2 Theories and Hypotheses Kuhn’s work on the development of scientific thought raises many insights and questions in both the physical and non-physical sciences. In his influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution , Kuhn (1970) describes a scientific develop- ment process as one which covers a life cycle of paradigms full of random discoveries of anomalies, crises, and scientific revolutions. Kuhn defines a paradigm in two senses: first, as “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community,” and second, as “one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science” (Kuhn 1970:175). The scientific development process can be summarized as periods of preparadigm, paradigm development, paradigm articulation, paradigm extension, and paradigm crisis (Galloway and Mahayni 1977). Applying the Kuhn structure, theories of environmental justice and equity are apparently in the preparadigm period. Currently, there is no consensus on a single paradigm, but instead competing theories and hypotheses offer different explanations for environmental justice issues. These theories are derived largely from traditional social and scientific work and include theories of justice, theories of risk, economic theory, health theories, location theory, theories of urban development, and theories of neighborhood change. In this chapter, we will review relevant bodies of literature concerning these theories and deduce from them some hypotheses about environ- mental justice. The theories reviewed here are in themselves subjects of many years’ research, which has generated rich bodies of literature. The focus here is a selective exami- nation of the literature that is relevant to our central area of interest: environmental justice and equity analysis. Omitted from this review is the literature on the socio- logical and political perspectives on the environmental justice movement, which the reader can easily find in the current environmental justice literature. 2.1 THEORIES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY Theories of justice and equity provide principles and guidelines for deciding what makes acts equitable or inequitable. Over the past several hundred years, philoso- phers and social scientists have been debating various perspectives on equity and justice, but have been unable to reach a unified theory of equity. There are different ways to classify these perspectives. Young (1994) distinguishes three basic principles of substantive fairness: equal distribution of resources among all constituents (egalitarianism); distribution of resources according to each person’s merits or input (proportionality to contribution); © 2001 by CRC Press LLC distribution of resources according to some priority principle, such as each person’s needs (distribution rule). Howe (1990) made a classification of normative ethical theories, which is helpful in current discussions of environmental justice. She classifies these theories along two dimensions: teleological vs. deontological, to act vs. to rule. The two major perspectives in the first dimension have been very influential in the debate on equity or ethics. A major distinction between the two perspectives is the goodness and rightness of action. The basic principle of the teleological perspective, commonly referred to as consequentialism, is that the goodness of the consequences of action decides what is the right action. In contrast, the deontological perspective focuses on the rightness of action itself — what we ought to do no matter what. The other dimension distinguishes “the level of application of a theory’s prin- ciples” (Howe 1990:127). In the “rule” case, broad “principles are used to generate rules that, in turn, serve as standards for guiding the behavior of individuals” (Howe 1990:127). In the “act” case, principles are used directly to make particular decisions. Wenz (1988) provides an extensive treatment of theories of justice in the envi- ronmental context. He examines property and virtue, the libertarian theory, the efficiency theory, human rights, animal rights, the utilitarian theory, and John Rawls’ theory of justice. In the following sections, we look at four major theories: utilitar- ianism, contractarianism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism. 2.1.1 U TILITARIANISM Utilitarianism is the most commonly used form in the teleological perspective. Clas- sical utilitarianism states that goods and services should be produced and distributed so as to maximize the total welfare or aggregate social utility. The goal is to achieve the greatest possible balance of good over bad for society as a whole. According to Davy (1996), “Justice is what is beneficial to the most, or: Maximize happiness!” Classical utilitarianism, as often credited to Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1948) and John Stuart Mill ([1863] 1985), is “universalistic,” concerned with aggregate con- sequences to everyone. In their view, “the good” is pleasure or happiness, and “the bad” is pain. For utilitarians, it is a matter of calculating the good and bad and identifying the greatest net benefit for all people in the long run. In neoclassical economics, “the good” is measured in utiles, and for policy analysis, is translated into