Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion In examining officials’ motivations and incentives to convert agricultural land to nonagricultural uses, the preceding chapters have sporadically touched on the consequences of indiscriminate land use conversion, which extend beyond the loss of agricultural and arable land. This chapter juxtaposes local officials’ benefits against the social costs or externalities of land use conversion to highlight the repercussions of their self-serving and opportunistic behaviour. The following case study of Sihui’s Xiamao town shows how land use conversion and the promotion of industrialization translate into direct gains for local cadres. The importance of economic targets in the evaluation of cadres’ performance and the provision of cash rewards for fulfilling the goals induced local cadres to actively draw industries and capital to the town, even at the expense of converting land illegally to bypass land use quotas. While the conversion of agricultural land in the name of industrialization appears to have benefited local officials, the process of using land as an instrument to drive urbanization had given rise to various externalities – rural disputes over land issues, environmental degradation, and idle land. The health hazards posed by heavy pollution industries relocating to Sihui and the questionable sustainability of this path of industrialization are adverse to the long-term development of the society. An analysis of the local government’s expenditures further reveals that little had been spent on collective goods despite the substantial revenues from land described in the last chapter. This, together with local accounts and evidence of poor governance, Yew Chiew Ping 138 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion suggests that the Sihui government had been predatory in manipulating land resources to its advantage and to the detriment of the society. About Xiamao Town Xiamao town is located in the hilly region of central Sihui. In 2005, it has a total population of 31,748 and an agricultural population of 30,154 spread over 13 villages and two neighbourhoods.1 This population composition is reflected in Xiamao’s land use distribution. Over 90 percent of Xiamao’s total land area is agricultural land, of which arable land makes up 23.5 percent and forests 51.6 percent. Capital farmland constitutes 28,800 mu or more than 80 percent of the total arable land. Construction land represents 5.7 percent of Xiamao’s land area while unused land, which comprises of grassland, ridges between fields and tidal land, makes up another 2.8 percent.2 There are three industrial parks in Xiamao town, which has a total land area of 160,470 mu after its merger with the adjacent Longwan town in 2003. The 1,010 mu Fulong industrial park and the 500 mu Xiamao industrial park were set up in 2002.3 Till date, both had drawn a number of non-ferrous metal, metal processing, and electroplating plants.4 Construction of the 10,000 mu Longwan ceramic industrial park, part of the Longwan new construction materials industrial zone, began in 2003 as a key project of the Xiamao town government.5 In 2003, the town government claimed to have drawn ten enterprises and leased over 4,000 mu of land to “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen jiben gaikuang” (“General situation in Xiamao town of Sihui”), available at http:// www.xiamao.gdsihui.gov.cn, accessed June 2005. Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu (Sihui city Xiamao town government), “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua (1997-2010)” (“Land use master plan of Sihui city’s Xiamao Town, 1997-2010”), March 2006. Sihui nianjian 2004, pp. 213-15. “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”). Sihui nianjian 2004, pp. 213; “Sihuishi (shengji) minying kejiyuan” (“Sihui (provincial level) non-state scientific technology zone”), available at http://www.gdsihui.gov.cn, accessed September 2005. Yew Chiew Ping 139 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion investors.6 As with the other industrial zones in Sihui, the Longwan ceramic industrial park had attracted industries relocating from nearby regions such as Foshan, which is renowned for its ceramic industry as well as the pollution caused by the ceramic manufacturing plants.7 Promoting Industrialization in Xiamao Town As part of its industrialization drive in response to upper level governments, Xiamao town meted out additional rewards for the offices and Villagers’ Committees (VCs) under its supervision in 2005: two percent of land proceeds would be allotted to each individual who successfully brought in an investor to set up a factory in the town’s industrial zone; for attracting an investor to set up a factory in other areas within Xiamao town, individuals would receive a one-time payment amounting to ten percent of the town’s economic gains (excluding taxes) arising from the investment in that year; individuals who secured investments ranging from below 500,000 yuan to above one million yuan would be awarded a percentage of the government’s economic gains, ranging from four to ten percent. To further entice local cadres and officials, cash rewards are meted out promptly within three days upon the receipt of payment for land and other expenses.8 Economic development as the top priority of the Sihui government, specifically the drawing of investments and businesses, had been built into its cadre target responsibility system and tasked to subordinate departments since 2003.9 Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show the targets and how they are weighted in the evaluation of Xiamao’s departments and VCs. Although only 20 points were allotted to the target of Sihui nianjian 2004, pp. 213. “Foshan taoci yaolu wuran Zhusanjiao jushou” (“Pollution from Foshan ceramic kilns is the worst in Pearl River Delta”), Nanfang dushibao (Southern City News), 25 April 2007. Xiafu document no. (2005), “Guanyu yinfa Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi jiangli banfa de tongzhi” (“Regarding the notice to promulgate Xiamao town’s measures for rewarding the attraction of business and investment”). Zeng Guohuan (Sihui city mayor), “Sihuishi 2004 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Sihui city government work report 2004”), speech at the third meeting of Sihui city’s 13th People’s Congress, March 2004. Yew Chiew Ping 140 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion drawing investments, the 30 points allotted to fulfiling the remittance target hinged on the department’s revenue too. While specific departments were tasked with bringing in investments, this did not preclude other departments from doing the. In Xiamao, a manufacturer of clothes-hangers with an investment of three million yuan was brought in by the bureau of classified documents (baomiju) and the bureau of archives (dang’anju).10 Fulong/ Longwan Industrial Zones Economic Department Table 6.1 Evaluation System for Xiamao Town’s Departments Target 1. Meet the required sum of remittance to the town 2. Fulfil the task of drawing 180 million yuan of investments; proper follow-up of the execution of the investment items of the previous year and this year Points 30 3. No occurrence of major safety incidents 20 4. Improve the management of Xiamao development zone and its enterprises, ensure the timely resolution of labour disputes and collective incidents 5. Expand the taking out of social labour insurance by enterprises 1. Meet the required sum of remittance to the town 2. Fulfil the task of drawing 180 million yuan of investments; proper follow-up of the execution of the investment items of the previous year and this year 20 3. No occurrence of major safety incidents 20 20 Evaluation Criteria points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement every half-yearly points deducted for incompletion of task; points deducted when brought-in businesses fail to invest within the same year; points added for every 10% increase in sum of investment with a cap at 10 points points deducted for every major safety incident points deducted for every case of compensation, labour dispute or collective appeal to upper levels 10 points deducted for incompletion of task 20 points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement every half-yearly points deducted for incompletion of task; points deducted when brought-in businesses fail to invest within the same year; points added for every 10% increase in sum of investment with a cap at 10 points points deducted for every major safety incident points deducted for every case of compensation, labour dispute or collective appeal to upper levels 30 4. Improve the management of the 20 development zones and their enterprises, ensure the timely resolution of labour disputes and collective incidents 5. Expand the taking out of social labour 10 points deducted for incompletion of task insurance by enterprises Source: “2007 nian xianban kaohe shishi xijie” (“Evaluation details of departments, 2007”). “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”). This is not an isolated case. Economic targets had been assigned to various non-related departments such as the meteorological bureau, statistical bureau, civil affairs bureau, central organization bureau etc. See Liu Zhihua and Huang Xinjian, “Qiantan difang zhengfu zai zhaoshang yinzi zhong de juese dingwei” (“On the role of the local government in attracting businesses and investment”), Zhengfu yu jingji (Government and Economy), No. (2004), pp. 36. 10 Yew Chiew Ping 141 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Table 6.2 Evaluation Criteria for Village Level Cadres of Xiamao Town Target Birth control Points 15 Attracting businesses and investments 10 Social order and governance 10 Medical co-operative 10 Military work 10 Progressive increase in village fixed revenue Party building Village hygiene Party newspaper and journal Agricultural irrigation Building of grassroots organization Production safety and forest fire prevention Civil affairs 10 11 12 13 5 Evaluation Criteria 0.1 point deducted for each percentage short of the town’s target points deducted for incompletion of task; no additional points for bringing in agricultural items, points given for each additional industrial item points deducted for every collective incident (5 persons and above) that bypasses the village; point deducted if incident reaches town-level; points deducted for deteriorating public order point given/deducted for achieving percent above/ below target; no ceiling for adding points points deducted for incompletion of task; points given for every additional enrolment points deducted for failing to reach target; points given for each additional base amount; points deducted for failing to hand over the village’s accounts on time points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement 2.5 points given for completion of task, beyond which extra points are given; additional points for winning the title of the city’s exemplary village or the province’s hygienic village points deducted for incompletion of task 5 points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement point deducted for failing to fulfil each of the town’s requirement points deducted for each case of production safety lapse; points deducted for each case of serious mountain fire points deducted for failing to fulfil each of the town’s requirement 14 Blood donation point deducted for incompletion of task, point given for each additional name Source: “2007 nian cunji kaohe shishi xize” (“Year 2007 implementation details of village-level evaluation”). The 13 VCs of Xiamao were ranked according to their performance and scores in various arenas as shown in Table 6.2. At the village level, ten and seven points were allotted respectively to the drawing of businesses, investments and growth in village revenue. That all VCs outperformed themselves by scoring 15 points in drawing investments, beyond the ten points allotted for this task, attests to the effort and attention given to attracting businesses and investors to Xiamao.11 Although scholars have suggested that certain targets such as birth control have veto power (yipiao “Xiamao zhen 2005 nian cunji kaohe xiangxi biao” (“Detailed table of Xiamao town village-level evaluation in 2005”). On the predominance of economic targets in the cadre target responsibility system, refer to Wu Xun, “Tudi jiage,” pp. 12-13; Li Hongbin and Zhou Li-An, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics, No. 89 (2005), pp. 1743-62. See also O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation,” pp. 172; Edin, “Local State Corporatism,” pp. 278-95; Tsui Kai-yuen and Wang Youqiang, “Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu,” pp. 71-90; Wang Jun, “Zhongzubu shixing,” pp. 7-8, 26; Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 101-19. 11 Yew Chiew Ping 142 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion foujue) over the rest, rendering a cadre’s other accomplishments futile, lapses in birth control appeared to be of no consequence for Xiamao’s VCs.12 Of the four villages that were granted additional three merit points for overall performance, three had underperformed in birth control, registering the lowest scores ranging from 7.9 to 12.1 among all 13 villages.13 There are also further awards and accolades for the danwei which excelled in drawing investments, as specified in a document released by the Sihui’s Party committee and government in 2006:14 In accordance with the regulations in “The 2005 Target Responsibility System for Towns (Street Offices), Departments under the City’s Direct Jurisdiction and Vertical Departments,”. . . the Party committee and city government have decided to commend and reward the danwei that have received following awards in 2005: the target responsibility system appraisal award; award of outstanding contribution to national and local taxes of towns (street offices); special award for being in the country’s top one thousand towns in small town integrated development; award for attracting foreign capital; award for exceeding the quota in attracting businesses and investment.15 Xiamao town was one of the few danwei that received a total of four awards, a testament to the town officials’ priority and zest in promoting economic development. In 2005, the Party secretary of Xiamao town single-handedly procured more than 300 million yuan of investment while other local leaders such as the town mayor and vice mayors attracted a combined investment sum of 22 million yuan.16 Both the town’s Party secretary and assistant Party secretary scored the full ten points for drawing investments to Xiamao in the appraisal of their work performance.17 Han Qiang, “Dui jianli he wanshan,” pp. 41. “Xiamao zhen 2005 nian cunji kaohe xiangxi biao.” 14 Zeng Guohuan (Sihui city mayor), “Sihuishi 2007 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Sihui city government work report 2007”), speech at the second meeting of Sihui city’s 14th People’s Congress, 23 March 2007. 15 Siweiban document no. (2006), “Guanyu 2005 niandu gongzuo mubiao zerenshi kaohe jiangli de jueding” (“Regarding the decision on the 2005 target responsibility system and rewards”). 16 “2005 nian Xiamaozhen banzi chengyuan, xianban zhaoshang yinzi huizongbiao” (“Year 2005 summary of Xiamao town teams’ and departments’ results in the attraction of business and investment”). 17 “2006 nian xianban, banzi, ganbu wancheng zhaoshang yinzi qingkuangbiao” (“Completion of the drawing investments by teams, departments and cadres in 2006”). 