Chapter Introduction: Toward a Political Elite’s Crafting Model What conditions make democracy possible And what conditions make democracy thrive? Dankwart Rustow1 Democratization is ultimately a matter of Political Crafting Giuseppe Di Palma2 There have been a number of studies that focus on the elite’s dimension of democratization in Europe and in America. This body of literature suggests that the impact of elites, their strategies, and pacts upon democratic change is very significant. Regarding the issue of village elections in China, although there have been some works touching on this issue, comprehensive and systematic studies are lacking, and consequently the issue of rural democratization in China is seriously understudied. Dankwart Rustow’s questions quoted above are meant to remind researchers of China’s political reform and in particular its democratic transition and democratization, of how these conditions have made democratic elections in rural China possible and what conditions should be involved to consolidate these elections and make them more meaningful in terms of democratic change. Then Giuseppe Di Palma’s words are quoted because they point to the crux of rural democratization in China. This thesis will attempt to identify some important dimensions of the political elite’s “crafting” that have Dankwart A Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no.3 (April, 1970): 337. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), 8. contributed to village democracy in rural China, highlighting the key role and the strategies of political elites at different levels in crafting Chinese village democracy. The intentions of this thesis are to demonstrate that the political elites and their crafting are crucial in accounting for the implementation of village elections and self-governance and the process of rural democratization in China. 1.1 Village Elections: the Encouraging Sign in the Quest of Chinese Democracy Before discussing village elections, this study proposes to make a short detour into the history of grassroots power structure in rural China since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The most important consequence of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its nationwide presence in almost all spheres and levels of social life. In the past formal government organization of imperial China ended at the county level; in contrast the PRC government organs reached down to the sub county level of ward and township, and the CCP party organizations extended further down to residents committees in urban areas and villages in rural areas. By the early 1960s, the primary institution of the rural areas, the people’s commune, was fully established and would remain for over 20 years since. Below the commune were the production brigades as the level of management and the production teams as the basic accounting unit. This was the so-called system of “three levels of ownership”. Under this system, the party branch formed the core of village power, the party exercised leadership over the production brigade committee, and at the commune level, the party committee appointed the heads of the two lower organizations. The cadres, in the eyes of villagers, were spokesmen of the higher institutions rather than of the villagers. Viewed in this light, village elections and self-governance meant a definite break with the pattern of electing rural cadres in the Maoist era. In fact, Chinese elites since the Opium War had been trying to democratize China and had made some achievements in developing democracy. Indeed China was the first country in Asia to set up a republican government. Yet, full democracy is still an unrealized dream. That is why the village elections can be viewed as a turning point in China’s politics history that brings to the people a democratic perspective of China. A review of China’s quest for democracy suggests great significance of village elections. “Among the most significant political reforms implemented by the Chinese government since 1989 is the introduction of competitive elections into rural villages”. Village elections represent the first step in the long-term process of China’s democratization. Historically, the PRC had indeed held elections of various sorts. During Mao Zedong’s era, for example, the normal practice for choosing people’s commune leaders would be for the Communist Party to decide on a slate of candidates, one candidate for each open position, and present that slate to the voters for approval or disapproval. Voting would generally be by a public show of hands at a mass meeting.4 The present village elections and self-governance have made a definitive break with the ways for electing rural cadres during the Mao era. If we compare village self-governance with the higher- Anne F. Thurston, “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China,” Untied States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 23 (1998): iii. During Mao Zedong’ era, many production brigades conducted the elections of production team cadres. For example, John P. Burns studied some production team cadres elections conducted in 1958-74. See his “The Election of Production Team Cadres in Rural China: 1958-74,” China Quarterly 74 (June, 1978): 273296. level appointments, it is not difficulty to find that this reform does involve an institutional innovation (see Table 1.1). Table 1.1 A Comparison between Village Self-governance with the Higher-level Appointments5 Type Orientation Ways of mobilizat-ion Candidate behavior Villager Role Source of legitimacy The mass line Higher authority’s role Organizi-ng Selecting Top- down Trying to form ties with leaders Passive Open competiti-on Organizing and judging Electioneering Active Empowered by higher authorities Villagers’ approval Electing Bottom-up Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has quietly promoted, through the establishment of directly elected villager committees (cunmin weiyuanhui), what may be the world’s biggest grassroots democratic education process. The 1998 Organic Law on Villager Committees (VC Law) requires villager committees (VCs) to implement democratic administration and subjects them to fiscal accountability. This law incorporates important democratic elements designed to ensure that the villagers truly have a choice in selecting their leaders, including • Open, direct nominations by individuals rather than groups; • Multiple candidates; • Secret ballots; • The mandatory use of secret voting booths to ensure the integrity of the individual vote; • A public count of the votes; Jin Yuejin, “Cunmin zizhi yu