CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN VIETNAM In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In Finance By Mr: Nguyen Thanh Tung ID: MBA04045 International University - Vietnam National University HCMC August 2013 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN VIETNAM In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In Fianance by Mr: Nguyen Thanh Tung ID: MBA04045 International University - Vietnam National University HCMC August 2013 Under the guidance and approval of the committee, and approved by all its members, this thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree. Approved: ---------------------------------------------Chairperson --------------------------------------------Advisor ---------------------------------------------Committee member --------------------------------------------Committee member ---------------------------------------------Committee member --------------------------------------------Committee member Acknowledge This thesis report is about the Corporate Governance and Firm Performance would not have been possible without valuable contribution of all teachers from school of Business. I would like to thank to the International University, Vietnam National University – Ho Chi Minh City for giving us a great opportunity to practice and learn more knowledge. I especially appreciated the School of Business that helped us have good condition to do the necessary research work and archive the results. I am deeply indebted to my thesis project advisor Dr. Duong Nhu Hung, for his patience, guidance and advice throughout this semester. He was always keeping his eyes on my research. This gave me the efforts which proved valuable for the success of this thesis project. Moreover, my gratitude goes to my beloved wife Nguyen Thi Van Anh for her love, insightful guidance, assistance, and support during the entire process of my mater‟s study and the writing of this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, also my friends for supporting and encouraging me throughout my studies. With their love, I could finish this work. I hope this will serve as a valuable resource for whose major or carrier related to this field. i Plagiarism Statements I would like to declare that, apart from the acknowledged references, this thesis either does not use language, ideas, or other original material from anyone; or has not been previously submitted to any other educational and research programs or institutions. I fully understand that any writings in this thesis contradicted to the above statement will automatically lead to the rejection from the MBA program at the International University – Vietnam National University Hochiminh City. ii Copyright Statement This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognize that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author‟s prior consent. © Nguyen Thanh Tung/ MBA04045/ 2011 - 2013 iii Table of Contents Chapter One - Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Overview: .................................................................................................................... 1 1.2. Research objective....................................................................................................... 4 1.3. Data and methodology ................................................................................................ 5 1.4. Limitation .................................................................................................................... 5 1.5. Structure of the study .................................................................................................. 6 Chapter Two - Literature Review .......................................................................................... 8 2.1. Theories on corporate governance .............................................................................. 8 2.1.1. Agency theory ...................................................................................................... 8 2.1.2. Stewardship theory............................................................................................... 9 2.2. Previous studies on corporate governance and firm performance ............................ 10 2.2.1. Internationally empirical findings ...................................................................... 10 2.2.2. Empirical findings from Vietnamese perspective .............................................. 12 2.3. Determinants of firm performance and corporate governances and hypotheses ...... 14 2.3.1. Dependent variables ........................................................................................... 14 2.3.2. Independent and controlling variables ............................................................... 15 Chapter Three – Data and Methodology ............................................................................. 22 3.1. Data collection........................................................................................................... 22 3.2. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 22 Chapter Four - Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Result ............................................. 26 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Variables in Vietnam ................... 26 iv 4.1.1. Leadership Structure .......................................................................................... 27 4.1.2. Board size........................................................................................................... 28 4.1.3. Board composition ............................................................................................. 29 4.1.4. ROA ................................................................................................................... 30 4.1.5. ROE.................................................................................................................... 30 4.1.6. Tobin‟s Q ........................................................................................................... 31 4.1.7. Firm Size ............................................................................................................ 31 4.2. Multi – collineartity................................................................................................... 32 4.3. Regression result and discussion ............................................................................... 33 4.3.1. Leadership Structure .......................................................................................... 35 4.3.2. Board composition ............................................................................................. 36 4.3.3. Board size........................................................................................................... 37 4.3.4. Firm size............................................................................................................. 37 4.3.5. Industrial business group ................................................................................... 38 4.3.6. Business group affiliation and firm performance .............................................. 40 4.3.7. Corporate governance culture ............................................................................ 42 Chapter Five – Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................... 44 References ............................................................................................................................... 51 Appendix 1 ........................................................................................................................A1 - 1 Appendix 2 ........................................................................................................................A2 - 1 Appendix 3 ........................................................................................................................A3 - 1 Appendix 4 ........................................................................................................................A4 - 1 v Appendix 5 ........................................................................................................................A5 - 1 Appendix 6 ........................................................................................................................A6 - 1 vi List of Tables Table 1: Summary the findings of the previous studies ........................................................... 12 Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 21 Table 3: Description of Variables ............................................................................................ 24 Table 4: Descriptive Statistics from 2009 and 2012 ................................................................ 26 Table 5: Correlation matrix ...................................................................................................... 32 Table 6: Estimation results for the relationship of industrial groups and corporate governance on firms‟ performances ............................................................................................................ 34 Table 7: Regression Result for the relationship of group-affiliation firm performances ........ 41 Table 8: Regression Result for the relationship of corporate governance practices between parent companies and their subsidiaries .................................................................................. 42 Table 9: Proposition, Hypotheses, Results and Hypotheses status .......................................... 42 vii List of Figures Figure 1: Mean value of corporate governance practices ........................................................ 28 Figure 2: Mean value of ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q and Firm Size.............................................. 30 viii Abstract In this thesis, I examine three corporate governance related issues, namely, the determinants of corporate governance (leadership structure, board composition and board size), the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q), the impact of six industrial sectors on firm performance (HEALTH, SERVICE, GOODS, INDUSTRIAL, FINANCE and INDUSTRY), the firm performance between parent and subsidiaries firms within a group, and the corporate governance culture of firms inside business groups. This study employed panel data analysis by using fixed-effect estimation of top 100 listed firms on the HOSE for a period of four years from 2009 to 2012. Empirical result shows that board size, industrial sectors and business affiliation have positive and significant impact on firm performance. The two corporate governance mechanisms leadership structure and board composition are found that they are not to be significantly and positively related to firm performance in the Vietnam context. For firms with high performance, investors additionally notice the valuation of firms with larger boards and in HEALTH or GOODS sectors. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Industrial Groups, Business Group Affiliation. ix x Chapter One - Introduction Chapter 1 presents the reasons for forming the subject, the urgency of the research, then presents research objectives, identify the object and scope of the research as well as practical significance that study can be achieved, finally announced the presentation layout of the thesis. 1.1. Overview: “The governance of the corporation is now as important to the world economy as the government of countries.” –James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank Group For emerging market countries, the enhancement of corporate governance (CG) can serve a number of important public policy objectives. Corporate governance is considered to have significant implications for the growth prospects of an economy. Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of companies. It defines the role of the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Better CG may: • Enhance market stability • Increase investor confidence and trust • Lead to transparency of company activities and operations • Encourage investment into Vietnamese markets from local and foreign sources • Reduce the cost of capital for companies. However, the way in which corporate governance is organized differs between countries, depending on their economic, political and social contexts. In Vietnam, after a decade of economic expansion and the growth of large corporations, corporate governance has become an important issue for Vietnamese firms as they increasingly interact with regulators and investors from developed markets. Vietnam‟s CG Regulations were developed based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance. It described current practice and provided policy recommendations in six areas: • Corporate governance framework; • Rights of shareholders; • Equitable treatment of shareholders; • Role of stakeholders in corporate governance; • Disclosure and transparency; • Responsibilities of the Board. In Vietnam, the foundation and legislation of corporate governance system are based on the three adoptions of: • The Law on Enterprises in 1999 and its replacement in 2005. • The Law on Securities in 2006 and its amendments in 2010. • The Competition Law in 2004. Furthermore, understanding corporate governance standards and issues in Vietnam is also important to both executives of local companies and foreign multinationals doing business in this country. Beside corporate governance issue, business groups are seemed to be playing an increasingly important role in Vietnam. Large business groups in Vietnam are characterized by significant ownership concentration. In the recent years, we have seen a heightened interest in studying the relationship between a firm‟s business group affiliation and its performance. Business groups are critical in emerging economies and the ubiquity of business groups suggests that they may affect the economic performance of group-affiliated members in these economies, either 2 generating benefits for or imposing costs upon members. Yet, in spite of their important role, there has been no consensus reached, either on the proper way to define them or on the effects. From an economic theory point of view, business groups form in order to compensate for market imperfections. However, sociology tends to regard that reason as too narrow, as they do not take into account social and cultural factors and do not differentiate between the different types of business groups. In Vietnam, lack of empirical evidences, that investigate how business group affiliation, within firm governance and economic environment affect firm performance in emerging economies, is an issue for both academics and practitioners. Vietnam is also absent in international analyses of business group affiliation with corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets. In August 2011, there is a research about the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in Vietnam, which is measured by obtained survey of corporate governance practices of 100 publicity listed companies on Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) conducted in 2009. The result showed that the score of corporate governance practices is still low with 75% of firms are below middle score and there is a positive relationship between company market performance and profitability. Moreover, Dao Thi Thanh Binh and Hoang Thi Huong Giang examined the relationship of corporate governance and performance in Vietnam commercial banks sector conducting in August 2012. Based on their suggested models, there was an insignificant effect of the compositions of the board and the foreign shareholders on bank performance. This is just two recent typical empirical studies about corporate governance and firm performance in Vietnam and they do not use external business variable like group-affiliation firm performance factor to compare the performance 3 within those groups so that we can know which industries in Vietnam have better performance. Moreover, there is one interesting thing is that we can test the corporate governance culture between parent companies and subsidiary companies to see if there is a similar culture about board structure or board composition inside each groups. Therefore, it is so important to study the influence of business groups on affiliated firms‟ performances in Vietnam. Using the unique database, this study will seeks to understand how business group affiliation, within firm governance and business industrial environment affect firm performance in emerging economies. 