Chapter The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public Chapter of this thesis examined how the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy, perceived and considered the Singapore Naval Base from the time of the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936. Later chapters will investigate how the two Japanese armed forces planned and prepared for attacking British Malaya and Singapore. But how did the Japanese people, who were outside the decision-making process of the government, view the Singapore Naval Base? This chapter analyses Japanese attitude towards the Singapore Naval Base expressed by the Japanese commercial publishing media in the period between the two world wars. The Japanese society in this period had already become a highly literate society. Thanks to a universal compulsory primary education system, literacy rates were high even the most economically marginal group. In the late nineteenth century, the middle and upper classes provided the core readership for an expanding newspaper industry. By the 1920s, however, the reading habit spread to the labouring classes in urban and rural areas. According to a survey in 1919, among workers household in the Tokyo working-class neighbourhood of Tsukishima, 80 per cent of 659 workers subscribed to newspapers, and 18 per cent took two or more papers. In a Kyūshū mine, about half the workers surveyed subscribed, and in farm 90 villages near Tokyo the subscriber rate was 87 per cent. Surveys of Tokyo working women (nurses, teachers, clerks, typists, shop attendants, and tram workers) revealed that 88 per cent subscribed a paper. Readership was, of course, higher than subscriber rates. In 1922, the male population of day labourers in a Tokyo slam, 92 per cent of the single residents and 89 per cent of the heads of household could read and write. By 1927, the circulations of two Osaka-based most circulated dailies, Osaka Asahi Shinbun and Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, were over a million. Nine other dailies boasted circulations of between 100, 000 and 500, 000. The Japanese in this period－regardless of social classes, genders, living areas, or ages－informed themselves through the expanding commercial publishing media. It is worth examining how these people perceived and considered the Singapore Naval Base through the commercial publishing media. The stereotype image of Japan in the 1930s was a militaristic police state which exercised unlimited powers of political repression to coerce unwilling but helpless people into cooperating with the army’s expansion programme. But, as a historian, Louise Young, examined in her study of Japanese public perceptions of the Manchuria Incident, this stereotype exaggerated the reality too much. Since the introduction of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925, censorships were conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but only extreme views, mostly communists, were restricted by them. In reality, imperial jingoism was the product of the commercial mass Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp.58-61. 91 media. Dissident views were not silenced by government repression, but were drowned by louder voices in the mass media. In fact, the commercial publishing media－newspapers, magazines, and books－played a central role in promoting war in Manchuria without any urging from the government.2 It is worth considering whether the same media played a role in promoting war against Britain. In Britain, the Naval Estimate which included the budget for a new naval base in Singapore was presented to Parliament by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Leopold Amery, on 12 March 1923. From then onwards, the British plan was no longer a secret. It had been widely reported not only in the British Empire but also in Japan in the period between the two world wars. In Japan, from the time of the Washington Conference to the mid-1930s, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a unifying policy on the Singapore Naval Base. It was not desirable but was acceptable on condition that Britain supported Article 19 which prevented the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. However, for the Japanese public, not knowing the navy’s secret approval of the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference, its construction right after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a confusing act of the former ally. They could not understand why the former ally would construct a new naval base against them. From May 1923 onwards, the Japanese media paid attention to debates on the base in the British Parliament and the British Ibid, pp.55-114. 92 media: the Labour party and the Liberal party opposed the Conservative plan of establishing a new naval base. For Labour and Liberal, the plan went against the current of the new era exemplified by the League of Nations and the Washington Treaties. They questioned why Britain needed a new naval base in this new peaceful era. In May and June 1923, all leading Japanese newspapers expressed critical views on the naval base. Francis Piggott, who was the British Military Attaché stationed in Tokyo, recollected in his memoirs: “The decision to build the base, then to suspend work, and then to start again, during 1922 [sic] and subsequent years was followed with close attention in Japan, and “Singapore” was a frequent headline in the Japanese press”.3 This chapter analyses major trends in Japanese public perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base by examining typical articles and books which appeared in the Japanese commercial publishing media in the period between the two world wars. How did the Japanese people who were outside the policy making process perceive and discuss the topic? F. S.G. Piggott, Broken Thread, (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), p.197. He was a British Army officer who had lifelong relationships with Japan and close relationships with the Imperial Japanese Army. He stationed in Tokyo as a language officer from 1904 to 1906 and from 1910 to 1913, as Military Attaché two times: from 1922 to 1926 and 1936 to 1939. Before that, he spent his childhood years in Tokyo. As for the year the British government suspend works on the Singapore Naval Base, he mistakenly wrote as 1922 instead of 1924. 