12 13 Yew Chiew Ping 143 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion As with many other towns and townships, the tax-sharing system between Sihui city and Xiamao town is a hybrid of “dividing taxes, contracting at different levels.” According to a town official, most of the township revenues are remitted upwards to the county, which then allocates funds for township expenditures. While the town manages its own surpluses and deficits, it may request for additional funds from the city government in times of emergencies. Town cadres have the incentive to collect more tax revenue than the target set by the upper level government as the town is entitled to a 20 percent tax return for the revenue collected in excess. This helped to ease the town’s finances.18 From 2005 to 2006, the town attracted a total of 1.36 billion yuan in investments, with an annual output of 1.22 billion yuan.19 The town’s tax contributions were equally impressive. In both 2005 and 2006, it exceeded its tax quota by more than 75 percent, collecting 11.2 million yuan and 21.2 million yuan respectively.20 Excessive Land Use Conversion The frenzy to industrialize in Xiamao comes at a cost: the excessive conversion of agricultural land. This section verifies the actual area of land converted for industrial use in Xiamao against the planned land area for industrial sites as drawn up in its land use plan. It suggests that the extent of land use conversion undertaken by the town government belies the land use quotas laid down on paper in Xiamao’s land use plan. Fieldwork in Xiamao town, Sihui, October 2007. “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”). 20 “Xiamaozhen gecunwei 05-06 nian gexiang zhibiao tongjibiao” (“Statistical table of performance indicators of VCs in Xiamao town”). 18 19 Yew Chiew Ping 144 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Table 6.3 Land Use in Xiamao Town, Sihui (mu) 1996 2000 2010 Difference between 1996 and 2010 +1530 +30.2 +810.9 +1390.7 -3 -698.8 -690 -773 268 -1091 50 Total land area 160470 160470 160470 Land for agriculture 146921 147104 148451 Arable land 34514 34401 34544.2 Orchards 10117 10828 10927.9 Forest land 75781 75618 77171.7 Grassland 32 29 29 Water surfaces 26477 26228 25778.2 Land for construction 9128 9164 8438 Residential, industrial & mining 6900 6899 6127 1. City 0 2. Towns 348 348 616 3. Villages 6157 6162 5066 4. Industrial, mining and 395 389 445 others Transport 1235 1272 1318 1. Railroads 0 2. Roads 556.8 586 632 3. Village roads 678.2 686.2 686 Water conservancy 993 993 993 Unused land 4421 4202 3581 Source: Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu, “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua (1997-2010).” +83 75.2 7.8 -9.94 -840 According to Xiamao’s land use plan, agricultural land area in the town registers an increase of 1,530 mu from 1996 to 2010 with a corresponding reduction in the area of land for construction and unused land. The reduction in construction land area is mainly due to a fall in the area taken up by rural settlements in villages. Arable land even witnesses a slight gain of 30.2 mu during the period though the increase is attributed to the reorganizing and tidying up of wasted grassland, water surfaces, river, forsaken orchards and even a brick kiln as substitutes for arable land, casting doubt over the suitability of these land parcels for cultivation.21 Of the area of land for residential, industrial and mining sites, only 395 mu was devoted to industrial and mining sites in 1996. This area expands by only 50 mu to a modest 445 mu in 2010 (see Table 6.3). In actuality, however, the town government had expropriated 2,756 mu of land to make way for 29 industrial enterprises from 2005 to 2006 (see Table 6.4). Moreover, the extent of land expropriation in Xiamao has defied its claim that the increase in 21 Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu, “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua (1997-2010).” Yew Chiew Ping 145 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion industrial land shall be derived mostly from existing idle land in the town and villages, as well as from a planned reduction of residential land by 80 mu.22 For instance, the 4,000 mu of land requisitioned from villagers for the construction of the Longwan ceramic industrial park includes orchards, fish ponds and arable land in eight of Xiamao’s natural villages.23 Moreover, the total area of the three industrial parks in Xiamao is 11,510 mu, which has exceeded the town’s 2010 quota of construction land of 8,438 mu. Local informants disclosed that out of the 4,000 mu of land expropriated for the Longwan ceramic industrial park, only 1,000 mu were legal. The town government had leased the rest of the land from villagers instead of going through proper state requisition (yizu daizheng). A total of 900 mu of land in the Xiamao and Fulong industrial parks were also illegally leased from villagers in this manner.24 Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu, “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua, 1997-2010.” Interviews with villagers in Xiamao, October 2007. 24 Fieldwork in Xiamao town, Sihui, October 2007. 22 23 Yew Chiew Ping 146 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Table 6.4 Industrial Enterprises Drawn to Xiamao Town, 2005-2006 Item Total sum of investment (10,000 yuan) Investment in place (10,000 yuan) Annual output value (10,000 yuan) Area of land requisitioned (mu) Longwan Ceramics Industrial Park Jinpeng Copper Limited Company 30,000 20,000 45,000 250 Loulan Brick Factory 4,000 100 8,000 200 Loulan Brick Factory 5,000 100 10,000 200 Loulan Brick Accessory Factory 1,000 30 2,000 55 Water Plant 100 100 500 15 Changkuan Copper Limited 8,000 120 9,000 250 Company Lejie Ceramic Sanitary Ware Limited 60,000 8,000 20,000 1,000 Company Jinyonglong Ceramic Limited 8,000 285 6,000 200 Company Xingtai Ceramic Limited Company 5,000 1,500 3,000 120 Fulong Industrial Park Beihai Metal Products Plant 700 500 1,000 Xi Tile Factory 300 100 300 10 Jianxing Electroplating Plant 2,000 2,000 2,000 30 Fire-Resistant Brick Factory 200 20 200 15 Yangxing Chemical Plant 1,000 1,000 800 10 Gaoshu Textile Fibre Limited 500 100 1,000 Company Xiamao Industrial Park Henghe Finished Products Plant 300 300 500 13 Yunxin Non-Ferrous Metal Limited 200 200 500 15 Company Zhongnan Resources 3,500 1,800 2,600 70 Zhongshan Footwear Factory 200 100 150 Hualian Plastic Limited Company 150 150 100 Huali Metal Limited Company 1,300 1,300 1,000 33 Shangshou Industrial Metal Limited 1,300 700 500 20 Company Glassed Steel Plant 100 80 100 Non-Ferrous Metal Limited 100 100 500 Company Fengge Clothes-Hanger Limited 300 300 500 13 Company Other Locations Senyu Furniture Manufacturing 100 60 300 Guangdong Recycling Company 1,000 100 3,000 150 Sihui Ciji Recycling Limited 1,500 300 3,000 38 Company Jade Processing Plant 200 100 500 Sources: “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”). Yew Chiew Ping 147 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Figure 6.1 Satellite Map of Longwan Ceramic Industrial Zone Source: Available at http://uemap.com/window/moon/sihui.html, accessed 14 May 2009. In seeking to maximize careers and other self-interests, therefore, local officials were not averse to violating laws. The next section probes into a case of land expropriation and illegal land use conversion in Xiamao town and traces how it had become a contentious issue for villagers and the town government, eventually resulting in the demotion of the town’s Party secretary in 2007. Land Expropriation in Village S Village S is a natural village in Xiamao town of Sihui. As with most other villages in the town, village S relies on fish rearing for a livelihood. More than 100 villagers, or one-third of its population, have jobs outside the