Sources: World Bank calculations based on data in Maddison 2010; World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: The definition of Europe follows that of Maddison A model of the different stages of demographic transition was first proposed by Warren Thompson in 1929 to explain the change over time in population dynamics Preindustrial societies represent the first stage, when a combination of highly fluctuating birth and death rates, punctuated by periodic famines, wars, and epidemics, resulted in little population growth (stage in figure B1.1.2) Europe was the first region to transition from this stage of low population growth that had typified most of human history However, in the early stage of expanding populations (stage in figure B1.1.2), the demographic structure was bottom heavy because of the large numbers of children and shaped like a pyramid because mortality in later life had not yet improved substantially (Continued) percent to 11.8 percent Aging reflects the rapid declines in fertility that have sharply reduced the share of younger age cohorts in the total population and not a substantial rise in longevity By 1990, the fall in fertility in Europe had put an end to the rapid population growth that began in the 18th century (see box 1.1).2 Europes population is now expected to decline over the next 40 years, making it the The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia BOX 1.1 41 (continued) Most countries moved to a late stage of expanding populations (stage in figure B1.1.2) by the early 20th century, with falling birth rates and a continued decrease in mortality at all ages The young countries of Central Asia are still in this stage Finally, in recent decades, births have dropped rapidly in European countries, leading to low population growth (stage in figure B1.1.2) Northwestern Europe moved first to stable population growth in the 1970s, the rest of Europe fol- lowed by the 1990s, and Central Asia is converging rapidly with the rest For a number of countries, fertility has fallen to well below the replacement rate, and populations have since begun to decline (a possible stage in figure B1.1.2) But a move to shrinking populations is not a given In France, for example, one of the first countries to begin the demographic transition (in the 18th century), fertility is at the replacement rate and the population has been increasing FIGURE B1.1.2 Most European countries are at the late stage of the demographic transition Amazon Basin tribes Ethiopia India United Kingdom Source: World Bank simulations using data from World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision only region in the world where the population is expected to fall (table 1.1) In Turkey and the countries of Central Asia, populations are much younger than in Europe and continue to increase Nevertheless, recent and substantial declines in fertility are also driving increases in the average age and slowing population growth in those countries as well Russian Federation 42 Golden Aging TABLE 1.1 Global Population Growth, 15002060 percent Period 15001700 17001870 18702012 18701950 195070 197090 19902012 201230 203060 North America Latin America Europe Africa Asia 0.0 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.7 1.9 1.8 2.8 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.8 1.2 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.1 0.1 0.4 1.2 0.7 2.1 2.0 1.5 0.8 0.1 Sources: World Bank calculations based on data in Maddison 2010; World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: The regional grouping follows that of Maddison The data for 15002012 represent actual ưpopulation; the data for 201260 are projections based on the medium-fertility variant The Effects of Declining Fertility on Aging and Population Growth The total fertility rate (TFR) has declined in many regional countries to well below 2.1 children per woman, the replacement rate required to maintain populations at current levels without immigration (figure 1.1) While the timing, intensity, and persistence of the fertility decline vary, in many countries the decline has been dramatic and has occurred rapidly For example, the shift from an average fertility rate of over five children per woman to below the population replacement In many countries the rate took two centuries in France but only 34 years in Albania (figure 1.2) recent fertility decline has been The average fertility rate per woman in Central Asian countries was six dramatic and rapid The shift children in the early 1960s but is fewer than three children today The decline since 1990 has been especially sharp in the Central from an average fertility rate Asian countries and Turkey, which had the highest fertility rates in the of over five children per woman early 1970s Fertility rates in the CaucasusArmenia, Azerbaijan, and to below the population Georgiaare now all below replacement levels TFRs have continued to replacement rate took two drop significantly in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan over the past centuries in France but only decade, while a fertility upturn has occurred in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 34 years in Albania Republic and, to a lesser extent, in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan Overall, however, the Central Asian countries still have comparatively high fertility rates that exceed population replacement rates In addition to the transition from high to low mortality and fertility rates, the current population structure reflects demographic shocks in discrete time periods Some countries in Central Europe, the Eastern Partnership countries, and Russia experienced an increase in fertility (a baby boom) following the Second World War, although the boom was less pronounced than in Western Europe and the United States A number of countries did not experience a baby boom; the Baltic states, for instance, exhibited some of the lowest fertility rates in the world in the 1950s and 1960s A baby boom echo occurred in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the children of the boomers started to have families of their own, and this generation reached peak size in the early 1980s In Central Europe and the Baltics, the Eastern Partnership, Russia, and the Western Balkans, the social and economic hardship of the 1990s resulting from the col- The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia 43 FIGURE 1.1 Total fertility has declined to below the replacement rate in many countries a Selected countries at or