benefits and costs. Classical utilitarianism has both strengths and weaknesses. It is intuitively appealing, quantitative, and “attractively egalitarian.” Its quantitative emphasis pro- vides a common umpire to deal with conflicts of obligations and is particularly attractive for policy analysis. However, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantification techniques are far from being simple, straightforward, and objective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also too flexible and subject to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. More importantly, they fail to deal with the issue of equity and distributive justice. Seemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and costs, each person is counted as one and only one. In other words, people are treated equally. © 2001 by CRC Press LLC For Mill, “justice arises from the principle of utility” (Howe 1990:130). Utilitarianism is concerned only with the aggregate effect, no matter how the aggregate is distributed. For almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. Some people win, while others lose. The Pareto optimality world is almost nonexistent. A policy’s outcome is Pareto optimal if nobody loses and at least one person gains. The Kaldor-Hicks optimality relaxes the Pareto criteria and would justify a policy if the gainers could potentially compensate the losers (Kaldor 1939; Hicks 1939). In theory, this seems to be fair and attractive. The emphasis on potential, but not required compensation, is where various problems start. Does the market or the government provide any mechanism for such compensation? Not necessarily. If there is a compensation mechanism, what is a fair compensation? More fundamentally, is a loss compensable? Some economists would argue that any loss can be compen- sated because compensation transactions happen every day, from compensation for damage in a car accident to compensation for a life lost in an airplane crash. If this is so, then by simply resorting to those compensation schemes proposed by econo- mists, we would not have such an impasse on waste facility siting issues as we have today. There is clear evidence that the true cost of hazardous waste facilities is uncompensable (Bacow and Milkey 1982; Weisskopf 1992). Summers’ proposal, as discussed in the preface, is utilitarianistic. Concerning this proposal, The Economist (1992b:18) stated: “He supposes that the value of a life, or of years of life expectancy, can be measured by an objective observer in terms of incomes per head — in other words, that an Englishman’s life is worth more than the lives of a hundred Indians. This is naive utilitarianism reduced to an absurdity. It is so outlandish that even a distinguished economist should see that it provides no basis for World Bank policy.” Other than this false assumption, however, The Economist stated that Summers’ economics was hard to answer. The economic premise underlying Summers’ three arguments is “environmental policy involves trade-offs, and should seek a balance between costs and benefits” ( The Economist 1992b:18). This balance should deter- mine the “right” non-zero level of pollution, which varies with local circumstances. The Economist believes that for the environmental policy arena, “economic method — the weighing of costs and benefits — is indispensable.” The Economist further argues that because poverty is the greatest cause of mortality in the third world and cleaner growth sometimes means slower growth, which means slower elimination or mitigation of poverty, “most poor countries will rightly want to tolerate more pollution than rich countries do, in return for more growth. So the migration of industries, including ‘dirty’ industries, to the third world is indeed desirable.” If this is a win–win strategy for both developed and developing countries, why are there as many as ninety countries that prohibit transboundary import of hazardous wastes? If this migration-of-pollution-to-LDCs strategy is indeed desirable in the international environmental policy arena, why do developed countries insist on a meaningful participation of developing countries in implementing an international treaty for curbing global warming? Could developed countries solve the global warming problem by simply dumping their CO 2 -generating industries into develop- ing countries? Similarly, could developed countries solve other transboundary envi- ronmental problems such as acid deposition through dumping into their neighbors? © 2001 by CRC Press LLC If this economic logic behind dumping on the poor is “impeccable” in the international policy arena, it should work similarly in the domestic area. The domes- tic counterpart of this logic is to dump pollution into the poorest areas in the country. More specifically, the U.S. EPA should, according to this logic, encourage migration of pollution industries from California and the Northeast to the Appalachia region, the Deep South, and urban areas with large slums, where America’s poorest are concentrated. Why does the EPA bother with regulations about regional transport of ozone in the eastern United States? Besides these ridiculous policy implications in the United States and in the world, the logic underlying Summers’ proposal