93 The First Perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base Scheme The Singapore Naval Base became a debating issue in the British Parliament in May 1923. Labour and Liberal opposed the Conservative plan of establishing a new naval base in Singapore. For Labour and Liberal, the plan would go against the current of the new era exemplified by the League of Nations and the Washington Treaties. They demanded to know why Britain needed a new naval base in the new peaceful era. In Japan, on May 1923, one of the leading newspapers, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, reported the debate in the British House of Commons under the title “Debate in the British House of Commons: The Singapore Naval Base Plan: Oppositions Asks Against Whom Britain Builds the Base?”, in which a Labour MP asked: “Against whom does Britain need the new base?” Another Labour MP asked whether the hypothetical enemy was Japan or the United States. He claimed that if the hypothetical enemy was Japan, Japan would regard it as British defiance. A Liberal MP, Lambert, asked whether the government had informed Japan of the plan, if not, he claimed it meant Britain insulted the League of Nations.4 From then on, Japanese newspapers continued to report the British Singapore Naval Base debate in Britain. Later that month, on 23 May Tokyo Asahi Shinbun expressed anxiety about the naval base plan in its leader entitled “Ayaururu Kafu-Jōyaku No Seishin (The Spirit of the Washington Treaty is in Danger)”. It argued: “The establishment of the naval base, therefore, as explained by Mr. Amery, First Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, May 1923, p.2. 94 Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, does not conflict with the Treaty from a legal point of view. But is the establishment of a powerful base in the Pacific only one year after the Naval Treaty was signed in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty?”5 Another paper, Kokumin Shinbun wrote on June that “At any rate the establishment of the Singapore naval base is not in contravention of the Washington Treaty and Great Britain is at liberty to it. Yet what we must bear in mind is that the Singapore base will become the centre of activity for the Anglo-Saxons in the West Pacific and it is an indisputable fact that that race will rule the world. The country that would feel oppressed between the two Anglo-Saxon peoples is Japan. While there are naval bases of the United States on the other side of the Pacific, Britain is going to establish the Singapore base on this side.” All other Japanese newspapers expressed similar views. There was a unified view on the Singapore Naval Base among Japanese newspapers. In May and June, they criticised two points. First, it could only be aimed at Japan. Second, even though the British plan did not violate the letter of the Washington Treaty, it infringed on the spirit of the treaty. They expressed regrets for the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore. At that time, for the Japanese, Britain was not just a foreign country. Since the Meiji Restoration, Britain had been the symbol of modernisation and Western civilisation. To become a country like Britain and gain equality with Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 23 May 1923, p.3; It was translated to English with some other newspaper articles in the Foreign dispatch from British Embassy in Tokyo to Foreign Office dated on July. TNA, FO 371/9225, 113-130. TNA, FO 371/9225, 113-130. 95 the Western powers were the consistent national imperatives. When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ratified in 1902, the Japanese rejoiced over the news. There were celebration parties all over Japan so that the prices of the national flags of Britain and Japan as well as those of champagne doubled.8 A newspaper, Jiji Shinpō, wrote: “It was only forty or so years since Japan had opened its doors to the world community, and barely five or six years earlier that it had demonstrated its power to the world in the Sino-Japanese War; it was now able to attain, quite suddenly, full status as a world entity among the most powerful nations. It looks as though it is but a captivating dream.”9 The Japanese dream had come true. They recognised Japan had finally become a country which could associate with Britain on equal terms. During the time of the Versailles Conference and the Washington Conference, the Japanese media widely used the word, Go Taikoku, which meant the five great powers: Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy. By using the word, Go Taikoku, the Japanese media tickled Japanese vanity that Japan had truly become a country which was regarded as equal to Western powers. The League of Nations and the Washington Treaties became the symbols of the new era for many Japanese in which Japan participated as one of the great powers. The British announcement of a plan to build a new naval base in Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p.2. Kiyoshi Ikeda, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, in Fraser, T.G. and Lowe, Peter (eds), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), p.30. Jiji Shinpō, Editorial “The Effect of the Anglo-Japanese Accord”, on 14 February 1902, cited from Ikeda Kiyoshi, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, p.30. 