village. According to the VC governing village S and seventeen others, the average annual income of a villager is 5,362 yuan, which is higher than the average annual income at both the town and county levels.25 25 Interview with Nantang VC, October 2007, Sihui. See also Sihui nianjian 2005, pp. 26. Yew Chiew Ping 148 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion In 2002, Xiamao town government commenced to expropriate land for the construction of the Longwan ceramic industrial park. To erect the industrial park, the town government requisitioned 4,000 mu of land from eight natural villages including village S. At that time, there were no village group leaders representing village S. The town government took advantage of this and forced villagers to consent to unreasonable terms. In giving up their rights to use the land over the next 50 years, villagers were supposed to receive, through the village collective, land compensation, resettlement subsidies, and compensation for young crops and attachments on the requisitioned land. The amount of compensation was as follows: 400 yuan per mu for fish ponds and cultivated land; 130 yuan per mu for hilly land; 120 yuan per mu for each fruit tree and an annual compensation of 400 yuan for the next 50 years. A town official said that a villagers’ meeting was held to announce the requisition and compensation scheme, which was attended by 80 percent of the villagers, out of which the majority agreed to the compensation amount. Despite the meeting, villagers said they had no idea of how the compensation amounts were derived. They also had not seen any official notice on the requisition.26 However, villagers later learned that factory owners paid 80,000 yuan for every mu of land. This price alone was already higher than the 20,000 yuan which each dispossessed villager was supposed to receive in instalments over 50 years.27 A survey conducted in 2006 and spanning 30 provinces and 1,538 landless farmers shows that more than 95 percent of the villagers had not seen any government documents and notices on the requisition of land; over 85 percent had not participated in any meeting pertaining to land expropriation whereas more than 70 percent were unclear about the exact sum of compensation offered by the government. Li Yanqiong and Jia Rongmei, “Chengshihua guocheng zhong tudi zhengyong yu guanli wenti de lixing fansi” (“A rational reflection on land expropriation and management issues in the urbanization process”), Jingji xuejia (The Economist), No.5 (2006), pp. 84-90. 27 The payment of compensation by instalment is not rare in China. Despite the relatively low compensation price as compared to land appreciation value and the high returns accruing to the local government, dispossessed peasants are often deprived of their deserved compensation. According to China’s Land Administration Law, “the total land compensation and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times the average annual output value of the requisitioned land for the three years preceding such requisition.” Based on this, if a farmer owned one mu of land with an average annual output value of 1,000 yuan, the highest compensation he or she may get is but a mere 30,000 yuan. See Zhang Hong, “Tudi zhengyong guocheng,” pp. 67. A nationwide survey conducted by Renmin University and the Rural Development Institute (RDI) in 2005 also reveals that among villagers who received compensation in 70 percent or 353 out of 507 instances of land expropriation, 272 received one-time payment, 65 received payment in instalments, and 16 received both one-time payment and instalments. See Ye Jianping et al, “2005 nian zhongguo nongcun tudi shiyongquan diaocha yanjiu” (A survey and 26 Yew Chiew Ping 149 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Villagers’ grievances over land and compensation terms were heightened by pollution from factories built on expropriated land. Those who did not sign the land expropriation agreement were gradually coerced into doing so. The authorities forcibly detained villagers who refused to comply on the pretext that the latter had “hampered their work.” Thus reluctant as they were, villagers had no choice but to give in and sign the agreement. From the past experience of nearby villages, villagers were concerned that the factories in the industrial park might pollute the underground water they consumed. For instance, in 2005, a metal processing factory polluted villagers’ fish ponds resulting in the death of fishes while others caused severe air pollution. Years ago, there was a “cancer village” in which many villagers contracted cancer, supposedly due to pollution from a nearby factory.28 To placate the villagers, Xiamao town government agreed to supply running water to every household in the village. Predictably, this promise did not materialize even when the first factory began operating in 2007. Villagers soon found that their well water had turned darkish in colour. Alarmed, they sought assistance from the VC, town mayor and other officials, who pushed the responsibility to other authorities. After three months of having to draw water from a distant well a few kilometres away, frustrated villagers blocked the only road to the industrial park with rocks, denying factory operators and workers access to the sole operating factory in the park. For over 20 days from July to August 2007, tens of villagers took turns to guard over the road block. The town Party secretary’s “offer” to make each household pay 1,000 yuan for the supply of running water was rejected by the villagers, who also demanded the return of some expropriated land. After villagers repeatedly replaced road blocks that were removed by police authorities, the town government study of land use rights in China’s villages in 2005”), Guanli shijie (Management World), No. (2006), pp. 79. The survey spans 17 provinces, 1,773 villages and 1,962 rural households. 28 Interview with Nantang villager, July 2007, Sihui. Yew Chiew Ping 150 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion dispatched over a hundred police to surround village S and disperse resistors by force. Around ten villagers were detained for around two weeks at the local police post. The incident accrued huge losses for the ceramic-glaze manufacturer whose factory stopped running for close to one month. After talking to the villagers, the factory operator pinned the blame on the town Party secretary, whom he suspected had failed to execute proper land expropriation procedures.29 He then lodged a complaint to the central authorities who, through satellite surveillance, discovered that the industrial park was an illegal development that proceeded without the approval of the land bureau. The town Party secretary was subsequently suspended of his duties and transferred to a local government department, effectively a demotion. However, disputes over village land remained unresolved. This incident shows that local officials have to tread carefully when maximizing careers through converting agricultural land to spur industrialization as the tables may be turned on them. As Hsing observes, Because development projects are financed by bank loans, township officials are often under great pressure to remove the peasants and clear the sites for the construction to start as fast as possible. They also have to be skilful enough not to trigger conflicts that will lead to villagers’ shangfang (personal visits to lodge complaints to higher-level governments) or xinfang (letter visits) . . . [which] could not only delay development projects seriously, but also have negative effects on cadres’ performance evaluation.30 In other words, officials have to weigh the pros and cons when seeking to maximize their careers. It may be argued that Xiamao town officials had little room to manoeuvre since the quota for construction land was low and vast expanse of the land was agricultural. In order to provide developable land for industries, which bring in tax revenues for the town, town Party secretary had to take calculated risks to Villagers of village S, for example, alleged that town cadres received from factory owners a rebate of 300 yuan for each mu of land sold to factories. 