zhongguo tese de minzhu zhi lu” (“Village Self-governance and the Democratic Road with Chinese Characteristics”), Tianjin Journal of Social Science, no.1 (Tianjin: 2002): 43. • Immediate announcement of election results; and • Recall procedures. The process of village democratization is laying a foundation for the development of rule of law among the 900 million Chinese, who live in the countryside by teaching them their rights and responsibilities under the VC Law and by demonstrating the benefits of having the accountable leaders whom they can vote out of office or even, in extreme cases, recall. The essence of village self-governance is that peasants will decide their own affairs. The most significant aspects of the village elections in terms of political changes are: (1) Any adult villager can vote and run for office; (2) Village elections have changed village power structure. Elites and particularly no-governing elites have been offered some opportunities to engage in village politics; (3) Village cadres obtain legitimacy through electoral mandate. As an effective type of China’s grassroots direct democracy, village selfgovernance is the most influential or penetrating area of China’s political system reforms, and also one of the most fruitful achievements. In one sense, this has fundamentally changed the way of empowerment by upper authority. As former U.S. president Jimmy Carter recognized that “from my own observations, the village elections in China have been remarkably successful and popular”, village election “was an important step for China on the eventual path to achieve full democracy”.6 Village self-governance has fixed the new way of producing rural public power: village elections present peasants a voice in the selection of their local leadership, which is a major advance over higher-level Jimmy Carter, “From May 4th Movement to Village Elections: China’s quest for Democracy”, addressed students of Beijing University (8 September, 2003). appointments of village leaders. This institutional arrangement embodies the spirit of modern democracy. 1.2 A Review of Scholarly Studies with a Focus on Political Crafting Scholarly Studies There have been some studies in English and in Chinese on village elections and self-governance in China.7 Out of these studies, Gunter Schubert sums up four research approaches on village elections and self-governance in China8: Examples include Daniel Kelliher, “The Chinese Debate over Village Self-government,” The China Journal 37 (January, 1997); Tong Zhihui, “Cunmin zizhi de yanjiu geju,” (“The Status Quo of Village Selfgovernance Studies”), Journal of Political Science, no.3 (2000); Liu Yawei, “Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China,” China Perspective 31(September-October 2000); Xu Yong, “Jinzhan yu qushi: zhongguo xuezhe dui cunmin zizhi de yanjiu,”(“Progress and Trend: Chinese Scholars’ Studies on Village Self-governance”), A Keynote Speech addressed in the International Symposium on Villager Selfgovernment and Rural Social Development in China (Beijing, China, September 2-5, 2001); Hu Rong, Lixing xuanze yu zhidu shijian : Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju de gean yanjiu (Rational Choice and Implementation of Institution: A Case Study of Chinese Village Committee Elections) ( Shanghai: Yuandong Press, 2001); Xu Zengyang, Wang Guangzhong, and Zheng Baiqiong, “ Cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju huiyi zongshu” (“The Summarization of the Conference on China’s Village Committee Elections”), Journal of Chinese Rural Observation, no.1(2001); and Bjöm Alpermann, “An Assessment of Research on Village Governance in China and Suggestions for Future Applied Research,” Report Prepared for the China-EU Training Programme on Village Governance, Beijing, 14 April, 2003. See Gunter Schubert, “Village Elections in the PRC: A Trojan Horse of Democracy?” Project Discussion Paper no. 19 of Institute for East Asian Studies, Gerhard-Mercator University (2002): 2-18. These four research approaches are similar to those approaches used in studying the third wave of democratization that occurred in South Europe, Latin America, East Europe, and Asia. Since the early of 1970s, some countries, including Spain commenced its transition to democracy, and form part of the third wave of democratisation as described by Huntington. There have been some prevailing theoretical perspectives which try to shed light on the question by Dankwart Rustow who asked in 1970: “What conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make democracy thrive?” The first theoretical perspective attempts to answer the dynamics of democratization by focusing on collective decisions and political interactions. This view is best represented by the four-volume collection under the co-editorship of Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The second perspective on democratisation is inspired by the neo-institutionalism, which began earned some popularity in the political economy literature in the 1980s. The third perspective on democratisation tries to revive the forgotten tradition of political economy by bringing back the classic analysis of the articulation between economic logic and political logic. The fourth and most recent study on democratisation focuses on the political elite. See Chu Yun-han, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (National Policy Research Series No.2, 1992), 2-7. (1) Modernist approach, which focuses on the relationship between electoral implementation and material welfare in the villages; (2) Institutionalist approach, which focuses on the relationship between electoral implementation and the generation of political legitimacy and stability in rural China; (3) Elite approach, which looks at the actors of the electoral implementation process; (4) Political cultural approach, which discusses the relationship between electoral implementation and the rise of villagers’ civil/democratic consciousness. The Main Factors Impacting on Village Elections: Modernist Approach Many scholars stress “structural analysis” as a method to test out the “background conditions” i.e. the prerequisites for democracy. Some scholars interchangeably labeled “structural analysis” as “modernization approach”. Seymour Martin Lipset has been regarded as the most dominating figure; his work set off a wide range of research and (naturally enough) criticism on how well structural factors can explain the breakthrough and the breakdown of democracy. 