near the replacement rate, 2012 Average total fertility rate, children per woman en n Sw ba er Tu Az ed ija e Ire Fra nc d lan d lan Ice y Tu ist rkm en kis be Uz rke an n ta n sta kh za Ka Ky rg yz Ta Re jik pu ist bli an c Country b Selected lower-fertility countries, 2012 Average total fertility rate, children per woman It Ge aly rm an y Un ite dK Un ing ite dS m ta t No es rw a Ge y or gia Fin la Be nd lgi u Al m ba n Ar ia me D nia Ne enm th ark e M rlan on ds te ne Ru ss Lit gro ian hu Fe ani de a ti Sl on ov e Lu xe nia mb ou Es rg to n Uk ia Ro ine ma ni Cr a oa Bu tia lga ria Cy pr u Cz Mol s ec h R va ep ub li Au c str ia M ac La ed tvi on a ia, FY R M alt a Ja pa n Country c Lowest low-fertility countries, 2012 B He osn rze ia go an vin d a l ga rtu Re a, re Ko Po p d lan Po ain Sp bia Se r y ar ng Hu ee Gr ub Sl ov ak Re p ce lic Average total fertility rate, children per woman Country 1970 2012 Replacement rate Source: WDI Note: The replacement rate is defined as 2.1 children per woman Lower-fertility countries had a total fertility rate (TFR) of at least 1.4 children, but below 2.0 in 2012 The lowest low-fertility countries are defined as those having a TFR of around 1.3 children Countries are ranked in descending order of TFR as of 2012 The data on Cyprus refer to the southern part of the island Data on Serbia for 1970 refer to 1971 44 Average total fertility rate, children per woman Replacement rate 17 17 05 17 06 70 17 08 90 18 9 18 00 01 18 02 03 04 18 06 18 17 1 18 881 80 91 1 900 19 11 19 12 21 19 3 14 41 19 5 19 16 61 7 1 19 981 80 91 200 01 France England Russian Federaon Poland Ireland Korea, Rep Albania Turkey Tajikistan a Total fertility rate Years b Years to reach below replacement rate fertility Korea, Rep (19661983) Russia (19371967) Economy and period FIGURE 1.2 The fertility transition in some countries in Europe and Central Asia is occurring much more rapidly than in advanced European countries Golden Aging Albania (19702004) Turkey (19752011) England (18451973) France (17751976) 50 100 150 200 No of years Sources: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects data: The 2012 Revision, except England and France prior to 1950 (Chesnais 1998); the Russian Empire in 1897 (Borisov 2001); and Russia for all o ther years prior to 1950 (Andreev, Darskiy, and Kharkova 1998) Note: Panel b shows the number of years it takes countries to move from a total fertility rate of to a sustained decline to under the replacement rate of 2.1 lapse of the Soviet Union reversed the positive fertility trends of the 1980s The recovery of births that were postponed during the 1990s has been slow.3 Fertility rates in all countries are below that needed to replace current generations (referred to as the replacement rate) The average TFR in these countries is just above 1.3, while the medium variant of the United Nations Population Division forecasts (commonly used for baseline population projections) assumes that these countries converge toward a TFR of 1.8 by 2040 (see World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision) The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia 45 Moving to a TFR of 1.8 would reduce the shrinking of younger generations as it implies 0.9 children per adult or a 10 percent decrease in every generation (if all children survive) In contrast, a TFR of 1.3 implies a 35 percent total decline in every generation (if all children survive), or about a 1.2 percent per year decline in population Returning to a population structure that is balanced across generations would require that fertility rates recover toward replacement rates But even if fertility recovers, such a rebalancing would take time Low fertility now, even if it rises in the future, has a multiplier effect Fewer children today mean fewer parents in the future Why Has Fertility Declined? Researchers have identified the declines in fertility to below replacement rates as a major driver of population aging and noted that increases in fertility are important to avoiding very large reductions in the population Understanding why fertility has declined is a first step toward formulating policies to support families who wish to have more children (policy recommendations are addressed in part III of this report) Decisions on whether and when to have children are influenced by myriad factors.4 Rising income per capita has been accompanied by a decline in fertility A shift in preferences from having a large number of children to having fewer children of higher quality (with higher human capital) is one explanation (Becker, As women are Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Galor and Weil 2000) Development is associmore educated and ated with improved opportunities in the labor market, and higher wages among women have been found to reduce fertility (Galor and Weil participate more in the 1996) For example, in England the Black Death led to a delay in the formal labor market, age of first marriages (and thus a decline in fertility), because the high reconciling work and mortality rates increased the availability of land per person, which infamily life are at the core creased employment opportunities in farming for women (Voigtlọnder of womens fertility and Voth 2013) The increasing importance of education is associated with a growing choices tendency for women to postpone having a child until later in life (Blossfeld 1995; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009) Indeed, there has been a sharp decline in fertility rates among women below age 30, which started in many countries almost five decades ago.5 The effect on family size seems to vary considerably across countries, however For example, in Nordic countries long-standing support for a balance between work and family life (Hoem, Neyer, and Andersson 2006) appears to have enabled educated women to progressively catch up with their peers; thus, the differences in completed fertility ratesthat is, the number of children women have had by the end of their reproductive livesby level of educational attainment are small, especially in Finland and Sweden (Andersson et al 2009) Overall, the impact of decisions to postpone child rearing on total fertility varies, since this is often accompanied by a significant increase in fertility among women in their 30s Cultural change has also had an impact on fertility decisions, particularly as the secular decline in fertility appeared to happen at the same time in many countries Women are postponing childbirth because of shifting ideas