CHAPTER THREE IS ASEAN A ‘NASCENT’ SECURITY COMMUNITY? Southeast Asia stands out as the region .that most closely approximates a community. In a region with great .diversity, ASEAN .fostered a collective Southeast Asian identity. As a result .the likelihood of war has been significantly reduced among a diverse group of states with histories of conflict. Despite the accumulating file of self-congratulatory visions .it may be the paucity of . measurable achievements in its announced policy goals and ambitions that has led to a new emphasis on creation of an ASEAN ‘identity’ as the major accomplishment of an organization now forty years old.2 Synopsis Since 2001, a growing number of constructivist scholars have claimed that ASEAN is either a nascent security community, or is already one. This claim is highly contentious. It is important to re-assess this claim as it affects our understanding of the driving forces shaping the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism. My argument is that after 43 years, ASEAN has made remarkable progress in promoting closer regional economic and political cooperation, but it has not yet become integrated into a regional security community. ASEAN has still not become a ‘we-feeling’ community and a ‘non-war’ community. Mutual trust is still at a low level. Militarized conflicts have taken place over territory and natural resources. Continuing increases in regional defence budgets focussed on the acquisitions of powerprojection capabilities show that war remains an option, and highlights an underlying sense of insecurity. The use of force remains thinkable. Nationalistic mindsets on issues deemed to affect core interests show that the ASEAN states remain strongly Westphalian in orientation, which are serious obstacles to forging a strong sense of regional identity and security country. Bahara Rumelili, Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p.126. Donald Weatherbee, “ASEAN’s Identity Crisis” in Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh eds., Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008, pp. 358-59. 115 Introduction The nature and dynamics of Southeast Asian regionalism is hotly contested. Realists and Constructivists hold strongly opposing viewpoints. The two quotations by Rumelili and Weatherbee show the wide gap in scholarly thinking on whether ASEAN is a regional security community. There are two main scholarly schools of thought in this debate, the Constructivists (optimists) and Realists (sceptics). In 2001, the Constructivist scholar Amitav Acharya formally claimed that ASEAN can be regarded as a nascent security community because the peaceful norms of the ASEAN Way have prevented war in Southeast Asia since 1967. Acharya’s claim has been strongly supported by among others, Rodolfo Severino & Alice Ba. But realists remain very sceptical. As pointed out by Tim Huxley in his (1996) review of Southeast Asian security studies, some analysts like Sopiee, Buzan, and Simon were already claiming by the late 1980s that ASEAN could be regarded as a ‘security community’. Writing in 1991, Acharya argued that ‘ASEAN has indeed become a Constructivist scholars would include: Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’?” Pacific Affairs 64 (2) Summer 1991: 159-78. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of Regional Order, London and New York: Routledge, 2001. The second edition of Acharya’s book was published in 2009. Khong Yuen Foong, “Making bricks without straw in the Asia Pacific?” The Pacific Review 10 (2) 1997. Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006. Alice D. Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Stanford: Stanford University Press, April 2009. Realist critics would include: Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in the study of International Relations”, Pacific Review (2) 1996: 199-228, cited in Tan See Seng ed. Regionalism in Asia London and New York: Routledge, Volume I: 42-71. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s model of Regional Security, Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, Adelphi Paper No. 302, 1996. N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, Singapore: ISEAS, 1999. Andrew Tan, Intra-ASEAN Tensions, Discussion Paper No. 84, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community”, The Pacific 116 security community in the sense that its members not foresee the prospect for resorting to armed confrontation to resolve existing bilateral disputes’. In contrast, sceptics (Realists) point to the continuation of historically-based mistrust and contemporary economic-political rivalries to argue that the ASEAN states not yet constitute a regional security community. As David Jones and Michael Smith have argued, ASEAN is not a genuine regional community: It is only an ‘imitation community’ “making process, not progress”. As is often the case, the truth seems to lie somewhere in between these two extreme positions. Scholarly debates are useful and important in the sense that it shows intellectual vibrancy and a forward-looking quest for greater understanding of complex phenomena. However, it is also timely that we should occasionally re-examine the situation in the light of changing circumstances. Aim of this Chapter The main aim of this chapter is to re-examine the claim that ASEAN has become integrated into either a nascent security community, or is already one. I will use the two core criteria of a “we-feeling” community, and “non-war” community (Chapter Two). For the former, I will examine whether the ASEAN members share the following commonalities: the overall state of bilateral relations among the ASEAN states, especially among the core group of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; they share common political values like democracy and respect for human rights; Review, 15(1) February 2002: 89-117. John Garofano, “Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?” Asian Survey 42 (3) May/June 2002: 502-21. Alan Collins, “Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific (2) March 2007: 203-25. David M. Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “ASEAN’s Imitation Community”, Orbis 46(1), Winter 2002: 93-109. 117 whether a high degree of economic integration has been achieved; the existence of a national versus regional market (mutual sensitivity to each other’s legitimate interests); and regional affinity and trust levels. Are there strong positive feelings about each other, and whether there is a strong sense of ASEAN identity and citizenship? Based on the writings of Deutsch, Adler/Barnett, and Acharya, I have come up with a framework (See Table 1) to attempt an analysis of the extent of ‘wefeeling’ and ‘non-war’ community among the ASEAN states. My overall approach in this chapter is to the assessment, state the main findings, followed by interpretation and analysis. 