1.2. Research objective The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and group-affiliation firm performance. The objectives are listed below:  Explore the impact of three corporate governance practices (including Board leadership structure, Board composition and Board size) on firm performance.  Examine whether there is a relationship of corporate governance and firm performance between parent companies and subsidiary companies in some business group. Research question:  What are the relationships between corporate governance practices (consisting of leadership, composition and size) and performance of listed firms in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange?  Does affiliation with a business group enhance a firm‟s performance and governance?  Is there a similar culture of corporate governance between parent companies and subsidiary companies within the given business groups? 4 1.3. Data and methodology A highly reliable longitudinal database exists about industries and firms. This database is four year panel data (from 2009 to 2012) and is based on a sample of top 100 largest firms listed on HOSE. We will examine the effect of group affiliation on firm performance and corporate governance on firm performance by using ordinary least square (OLS) regression model. Moreover, with Eview 6 software, this quantitative research also uses descriptive statistics and group correlations as analysis tools. 1.4. Limitation This study has some limitations. First, through this study, the effect of corporate governance practices and firm performance is examined by using a sample of top 100 largest companies in the period of four year 2009 - 2012. However, because of limited sample population and time scale, so this result cannot represent all of companies in Vietnamese market. Second, there are still other variables such as board committees, corporate reporting, board‟s compensation, number of board meeting, gender diversity, education qualification, director ownership, foreign ownership and dividend policy, etc. which have potential impact on firm performance. The poor performance of model in explaining firm performance is caused by the insufficient of some important variables, which are crucial factors, in the regression model. In sample of 100 companies, the data is not available for some variables such as board committees, corporate reporting, average age of directors, and number of board meeting and so on. This comes from poor corporate governance implementation on disclosure and transparency in Vietnam. 5 Lastly, another important factors effect to the result of this research is the corporate governance theories. This research is only applied Agency and Stewardship perspective theory as the two theory of corporate governance because they are the most popular and has received maximum attention from academics (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) as well as practitioners. However, other alternative theories of legitimacy theory, resource dependency theory, social contract theory and stakeholder theory have become prominent over the recent times. In further development, I will apply those theories to make this research be more comprehensive and objective. 1.5. Structure of the study To achieve the research objectives, the thesis is organized in layout consists of five chapters. The specific content of each chapter is as follows: Chapter 1: Introduction presents the reasons for forming the subject, the urgency of the research, then presents research objectives, identifies the object and scope of the research as well as practical significance that researchers can achieved, finally there is an announcement of the presentation layout of the thesis. Chapter 2: Literature Review will present the basic theoretical concepts related to the responsibilities of the corporate governance practices and firm performance, and then summarize and discuss previous research related to the one in this thesis and give recommendations research model, the research hypothesizes. Chapter 3: Data and Methodology includes the presentation of the study process, the definition of the variables studied and the steps to build the scale of the independent variables, thereby the setting of the research model. Collection methods and data processing, methods and statistical tools used to analyze the research data will also be introduced in this chapter. 6 Chapter 4: Empirical Results of the Research particularly includes two parts: the presentation and the discussion of the results of data analysis included descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multivariate regression analysis to test the research hypotheses. Chapter 5: Conclusions, Recommendations and Limitations will be the conclusions of the research results obtained and make a number of recommendations for the relationshio between firm performance and governance within the affiliation with a business group. The final chapter also presents the existence of limitations of the current study and concludes with a set of recommendations for further research. 7 Chapter Two - Literature Review Chapter two provides detailed review of relevant literature. Then the chapter reviews literature concerning firm-level and group-level corporate governance. Finally, this chapter presents the conceptual framework and research hypotheses. 2.1. Theories on corporate governance Corporate governance is of growing importance, particularly with regards to the monitoring role of the board of directors. As a result, the theoretical perspectives that are relevant to this study are based on the governance structures and reporting practices that affect the value of the firms. This section reviews the theoretical perspectives of a board‟s accountability that is relevant for this study. It draws on agency theory and stewardship theory. 2.1.1. Agency theory Much of the research into corporate governance derives from agency theory which provides a rational argument for the introduction of corporate governance mechanisms. The Agency theory is based on the principal-agent framework. Jehnsen and Meckling (1976) viewed organizations as sets of explicit and implicit contracts with associated rights. Separation between ownership and control of corporations characterizes the existence of agency relationship between the board who represent the shareholders and the management who represent the board and other stakeholders. Agency theory is concerned with ensuring that managers act in the interest of the shareholders. In the context of corporations and issues of corporate control, agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms especially the board of directors, as being an essential monitoring device to try to ensure that problems that may be brought about by the principal-agent relationships are minimized (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2001; Mallin, 2007). The agency role of the directors refers to the governance 8 function of the board of directors in serving the shareholders by ratifying the decisions made by the managers and monitoring the implementation of those decisions. Because according to the perspective of agency theory, the primary responsibility of the board of directors is towards the shareholders to ensure maximization of shareholder value. The agency problem is how to induce the agent (managers) to act in the best interests of the principal (shareholders) when the separation of ownership from management can lead to managers of firms taking action that may not maximize shareholders wealth. This solution is agency costs, for example monitoring costs and disciplining the agent to prevent abuse. The important governance mechanisms used for this purpose are board of directors. The literature on board, as a governance team, is mainly focused on issues such as board size, inside versus outside directors (also known as executive versus non-executive directors), separation of CEO and Chair positions, etc (Dalton et al., 1998; Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Daily et al., 2003) with an aim to improve the effectiveness of oversight. Various governance mechanisms have been discussed by agency theorists in relation to protecting the shareholder interests, minimizing agency costs and ensure alignment of the agent-principal relationship. 2.1.2. Stewardship theory While Agency theory assumes that principals and agents have divergent interests and that agents are essentially self-serving and self-centered, stewardship theory presents a different model of management, where agents (directors and managers) are essentially trustworthy and good stewards of the resources who will act in the best interest of the owners (Donaldson 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). 9 Stewardship theory posits that not only executive managers are intrinsically trustworthy individuals (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.588) but also directors are regarded as the stewards of the company assets and are pre-disposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Mallin, 2007). According to Abdulla and Valentine (2009), stewards are company executives and managers working for the shareholders so that there is a strong relationship between managers and the success of the firm, and therefore the stewards protect and maximize shareholder wealth through firm performance. Moreover, by improved firm performance, the organization satisfies most groups that have an interest in the organization. Thus, from the stewardship theory perspective, stewardship theory supports the need to combine the role of the chairman and CEO and insider-dominated boards are favored by consisting of specialist inside (executive) directors on the board rather than majority outside (nonexecutive) directors. 2.2. Previous studies on corporate governance and firm performance This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link corporate governance practices and firm financial performance. 2.2.1. Internationally empirical findings The literature indicates mixed results regarding combined corporate governance practices and firm performance. Yermack (1996) examines large US firms from 1984 to 1991 and finds a strong negative effect of board size on Tobin‟s Q. Boards seem systematically too big. Moreover, this is very costly. Klein (1998), like Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), investigate the relation between the fractions of board members who are outsiders and Tobin‟s Q for firms during five different years (mostly in the 1970s). They find no relation between board composition and firm performance among large US firms in the early 1990s. In addition to that, Agrawal and Knoeber 10 (1996) while conducting a study on US firms found negative relationship between proportion of outside directors and performance of firms. Indeed, previous studies in several other countries also find a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. Bhagat and Black (1999) found no significant between board independence and firm‟s performance in a long run in case of US firms. Mak and Yuanto (2002) examine the relationship between the size of the board and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia, and find that board size is negative in relation to Tobin‟s Q. Although IFC codes recommend that the separation of the role of CEO and chairman as a sign of good governance, previous empirical analyses do not support it. Weir et al. (2002) find that duality has no role in enhancing firm performance in U.K firms and this result is similar with Dalton et al. (1998), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Brickley et al. (1997). In the context of Hong Kong market, Z. Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong (2005) selected 412 publicly listed Hong Kong firms during 1995–1998 and found a negative relationship between CEO duality and performance due to managerial entrenchment in companies that combine the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. This study also show that the composition of the board of directors (proportion of independent non-executive directors, outsider dominated board) has little impact on firm performance. Klein et.al (2005) conducted a study with sample of 263 Canadian firms and explored that corporate governance does matter in Canada and size was consistently negatively related to performance. Also, there is international evidence suggesting this positive link on certain developed markets. For instance, Selvaggi and Upton (2008) claimed that good CG enhances firm‟s performance for the United Kingdom and found the presence of a strong 11 causality between the two variables. Similarly, Black (2001) reported the same conclusions in the case of Russian firms. Besides that, Klapper and Love (2004) found a high positive association between better governance and operating performance using firm level data of 14 emerging stock markets with return on assets as a proxy for operating performance, although affirming that this may vary among countries. 2.2.2. Empirical findings from Vietnamese perspective Nguyen Ngoc Thang (2011) examines the effects of corporate governance on firm performance with a sample of top 100 listed Vietnamese companies in 2009. That research found that the corporate governance in Vietnam has little impact on firm performance. In 2008, Tung Thanh Dao tested the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance with 20 equitized companies and found that the role of board of directors has positive impact on firm performance. One more interesting thing in the result is that there is no relationship between firm size and firm performance. Dung To Thi (2011) conduct a study with sample top 100 listed companies at the year-end 2009 and explored that there is no significant relation between board size and firm performance. Moreover, the dual of CEO and Chairman impacts significantly on Tobin‟s Q of the companies, but not significant affects ROA. The following table is to summarize some studies related to the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Table 1: Summary the findings of the previous studies Researchers Data Findings Klein (1998); Hermalin and US firms in the Weisbach (1991) early 1990s 12 No relation between board composition and firm performance Yermack (1996) US firms from A strong negative effect of board size on 1984 to 1991 Tobin‟s Q Negative relationship between Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) US firms proportion of outside directors and performance of firms Brickley et al. (1997); Dalton et al. (1998); Vafeas and Theodorou (1998); Weir et al. U.K firms Duality has no role in enhancing firm performance (2002) Bhagat and Black (1999) US firms Black (2001) Russian firms Mak and Yuanto (2002) Klapper and Love (2004) Z. Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong (2005) No significant between board independence and firm‟s performance Strong relationship between CG and firm performance Singapore and Board size is negative in relation to Malaysia firms Tobin‟s Q 14 emerging High positive association between better stock markets governance and operating performance 412 Hong Kong firms (1995– 1998)  Composition of the board of directors has little impact on firm performance  Negative relationship between CEO duality and performance Klein et.al (2005) 263 Canadian firms  CG does matter with firm performance  Size was consistently negatively related to performance  CG enhances firm‟s performance Selvaggi and Upton (2008) UK firms  Strong causality between CG and firm‟s performance  The role of board of directors has Tung Thanh Dao (2008) 20 Vietnamese positive impact on firm performance firms  No relationship between firm size and firm performance Nguyen Ngoc Thang (2011) 100 Vietnamese  Corporate governance in Vietnam has firms (2009) 13 little impact on firm performance  No significant relation between board Dung To Thi (2011) 100 Vietnamese firms (2009) size and firm performance  Dual of CEO and Chairman impacts significantly on Tobin‟s Q 2.3. Determinants of firm performance and corporate governances and hypotheses 2.3.1. Dependent variables Firm performance in the literature is based on the value of the firm. There are many measures of firm performance. Financial measures of firm performance used in empirical research on corporate governance fit into both accounting-based measures and market-based measures (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Most commonly used accounting based-measures are return on assets (ROA) (Kiel & Nicholson 2003), return on equity (ROE) (Baysinger & Butler 1985) and earnings per share. The most commonly used market-based measures are market to book value ratio and Tobin‟s Q for reflecting the firm‟s current value and future profitability potential (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein 1994; Ma & Tian, 2009). Besides that, to evaluate performance, some empirical studies uses return on investment (Boyd,1995; Adjaoud, Zeghal & Andaleeb, 2007), sales revenue (Bhagat et al.,1999), stock returns (Bhagat et al., 1999), earnings per share (Adjaoud et al., 2007), net profit margin (Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004) and economic value added (Adjaoud et al., 2007) as a proxy for financial measurement. For the purpose of the study, I choose ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q as an indicator of firm performance for both accounting return and market return because this is the most common variables which are used most in the existing literature on corporate governance practices (Abdullah 2004; Bhagat & Black 2002; Daily & Dalton 1993a; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Lam & Lee 2008; Yarmack 1996) and reduce the bias. 14 Firm performance in this study is measured in terms of the profitability and value of a firm. 2.3.2. Independent and controlling variables The basis of the hypothesis is that the introduction of corporate governance best practices namely the board leadership structure, board composition, board committees and corporate reporting practices, will be reflected in firm performance in Vietnam. The monitoring mechanism of the board leadership structure (Hypothesis 1), board composition (Hypothesis 2) and board size (Hypothesis 3) is represented to investigate the boards‟ accountability to shareholders through firm performance. Firm size (Hypothesis 4) indicates how large the firm is and the returns the firm earns and its effect on firm performance. Industrial business group (Hypothesis 5) indicates which industrial sector will have good firm performance in business. Business group affiliation (Hypothesis 6) shows the relationship how effective of firm performance between parent and subsidiaries‟ firms inside groups. The corporate governance culture (Hypothesis 7) indicates the similarity of corporate governance between parent and their subsidiaries companies within business group. 2.3.2.1. Board leadership structure and firm performance The first requirement for each companies in Vietnam to have effective corporate governance is that the separation of the top two positions of the board (chairman and CEO). CEO duality arises when the post of CEO and Chairman are managed by one person. Alternatively, it could also be argued that when one person is in charge of both tasks, favorable decisions are reached faster provided that person is well aware of the decisions needed to improve the performance of the firm (Abdullah 2004). Agency theory evidences that a separate leadership structure could curb agency problems and enhances the firm value (Fama & Jensen 1983; Rechner & Dalton 1991; 15 Fosberg & Nelson 1999). As such, leadership structure is considered important in affecting firm performance in this study. To test the above argument in relation to the Vietnam context the following hypothesis is suggested: Hypothesis 1: Separate leadership structure is positively associated with firm performance. 2.3.2.2. Board composition and firm performance The board composition is also an important component of the board structure. The composition of the board in this research refers to the proportion of inside and outside directors serving on the board. The distinction between the roles of inside and outside directors is important, because the latter bring in specific advantages and disadvantages. According to agency theory, these outside non-executive directors are able to provide superior performance as a result of their independence from firm management (Dalton et al. 1998). It is believed that increasing the number of independent directors in the core institutions of governance contributes to the improvement of corporate performance since it can restrict the power of larger shareholders and protect the benefit of small ones Accordingly, proponents of stewardship theory argue that superior performance of the firm is linked to a majority of insider directors for effective monitoring. Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between firm performance and board composition is mixed. According to the arguments put forward by agency theory, non-executive directors are an important component of the board structure that affects firm performance. It also means higher proportion of outsiders on the board is significantly related to various performance measures. On this basis, the second hypothesis in this study is stated as follows: 16 Hypothesis 2: The number of non-executive directors on the board is positively associated with firm performance. 2.3.2.3. Board size and firm performance Corporate board size is considered to be one of the most important board structure variables. In the academic literature, “size” variable refers to the number of directors who serve on the board (Abdullah 2004; Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Large boards are claimed to be superior to small ones because larger groups have more capabilities and resources, greater monitoring and advice, and wider external contracting relationships (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998; Adam & Mehran, 2003; Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) explained that large groups could enhance problem solving capabilities, provide more solution strategies and critical judgment to correct for errors. Moreover, it is acknowledge that board size is related to firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). For example, Yermack (1996) and Coles et al. (2008) found that larger and diversified firms have a greater number of directors on the board. Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) also found that as firms become larger and more diversified, board size increased. As suggested by agency theorist (Jensen 1993), an optimal limit should be around seven or eight directors and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested the maximum size of the board should be ten members and it is easier for CEO to dominate. Going by this, it is hypothesized that: Hypothesis 3: Board size is positively associated with firm performance. 2.3.2.4. Firm size and firm performance Firm size is a control variable used as proxy for measuring the firm performance. Therefore, we consider firm size as one of the important control variables to be included in our study. Firm size may be related to corporate governance 17 characteristics and may be correlated with firm performance. Firm size can be represented by taking the natural logarithm of book values of total assets of the firm. Size of a firm can have a significant influence on firm performance and a proxy for firm size is used in almost all studies explaining firm performance. A firm‟s size is expected to have a positive influence on a firm‟s performance. Gleason, among others, found that firm size has a positive and significant effect on firm performance ROA. In contrast, many other researchers such as Mudambi and Nicosia, (1998), Lauterbach and Vaninsky, (1999), Durand and Coeuderoy, (2001), and Tzelepis and Skuras, (2004) have found an insignificant effect of firm size on the firm's performance. Based on this discussion, I propose the Hypothesis 4: Hypothesis 4: Firm size is positively associated with firm performance. 2.3.2.5. Industrial business group and firm performance The relationship between firm performance and governance mechanisms might well vary from one sector to another. Also, a firm's growth and business cycle varies from one industry to another (see for instance, Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2005). For example, it is also found that a firm's growth and business cycle varies from one industry to another (see for instance, Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2005). Therefore, the industries sector is expected to have an impact on corporate performance. Based on this discussion, Hypothesis 5 can be stated as: Hypothesis 5: Industrial sectors affect firm performance. To control for the effect of industrial sectors on a firm‟s performance, 6 dummy variables are used. 53 companies are distributed across 6 main industries:  Sector 1 (GOODS): This sector includes companies involved with food production, packaged goods, clothing, beverages, automobiles and electronics. 18  Sector 2 (HEALTH): The healthcare sector includes hospital management firms, biotechnology and a variety of medical products firms.  Sector 3 (SERVICE): This sector refers to public service sector including gas, water supply and electricity firms.  Sector 4 (FINANCE): This sector includes securities, investment funds, insurance companies and real estate firms.  Sector 5 (MATERIAL): materials sector includes the mining and refining of metals, chemical producers and forestry products.  Sector 6 (INDUSTRY): This sector includes companies involved with aerospace and defense, industrial machinery, tools, lumber production, construction, cement and metal fabrication. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes the value 0. 2.3.2.6. Business group affiliation and firm performance Business groups are an important feature of many emerging economies and are defined as a set of firms doing business in different markets in under common administrative and financial control. Group affiliation also provides an easier access to capital, raw materials, and markets for end products of at least some member firms. Parent company is a company which controls other companies by owning an influential amount of voting stock or control. Parent companies will typically be larger firms that exhibit control over one or more small subsidiaries in either the same industry or other industries. Parent companies can be either hands-on or hands-off with subsidiaries, depending on the amount of managerial control given to subsidiary managers. Affiliated companies are companies that is owned and controlled by the same parent company. Parent company only possesses a minority stake in the 19 ownership of affiliated companies. According to this research, there expects that parent company and its affiliated companies have also same firm performance. I propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 6: There is an association between the performance of the parent and its subsidiary within business group affiliation. We used an indicator variable to indicate whether a Vietnamese listed company is affiliated with a particular business group. The indicator variable took a value of 1 if the listed company is affiliated with a business group, 0 otherwise. 2.3.2.7. Corporate governance culture While a focus on within firm governance mechanisms has advanced our understanding of the links between governance practices and firm performance, there is an increasing realization that the efficacy of within firm governance may be dependent on the quality of external governance and institutions (Judge et al., 2008). It is well documented that many emerging economies, such as China and Vietnam, do not have well developed external control mechanisms, such as a market for corporate control, merger, and acquisition laws, and efficient law enforcement. Consequently, this discussion leads to the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 7: There is an association between the board characteristics of the parent and its subsidiary company. The above hypotheses discuss the effect of corporate governance practices on firm performance because effective corporate governance is about adhering to best practice recommendations which suggests that boards should be comprised of a majority of independent non-executive directors, a separate leadership structure and board size through appropriate disclosures which will be associated with higher firm performance. Moreover, there will be hypotheses about the relationship about 20 industrial business group with firm performance or corporate governance culture inside group affiliation. Here is the Table 2 that summarizes all seven hypotheses needed to be test: Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses Variables Expected sign by theories Hypotheses Leadership - (Agency theory) H1: Separate leadership structure Structure + (Steward theory) performance + (Agency theory) H2: The number of non-executive is positively associated with firm directors on the board is Board Composition - (Steward theory) positively associated with firm Direction of Hypothesized sign + + performance Board Size + (Agency theory) Firm size N/A Business group affiliation N/A associated with firm performance H4: Firm size is positively associated with firm performance H5: Industrial sectors affect firm performance + + + H6: There is an association Parent companies and their H3: Board size is positively N/A subsidiaries between the performance of the parent and its subsidiary within + business group affiliation H7: There is an association Corporate governance culture N/A between the board characteristics of the parent and its subsidiary company 21 + Chapter Three – Data and Methodology Chapter 3 explains the methodology used in the study, which includes selection of the sample and the data collection method. This chapter will also discuss the variables used to measure, and includes a discussion of the statistical techniques employed to analyze the data. 3.1. Data collection The data employed in this study of corporate governance in Vietnam is covered the sample period of four years, from 2009 to 2012. The sample consists of top 100 companies with the largest market capitalization listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchanges (HOSE). Information on corporate governance mechanisms such as board size, independent directors, ROE and ROA were hand-collected from the Companies Annual Reports and financial statements such as HNX 1 , HOSE 2 , cophieu68 3 and companies‟ websites. The data for this study comes from multiple sources of secondary data. 3.2. Methodology This paper employs the panel data approach as it eliminates unobservable heterogeneity that different firms in the sample data could present, less collinearity among the variables and a better measurement than pure cross section or pure time series data (Gujarati 2003; Baltagi 2001). In this study, the data will be presented by ratios. Data is analyzed using quantitative approach. In the quantitative approach, descriptive statistics involve the use of mean, median, maximum and minimum value to evaluate the selected variables. Other measures of descriptive estimates like the standard deviation and variance were also 1 HNX‟s website: www.hnx.vn HOSE‟s website: www.hsx.vn 3 Cophieu68‟s website: www.cophieu68.com 2 22 employed so as to see the degree of variability of these estimates. The regression model is taken the form of the Fixed Effects Model in order to establish the most appropriate regression with the highest explanatory power that is better suited to the data set employed in the study i.e. a balanced panel (Greene, 2003; Chen, 2004; Salawu, 2007). Panel data is developed because of combining time series and cross sectional data and it is used for the study as it increases efficiency by combining time series and cross-section data. Panel data involves the pooling observations on a cross section of units over several time periods. Furthermore, panel data facilitates identification of effects that cannot be detected using purely cross- section or time series data. The method of analysis is that of multiple regressions and the method of estimation is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). To reveal the relationship between corporate governance and firm‟s performance, the estimation procedure used by Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) was adopted and modified as: Yit = αi + β1Xit + eit. Where:  Yit is firm performance (ROE and ROA, Tobin‟s Q,)  αi = refers to time-invariant firm-specific effects  Xit is the independent variables  β1 coefficients  eit is a random disturbance.  