about the ideal family 46 Golden Aging size and about the relationship between quality of life and number of children (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Galor and Weil 2000) The rising cost of having children has been an important determinant of the declines in fertility since the early 1970s (for example, see Hotz, Kerman, and Willis 1997) Having children incurs both a direct, visible cost and an indirect, less visible cost (Thộvenon and Luci 2012; Willis 1973) The direct costs of children include the additional consumption incurred by households because of the presence of children: housing, food, clothing, child care, education, transport, leisure activities, and so on Surveys of the literature on the cost of children suggest that a child would account for approximately 1530 percent of the budget of a childless couple (OECD 2011; Thộvenon and Luci 2012) Variations depend on several factors, including the childs birth order, the age of the child, parental educational attainment and income level, and the bargaining power of household members Housing and education are particularly important items in the expenditures of families with children The growing cost of housing, the rising number of years spent in education, and the expanding importance attached by parents to education are thus likely to represent a barrier to fertility (OECD 2011) The 2008 economic crisis may have reduced the ability of households to meet these costs and thus may have reduced fertility rates (box 1.2) Households also bear indirect costs if they have children because parents, usually mothers, must invest time in caring for, educating, and raising the children rather than in paid employment These costs can be measured by the earnings forgone by parents who reduce their working hours or stop work altogether Full-time leave or temporary reductions in working hours can also incur costs by lowering long-term career prospects The availability of modern contraceptives has facilitated the postponement of children and a reduction in family size (Frejka 2008) The use of modern contraceptives reduces the number of unwanted and mistimed pregnancies and births It is likely that modern contraceptive methods have also facilitated the shift toward smaller families, but they cannot be seen as a principal cause of currently low fertility rates (Leridon 2006) The Effect of Labor Market Conditions on Fertility The decline in fertility with increasing economic development has not been uniform Figure 1.3 shows that, while many of the countries with the highest level of human development have very low fertility rates, in recent years fertility rates began increasing again once a certain threshold was reached (Myrskylọ, Kohler, and Billari 2009) The differences in fertility levels among the advanced countries are in large part due to differences in family policies and the institutional environment for the labor market, particularly as these affect the employment of women (see box 1.3 for a comparison of France and Germany) Recent studies have emphasized the importance of labor market conditions for fertility in advanced countries Long working hours make juggling work and care commitments more difficult and have been found to affect fertility rates negatively (Luci-Greulich and Thộvenon 2013; Schmitt 2012) In contrast, part-time employment opportunities have had a positive effect on fertility rates in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, especially among women with higher educational attainment (Adsera 2011; dAddio and dErcole The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia BOX 1.2 47 Have People Had Fewer Children because of the 2008 Economic Crisis? Fertility generally declines in economic downturns (for a review of the literature, see Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011) Evidence on the impact of previous economic recessions suggests that spells of unemployment seem to affect the timing of births, but not the size of families (Adsera 2005; Kravdal 2002) The rise in unemployment during the recent economic crisis has created economic uncertainties that may cause households to put off having children The consequences can be short term if births are simply postponed or longer term if the downturn persists and is not followed by a catch-up in fertility Fertility responses to economic downturns differ by gender and socioeconomic status (see OECD 2011 for a review of empirical results) The largest decline in birth rates is likely to be associated with poorly educated, low-skilled men Available evidence for previous economic shocks in Germany and Sweden suggests that women with high levels of educational attainment are most likely to postpone childbirth, especially if they not already have children; less well educated women often maintain or increase the rate of entry into motherhood (Hoem 2000; Kreyenfeld 2010) In the decade before the recent economic crisis, the trend in many countries was for fertility to increase Partly this has been explained by the diminishing impact on annual fertility of women delaying having children until later in life From 2000 onward, the rise in the age of women at childbirth slowed, and women started to have the children they had delayed (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009; Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012) Recent changes in fertility rates suggest, however, that the observed rise in total fertility rates reversed in some countries In Europe, the crisis was accom- panied by a fall in fertility in countries that were severely affected, such as Greece, Latvia, and Spain In contrast, in Iceland, Ireland, and Romania, fertility increased somewhat in the crisis period One explanation for this difference is that the crisis has had a stronger impact on fertility in countries where younger people were disproportionately hit by unemployment, while in other countries family policies played a role in diminishing the impact of the recession on fertility Goldstein et al (2013) find a strong association between fertility and unemployment in the central, eastern, and southern countries of Europe The greatest effects occur among the youngest age cohorts and in first births, which makes sense because unemployment rates have jumped drastically among young people, who also can postpone childbearing the most easily Whereas fertility rates declined markedly in Latvia in 2009, fertility in the other Baltic states showed no major downturn One possible explanation is that generous parental