118 Table 3.1 List of Indicators to Assess the Extent of “we-feeling” Community within ASEAN (A) Overall state of bilateral relations among ASEAN states. Can vary from very bad to very worst. (B) Degree of Regional Economic Integration (C) Extent of shared political values (Democracy and respect for Human Rights) (D) National versus Regional Mindset Very bad. Rollercoaster (historical animosities and economic rivalry). Business-like, friendly. (minimal grievances and resentments) Very warm (little or no grievances or resentments). Has developed mutuallybeneficial mindsets. Low Medium (e.g. ASEAN) High (e.g. The EU) Cultural-religious background Level of national economic development Type of domestic political system ‘War on Terrorism’ Attitudes/Policies towards the US and China; Myanmar issue Regional Haze Issue (E) Extent of Identification as “ASEAN Citizen” Findings from opinion polls and surveys carried out by scholars, the ASEAN Secretariat Low Medium High (EU; US-Canada; Australia-New Zealand) (F) Degree of Affinity and Trust (low to high level) among ASEAN members Source: Author’s conceptualization based on Deutsch (1957), Adler and Barnett (1998), and Acharya (2001). 119 Has ASEAN become integrated into a “we-feeling” community? My purpose in this section is to examine whether there is a strong sense of ‘Wefeeling’ among the ASEAN states. Based on Table 1, I will (a) examine the overall state of bilateral relations among the ASEAN states, b) the degree of regional economic integration, c) the extent of shared political values (democracy and respect for human rights), d) ‘national versus regional’ mindsets, e) the extent of identification as ‘ASEAN Citizen’, and f) the degree of affinity and trust among the ASEAN member-states. (A) Overall State of Bilateral Relations among the ASEAN States Singapore-Malaysia Relations Over the past forty-seven years, Singapore-Malaysia relations have been characterized by ups and downs. Malaysia is essential Malay-Muslim. Singapore is a Chinesedominant city state. Race, language, and religion continue to exert a powerful influence on the overall tone of Singapore’s relations with its two immediate Muslim neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. Contentious bilateral issues include water, the territorial dispute over Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Putih), the relocation of the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ), over-flights by RSAF planes, withdrawal of CPF monies by Malaysian workers in Singapore, and land reclamation. Singapore and Malaysia are two core members of the original ASEAN-5. They are among the more developed and prosperous of the ASEAN states. A detailed analysis of their bilateral political-strategic relations is important in helping us to evaluate Leo Suryadinata ed. Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ethnic Chinese. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2004. 120 whether ASEAN is truly a regional security community. A striking feature of Singapore-Malaysia relations is the bitter legacy of their August 1965 Separation. The Kuala Lumpur government led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) wanted a Malay-Malaysia. In contrast, the Singapore government led by the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) favoured a Malaysian-Malaysia. Culture-Religion continues to play a major role in determining Singapore-Malaysia relations. The overall tone of their bilateral relations also depends to a great extent on the personality and character of their leaders. Under the abrasive and mercurial Prime Minister Mahathir, bilateral relations were often turbulent. An acrimonious bilateral issue is over water. Within seven months of Singapore’s independence, in March 1966, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman issued a veiled threat to Lee Kuan Yew that Singapore’s lifeline (water supply) was with Malaysia. 10 During the 1970s and 1980s, whenever there were disputes between the two states, threats to cut off the water supply from Johor to Singapore were invariably made by firebrands within Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia”: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008. Takashi Shiraishi ed. Across the Causeway: A Multi-Dimensional Study of MalaysiaSingapore Relations. Singapore: ISEAS, 2009. Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy. (2nd edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009. See Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Andrew Tan Tian Huat, Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terror. University of California: Edward Elgar, 2004. Michael Barr and Carl A. Trocki eds. Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in postwar Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009. Barry Wain, Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 10 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2000. See also K. Kesavapany and Saw Swee-Hock, Singapore-Malaysia Relations under Abdullah Badawi. Singapore: ISEAS, 2006. 121 UMNO Youth. During a meeting between Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir in 1978, the former recounted the following conversation: He (Mahathir) said clearly that he accepted an independent Singapore and had no intention of undermining it. My reply was that on this basis we could build a relationship of trust and confidence. So long as we believed that they wanted to us in, we would always be distrustful, reading sinister motives into every ambiguous move. 11 The above quotation showed that Singapore’s leaders were concerned that the citystate’s sovereignty would be respected by its neighbours. Any signs that Singapore’s independence would be undermined by any of its immediate neighbours tended to be viewed with alarm by the island-republic’s leaders. In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew pointed out that during his 1978 talks with Mahathir, he had stated that if the Water Agreement between Singapore and Malaysia “were breached, we would go to the UN Security Council. If water shortage became urgent, in an emergency we would have to go in, forcibly if need be, to repair damaged pipes and machinery and restore the water flow .” 12 The two Water Agreements are lodged with the United Nations. They will expire in 2011 and 2061. To de-securitize the water issue, Singapore has considerably expanded its self-reliance by using advanced water production technology (NeWater) and signed water supply agreements with Indonesia. 13 11 Irvin Lim, Joey Long, and Kog Yue Choong, Beyond Vulnerability? Water in Singapore-Malaysia Relations, IDSS monograph No. 3, 2002. 