10 As to village elections in rural China, among these structural factors, some researchers have paid special attention to the relationship between economic development and village elections. Based on a survey conducted in some of Fujian province’s villages with different economic development levels, Hu Rong analyzes the relationship between economic development and village elections, his findings indicate economic development level has a close linkage with village self-governance: economic development can promote Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, “Challenges to Democratic Theory,” in The Challenge of Theories On Democracy: Elaborations over Trends in Transitology, ed. Stenn Ugelvik Larsen (Columbia University Press, 2000), 462. 10 Stenn Ugelvik Larsen, 452. villagers’ participation and is favorable to the implementation of village election institution; the more developed the village economy, the more competitive the elections.11 On the other hand, based on their surveys conducted in Zhejiang province, He Baogang and Lang Youxing have found that there is a strong correlation between economic variables and their impacts on democratic elections but a weak correlation between village elections and their promotion of economic development.12 In Western literature on village elections in China, Kevin O’Brien’s article entitled “Implementing political reform in China’s villages” has often been quoted. He finds that the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee is probably more likely to be successfully implemented in relatively rich villages than in poor ones. O’Brien argues that “my field research and Chinese accounts suggest that up-to-standard village organizations appear disproportionately in wealthier demonstration villages and those with a large number of collective enterprises”. 13 However, based on a fieldwork conducted in a Hebei’s village, Susan Lawrence posits that some relative poor villages lead in village democracy, which opposes to O’Brien’s finding. Lawrence finds that “it was precisely because the villagers were so unmanageable, and performing so poorly economically, that local authorities felt the need to experiment with new forms of village 11 Hu Rong, “Lixing xingdongzhe de xingdong jueze yu cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju zhidu deshishi,” (“Rational Actors’ Action Alternatives and the Implementation of Villagers Committee Electoral Institutions”), Sociological Research, no.2 (Beijing: 2002): 107-108. 12 See He Baogang and Lang Youxing, Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pingheng: Zhejiangshen cunmin xuanju jingyan yanjiu (In Search of a Balance between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Study on the Experiences of Zhejiang Province in Village Elections) (Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press, 2002), 152-180. 13 Kevin O’Brien, “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July, 1994): 47. governance.” 14 Jean C. Oi finds that “high levels of economic development not necessarily bring enthusiasm for implementing democratic reforms.” 15 She states that “there may be an inverse relationship between level of economic development and progress in the implementation of democratic village rule”. 16 Amy Epstein supported Ministry of Civil Affairs’ reports that the village elections at a medium level of economic development have developed “most aggressively and with the most success”17 , which means that there is no linear, but a curvilinear (convex) relationship between economic development and the implementation of village elections in rural China. Shi Tianjian confirmed the assumption that villages in middle-developed level areas are the most likely to have free and fair elections: “the relationship between the speed of economic development and village elections appears to be a convex curve, that is, a higher rate of economic development reduces the likelihood that Chinese village will hold semicompetitive elections in a accelerated manner, that is, the higher the rate of economic development in a county, the less likely that elections in the villages located in that county will be semi-competitive”.18 Later on, Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle modified their statement, focusing on the locus of power, regarding village power as dependent on the 14 Susan V. Lawrence, “Democracy, Chinese Style,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July, 1994): 67. 15 Jean C. Oi, “Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Self-governance,” in China Review 1996, eds. Maurice Brosseau et al (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1996), 137. 16 Ibid., 141. 17 Amy B. Epstein, “Village Elections in China: Experimenting with Democracy,” in Crisis and Reform in China, ed. E. Bliney (New York: Nova Science Publisher, In., 1997), 150-151. 18 Shi Tianjian, “Economic Development and Village Elections in Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 8, no.22 (1999): 436. degree of village industrialization and on the nature of the peasants’ ties to the economy outside the village. They also confirmed Epstein’s assumption.19 However, Xu Yong denies the relevance of economic development level to the competitiveness of village elections. 20 Zheng Yongnian also argues that economic development level is irrelevant to the development of village elections.21 Yet, Shen Yansheng clearly and definitely opposed the village self-government, regarding it as a reactionary phenomenon which is not in line with the whole national modernization progress, the currently typical development model in the world or even the masses’ own willing. This trend refers to the fact that modern nation-states always try to permeate their forces into every corner within their territories, establishing formal administrative agencies. 22 Following the same perspective, Dang Guoyin questions village self-governance, arguing that if some important materials, political and cultural factors are absent in the society, village self-governance cannot lead to democracy, and extended participation will lead to social disorder if the political system lacks proper institutionalization.23 19 Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages,” China Quarterly 162 (June, 2000): 513-539. 20 Xu Yong, “Yingxiang zhongguo cunmin xuanju jingzheng de jiben jinsu,” (“Basic Factors that Influence the Competition of Village Elections in China”), a working paper (1999). 21 Zheng Yongnian, “Difang minzhu, guojia chongjian he zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan mushi,” (Local Democracy, National Building, and the Model of Chinese Political Development: A Realistic Evaluation of Chinese Democratization), Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu (Princeton: Modern China Studies), no.2 (1997): 31. 