represents “cultural imperialism,” the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and “a particular kind of polit- ical-economic power and its discriminatory practices” (Harvey 1996:368). Except for its beautiful guise of economic logic, the proposal is nothing new to those familiar with the history. The capitalistic powerhouses in Europe practiced material and cultural imperialism against countries in Africa, America, and Asia for years. They did it by raising the banner of trade and welfare enhancement. They did it through guns and powder. Of course, they had their logic for exporting opium to Canton (Guangzhou) in China through force. Now, we see a new logic. This time, it is economic logic and globalization. This time, the end is the same, but the means is not through guns and powder. Instead, it is political-economic power. This example illustrates clearly the danger of using the utilitarian perspective as the only means for policy analysis. Fundamentally, the utilitarian disregards the distributive justice issue altogether and espouses the current mode of production and consumption and the political-economic structure, without any attention to the ineq- uity and inequality in the current system. Even worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of “it exists, therefore it’s good.” However, “just because it sells, doesn’t mean we have to worship it” (Peirce 1991). 2.1.2 C ONTRACTARIANISM AND E GALITARIANISM In A Theory of Justice , Rawls develops a contractarian theory of justice. In a hypothetical society, individuals reach a consensus on a social contract that includes basic institutions and guiding principles for the society to distribute resources. Individuals make their choices “behind a veil of ignorance” that obscures them from knowing their abilities, history, and socioeconomic position. This veil of ignorance provides incentives for individuals to create a society that is fair to all. Under these conditions, two principles of justice would emerge. The first principle is that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” The second is the well-known maxim or difference principle: “Social and economic inequalities [of primary goods such as liberty and opportunity, income and wealth] are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged… (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1971:302). In other words, the least well-off group in society should be made as well off as possible. In the words of Davy (1996), “Justice is what is beneficial to the poor, or: Minimize pain!” © 2001 by CRC Press LLC Contractarianism provides strong moral rules pertaining to the dignity and auton- omy of human beings. These rules are particularly concerned with collective goods and are useful for policy analysts and planners. However, they do not provide a single method akin to cost–benefit analysis for evaluating policy alternatives. Although emphasizing the rightness of an action, contractarianism pays inadequate attention to the consequences of action or policy outcomes. The principles and rules are “impractically extreme and rigid” (Howe 1990:140). People often confuse contractarianism with egalitarianism. Both recognize exist- ing inequity, but they differ in their ultimate end goal. The egalitarian has the goal of eliminating the existing inequality altogether, while the contractarian does not have such a goal. The contractarian would choose an alternative, among many options, that benefits both the poor and the rich, and, as a result, still does not help reduce any existing inequality. Even worse, an action that could exacerbate the existing inequality would still be acceptable to a contractarian as long as it is to the greatest benefit of the poor. The egalitarian emphasizes the existing inequality and evaluates any action based on the degree to which such action can reduce the level of inequality. According to Sager (1990), Bedau (1967) summarizes egalitarianism as follows: • All social inequalities are unnecessary and unjustifiable, and ought to be eliminated • All men are equal — now and forever — in intrinsic value, inherent worth, and essential nature • The concept of justice involves that of equality • Social equalities need no special justification, whereas social inequalities always do • All persons are to be treated alike, except where circumstances require different treatment 2.1.3 L IBERTARIANISM Libertarianism emphasizes freedom of individuals. People should be able to do whatever they want in the absence of force or fraud, as long as they respect the equal right of others to do the same (Wenz 1988). Justice results from the free market, where individuals make their choices freely. In the words of Davy (1996), “Justice is what is beneficial to the strong: or, Maximize liberty!” Libertarian justice is illustrated by Friedrich von Hayek’s “catallaxy” (a spontaneous order produced by the market) and Robert Nozick’s theory of a minimal state: All the state can do is to prevent aggression and fraud; otherwise, it would violate individual’s rights. Contractarianism and libertarianism can be traced to the same root in Kant (Howe 1990). Kant, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals ([1785] 1964), devel- oped two purely rational criteria for the