12 Lee Kuan Yew 2000, op cit., p. 276. In April 2002, Johor’s ex-Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) Muhyuddin Yassin revealed that in the 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew had threatened war with Malaysia if the city-state’s water supply from Johor was cut-off; cited from Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 91. 13 Joey Long Shi Ruey, Irvin Lim fang Jau, and Yue Choong Kog, Beyond Vulnerability?: Water in Singapore-Malaysia Relations. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2002. 122 There are a number of reasons for the roller-coaster nature of SingaporeMalaysia relations. The first factor has to with the continuing salience of primordial sentiments of race, language, and religion. As Lily Zubaidah Rahim has argued, Singapore’s relations with her immediate Malay neighbours are “fraught with tensions and misunderstandings” and that the causes are historical animosities, competitive economic pressures, and perceptions of Singapore as a regional ‘outsider’. 14 Singapore is dependent on Malaysia for half of its water supply. In her study of the history of water negotiations between Singapore and Malaysia, the Canadian scholar Diane Mauzy found that Malaysia had used water as leverage in many of the bilateral disputes between the once-joined states. 15 Mauzy’s observations are significant because it showed that it was the Malaysian side which first threatened the use of force against Singapore, starting in 1966 and continuing on-and-off into the 1980s depending on the vagaries of domestic Malaysian politics. By the early-1990s, the SAF had built up a credible defensive and war-fighting capability. In response, Singapore has counter-threatened the use of force if its water supply is cut off. From 14 Rahim 2009, op cit. Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs behind the Man. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000. See also Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces: Trends and Implications, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 153, 2003. Singh has argued that “Malaysia is perhaps the most conspicuous factor in Singapore’s security calculations. Singapore-Malaysia relations can be deemed the most tempestuous and unpredictable amongst all countries in the ASEAN region”, p. 23. 15 Diane Mauzy, “Water Wars: Singapore versus Malaysia”, University of British Columbia, 24 February 2004. See also Agence France Presse (AFP), “Water issue could spark Malaysia-Singapore military conflict: report”, February 2002: http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020203af.htm. Ex-Malaysian general Zaini Mohammad Said was quoted as saying that the close ties of the people of the two ASEAN member-states ‘was insufficient to prevent a military conflict.’ Mahathir had also made public remarks about skinning a cat: “There are many ways to skin a cat. There are also many ways of skinning Singapore.” Such hostile remarks are counterproductive to forging harmonious bilateral relations. See Chen Jun An, “Malaysia should ditch Cold War Mindset”, Straits Times, November 2009, p. A18. 123 a policymaking viewpoint, the 2000 memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew are significant because it showed that he had serious doubts that Singapore’s independence was fully accepted by its nearest neighbour. As a small city-state surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours, Singapore is sensitive to any signals that suggest that its sovereignty is less than respected by its neighbours. This piece of Realpolitik conversation in 1978 between the top two leaders of Singapore and Malaysia suggests that both sides agreed only to business-like ‘peaceful coexistence’. Eric Thompson has pointed out that in its early days of independence, Singapore’s leaders portrayed the island-state as “a Chinese state in a Malay ocean”, a situation comparable to that of Israel in the Arab world. 16 Singapore’s sense of vulnerability has since been considerably reduced as a result of its prosperity and the relentless build-up of the SAF into a credible deterrent force. Malaysian analysts and policymakers recognize the dramatic transformation of the SAF. In a June 2009 study, three Malaysian analysts with the Universiti Utara Malaysia, noted that Singapore had “become the strongest and finest in military and defense compared to other Southeast Asian nations .The offensive defense doctrine practiced such as forward defense, poison shrimp, pre-emptive strike and strategic weaponry ownership had raised concerns among leaders in the Southeast Asian countries.” 17 One needs to keep in mind the difference between the smiling diplomacy represented by various ASEAN summit meetings (‘photo opportunities’) and the underlying suspicions and tensions. 16 Eric C. Thompson, “Singaporean Exceptionalism and its Implications for ASEAN Regionalism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(2) August 2006: 183-206. 17 Mohamad Faisol Keling, Md. Shukri Shuib, and Mohd Naeim Ajis, “The Impact of Singapore’s Military on Malaysia’s Security”, Journal of Politics and Law, (2) June 2009: 68. 124 In contrast, the second school argues that defence spending in the East Asian region goes beyond that necessary for legitimate national defence into acquisition of offensive-related war-fighting and war-winning capabilities. 106 In the post-Cold War era, defence budgets in the East Asian region have continued to rise. The military establishments in the Southeast Asian region also keep a wary eye on the arms acquisitions of their neighbours. It is logical for us to ask about the factors that are driving military modernization in both Southeast and Northeast Asia. By its very nature, it is often quite difficult to accurately decipher the underlying intentions behind the arms acquisitions by states. Military establishments around the world tend to be quite secretive in nature, following Sun Tzu’s precept that ‘all warfare is based on deception’. The acme of military strategy is to conceal your capabilities and lull the enemy into complacency. Most militaries aim for effective deterrence. Failing that, they seek war-fighting capabilities to defeat the enemy in warfare. For prudent reasons, states usually not want to openly identify a rival or potential enemy so as to avoid the danger of a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. But having said that, we can draw some conclusions about the pattern of arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia by closely examining the types of weaponry that are being acquired, especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 57% of Europe’s. Richard Smith, “Asian Military Modernization,” Originally prepared for presentation to the IISS Global Strategic Review, Geneva, 12-14 September 2008. J David Singer, Deference Arms Control and Disarmament, New York: University Press of America, 1984; cited in Bilveer Singh 2003, op cit., pp. 56. 