i is number of firms.  t is the time period. By adopting the economic model as in equation above specifically to this study, we apply to this study to have below models: PERFt = ßo + ß1 LDSit + ß2 BSIZEit+ ß3 BCOMPit + ß4 SIZEit + eit Where, 23  PERFit = Firm performance proxies (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q)  LDSit = Separate leadership  BSIZEit = Board size  BCOMPit = Board composition  SIZEit = Firm size  eit is a random disturbance Table 3: Description of Variables Notations Variables Operationalization of the variable (proxy) Measurement in other selected studies Corporate Governance LDS BCOMP Separate leadership Board composition Dummy variables 0 for combined (Collins, 2009), (Kashif, leadership and 1 separate leadership 2008), (Hanoku,2008) Non-executive directors to number of (Wan & Idris, 2012) , directors (Hanoku,2008), (Kingsley & Theophilus, 2012) BSIZE Board size Number of directors (Wan & Idris, 2012), (Kashif, 2008) , (Hanoku,2008) Firm performance ROA Return on total assets Net Income / Total Assets Net Income / Total Assets (Tong & Green, 2005), (Huang & Song, 2006), (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007), and (Frank & Goyal, 2009) ROE Return on equity Net Income / Shareholder's Equity Net income / Shareholder‟s equity (Tong & Green, 2005), (Huang & Song, 2006), (Margaritis & 24 Psillaki, 2007), and (Frank & Goyal, 2009) TOBINQ Tobin‟s Q Market Capitalization / Total Assets Market Capitalization / Total Assets (Dadson & Jamil, 2012) Other SIZE Firm size Log(TA) : Natural logarithm Total Log(TA) Assets (Zeitun & Tian, 2007), (Abdul 2012), (Zuraiah, et al 2012) Industrial sectors: GOODS • Goods (Zeitun & Tian, 2007) Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 HEALTH • Health Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 SERVICE • Service Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 FINANCE • Finance Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 MATERIAL • Material Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 INDUSTRY • Industry Dummy variables takes 1 if firm is in that sector; otherwise it takes 0 25 Chapter Four - Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Result Chapter 4 discusses the results of the statistical analysis of the data and implications of the statistical analysis in relation to corporate governance practices, industrial sectors, business group affiliation and firm performance of listed companies in Vietnam. 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Variables in Vietnam As discussed in Chapter 3, descriptive statistics for 2009 to 2012 were calculated for corporate governance variables and firm performance variables in the study. Descriptive statistics compared the compliance by the companies with corporate governance best practice recommendations from 2009 to 2012. They also described the characteristics of three corporate practices prevalent among listed companies in Vietnam and the variables used to measure firm performance. A summary of the descriptive statistics are presented in the Table 4. Table 4: Descriptive Statistics from 2009 and 2012 Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Separate leadership Board size Board composition Return on assets Return on equity Tobin’s Q Firm size 0 1 0.45 0 1 0.45 0 1 0.37 0 1 0.34 4 11 5.97 4 11 6.01 2 11 6.06 4 12 5.98 28.57143 100 62.75429 16.66667 100 62.51183 33.33333 100 65.40415 20 100 66.25458 -7.6 59.8 14.8565 0.04 48.83 13.3696 -6.98 47.41 11.3257 -5.76 40.23 9.4111 -12.14 101.55 27.5253 0.1 77.64 23.8587 -7.85 65.53 18.9948 -17.98 46.16 15.5699 0.06 8.3 0.9883 0.09 8.5 0.9009 0.08 7.46 0.843 0.08 5.68 0.8737 4.9814 7.3403 6.1588 5.0688 7.5985 6.2713 5.1920 7.6590 6.3349 5.2376 7.7468 6.3808 Note: Firm Size = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q = Market Capitalization / Total Assets. 26 4.1.1. Leadership Structure Analysis of the leadership structure from 2009 to 2012 (Table 4) reports that the means value of LDS variable is 45% 2009 and it is still 45% in 2010. In 2011, it decreased to 37% and continued decreasing to 34% in 2012. That means the number of combining the posts of CEO and the chairman is getting lower from year to year and number of firms having separated the leadership roles will increase yearly. But the mean value is greater than 34% in four years indicating that the duality of CEOchairman is quite common in Vietnam. Looking at the Table 4, we clearly see that there will be 55% of firms having separate leadership in 2009 and 2010; and it continues to increase to 63% in 2011 and to 64% in 2012. Figure 1 helps us have better view about how separate leadership structures change in Vietnam over the past four years. The slope of leadership structure is decreasing yearly. However, over 60% of the firms in the sample identified the importance of separating the position of chairman. Examination of the data also shows that some companies have moved back to separated leadership, whereas some are still keeping combined leadership instead of choosing separate leadership structures. 27 Figure 1: Mean value of corporate governance practices 4.1.2. Board size Board size has not varied significantly from 2009 to 2012 with the average size is nearly 6. The maximum size of board is 11 in three years 2009 to 2012 and increases to 12 in 2012. Looking at Figure 1, there is a slight slope of changing in mean value of board size in Vietnam companies and it shows that there is not much changing in the size of board of directors. Taking a look at Table 4, the median of number of director is around 6 for four years means that 40% of Vietnamese companies have number of boards of director in low range [4-6) and 40% of companies have number of board size in range (6-11]. It proves that board of director in Vietnam favors the board with not many people. In Vietnam, Law on Enterprises regulates that number of directors on boards cannot be less than 3 and more than 11 members (IFC and State Securities Commission Vietnam, 2006). 28 The lack of universal evidence on “ideal” board size in different markets and nations could stem from the fact that there is no “one size fits all” in the field of corporate governance. In addition, empirical analyses suggest a positive relationship with optimal board size ranging from 5 to 10 members. The range of number of director is not much with largest board has 11 directors and the smallest one has 2 directors. The range of this variable seems to conform to Law on Enterprises (LOE) 2005. However, according to CG Rules and empirical studies, board size of joint stock companies should be sufficient but not too many members to allow effective operations. 4.1.3. Board composition Board composition, which is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of director, shows that there is a large variation in the percentage of non-executive directors on the boards in four years (more than 60%). The mean value of proportions is 62% in 2009 and 2010, and it increased to 65% and 67% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. That means there is a small increasing in the number of independent directors in top 100 largest listed companies in HOSE. But this change will not make a high slope because the number is not changing much and Figure 1 is a good illustration for this change. The proportion of outside directors sitting on the board is nearly equal to two-third of the board. It means there will be two non-executive directors if a board of director in company has three members. One can therefore infers that majority of the boards of the sampled firms are independent. There is plenty of scope for Vietnamese companies while the Code of Corporate Governance encourages listed companies to have at least one-third of their board made up in independent directors4. 4 Based on ACGA – CG Watch 2010 report 29 4.1.4. ROA The mean value for ROA was 14.85%, with a minimum of -7.6% and a maximum of 59.8% for 2009. In 2010, the mean decreased to 13.36%, with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 48.83%. The mean value of ROA keeps decreasing to 11.32% in 2011 and to 9.41% in 2012. Results report that the profitability based on total assets decreased from 2009 to 2012 and it is described clearly in Figure 2. Figure 2: Mean value of ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and Firm Size 4.1.5. ROE ROE averaged around 27.52% in 2009 with a minimum value of -12.14% to a maximum value of 101.55%. The mean value of return on equity decreased in 2010 to 23.85% with a 0.1 minimum value and a maximum value of 77.64%. In 2011 and 2012, the mean value of ROE continues to fall to 18.99% and 15.56% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Results of descriptive statistics show performance based on shareholders‟ equity decreased in 2010, 2011 and 2012 and Figure 2 is a good demonstration for describing this change in mean value. 30 4.1.6. Tobin’s Q As stated in the previous chapter, Tobin‟s Q measures market performance. A Tobin‟s Q value of greater than 1 represents a positive investment opportunity. The mean value for Tobin‟s Q for 2009 was 0.98, with a minimum value of 0.06 and a maximum value of 8.3. In 2010, Tobin‟s Q averaged at 0.9 with minimum value of 0.09 and maximum value of 8.5. In contrast, the mean value for 2011 was 0.84, with a minimum value of 0.08 and maximum value of 7.46. Similarly to year 2011, the mean value is nearly the same with the value of 0.87. The results of Tobin‟s Q value show that market value of the firm slightly decreased over the years. By taking a look at Figure 2, the change of Tobin‟s Q is not much in four years so that it looks like a straight line. 4.1.7. Firm Size Firm size is represented by natural logarithm of total assets. The descriptive statistics show that market capitalization of the companies in the sample has not increased significantly. The mean value of firm size is slightly different because the firm size averaged at 6.15 in 2009; at 6.27 in 2010; at 6.33 in 2011 and at 6.3 in 2012. The minimum value and maximum value does not change much from the year 2009 to 2012. The change in mean value of firm size is not much different from the change in Tobin‟s Q because the slope of changing is very small and we can see it clearly in the Figure 2. But it is still a good signal because this slope is not going down but it is going upward over the time. Descriptive statistics in this study show the extent to which companies in Vietnam complied with governance structures and corporate reporting practices. The accounting–based measures of ROE are greater than ROA. The market-based measure of firm performance, Tobin‟s Q, showed a significant increase during the period under 31 review. Finally, these results indicate that corporate performance measured by all three ratios increased over the years. 4.2. Multi – collineartity When using regression model to test the impact of the leadership structure, board size, and board composition on firm performance, firstly a correlation test is conducted if an independent variable is correlated with another independent variable. If there is correlation between independent, the condition of multi-collinear exists. This can produce problems in interpreting the coefficients of the variables as several variables are providing duplicate information. Correlation coefficients express the degree or strength of the linear relationship between two random variables. The correlation coefficients among independent variables in the study are presented as follows. Table 5 presents the correlation matrix. Other than the correlation between ROA and firm ROE, none of the correlations are high enough to warrant any problem of multicollinearity. Table 5: Correlation matrix Variables LDS BSIZE BCOMP ROA ROE TOBINQ SIZE LDS BSIZE BCOMP ROA ROE TOBINQ SIZE 1 -0.1238 1 -0.4693 0.1252 1 -0.0005 0.0164 -0.0453 1 -0.0091 0.0185 -0.0525 0.8549 1 -0.0467 0.1060 -0.0654 0.4887 0.2766 1 -0.1351 0.2109 0.1398 -0.3802 -0.2506 -0.1845 1 Note: Firm Size (SIZE = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets), Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q = Market Capitalization / Total Assets, LDS: Leadership structure, BSIZE: Board size, BCOMP: Board composition. The correlation matrix for the variables is presented in Table 5 in order to examine the correlation that exists among variables. The result shows three issues. First of all, three measures of firm performance are positively correlated with each other. The high correlation between ROA and ROE is 85.49%, while the low correlation between 32 ROA and TOBINQ, ROE and TOBINQ is 48.87% and 27.66% respectively. In the second, the results show that there is a negative relationship between two variables of corporate governance (board leadership structure and board composition) and three measures of firm performance i.e. ROA, ROE, and TOBINQ which ranges from 0.05% to 4.67% and 4.53% to 6.54%. On the contrary, there has a positively low correlation between board size and three measure of firm performance which ranges from 1.85% to 21.09%. This result means that larger boards are better, therefore the larger the board, the better the performance of the company. In the last, the correlation matrix for the variables also examines the correlation between the explanatory variables. The result shows that there is a negative relationship between size and three measures of firm performance (ROA, ROE, and TOBINQ). This implies that larger companies have a lower firm performance. Besides, size has negative relationship with leadership structure while it has positive correlation with two residual variables of corporate governance (board size and board composition). 