22 Shen Yansheng, “Cunzheng de xingshuan yu chongjie” (“Rise and Fall and Re-Establishment of Village Administrative”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no. (Beijing, 1998): 1-34. 23 Dang Guoyin, “Cunmin zizhi shi minzhu zhenzhide qidian ma?” (“Is Village Self-governance the Starting Point of Political Democracy?”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no.1 (1999): 8896. 10 reasonable to argue that the term “political elite” is applicable here as a conceptual entity. Similarly, other actors have of course also contributed to village democratic development. 1.3 Research Methods As stated earlier, practically all approaches, including the modernization perspective, institutionalism and the actor-oriented approach, can be grouped into either the structural approach or the process approach. A major concern of Giuseppe Di Palma’s To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions is the process of “democratic crafting” involving “negotiated agreements” between challengers of the old regime and incumbent elites under given conditions. However, he does not specify how the structural circumstances give significance to different techniques of crafting for the ultimate outcome. In view of the separation of structural approach from process approach, some scholars have expressed their intention to combine structural and process accounts of democratization. For example, Karl and Schmitter use “from contingent choice to structural contingency” to try to integrate these two approaches.53 This study attempts to relate structural constraints to process-oriented approach constituting a composite or an integrated analysis framework with its focus on elites’ crafting. However, the integration of these approaches needs a conceptual base, and therefore this study also seeks to lay the base so as to reconcile and transcend the contradictions. 53 Terry L. Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Science Journal, no.128 (1991): 270-71. 20 “Crafting under Structural Circumstances” 54 : Toward a Composite Analysis Framework This framework of course belongs to a process analysis concerned with actors, in particular with their action strategies and choices. First, this study is a historical analysis, dealing with how village self-governance emerged in rural China. Second, this study focuses on the institutional construction, investigating how the political elites at national and local levels craft village democracy by formulating relevant laws, rules and regulations, designing relevant institutions and making policies. Third, this study is a study of village elites, considering on the one hand how and to what extent village election challenges village party branch authority and then changes the legitimacy of village power, and on the other how village elites push village democracy further by campaigning village elections, and by developing new democratic participation mechanisms. However, political crafting is not made in a vacuum. In order to understand political elites’ crafting village elections, the structural contexts must be taken into consideration. This study advances a conceptual framework that recognizes the importance of the structural context. This study puts forward an analysis concept of “crafting under the structural circumstances”. Initially, the concept of “crafting under the structural circumstances” first refers specifically to some structural conditions that enhance or restrict the options available to 54 Jeff Haynes offers the concept of “Structured Contingency”, which is similar to the term, “crafting under Structural Circumstances” used by me, to help understand the democratic transition and consolidation in the developing world. Hayne’s concept of “Structured Contingency” concentrates on that (1) all political systems have structures; and (2) at the same time political outcomes are linked to what individual political actors do. See Jeff Haynes, Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), chapter 2, 18-34. 21 actors engaged in democratic crafting. Political elites may face a variety of practical and political constraints on their ability to implement village self-governance. Political elites not have the ability to craft village elections at will, because structural circumstances constrain their crafting, whereas some structural resources are beneficial to village elections’ crafting. Among the structural contexts, one has to take notice of the politicalinstitution contexts, which demonstrate how crafting village elections take place. For example, under China’s current political system, the Civil Affairs system is limited in terms of its ability to promote village elections, and this limitation is a structural one. Fortunately, the Civil Affairs system cleverly chose some strategies to overcome that limitation. Second, it refers to some structural features of crafting. A concern for political elites’ crafting would draw attention to the political role of different social groups/ types of elites. This study argues that the internal structure and composition of political elites are helpful to our understanding of who the key actors of crafting village democracy are and how they have contributed to democratic development in rural China. In fact, not every political elite has an interest in developing village democracy, and among various government agencies not every agency is in charge of village self-governance affairs. “Crafting under the structural circumstances” means a “division of labor” or functional division among governmental agencies. Specifically, only the civil affairs system and its officials at different levels, as well as township leaders, are key actors of implementing village elections and self-governance. Currently there are five levels at which political elites are in charge of self-governance: national, provincial, county and township, and village’s levels. Meanwhile different administrative political elites play different roles and have different crafting strategies. This means crafting village democracy shares some 22 common features with the administrative structure. Finally the strategic choices to craft village democracy will change as reaction and adaptation to the changing circumstance. Political crafting of new democracies means the creation of favorable conditions for the introduction and enforcement of new rules of the political game. The interaction between political elites’ strategies and the structural circumstances under which the elites work can provide a more dynamic picture of how