106 Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job, “Raising the Risks of War: Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes”, The Pacific Review 20 (1) March 2007; Tim Huxley, “Defence Procurement in Southeast Asia”, 5th Workshop of the InterParliamentary Forum on Security Sector Governance in Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, 12-13 October 2008; Richard Bitzinger, “A New Arms race in the Asia-Pacific”, The International Spectator, 44 (2), June 2009. 168 In the post-Cold War era, one factor in the defence buildup within Southeast Asia is the rise of China’s economic and military power. China’s defence budget has expanded by double-digit figures annually between 1997 and 2005, or an annual 13.7 percent rise in real terms. In the period 2001-2005, defence spending by the Southeast Asian states increased by an estimated 19 per cent. 107 A state’s defence spending is significantly influenced by the health of its economy and the intensity of the security dilemma they face. Following the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in December 1978, military modernization took off in the ASEAN region. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Southeast Asian states started to buy larger surface warships, anti-ship missiles, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and multirole combat aircraft. 108 In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 1997-98, defence spending in most of the ASEAN region has resumed an upward trend as a result of the economic recovery. This increase was sustained with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US. Malaysia is one example where military modernization is taking place at a steady pace. Between 1998 and 2002, Malaysia’s defence spending averaged two percent of its GDP annually. 109 In 2003, Malaysia ordered 18 Su-30 MKM combat aircraft (scheduled for delivery by end-2008), together with eight MB339CDs as lead-in fighter trainers. In 2005, Malaysia ordered four A400M heavytransport aircraft. These are due to be in service by 2013. Malaysia has ordered two French-made Scorpene submarines; they are expected to be based at Sepanggar Bay 107 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks 2002-2006. 108 Huxley 2008, op cit. 109 Hartfiel and Job 2007, op cit. 169 in Sabah during 2009-10. Four more locally-built Meko-100-type large naval patrol vessels are to be commissioned by 2010. In August 2007, Malaysia ordered a second batch of 18 Avibras Astros II multiple-launch rocket systems. This will allow the Malaysian army to equip a second regiment. 110 For the period 2001-2005, Malaysia’s defence spending increased by 19 percent. According to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Malaysia’s military budget has grown more than 75 percent between 2000 and 2006, from US$1.7 billion to US$3 billion (in constant 2005 dollars).111 According to the IISS, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (covering 2006-2010) allocated US$4.4 billion for military upgrading and important contracts are pending. Malaysia has already signed a letter of intent for two British-built Jebat-class frigates, which are intended to enter service by 2015. 112 Geography and geo-politics have compelled Singapore, one of the smallest states in Southeast Asia, to put great emphasis on progressively reducing its sense of vulnerability. Singapore is a tiny Chinese-majority city-state located in a Malay sea. As the IISS has observed, Singapore (and Vietnam) have “good reasons to feel strategically uncomfortable in relation to their larger neighbours and consequently 110 The Military Balance 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 111 Richard Bitzinger and Curie Maharani, “Arms, Money, and Security: Southeast Asia’s growing market”, The Nation (Bangkok), 14 April 2008. 112 In November 2007, the Malaysian government asked for tenders to supply up to 36 medium-lift helicopters for troop transport and search and rescue to replace the existing ageing S-61 Nuri fleet. In September 2008, the defence ministry announced an order for 12 Eurocopter EC725 Cougars equipped for a combat search-and-rescue role. Under the 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-15), Malaysia plans to purchase three LPD-type multi-role support ships, additional combat aircraft (either Su-30MKKs or F-18E/Fs), airborne early-warning aircraft, and new armoured vehicles. The Military Balance (IISS) 2009. 170 take external defence more seriously than other Southeast Asian states.” 113 It has done so by modernizing and transforming its defence capability against internal and external threats. Between 1998 and 2002, Singapore’s defence spending averaged 5.5 percent of its GDP annually. Singapore’s defence spending plateaued in 2003 and 2004 as a result of economic pressures. Singapore’s defense budget increased 24 percent, from US$4.6 billion (2000) to US$5.7 billion (2006). Since then, Singapore’s defence spending has continued at about percent of its GDP. In 2005, Singapore’s military modernization efforts resumed, rising by almost percent in 2005. In 2008, Singapore’s military budget totaled an estimated US$7.5 billion. The expansion and transformation of the SAF’s naval and air power has been truly impressive, a fact noticed by its regional neighbours. To compensate for its limited physical size, Singapore has made it a point to ensure that its naval and air power are qualitatively far ahead of its nearest neighbours. Singapore’s leaders believe that they still face the classic security dilemma. Not surprisingly, as noted by Tim Huxley in October 2008, “Singapore has been committed to not just modernizing but to transforming its armed forces to maintain their combat advantage over potential regional adversaries.” 114 113 “East Asia and Australasia”, IISS, The Military Balance 2009, p.368. Singapore also has far more extensive and in-depth military linkages with non-Southeast Asian states. In May 2008, SAF units were deployed to the Lohatla Army Battle School in South Africa’s Northern Cape province for Exercise Lightning Warrior. Other major SAF military exercise include Ex Wallaby in Australia (in late 2008), and Ex Forging Sabre in the US (planned for 2009). See also Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Globalization’s impact on defence industry in Southeast,” in Geoffrey Till, Emrys Chew, and Joshua Ho eds. Globalization and Defence in the Asia-Pacific: Arms Across Asia, London & New York: Routledge, 2009. Hartfiel and Job 2005, op cit. 114 Huxley 2008 op cit. In his 2003 study, Bilveer Singh had made this point. See Bilveer Singh 2003, op cit. The SAF’s war-fighting and war-winning strategy was also emphasized by Mr Mark Hong (ISEAS) and Dr Alan Chong (RSIS, NTU) in interviews with the author on 29 October 2009. 