30 Hsing, “Brokering Power and Property,” pp. 108-109. 29 Yew Chiew Ping 151 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion convert land illegally.31 The strategy of leasing agricultural land from villagers without state requisition and then converting it to industrial use had been largely rewarding for the town government, considering the awards accorded to it by the proindustrialization county-level government. Ensuing events, however, led to the downfall of the Xiamao town Party secretary. Villagers’ unhappiness over the sum of land compensation could have been quelled if it was not subsequently aggravated by the pollution of their drinking water. By dismissing the villagers’ pressing concerns, town officials triggered their collective resistance, which hindered the operation of the ceramic plant and incurred the wrath of the investor. The county government could not suppress the matter because it was brought to the attention of the central government.32 The demotion of the town Party secretary appeared to be a temporary measure to answer to the central authorities and appease all other parties involved in the conflict.33 The Predatory State? Some states may extract such large amounts of otherwise investable surplus and provide so little in the way of “collective goods” in return that they indeed impede economic transformation. It seems reasonable to call these states “predatory” . . . Those who control the state apparatus seems to plunder without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for its prey.34 To what extent does Evans’ description of the predatory state describe Sihui’s officials’ behaviour in expropriating collectively-owned land for industrialization and urbanization? The following sections analyze government expenditures in Sihui, its history of governance, and the externalities created in the process of land It has been suggested that the handing down of economic targets or quotas from upper levels induces lower rank officials to seek investments through extensive land use conversion even if it entails the violation of land use regulations. See Yang You-Ren Daniel and Wang Hung-Kai, “Dilemmas of Local Governance,” pp. 1049. 32 It is hard to believe that the county government was unaware of the illegal nature of the land conversion as land quotas are clearly specific in the land use plans of the county and the town. 33 According to a local informant, the town Party secretary was later transferred to a county-level department to take charge of drawing investments. Other town cadres were also implicated. The chief of the town economic office, for instance, was also relegated to oversee the town’s hygiene instead. 34 Peter B. Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. (1989), pp. 562. 31 Yew Chiew Ping 152 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion development to assess if local government behaviour had been detrimental to the society. Government Expenditures and Collective Goods Sihui had a history of high crime rates, murders and serious crimes. Despite frequent crackdowns on crimes, incidence of criminal cases remained high and public security poorly enforced. Sihui, together with Duanzhou and Huaiji in the Zhaoqing prefecture, had been permeated with problems of drugs, prostitution, gambling, thefts, and robberies. In a crackdown on crimes from 2001 to 2003, Zhaoqing prefecture arrested 33,325 suspects, seized numerous guns, bullets, bombs and other weapons, heroine and other drugs, and dealt with 623 cases of severe crimes including murder, assault, arson, rape, kidnap, and bombing.35 Local residents of Sihui affirmed that public security left much to be desired.36 Their accounts are corroborated by remarks of residents and visitors in media reports: a grassroots leader said that break-ins and robberies were common occurrences in her neighbourhood; a practicing doctor observed that violent crimes, petty thefts and robberies took place frequently in the five years on the street where he run his medical clinic; jade traders from other regions spoke of the necessity of arming themselves for protection against robbers when they were in Sihui.37 “Lishi liangnian, quanmin canzhan, defang bingju, quebao anning” (“The entire society participated in the crackdown on crimes for two years to ensure security”), 28 April 2003, available at http://cn.icchina.com, accessed April 2009. 36 Fieldwork in Xiamao town, Sihui, October 2007. 37 “Sihuishi san da zhanlüe pojie gongan fazhan san da nanti” (“Sihui employs three key strategies to resolve three key problems in the development of public security”), Renmin gonganbao (People’s Police News), November 2008, pp. 08. 35 Yew Chiew Ping 153 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Another point raised by interviewees is the poor quality of governance.38 When asked to explain the county’s relative backwardness, a local resident remarked, Although Sihui is located on the fringe of the Pearl River Delta, it is littleknown so investors not know what it has that is worth investing. Sihui actually has rich resources but the government does not know how to make the most out of them. In the past few years, the oranges and tangerines festival created some reputation for Sihui but this specialty of Sihui has not claimed a large market share. This is a pity. And yet the government is only passionate about “face projects” that waste both labour and money. In terms of governance, the government operates with low transparency and is weak in legal enforcement, failing to fulfil its responsibilities very well.39 Another local resident, a tangerine farmer, lamented that two short stretches of roads leading to the tangerine market were poorly constructed and very bumpy. Residents in most of the towns commute to the city district via these roads, especially during the harvest season when farmers transport their tangerines to the market for sale. “After five or six years, the government still has not repaired these roads. How can they claim to care about us farmers?” Considering that tangerines are a specialty of Sihui and the local farmers’ main source of income, these poignant remarks are rather revealing on what the government’s priorities are.40 A breakdown of Sihui’s government expenditures from 1997 to 2004 shows that government administrative expenses and operating expenses of government departments ranged from 58 to 62 percent of total expenditure every year (see Table 6.5). Among these expenses, an annual average of 77 percent was spent on administrative expenses, retirement funds, operating expenses of the education, For other incidents in Sihui’s history of governance that not reflect well on its government, refer to Zhao Donghui, “‘Ranguanban’ chengle ‘shouqianban’” (“’Fuel management office’ turns into a ‘moneycollecting office’”), Xinhua meiri dianxun (Xinhua Daily News Bulletin), 25 April 2002, pp. 001; Zhao Donghui, “Sihui shifu jinji kaihui zhenggai ‘ranguanban’” (“Sihui government calls for emergency meeting to reform ‘fuel management office’”), Xinhua meiri dianxun (Xinhua Daily News Bulletin), 30 April 2002, pp. 006; “Hei’e shili zenyang qinshi jiceng zhengqquan” (“How dark forces invade and erode grassroots political power”), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan (New Watch Weekly), 21 November 2005, pp. 22-24; Sun Xing, “Weihe heishehui hengxing wunian wuren guan” (“Why secret society run amuck for five years”), Falü yu shenghuo (Law and Life), No. 11 (2005), pp. 32-34. 