4.3. Regression result and discussion The panel Generalized Least Square (GLS) method was used over the four-year period (2009-2012). The GLS was adopted because it is a better estimation method and effectively standardizes the observations (Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2000). The regression model includes most variables mentioned above such as the duality of CEO and chairman, number of directors in board, the board composition, firm size and 6 industrial business groups are used to measure the impact of corporate governance structures in Vietnam Stock Exchange. Table 6 reports the first regression result of the impact of CG practice on firm performance by using random effects GLS estimation, assessing the effect of board 33 characteristics on firm performance. Based on Table 6, I developed three models in a hierarchical manner. The first model is the measure the effect of independent variables and business group affiliation on ROA. Model 2 and 3 will exanimate the relation between corporate governance with industry group and ROE and Tobin‟s Q respectively. Table 6: Estimation results for the relationship of industrial groups and corporate governance on firms’ performances Constant LDS Prob. BSIZE Prob. BCOMP Prob. SIZE Prob. GOODS Prob. HEALTH Prob. SERVICE Prob. FINANCE Prob. MATERIAL Prob. No. observations R-squared F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ROA ROE TobinQ 10.20686 20.64263 3.186754 0.219532 -0.46906 -0.019948 0.3546 0.5267 0.0003 0.178968 0.221316 0.019611 0.1518 0.013 0 -0.007594 -2.483433 -0.003096 0.1857 0 0 -1.08753 -1.413491 -0.407027 0.0476 0.0008 0 3.722523 9.180564 0.159192 0.0367 0.0152 0 8.384857 -12.82414 0.258025 0 0.0664 0.0858 2.318699 8.459987 -0.160153 0.4421 0.1264 0.18 -7.145093 1.640793 0.01999 0.1693 0.7264 0.7082 -2.228965 2.186704 0.245647 0.6097 0.7509 0 400 400 400 0.830575 0.684321 0.959832 141.6768 62.64857 690.5755 2.148643 2.048534 1.90189 The value for the R-squared in Table 6, shows that 83.05%, 68.43% and 95.98% of the variation in the dependent variable are explained by the independent variables of both the models i.e., with ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q respectively. Closer the Adjusted 34 R-squared to 100% the more the variability of dependent variable is being explained by variation of independent variables. The smaller value of R-square variations in the dependent variable remains unexplained by the independent variables of the study. The results obtained above is from the fixed effect models indicate that the overall coefficient of determination (R-squared) shows that the equation has a good fit with 83.05% for ROA, 68.43% for ROE, and 95.98% for Tobin‟s Q. It means that 83.05%, 68.43% and 95.98% change in the dependent variables (LDS), (BCOMP) and (BSIZE) are caused by the independent variables (LDS, BCOMP, BSIZE, SIZE, GOODS, HEALTH, SERVICE, FINANCE and MATERIAL). The higher the R-squared is the higher the goodness of fit, and the higher the goodness of fit is the higher the reliability of the model. As the adjusted R-squared tends to purge the influence of the number of included explanatory variables, the adjusted R-squared of 83.05% for ROA, 68.43% for ROE, and 95.98% for Tobin‟s Q also show that having removed the influence of the explanatory variables, the model is still of good fit, hence, in terms of the goodness of fit we can say that the test is fair and those independent components work in top 100 companies. The Durbin Watson statistics of 2.14, 2.04 and 1.90 for three firm performance measures ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q respectively; as it is significantly within the bench mark, we can conclude that there is no auto- correlation or serial correlation in the model specification. 4.3.1. Leadership Structure Hypothesis 1 predicted that separate leadership structure is positively associated with firm performance. In model 1, the setting of positions of the Chairman and CEO and firm performance efficiency are positive related (β = 0.219532), but this is not significant effect on ROA because of the high value of probability (p > 0.10).This 35 coefficient remains negative in model 2 and 3 involving interaction terms. But in model 3, LDS variable is significant with Tobin‟s Q (p < 0.10). This is inconclusive with our initial expectation supposed a Chairman who is also possess the CEO position effects negatively on firm performance so that Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Moreover, this result is contrary to the predictions of steward theory but consider with the agency theory. Despite of their insignificance, these relationships from three models to some extent have explained that duality of in corporate governance influences performance efficiency is complex and instable, and easy impacted by exogenous variables. Due to this fact, the duality in role of CEO and Chairman usually becomes more active in management process, faster in decisions making and hence the firm value. 4.3.2. Board composition Next, continue to examine the relation between Board composition and firm performance. BCOMP has negative impact on firm performance including ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q with β = -0.007594, with β = -2.483433 and with β = -0.003096 in model 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Looking at model 1, the BCOMP is insignificant effect on ROA with p > 0.10 but BCOMP is significant with ROE and Tobin‟s Q because the value of p < 0.10. The implication of this is that for the 100 sampled firms, there is no relationship between the firms‟ financial performances and the outside directors sitting on the board. It is also pointed out that the more outsider of board of directors, the greater the loss of firm value. Because hypothesis 2 predicted that board composition leadership structure is positively associated with firm performance so that we reject hypothesis 2. 36 4.3.3. Board size Hypothesis 3 predicted that board size has positive impact on firm performance. From the regression results in model 1, 2 and 3, the result shows that the role of the board size of directors has a positive impact on the three firm performance measures. In addition, the coefficients for the significant variables are also found to be small with β = 0.17, 0.22 and 0.01 for ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q respectively. However, in model 1, the impact of BSIZE is insignificant as probability coefficient is 0.15 (p greater than 0.10). But the effect of BSIZE is significant with ROE and Tobin‟s Q because both of the values of p in model 2 and 3 are less than 0.10. Therefore, the Board size affects positively ROE and Tobin‟s Q and does not affect ROA in Vietnam. In fact, there are also a set of studies which are relevant to the investigation between board size and corporate performance. The result of this positive relationship in Vietnamese firms is also consistent with a number of empirical studies in the world. According to the estimated effects, increase of the Board size improves company performance. The result shows that the role of the board of directors has a positive impact on company performance and Hypothesis 3 is accepted. 4.3.4. Firm size Firm size turns out to be related to firm performance because all the statistically significant results for size in model 1, 2 and 3 show that size has a negative and significant effect on the three firm performance measures ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q. The SIZE control variable has negative and significant coefficients (with β = -1.08 and p < 0.10 in model 1; β = -1.41 and p < 0.10 in model 2; β = -0.40 and p < 0.10 in model 3) at conventional level, so that firm size turns out to be negatively related to ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q. Suggesting that larger firms tend to be less efficient, everything else equal. There is a higher probability that the company will have a negative financial 37 result with larger size. Increasing of the size of company (SIZE) is associated with a decrease in the probability of corporate “success”. This result argues that the effect of the company size strongly affects firm performance, i.e. this effect can be considered as important. However, it is also not consistent with the conventional wisdom that larger firms are better diversified and they can thus hold less capital to buffer against losses. It can be said that the significance of firm size indicates that large firms do not earn higher returns compared to smaller firms, presumably as a result of diversification of investment and economies of scale. This result is not consistent with previous findings including Gleason et al. (2000), among others. According to the above result, I reject the hypothesis 4: The firm size is expected to have a positive influence on a firm capital structure. 4.3.5. Industrial business group This finding is similar to the result suggested by Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001) that industry performance is significantly related to company performance in addition to CG variables. Industrial group variable is considered to be important factors effect to the firm performance. In Table 6, only 5 industrial sectors are presented and 1 sector is dropped out because all 6 industrial business groups are dummy variable so that we cannot add all of them in one regression model to avoid multicollinearity issues. Hence, the available industrial variables will be GOODS, HEALTH, SERVICE, FINANCE and MATERIAL. The one disappearing in the regression equation is INDUSTRY sector. Based on the regression results, firms fall into two groups which are dependent on the corporate governance significant value: 3 sectors GOODS, HEALTH and MATERIAL will be in group 1 and the remaining 2 sectors SERVICE and FINANCE 38 are in the same group 2. The only different thing between group 1 and 2 is that the significant value because group 1 has a significant impact but group 2 has insignificant relationship so that group 1 affects the firm performance and group 2 is not. We clearly see that all sectors in group 1 are positive impact on firm performance because the probability is less than 0.10 but the HEALTH has negative impact on ROE. It should be noted that MATERIAL sector only has positive and significant relationship with Tobin‟s Q (not with ROA and ROE). The positive and significant impacts of these industrial dummy variables in group 1 indicate that a higher level of investment in these sectors could be associated with a higher ratio of ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q. It also shows that the GOODS, HEALTH and MATERIAL sectors is profitable, and the Vietnamese economy depends to some extend on GOODS, HEALTH and MATERIAL as a source of income. The coefficients are positive or negative; depending on the relative performance between the industries, investing in these sectors may be profitable. In the recent years, the economy and society of Vietnam has attained more important achievement. The human life has greatly improved and enhanced. Especially, the HEALTH industry has a good performance in the fields of prevention of disease, medical examination and cure. In general, the health industry has achieved many targets such as the age, nutritional standard, health, etc. All the above reasons are explained clearly for development and positive performance of HEALTH industry in the Table 6. Per capita income of Vietnam is more and more improved. It boosts development of the goods industry which is the solid growth resource regardless of economic crisis in the world. In 2012, AC Nielsen has ranked Vietnam is the country which has the fastest speed of growth in the field of goods in the Asian (Vietnam 23%, India 18%, 39 and China 13). Vietnam has 3rd population in the ASEAN. About 70% of population is in the labor age (15 to 60 years). Therefore, consumer needs are continuously expected and extended in next 30 years. All of them are reasons for good performance in goods industry and that is the reason why GOODS sector has positive impact on firm performance. The reason for the insignificant of group 2 because the significant level is greater than 0.10 that the reason why SERVICE and FINANCE are not related to firm performance. The negative sign for some industries could be as a result of the negative equity value for some firms included in the analysis as a result of distress. Hence, three sectors in group 1 showed a better level of performance than two sectors in group 2. Through the Table 6, we conclude that each industry sector has different effect on firm performance. The hypothesis 5 state that industrial business group has positive associated with firm performance. So that hypothesis 5 is accepted. 4.3.6. Business group affiliation and firm performance Hypothesis 6 stated that parent companies and their subsidiaries are positively associated with firm performance. In this part, the relation between two variables for the proxy of business group affiliation and firm performance will be considered. By using four OLS models to make the comparison of the firm performance within business groups. The models will be ROA_MO to ROA_SON and ROE_MO to ROE_SON. In addition to make the result to me more consistent, two corporate governance practices of subsidiary companies (such as: board size (BSIZE_SON) and composition of boards of subsidiaries (BCOMP_SON)) will be counted in the regression equation. The joint examination of various corporate governance issues 40 and firm performance will be critical for further scrutiny of the firm performance of group-affiliated companies. Table 7: Regression Result for the relationship of group-affiliation firm performances ROA_SON ROE_SON Constant ROA_MO Prob. -1.905375 0.305645 0 ROE_MO -21.19162 Prob. BCOMP_SON Prob. 0.247838 0.3638 0.048977 0.311 0.977851 0 -0.14139 0.9043 0.33365 0.2911 No. observations R-squared F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.817282 8.147111 2.298126 212 0.705298 4.359155 2.124783 Prob. BSIZE_SON From the result in Table 7, the firm performance of parent companies are positively associated subsidiary companies. Let‟s consider the first comparison between ROA of parent companies to ROA of subsidiary companies. It is found that ROA_MO is significant (p < 0.10) and positive impact on both ROA_SON because the values of β will be 0.3. Moreover, the ROE_MO impacts significantly and positively with firm performance of subsidiaries (with β = 0.97; p < 0.10 for second equation). The Rsquared which ranges from 0.82 to 0.71 is satisfactory in all cases of two measures of firm performance. This indicates that about 71% to 82% of the variation in the firm performance measure ROA and ROE of affiliated companies has been explained by the variation in firm performance measure ROA and ROE of parent companies. Table 7 shows the firm performance between parent company and their subsidiaries within a business group will be similar and related to each other. When the operation process of parent company is good and generates better firm performance, then the firm value 41 of subsidiary companies will be more efficient too. As stated before in chapter 2, hypothesis 6 is not rejected. 