validity of moral rules. The first criterion is the well-known categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant [1785] 1964:88). The second criterion is the humanity principle: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any © 2001 by CRC Press LLC other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant [1785] 1964:96). Therefore, Kantian theories emphasize dignity and freedom. Rawls’s con- tractarian theories draw on both dignity and freedom, while Nozick’s minimal state theory relies only on freedom. Libertarianism stresses the importance of free market, private property right, vol- untary transaction, and free choices. This theory provides an underlying rationale for settling conflicts between individuals such as nuisance and trespass (Wenz 1988). However, when the conflicts involve a large number of people, the libertarian theory often fails to provide any just remedy. Environmental pollution often involves many people, and cannot be solved through voluntary bargaining among individuals. Envi- ronmental resources such as air and water are usually collective goods, which one person consumes without taking into account costs or benefits for other people that his/her consumption creates. In these cases, market failures often occur. A more fun- damental problem with the libertarian theory is the justification for the initial assignment of property rights. One underlying assumption for the libertarian theory is that property rights are well and rightfully defined. In addition, original acquisition must take place without force and fraud. This is often not the case; “there are few, if any parts of the earth whose environmental resources have reached their current owners without force or fraud” (Wenz 1988:75). The libertarian theory “fails to provide adequate underlying justification for contemporary property rights and for the view that all issues of justice should be decided solely by reference to such rights” (Wenz 1988:77). 2.1.4 W HICH THEORY ? There is no doubt that policy-makers and planners holding different perspectives of justice will make different decisions. Figure 2.1 illustrates four hypothetical propos- als with different distribution of net benefits (Beatley 1984). The utilitarian will choose Proposal I based on the maximum net benefits to the community as a whole. However, this proposal exacerbates the existing inequality. Under this proposal, the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer. Those who emphasize equal share of benefits and burdens would choose Proposal II. The aggregate net benefit to society is smaller in Proposal II than that in Proposal I, but different income groups share the net benefit more evenly. Proposal II would also deepen existing inequalities, although to a lesser degree. Both proposals are unacceptable to the egalitarian, who seeks to minimize inequalities. The egalitarian would choose Proposal III, because it would reduce the relative level of inequality to the greatest extent among four proposals. Please note that this proposal has the smallest aggregate net benefit and does not contribute the greatest benefits among four proposals to low and lower-middle income groups. However, the low and lower-income groups benefit from Proposal III more than high and upper-middle income groups. To maximize the benefit to the least advantaged group of a society, the Rawlsian would favor Proposal IV, which generates the greatest net benefit among four proposals to the low income group. In Proposal IV, however, the high income group would benefit the most, and thus the level of inequality would be increased. Each of the theories discussed above has its strengths and weaknesses. Each one is powerful and “impeccable” in the eyes of its beholders. On the other hand, each © 2001 by CRC Press LLC is subject to strong criticism from other camps. In fact, Wenz (1988: 310) concludes that “each theory failed when taken by itself.” Noting the failure in searching for a singular unified theory to deal with a diversity of environmental issues, Wenz (1988) suggests that different theories should be used in different situations. Indeed, in a controversial situation, we often see application of different theories by different participants. In the case of waste facility siting (Davy 1996) or lead-paint poisoning (Harvey 1996), different stakeholders use different notions of justice to support their interests. Landlords and developers use the libertarian view of justice and seek maximum individual freedoms with respect to their rights invested in their properties under minimal government intervention. Residents in a facility-hosting community or living in houses with lead paint take the contractarian view of justice, laying claim as (potential) victims of the corporate greed for profit and asking for protection from exposure to environmental risks. Some government officials attempting to act on behalf of the public interest assume a utilitarian view of justice. If one takes lead paint as a public health issue or facility siting as a public policy issue, such officials attempt to balance the benefits and costs of siting the facility in a community or removing lead paint, thereby making decisions based on the aggregate net gains to the society as a whole. Some environmental justice advocates take an egalitarian perspective. They reject any inequality, whether social, economic, environmental, or political. They reject siting efforts not by raising the banner of “not-in-my-backyard” but by the principle of “not-in-anybody’s-backyard.” According to Bullard (1994:206), a pioneer in the environmental justice movement, “the solution to unequal environmental protection FIGURE 2.1 Different theories of justice select different policies. (Adapted from Beatley, T., Figure 2, 22. J. Am. Planning Assoc . 