171 In 2008/9, Singapore’s defence budget increased substantially to US$8.7 billion, the largest military budget in the Southeast Asian region. In 2003, Singapore took delivery of four Swedish-manufactured Sjoormen-class diesel submarines. The last of six Formidable-class frigates was delivered in August 2008; all the vessels were commissioned by early-2009. In 2009, the first batch of F-15SG combat aircraft, out of 24 ordered so far, was expected to be delivered to a Singapore air-force training squadron in the United States. Similarly, four Gulfstream G550 CAEWA (Conformal Airborne Early Warning Aircraft) were also expected to be delivered. 115 Over the past decade, Indonesia’s military modernization has been constrained by internal political instability and limited funding. But the desire and political will to strengthen the operational capabilities of Indonesia’s armed forces is clearly present. Between 1998 and 2002, Indonesia’s defence spending averaged 1.5% of its GDP annually. 116 Between 2001 and 2005, Indonesia’s defence spending increased by almost 14 percent, with the acquisition of helicopters, coastal patrol vessels, and longrange fighter aircraft. During 2008, the Indonesian Armed Forces’ first Kobra integrated low-to-medium air-defence unit was put into service. A second unit will be delivered in 2009. Between June and October 2008, the army is scheduled to accept a further six Mi-35 attack helicopters, part of a US41 billion defence-equipment package to be funded by Russian credit that then-President Putin and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agreed in September 2007. Indonesia is also seeking to purchase additional Mi-17 helicopters and two –Kilo-class submarines. 115 The Military Balance 2009, IISS. 116 Hartfiel and Job 2007, op cit. 172 The IISS also reported that ABRI is seeking closer military cooperation with South Korea. 117 Military modernization in Thailand and the Philippines are also to a large extent constrained by budgetary pressures. 118 Thailand’s military upgrading was adversely affected by the economic chaos arising from the Asian financial crisis 199798. Between 1998 and 2002, Thailand’s defence spending averaged 1.6 percent of its GDP annually. During the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06), defence spending was kept down. After the September 2006 military coup, Thailand’s defence budget has risen again. Since then, Thailand’s armed forces have resumed efforts to strengthen conventional and counter-insurgency capabilities against the Thai Muslim insurgents in the three southernmost provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. In April 2008 at the Singapore Air-show, Thailand was reported to have purchased US$600 million of six Swedish-made Gripen fourth-generation fighter jets along with airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. Thailand also purchased anti-ship cruise missiles from China, self-propelled artillery from France, and assault rifles from Israel. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Thai defense spending has rebounded strongly. After the 2006 military coup, the Thai military junta approved a 34 percent increase in the 2007 defense budget and a further 24 percent rise in 2008. In November 2007, the military proposed a new ten-year US$9.8 billion modernization program, starting in 2009, which would push defense spending from 1.58 percent of GDP to percent by 2014. 119 A close examination of the arms 117 The Military Balance, IISS 2009. 118 Hartfiel and Job 2007, op cit.; Huxley 2008 op cit.; The Military Balance 2009 op. cit. 119 Bitzinger and Maharani 2008 op. cit. 173 acquisitions by the Southeast Asian state indicates that they are accumulating offensive-related, power-projection capabilities which can also be used for conventional inter-state warfare. As Hartfiel and Job observed in March 2007, the arms buildup among the ASEAN militaries are characterized by a focus on purchasing fighter aircrafts (over 900 supersonic combat planes were acquired during the 19972004 period alone), the addition of major naval vessels, and the build-up of submarine and sophisticated missile capabilities. 120 My main argument is that it is too optimistic and premature to claim that the threat/use of force within the Southeast Asian region is really unthinkable. There are a number of reasons. First, although the Southeast Asian region has made progress in promoting greater mutual confidence since 1967, the underlying mistrust and nationalistic sentiments and rivalries arising from deep-seated cultural-civilizational, economic, political and strategic differences, have not been significantly reduced. As pointed out by Tim Huxley in October 2008: Southeast Asia is replete with bilateral disputes, tensions and distrust among its constituent states…It is strikingly true that there has been no major armed conflict between members of ASEAN since the organization was set up in 1967. But there have been border clashes, naval stand-offs, and reactive military mobilizations involving neighbours. It is clear that certain pairs of Southeast Asian states have made and still make serious plans for war with each other…In recent years politicians and military leaders have sometimes explicitly justified procurement decisions with reference to neighbours’ purchases of similar equipment. 121 Second, the 2008 study by Rommel Banlaoi highlighted that the political-military elites in the Southeast Asian region are very sensitive about their defence spending 120 Hartfiel and Job 2007 op. cit. 121 Huxley 2008 op cit. Huxley’s argument that the ASEAN states have military contingency plans against their immediate neighbours are shared by Mr Mark Hong (ISEAS) and Dr Alan Chong (RSIS, NTU) in their email exchanges with the author on 29 October 2009. 174 plans which are characterized by a lack of transparency. 122 These attitudes not facilitate the growth of openness and mutual trust as they relate to the driving forces and motivations behind the continuing acceleration of the military buildup in the region. Specifically, Banlaoi observed the slow development of domestic defence industries in the ASEAN states (with the exception of Singapore). The persistent lack of transparency in regional defence procurement is resurrecting fears that arms purchases could have a destabilizing effect; and that ‘Even amongst themselves, Southeast Asian countries are suspicious of one another’s defence spending patterns’. 