4.3.7. Corporate governance culture Table 8: Regression Result for the relationship of corporate governance culture BSIZE_SON BCOMP_SON Constant BSIZE_MO 4.824622 0.045045 0.2921 Prob. 102.0472 BCOMP_MO -0.503239 0 Prob. 212 0.759105 9.394106 2.249355 No. observations R-squared F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.811939 12.87084 2.149769 Analysis of variance was also performed to find the similarity of corporate governance between parent companies and their subsidiary companies (Table 8). Results did not show significant relationship in comparing between BSIZE_SON and BSIZE_MO because the value of probability is high (p = 0.29) and greater than 0.10. But the effect of BCOMP_MO to BCOMP_MO is significant (p = 0 < 0.10) but it has negative relationship because the value of β is a negative number (β = -0.5). Therefore, it is no evidence showing that there is a relationship of corporate governance structure between parent companies and their subsidiaries within business group affiliation. In summary, the hypothesis 7 was rejected. Here is the table 9 summarizes the specific Propositions, Hypotheses and Results and Hypothesis Status. Table 9: Proposition, Hypotheses, Results and Hypotheses status Variable Propositions Hypotheses Results Leadership Structure Positive impact / Positive impact Negative impact Negative impact 42 Hypotheses Status Rejected Board composition Positive impact / Positive impact Negative impact Rejected Positive impact Positive impact Accepted Negative impact Board size Positive impact / Negative impact Firm size Positive impact Positive impact Negative impact Rejected Industrial business Positive impact / Positive impact Positive impact / Accepted group Negative impact Business group Positive impact / affiliation Negative impact Corporate Positive impact / governance culture Negative impact Negative impact Positive impact Positive impact Accepted Positive impact No impact Rejected This study has done an analysis on the corporate governance mechanisms to see their influence on firm performance. Furthermore, there will be comparisons between industrial business group, firm size, business group affiliation and firm performance. The impact of corporate governance culture within group is also tested with this research. Indeed, the study uses Tobin‟s Q, ROA and ROE as performance measures to evaluate the firm performance and the results are tabulated in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. The study finds that there are two negative impact of leadership structure and board composition on firm performance. Board size is the only one of three corporate governance mechanisms that has positive effect on performance. By looking on industrial sectors and business group affiliation, both groups have a significance and positive relationship on ROA, ROE and Tobin‟ Q. In contrast, the last two variables are firm size and corporate governance culture have negative impact so that their hypothesis is not supported. Table 9 will summarize our main results of descriptive statistic to let us have better view about this research. 43 Chapter Five – Conclusions and Recommendations There is no doubt that several studies have been conducted so far (and is still on – going) on the examination of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance measures, but the outcomes of these studies are mixed. This research examines the relationship between the CG practices and performance of Vietnam‟s listed companies, using three CG practices (duality, board composition and size) and three firm performance proxies (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q). The two variables: industrial group performance and CG culture within business group are also tested in this paper. All the analyses are based on the data of top 100 largest companies which are listed on HOSE from 2009 to 2010 for empirical test. Panel data methodology is employed; the method of analysis is multiple regressions and the method of estimation is OLS. The results show CG practice has little impact on the performance of Vietnam‟s companies and suggests that CG practice could not explain the whole company performance. The study reveals the following results: i. There is a negative and significant relationship between the integration of manager and the chairman of the board and Tobin‟s Q and they are not consistent with the hypotheses, inferring that, under the condition that CEOs serve as executives, the board would likely fail to be an objective supervisor, correspondingly putting firms at a disadvantage. Therefore, it can be also concluded that higher profitability for firms in Vietnam is due to the separation of the position of CEO and chairman. This evidence is also supported by Jensen (1986) who suggests that it gives too much power to someone holding two top positions and thereby allows decisions to be based 44 on their personal interest with a consequent drop in firm performance. Based on the agency theory, the separation of manage and chairman not only can help the enterprise avoid a severe crisis, but also make the chairman of the board valuate the manager more objectively. Hence, it is better to separate the two roles in order to make sure that the top leadership of the firms have a proper check and balance as suggested by the agency theory. However, in contrast, this study also found that there is no significant relation between firm performances as measured by ROA and ROE across the board leadership structure as separate and combined leadership in listed firms in Vietnam. Tobin‟s Q measures the market value while ROA and ROE measure accounting profitability. It appears that the market prefer a firm without dual chairman-CEO than that with dual chairman-CEO even though the accounting performance. It implies that there is no significant impact on firm value or decision making when someone holds both the CEO and chairman position. ii. There is a negative and significant relationship between board composition and firm performance. It implies that firm performance is decreased as outside directors are added to the board. This result suggests that the more independent the board is, the more detrimental firm performance would be. Contrary to claims in the hypothesis, increasing of board independence should be noted with caution the negative relation between board independence and future operating performance. Perhaps, the need for decreasing outside directors when the commitments of inside directors, who know the company very well, will benefit the firm. Based on the recommendation of OECD and ACGA for reducing outside directors, the minimum proportion between outsiders and insiders must be at least one-third of a board. 45 iii. There is a positive and significant premium effect between board size and firm performance. BSIZE is only one of three CG practices is significantly positively correlated with performance and means that larger and diversified firms have a greater number of directors on the board. Moreover, it is implying that, in a large size board, the diversity of directors‟ opinion has a positive impact on making decisions. It is quite understandable that BS has a certain positive relationship with firm performance represented by ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q. There are a number of possible advantages associated with a larger board such as an enlarged provision of valuable advice and networks. A larger board could also favor better decisions since it is likely to be based on diversified competencies and experiences. The mean value of BSIZE is around 6 in four years so that the size is fitted with the recommendation size for Vietnam companies from IFC and State Securities Commission Vietnam, 2006. To maximize the profits, firms should be “efficiently” sized in range from 5 to 10 members in a board. iv. The size of the firm is shown to have effect on the firm performance and firm size is negatively related to company performance, which suggests that firms with greater size tend to be less efficient on firm performance. Size of the firms in all the three models in Table 6 is remained negative to ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q so that firm size is not considered as the function of firm investment opportunity in this case. The negative sign shows that, on average, profitability of Vietnamese companies decrease with a company size. It is also not consistent with the conventional wisdom that larger firms are better diversified and they can thus hold less capital to buffer against losses. It can be said that the significance of firm size indicates that large firms earn 46 higher returns compared to smaller firms, presumably as a result of diversification of investment and economies of scale. This may be because companies may not be able to fully control and monitor the business as the companies become larger in size. Thus, the performance slowly decreases. This result is not consistent with previous findings including Gleason et al. (2000), among others because they found that firm size has a positive and significant impact on firm performance ROA, and Tobin‟s Q, indicating that a firm‟s size is an important determinant of corporate performance. v. We find that the positive association and significant impact of three industrial sectors (GOODS, HEALTH and MATERIAL) on firm value measurements (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q). Specially, firms in GOODS and HEALTH sectors have higher efficiency because health industry has achieved many achievements and Vietnam has 3rd population in the ASEAN, together with more than 70% of population is in the labor age. The negative and significant coefficient of HEALTH variable could be as the result of the negative ROE value for some firms. It also means that natural resource companies in Vietnam less use leverage as source of expanding. vi. Meanwhile, it is also found that there is a positive and significant relationship of firm performance between many firms within groups. Hence, it showed that if parent companies have good firm performance, the performance of subsidiaries firms will increase too. It is easy to understand that because the profits of business group affiliates were higher than otherwise comparable unaffiliated firms. Moreover, group affiliation also provides an easier access to capital, raw materials, and markets for end products of at least some member firms. Besides that, groups generally enjoy a good reputation, and are able to 47 derive benefits through their connections with the government and help the affiliated firms in achieving sustained superior performance, which are not easily available to stand alone firms. Because of these benefits, group affiliation has potential benefits by playing substitution role to fill the institutional voids such as lack of intermediaries in product, labor and capital market. The above analysis points to the various benefits of being a business group member and help us understand the benefits and costs of business group affiliation in emerging economies, especially in Vietnamese market. vii. There is a negative and significant relationship impacts on board composition between parent companies and subsidiaries within groups‟ governncance. One can infer that the negative governance effect of outside directors proves that the governance culture between parent and subsidiaries firm inside groups is not similar and correlated to each other. Or we can infer that when parent companies increase the board independence, there will be a reduction the outsider in board of subsidiaries and this is contrary to the stated hypothesis above. Moreover, the size of boards inside each company within a group has positive impact but insignificant relationship. Notably, the study finds that listed firms within a group will not have same the same model or structure of CG in the context of Vietnam. In general, all the values for the R-squared in this research are high and greater than 61.17% which endorses that more than 61.17% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables of the model. Less than 38.83% variation in the dependent variable remains unexplained by the independent variables of the study. 48 The contribution of this paper is that it extends the research streams from both firms levels and business group levels to examine how effective in firm performance and similar of corporate governance mechanisms between parent and subsidiaries firms within business group in Vietnam. The above findings have important implications for researchers, senior policy makers, and corporate boards: It is plausible that governance factors are not much related to firm value. Based on IFC and the State Securities Commission (SSC) published the Corporate Governance Scorecard Report 2012, the report remarks the current regulations on corporate governance in Vietnam are often insufficiently implemented. The report suggested businesses should further raise their awareness of the importance of good governance practices. In particular, they should focus more on protecting the interests of shareholders and related parties, promote disclosure and ensure responsibility of the board of directors in risk management. Corporate governance is a competitive advantage of a business, said Simon Andrews, IFC regional director for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. He said applying international standards on corporate governance and ensuring accountability and transparency in decision-making will help businesses improve their appeal and cut costs for capital access. This will provide them with an important advantage at a time when the economy has a lot of fierce competition, he added. In summary, the regression analysis finds that there is some and not consistent relationship between current quality of CG practice and the financial measures. We found that better corporate governance mechanism is associated with higher corporate performance. Interestingly enough, six industrial sectors performance is found to be consistently significantly or insignificantly and positively correlated with company performance. This result means that CG practice only have a small impact on 49 performance of companies. Instead, industry performance is of stronger influence on the performance of Vietnam‟s listed companies. 50 References Frick, B. and Bermig, A. (2009), „Board Size, Board Composition and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Germany‟, Working Paper. Hill, C. W. L. and Jones, T. M. (1992), „Stakeholder –Agency Theory‟, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29, pp. 131-154. Hudgin S.C., (2000), Corporate Governance in Banking, The Mc Graw-Hill. IFC, SSC and GCGF, (2011), „Corporate Governance Scorecard Report‟, Pennsylvania Ave. NW,Washington. OECD. (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. OECD Publishing. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 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Composition and Configuration of the Board and Firm Performance in Financial Services Industry in Sri Lanka. McGee, Robert W. (2008). corporate governance in Asia: a comparative study of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Claessens, Stijn and Simeon Djankov, 1999. “Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, 498-513. 