Chapter Practicing: “Village Politicians” and Village Elections If village self-governance is to become a vibrant and powerful institution, rather than merely another formalistic addition to Chinese public agencies, it would have to outgrow its origins: village elites’ supports and crafting as well as village committee leaders’ gaining greater independence. China’s village self-governance is indeed a process of democracy led by state’s elites, but the mere crafting of democracy by the higher authority’s elites, who are external elites to villagers, is not enough, however. External elite-led village democracy needs internal elites’ support and co-operation. After having reviewed the literature on village elections and self-governance, unfortunately, we find there are at least two obvious limitations. First, many studies focus on explaining village election itself such as voter registration, voting, who opposes it, and who takes great effort to conduct it. But few have attempted to find out which factors have made this electoral institution work after all. Second, most studies lay special emphasis on analyzing and exploring political signification and outcomes of village elections, but there are few studies on how village elites reshape village power structures, and create new institutions or election procedures during the campaigning for village leadership positions. Some works touched on the political elites’ roles and their crafting1, yet, comprehensive and detailed studies on village There has been some literature on this issue. Examples include Xu Yong, “Minzhuhua jincheng zhong di zhengfu zhudongxing: sichuansheng dachuanshi cunmin zizhi shifan huodong diaocha yu sikao” (“Active Government in the Process of Rural Democratization: A Case Study of Dachuan City, Sichuan Province”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no.3 (Beijing: 1997): 68-74; Wu Yi, “Zhidu yinru yu jingying zhudao: minzhi xuejiu guize zai cunluo changyu de yanyi” (“Institutions’ Introduction and Elites’ Domination: How Democratic Electoral Rules be Exercised in a Village Arena”), Huazhong shifan daxue xuebao (Journal of Central China Normal University) (Humanities and Social Sciences), 187 elites are still lacking. Obviously, without an understanding of rural elites’ crafting, any description of rural democracy landscape in China will be incomplete. The main body of village democracy promoted by official leaders is after all thousands upon thousands’ villages, while village elites are the leading roles of village democratic practices. Behavior is a crucial link between institutions and outcomes. At a village level, what is important is that village democracy needs villagers’ and particularly village elites’ democratic practices, while the crafting of rural democracy is achieved through the process of how to rise to power, how to stay in power, and how to pass it on in village elections. This chapter examines the roles of village elites and their practices in village elections. In the first section, I focus on the elites and power structures in the village, attempting to present institutional power and elite structures as the background against which village elections take place. Next, I describe and analyse the roles, context, and strategies of village elites. In the third section, I will analyse the dominant position of the Party branch in village and in particular the secretary and his or her role in village elections. Then, I will discuss village election campaigns in the fourth section. Finally, before making a conclusion, I will look at the village elites’ innovations, focusing on the case of villagers’ representative assembly. 5.1 Village Power Structure and Elites’ Configuration Since the implementation of village elections and self-governance, the local power structure, leadership strategies and styles have indeed changed significantly. Vol.38, no.2 (Wuhan, 1999): 10-17; Tong Zhihui, “Nongmin xuanju canyu zhong de jingying dongyuan” (“Elites’ Mobilization in Peasants’ Participation in Village Elections”), Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological Studies), no.1 (Beijing: 2002): 1-9; Anne F. Thurston, “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China,” Untied States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 23 (1998); Shi Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” World Politics 51 (April 1999): 385-412. 188 5.1.1. The Current Village Power Organizations Since the collapse of the people’s communes in the early 1980s and the implementation of village self-governance, four organizations have become central to village-level life: the party branch, village committee, the villagers-assembly and the villagers-representative assembly, and economic cooperative. These four organizations make up the village power structure. We here explain these organizations with the help of the following table (Table 5.1) in terms of their power nature, origin, production ways, and base. Organizations The Party Branch Village Committee Villagersassembly or villagersrepresentative assembly Economic cooperative Table 5.1 Village Power Organizations Nature Origin Ways Selected* Political 1. the Ruling Appointed Organization party 2. The party Constitution Elected Mass 1.villagers Organization 2. the