50, 4, 22, 1984. With permission.) - - © 2001 by CRC Press LLC is seen to lie in the struggle for justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become an ecological ‘sacrifice zone.’” It is no wonder that different stakeholders speak different languages in such conflicts. Numerous failures in the waste facility siting efforts lead some observers to conclude that the conflict due to these different perspectives of justice is irrecon- cilable. Davy (1996) argues that in this pluralist world of justice concepts, adoption of any justice concept will be seen as unjust or unfair to somebody with a different justice concept. Any siting will be unjust or unfair to somebody. He labels this phenomenon as “essential injustice.” From a philosophical point of view, the conflict of different perspectives of justice is also irreconcilable, with some qualifications (Howe 1990). Which principle of justice prevails in such an irreconcilable conflict? Harvey (1996) argues that it is a “class struggle.” He quotes Marx as saying “Between equal rights, force decides.” What should a policy analyst or any individual do in the pluralist world of justice concepts? An analyst can choose a perspective according to a specific situation (Wenz 1988) or a role he or she holds (Held 1984). This situation-specific strategy is not without difficulty. A lack of available criteria for choosing one perspective over the other creates a flexible situation where any choice may be subject to “acts of power” (Harvey 1996). Some argue that a policy analyst should apply multiple perspectives to a policy issue and analyze the conflicts involved from different angles (Anderson 1979; Moore 1981). This enables the analyst to offer public officials a multi-faceted analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective. This information is particularly useful to search for “policies that move most surely in the direction of commonweal” (Moore 1981:14). In the case of facility siting, Davy (1996) argues for “a fair balance between different justices,” and for eliminating and avoiding injustice to the extent possible. Justice to whom? In the policy or planning domain, groups of people that share common interests and concerns are often the subject of inquiry for justice. In philosophy, however, the focus is on the individual. In measuring equity concerning groups, disproportionality is often used and equated with inequity or injustice. Perhac (1999), a philosopher, argues that three major theories of justice — utilitarianism, natural rights theory, and (Rawlsian) contractarianism — do not call for “eliminating disproportionality along racial or socioeconomic lines” as a matter of justice. Pro- portionality of risk distribution along racial or socioeconomic lines does not ensure justice to individuals. He suggests a shift of focus from racial or socioeconomic groups to individuals at greatest risk irrespective of their group association. However, in the current political environment, it is not individuals but rather groups that play major roles. 2.2 ECONOMIC AND LOCATION THEORIES Efficiency is what economists worship. When they talk about efficiency, what they usually mean is Pareto efficiency. It is a state in which no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. An economy is Pareto efficient if there are “no unexploited gains to trade, no unexploited way of increasing output with © 2001 by CRC Press LLC the same level of inputs,” and no mix of products that do not reflect the preferences of consumers (Stiglitz 1993). These very strong conditions for the Pareto efficiency of the market economy are referred to, respectively, as exchange efficiency, produc- tion efficiency, and product-mix efficiency. A competitive market is Pareto efficient, and every Pareto-efficient allocation can be obtained through the market mechanism. A competive market also has strong assumptions: rational participants, perfect infor- mation, utility- or profit-maximization, and non-existence of market failure condi- tions. In the real world, these conditions are seldom realistic. Many environmental issues have defied all these conditions. 