53 Appendix 1 Top 100 Listed Companies and Data No. Comp. Year LDS BSIZE COMP ROA 1 5 0.6000 32.88 09 1 5 0.6000 37.56 10 1 VNM 1 5 0.6000 32.01 11 1 7 0.7143 32.99 12 0 5 0.6000 17.49 09 0 5 0.8000 15.42 10 2 GAS 0 6 0.6667 13.86 11 0 5 0.8000 21.61 12 0 7 0.7143 9.7 09 0 6 0.6667 16.22 10 3 MSN 0 7 0.7143 7.21 11 0 7 0.8571 3.49 12 0 6 0.6667 8.84 09 0 6 0.1667 11.4 10 4 VIC 0 9 1.0000 2.66 11 0 10 0.6000 3.44 12 0 9 0.5556 29.13 09 0 8 0.8750 31.43 10 5 DPM 0 7 0.8571 47.41 11 0 5 0.8000 40.23 12 0 8 0.6250 11.29 09 0 7 0.5714 11.59 10 6 HAG 0 7 0.5714 5.24 11 0 7 0.5714 1.23 12 0 9 0.8889 16.02 09 0 9 0.8889 10.73 10 7 HPG 0 9 0.8889 7.63 11 0 12 0.8333 5.44 12 0 11 0.8182 12.87 09 0 11 0.8182 11.14 10 8 FPT 0 11 0.9091 12.34 11 1 7 0.8571 10.57 12 0 5 0.4000 7.76 09 0 7 0.8571 6.53 10 9 PVD 0 7 0.8571 6.43 11 0 7 0.7143 7.7 12 0 6 0.6667 13.29 09 10 KDC 0 6 0.5000 11.31 10 A1 - 1 ROE 41.68 49.53 41.27 41.61 49.92 32.29 25.97 38.71 15.92 29.68 14.89 8.47 50.42 51.78 12.31 18.42 26.3 29.04 43.05 35.11 28.11 28.05 13.28 3.65 28.23 23.89 17.9 12.83 38.52 35.76 35.39 26.32 25.77 18.65 18.67 21.94 21.39 17.05 TobinQ 5.1 4.15 4.43 5.29 1.14 1.39 2.2 2.23 8.3 2.69 1.8 1.95 0.86 0.93 0.72 0.79 2.56 2.19 1.72 1.53 0.49 0.36 0.4 0.38 0.56 0.62 0.52 0.64 0.51 0.58 0.54 0.72 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.44 0.88 1.14 Size 6.93 7.03 7.19 7.29 7.34 7.60 7.66 7.65 6.85 7.32 7.53 7.59 7.16 7.42 7.55 7.75 6.80 6.87 6.97 7.02 7.09 7.28 7.41 7.50 7.01 7.17 7.24 7.28 7.02 7.09 7.17 7.15 7.09 7.17 7.27 7.28 6.63 6.70 11 PPC 12 VCF 13 SSI 14 DHG 15 REE 16 HSG 17 ITA 18 GMD 19 DRC 20 VSH 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 5 5 5 5 7 7 11 11 8 7 7 7 7 8 9 8 5 5 5 5 7 7 5 5 5 4 5 5 9 9 11 11 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 0.4444 0.4444 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.5714 0.4286 0.7273 0.7273 0.7500 0.7143 0.7143 0.7143 0.5714 0.6250 0.4444 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5714 0.5714 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8000 0.6000 0.7778 0.7778 0.8182 0.8182 0.5714 0.4286 0.4286 0.4286 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 A1 - 2 5.04 6.24 7.91 0.04 0.03 4.23 30.82 26.46 27.29 30.57 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 27.43 22.81 21.78 22.22 14.43 8.68 10.01 11.07 18.18 2.32 4.29 6.92 6.37 8.21 0.81 0.35 7.47 3.74 0.09 1.52 56.2 21.22 14.72 15.23 14.79 10.78 10.32 6.96 7.22 9.02 23 0.1 0.12 14.2 34.46 31.48 32.37 35.46 18.39 13.36 1.5 9.04 41.67 33.17 31.22 31.66 18.99 13.51 15.18 16.25 51.4 6.43 12.7 20.07 8.76 12.31 1.26 0.56 13.73 6.42 0.15 2.4 101.6 30.41 24.56 30.49 17 12.88 13.78 9.76 0.98 1.37 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.57 6.7 8.5 7.46 5.4 0.37 0.68 0.93 0.76 1.42 1.19 2.62 2.21 0.47 0.73 0.9 0.73 0.71 0.86 0.66 0.75 0.21 0.26 0.28 5.68 0.3 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.8 1.18 1.17 1.16 1 0.88 0.76 0.76 6.77 6.74 7.07 7.06 7.07 7.08 5.69 5.86 5.91 6.05 6.85 6.94 6.81 6.90 6.18 6.26 6.30 6.38 6.53 6.70 6.72 6.82 6.50 6.67 6.78 6.73 6.86 6.95 6.96 7.00 6.65 6.82 6.84 6.83 5.89 6.03 6.21 6.39 6.41 6.48 6.52 6.53 21 PHR 22 DPR 23 IJC 24 POM 25 BMP 26 HVG 27 CII 28 SBT 29 HCM 30 MPC 31 KBC 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 7 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.6000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.6667 0.8333 1.0000 1.0000 0.8571 0.8571 0.7143 0.7143 0.5000 0.5000 0.4000 0.4000 0.8000 0.8571 A1 - 3 10.65 16.68 8.96 6.42 18.4 26.97 39.09 20.56 9.56 8.43 7.58 4.08 13.13 9.63 4.95 0.05 35.95 30.48 27.42 27.85 9.94 4.77 7.15 4.11 13.99 12.48 3.63 7.16 11.63 18.16 25.95 14.98 15.59 7.9 7.55 8.46 10.66 10.01 5.39 0.27 8.98 10.94 33.68 40.63 19.46 12.69 27.22 37.62 51.16 26.39 15.63 28.95 16.14 5.96 40.01 27.36 14.24 0.17 42.88 35.99 30.97 31.03 20.06 12.37 21.37 12.21 31.71 28.87 11.85 30.96 13.57 20.08 30.86 21.21 19.37 11.62 10.75 11.76 23.59 25.25 19.15 1.18 19.96 28.59 1.36 1.1 0.82 0.82 1.79 1.43 0.97 0.85 0.48 0.12 0.55 0.63 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.27 2.81 2.37 1.99 1.63 0.49 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.4 0.43 0.31 0.36 1.16 1.09 0.93 0.81 0.41 0.52 0.83 0.7 0.9 0.51 0.32 0.32 0.17 0.19 6.27 6.36 6.49 6.49 6.10 6.22 6.39 6.45 6.02 6.60 6.64 6.66 6.78 6.88 6.94 6.94 5.92 5.99 6.07 6.15 6.58 6.73 6.80 6.81 6.40 6.55 6.70 6.82 6.27 6.29 6.36 6.42 6.32 6.40 6.42 6.51 6.35 6.59 6.80 6.80 6.93 7.06 32 PNJ 33 CSM 34 DIG 35 TRA 36 SJS 37 TRC 38 PDR 39 CTD 40 DVP 41 VHC 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 7 5 5 5 5 0.8571 0.8000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4286 0.5714 0.5000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.4000 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.1667 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 1.0000 0.8000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.5000 0.7143 0.6667 0.7143 0.7143 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 A1 - 4 0.31 0.81 -3.67 -10.38 11.03 21.47 9.44 20.8 9.54 23.62 9.3 21.45 25.13 70.26 12.02 22.9 2.9 6.07 15.07 32.02 18.23 38.96 11.47 19.03 2.82 5.28 0.49 1 13.34 19.58 13.45 21.61 12.51 23.67 12.88 27.33 30.73 48.56 12.24 23.24 -1.74 -4.11 -5.74 -17.98 22.5 28.83 29.75 39.35 40.78 54.38 23.13 28.2 4.1 10.45 8.69 21.68 0.16 0.45 0.1 0.35 15.58 22.88 12.68 20.31 9.43 15.6 7.2 12.43 21.4 33 29.34 40.88 25.2 36.13 25.27 37.9 14.15 37.05 12.82 26.97 18.65 36.19 7.68 16.36 0.18 0.18 0.54 0.66 0.56 0.78 0.69 1.14 0.89 1.02 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.3 3.31 2.78 1.94 1.67 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.32 1.92 1.41 1.02 1.01 0.4 0.4 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.55 0.47 0.42 3.02 2.71 1.99 1.72 0.58 0.69 0.52 0.41 7.08 7.07 6.31 6.39 6.47 6.41 6.07 6.07 6.18 6.27 6.56 6.63 6.68 6.71 5.61 5.76 5.92 5.99 6.48 6.65 6.70 6.74 5.90 6.02 6.17 6.17 6.57 6.58 6.67 6.71 6.25 6.30 6.39 6.56 5.66 5.70 5.84 5.90 6.18 6.26 6.38 6.49 42 PGD 43 PET 44 BCI 45 VNS 46 ELC 47 PVT 48 VSC 49 HT1 50 SAM 51 TDC 52 ALP 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 7 9 8 8 8 7 9 9 9 7 9 7 7 5 5 5 5 7 7 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.4000 0.4000 0.5714 0.4286 0.5714 0.5714 0.5714 0.5714 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5714 0.5556 0.5000 0.6250 0.6250 0.5714 0.6667 0.4444 0.4444 0.8571 0.8889 0.8571 0.8571 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.2857 0.4286 A1 - 5 28.41 24.9 22.45 12.07 4.91 4.99 6.72 4.48 7.55 8.22 2.02 4.4 9.54 11.69 7.5 8.47 15.98 18.45 9.98 11.17 0.14 1.06 0.32 1.37 28.57 24.64 22.89 23.92 2.49 0.63 -0.07 0.07 9.37 4.47 -6.98 3.91 7.56 6.92 8.63 5.18 3.82 5 41.49 35.23 38.06 24.34 17.71 20.27 24.65 15.31 18.29 19.36 4.75 9.81 17.23 23.43 15.88 16.88 56.75 45.36 19.96 18.36 0.8 3.97 1.1 4.49 43.07 36.99 32.28 32.65 14.98 4.03 -0.5 0.5 9.92 4.82 -7.85 4.62 33.07 29.51 23.65 13.07 6.19 9.88 1.28 1.3 0.74 0.62 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.3 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.54 0.61 0.6 0.6 0.46 0.66 0.67 1.02 0.1 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.77 0.61 1.16 0.95 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.35 0.19 0.11 0.35 0.29 0.16 0.12 5.88 5.99 6.24 6.31 6.49 6.64 6.61 6.63 6.48 6.59 6.63 6.55 6.12 6.25 6.25 6.25 5.84 6.06 6.06 5.97 6.81 6.89 6.90 6.90 5.81 5.91 5.93 6.02 6.86 7.07 7.11 7.12 6.43 6.42 6.42 6.44 6.00 6.23 6.43 6.54 6.08 6.19 53 TMP 54 TBC 55 OPC 56 QCG 57 HRC 58 NTL 59 BTP 60 TAC 61 NSC 62 VFG 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 0.5000 0.5714 0.8000 0.8000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5714 0.5714 0.6667 0.6667 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 1.0000 0.6667 0.6000 0.8000 0.4286 0.4286 0.5714 0.5000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 A1 - 6 1.14 2.25 -5.76 -10.29 11.33 21.39 1.68 2.89 5.64 9.37 10.5 17.15 15.13 16.44 6.23 6.88 8.85 9.56 14.54 15.2 15.39 19.44 12.85 17.91 11.63 16.82 11.55 17.25 5.17 18.04 6.91 17.45 -0.75 -1.75 0.13 0.34 15.91 18.98 20.28 24.42 22.83 29.55 13.91 18.88 36.77 96.17 34.88 77.64 4.58 10.98 3.79 8.3 2.5 6.19 1.08 2.7 3.07 7.23 6.43 14.61 3.46 7.65 11.02 26.45 2.55 6.99 6.28 17.48 14.82 21.01 15.72 22.86 18.46 29.27 20.54 32.2 17.04 29.33 13.96 23.1 13.83 26.72 8.11 17.12 0.18 0.23 0.62 0.7 0.69 0.63 1.01 1 1.03 0.94 1.49 1.43 1.83 1.81 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.14 1.93 1.67 1.35 1.28 0.19 0.2 0.41 0.5 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.38 1.12 0.76 0.7 0.72 2.45 1.98 1.69 1.95 0.65 0.71 0.62 0.58 6.19 6.54 6.17 6.12 6.12 6.17 5.94 5.94 5.93 5.96 5.59 5.60 5.67 5.70 6.42 6.71 6.74 6.80 5.64 5.70 5.79 5.82 6.07 6.33 6.31 6.23 6.32 6.32 6.30 6.34 5.81 5.98 6.01 6.00 5.39 5.48 5.56 5.59 5.81 5.85 6.04 6.06 63 BMC 64 HBC 65 DTL 66 AGD 67 DQC 68 LSS 69 CNG 70 LIX 71 TLG 72 SJD 73 HDG 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 7 7 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.2000 0.5000 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.4286 0.5000 0.5000 0.6667 1.0000 1.0000 0.8000 0.8000 1.0000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8571 0.7143 A1 - 7 15.25 14.47 42.79 32.69 3.87 8.57 5.73 3.36 11.28 10.91 8.6 0.71 7.51 11.14 23.12 9.93 0.26 2.6 2.21 2.76 16.98 23.51 21.98 1.48 9.02 39.48 38.21 17.75 41.49 22.26 17.1 13.84 10.27 10.5 9.46 10.47 10.12 6.74 8.82 15.33 21.76 20.29 17.69 19.28 59.16 44.12 8.65 22.33 21.49 17.69 24.68 25.77 20.95 1.77 18.27 28.69 57.92 18.98 0.6 5.87 5.06 6.27 24.92 31.95 32.11 2.72 18.21 68.73 65.53 30.7 65.72 33.24 26.87 22.78 17.04 18.88 18.52 19.45 26.94 14.46 16.76 25.61 69.46 53.8 3.53 3.18 2.09 3.03 0.19 0.14 0.1 0.15 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.34 1.84 1.22 1.25 1 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.24 1.12 1 0.83 0.99 0.51 0.62 0.6 0.58 0.78 0.63 0.57 0.68 0.45 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.13 0.16 5.18 5.23 5.41 5.43 6.13 6.28 6.52 6.66 6.17 6.29 6.26 6.28 5.48 5.66 5.83 6.11 6.21 6.24 6.26 6.23 6.00 6.19 6.34 6.43 5.24 5.56 5.85 5.79 5.47 5.54 5.61 5.66 5.78 5.88 5.98 5.98 6.03 6.01 6.00 6.01 6.08 6.17 74 SSC 75 EVE 76 ABT 77 IMP 78 TMS 79 DMC 80 VIS 81 BHS 82 ITC 83 DSN 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 5 7 8 8 7 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 7 7 6 5 6 5 5 7 7 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 5 7 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 0.7143 0.4286 0.7143 0.7143 0.7143 0.6000 0.5714 0.6250 0.6250 0.5714 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5714 0.8571 0.8333 0.8000 0.8333 0.6000 0.6000 0.7143 0.7143 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.7000 0.7000 1.0000 0.5714 0.5000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 A1 - 8 7.26 1.35 25.16 20.21 20.06 18.43 26.46 18.82 19.85 8.55 19.7 16.49 18.48 15.92 9.9 10.86 9.83 9.19 10.93 8.66 7.12 11.98 11.54 11.21 10.01 10.72 17.89 7 1.83 -0.86 16.19 15.36 12.82 7.03 3.58 7.08 -4.96 0.26 26.2 35.16 41.59 39.56 17.48 3.51 32.26 26.17 26.59 27.49 34.54 22.51 23.86 10.59 23.21 21.22 23.85 20.38 12.41 14.21 11.96 10.91 13.96 12.37 10.08 15.91 15.62 15.79 14.28 15.75 63.64 21.64 4.93 -3.01 31.61 31.53 28.17 21.26 8.6 12.38 -7.31 0.39 27.64 38.18 45.35 42.35 0.29 0.33 1.78 2.37 1.93 1.43 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.62 0.81 0.87 1.09 1.02 0.51 0.49 0.58 0.62 0.53 0.53 0.7 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.67 0.68 0.11 0.2 0.26 0.2 0.35 0.3 0.39 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.2 0.2 5.1 4 3.09 2.75 6.21 6.26 5.37 5.42 5.50 5.63 5.62 5.83 5.93 5.95 5.73 5.78 5.68 5.71 5.86 5.88 5.92 5.94 5.66 5.78 5.79 5.88 5.85 5.88 5.92 5.93 6.18 6.22 6.12 6.45 5.95 6.01 6.11 6.32 6.47 6.44 6.44 6.43 4.98 5.07 5.19 5.24 84 FDC 85 KHP 86 PAC 87 VTF 88 SPM 89 PGC 90 VIP 91 ANV 92 RAL 93 TTP 94 TIX 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 5 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.8000 0.5714 0.5714 0.5714 0.7143 0.6667 0.6667 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5000 0.4000 A1 - 9 6.9 21.53 9.17 24.9 3.77 8.04 4.46 7.68 6.11 20.5 9.32 23.76 7.09 14.72 10.66 21.21 25.13 40.69 14.69 29.05 8.46 18.8 5.5 11.88 8.04 20.49 7.06 17.11 20.05 44.88 13.65 27.46 13.78 28.24 17.94 31.06 5.88 10 6 10.39 7.28 12.19 4.32 8.74 2.64 5.56 5.74 12.92 2.8 6.4 3.5 9.19 2.49 6.28 2.65 6.29 -7.6 -12.14 3.47 4.98 3.59 5.09 1.49 2.39 4.37 9.96 3.31 8.45 4.67 13.47 5.08 15.75 16.42 19.14 14.32 17.82 10.05 12.81 6.19 7.76 6.32 16.65 6.84 16.18 0.4 0.42 0.64 0.65 0.29 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.64 0.47 0.48 0.39 0.66 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.24 0.2 0.26 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.2 0.18 0.38 0.36 0.3 0.27 0.74 0.61 0.62 0.6 0.21 0.19 5.89 5.90 5.83 5.82 5.93 6.03 6.00 6.03 5.83 6.04 6.07 6.06 5.81 5.94 5.94 6.11 5.68 5.99 6.02 6.05 6.00 6.09 6.06 6.18 6.35 6.34 6.33 6.29 6.33 6.29 6.33 6.39 6.02 6.07 6.15 6.19 5.73 5.82 5.81 5.83 6.01 6.07 95 TCL 96 SMC 97 TDH 98 COM 99 NNC 100 HDC 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 5 7 7 7 8 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 0.4000 0.4000 1.0000 0.5000 0.5000 0.7143 0.6000 0.8571 0.8571 0.8571 0.8750 A1 - 10 10.83 4.95 23.34 18.16 12.09 8 6.26 4.05 2.99 3.04 18.02 11.93 1.94 1.46 15.79 7.9 7.29 4.65 59.8 48.83 46.1 34.78 11.47 10.63 7.01 3.23 23.57 9.42 33.18 30.37 24.5 17.07 25.38 19.1 13 11.88 26.18 18.95 3.31 2.47 19.85 10.5 9.31 6.86 73.23 62.03 60.74 46.16 47.32 29.64 15.99 7.3 0.39 0.44 0.77 0.62 0.47 0.53 0.15 0.16 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.2 0.24 0.28 0.52 0.85 0.88 0.65 2.59 2.61 1.85 1.9 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.31 6.06 6.00 5.65 5.79 5.96 5.91 6.19 6.39 6.38 6.33 6.26 6.37 6.36 6.35 5.67 5.67 5.65 5.78 5.21 5.20 5.35 5.34 5.89 6.05 6.10 6.11 Appendix 2 Six Industrial Groups and Subsidiaries’ Companies No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Comp. Goods Finance Health Industry Service Material 0 0 0 0 0 VNM 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 GAS 0 0 0 0 0 MSN 1 0 0 0 0 0 VIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 DPM 1 0 0 0 0 0 HAG 1 0 0 0 0 0 HPG 1 0 0 0 0 0 FPT 1 0 0 0 0 0 PVD 1 0 0 0 0 0 KDC 1 0 0 0 0 0 PPC 1 0 0 0 0 0 VCF 1 0 0 0 0 0 SSI 1 0 0 0 0 0 DHG 1 0 0 0 0 0 REE 1 0 0 0 0 0 HSG 1 0 0 0 0 0 ITA 1 0 0 0 0 0 GMD 1 0 0 0 0 0 DRC 1 0 0 0 0 0 VSH 1 0 0 0 0 0 PHR 1 0 0 0 0 0 DPR 1 0 0 0 0 0 IJC 1 0 0 0 0 0 POM 1 0 0 0 0 0 BMP 1 0 0 0 0 0 HVG 1 0 0 0 0 0 CII 1 0 0 0 0 0 SBT 1 0 0 0 0 0 HCM 1 0 0 0 0 0 MPC 1 0 0 0 0 0 KBC 1 0 0 0 0 0 PNJ 1 0 0 0 0 0 CSM 1 0 0 0 0 0 DIG 1 0 0 0 0 0 TRA 1 0 0 0 0 0 SJS 1 0 0 0 0 0 TRC 1 0 0 0 0 0 PDR 1 A2 - 1 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 CTD DVP VHC PGD PET BCI VNS ELC PVT VSC HT1 SAM TDC ALP TMP TBC OPC QCG HRC NTL BTP TAC NSC VFG BMC HBC DTL AGD DQC LSS CNG LIX TLG SJD HDG SSC EVE ABT IMP TMS DMC VIS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 A2 - 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 BHS ITC DSN FDC KHP PAC VTF SPM PGC VIP ANV RAL TTP TIX TCL SMC TDH COM NNC HDC Total 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 A2 - 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 23 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 Appendix 3 Business Group Affiliation Companies and Data Group No. Mo Son 1 PGD 2 GSP 3 PGS 1 GAS 4 PVG 5 PCG 6 PCT 7 2 NSC SSI 8 SSC 9 ABT 09 10 11 12 09 10 ROA (Mo) 17.49 15.42 13.86 21.61 17.49 15.42 ROA (Son) 28.41 24.90 22.45 12.07 15.20 9.46 ROE (Mo) 49.92 32.29 25.97 38.71 49.92 32.29 ROE (Son) 41.49 35.23 38.06 24.34 16.57 13.22 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 13.86 21.61 17.49 15.42 13.86 21.61 17.49 15.42 13.86 7.06 7.48 3.89 12.14 8.28 4.88 2.87 3.02 10.20 25.97 38.71 49.92 32.29 25.97 38.71 49.92 32.29 25.97 11.90 11.98 22.32 82.94 43.83 19.55 8.80 11.33 38.26 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 21.61 17.49 15.42 13.86 21.61 17.49 15.42 13.86 1.99 5.11 2.79 1.97 1.63 1.38 1.51 0.68 38.71 49.92 32.29 25.97 38.71 49.92 32.29 25.97 6.54 7.05 4.41 3.13 2.73 1.85 2.10 0.98 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 12 09 21.61 12.66 2.20 14.82 38.71 18.39 3.18 21.01 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 8.68 1.03 6.41 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 12.66 8.68 15.72 18.46 20.54 25.16 20.21 20.06 18.43 19.70 16.49 13.36 1.50 9.04 18.39 13.36 1.50 9.04 18.39 13.36 22.86 29.27 32.20 32.26 26.17 26.59 27.49 23.21 21.22 Year A3 - 1 BSIZE BSIZE (Mo) (Son) 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 COMP (Mo) 60.00 80.00 66.67 80.00 60.00 80.00 COMP (Son) 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 66.67 80.00 60.00 80.00 66.67 80.00 60.00 80.00 66.67 60.00 60.00 60.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 80.00 60.00 80.00 66.67 80.00 60.00 80.00 66.67 60.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 5 8 6 7 80.00 75.00 83.33 42.86 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 5 5 5 71.43 71.43 71.43 75.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 75.00 71.43 42.86 57.14 50.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 60.00 80.00 80.00 10 HVG 11 PAN 12 GIL 13 ELC 14 TMS 15 3 HLA BVS 16 TLG 17 4 TMP REE 18 TBC 11 1.03 18.48 1.50 23.85 7 5 71.43 80.00 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 6.41 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 15.92 9.94 4.77 7.15 4.11 15.38 7.54 4.40 24.43 9.04 18.39 13.36 1.50 9.04 18.39 13.36 1.50 9.04 20.38 20.06 12.37 21.37 12.21 17.20 8.58 5.06 27.90 7 8 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 71.43 75.