leave schemes were introduced in the latter shortly before the economic crisis Fertility in countries with a high level of welfare and family support, such as France, Norway, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom, has been more resilient in the face of the recession The evidence on recent changes in fertility does not allow a conclusive assessment of the impact of the crisis, as a decline in fertility during the crisis may simply reflect the postponement of births Thus, a few more years will be required before the impact of the recent crisis on fertility can be properly judged But what is clear is that the crisis has been more prolonged than past downturns in the most severely hit countries and thus could have more drawn-out implications for fertility 2005; Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzato 2009) The likelihood of being in full-time employment was 1.5 times greater or more among childless women than among mothers aged 2044 in Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the 1990s and up to around 2005 (Thộvenon 2009) The likelihood of working part-time increases with the number of children in every country, but especially in the Netherlands, where the vast majority of employed women work part-time Greulich, Dasre, and Inan (2014) find that the provision of child 48 1980 2013 Total fertility rate, children per woman FIGURE 1.3 A U-shaped relation is emerging between fertility and level of development Golden Aging 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Human Development Index Sources: HFA-DB; WDI care coverage has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of having a second child, while the length of leave schemes and the amount of total cash transfers (family benefits, leave benefits, and income tax rebates) have no significant effect Luci-Greulich and Thộvenon (2013) emphasize that increases in fertility with economic development would be supported by institutional changes that improve parents opportunities to combine work and family life Myrskylọ, Kohler, and Billari (2011) argue that an increase in fertility in advanced countries is conditional on gender equality: countries ranking high in development (as measured by health, income, and education) but low in gender equality continue to see declining fertility Employment status appears to have some effect on whether women have a second child, which is the major difference between low- and high-fertility countries (see box 1.4) Being employed during the months before potential conception is found to significantly increase the probability of having a second child for women aged 1549, in comparison to both unemployed and inactive women (Greulich, Dasre, and Inan 2014).6 Taking into account interaction effects, being in stable employment is positively correlated to child arrival, particularly for women who have a partner who is also in stable employment These results are stronger for high-fertility countries, such as Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, but not hold in some lower-fertility countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, that have high full-time employment rates, low fertility rates, and a low average probability of a second child In these lower-fertility countries, the low probability of a second child may be explained by institutional barriers, such as family policies (parental leave or child care, for instance) Women who already have one child may decide against a second for fear of a fall in income after the birth of the second child Or for families with insufficient incomes, the direct cost of having an additional child in itself may be a constraint 62 Golden Aging most Central European and Baltic economies generally experienced a positive, though small, increase in wages as a result of emigration during the 1990s In contrast, less well educated workers witnessed a decline in wages and employment (Docquier, ệzden, and Peri 2010) Toward More Balanced Age Structures over the Next Half-Century Rapid drops in fertility across age groups, baby booms, limited improvements in longevity at middle age, and upticks in emigration among younger age groups have led to large differences in size across age cohorts in the region In the Eastern Partnership countries and Russia, the cohorts born between 195665 and 198190 are larger than other age groups (figure 1.12), while cohorts born in the 1980s are particularly large relative to other subregions (table 1.2) By contrast, the relatively young countries of Turkey and Central Asia reflect the bottom-heavy age structure typical of the high fertility of the earlier transition stage: 56 percent of the population is under 30 years of age Of course, individual countries have divergent demographic histories, so this dating may not be appropriate for all countries In Romania, for example, the Ceausáescu regimes policies aimed at increasing the population resulted in a rise in births over 196789 The substantial imbalances in the Eastern Partnership countries and Russia are expected to ripple through the population structure in the next 50 years By 2060, if fertility were to recover, the age structure would be more balanced, with roughly similar population shares in all age cohorts, with the exception of the very old (figure 1.12) A similar evolution is expected for Turkey and Central Asia, although their relatively young populations in 2010 would mean that by 2060 their middleaged groups would have a somewhat larger share of the population than in Central Europe and the Baltics and the Western Balkans (figure 1.13) The regions aging societies will face changes in needs generated by age groups of different sizes going forward For example, the shrinking of student FIGURE 1.12 The larger cohorts aged 2029 and 4554 of Eastern Partnership countries and the Russian Federation in 2010 will transition through the population structure 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 Males 0 Percent Females 5 Males 0 Percent Age group c 2060 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 Age group b 2030 Age group a 2010 Females 5 Males 0 Percent Females Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: Data are the sum of the population of the country group, and thus the outcome is dominated by the Russian Federation, the most populous country The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia 63 TABLE 1.2 Dates of Birth of the Largest Age Cohorts, by Subregion, 2010 EU-15, Northern and Central Europe Age in 2010 04 59 1014 1519 2024 2529 