39 Interview with Sihui resident, Sihui, October 2007. 40 Interview with Sihui resident, Sihui, October 2007. 38 Yew Chiew Ping 154 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion taxation and other departments. Little, however, was spent on the armed police force and police force (0.5 percent annually) despite the high crime rates in Sihui. Although the lack of funds might also have impaired the capacity of the local police in law enforcement, the crux of the matter is the government’s lack of discernment or nonchalance over the state of public security in Sihui. Government expenses on collective goods and support for agriculture were also insignificant compared to the annual average of 53 percent taken up by government bodies. An average of 7.6 percent was spent on city maintenance and sewage discharge every year. Social welfare and security, subsidy to less developed regions within Sihui only constituted an average of 4.3 percent every year. Support for agricultural production and operating expenses of agricultural departments only took up an average of 12.5 percent annually, despite Sihui’s predominantly agricultural population. Together, capital construction, enterprise innovation and promotion of science and technology took up another 8.7 percent of the total expenses annually. Furthermore, in contrast to the large amount of land proceeds outlined in the previous chapter, government expenditure on paid land use (tudi youchang shiyongfei zhichu) for developing and organizing agricultural land to replace newly added construction land was only 4.71 million yuan from 2000 to 2004.41 Sihui nianjian 2001, pp. 529 ; Sihui nianjian 2002, pp. 247 ; Sihui nianjian 2003, pp. 239 ; Sihui nianjian 2004 pp. 251-52; Sihui nianjian 2005, pp. 266-67. 41 Yew Chiew Ping 155 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Table 6.5 Some Expenditures of Sihui’s Government (10,000 yuan) Item 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Support for agricultural production and operating expenses of agricultural department Percentage of total expenditure Pension and relief funds for social welfare Social security Support for less developed regions SUBTOTAL Percentage of total expenditure City maintenance Sewage discharge SUBTOTAL Percentage of total expenditure Government administrative expenses Government departments retirement funds Operating expenses of education department Operating expenses of public health department Operating expenses of industrial, transport, commercial departments Operating expenses of circulation departments Operating expenses of culture, sports and broadcasting Operating expenses of police force Expenditure of armed police force Expenditure of public security organs Operating expenses of taxation and other departments SUBTOTAL Percentage of total expenditure Capital construction Enterprise innovation funds Science and technology promotion SUBTOTAL 1526 1768 2076 2817 4012 3716 4183 4958.5 10.7 295 14 309 2.2 450 217 976 6.9 2120 3555 561 234 11.5 296 22 323 2.1 493 230 1046 6.8 2127 3785 611 225 10.8 304 141 14 459 2.4 523 261 1243 6.5 2220 1131 4078 705 269 13.2 530 326 865 4.0 500 300 1665 7.8 2271 1713 4544 667 138 14.9 700 274 1055 2029 7.5 501 300 2830 10.5 2683 2015 6325 705 95 12.1 784 313 24 1121 3.6 647 300 2068 6.7 3097 2488 7211 916 296 12.3 904 571 373 1848 5.4 786 230 2864 8.4 3201 2649 7331 839 658 13.1 903.2 589.9 301 1794.1 4.8 568.8 217 2579.9 6.8 3784.1 3069 7639.3 1532.3 382.7 374 39 31 907 1008 8829 62.1 140 415 40 595 413 28 20 1224 1000 9433 61.2 109 548 657 1443 33 28 1025 719 11651 60.5 1067 565 720 2352 58 520 58 18 1168 655 11810 55.3 958 403 653 2014 54 525 90 25 1666 1238 15421 57.3 907 533 414 1854 57 638 52 27 1456 2674 18912 61.4 1610 460 513 2583 53 625 45 20 2060 2386 19867 58.3 2248 785 635 3668 72.3 790.5 75.6 26.6 2378.5 2417.1 22168 58.8 1969.5 1110 508 3587.5 Yew Chiew Ping 156 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Percentage of total expenditure 4.2 4.3 12.2 9.4 6.9 8.4 10.8 9.5 TOTAL EXPENDITURE 14225 15422 19265 21368 26899 30806 34054 37727.3 Sources: Sihui nianjian 1998, pp. 220 ; Sihui nianjian 1999, pp. 256 ; Sihui nianjian 2000, pp. 233 ; Sihui nianjian 2001, pp. 529 ; Sihui nianjian 2002, pp. 247 ; Sihui nianjian 2003, pp. 239 ; Sihui nianjian 2004 pp. 251-52; Sihui nianjian 2005, pp. 266-67. Yew Chiew Ping 157 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion EXTERNALITIES Idle Land and Wastage of Resources Land use conversion carried out with the aim of reaping short term gains has often resulted in the wastage and underutilization of land resources. For instance, the proliferation of development zones, often championed by local cadres as the answer to industrialization, has resulted in large areas of idle land that was expropriated from rural peasants and left in a desolate state due to a lack of investors, funds or other reasons.42 In Sihui, the total area of idle land was 163.6 hectares or 2454.4 mu in 1997.43 In 2000, under the regulations and guidelines in newly promulgated government documents such as the “Temporary Regulations on the Handling of Sihui City’s Idle Land,” Sihui Land Bureau dealt with 108 cases of idle land. Construction on 242 mu of land was expedited and put into use; the land use rights of 1,045 mu of land were retracted; 2,216 mu of idle land were assigned to other usage and the deadline for construction on 34 mu of land was extended.44 Yet in 2007, Sihui still had 22 cases or 1120.67 mu of idle land. The culprits that left large areas of undeveloped land for the longest period were mainly manufacturing and metal processing plants located in development zones.45 In addition, 3,000 mu of land in the Longwan Ceramic Industrial Zone located in Xiamao, which was found to be acquired illegally – the town authorities had leased land from villagers instead of going through proper requisition – was also in limbo. According to a town official, part of this tract of land was converted back into arable land for the cultivation of corn but He Shujin and Su Guangquan, “Kaifaqu xianzhi tudi chengyin jizhi jileixing huafen” (“The casual mechanism and types of idle land in development zones”), Ziyuan kexue (Resources Science), Vol. 23, No. (2001), pp. 17-19; Wang Jun, “Zengzhang quxiang,” pp. 57. Compared to other countries, the percentage of land for industrial use in China is much higher at over 20 percent. See Cao Jianhai, “Lun woguo tudi guanli zhidu yu chongfu jianshe zhi guanlian” (“On the relationship between China’s land management system and duplicate construction”), Zhongguo tudi (China Land), No. 11 (2004), pp. 12-13. 43 Guangdong dizheng dichan nianjian 1998 (Yearbook of Guangdong Land Governance and Land Resources 1998), Yuan Zheng et al. (eds.), (Guangdongsheng ditu chubanshe, 1998), pp. 286. 44 Guangdong guotu ziyuan nianjian 2001 (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook 2001), Jiang Donghai et al. (eds.), (Guangdongsheng ditu chubanshe, 2002), pp. 267. 45 Ou Xing, “Sihui panhuo shangqian mu xianzhi tudi” (“Sihui revitalizes over one thousand mu of idle land”), Xijiang ribao (Xinjiang Daily), June 2007, http://www.zq.net.cn, accessed 11 June 2008; “Gonggao” (“Announcement”), Sihuishi guotu ziyuanju (Sihui Land Bureau), http://www.guotuju.gdsihui.gov.cn, June 2007, accessed 11 June 2008. 