Organic competing Law Elected Mass 1.villagers Organization 2. the Organic competition Law Mass Organization 1.members 2.law and rules Elected between appointed and competition Sources Generally recognized by the masses Confirmed by voters Confirmed by voters Confirmed by members * Although more and more places use some new ways such as “two balloting system” to select village party branch secretaries, which seems a trend of taking a step in the direction of election, they are essentially selected by township party Committee. The party’s political position is paramount even at the village level, while the village party branch secretary is a pivotal person in his or her community. By law, the villagers-assembly is the supreme policy-making body in a village, voting on all major 189 village affairs. But because of the size and increasingly social mobility, it is difficult to gather all adult members of the village to make decisions. The villagersrepresentative assembly naturally becomes the more realistic decision-making body for most villages. Theoretically, this body should make the most important decisions concerning village life, and supervise the village committee’s implementation of those decisions. A village committee is responsible for executing the villagersrepresentative assemblies’ decisions, while its members are elected by villagers. These three organizations are formal political ones. Economic cooperative in many villages exists only in name. It was said that the reason for its creation was to facilitate economic relations with outsiders. Generally, the party secretary is the director of economic cooperative. In some regions, particularly in coastal areas, some villages usually form economic organizations such as industrial and commercial corporations, which mainly engage in economic activities and control village collective property, and are usually controlled by main village leaders. Besides the above organizations, formal organizations in the village also include the branch of the Communist Youth League, Women’s Committee, and the Militia. The leaders and main members of those organizations are the village elites or “village politicians” in the countryside. 5.1.2. The Mechanism of Community Elite Formation: Two Models The village in reformist China is a stratified community, in which villagers have differentiated into various strata. When looking at village elections, one may look at power elite transformation. This notion departs from the idea that elites need to respond to a rapidly changing context in transition. 190 Then, how we explain the elite formation in rural China? It seems that the conceptual framework of circulation or reproduction of elites employed by those Eastern European scholars2 can also be applied to rural China. Victor Nee offers a circulation of elite hypothesis, arguing that China’s market reform is beneficial to new economic actors, while former cadres lose out. Whereas Andrew Walder takes a position of reproduction of elites, claiming that the technocratic fraction of the old elite benefits from transformation. Wang Hansheng discusses the phenomenon of reproduction of elites in rural China, noting the transformation from rural cadres to economic elites. However, she also points out the possibility of independent formation of elites.5 The political and economic developments since the late 1970s have had a strong impact on the formation of elites in transitional China. In rural China, market transition mainly relates to the emergence of new economic elites, while democratic transition, namely, village elections, mainly relates to the formation of village political elites. According to my own surveys, the introduction of village election into rural China since the middle of 1980s has indeed generated considerable circulation among village political elites. However, the process of elite formation is not a process of social revolution, but more probably a result of implementing policies. See Theory and Society, Volume 24, Issue 5, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe (Oct., 1995). Victor Nee, “The Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,” American Sociological Review 54, no.5 (1989): 663-681. Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60, no.3 (June, 1995): 309-328. Wang Hansheng, “Gai ge yi lai zhongguo nongcun de gongyehua yu nongcun jingying goucheng de bianhua” (“Rural China’s Industrization and Transformation of Rural Elite Configuration since the Reform”), Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan (China’s Social Science Quarterly) (Hong Kong: Autumn 1994): 18-24. 191 Individuals are recruited by some prespecified criteria. Many factors such as channels, personality, and institution affect the elite recruitment. They can be devided into three types: resource (economic, social, and personal), institutional, and village background. 