3034 3539 4044 4549 5054 EU-15, Southern Europe Western Balkans 199195 198690 198185 197680 197680 197175a 196670a 196165 197175 196670 196165 195660 Central Europe and the Baltics (plus Cyprus and Malta) Eastern Partnership and Russian Federation 200610a 200105a 19962000a 199195a 198690a 198185a 198690a 198185a 197680 198185 197680 197175 Young countries 196165 195660 195660 Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: Age cohorts are considered among the largest if they exhibit the greatest deviation from a hypothetical population structure that is equally balanced across all age cohorts The young countries include Turkey and Central Asia a The age cohort is particularly large relative to the corresponding age cohort in other subregions Males b 2030 c 2060 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 0 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 0 100+ 9599 9094 8589 8084 7579 7074 6569 6064 5559 5054 4549 4044 3539 3034 2529 2024 1519 1014 59 04 0 Percent Females Males Percent Age group a 2010 Age group Age group FIGURE 1.13 Rapid aging is expected in Central Asia and Turkey over 201060 Females Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision populations has allowed countries to cut back on education infrastructure Likewise, a surge in deaths for a transitional time period would imply increasing demand for health services A wave of people reaching pension age at the same time would place additional demands on public budgets, which requires planning (see the discussion on the fiscal consequences of aging in chapter 3) But these waves of larger age groups are part of the transition to a more balanced population structure and so are expected to be temporary The transition period will be long, however Males Percent Females 64 BOX 1.6 Golden Aging Fertility Scenarios: The United Nations Population Division The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) revises global population projections every two years The estimated population as of July 1, 2010, is the basis for projections, unless otherwise stated Assumptions are made on future trends in fertility, mortality, and international migration The latest projections (World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision) are those used here The UNPD fertility projections are subject to considerable uncertainty For this reason, the United Nations offers several variants based on different assumptions about future trends in fertility, mortality, and international migration Life expectancy at birth by sex is used as the basis for projections, with mortality expected to follow a declining trend from 2010 Under the normal migration assumption, the future path of international migration is set on the basis of past international migration estimates and the policy stance of each country on future international migration Projected levels of net migration are generally kept constant over the next decades For fertility, a range of assumptions, from low to high, are made The variants on population projections offered are as follows: Low fertility Low fertility, normal mortality, and normal international migration Medium fertility Medium fertility, normal mortality, and normal international migration High fertility High fertility, normal mortality, and normal international migration Constant fertility Constant fertility, normal mortality, and normal international migration Instant-replacement fertility Instant-replacement fertility, normal mortality, and normal international migration Constant mortality Medium fertility, constant mortality as of 200510, and normal international migration No change Constant fertility as of 200510, constant mortality as of 200510, and normal international migration Zero migration Medium fertility, normal mortality, and zero international migration as of 201015 Source: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision The Possible Increase of Dependency Ratios due to Aging One implication of the transition to more balanced age structures will be increases in dependency ratios The most often cited population forecasts, the mediumfertility variant of the United Nations Population Division projections (see box 1.6), illustrate the challenges facing the region These projections assume a recovery of fertility in many countries to the levels of the 1980s This assumption reflects the experience of some advanced countries, where fertility rates have begun to rise, but this is not a given The recovery in fertility started relatively early in some countriesFrance, for exampleand has been particularly steep since the start of the new century in Finland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom While mortality rates in the region are assumed to fall, convergence toward the higher longevity in advanced countries is not expected to accelerate dramatically.11 In the United Nations projections for Eastern Europe (which includes Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine), life expectancy is assumed The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia 65 FIGURE 1.14 Europe and Central Asia is converging quickly to the high share of population aged 65+ in the EU-15 35 Population aged 65+, % 30 25 20 15 10 2010 2030 2060 EU-15, north and central 2010 2030 2060 EU-15, south 2010 2030 2060 Western Balkans 2010 2030 2060 Central Europe and the Baltics (plus Cyprus and Malta) 2010 2030 2060 Eastern Partnership and Russian Federation Year and region or country group 6579 years 80+ years Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision to increase from 70 years in 201015 to 72 years in 202530 and to 76 years in 205560 The gender gap is projected to narrow slightly, from 11 years in 201015 to years by 205560 Thus, men in Central Europe and the Baltics are still projected to live much shorter lives than men in Northern Europe: the projections assume that life expectancy at birth among men will increase from 65 years in 201015 to 72 years in 205560; this compares to a rise from 78 to 84 years in Northern Europe over the same period The aging of Europe and Central Asias population is expected to accelerate in coming decades, as the 65+ age group becomes larger in all countries (figure 1.14) By 2030, the share of this group in the population is expected to expand by a third in the Eastern Partnership and Russia, by 40 percent in Central Europe and the Baltics (plus Cyprus and Malta), by 50 percent in the Western Balkans, and by over 70 percent in the young countries of the region The oldest old population individuals 