123 Third, the debate about whether there is a destabilizing arms race within Southeast Asia may actually be one of semantics. The reality is that over the past two decades, Southeast Asian militaries have much bigger defence budgets (in absolute terms) as a result of faster economic growth. Their weapons purchases involve warfighting and greater power-projection capabilities: advanced war-planes, missile systems, frigates, destroyers and submarines from the US, Western Europe, and Russia. Frank Umbach has pointed out that the ASEAN states ‘now have military options they never had before’: …Their naval and air forces threaten to continue escalating the many unsolved maritime territorial conflicts (as in the South China Sea) despite strenuous ongoing efforts at building mutual trust and security in Asia. The level of maritime arms spending by the Asia-Pacific states alone is expected to double to about US$14 billion by 2009. Even smaller states of ASEAN are likely to add to the number of their submarines and relatively large 122 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Globalization’s impact on defence industry in Southeast Asia”, in Geoffrey Till, Emrys Chew, and Joshua Ho eds., Globalization and Defence in the Asia Pacific. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 123 Ibid., p.212. 175 warships such as corvettes, frigates, and destroyers equipped with the most modern guided weapons, including cruise missiles. : 124 In their study of East Asian military modernization, Tellis and Wills concluded that after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, ASEAN states have resumed their military modernization efforts, aimed at enhancing their ability to overcome potential enemies, and increase their power-projection capabilities. 125 Summary of Findings and Arguments There are strong grounds to argue that serious doubts surround claims that ASEAN is a ‘nascent’ security community or is already one. ASEAN has not become integrated into either a ‘we-feeling’ and ‘non-war’ community, thus failing to satisfy the two basic conditions of a regional security community. Other than a common interest in promoting mutually beneficial economic relations, the ASEAN states not appear to share a common regional identity or interests. Relations among the three core ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are still influenced by primordial considerations of racial-cultural differences and competitive economic pressures, leading to frequent outbreaks of tensions and misunderstandings. For the other two core ASEAN states of Thailand and the Philippines, their economic, political and security relations are with the developed states of the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea rather than with other ASEAN states. Both Thailand and the Philippines are treaty allies of the US. In terms of the degree of regional economic integration, the volume of intra-ASEAN trade has stagnated at about 30 per cent of 124 Frank Umbach, “East Asian Arms Races – and Cooperation”, Redaktion Internationale Politik (IP) Summer 2005. 125 Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills eds. Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, US: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005. 176 their total global trade in recent years, way behind that of the EU and NAFTA due to non-implementation of ASEAN economic agreements and the fact that the bulk of their external trading links are with the developed economies. The ASEAN states not have shared values of democracy and respect for human rights. Their political diversity ranges from new democratic transitions in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, ‘soft’ authoritarian regimes in Singapore and Malaysia, monarchy in Brunei, communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos, an authoritarian dictatorship in Cambodia, and a military dictatorship in Myanmar. Not surprisingly, the ASEAN states not have a common policy stand regarding the violations of human rights in Myanmar. With regard to the ‘war on terrorism’, attitudes towards the US and ‘rising China’, and the regional haze problem, the ASEAN states have demonstrated a continuing reliance on a strong ‘national’ mindset rather than a regional mindset, to the detriment of efforts to create ‘regional resilience’. On the issue of the degree of regional affinity and trust, there is fairly convincing evidence from opinion polls and regional surveys that there has been an improvement compared to the pre-1967 period, it is not strong enough to give us confidence that a ‘we-feeling’ regional community within ASEAN has been achieved yet. In terms of the criteria of a ‘nonwar’ community, there is fairly strong evidence that at least among some of the ASEAN states, they have contingency military plans to use force against one another, as a last resort. Further, the pattern of post-AFC military expenditures shows that the ASEAN states are engaged in the acquisition of offensive, power-projection and conventional war-fighting capabilities against threats to their core interests, which could include their ASEAN neighbours. Over the past decade, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have experienced militarized naval power displays arising from territorial conflicts. There remains a whole list of territorial disputes in Southeast 177 Asia in which militarized conflicts or displays of naval power cannot be totally discounted in the future. Overall, the ASEAN elites have shown a measure of realism in setting 2015 as the target date to bring about an ASEAN Community. Clearly, the claim in 2001 that ASEAN is a ‘nascent’ security community is not only premature, but misleading. Given that the ‘ASEAN Way’ involves a slow and patient process of building up consensus and protection of national sovereignty, it is not at all certain that the goal of establishing an ASEAN Community can be reached by 2015. Main driving forces behind ASEAN regionalism The driving forces behind ASEAN regionalism have been both external and internal. To quote Hari Singh: “Regionalism within the ASEAN context was not entirely driven by external stimuli, but also reflected internal dissent and the importance of state-building … states in Southeast Asia were ill-defined and weak national entities, plagued by problems of territorial demarcation, regime legitimacy, insurgency, corruption, ethnic conflict and secessionism”. 