5.1.3. The Configuration of Village Elites An elite structure is not only quite unusual in a statistical sense but also is quite unusual in term of its configurations. Elite structure refers not only to the statuses and roles that define elites, but also to (1) the pattern of actual and expected behavior among them, and (2) the procedures and institutions through which they interact to make political decisions.6 Village elites are essentially political actors at grassroots level, situated at the interface of the modern state and traditional society. Their social composition and political character are critical to the situation of village elections. There are currently three types of elites in a village community. Political Elite Crudely speaking, political elites in villages mainly refer to the cadres-power group in villages, however, theoretically those who are in the rank of cadres but not exert their influences on village should be eliminated from the list of political elites in village. Thus, so-called political elites in village refer to the leaders in village committees and the party branches. There are also some non-cadre political elites in some villages are closely involved in village politics and exert much influences on village affairs. Economic Elite Village elites who have benefited economically from the reforms have greater resources at their disposal to intervene in the political process. Economic elites in the context of rural China mainly refer to managers, private John Higley, G. Lowell Field, and Knut Grogolt, Elite Structure and Ideology (New York: Columbia 192 entrepreneurs and owners. However, in this chapter I will equate the term of economic elite with the terms of rich man or capable man or can-doer (nengren), although there are some differences in the definitions and extensions among these terms. In recent years, a new phenomenon: from economic elite to political administrator, namely the dramatic emergence of economic elites in village power structure by village elections in rural China and particularly in coastal areas, has captured the attention of the Western and Chinese scholars as well as Chinese government and society. Rich men’s rise to power has changed the recruitment of the village cadres and village politics operation. Many of them and one after another participates in village public affairs and campaign for village elections, consisting of a large proportion of village committee or party branch membership.7 Economic elites’ rise to power is, politically, one of the most crucial changes in village community, and an important dimension of rural politics. Social Elite In a village community, those who have a high status and moral quality, and a great influence on public affairs are usually social elites. They become village elites on the basis of their moral character and personality, rather than on their economic incomes or political positions in village formal power organizations. Another approach is to divide village elites into two types: governing elite and non-governing elite, the former mainly refers to the incumbent cadres, the latter the rest of village elites. It is necessary to point out that on the one hand more and more village elites, particularly economic elites, actively participate in village politics. Almost all village elites, political, economic, and social, have been drawn into village politics through University Press, 1976), 88. 193 village elections and over time. On the other hand, the distinction among these elites has become less and less clear. Therefore, compared with the common villagers, all village elites are essentially political actors. Hence the term “village elites” is used to mean political elites in the village in this study. 5.2 Roles, Contexts, and Strategic Acts Due in great part to peasants’ passivity and weakness, village elites are the representatives of their villages and fellows. They are the real practitioners and operators of village democratic politics, but their roles are conditioned or constrained by contextual factors, thus their need to employ some strategic acts to protect democratic rights and promote village democracy. 5.2.1 “Apolitical Stratum” and Roles of Village Elites Chinese common villagers are in a sense an apolitical stratum and this underscores the important role of of village elites in village democratic politics. “Apolitical Stratum”: the Social Foundation of Elites-dominated Village Elections In modern societies, there is usually a large population who not become involved in politics. Robert A. Dahl once regards them as an “apolitical stratum”.8 The number of apolitical stratum in rural China is large too, but the reasons are somewhat different. See Lang Youxing and Lang Yougen, “Cong jingji jingying dao cunzhuren: cunji quanli gengti he cunmin xuanju” (“From Economic Elite to Village Administrator: the Recruitment of Village Powerholder and Village Elections in China”), Zhejiang Journal of Social Science, no.1 (2003): 114-119. In Modern Political Analysis, Dahl presents six aspects to explain this phenomenon. See Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (fifth Edition) (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1991), 98-102. 