80+ years of ageis expected to remain small throughout the region, but these shares are also expected to grow The rise in the share of the population aged 65 and over will be accompanied by a decline in the share of people of working age (here set at 1564 years) throughout the region While the decline is not expected to be as pronounced as in Western European countries, the relative size of the working-age population is projected to shrink quickly in all subregions of Europe and Central Asia; see figure 1.15 The difference between the forecasts for the evolution of dependency ratios between Western Europe and Europe and Central Asia can be seen in figure 1.16, which compares the increase in the old-age dependency ratio in France and Russia In France, the postwar baby boom has resulted in a relatively large increase in the number of older people in 201015, while the growth of the old-age depen- 2010 2030 2060 Young countries 66 Young countries Western Balkans Eastern Partnership and Russian Federation Central Europe and the Baltics (plus Cyprus and Malta) EU-15, south EU-15, north and central 95 Working-age population (1564), % of adult population (15+) FIGURE 1.15 The working-age population is projected to contract substantially in many countries in Europe and Central Asia Golden Aging 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Year Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Growth rate, percentage points a France 2 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 Year b Russian Federation Growth rate, percentage points FIGURE 1.16 Frances large postwar baby boomers bring a large rise in the 65+ age group from 2010 to 2015; the Russian Federations share of the elderly will fluctuate over the next 45 years 2 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 Year Source: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 revision The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia y, zero immigration y ty 26 Working-age population (1564), millions gh immigration FIGURE 1.17 A fertility rebound is critical to reviving the working-age population in Poland 28 24 Low fertility, high immigration High fertility 22 Medium fertility, zero immigration Medium fertility 20 Constant fertility 18 Low fertility 16 28 26 Working-age population (1564), millions und is critical working-age oland 67 24 22 20 18 16 14 14 12 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 12 1990 Year Sources: The low-fertility with high immigration (immigration = 0.5% of the population per year) scenario and the medium-fertility with zero immigration scenario: World Bank calculations; all other scenarios: World Bank calculations based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision dency ratio is expected to decline going forward By contrast, in Russia old-age dependency ratios are expected to fluctuate sharply over the next 45 years These forecasts may not provide a reliable indicator of the rise in the share of the dependent population relative to workers As noted in chapter 3, policy interventions and adjustments by firms and individuals could expand labor force participation among women and the older age cohorts Thus, dependency ratios defined strictly by age may provide a pessimistic view of changes in the share of workers in the population The decline in the working-age population, however, could be even greater than anticipated in the above forecasts if fertility in the region fails to increase Indeed, fertility rates in some advanced countries, for example Germany, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, have remained extremely low Moreover, population growth may be affected by adverse shocks, as demonstrated by the sharp drop in fertility during the transition to the market economy after the Soviet era and the large emigration that accompanied EU accession in many countries in Europe and Central Asia Poland provides a useful illustration of the impact on the forecasts of the ưworking-age population of different assumptions for fertility (figure 1.17) Under the high-fertility scenario, which assumes that Poland reaches the replacement rate by 202025, the working-age population would stabilize With the medium-fertility assumption (which assumes a rise in the TFR from 1.34 over 200510, to 1.66 over 202025, and to 1.8 over 205560), the working-age population would decline by 36 percent from 2010 to 2060, while with low fertility the decline is 50 percent Ideally, the burden of disease and disability should be reflected in measurements of the share of the dependent population Therefore, rather than using a fixed chronological definition of age to calculate the dependency ratio, Sanderson 68 Golden Aging TABLE 1.3 Disability-Adjusted Dependency Measures in Selected Countries, 200550 percent Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) Czech Republic France Hungary Japan Slovak Republic 202530 204550 21 10 18 10 22 12 20 10 11 23 13 23 World Bank calculations Belgium Czech Republic France Hungary Slovak Republic Spain 200510 201014 202529 204549 205560 32.6 14.8 12.1 16.4 15.4 29.8 33.5 16.8 12.9 18.0 17.2 29.5 39.1 17.8 15.2 18.5 18.5 36.3 40.7 20.5 15.7 20.2 21.2 42.1 Sources: Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) calculations use the 2009 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey World Bank calculations use the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS) and World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: The adult disability dependency ratio is defined as the number of adults who are at least 20 years of age and who have disabilities, divided by the number of adults who are at least 20 years of age and who not have disabilities and Scherbov (2010) propose the use of the share of the adult population that has a limited ability to perform the functions of daily life One such measure is the adult disability dependency ratio, which is defined as the number of adults who are at least 20 years of age and who have disabilities, divided by the number of adults who are at least 20 years of age and who not have disabilities By this measure, richer countries with higher shares of older people are shown to have lower dependency ratios For example, Japan has the highest share of people in the 65+ age group (35 percent) and a relatively low adult dependency ratio (10 percent) (table 1.3) In contrast, Hungary has more than double the share of dependent adults because of disability (21 percent) The high levels of disease and disability rates in Europe and Central