42 Yew Chiew Ping 158 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion most was still lying idle as the construction of factories had halted and investments were rescinded.46 It may be argued that idle land is a result of the indiscriminate use of land as an instrument to promote industrialization. Pollution and Unsustainable Development According to an official in the environmental protection bureau, heavy pollution industrial enterprises constituted a substantial part of Sihui’s GDP.47 Statistics from 1990 to 2001 show that electroplating, bleaching and dyeing, leather, pharmaceutical, biochemical contributed more than 40 percent to Sihui’s gross industrial output value each year.48 Incidentally, Sihui had been one of south China’s regions with the highest incidence of nasopharyngeal cancer since the 1970s.49 Although there has been no conclusive findings on what caused the high incidence of cancer in Sihui, a study spanning 1989 to 1998 finds that Sihui residents whose source of drinking water was the Longjiang river – one of Sihui’s rivers polluted by the discharge of industrial waste – were more likely to contract nasopharyngeal cancer than those consuming other sources of water in Sihui.50 Apart from the health hazards, Sihui’s over-reliance on heavy pollution industries has other political repercussions that undermine the sustainability of its development. In Interview with town official in Xiamao, October 2007. Zhong Qizhen and Fu Yongkang, “Tanmi ‘Du shui he’” (“Investigating the Dushui river”), Huanjing (Environment), No. (2008), pp. 34-35. 48 Sihui tongji nianjian 1990-2001, pp. 154-55. 49 Huang Qihong, Li Yanhua, Wen Falin, Xu Yiwei, Ling Wei and Lin Xiao, “Sihuishi 1971-2000 nian biyanai fabing dongtai fenxi” (“Analysis of the incidence of nasopharyngeal carcinoma in Sihui from 1971 to 2000”), Quanguo zhongliu liuxing bingxue he zhongliu bingyinxue xueshu huiyi (National conference on cancer and its causes), 2007. 50 Guo Yin, Luo Futian, Jiang Wenqi, Liu Guohui and Zheng Yingdong, “Yingying xiaodiyu fenxi moxing yanjiu Sihuishi biyanai de fabing yinsu” (“Study on the incidence factors of nasopharyngeal carcinoma in Sihui using small area analysis model”), Aizheng (Cancer), Vol. 20, No. 11 (2001), pp. 1272-75. In November 2006, large numbers of dead fish surfaced on Longjiang river in Sihui city district. Investigation reveals that this is likely to be a result of water pollution – electroplating plants discharging waste water into the river. See Huang Yonghong and Xie Haibin, “Yi qi Longjianghe qunyu siwanshijian de diaocha” (“Investigation of a case of fish death in Longjiang river”), Zhiye yu Jiankang (Occupation and Health), Vol. 24, No. 24 (2008), pp. 2667-68. 46 47 Yew Chiew Ping 159 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion March 1999, the Nanjiang Industrial Park, which took up more than 7,000 mu of land, was set up within the Mafang Development Zone at the southern tip of Sihui adjacent to Sanshui district of Foshan. Among the industries in the Industrial Park were 18 electroplating plants that relocated from the then Nanhai city of Foshan. The perils of water pollution soon captured the attention of Foshan Deputies to the People’s Congress as the industrial park was located at the confluence of three rivers – Beijiang, River Sui and Xijiang – which flow downwards to Foshan. The deputies alleged that seven of the eight electroplating plants already in operation had discharged unprocessed waste water directly into Beijiang, which is the source of drinking water to Foshan and other cities in the Pearl River Delta. On 25 January 2000, the Guangdong Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau was subject to the interrogation of the Foshan deputies, which ended with the former sending a notice to Sihui Nanjiang Industrial Park to put a stop to the construction of electroplating plants. Yet because Sihui government was unable to pay the huge compensation of 200 million yuan required for their relocation, nine remaining plants continued their operation in the industrial park till the end of 2007, after which five moved to Sihui Longfu Industrial Park while the rest moved out of Sihui.51 The problem of water pollution, however, had not been eradicated after the industries moved from Nanjiang to Longfu. There were more than 30 heavy pollution industries, including over 20 electroplating plants and 15 bleaching and dyeing mills in Longfu, scattered around the 21 kilometres long Dushui river, whose water eventually flows into Beijiang too.52 In 2007, the Guangdong Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau imposed stringent rules to limit the approval for the setting up of industries around Dushui river. Zhaoqing prefecture government also vowed to relocate Yan Huaiqiang, “Huanbao menkan jiangdi de daijia” (“The price of lowering the standard for environmental protection”), Huanjing jingji (Environmental Economy), No. 55 (2007), pp. 60-61. 52 Zhong Qizhen and Fu Yongkang, “Tanmi Dushuihe,” pp. 34-35. 51 Yew Chiew Ping 160 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion electroplating plants and heavy pollution industries like leather processing, bleaching and dyeing mills, from the Dushui river region to other industrial parks before 2010 and upgrade the waste water processing capacity of 14 other electroplating plants by 2010.53 According to a manager of the Nanjiang Industrial Park, the Industrial Park contributed 20 percent to the city’s tax revenues. As Sihui’s economic development had lagged behind other counties of the Pearl River Delta, it had taken a reckless approach to the drawing of businesses and capital and neglected the sustainability of development.54 This seems to be typical of less developed counties in Zhaoqing (see Table 6.6). However, with the Nanjiang Industrial Park coming under the close scrutiny of the provincial government and the limitations imposed on industries around Dushui river, it is doubtful if Sihui can continue to rely on its strategy of achieving industrialization through the accommodation of heavy pollution industries. Table 6.6 Heavy Pollution Industries and GDP in Zhaoqing’s Counties Gaoyao Sihui GDP per capita (yuan) 13935 12891 Gross industrial output value 6196335 4821089 (thousand yuan) Textile 468639 264610 Leather, furs, down and related 582094 340485 products Papermaking and paper products 92579 20323 Raw chemical materials and 425151 146242 chemical products Medical and pharmaceutical 58959 products Nonmetal mineral products 752484 688508 Smelting and pressing of ferrous 5050 metal Smelting and pressing of nonferrous 136953 419478 metal Metal products 999783 1565163 Percentage of gross industrial 39.7 40.3 output value Source: Zhaoqing tongji nianjian 2006, pp. 229-30. Deqing 8555 1656533 Fengkai 8124 1278536 Guangning 7344 1515877 Huaiji 6581 1254193 51887 0 103929 21171 43171 526143 67439 276602 836346 108383 241660 102611 132140 269804 8904 26265 74900 84118 5369 50.6 48.0 76.5 29.5 Ibid. “Beijiang tiewan zhiwu, jiu da diandu qiye jiti banqian,” (“Beijiang eliminates pollution with an ironhand, nine main electroplating enterprises moved collectively”), Diyi caijing ribao (Top Financial and Economic News), 12 December 2006, pp. A04. 53 54 Yew Chiew Ping 161 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Conclusion Pursuing urbanization and industrialization through instrumental land use had been a strategy of the Sihui government in the past decade. In face of regional competition from neighbouring counties in the drawing of enterprises and capital, local officials had leased land use rights at low cost and diverted part of the land proceeds as monetary incentives for cadres who met these objectives.55 Responding to the calls of upper echelons to promote industrialization, some local officials had even resorted to illegal land use conversion to circumvent restrictions in the form of quotas for construction land imposed from top-down, at the risk of jeopardizing their careers. On one hand, the lack of resources had impeded local officials’ efforts in driving urbanization and industrialization in Sihui. First and foremost, developable land for construction is scarce given the large areas of mountainous and hilly terrain within its territory. Secondly, development may also be hampered by a lack of funds as Sihui’s expenditures had always exceeded its revenue. This may have impaired local government’s capacity in providing infrastructure to improve accessibility and enhance its competitiveness. Finally, the county’s reliance on heavy pollution industries is also partly path-dependent as it is unable to afford the high costs of reversing that path.56 In other words, it may be argued that Sihui does not have many options in its path of industrialization unlike the highly developed regions in the Pearl River Delta. Other counties in the region also offered land at low cost and tax returns to attract investments. See, for instance, Ningfu document no. 98 (2007), “Guanyu yinfa Guangningxian gongye xiangmu touzi youhui banfa de tongzhi” (“A notice on the promulgation of preferential measures for the investment of industrial items in Guangning county”). 