194 First of all, the existence of apolitical stratum in rural China marks the return to a normal life from a period of high politicization, which is a result of depoliticalization. Second, there are no political associations except the CCP, and a few non-political mass organizations and clans in rural China. Villagers belong to the nonpolitical stratum. Yet association is a precondition for the effective self-governing. Furthermore, peasants’ activities are generally limited in the local political situation. They are interested primarily in local issues and solutions, rarely in wider political issues or in fundamental social change. Meanwhile classes seem to disappear, and are no longer an important force in rural Chinese political life. A conclusion is that elites rather than classes were destined to play a leading role in village elections and other participations. The passivity of peasants’ involvement in politics leaves political elites some opportunities and a space to craft or manipulate village elections. Village elites indeed have better skills of political participation than average villagers. They can increase villagers’ awareness of their rights, role, and responsibility in village elections and help them generally to play a more effective role by participating in the democratic process. Roles of Village Elites in Village Elections Village elites are the representatives of their fellow villages, and main players of village politics. (1) Spokespersons of Villagers and Community Interests There is much evidence to show that neither the People’s congress deputies at all levels in rural areas, nor outsiders such as intellectuals and higher authorities, are 195 fully capable of representing peasants’ interests. Even village cadres cannot effectively represent and defend village interests under the current political system. And, as above mentioned, peasants are poorly or weakly organized and their villages have only weakly enabled upward representation by ordinary villagers. Yet, common villagers need spokesperson(s) to protect their interests and defend their democratic rights. When peasants gradually lose confidence in those institutional authorities, the authorities outside the system (tizhi wai) quietly emerge and develop and in such as an instance, the village elites have arisen to fill this vacuum, becoming their spokespersons. Furthermore, one psychological foundation of village elites’ important role in democratic process lies in the belief by the masses that think elites can get more resources for villages and have more channels to contact with higher authorities and outside the villages. As David Zweig pointed out, the largest of the villagers selected “people who keep close ties to the party”, because “villagers recognize that the CCP is the most important organization in rural China and a major channel through which the state distributes resources, so they benefit when their leaders have good party ties.”10 Those who can become the spokesmen of peasants’ interests usually have the following characteristics: (a) their ages are around 30 to 45; (b) their educational level is over junior middle school; (c) their family income is at or above the middle income level; (d) they have richer social experiences and more channels and ability to For example, the data from one questionnaire conducted in 16 provinces including Beijing in 2000 demonstrate that among 1950 respondents, 1223 (62.7%) respondents think the current People’s Congress gives a partial play to its role, and 217 (11.1%) respondents think the current People’s Congress gives no play to its role. 1014 (52%) respondents think that the current People’s Congress elections are conducted only as a matter of form. 633 (28.05%) respondents think that the current People’s Congress deputies are only there as an honor or as a matter of form, while the proportion of those who think that the current People’s Congress deputies can truly represent the masses’ opinions is not high (only 36.77%). See Cai Dingjian, ed., Zhongguo xuanju zhuangkuang de baogao (The Report on the State of Chinese Elections) (Beijing: Law Press, 2002), 518-520. 196 To be aware of the rise of campaigns in village elections, we need to understand the institutional arrangements that structure the campaign process and competitiveness as well as the candidates’ motives. The motives are complicated and multi-dimensional. There are largely four types of the motives behind the campaigning in village elections. First of all, some but a few people desire to reap some profit. Second, some hope to improve their political or social status, and among them, a few aim at bringing honour to their own ancestors. Third is to build personal network, which is very beneficial to the lives of Chinese people, whether economically or otherwise. Fourth is that democratic institution has been the most reliable one to protect people’s interests so far, which is neglected by some scholars. Of course, we not deny that there are still some candidates in rural China who are selfless and willing “to sacrifice for the greater good”, which is “central to the elite’s view of actually functioning democratic systems”59. Regarding institutions and structure, there are two major factors as follows. First, law and institutions and their changes are two precautions, which help to bring about campaigning in village elections. Article 14 is important in the Organic Law of Village Committees, which introduces “sea election” (haixuan), stipulating that “in electing village committees, candidates should be nominated directly by villagers who are eligible to vote. The number of candidates should exceed that of positions to be elected”. Whereas the stipulation of Zhejiang