96 Singapore came totally out of the blue for the Japanese. Even though their government substantially approved the British plan, it had been decided secretly. When the ordinary Japanese first knew of it, they were disappointed. For them, to propose a new naval base plan right after the enactment of the Washington Treaties was a confusing act. Was the new era of World peace not coming? Why did Britain need a new base in the Pacific? All the leading Japanese newspapers claimed that the plan violated the spirit of the Washington Treaties. Even though it did not violate any article of the Washington Treaties, it violated the spirit of the new era. The Japanese government, however, could not criticise the British plan owing to the fact that it had substantially approved it at the Washington Conference. The British Embassy in Tokyo perceived a media campaign against the Singapore Naval Base and reported it to London. Captain Colvin, the British Naval Attaché stationed in Tokyo, submitted a report to the British Embassy in Tokyo on 29 June 1923, in which he compiled several articles which were critical of the Singapore Naval Base with English translations. The report was sent to the Foreign Office on July. He commented that: “All the articles are unfavourable to the contemplated Naval Base at Singapore mainly on the ground that it is a breach of the spirit of the Washington Treaties and can only be aimed at Japan. Official Naval opinion is naturally better informed on this point and while not viewing the Singapore base project with much favour, realises that Great Britain has not infringed in any way the letter or 97 spirit of the Washington Treaty in this matter.”10 At the Washington Conference, the Japanese delegates accepted the British plan to build a new naval base in Singapore on condition that Britain accepted Article 19 of the Washington Treaty which prevented the United States from establishing advanced naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. However, this acceptance was a secret decision. The Japanese public did not know about it. On the other hand, France had not yet ratified the Washington Treaties due to domestic reasons, so that the treaties were not put into effect, which exacerbated Japanese anxiety.11 Yomiuri Shinbun wrote on 29 June that “Japan was being seriously inconvenienced internally and diplomatically owing to the delay in the ratification of the naval Treaty by France.” 12 Newspapers spoke for the Japanese who welcomed the new era symbolised by the Washington Treaties. It is highly likely that the readers were disappointed by the British Singapore Naval Base plan and the French non-ratification of the Washington Treaties. Real-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō, told Colvin, at an informal luncheon at Colvin’s house, that “the non-ratification of the treaty by France created a very serious situation for Japan―not only from the naval point of view but also politically”13. Although all the leading Japanese newspapers expressed regrets for the Singapore scheme, the Japanese government officially avoided direct TNA, FO 371/9225, 118, “Report No.13 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché, dated on 29 June 1923”. 11 France finally ratified the Washington Treaties in August that year. 12 Extracted from English Translated version in TNA, FO 371/9225, 131. 13 TNA, FO 371/9225, 141-142, Report No.14 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché, dated on July 1923. There was no mention of the Singapore Naval Base in this report. 10 98 criticisms. In an interview with The Times correspondent, Count Uchida Yasuya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that “It [Singapore Naval Base] conflicted in many ways with the spirit of the Washington Treaty, but it was a British internal affair, and Japan could not interfere.”14 Admiral Takarabe Takeshi, the Minister of the Navy, said that “Japan must now look to national defence since Singapore is two days only from Formosa.”15 They intimated regrets or expressed some indirect critical views as public statements, but did not criticise the British plan directly. On September, the Great Kantō Earthquake hit Tokyo. Approximately one hundred thousand people died. It was the second greatest disaster in modern Japanese history, next to the Second World War. For several days after the earthquake, newspapers in Tokyo stopped printing. After that, reports of the Singapore Naval Base totally disappeared from newspapers for a while. Later that year, on December, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun claimed the necessity of a counter-scheme to the British plan to establish the naval base. It stipulated: “Singapore being outside the zone where the status quo as regards naval bases and fortifications are to be maintained under the Washington Treaty, Britain is at liberty to establish a naval base there… Since, however, from a national defence point of view, the Ministry of the Navy cannot overlook the matter, it will consult other ministries concerned and frame some counter-scheme.”16 However, the government and the Imperial Japanese Navy 14 15 The Times, 23 July 1923. Ibid. Tokyo Asahi, on December 1923; An English translation of this is in TNA, FO 371/10299, 33-34, Report No.20 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché, 16 99 he was not an officer on the active list. Also, it is inconceivable that his view represented the Imperial Japanese Navy in view of the fact that he had no experience of working for the Ministry of the Navy or the Navy General Staff. His last post was chief gunnery officer of the battleship Sagami. The main argument of Japan Must Fight Britain was the dangerous implications of the construction of the Singapore Naval Base. 69 Ishimaru argued that the British government explained that Britain needed the base to protect its trade routes, but if this was so, “it need not be designed to accommodate anything larger than light cruisers.”70 However, it was designed to accommodate the largest capital ships the Royal Navy had, so that “the British Government’s statement that the base is required solely for protection of trade routes is an empty excuse.”71 Ishimaru pointed out that the Singapore Naval Base, which was first proposed by Admiral Jellicoe, was constructed as a precaution against Japanese expansion. A British Fleet from home waters had little difficulty in operating from Singapore against Japan. Therefore, the argument that the Singapore base was a menace to Japan was an incontrovertible fact.72 He warned his readers: “It must be understood that our naval outlook is completely altered when it has to envisage operations conducted by a British Fleet based on Singapore and using Hong Kong as an 69 Kiyoshi Ikeda, “Japanese Strategy and the Pacific War, 1941-5” in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952, p.127. 