political elites craft village democracy than can be derived from structural analysis. Therefore, the interaction of resource, strategy, and structure provides a convenient conceptual map for understanding political elites’ crafting of village democracy in China. Within these structures, political elites play a key role in crafting village democracy. The village democracy is a result of the dynamic interaction between the impetus provided by political actors at different levels and the structural circumstances. Research Methods It is very important for a study to employ suitable research methods. The “what” of our research - its substantive conclusion - is very much affected by the “how” - the methods used to gather and analyse data. 55 Case study, interview, and questionnaire surveys will be employed in this study. One of the principal reasons for my decision to use a case study is that the case study method allows me to in-depth research through which I can gain a personal “feel” for what has happened and who has contributed to the village elections and selfgovernance. The case study can generate hypotheses, test existing theories, and throw 55 William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 57. 23 new light into the general pattern and trend, though admittedly the case study is unable to produce a generalised theory, at least not easily. Survey research is an important method of data gathering. “Survey research on political elites, where it is possible, has the advantage of directness, and the accompanying advantage of being able to pursue interesting issues and /or clarify ambiguous responses. Furthermore, survey research enjoys the obvious virtue of being organised around precisely those topics in which the researchers are interested. This is a major advantage over the use of secondary data sources such as biographic directories or printed communications.” 56 Of course, there are some potential difficulties in doing survey research on political elites. One is with the validity of the findings, and another is with the reliability of the method itself. Thus, one scholar suggested that a great deal of care must be exercised in using this technique: “additional methods can be used to gain an understanding of political elites and leadership. These other possibilities include: (1) Interviewing persons close to elites, or whose lives are identifiably influenced by elites (which could well involve interviewing a sample of the general population about their attitudes toward elites); and (2) Carefully examining archival and other documentary materials dealing with elite and leaders.”57 Naturally, each method has its strengths and drawbacks. Thus, a researcher should use the method that is most suited to the topic. 56 Ibid., 56. 57 Ibid., 57. 24 Types of Materials and Data This thesis is based primarily on research projects I have participated in or conducted over the past years. Different sources of materials will be used in this study, including surveys (questionnaires and personal interviews). My own field studies were conducted in October-November 1998, July-August 1999, May-June 2001, June-August 2002, and October- November 2003 in Zhejiang province. I also conducted a few field studies in August 1999 in Sichuan province, in September 2001 in Beijing, in December 2001 in Fuzhou of Fujian province, and in October 2002 in Wuhan of Hubei province. Other materials include academic publications, government documents, political elites’ statement, newspaper reports, etc. The following is a brief description of the research materials and data collected for writing this dissertation. (1) In-depth interviews58 with political elites from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. (2) In-depth interviews with some leaders of Civil Affairs departments in Jilin, Henan, Sichuan, and particularly Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. (3) In-depth interviews with local leaders of city/county and township governments in Wenzhou, Taizhou, Lishui, Shaoxing, Ningbo, and Jinhua of Zhejiang province. (4) In-depth interviews with over a hundred village secretaries, village committee heads, village cadres, and common villagers in Zhejiang province. (5) The quantitative data from the survey conducted in Zhejiang in 1998. Chapters and employ some statistical data, which was procured via questionnaires in October- 58 The author interviewed leaders and cadres at provincial, county, township, village levels, and villagers. Most of the conversations with cadres and villagers took place under informal settings and visited many of the interviewees were visited more than once. 25 November 1998 in Zhejiang with the assistance of a research team from Zhejiang University. The survey involved villages in Wuyun Town of Jingyun County, Lishui, in Chengdong Township of Yuecheng District, Shaoxing City, in Tangxia Town of Reian City, Wenzhou, in Luao Town of Shanmen County, Taizhou, in Shuige Town of Liyun District, Lishui. Three types of questionnaires were distributed to villagers, village heads and township leaders respectively. Around 1,800 questionnaires were distributed to selected average villagers from the voters of 21 villages. Around 1,500 were returned, of which 1,245 were valid. The second questionnaire was sent to selected village committee heads of 111 villages. The third questionnaire was sent to selected township officials, and 115 of those returned were useful. (6) Official documents and reports, including the Excerpts of Grassroots Democratic Political Construction in Rural China from 1993-2001 edited by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of P. R. China and official reports from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. (7) Nearly 70 reports from summer fieldwork conducted by the students of Department of Political Science at Zhejiang University from 1998 to 2000. I organized some students to conduct some investigations on different aspects of village elections between 1998 and 2000. (8) Other supplementary data was draw from secondary literature in English or Chinese related to the topic in this study. 