2.2.1 E XTERNALITY AND P UBLIC G OODS An externality arises when one individual’s activity imposes costs or benefits on other unrelated parties, but this individual does not take into account these external effects when making his or her decision. As a result, there is a divergence between social costs and private costs, which indicates economic inefficiency. In order to achieve efficiency, such government policies as taxation and subsidy are justified (Pigou 1926). On the other hand, Coase (1960) argued that such government inter- vention was unnecessary. The well-known Coase theorem states that if property rights are well defined and freely transferable in a world of zero transaction cost, a voluntary bargaining and compensation solution among different users of the envi- ronment will result in a Pareto-optimal allocation, and properties will go to their most socially valued uses. Coase argued further that victims of environmental pol- lution should not only be not compensated but also be taxed, for victims’ decisions to locate near the polluter impose an external cost or an increase in damages incurred by the polluter’s activity. The Coase theorem has been criticized on many grounds, including the impracticality of bargaining in real world situations involving a large number of parties, relevance of transaction costs, and equity considerations (Baumol and Oates, 1988). In particular, environmental quality is a public good. Public goods are goods for which one person’s consumption does not affect another’s (nonrival- rous), and it is extremely costly to exclude anyone from enjoying (nonexcludable). In the case of public goods, an individual can take the position of a freerider and never pay the cost for using them. From economic theories, Hamilton (1995) derives three hypotheses for explain- ing why exposure to environmental risks might vary by race: pure discrimination, the Coase theorem (differences in willingness to pay), and the theory of collective action (differences in propensity to engage in collective action). In the pure discrim- ination model, owners of environmentally risky facilities increase their utility by siting their facilities in the communities with the racial groups against which they have prejudice. Interpreting the Coase theorem in the context of siting a hazardous waste facility, he indicates that this type of facility will locate where compensation due to damages is the least. Furthermore, compensation is associated with the characteristics of the host community, such as population affected, income, property values, and residents’ willingness to pay for an environmental amenity. In turn, these variables may be associated with race. As discussed above, voluntary negotiations for compensation may be impossible in real world situations. More often, residents © 2001 by CRC Press LLC in a target community voice their concern and compensation demands through the political process. To the extent that different racial and income groups have different propensities for political participation, the location of the environmentally risky facilities may be associated with the race and income characteristics of the host community. In examining capacity expansion decisions of commercial hazardous waste facilities during the period from 1987 to1992 by using population data at the ZIP code level, Hamilton (1995) found that collective action, measured in terms of actual voter turnout in a county, offered the best explanation for which neighborhoods were selected for capacity expansion. After controlling for other variables, the percentage of nonwhite population was not statistically significant. 2.2.2 W ELFARE E CONOMICS Economic effects of any environmental quality changes such as air and water quality can be measured in terms of public welfare changes. Welfare changes occur as “changes in the prices they pay for goods bought in markets; changes in the prices they receive for their factors of production; changes in the quantities or qualities of nonmarket goods (for example, public goods such as air quality); and changes in the risks individuals face” (Freeman 1993:39). Ordinary consumer’s surplus, also called Marshallian consumer’s surplus, is a welfare measure and is simply defined as the difference between the price which the consumer is willing to pay and the actual price he or she pays. It measures the surplus of satisfaction that is derived from the consumer’s paying a lower price than his or her maximum willingness to pay. This interpretation is very intuitive. However, the Marshallian consumer’s surplus measure does not offer much help for quantifying welfare changes associated with public policies. It does not measure either utility changes, except for some special cases, or gains or losses of potential compensation. Following Freeman (1993), let us look at four other welfare measures: compensating variation, equivalent variation, compensating surplus, and equivalent surplus. Compensating variation measures the compensating payment that is required to make a consumer indifferent to his or her original consumption bundle at the old price and new consumption bundle at the new price. The consumer’s initial utility is the reference point; that is, the consumer should be as happy as he or she is now in the face of proposed changes in price. This measure implies that the consumer has the right to the status quo. If a proposed policy increases the price for the consumer and thus decreases his or her utility, the consumer has to be compensated with a certain income to maintain his or her original utility level. For a price increase, compensating variation is the minimum amount that the consumer is willing to accept (WAC) to prevent a utility decrease. On the other hand, if a proposed policy decreases the price for the consumer and thus would increase his or her utility, the consumer would be willing to pay a certain amount to purchase at the new price level. The maximum amount that the consumer would be willing to pay is where he or she still maintains his or her original utility level and thus exhausts any potential welfare gain. For a price decrease, compensating variation is the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for consuming at the new price. Essentially, compensating variation is the income change required to maintain the status quo when prices change. © 2001 by CRC Press LLC [...]