70 Tōta Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain (London: Paternoster, 1937), p.190. 71 Ibid., p.191. 72 Ibid., pp.204-205. 127 advanced base.”73 What arouses our interest are his following remarks: “When Japan accepted at Washington a naval strength of 60 per cent, it was relying on the agreement to limit fortifications and bases in the Pacific. Our naval officers, at the time, were so much concerned about the United States that the possibility of a British base at Singapore never occurred to them. The few to whom it might occur, remembering the twenty years of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, regarded war with Britain as inconceivable, and could not see in a base at Singapore a threat to Japan. Our representatives included Hong Kong in the agreement, but entirely overlooked Singapore, the distance from which to Japan is around as half that from Hawaii”.74 Japan “accepted a ratio of 60 per cent of naval strength in comparison with those of Britain and the United States because we overlooked the base at Singapore. Therefore, Britain deceived us!” 75 What he wrote was incorrect. Britain did not deceive or manipulate Japan at the Washington Conference. He was not in a position to know that representatives of the Imperial Japanese Navy substantially accepted the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference on condition that Britain supported Article 19 which prevented the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. He claimed to know everything but did not. Ishimaru argued that a clash between Japan and Britain over China Ibid., p.199. Tōta Ishimaru, Nichi-Ei Sensō Ron (Anglo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Shunjunsha, 1937), p.262; Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, pp.198-199. 75 Ishimaru, Nichi-Ei Sensō Ron, p.273; Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, p.207. 73 74 128 and Southeast Asia would be inevitable: “Britain is already on the down grade: Japan has started on the up grade. The two come into collision because Britain is trying to hold on to what she has, while Japan must perforce expand. Territorial possessions and natural resources Britain has in abundance, she can afford to relinquish some. Japan has neither, and to her they are a matter of life and death”.76 After presenting the British threat the Singapore Naval Base imposed on Japan and advocating the inevitability of Anglo-Japanese confrontations to his readers, he moved on to discuss his supposed Anglo-Japanese war. He expressed his confidence in the ability of the Imperial Japanese Navy to hold its own or to defeat the British Fleet in a sea battle in the South China Sea, and concluded that Britain could avoid war only by reigning supreme in her domain, the southern Pacific, while leaving the western Pacific to Japan. In the earlier parts of the book, he aroused the reader’s anxiety by explaining the threat the Singapore Naval Base imposed on Japan, and in the latter parts he relieved the reader’s anxiety by advocating that the Imperial Japanese Navy could defeat the British Fleet. It was the common technique many writers of war scare literatures used in their books. Japanese naval officers did not take Ishimaru’s books seriously and regarded them as “rather ridiculous” as Captain Ōi Atsushi explained to a British naval historian, Arthur Marder.77 However, Ishimaru’s books were harmful to Anglo-Japanese relations both in Japan and Britain. In Japan, in the Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, p.317. Arthur, J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.23. 76 77 129 early to mid 1930s, he became one of the most prolific contributors to periodicals. He contributed similar war stories against Britain or the United States almost every month to magazines and commanded a large readership. Even though his views did not represent the views of the Imperial Japanese Navy, there was the possibility that radical young officers had the same or similar views. In Britain, according to Marder, it “made quite an impression in British naval circles. It was not so much the actual contents of the book that caused any concern as the fact that the author was believed to have been a guest student at the Naval Staff College”.78 But Ishimaru might go further than was acceptable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Imperial Japanese Navy. It has been well known that, in Japan in the 1930s, communist, socialist and anarchist materials were censored by authorities. But at that time, all publications including popular war scare literatures, like Ishimaru’s books and articles, were subject to censorship. Extreme views－both left and right－ were restricted by them. In 1939, Ishimaru was arrested and sentenced to one and half years for disclosing of military secrets. 79 He might have been arrested as a warning to writers who misled the public with war scare literatures filled with inaccurate information. A German journalist living in Japan, Arvid Balk published a book, Singapur: Englands Panzerfeste in Fernen Osten, in 1937. The Japanese translated version of it, Tōyō Heiwa no Kagi: Shingapōru Dai Konkyo-chi (The Key of Eastern Peace: the Singapore Grand Base), was published in 1938. He wrote in this book that 78 79 Ibid., p.24. Inose, The Century of the Black Ships, pp.326-327. 