Province Measures for the Election of Villagers’ Committees is more specific: “There shall be at least one more candidate respectively for the positions of chair and vice chair than the number of people required to serve in those positions. There must be one to three more candidates than the number of required 59 Arthur J. Lerman, “National Elite and Local Politics in Taiwan,” The American Political Science 231 villagers’ committee members” (Article 13), and the candidates for membership in the village committee “who receive over half of the total number of ballots cast shall be directly confirmed to be official candidates based on the number of votes received” (Article 15). In addition, although not directly using the term of “campaign”, many provinces have introduced an article on election campaigns into their provincial election measures. For example, Article 16 of Zhejiang Province Measures for the Election of Villagers’ Committees stipulates that “The village election committee may organize the official candidates to give formal speeches on village governance and to respond to the questions asked by the villagers.” Of course, village election campaigns have gone far beyond the speeches. After the passing of the revised Organic Law in November 1998, village electoral competitions have become more and more intense. For example, in 1999 village elections in Yuyao City in Zhejiang Province, which was the first one according to the new Organic Law, the average ratio of the number of the primary candidates to the number of required village committee in 786 village committees is 48.7:1, which is a very high ratio.60 Second, social stratification and existence of factions are the foundation of campaigns in social structure. With the economic development in rural areas, villagers have differentiated. As a result, rural China is no longer a simple society with no differentiation in social strata, but a complicated community with different social strata and where interest groups co-exist. Whereas the differentiation can at times lead to conflicts of interest. Therefore, a village community has various factions, which are different from those existed during the Cultural Revolution, while the elites of the factions represent the interest of different groups. A faction is based on personal Review 71, no.4 (Dec., 1977): 1420. 60 The Organizational Department of Yuyao City, “Yuyaoshi cunmin xuanju qingkuang zongjie” (“A Summary of the Situation of the Village Elections in Yuyao City”) (July 1999). 232 relationships and associations. Village elections represent a complex intersection of a variety of social forces including incumbent village cadres particularly secretary of the party and head of village committee, former cadres, clans61, rich men, the underworld, township government, and so on. As a result, the members of one faction become an important resource of its candidate’s ballots. 5.4.2 Grassroots Resources and Village Electoral Campaigns Like other activities, campaigns need a variety of resources including social capital such as relationship (guanxi) and particularly economic resources. Whether candidates can effectively campaign to a great extent depends on the available level of resources, and what strategy a candidate chooses during an election campaign is to a great extent dependent on the resources s/he has access to. The forms of strategies are both enabled and limited by the resources available to candidates. In other words, political campaign is a process in which candidates employ all the resources they can get to win ballots as far as possible. P. Bourdieu has divided capital into three kinds: economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital, and they can change each other. 62 The resources employed in village election campaigns are varied. In line with to Boudieu’s classification, there are three local resources (xiangtu ziyuan) in rural China: economic resource, social resource, and cultural resource. Western scholars commonly argue that civil society is important to democratic politics. However, in view of the weakness or even no-existence of civil society in 61 Actually there are not many clan-dominated villages in rural China, and even in such villages, the clan’s influence has waned considerably as compared to the past. 62 Some scholars use the term “social resource” rather “social capital”. Although these two terms are overlapping, “social capital” has a more modern color. But as today’s rural China is still a society with grassroots color; we prefer to use the word “resource” to “capital” in this context. 233 rural China, social networks and trust become two important social capitals in local society. In Mark S. Granovetter’s term, the networks of local society are strong ties which are measured by four items: time, feelings intensity, intimacy and reciprocity63, and family or kinship/clan is a representative of the strong ties. As a social resource, clan or kinship is still an important resource employed in village elections. Particularly in some backward mountain villages, making an appeal to the feelings of the same clan and kinship is a resource commonly employed in village political campaigns. Wealth is, of course, an economic resource, and in the meantime also a social resource in villages, becoming a base of strong ties. In fact, a village’s public goods are more dependent on the village economy, whereas the rich men exert a great influence on the village and its residents. In other words, village wealth has directly or indirectly, visibly or invisibly bound villagers closely together. Hence, those villagers embedded in one candidate’s network are often the pool of his or her ballots. As regards trust, although modern society needs trust, many people not depend on it. One reason for that situation is that more and more people resort to laws and institutions to deal with their problems or conflicts. 