Asia, discussed in chapter 2, imply that this adjustment has important implications for measuring the dependency ratios in the region Another approach is to calculate a cognitive age that is a more accurate reflection of the productivity of a person than his or her chronological age (Skirbekk et al 2013) When doing that, it shows that some of the chronologically oldest countries turn into the youngest ones with regard to cognitive age Migration Unlikely to Make a Significant Contribution to Limiting the Rise in DependencyRatios Given recent migration trends, most countries in Europe and Central Asia are unlikely to attract sufficient immigrants to offset the anticipated decline in the working-age population during the next 10 years (figure 1.18) Most countries in the Western Balkans and in Central Europe and the Baltics would need to reverse the profile of migration flows and become net receivers of The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia 69 FIGURE 1.18 Current migration flows in Europe and Central Asia are not enough to offset the future decrease in the working-age population Country Natural decrease in working-age population (201525) and positive net immigration (200010) Natural decrease in working-age population (201525) and negative net immigration (200010) Natural increase in working-age population (201525) and positive net immigration (200010) Natural increase in working-age population (201525) and negative net immigration (200010) Ukraine Russian Federation Belarus Slovenia Germany Hungary Slovak Republic Czech Republic Austria Italy Greece Switzerland Finland Bosnia and Herzegovina Portugal Belgium Netherlands Spain Denmark Luxembourg Sweden France United Kingdom Norway Bulgaria Poland Croatia Latvia Moldova Lithuania Romania Serbia Estonia Macedonia, FYR Georgia Montenegro Iceland Azerbaijan Ireland Kazakhstan Armenia Albania Turkey Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan 15 10 5 10 15 % of population Net immigration needed to keep working-age population constant between 2015 and 2025 Net immigration rate (200010) Source: Based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: The natural decline in the working-age population between 2015 and 2025 is derived from population projection data under the zero migration scenario The net immigration needed to keep the working-age population constant assumes that migrants are in the 1564 age group, which is a realistic assumption given the migration patterns in Europe and Central Asia 70 Golden Aging BOX 1.7 Do Immigrants Raise Local Fertility Rates? In many advanced countries, recent immigrants tend to have higher fertility rates than natives However, given that recent migrants often constitute only a small share of populations in European countries, their effect on total fertility rates (TFRs) is often small The last column of table B1.7.1 provides an estimate of the net contribution of immigrants to TFRs in European countries (McDonald 2010; Sobotka 2008) While the TFRs of immigrants are higher than the TFRs of the native population, the overall effect on birth rates ranges from only 0.03 to 0.13 children per woman In most cases, the impact of immigrants with higher fertility on national fertility rates is small because immigrants represent a small share of the population of childbearing age In addition, in most countries where the issue has been studied, fertility among recent immigrants declines to native levels within a decade of migration (Garssen and Nicolaas 2008; Schoorl 1995; Toulemon and Mazuy 2004) Thus, any positive net contribution gradually fades TABLE B1.7.1 The Effect of Immigrant Women on Total Fertility Rates, Various Economies and Years children per woman All women Native nationals Immigrant women Net contribution Denmark 1998 19992003 200408 2008 1.75 1.89 1.68 1.69 1.82 1.91 2.43 1.90 0.07 0.03 England and Wales 1996 2007 1.74 1.92 1.67 1.79 2.51 0.07 0.13 France 199198 1.72 1.65 2.50 0.07 Netherlands 1996 2008 1.53 1.77 1.47a 1.78a 2.19 1.77b Norway 2007 1.90 1.85 0.05 Sweden 2008 1.91 1.85 2.09 0.05 Economy 0.06 0.01 Sources: McDonald 2010; Sobotka 2008 Note: = negligible; = not available a Second-generation immigrants (that is, women born in the Netherlands who have at least one immigrant parent) whose mothers were born in the Netherlands are not included b Second-generation immigrant women are included migrants rather than net senders to offset this process While Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine have experienced positive net immigration flows during the past 10 years, similar levels during the next 10 years would not be sufficient to counteract the declines in the working-age population And while recent immigrants tend to have higher fertility rates than natives (at least in advanced countries), in general the number of recent immigrant women is too small to have an appreciable impact on fertility rates, while the fertility behavior of immigrant women tends to resemble The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia native women over time (box 1.7) In contrast, some countries in Central Asia are expected to experience a substantial increase in the working-age population, although the maintenance of emigration flows at current levels may partially offset the gains Relying on immigration to offset population aging appears even less promising if viewed over a longer time horizon According to a report prepared by the United Nations (2001), to keep the old-age dependency ratio constant between 2000 and 2050, Russia would need million immigrants per year (a total of 257 million immigrants) Such numbers seem far from feasible if one considers that, between 2000 and 2010, Russia received fewer than 400,000 immigrants a year Similarly, if fertility remains at currently low levels in Poland (TFR of 1.34), then net immigration flows would have to equal 0.5 percent of the population each year to maintain the working-age population at current levels by 2060 Given that Poland has experienced considerable net emigration in the past and that the wage differential between Poland and the higher-income EU countries remains high, such large net immigration rates are unlikely Nevertheless, sharp changes in net immigration flows are possible Some of the countries that have received large net inflows of immigrants since 2000, such as Ireland and Spain, quickly transformed into net senders when the financial crisis hit labor markets severely In contrast, Kazakhstan (as other countries in Central Asia) entered the new century