130 Japanese south-bound economic expansion was understandable because Japan had a population problem and the Japanese could produce goods which local people in the south could buy. If Britain tried to stop the legitimate Japanese economic expansion to the south by constructing the Singapore Naval Base, Anglo-Japanese confrontation would become inevitable.80 In the 1920s, the Japanese public were disappointed by the British construction plan. After Anglo-Japanese relations deteriorated over the Manchuria Incident, the Shanghai Incidents and Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations, writers of war scare literatures such as Ikezaki and Ishimaru asserted the inevitability of an Anglo-Japanese war. They explained dogmatically that the Japanese did not need to be afraid of the Singapore base. However, even though their books sold well, their views did not become dominant in Japan before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The Singapore Naval Base in Anti-British Movements The Sino-Japanese War broke out at Marco Polo Bridge on July 1937. By the end of that year, the Japanese forces occupied Nanjing, but could not defeat the Chinese Nationalists. It was after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War that anti-British feelings permeated widely in Japan. Faced with fiercer Chinese resistance than anticipated, the Japanese turned their eyes Arvid Balk (Translated by Yamauchi, Akira), Tōyō Heiwa no Kagi: Shingapōru Dai Konkyo-chi (The Key of Eastern Peace: the Singapore Grand Base) (Tokyo: Nihon Tanken Kyōkai, 1938). 80 131 on Britain and the Soviet Union as the backers of the Chinese Nationalists. The Japanese public considered what prevented quick victory was foreign assistance, especially British and Soviet assistance to the Chinese Nationalists. The war against China was not simply a war between China and Japan, otherwise Japan could have easily defeated the Chinese Nationalists.81 In this way, anti-British feelings grew rapidly. For example, Muto Teiichi, a nationalistic journalist, published a book untitled Eikoku o Utsu (Attacking Britain) in December 1937, in which he claimed that the Sino-Japanese War was “a war between Japan and the Soviet Union in different form, but at the same time and for more profound reasons a war between Japan and Britain”.82 The eruption of anti-British feelings aimed to demonstrate that the Sino-Japanese War was a process of breaking up the world order that Britain represented.83 At that time, a large number of articles claimed that Britain should leave East Asia. It was impossible for the scanty British China Fleet to confront the Japanese Combined Fleet. To take one example, a writer, Saitō Cyū, wrote an article “Gaisyū I’shoku!! Eikoku Kyokutō Kantai no Jutsuryoku Kentō (Could Defeat Instantly!! Analysing the British Far East Fleet)” in a Katusmi Usui, “A Consideration of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Japanese Views of Britain, 1937-41” in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952, p.81. 82 Teiichi Mutō, Eikoku o Utsu (Attacking Britain) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1937), p.3, cited from Yoichi Kibata, “Anglo-Japanese Relations from the Manchuria Incident to Pearl Harbor: Missed Opportunities?” in Ian Nish, Yoichi Kibata and John Chapman (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 81 1600-2000 Volume Two: The Political-Diplomatic Dimention, 1931-2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), p.18. Kiyoshi Ikeda, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, p.40. 83 132 magazine Hanashi in March 1938. Saitō wrote that Britain had no strength to simultaneously confront Germany in the North Sea, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the western Pacific. Britain could not send its fleet to the Far East because it had to defend its homeland and the Mediterranean from Germany and Italy. If an Anglo-Japanese war broke out, the British China Fleet would easily be annihilated by the Japanese fleet. Everyone knew that Britain possessed Hong Kong and Singapore. But, Japan, without fail, could occupy Hong Kong within ten days. If Britain lost Hong Kong, it would become difficult for Britain to attack Japan. To attack Japan from Singapore, the British Fleet would have to pass through either the Taiwan Strait or the Bashi Channel. They were ideal places for the Japanese fleet to intercept it. Therefore, it was almost impossible for Britain to attack Japan from Singapore. Even if Britain reinforced its China Fleet, the most it could was shut itself up in the Singapore Naval Base and defend India. In the meantime, Japan would hold the mastery of the seas east of the Malacca Strait. Consequently, the British China Fleet and the Singapore Naval Base were no more than a means to overawe China and oppress India. Britain should leave East Asia and devote itself to defending India. If Britain did conceive an ambition in China, it would be the end of the British Empire in East Asia.84 Maida Minoru expressed a more restrained view on the base in an academic article “Shingapōru Konkyochi Rekishi Oyobi Sono Seiji-teki Igi Cyū Saitō, “Gaisyū I’shoku!! Eikoku Kyokutō Kantai no Jutsuryoku Kentō (Could Defeat Instantly!! Analysing the British Far East Fleet)” in Hanashi (March, 1938), pp.16-23. 84 133 (History and Political Meaning of the Singapore Naval Base)” in June 1938.85 He explained Britain had three purposes of the Singapore Naval Base. The first purpose was military. Britain constructed the base to defend its territories and dominions from Japan in the Pacific and East Asia. The second purpose was to defend sea routes between its homeland and its possessions in the Pacific and East Asia. The third and most important purpose was to carry out its colonial policies. Britain had four types of colonies in the Pacific and East Asia. The first was its dominions: Australia and New Zealand. The second was India. The third was its Royal colonies: the Straits Settlement and Hong Kong. And the fourth was its protectorates: British Borneo and British Malaya. For Australia and New Zealand, Britain needed the base to preserve their loyalties to Britain. For India, Britain needed the base to overawe its independence movements. In the Straits Settlement, Hong Kong, British Malaya and British Borneo, there were anti-British movements among the Indian population and Kuomintang movements among the Chinese population. To control them, the base was useful. Also, Thailand was an independent country but it was in the British sphere of interests. To keep Thai loyalty to Britain, the base was useful. He implied at the end of this article that when discussing the Singapore Naval Base, it was wrong to discuss it only from military points of view. 86 Compared with the jingoistic war scare arguments appearing in the mass media at that time, Maida’s view was more restrained. He did not discuss in He retired as an editorial writer of Tokyo Asahi Shinbun in December 1933. Minoru Maida, “Shingapōru Konkyochi Rekishi Oyobi Sono Seiji-teki Igi (History and Political Meaning of the Singapore Naval Base)” in Hitotsubashi Ronsō (June, 1938), pp.48-70. 