64 But, trust is an important resource in a village community, because people know each other very much in the village. If a villager breaks faith with someone, s/he will pay a price for that behaviour. People trust those whom they know. Kinships, clans, social networks, and trust are the main compositions of social resource in rural China, which to a great extent decide or influence the choice of campaign strategies. However, more and more candidates are inclined to employ 63 See Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no.4 (1973): 1360-1380. 234 economic resources to campaign. One indicator is that more and more rich villagers participate in village electoral campaigns and successfully win the positions of village committees, while those candidates without economic strength find it more and more difficult to win the elections. 5.4.3 Strategies of Village Electoral Campaigns Some Western scholars have summarized some strategies and techniques such as cooperative strategy, disruptive strategy, manipulative strategy, and authoritative strategy, which are not completely unfamiliar to rural China. However, the strategies of election campaigns are after all shaped by institutional context, while the election competition in rural China has grassroots colour. First of all, there is canvassing for the voters who are uncertain about which candidate to cast their ballots for. This is the core of campaigning. A candidate usually designs his or her strategies around the targeting of voters. Many cases in village elections demonstrate that most of candidates or factions focus their attention on canvassing for the voters who are uncertain about which candidates to vote for. According to Fan Junjie, the head of Jianshe village of Wujun Town of Jinyun County in Zhejiang province, a candidate does not need to spend time on his or her core voters and those who are die-heart opposing voters, but should focus his or her attention on the voters who are unsure which candidates to cast their votes for. Actually these votes are often the critical determinant of an election result. Many Western elections also have shown that the votes in an election are usually from loyal voters and the voters who are uncertain to cast their votes to which candidate. Focus on the key voters of every age group was Fan Junjie’s experience: (1) after controlling the representatives of the old age group (60 and over), s/he can gain the most of that 64 Ibid. 235 group votes; (2) if controlling the representatives of the group aged from 40 to 60, s/he can gain the most of that group votes; (3) s/he does not need to spend time on the young group, however, because young villagers are more independent than other age groups, besides, the votes from the first two groups are enough for a candidate to win a village election. Since female-villagers makes up 50% of the village voters, in addition, they become more and more independent, and a candidate should not forget to build a good relationship with them. For example, as an incumbent village leader who wants to be re-elected, Mr. Fan can hold some activities for the village women on the International Women’s Day (March 8) in the name of the collective, which is helpful to the re-election.65 Second, “playing the economic card” can be effective in winning votes. Most of the villages and most of the peasants are indeed still poor. “Playing the economic card” along with economic elites’ rise to power can indeed be attributed to a public desire to increase the standard of living. Therefore, how to develop village economy and promote villagers’ lives is the central issue of village electoral politics, and the question that peasants are most interested in. This constitutes the basis for “playing the economic card”. During campaigns, candidates frequently appeal to voters on the basis of village development and improvement of villagers’ life. For example, some candidates used the following slogan as a campaigning tactic: “Let us elect a capable villager who can and will lead all of us to become rich as our village head”. Mr. Lu, the elected head of Seventh Hongjiashan Village Committee of the West Lake District, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, for example, chose the following tactics during 2002 campaigning: (1) He declared that he would not take his salary during his first year tenure of office; (2) He would not take the village cars; (3) If 65 Fan Junjie, interviewed by the author, Wuyun, November 1998 and July 2002. 