experiencing large net emigration, but then shifted to being a net receiver of migrants as workers responded to an improving economy and declines in unemployment Thus, an improvement in economic prospects could make some contribution to limiting the aging of populations Notes The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of older dependents, people older than 64, to the working-age population, defined as those aged 1564 Maddison (2010) is the source used, and given the lack of availability of data for all countries, his regional groupings are reported here, which differ from those used elsewhere in the report Frejka and Zakharov (2012) estimate that only 20 percent of the postponed births in Russia were accounted for by the cohort of women of the 1960s that entered their most reproductive years in the late 1980s and early 1990s The fertility analysis draws largely on a background paper produced for this report; see Greulich, Thộvenon, and Guergoat-Lariviốre (2014) A few countries deviate from this general pattern, as age-specific fertility rates continue to decline among all age groups; these include Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Mexico but also Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan Greulich, Dasre, and Inan (2014) use the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which contains data for 27 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) The longitudinal version is a four-year rotational panel covering the years 2003 to 2011 See Aging and Prosperity in the Russian Federation (World Bank, forthcoming) This basic decomposition of the change in population disregards the impact of immigration on fertility and therefore downplays the importance of immigration On aver- 71 72 Golden Aging age, in Latvia families with the largest demographic potential are more likely than others to emigrate (Hazans 2014) Static studies have estimated that these gains exceed the current levels of development assistance and foreign direct investment to developing countries and even ưapproach the level of worldwide GDP (Hamilton and Whalley 1984; 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Journal of Political Economy 81: S1464 World Bank Forthcoming Aging and Prosperity in the Russian Federation Washington, DC: World Bank World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (database) United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York http://esa.un.org /unpd/wpp/index.htm [...]... most countries in Europe and Central Asia are unlikely to attract sufficient immigrants to offset the anticipated decline in the working-age population during the next 10 years (figure 1.18) Most countries in the Western Balkans and in Central Europe and the Baltics would need to reverse the profile of migration flows and become net receivers of The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia ● 69 FIGURE... of individuals born and living in Western Europe The same patterns emerge from an analysis of the effects of migration from Central Asia on the age structure of Russia.7 Migration is playing an important role in shaping the population structure in many countries in Europe and Central Asia (figure 1.10) In Central Europe and the Baltics, emigration sped up following EU accession and the opening up of. .. 84 years in Northern Europe over the same period The aging of Europe and Central Asia s population is expected to accelerate in coming decades, as the 65+ age group becomes larger in all countries (figure 1.14) By 2030, the share of this group in the population is expected to expand by a third in the Eastern Partnership and Russia, by 40 percent in Central Europe and the Baltics (plus Cyprus and Malta),... Caribbean; East Asia was even lower, at 46 years However, Central Asia failed to keep up with the gains of these other areas By 2005, men in Latin America and the Caribbean had gained 21 years and in East Asia 28 years, compared with only 12 years in Central Asia As in Eastern Europe, life expectancy of men in Central Asia stagnated during the transition to a market economy that began in 1990 In contrast... based on World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Note: Data are the sum of the population of the country group, and thus the outcome is dominated by the Russian Federation, the most populous country 5 The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia ● 63 TABLE 1.2 Dates of Birth of the Largest Age Cohorts, by Subregion, 2010 EU-15, Northern and Central Europe Age in 2010 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24... While the decline is not expected to be as pronounced as in Western European countries, the relative size of the working-age population is projected to shrink quickly in all subregions of Europe and Central Asia; see figure 1.15 The difference between the forecasts for the evolution of dependency ratios between Western Europe and Europe and Central Asia can be seen in figure 1.16, which compares the increase... Nations’ projections for Eastern Europe (which includes Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine), life expectancy is assumed The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia ● 65 FIGURE 1.14 Europe and Central Asia is converging quickly to the high share of population aged 65+ in the EU-15 35 Population aged 65+,... to support the integration of mothers into the labor force as they become more educated and are more likely to be in the formal labor market The Slower Improvement of Life Expectancy in Europe and Central Asia Since the 1960s, the Europe and Central Asia region has experienced the smallest gains in life expectancy of all global regions (figure 1.4) Since 1960, people in this region have added only 10... some labor markets in 2004 Latvia has experienced the largest population decline in the The Drivers of Aging in Europe and Central Asia ● 57 FIGURE 1.8 Europe and Central Asia is currently a region of emigrants Eastern Partnership and Russian Federation Young countries Subregion and country Western Balkans Central Europe Baltics Western Europe Other Moldova Georgia Armenia Ukraine Belarus Russian... contributing to aging in Central Europe and the Baltics (figure 1.9a) Migration in the region follows two distinct patterns: most migrants from Central Asia, the Eastern Partnership, and Russia move within this group of countries, while migrants from Central Europe and the Baltics move mostly to Western Europe Migrants from each subregion are more likely than the people they leave behind to be part of the