85 86 134 this article whether an Anglo-Japanese war would be inevitable or whether Japan could defeat Britain. Maida published it as an academic article. It is doubtful whether, even though it was not a pro-British article, he could publish it in the mass media, considering the eruption of jingoistic anti-British arguments appearing since the autumn of 1937. During the Tientsin Incident in the summer of 1939, anti-British movements in Japan reached their peak. On April 1939, the Chief of Customs at Tientsin and a collaborator with Japan, Ch’ êng His-kêng, was assassinated in the British concession in Tientsin. But the British concession authorities refused to hand over the culprits to the Japanese Northern China Army, so the Japanese Northern China Army sealed off the British and French concessions in Tientsin on 14 June. The British government made a stern protest to the Japanese government about the Japanese army’s action. This was the Tientsin Incident. During the Tientsin Incident, for the first time in Japanese history, anti-British feelings overwhelmed anti-American feelings and anti-Russian feelings. From the dual targets of hostility－Britain and the Soviet Union－the target shifted to Britain alone. Newspapers not only conducted an anti-British campaign but also sponsored anti-British gatherings.87 On 14 July, there was a “Tokyo Citizens’ Anti-British Meeting” in Tokyo jointly sponsored by all newspapers there. 65,000 Tokyo citizens participated in this meeting. They demonstrated at the British Embassy, the Kazu Nagai, “1939 Nen no Hai-Ei Undō (Anti-British Movement in 1939) in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu Kai (ed.) Shōwa ki no Shakai Undō (Social Movements in Shōwa Era) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1983), pp.226-236; Ikeda Kiyoshi, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, pp.40-41. 87 135 Ministry of War, the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.88 On that day, there were similar anti-British meetings all over Japan. The resolution of the “Tokyo Citizens’ Anti-British Meeting” proclaimed: “We, the seven million citizens of Tokyo, embodying the rising aspirations of Asian peoples, have determined upon a thorough bombing of Britain, the enemy of justice and humanity. Britain must abandon all its mistaken beliefs, return the concessions to China, and without delay leave the land of East Asia”.89 The anti-British media campaign continued until anti-American feelings returned to overwhelm anti-British feelings in November 1939 when the mercurial Japanese mass media started blaming that the United States was behind China and Britain.90 During the Tientsin Incident, numerous Anglo-Japanese war stories appeared. Japan should kick Britain out of East Asia. If Britain would not leave, Anglo-Japanese war in East Asia would become inevitable. What was their most striking feature was that they were Anglo-Japanese war stories, not war stories against Anglo-American allies, in which Japan could easily defeat Britain. There were two choices for Britain: either leave China or be kicked out of China by Japan. For example, Fukunaga Kyōsuke, a popular war scare writer, especially popular among children, wrote an article entitled “Eikoku no Tainichi Sekuen o Abaku (Disclosing British Plans Against Japan)” in a 88 Katsumi Usui, “A Consideration of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Japanese Views of Britain, 1937-41”, p.88. 89 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, editorial on 15 July 1939; Kiyoshi Ikeda, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”,p. 30. 90 Tomoko Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 1931-1941”, p.547. 136 magazine Hinode in October 1939. It was written just before the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. He wrote that Japan could easily annihilate the British China Fleet and the British East Indian Fleet, and hold command of the sea in East Asia and the Indian Sea. Trade routes between the British homeland and its territories in Asia and the Pacific would be cut by Japan. In this situation, Britain could not import tea from Ceylon, raw cotton and jute from India, meat, butter and wheat from Australia and New Zealand, and oil and rubber from British Borneo. Consequently, if Britain chose to confront Japan, it could not exist. Should Britain try to send its fleet from Europe, even though it was almost impossible considering the situations in Europe, it would take at least two months. This would be enough time for Japan to occupy Singapore. During the Tientsin Incident, in July 1939, Ikezaki Tadayoshi published a book, Eikoku no Kyokutō Sakusen: Shingapōru Konkyochi (The British Strategy for the Far East: The Singapore Base), in which he wrote about the history of Singapore, the geography of Singapore, and the Singapore Naval Base. Commercially, it was the best time for him and the publishing house to publish an anti-British book. The conclusion of this book was that, even if Britain built a huge naval base in Singapore, the Japanese did not need to be afraid of it. What he claimed was the invincibility of the Imperial Japanese Navy. There was no fleet in the Singapore Naval Base. Considered with tensions in Europe, Britain could not send a large fleet to the Far East. If Britain sent a few capital ships, the Imperial Japanese Navy could easily annihilate them. It was impossible for Britain to defeat the Imperial Japanese 137 Navy with a few capital ships, so that the Japanese did not need to be afraid of the Singapore Naval Base. There would be a possibility that Japan would wage war against Britain and the United States, however, it would be difficult for the Anglo-American powers to coordinate their operational plans in the vast Pacific Ocean. The Imperial Japanese Navy would not be defeated by them. What is interesting