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 75.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 80.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 75.00 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 12.66 8.68 1.03 6.41 12.66 8.68 13.81 7.43 10.24 4.35 15.98 18.45 9.98 11.17 10.93 8.66 18.39 13.36 1.50 9.04 18.39 13.36 1.50 9.04 18.39 13.36 17.15 10.41 19.31 11.28 56.75 45.36 19.96 18.36 13.96 12.37 8 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 8 7 6 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 75.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 75.00 71.43 71.43 71.43 75.00 71.43 66.67 40.00 66.67 71.43 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14 85.71 83.33 11 1.03 7.12 1.50 10.08 7 5 71.43 80.00 12 09 6.41 10.86 11.98 5.35 9.04 15.11 15.91 25.89 7 4 6 5 71.43 100.00 83.33 40.00 10 11 12 09 10 11 -5.46 -6.70 5.35 10.86 -5.46 -6.70 0.81 -0.68 1.90 10.27 10.50 9.46 -7.77 -9.08 7.11 15.11 -7.77 -9.08 4.07 -3.67 10.30 17.04 18.88 18.52 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 12 5.35 10.47 7.11 19.45 5 4 80.00 100.00 09 14.43 11.33 18.99 21.39 5 5 60.00 80.00 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 8.68 10.01 11.07 14.43 8.68 10.01 11.07 1.68 5.64 10.50 15.13 6.23 8.85 14.54 13.51 15.18 16.25 18.99 13.51 15.18 16.25 2.89 9.37 17.15 16.44 6.88 9.56 15.20 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 A3 - 2 19 NBP 20 5 LGC CII 21 6 SII 22 DC2 23 DIH 24 DIG DIC 25 DC4 26 DID 27 7 SVS SJS 28 SJM 09 14.43 22.45 18.99 33.05 5 5 60.00 60.00 10 11 8.68 10.01 26.75 12.29 13.51 15.18 37.67 18.50 5 5 5 5 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 12 09 11.07 13.99 8.24 7.63 16.25 31.71 13.59 19.69 5 7 4 5 60.00 85.71 50.00 60.00 10 11 12 09 10 12.48 3.63 7.16 13.99 12.48 9.39 1.37 0.21 1.66 7.21 28.87 11.85 30.96 31.71 28.87 24.30 3.38 0.52 3.41 13.10 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 3 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 33.33 11 3.63 1.29 11.85 2.48 7 5 85.71 60.00 12 09 7.16 18.23 12.39 11.74 30.96 38.96 22.77 35.62 7 5 5 5 85.71 40.00 60.00 60.00 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 11.47 19.03 6 6 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 33.33 5.28 1.00 38.96 19.03 5.28 1.00 21.40 9.95 1.84 29.94 26.79 23.45 22.28 6 2.82 0.49 18.23 11.47 2.82 0.49 7.23 3.58 0.64 5.16 6.26 6.50 5.75 33.33 33.33 40.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 60.00 60.00 60.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 18.23 11.47 2.82 0.49 18.23 11.47 2.82 0.49 18.23 11.47 4.99 5.72 2.74 1.06 6.50 5.46 3.73 3.29 3.43 9.79 38.96 19.03 5.28 1.00 38.96 19.03 5.28 1.00 38.96 19.03 16.62 17.56 8.03 3.25 23.61 18.06 10.88 9.72 8.53 20.28 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 7 7 40.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 40.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 40.00 33.33 57.14 66.67 66.67 60.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 75.00 85.71 85.71 11 2.82 5.40 5.28 10.77 6 7 33.33 85.71 12 09 0.49 30.73 0.77 14.54 1.00 48.56 1.66 23.18 6 5 7 7 33.33 80.00 85.71 100.00 10 11 12 09 10 12.24 -6.93 -1.74 -19.80 -5.74 -25.63 30.73 5.19 12.24 0.06 23.24 -4.11 -11.41 -24.15 -28.40 16.74 0.16 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 80.00 100.00 100.00 83.33 80.00 80.00 60.00 -17.98 48.56 23.24 A3 - 3 5 5 5 80.00 80.00 80.00 29 VSI 30 9 GSP PVT 31 PCT 32 10 NSP SAM 33 SMT 34 VC1 35 VC2 11 VCG 36 VC3 37 VC5 11 -1.74 -4.98 -4.11 -13.21 5 5 100.00 60.00 12 09 10 11 -5.74 30.73 12.24 -1.74 -6.60 3.39 2.70 4.00 -17.98 48.56 23.24 -4.11 -21.14 14.81 12.18 18.33 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 12 09 -5.74 0.14 1.07 15.20 -17.98 0.80 4.80 16.57 5 5 5 5 80.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 10 11 12 1.06 0.32 1.37 9.46 7.06 7.48 3.97 1.10 4.49 13.22 11.90 11.98 5 5 7 5 5 5 60.00 60.00 57.14 60.00 60.00 60.00 09 10 11 0.14 1.06 0.32 1.38 1.51 0.68 0.80 3.97 1.10 1.85 2.10 0.98 5 5 5 5 5 5 60.00 60.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 12 2.20 3 57.14 85.71 83.33 -3.08 7 7 6 -2.72 4.49 9.92 3.18 09 1.37 9.37 100.00 10 11 12 09 10 4.47 -6.98 3.91 9.37 4.47 -5.34 -11.16 -13.17 11.21 10.05 4.82 -7.85 4.62 9.92 4.82 -6.27 -12.59 -13.46 14.12 13.83 9 7 7 7 9 3 3 3 5 5 88.89 85.71 85.71 85.71 88.89 100.00 100.00 100.00 60.00 60.00 11 -6.98 1.71 -7.85 2.44 7 5 85.71 60.00 12 09 3.91 0.02 10.48 4.92 4.62 0.26 15.01 18.93 7 9 5 5 85.71 88.89 60.00 40.00 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 8.14 7.51 3.87 6.30 4.28 1.92 1.56 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 30.78 25.91 12.02 20.96 18.60 10.88 8.60 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 50.00 80.00 80.00 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 2.82 5.38 3.74 1.40 3.71 2.28 1.70 1.05 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 A3 - 4 16.37 34.61 24.11 9.14 20.70 13.73 12.08 7.76 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 40.00 40.00 60.00 75.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 38 VC7 39 VC9 40 V11 41 V12 42 V15 43 VCC 44 VMC 45 VCT 46 XMC 47 VCR 09 0.02 3.65 0.26 13.59 9 5 88.89 40.00 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 4.32 0.70 0.92 2.19 1.95 1.20 1.25 1.89 1.01 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 18.49 3.18 4.53 17.29 18.02 10.97 9.97 12.58 7.29 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 40.00 50.00 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 -4.23 -1.58 2.27 1.93 1.53 1.83 3.56 5.88 2.44 -3.22 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 -30.39 -10.98 20.77 18.03 12.97 13.00 18.27 19.91 6.57 -9.26 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 75.00 100.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 09 10 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 3.62 3.47 3.18 3.41 3.69 3.56 2.30 1.05 6.96 4.80 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 15.46 17.48 16.39 17.58 24.94 19.74 11.90 5.20 29.56 24.35 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 20.00 20.00 11 12 09 10 11 12 09 10 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.67 3.45 -4.14 5.32 5.01 1.23 -0.50 7.26 11.39 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 1.98 0.26 6.08 20.41 -28.29 22.47 25.27 6.69 -3.08 8.25 18.18 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 66.67 88.89 88.89 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 83.33 83.33 A3 - 5 48 VCV 49 12 PSP PVS 50 PSB 51 13 52 53 PVA PVX PSG SDP 11 0.33 1.27 2.83 2.57 9 6 77.78 83.33 12 09 10 11 0.30 0.02 0.67 0.33 -4.84 1.41 0.76 -2.47 1.98 0.26 6.08 2.83 -11.41 3.75 2.02 -5.97 9 9 9 9 6 5 5 5 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 83.33 80.00 80.00 80.00 12 09 0.30 6.24 -18.57 -1.61 1.98 21.65 -52.61 -2.84 9 7 4 4 66.67 85.71 75.00 75.00 10 11 12 6.14 6.91 5.00 1.62 -4.19 0.18 25.94 30.06 18.40 3.63 -9.06 0.36 7 7 7 5 5 5 85.71 85.71 85.71 80.00 80.00 80.00 09 10 11 6.24 6.14 6.91 3.11 3.33 3.05 21.65 25.94 30.06 3.72 4.56 4.45 7 7 7 5 5 6 85.71 85.71 85.71 80.00 80.00 83.33 12 0.84 5 85.71 80.00 80.00 29.34 7 5 5 6.75 18.40 12.32 1.22 09 5.00 4.38 10 11 12 09 10 6.46 -0.13 -7.49 4.38 6.46 4.72 -0.10 -7.81 2.03 4.01 25.08 -0.67 -47.77 12.32 25.08 38.58 -1.01 -80.00 7.46 12.39 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 40.00 80.00 60.00 11 12 09 10 11 -0.13 -7.49 4.38 6.46 -0.13 -6.79 -19.13 1.92 1.69 1.01 -0.67 -47.77 12.32 25.08 -0.67 -27.05 -176.86 15.93 10.96 5.23 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 40.00 12 -7.49 0.81 -47.77 3.98 5 5 80.00 60.00 A3 - 6 60.00 Appendix 4 Estimation results for the relationship of industrial groups and corporate governance on firms’ performances Constant LDS t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP t-Statistic Prob. SIZE t-Statistic Prob. GOODS t-Statistic Prob. HEALTH t-Statistic Prob. SERVICE t-Statistic Prob. FINANCE t-Statistic Prob. MATERIAL t-Statistic Prob. No. observations R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ROA ROE TobinQ 10.20686 0.219532 0.92713 0.3546 0.178968 1.436975 0.1518 -0.007594 -1.326707 0.1857 -1.08753 -1.9891 0.0476 3.722523 2.099061 0.0367 8.384857 6.679213 0 2.318699 0.769786 0.4421 -7.145093 -1.378041 0.1693 -2.228965 -0.510988 0.6097 400 0.830575 0.824712 5.798387 141.6768 0 18.54232 18.60419 20.64263 -0.46906 -0.63378 0.5267 0.221316 2.498306 0.013 -2.483433 -4.638606 0 -1.413491 -3.385351 0.0008 9.180564 2.442181 0.0152 -12.82414 -1.843018 0.0664 8.459987 1.533075 0.1264 1.640793 0.350192 0.7264 2.186704 0.31771 0.7509 400 0.684321 0.673397 10.12915 62.64857 0 31.98119 28.42598 3.186754 -0.019948 -3.68559 0.0003 0.019611 5.541551 0 -0.003096 -12.65583 0 -0.407027 -8.692032 0 0.159192 5.622898 0 0.258025 1.724005 0.0858 -0.160153 -1.344081 0.18 0.01999 0.37458 0.7082 0.245647 14.0803 0 400 0.959832 0.958442 0.405631 690.5755 0 2.527358 2.12204 A4 - 1 Sum squared resid Durbin-Watson stat 9716.552 2.148643 A4 - 2 29651.31 2.048534 47.55104 1.90189 Appendix 5 Regression Result for the relationship of group-affiliation firm performances ROA_SON Constant ROA_MO ROA_SON Constant ROE_MO t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. -1.905375 0.305645 5.922213 0 0.247838 0.912282 0.3638 0.048977 1.018233 0.311 t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. -1.269517 0.154501 7.002724 0 0.324934 1.361694 0.1763 0.035364 0.827265 0.41 No. observations R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.817282 0.716967 4.133076 1742.396 -415.9432 8.147111 0 4.333145 7.768811 5.94897 7.049144 6.395739 2.298126 No. observations R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.829094 0.735263 3.997258 1629.763 -410.6304 8.836038 0 4.333145 7.768811 5.882144 6.982317 6.328912 2.289342 ROE_SON Constant ROA_MO t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. No. observations -23.36144 1.214814 3.932399 0.0002 -0.536204 -0.5079 0.6126 0.40926 1.266673 0.2082 212 ROE_SON Constant ROE_MO t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. No. observations A5 - 1 -21.19162 0.977851 12.31576 0 -0.14139 -0.120515 0.9043 0.33365 1.06111 0.2911 212 R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat 0.611708 0.398529 17.55458 31432.66 -645.9038 2.86945 0.000002 9.200629 22.63513 8.841557 9.94173 9.288325 2.064544 R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat A5 - 2 0.705298 0.543501 15.29336 23856.45 -623.9782 4.359155 0 9.200629 22.63513 8.565764 9.665937 9.012533 2.124783 Appendix 6 Regression Result for the relationship of corporate governance culture ROA_SON Constant ROA_MO ROA_SON Constant ROE_MO t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. -1.905375 0.305645 5.922213 0 0.247838 0.912282 0.3638 0.048977 1.018233 0.311 t-Statistic Prob. BSIZE_SON t-Statistic Prob. BCOMP_SON t-Statistic Prob. -1.269517 0.154501 7.002724 0 0.324934 1.361694 0.1763 0.035364 0.827265 0.41 No. observations R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.817282 0.716967 4.133076 1742.396 -415.9432 8.147111 0 4.333145 7.768811 5.94897 7.049144 6.395739 2.298126 No. observations R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat 212 0.829094 0.735263 3.997258 1629.763 -410.6304 8.836038 0 4.333145 7.768811 5.882144 6.982317 6.328912 2.289342 A6 - 1 [...]... size and firm performance  Dual of CEO and Chairman impacts significantly on Tobin‟s Q 2.3 Determinants of firm performance and corporate governances and hypotheses 2.3.1 Dependent variables Firm performance in the literature is based on the value of the firm There are many measures of firm performance Financial measures of firm performance used in empirical research on corporate governance fit into... Board composition and Board size) on firm performance  Examine whether there is a relationship of corporate governance and firm performance between parent companies and subsidiary companies in some business group Research question:  What are the relationships between corporate governance practices (consisting of leadership, composition and size) and performance of listed firms in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange?...Abstract In this thesis, I examine three corporate governance related issues, namely, the determinants of corporate governance (leadership structure, board composition and board size), the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q), the impact of six industrial sectors on firm performance (HEALTH, SERVICE, GOODS, INDUSTRIAL, FINANCE and INDUSTRY), the firm performance. .. studies in several other countries also find a negative relationship between board size and firm performance Bhagat and Black (1999) found no significant between board independence and firm s performance in a long run in case of US firms Mak and Yuanto (2002) examine the relationship between the size of the board and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia, and find that board size is negative in relation... 2.2.2 Empirical findings from Vietnamese perspective Nguyen Ngoc Thang (2011) examines the effects of corporate governance on firm performance with a sample of top 100 listed Vietnamese companies in 2009 That research found that the corporate governance in Vietnam has little impact on firm performance In 2008, Tung Thanh Dao tested the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance with... analyses of business group affiliation with corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets In August 2011, there is a research about the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in Vietnam, which is measured by obtained survey of corporate governance practices of 100 publicity listed companies on Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) conducted in 2009 The... understand how business group affiliation, within firm governance and business industrial environment affect firm performance in emerging economies 1.2 Research objective The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and group-affiliation firm performance The objectives are listed below:  Explore the impact of three corporate governance practices (including Board... performance in this study is measured in terms of the profitability and value of a firm 2.3.2 Independent and controlling variables The basis of the hypothesis is that the introduction of corporate governance best practices namely the board leadership structure, board composition, board committees and corporate reporting practices, will be reflected in firm performance in Vietnam The monitoring mechanism of. .. logarithm of book values of total assets of the firm Size of a firm can have a significant influence on firm performance and a proxy for firm size is used in almost all studies explaining firm performance A firm s size is expected to have a positive influence on a firm s performance Gleason, among others, found that firm size has a positive and significant effect on firm performance ROA In contrast,... how effective of firm performance between parent and subsidiaries‟ firms inside groups The corporate governance culture (Hypothesis 7) indicates the similarity of corporate governance between parent and their subsidiaries companies within business group 2.3.2.1 Board leadership structure and firm performance The first requirement for each companies in Vietnam to have effective corporate governance is .. .CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN VIETNAM In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In Fianance... board independence and firm s performance in a long run in case of US firms Mak and Yuanto (2002) examine the relationship between the size of the board and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia,... and firm performance in emerging markets In August 2011, there is a research about the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in Vietnam, which is measured by obtained survey of corporate