26 1.4 Major Argument and Questions to Address Major Argument The premise of this study is that political elites at different levels are the main political actors in process of rural democratization in China. The central argument of this study is that the development of village elections in China to a great extent has been dependent on political elites at different levels and their crafting. To use Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s words (no state, no democracy)59, we can say “Without political elite/ the insiders of the system and their crafting, without rural democracy in China”. Under the current Chinese political system and with the status quo of rural China, where there are better-formed elites networks and better strategies is also better village elections. Therefore, this study examines political elites’ efforts to craft village elections in rural China, focusing on their roles, attitudes and behaviours, and crafting strategies. The Questions to Address The purpose of this study is to explain why political elites in China were willing to establish villagers’ committee and to explore their roles in the rural democratization process. Seeking how democracy has taken roots in Chinese villages with the common traits of low-income economy and low literacy paralleled the above exploration. Therefore, four closely related questions become the focus of this study. (1)Why did the CCP and Chinese governemnt initiate the democratic elections in rural China? 59 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no.2 (April 1996): 14. 27 (2) Who are the actors among political elites that have crafted village democracy in rural China? This question directs our attention to the types of craftsmen, including which departments those elites come from. It also directs our attention to the attitudes, behaviors and functions of political elites in the process of rural democratization of China. (3) How did political elites craft village elections? A concern with political elites’ crafting, in turn, draws attention to such aspects as leadership strategies, the design of political institution, the political role of different social groups/ types of elites, strategic choices and endeavours, and particularly “elite network” or chain of personal contact which can serve as a mechanism for promoting village democracy in China. (4) How did some local governments and village party branches deal with village selfgovernance and how did the CCP maintain its control of rural areas after implementing village elections and self-governance? 1.5 Concepts Defined This section will give definitions of the major concepts used in this study. These major concepts are “democracy” and “democratization”, “elite” and “political elite”, and “craft”. Democracy Different people have stressed different aspects in their definition of democracy. However, Robert A. Dahl’s work seems to be more helpful in defining democracy. He regarded democracy as a political system, emphasising the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. Dahl further put out eight conditions to 28 measure whether a country is a democratic one. 60 This study defines democracy as follows: democracy is a political rather than social or economic system, covering three main dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. Democracy is a competitive political system in which the people have a choice among the alternatives created by competing political organization and leaders. Moreover, it is necessary to point out that elections alone are not enough to make a democracy, but elections are an essential part of the democratic process, because elections reflect the ways in which citizens are currently able to play a part in politics, national or local. Therefore, in this sense, democracy can be defined simply as the appointment of leaders by voting. In the case of rural China, village elections are the core of village self-governance. Therefore, this thesis uses village democracy, village elections, and village self-governance alternately, in other words, it uses these terms in an indistinctive manner. Democratization Transitions to democracy involve both what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call “democratization” and “liberalization”.61 Democratization refers to the establishment of institutional arrangements --- free competitive elections, universal adult suffrage, freedom of speech, of press, and of political association --- that make possible such an alternation. It is now clear from our democracy terminology that the character of such movement over time is from less accountable to more accountable government, from less competitive (or 60 Robert. A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 3. 61 Cited from Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), footnote 3, 48. 29 non-existent) elections to freer and fairer competitive elections, from severely restricted to better protected civil and political rights, from weak (or non-existent) autonomous associations in civil society to more autonomous and more numerous associations.62 However, democratization that is currently taking place in rural China is a political reform. Although there are other purposes and goals of the implementation of village elections, the core is to decentralise and to regain the legitimate base of the Communist Government from the masses, which has been eroded since the reform and opening to the world, particularly after the collapse of the People’s Commune. Of course, this political reform is “moving in a democratic direction”, and does belong to a type of democratization. Elites According to Tom Bottomore, in the 17th century people used the word “elite” to describe commodities of particular excellence, and then later extended it to refer to superior social groups. Bottomore thinks that this term did not become widely used in social and political writing until late in the 19th century in Europe, or until the 1930s in Britain and America.63 Vilfredo Pareto’s definition for “elite” is often cited by scholars.64 This study makes use of the definition of the term “elite” by G. Lowell Field and Jon Higley. According to them, “Elites are the persons who occupy strategic positions in 62 David Potter et al. eds., Democratisation (Malden, Ma.: Polity Press, 1997), 6. 63 Tom Bottomore, Elite and Society (London: Routledge Press, 1993), 1. 64 Vilfredo Pareto said, “Let us assume that in every branch of human activity each individual is given an index which stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in the various subjects in examinations in school. So let us make a class of the people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and to that class give the name of elite.” Quoted from Anton Steen, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist Countries ----- A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Ashgate publishing Ltd., 1997), 16. 30 public and private bureaucratic organisations”. They listed some organisations such as government, parties, militaries, productive enterprise, trade union, media, religious organisation, educational organisation, and so on.65 However, “Many scholars use synonyms such as leaders, rulers, power groups, power networks, and state actors”. 