is that, even though Ikezaki had no military background and over-emphasised the invincibility of the Imperial Japanese Navy dogmatically without presenting convincing reasons, he reasonably pointed out the defects of the Singapore Naval Base. He pointed out four. First, the Singapore Naval Base had no hinterland to support the base. The Malay Peninsula－hinterland of the base－was famous for producing areas of rubber and tin, and the oil producing area was not too distant from Singapore. However, there was no industry which could support the naval base. Should trade routes between the British homeland and Singapore be cut, Singapore would be isolated. It was impossible for the Singapore Naval Base to fight a long protracted war without outside aid. Second, it had no sub-base around it. Trincomalee in Ceylon was too distant, and it was easy for the Imperial Japanese Navy to capture Hong Kong right after the outbreak of war in view of the fact that Hong Kong was surrounded by Japanese occupied areas. Third, the Johor Strait, which was an anchorage area of the Singapore Naval Base, was too small to accommodate a large fleet. It might be possible to accommodate a fleet consisting of five capital ships, but if Britain stuffed the entire British Fleet into the narrow strait, it would become an easy target for aeroplanes. The Johor Strait had only one entrance: the west entrance to the 138 naval base was closed by the Causeway. If the only entrance was blocked or watched by submarines, it would become extremely difficult for the fleet to leave the Johor Strait. Considering the evolution of the aeroplane, it was greatly dangerous for the fleet to anchor in a narrow and enclosed area. Four, the climate of Singapore was not suitable for Caucasians. Singapore was hot and humid but Caucasians were weak in hot weather, so it was difficult for Britain to maintain the morale of its soldiers and officers there. In conclusion, even though Britain spent huge sums of money and time constructing the naval base in Singapore, the Singapore Naval Base was not perfect.91 He pointed out fundamental defects in the British “Singapore Strategy”. Considered with the situation in Europe, there was little possibility that Britain could send a large fleet to the Far East to defend its Empire. Even if the British Fleet from Europe successfully arrived in Singapore, it would be insignificant. It would be just annihilated by Japanese planes in the Johor Strait. What is interesting is that he asserted of the superiority of air power against battleships. He also pointed out: “if the British Fleet advances to the north from Singapore to attack Japan by taking advantage of Japanese unpreparedness, it could not much. The most it could would be to bombard Japan’s coastal cities briefly or try to bomb them from the air before escaping back to Singapore”, because the distance between Japan and Singapore was too great for the British Fleet to stay in the vicinity of Japan to conduct effective operations. If it stayed too long, it would run out of fuel. 91 Ikezaki, Eikoku no Kyokutō Sakusen, pp.136-146. 139 Furthermore, Japan could easily capture Hong Kong, which was surrounded by Japanese dominated areas, so that it was inconceivable that Britain would use Hong Kong as an advance base. Singapore was useless as a naval base if Hong Kong was not in the possession of the British.92 Militarily, the British “Singapore Strategy” and the Singapore Naval Base were meaningless. The Japanese did not need to be afraid of the base. Conclusion Many Japanese were disappointed when they first knew of the British plan to construct a new naval base in Singapore. For most Japanese, the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore was shocking news. They could not understand why the former ally which had treated Japan as an equal partner abolished the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and planed to construct a new base to defend itself from Japan. When the British Parliament discussed the British plan in May and June 1923, all the newspapers in Japan criticised two points regarding it. First, it could only be aimed at Japan. Second, even though the British Singapore Naval Base plan did not violate the letter of the Washington treaty, it infringed the spirit of the treaty. Facing Japanese criticism towards the base, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shidehara Kijūrō, and the Japanese Ambassador to Japan, Charles Eliot, jointly tried to assuage Japanese negative feelings against it. They 92 Ibid., pp.17-18, 250-251. 140 considered that Japanese criticism of the Singapore Naval Base was harmful to Anglo-Japanese relations. But it is doubtful whether they could succeed in assuaging these feelings. In the late 1920s, Japanese feelings calmed down but did not die away. However, the Japanese public did not become too hostile in advocating confronting Britain militarily. All of them claimed that Japan and Britain should solve the problem diplomatically at a naval disarmament conference. After the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, Japanese Public opinion turned more hostile against the Western powers: the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. During this period, Anglo-Japanese relations deteriorated gradually as a conflict of interest between the two countries in China became clearer. Writers of war scare literatures such as Ikezaki and Ishimaru advocated the inevitability of future Anglo-Japanese war. However, their views did not become dominant in this period. Anti-American feelings and anti-Soviet feelings were stronger than anti-British feelings. The Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937. Faced with fiercer Chinese resistance than anticipated, the Japanese turned their eyes on Britain and the Soviet Union as the backers of the Chinese Nationalists. The Japanese considered that what prevented quick victory was foreign assistance, especially British and Soviet assistance. In the autumn of 1937, the Japanese public started criticising Britain and the Soviet Union as backers of the Chinese Nationalists. They needed scapegoats, because they had to explain why the Imperial Japanese Army could not defeat the Chinese Nationalists. 