236 elected as the head, he would buy Longjin tea (a green tea) from the villagers. The third offer was crucial for his campaigning, because Hongjiashan village is a major producer of Longjin Tea, and a large portion of the villagers’ income is from Longjin Tea, whereas, the government no longer buy the tea from these peasants. He naturally won popularity with this trick.66 Third, candidates make full use of all resources so as to establish campaign networks. According to my own fieldwork, in 2002 Wuyun Town’s village elections, many candidates formed their own campaign teams. This kind of team usually consisted of two parts: the first part is the core members who are staunch supporters of the candidate; and the second part is the so-called peripheral members, mainly consisting of the candidate’s relatives and friends. This team focused its endeavor on the villagers who took a middle attitude towards the candidates, canvassing over their votes. These members each took charge of a district and canvassed for the votes there. They visited villagers door by door, collected the information on the election, analyzed the voters’ intention of voting, summarized the experiences and lessons, with the aim to canvass as many voters as possible. They decide which member of the team is more suitable to mobilize a villager to cast his vote to the candidate. Through this team the candidate could establish his or her network for the campaign. For example, there emerged two big competing factions in the process of 2002 Tongmen village election, and each formed its own campaign team and networks. Through those networks the two candidates for the position of the head of the village committee were able to estimate the number of the votes each could get before the casting of votes. They paid much attention to their own grassroots resources in the election. The final 66 Sheng Jialiang, Vice-Director of West Lake District’s Bureau of Civil Affairs and a villager from Wei Jia Wu Cun, West Lake District, interviewed by the author, Hangzhou, June and August 2002. 237 result of voting was very close to their estimation.67 The campaign team and networks help a candidate to secure new votes in addition to those from staunch supporters. 5.4.4 Campaigning and Rural Democracy Deepening. Village electoral campaigns indicate the increase of election competition, deepening electoral politics. Candidates for village committees not only have learned the new rules of “the political game”, but also crafted some rules in democratic practices. More importantly, village elections have transformed political culture. Village elections have forced villagers and particularly village elites to be more willing to accept democratic ideas, coupled with a strong trend toward a more pragmatic approach to village democracy. Increasing the capacity along with enhancing political participation mechanisms can help Chinese peasants promote village democracy. To the government, an important issue is how to standardize village election campaigns, creating a fair play environment for all candidates. To candidates, what is important is to learn the art of campaigning. 5.5 Crafting from Bottom: the Case of “Village Congress” Villagers-representative assembly (VRA) is a great innovation showing the political wisdom of Chinese village politicians and peasants. It refers to the assembly participated by the representatives to discuss and decide on the important affairs of a village and supervise the work of the village committee. Villagers-representative assembly is the supreme decision-making body, a “village congress”, which is 67 Mr. Hu, a cadre of Wuyun Town, Mr. Mei Wangqiu, accountant of Tangmen Village in Wuyun Town, interviewed by the author, Tangmen Village, July 24, 2002. 238 “similar in principle to the New England town meeting”68. The VRA is responsible to the villagers-assembly. In essence, villagers-representative assembly serves as a legislature, making decision governing villagers’ everyday lives, while the village committee is responsible for executing the former’s decisions.69 5.5.1 Why Villagers-representative Assembly Emerged Several factors have led to the appearance of villagers-representative assembly. The first is the population or the size of a village. The village committee evolved from the former brigade usually has a relatively large population, averaging 1,000-3,000 people, which made it difficult to hold villagers-assembly (VA). For example the largest village in 12 counties of Ningbo municipality has 1,631 families. The following table gives more details of village population and size in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, in 1999 (see Table 5.6). The second factor is the scattering of households. Particularly in mountainous districts an administrative village usually consists of quite a few natural villages with wide scattering households. Third is the demand of family farming. With the production responsibility system, plots of land are distributed to peasants to farm. Consequently working hours and leisure time are different with individual farmers, which made it difficult to ensure full attendance at villagers’ assemblies. Fourth is social mobility and migration.70 68 Anne F. Thurston, “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China,” 17. 69 Ibid.,18. 