66 This study favours the term “elite” over other concepts such as ruling class, power group, ruling party, and ruler. Political Elite The concept of political elite has a long history. Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca regarded political elite as a key term in new social science. In their writings, they distinguished political elites from other elites, the latter referring to elites who are less closely associated with the exercise of power, although they may have a considerable social influence. However, Pareto and Mosca substituted the terms “governing elite” and “political class” respectively for political elite. One scholar once argues that “the political elite, in this study, refers to political actors, within and outside of government; including officials, intellectuals and social activists who are connected with public affairs.”67 The scope of this definition is too wide, so it will easily lose its value in explaining democratization. I will thus use political elite in a relatively narrow sense, excluding the political actors outside of the CCP and Governemnt. So, for my study, political elite refers to leaders within “dangzheng jiguan” (party and government institutions) at 65 G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elitism (London; Boston: Routledge & Keban Paul Ltd, 1980), 20. 66 John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 238. 67 Lin Gang, “China’s Long Quest For Democray” (Ph.D. diss., The Pennsylvania State University, 1997): 14. 31 different levels from the central to the local. These elites are governing-elites in Pareto’s term. Here the political elites not mean the leadership of a minority, but rather a large political elites existing throughout the political system. Furthermore, political elites in this study include village party branch secretaries and other important village elites, who are bottom ones in the hierarchy of political elites. Therefore, in a sense, the political elites in China used in this study are elites holding office inside the party-state system. This study in some cases uses the terms leaders, cadres68, or simply elites to refer to political elites. Craft If to craft democracy is similar to the building of architecture, the political elite is the architect of democracy and democratization. The phrase “political crafting” comes from Di Palma’s 1990 book, To Craft Democracy. For Di Palma, there are four aspects of democratization by “crafting”: (1) the quality of the finished product ( the particular democratic rules and institutions that are chosen among the many available)69; (2) the mode of decision making leading to the selection of rules and institutions ( pacts and negotiations versus unilateral action); (3) the type of “craftsmen” involved ( the alliances and coalitions forged in the transition); (4) the timing imposed on the various tasks and stages of the transition. Naturally, political actors in the transition may or may not have the objective opportunity----or the subjective ability that transcends opportunities---to 68 The term “cadre” is sometimes used in this study. It is worthwhile here to elaborate a little on this term. The term “cadre”, a concept with Chinese characteristics, is commonly used in Chinese academia and dialy life and is not confined to any specific social class. However, this word tends to lose its academic flavor and its universality when used by outsiders looking on China. Another point worth highlighting is that “cadre” is a somewhat ambiguous term in either its application or connotation in China. 69 Giuseppe Di Palma does not believe material policies and outcomes are a very significant part of democratic crafting. 32 make the correct choices. Nonetheless, it is these four aspects that ultimately influence the success of transitions.70 As to Chinese village elections, “craft” mainly refers to three aspects. The first one is “craftsmen” (those elites who have crafted village democracy are the main departments they come from) and their networks through which elites from national to local craft rural democracy. The second is those relevant laws, national and provincial, policies at all levels of governmental pyramid, and rules and regulations at all levels down to the village. The third one is strategies by which political elites have implemented and promoted village democracy. The strategies may involve some elements of manipulation by local government leaders and village elites’ who seek control of village elections. 1.6 Lay-out of the Thesis This study consists of six chapters and one appendix. Following this chapter, Chapter aims to examine the roles and functions of national political elites in village elections. Its goal is to find out how villagers’ self-governance emerged, and why national political elites were willing to implement village election and replace the People’s Commune with this more democratic vehicle. The chapter attempts to explore how reform-oriented political elites endured numerous difficulties and still managed to have the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee passed. It discusses respectively the roles of senior political elites and particularly that of Peng Zhen, and the officials at the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) such as Wang Zhenyao and his elite network. This discussion 70 Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, 8-9. 33 shows how the officials at MCA promoted village elections through building a sound macro environment by designing laws, rules and regulations, and by making institutional arrangements and three co-operation projects. Chapter explores the roles of the political elites at provincial level in village elections. The study finds that provincial elites play a vital role in conditioning the institutional environment of village self-governance, which is seen as crucial to the implementation of central government’s policy. The key point is whether these actors can succeed in activating some vital governmental agencies within their own administrative zone to put the village self-governance mechanism in action. Some of them had to make a start with village elections, then what they did became models for other provinces and after that major political elites in charge of village self-governance affair would craft and supply more democratic institutions and policies for village democracy. Chapter examines to study the role of county and township authorities in Chinese village elections: how local leaders craft or manipulate village elections for their utilitarian purposes, and how they perceive village elections. It will explore the strategies and attitudes of local leaders toward village elections in terms of active or passive support, resistance, and their strategies of manipulation. Chapter inquires into the role of elites at village level in village elections. Village elites have to struggle to serve as both practitioners of village elections and craftsmen of political participation mechanisms. Village politicians have made some significant progress in village democratic practices during the pass two decades. Village elites not only have learned the new rules of “the political game”, but also crafted some rules in democratic practices. Election campaigns and villager representative assemblies are probably two of the most impressive steps in the development of village elections. 