141 During the Tientsin Incident in the summer of 1939, anti-British movements in Japan reached their peak. Britain came to be singled out as the Japanese public number one enemy country. Britain became a country which Japan should defeat or kick out of East Asia. The Singapore Naval Base was no more a threat imposed by Britain on Japan, but the last bastion that the declining British Empire possessed in East Asia. If Britain did not leave East Asia and did challenge Japan, Japan could easily defeat and occupy Singapore. What is the most important thing is that there was some consensus among the Japanese public during the Tientsin Incident in the summer of 1939 that Japan should kick Britain out of East Asia. It was earlier than that of the Imperial Japanese Army. It was not until the summer of 1940 that the Army seriously considered attacking Southeast Asia. The public was more hostile and war-mongering than the two armed forces against Britain in the summer of 1939. It is difficult to estimate how far the public opinion affected policy-makers in the government. But, it could be said, the commercial publishing media played a central role in nourishing hostility towards the Singapore Naval Base and jingoistic Anglophobe atmosphere in Japan, which laid the foundations for policy-makers to take more aggressive policies towards Britain. 142 [...]... expressing critical views on the Singapore Naval Base in 1926 He was also critical of the Japanese government’s stance against it The Singapore Naval Base in the Japanese Public in the late 1920s After the media campaign from 1923 to 19 25, the British Singapore Naval Base plan became a fait accompli in the Japanese public, so that newspapers paid less attention to it in the last part of the 1920s Discussions... was most anxious to do all in his power to dispel the anxiety which had arisen in the Japanese public regarding the policy of the Singapore Naval Base, and he wished to give effect to Shidehara’s suggestions.30 On 13 February 19 25, the Admiralty rejected Shidehara’s second suggestion by sending a reply to the Foreign Office under the name of Oswyn Murray, the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty He... policies towards the Singapore Naval Base than the actual British Singapore Naval Base plan itself Even though the plan was a great threat to the national security of Japan, the Japanese government neither criticised nor opposed it He strongly claimed that the Japanese government should discuss it and solve the problem at the next naval conference However, as we saw in the previous chapter, there was the. .. Japan’s Total Empire, pp .55 -114 53 121 1930s, the Japanese image of Britain gradually deteriorated The unpopularity of the Lytton Report among the Japanese public led to the increased unpopularity of Britain Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933 led to its estrangement from Britain It was also a first step toward challenging the existing international order that Britain represented .54 ... Since 1932, after the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, a great number of war scare literatures, future war stories by various writers－most of them were war stories against the United States－ were published 55 The target readers of them were the masses From the autumn of 1933 to 1934, a slogan “19 35- 1936 Crisis” was widely used by the Japanese media .56 A number of newspapers,... winning the Russo -Japanese War, and by participating in the Versailles Conference and the Washington Conference as one of the most important participants However, facing the rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal at the Versailles 49 Ibid 119 Conference, the abrogation of the Anglo -Japanese Alliance, discrimination against Japanese American in California, and the construction plan of the Singapore. .. spurning of an Asiatic Power by the Western World Many links were sundered which might afterwards have proved of decisive value to peace” 50 This disillusionment led the Japanese to be estranged from the West Some would advocate pan-Asianism or Greater East Asianism in later days But to analyse these is beyond the purpose of this thesis With regard to the abrogation of the Anglo -Japanese Alliance and the Singapore. .. January 19 25 31 TNA, FO 410 /78, 62, Enclosure 1 in No. 25, Admiralty to Foreign Office by O.Murray, dated on 13 February 19 25 32 Ibid 29 30 109 Mr Cecil Wilson asked the Prime Minister whether he has received any representations expressing the feeling of any portion of the Japanese people regarding the execution of the naval base at Singapore, and, if so, whether he can state their nature? The Prime... no doubt that the Singapore Naval Base insulted Japanese feelings together with the rejection of Japanese racial equality proposal at the Versailles Conference, the abrogation of the Anglo -Japanese Alliance, and discrimination against Japanese Americans in California in the 1920s After the First World War, the Japanese public naively considered that Japan had finally become a member of the western powers... Hosaya, “Britain and the United States in Japan’s View of the International System, 1919-37” in Ian Nish (ed.), Anglo -Japanese Alienation 54 1919-1 952 : Papers of the Anglo -Japanese Conference on History of the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.17 55 For detailed study of these future war stories, see Naoki Inose, The Century of the Black Ships: Chronicles of War between Japan . the Singapore Naval Base, he mistakenly wrote as 1922 instead of 1924. 94 The First Perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base Scheme The Singapore Naval Base became a debating issue in the. abandon the base. After the First World War, with the extinction of the German Navy and the opening of the Panama Canal, the centre of the sea power struggle was moving from the Atlantic to the. The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public Chapter 1 of this thesis examined how the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy, perceived and considered the Singapore