126 One main feature of ASEAN regionalism is its ‘defensive’ orientation. As a grouping of small and medium-sized states, ASEAN for the most part has to stay agile and vigilant in responding quickly to developments and trends at the global level which are likely to affect the collective interests of the ASEAN states. Historically, the Southeast Asian region has had to react and respond to the arrival and impact of the Western imperial powers from the 16th century onwards. Having gained their political independence after the end of the Second World War, the Southeast Asian states guard their national sovereignty jealously. This is not surprising as most of them are still engaged in the fragile 126 Hari Singh, “Hegemons and the construction of regions”, in Vandersluis ed., op cit. 178 process of state-building and nation-building, faced as they are with internal challenges like poverty, inter-ethnic and religious divisions and tensions. For the foreseeable future, the ASEAN states are likely to stay pre-occupied with building-up ‘national and regional resilience’. In practice, this means that the ASEAN states view the ASEAN organization as a useful tool to consolidate regime-survival and national interests first and foremost, followed by the promotion of collective regional interests whenever possible. Faced with the growing economic challenge posed by the rising economic and political power of China and India, the ASEAN states are seeking to accelerate the pace of sub-regional integration, especially in the economic sphere, to ensure that the region stays attractive and relevant to foreign investors. The goal of establishing an ASEAN Community by 2015 should be seen in this perspective. Further, ASEAN needs to stay united and relevant as the region has recently seen more ‘region-building’ initiatives by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and the newly-elected Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to promote either an AsiaPacific Community and an ‘East Asian Community” respectively. A contentious issue has to with the inclusion or exclusion of the US, as it will impact Chinese and Japanese rivalry for East Asian leadership. A second major driving force behind the nature of ASEAN regionalism is its adherence to the promotion of the national interests of each ASEAN member-state. The focus continues to be on regime-survival and the consolidation of national unity and identity. Seen in this perspective, the basic operating principles of ASEAN, as embodied in the ‘ASEAN Way’ has not changed at all over the past forty-three years, and appears unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The steady progress made by ASEAN in increasing levels of comfort in dealing with one another, especially seen in the ratification of the more rules-based ASEAN Charter (December 2008) and 179 the setting up of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights in April 2009 can be regarded as ASEAN achievements, which would portend a bright future for ASEAN. Having said that, however, it is also clear that the ‘ASEAN Way’ also imposes limits on the extent of ASEAN cooperation, especially seen in the organisation’s inability to effect any substantive change in Myanmar. As pointed out by Jurgen Ruland and A. Jetschke: Why have ASEAN member states declared and why they continue to declare their intention to enhance cooperation and devise projects when implementation lags behind their rhetoric? Why they rhetorically commit themselves to cooperation, when they continue to stick to self-interested policies to the detriment of ASEAN's collective interest? And given these diverging practices, how likely is it that the objective of a more legalized and binding cooperation associated with the recently ratified ASEAN Charter is being implemented? .Southeast Asia's social structure and political culture that have not produced those mechanisms that might facilitate international cooperation…Based on an analysis of the two major shocks with which ASEAN has had to contend in the last two decades, namely the Cold War in Asia and the Asian financial crisis, we argue that ASEAN's dominant response to major ideational challenges has been combinations of localization and inertia and has not been followed by a fundamental change of practice. 127 Conclusion Whether ASEAN has developed into a regional security community is a matter of controversy among scholars. This chapter has examined the empirical evidence and come to the conclusion that ASEAN, after forty-three years, has not really become integrated into a regional security community. Relations among three of the ASEAN founder-members, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, are still characterized by tensions and deep-seated suspicions and resentments, and competitive economic 107 Jurgen Ruland, and A. Jetschke, “Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN Cooperation”, The Pacific Review, 22 (2) May 2009: 179-203, Abstract. 180 pressures. Their relations occur within the context of political competition, rivalry, and uncertainty. Singapore-Thailand relations have generally been cordial and mutually beneficial, but the situation can abruptly change, as happened in September 2006 when an authoritarian military junta took power in a coup and accused the republic of “spying”. Tensions in Malaysia-Indonesia, Thailand-Cambodia, and Thailand-Myanmar relations were due to the powerful force of nationalist sentiments with regard to territorial and resource disputes. Surveys and opinion polls of elites and ordinary citizens in the ASEAN states also reveal that there is as yet still no clear sense of ASEAN solidarity or identity. Perceptions and policies of ASEAN states remain driven by the powerful force of national interests and national sentiments. Governments and states in Southeast Asia are still the key actors in regional politics. Finally, the patterns of military modernization with the ASEAN region over the past decade highlight a number of points. They indicate that while there is no real, immediate danger of intra-ASEAN military conflict, the continuing acquisition of lethal, offensive-related weaponry should be a cause of regional concern, especially should there be prolonged economic and financial downturns. Overall, the evidence indicates that claims of ASEAN being a regional security community, nascent or otherwise, are premature and misleading. The quest to forge ASEAN as “One- Community” has a long way to go, despite commendable progress made over the past four decades. In conclusion, ASEAN cannot yet be considered as a regional security community. An analyst has characterized ASEAN as at most a “minimalist-assurance 181 community” for a number of reasons. 128 First, intra-ASEAN disputes have not been satisfactorily or virtually fully resolved over territorial and natural resources among Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia; Malaysia and Thailand, Thailand-Cambodia, and Thailand-Myanmar. In comparison, members of the EU no longer have unresolved territorial disputes. In particular, Frenchmen and Germans are no longer emotionally troubled over their once-bitter conflict over Alsace Lorraine. Second, the perceptions of people in each ASEAN state about their neighbours remain nation-centric; in most cases, they have rather low consciousness of their ASEAN neighbours. In some cases, they had quite negative views about the citizens of other ASEAN states. Third, each of the ASEAN states appears to have a relatively low degree of sensitivity to the legitimate interests of their neighbours. The mindsets of most elites and masses appear focused on nationalistic concerns, not that of ‘regional mindsets’ concerning the overall interests of the Southeast Asian region as a whole. Fourth, the degree of “we-feelings” among the ASEAN citizens appears to be still rather low. Fifth, the trends in military modernization among the ASEAN states show a preference for the development of offensive, more complex power-projection, and conventional warfighting capabilities, which appear to highlight the continuation of uncertainty and mistrust about the intentions of their neighbours. 