34 The former adds to the competitiveness of election, makes change to the village politics, and fosters among villagers a modern democratic spirit while shaping the new political flavor in rural China. On the other hand, the emergence of the villager-representative assembly suggests that the role of village elites in village democracy is important. Further significance is found by noting that this importance exists despite the dominant position of the Party branch, in particular its secretary, in the village. This chapter also examines how the party branch deals with village elections. This study concludes with Chapter 6, in which the empirical findings are summarized, some striking Chinese characteristics in developing democracy are identified, and the theoretic implications of the findings are discussed. Appendix is “The Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees of the People’s Republic of China, which was approved by the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, November 4, 1998. 35 [...]... laws, rules and regulations, designing relevant institutions and making policies Third, this study is a study of village elites, considering on the one hand how and to what extent village election challenges village party branch authority and then changes the legitimacy of village power, and on the other how village elites push village democracy further by campaigning village elections, and by developing... from the central to the local These elites are governing -elites in Pareto’s term Here the political elites do not mean the leadership of a minority, but rather a large political elites existing throughout the political system Furthermore, political elites in this study include village party branch secretaries and other important village elites, who are bottom ones in the hierarchy of political elites Therefore,... Therefore, the interaction of resource, strategy, and structure provides a convenient conceptual map for understanding political elites crafting of village democracy in China Within these structures, political elites play a key role in crafting village democracy The village democracy is a result of the dynamic interaction between the impetus provided by political actors at different levels and the structural... steps in the development of village elections 34 The former adds to the competitiveness of election, makes change to the village politics, and fosters among villagers a modern democratic spirit while shaping the new political flavor in rural China On the other hand, the emergence of the villager-representative assembly suggests that the role of village elites in village democracy is important Further significance... circumstance Political crafting of new democracies means the creation of favorable conditions for the introduction and enforcement of new rules of the political game The interaction between political elites strategies and the structural circumstances under which the elites work can provide a more dynamic picture of how political elites craft village democracy than can be derived from structural analysis Therefore,... Roles of Chinese Civil Affairs System and Local Officials: Elite Approach Furthermore, there are some studies on the actors of the village elections As Gunter Schubert said, “They focus on the strategies of these actors to adjust the tempo and extent of this process It is assumed that high and mid-level cadres are the most crucial agents of change by their promotion of rural democracy. ”31 Through the. .. “Without political elite/ the insiders of the system and their crafting, without rural democracy in China” Under the current Chinese political system and with the status quo of rural China, where there are better-formed elites networks and better strategies is also better village elections Therefore, this study examines political elites efforts to craft village elections in rural China, focusing on their... planted in Chinese villages not by dissidents or even by the masses, but by reformers in the Chinese government”.38 Shi Tianjian noticed the roles of the actors in the process of village elections and self-governance: officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, national leaders, local bureaucrats, village cadres, peasants, and foreign actors, paying a particular attention to the leading role of officials... Therefore, in a sense, the political elites in China used in this study are elites holding office inside the party-state system This study in some cases uses the terms leaders, cadres68, or simply elites to refer to political elites Craft If to craft democracy is similar to the building of architecture, the political elite is the architect of democracy and democratization The phrase political crafting comes... departments those elites come from It also directs our attention to the attitudes, behaviors and functions of political elites in the process of rural democratization of China (3) How did political elites craft village elections? A concern with political elites crafting, in turn, draws attention to such aspects as leadership strategies, the design of political institution, the political role of different . understanding of the issues at hand” 52 . Like Shi Tianjian, Tong Zhihui, and others, I would consider political elites and their crafting as one of the central concerns of the process of village. in crafting Chinese village democracy. The intentions of this thesis are to demonstrate that the political elites and their crafting are crucial in accounting for the implementation of village. even by the masses, but by reformers in the Chinese government”. 38 Shi Tianjian noticed the roles of the actors in the process of village elections and self-governance: officials in the Ministry