... Therefore, Hypotheses 2. 2.1 and 2. 2 .2 should be relaxed in terms of perceived risks Furthermore, we may have the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2. 3.1: To the extent that risk perception is related to residential location choices, environmental risks with a larger degree of dread and unfamiliarity tend to be associated with the poor Environmental risks with a small degree of dread and unfamiliarity are... population distribution and environmental risks changes over time Theories reviewed here include the classical invasion-succession model, the neighborhood life-cycle model, the push-pull model, and institutional theory In the following, LULU refers to locally unwanted land use and environmentally risky facilities such as hazardous and solid waste management facilities, uncontrolled toxics and solid waste sites,... of their racial composition Moreover, land use would become more and more dominated by industrial use 2. 4 .2 NEIGHBORHOOD LIFE-CYCLE MODEL The life-cycle model, formally devised by Hoover and Vernon (1959), takes the view that a neighborhood has a natural life-cycle, just like any natural and life process Through this life cycle, a neighborhood ages and declines, and its inhabitants become members of... rate than those without; and may even decrease over the decade Therefore, we have the following hypotheses: © 20 01 by CRC Press LLC Hypothesis 2. 2.1: The more serious environmental risks are (perceived to be) in a community, the smaller the proportion of the rich and the greater the proportion of the poor who live there Hypothesis 2. 2 .2: The proportion of the rich decreases and the proportion of the... family structure, and housing consumption, and produced more realistic spatial patterns of residential location According to Fujita (1989: 42) , “Wage-poor and wage-rich households with few dependents (such as singles and working couples with few children) will tend to reside close to the city center Beyond them and out toward the suburbs, middle-income households with large families and few commuters... arise ex post After an environmentally risky facility is sited and operating in a community, environmental quality will decline and environmental risk will increase to the extent that some residents placing a higher value on environmental quality will be discontented These dissatisfied residents would shop for the communities that can satisfy their demands on environmental quality and “vote with their... racial transitions in neighborhoods, the invasion-succession model was also used to explain changes in land-use activities in neighborhoods over time The encroachment of commercial and industrial activities upon adjacent residential areas can contribute to conversion from residential land use to commercial and/ or industrial land uses (Burgess 1 925 ; Smith and McCann 1981) Therefore, we would expect that... more danger and hazards the poor suffer Rayner (19 92) proposes the fairness hypothesis and defines risk as probability × magnitudes + TLC (trust, liability, and consent) He points out the different concerns for various social groups in risk decision-making processes While public/private decision-makers focus their concerns on economic risks and © 20 01 by CRC Press LLC technological aspects of environmental. .. little to the neighborhood decline 2. 5 SUMMARY In this chapter, we have discussed several theories of justice and equity: the utilitarian notion of equity, Rawls’ theory of contractarian justice, the egalitarian notion of equality, and the libertarian notion of freedom None of them can adequately serve as a unified framework to deal with environmental justice issues In practice, we have seen that different... higher value on environmental quality Under the condition of perfect information, upper-income households would tend to locate ex ante where there is little environmental risk or pollution, ceteris paribus The poor would choose their residences in the communities with the lowest environmental quality and the most serious environmental risks This association between population distribution and environmental . perspectives on the environmental justice movement, which the reader can easily find in the current environmental justice literature. 2. 1 THEORIES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY Theories of justice and equity. economic, environmental, or political. They reject siting efforts not by raising the banner of “not-in-my-backyard” but by the principle of “not-in-anybody’s-backyard.” According to Bullard (1994 :20 6),. (Adapted from Beatley, T., Figure 2, 22 . J. Am. Planning Assoc . 50, 4, 22 , 1984. With permission.) - - © 20 01 by CRC Press LLC is seen to lie in the struggle for justice for all Americans. No