128 This point was made by Dr Alan Chong (RSIS, NTU) in an email exchange with the author on 29 October 2009. 182 Table 3.2 List of unsettled bilateral disputes and militarized conflicts in Southeast Asia Years 1990s 2007 Early1960s 1990s 2001 2008 From the 1960s Type of Conflicts There were very aggressive encounters between the Malaysian and Indonesian armed forces during the course of sovereignty patrols around the contested islands of Sipadan and Ligitan in the Celebes Sea, off the eastern Sabah coast. In 2001, both countries signed the Malaysia-Indonesia Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement (MALINDO INCSEA). In 2002, the ICJ awarded the two islands to Malaysia. There were renewed bilateral tensions in February-April 2005 over the disputed Ambalat Sea, off the southeastern coast of Sabah, and again in 2007. Both countries are also involved in maritime disputes of the west coast of SarawakKalimantan in the Gosong Niger zone in March 2006. Singapore and Malaysia: Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Putih). In 2008, the ICJ decided in favour of Singapore. Indonesia and the Philippines: Miatan Islands. Malaysia and the Philippines: Sabah claim. Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines: Spratly Islands. Thailand-Myanmar fought a short border skirmish in 2001 in northwest over issue of separatist rebels using Thailand as a base. Thailand-Cambodia tensions escalated over the disputed Preah Vihear temple in 2008. UN World Heritage Status. In 1962, the ICJ decided in favour of Cambodia. Spratlys dispute. Vietnamese and Filipino occupation of the Spratlys took place in the 1960s and 1970s. In December 1979, a Malaysian task force occupied Swallow Reef, which is also claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In 1999, Malaysia occupied the Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef. Source: Mak 2009: 110-124. 183 [...]... bilateral security cooperation, and not on multilateral military -security arrangements, and that ASEAN is definitely not a regional military pact or military alliance In contrast, West Europe has the NATO military alliance Until today, security cooperation among the ASEAN states remains 46 Thompson and Chulanee op cit., p 8 This point was also made at a talk (“Constructing East Asia”) by Bilahari Kausikan... ibid.: 129- 130 Eliassen and Arnesen have also pointed out that Southeast Asia has much greater diversity compared with Europe The latter shares a common Christian heritage See Kjell A Eliassen and Catherine Borve Arnesen, “Comparison of European and Southeast Asian Integration”, in Mario Telo ed European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era (2nd Edition)... being an integral component of the Southeast Asian community of states’ If Lily Zubaidah Rahim’s view is correct, it would challenge the constructivist claim that ASEAN is a nascent security community In his 2007 study, Stephen Levine found that the forces of regional integration and possible fragmentation are present in East Asia: In East Asia, and in the principled statements that have surrounded the. .. security guarantor’ in both Southeast and Northeast Asia 62 It would appear to suggest that ASEAN is a long way from becoming integrated into even the nascent phase of a regional security community, let alone the real thing Negative Singaporean Perceptions of the Region A scrutiny shows that the ASEAN states are far from being integrated into “onecommunity” An integrated regional political community. .. Nations London and New York: Routledge, 2005 132 Militarised naval conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia can be seen in their 2005 Ambalat territorial dispute (Sulawesi Sea) Between February and April 2005, Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in a serious maritime/natural resources dispute over part of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea off the east coast of Borneo (Kalimantan to Indonesia) 33 Mutual accusations... for ASEAN Regionalism , Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28 (2) August 2006: 1 83- 206 See also Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges, London and New York: Routledge, 2009 147 sound knowledge of the economics and politics of the other ASEAN states Thompson noted that the Singapore secondary school curriculum devote more attention to the Northeast Asian and. .. ‘theft’ of a Balinese dance by the Malaysian tourism authority The bilateral dispute was serious enough that the 33 Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol IX, no 4, Fall 2005 Malaysia’s national oil company Petronas had unilaterally issued exploration licences to its own exploration arm, Petronas... Indonesia clearly has the potential to become the most powerful state in maritime Southeast Asia This could be achieved with the rise of a new Indonesian strongman, who would combine the charisma of a Sukarno and the quiet determination of the developmentalist inclinations of a Suharto The history of brutality perpetuated by the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), as studied by Leonard Sebastian and other analysts,... level, it forces us to raise related questions like the degree of comfort and trust levels among the armed forces of many of the ASEAN states Overall, the results of the Thompson-Chulanee survey appear to lend support to the studies conducted by Tobias Nischalke 51 and Allan Collins 52 that the sense of an ASEAN identity” remains quite weak among the ASEAN states, even among the elites and within the long-time... regional economic and political crises, Singapore’s neighbours often accuse the island-state of being “arrogant”, “insensitive”, and “not a real friend in need” Lily Zubaidah Rahim argued in her 2009 study that these traits have led Malaysia and Indonesia to perceive Singapore as a regional outsider’ 64 That is, Rahim is arguing that the elites in Malaysia and Indonesia do not see the city-state as . identification as ASEAN Citizen’, and f) the degree of affinity and trust among the ASEAN member-states. (A) Overall State of Bilateral Relations among the ASEAN States Singapore-Malaysia Relations. Malaysian workers in Singapore, and land reclamation. Singapore and Malaysia are two core members of the original ASEAN- 5. They are among the more developed and prosperous of the ASEAN states Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Stanford: Stanford University Press, April 2009. Writing in 1991, Acharya argued