70 See Commission of Legislative Affairs under National People’s Congress, Office of the Legislative Affairs under the State Council, and Department of Grassroots Power and Community Construction under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, eds., ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa’ xuexi shouce (Textbook of the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees) (Beijing: China’s Democracy and Legislation Press, 1998), 53-54; Xu Yong, China’s Village Self-Governance, 83-84; Lang Youxing and He Baogang, “Cunmin huiyi he cunmin huiyi: cunji minzhu wanshan zhi changshi”(“Villagers’ 239 county Cixi Table 5.6 Data of Ningbo’s Village Size in 1999 Village Size >801 300~400 Smallest [...]... dimension of village elections is the interaction between the masses and elites The stable syndromes of elite-mass linkages can actually deepen our understanding of the dynamics of political elites crafting in different areas In the process of village elections, village elites usually appeal to the masses’ emotion, help in forming their common interests, and become the spokesmen of these interests If they... interests and rights As the representatives of their fellow villagers, the elites are responsible for reporting villagers and village s needs to the higher authorities, supervising the management of the village party branch and village committee, handling complaints and even conducting resistance (2) Practitioners and Operators: Mobilizing, Organizing, and Campaigning Village elites are considered as the. .. know more about the laws and regulations, policies concerning village self-governance The more village elites know about election procedures and the news of successful elections conducted in other areas, the more and better the common villagers know about the laws and policies because of the elites propagating (elite-led village elections), and the more difficult it would be to manipulate the elections... Law and relevant institutions can encourage village elites to participate in village political competition, but village elites may not be able to promote village democracy due to the political constraints by the party leadership The contextual factors of village elites practicing of village democracy mainly involve institutional and organizational dynamics, existing social network, information and. .. 1968), 9 217 village party secretary into a dilemma that is seldom encounted before the implementation of village self-governance Unlike that of county and township officials, the authority of the village party branch can be directly challenged by village elections, because the elected villagers’ committee heads may share much of the secretaries’ power and then challenge the core position of the village. .. Party, and only 2 were not Among the 203 secretaries of the Party branches there, 198 campaigned for the post of the head of villagers’ committee, and 167 secretaries (84%) successfully won the elections .50 In the third round of villagers’ committee elections conducted in Hainan province in 2001, a total of 1,6 25 (63%) newly elected heads concurrently hold the post of the party branch secretaries In the. .. particularly in the process of their struggle against control or manipulation of village elections and defence of their democratic rights.43 5. 2.4 A Brief Summary Due in large part to the common villagers’ passivity, village elites become key actors in village elections However, their acts are conditioned or constrained by a set of contextual factors such as information and networks In fact, village elections... it comes to the issue of village self-governance, while those elites contending for the positions of villagers’ committees actively campaign in village elections At the same time, it is in the process of village elections that village elites have innovated some very important democratic procedures and institutions to restrict and supervise the actions of governing elites The remainder of this chapter... guarantee the competitive of village elections and strictly abiding by electoral procedures, and maybe move towards social or political pluralism Some cases show that village factions can be helpful to the efficiency of village elites and the masses’ public participation 27 However, the existence of factions indicates the absence or at least lack of citizenship in village communities 25 Xu Yong, Village. .. lack of the example where the village party branches also join the ranks of crafting or developing new political mechanisms of village democracy So far the party branch secretaries have made efforts and taken a number of measures to control or manipulate village elections, through which they can maintain its leading position in leadership First, the party secretaries are usually the heads of the village . promote village democracy. 5. 2.1 “Apolitical Stratum” and Roles of Village Elites Chinese common villagers are in a sense an apolitical stratum and this underscores the important role of of village. Roles of Village Elites in Village Elections Village elites are the representatives of their fellow villages, and main players of village politics. (1) Spokespersons of Villagers and Community. and analyse the roles, context, and strategies of village elites. In the third section, I will analyse the dominant position of the Party branch in village and in particular the secretary and