56 Broadly, path-dependence refers to “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence.” Levi offers an alternative conception: “Path dependence has to mean . . . that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.” See Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No.2 (2000), pp. 254; Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map,” pp. 28. 55 Yew Chiew Ping 162 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion While recognizing that Sihui’s reckless pursuit of urbanization and industrialization may be partly attributed to the above constraints, there are evidence that the government is not wholly absolved of blame. Although local officials had maximized fiscal revenues and perhaps other private gains through appropriating land at low cost from peasants and leasing at high prices to property developers, little was spent in return on collective goods such as social welfare and security, support for agriculture, city maintenance and others. Moreover, the existence of idle land in a place where developable land is already scarce is sign of poor planning, lack of foresight, and indifference to the wastage of resources. Ambitious and unrealistic visions of urbanization and the channelling of funds to large-scale projects such as the Sihui People’s Square appear to be motivated by officials’ parochial self-interests rather than the interests of society. Recapitulating what has been said in Chapter Two, the demands of macro-processes such as industrialization and urbanization are not sufficient in accounting for the conversion of land to non-agricultural use in China. Neither flaws in China’s land system provide a complete answer. Instead, how much agricultural land local governments supply for conversion to other uses and what determines their capacity to supply land are crucial to understanding the land process. In this light, the political and fiscal institutions that shape cadres’ behaviour are important but a comprehensive study should also look into local conditions and the way these localspecific factors interact with cadres’ incentives in order to account for local variations in the patterns of land use change. Yew Chiew Ping 163 [...]... Two, the demands of macro-processes such as industrialization and urbanization are not sufficient in accounting for the conversion of land to non-agricultural use in China Neither do flaws in China s land system provide a complete answer Instead, how much agricultural land local governments supply for conversion to other uses and what determines their capacity to supply land are crucial to understanding... For instance, the proliferation of development zones, often championed by local cadres as the answer to industrialization, has resulted in large areas of idle land that was expropriated from rural peasants and left in a desolate state due to a lack of investors, funds or other reasons.42 In Sihui, the total area of idle land was 163 .6 hectares or 2454.4 mu in 1997.43 In 2000, under the regulations and... levels induces lower rank officials to seek investments through extensive land use conversion even if it entails the violation of land use regulations See Yang You-Ren Daniel and Wang Hung-Kai, “Dilemmas of Local Governance,” pp 1049 32 It is hard to believe that the county government was unaware of the illegal nature of the land conversion as land quotas are clearly specific in the land use plans of the. .. developable land is already scarce is sign of poor planning, lack of foresight, and indifference to the wastage of resources Ambitious and unrealistic visions of urbanization and the channelling of funds to large-scale projects such as the Sihui People’s Square appear to be motivated by officials’ parochial self-interests rather than the interests of society Recapitulating what has been said in Chapter...Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Figure 6. 1 Satellite Map of Longwan Ceramic Industrial Zone Source: Available at http://uemap.com/window/moon/sihui.html, accessed 14 May 2009 In seeking to maximize careers and other self-interests, therefore, local officials were not averse to violating laws The next section probes into a case of land expropriation and illegal land use conversion. .. caijing ribao (Top Financial and Economic News), 12 December 20 06, pp A0 4 53 54 Yew Chiew Ping 161 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion Conclusion Pursuing urbanization and industrialization through instrumental land use had been a strategy of the Sihui government in the past decade In face of regional competition from neighbouring counties in the drawing of enterprises and capital,... nianjian 2001, pp 529 ; Sihui nianjian 2002, pp 247 ; Sihui nianjian 2003, pp 239 ; Sihui nianjian 2004 pp 251-52; Sihui nianjian 2005, pp 266 -67 Yew Chiew Ping 157 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion EXTERNALITIES Idle Land and Wastage of Resources Land use conversion carried out with the aim of reaping short term gains has often resulted in the wastage and underutilization of land. .. guidelines in newly promulgated government documents such as the “Temporary Regulations on the Handling of Sihui City’s Idle Land, ” Sihui Land Bureau dealt with 108 cases of idle land Construction on 242 mu of land was expedited and put into use; the land use rights of 1,045 mu of land were retracted; 2,2 16 mu of idle land were assigned to other usage and the deadline for construction on 34 mu of land was... (Occupation and Health), Vol 24, No 24 (2008), pp 266 7 -68 46 47 Yew Chiew Ping 159 Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion March 1999, the Nanjiang Industrial Park, which took up more than 7,000 mu of land, was set up within the Mafang Development Zone at the southern tip of Sihui adjacent to Sanshui district of Foshan Among the industries in the Industrial Park were 18 electroplating plants... the county and the town 33 According to a local informant, the town Party secretary was later transferred to a county- level department to take charge of drawing investments Other town cadres were also implicated The chief of the town economic office, for instance, was also relegated to oversee the town’s hygiene instead 34 Peter B Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative . unaware of the illegal nature of the land conversion as land quotas are clearly specific in the land use plans of the county and the town. 33 According to a local informant, the town Party secretary. agricultural land. This section verifies the actual area of land converted for industrial use in Xiamao against the planned land area for industrial sites as drawn up in its land use plan. It suggests. Chapter Six The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion 6 The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion In examining officials’ motivations and incentives to convert agricultural land to non- agricultural