created creditor’s bill has supplanted the writ. This bill creates an equitable remedy for a person who cannot enforce a judgment in a court of law. A court provides an equitable remedy based not on legal authority but on principles of fairness. States that maintain the scire facias writ require it to be filed within a certain time after expiration of the judgment. In Texas, for example, the Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifies that a scire facias writ may be brought no later than two years after the date that the judgment became dormant (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 [West 1995]). The term scire facias also is used in the law to describe a particular form of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage. After a mortgagor of property defaults on payment obligations, the mortgagee may obtain a writ of scire facias, which is an order commanding the respondent to appear and explain why the mortgaged property should not be sold to satisfy the mortgage debt. FURTHER READINGS Edward M. Reisner. Practising Law Institute (PLI). 1995. Using Litigation Support Programs and Graphic Evidence Media in Patent Cases, by Patents, Copyrights, Trade- marks, and Literary Property Course Handbook series, PLI order no. G4-39. Wiedemer, James. 2008. The Homeowner’s Guide to Foreclo- sure. 2d ed. New York: Kaplan Publishing. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT Activities of an employee that are in furtherance of duties that are owed to an employer and where the employer is, or could be, exercising some control, directly or indirectly, over the activities of the employee. Under the doctrine of RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR,a employer is vicariously liable for the TORTS, civil wrongs, of an agent committed within the ambit of the agent’s occupation. The scope of employment includes all acts reasonably necessary or inci dent to the perfor- mance of work, including matters of personal convenience and comfort that do not conflict with specific instructions. SCOPES MONKEY TRIAL The criminal prosecution of John T. Scopes was an attack by citizens of Dayton, Tennessee, on a Tennessee statute that banned the teach ing of evolution in public schools. The Butler Act, passed in early 1925 by the Tennessee General Assembly, punished public school teachers who taught “that man has descended from a lower order of animals” or any theory “that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible.” Some citizens of Dayton decided to chal- lenge a crimonal statute. On the last day of school in May 1925, they congregated in Robinson’s Drug Store and devised a plan to use a willing teacher to challenge its constitu- tionality. According to the plan, a teacher would admit to teaching evolution and volunteer to face criminal charges under the statute. One person in the assemblage suggested John T. Scopes, a popular substitute teacher who had taught science and coached athletics at the high school for the past year. Scopes agreed, and within days he was accused of criminal teachings. He was arrested, indicted, and released pending trial in the town of Dayton. He faced no jail time. If convicted of the offense, Scopes would have had to pay a fine of at least $100, but no more than $500. News of the case touched off a national debate on creationism, evolution, and public school teaching. Vendors, preachers, journalists, and gawkers descended on the town of Dayton during the months of June and July. The case also attracted legal celebrities. General A. T. Stewart was joined by a host of special counsel for the prosecution, including WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN . Bryan, age 65, was a skilled speaker, veteran lawyer, and former presidential candi- date. A Dayton newspaper asked the eminent litigator CLARENCE SEWARD DARROW, age 68, to defend Scopes. Darrow, an ardent opponent of religious fundamentalism, agreed to defend Scopes free of charge. He was assisted by Dudley Field Malone and Arthur Garfield Hays of the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION. The trial began on July 10 in the midst of a blistering heat wave, but the intense heat did not deter spectators. The courtroom was so crowded that the last part of the trial was held outside in the courthouse yard to accommodate the large audience. Much of the trial was consumed by argu- ments on evidence and orations delivered by Bryan, Darrow, or Hays. Some of these orations were directed no t toward the judge and jury but toward the gallery, which responde d with jeers, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 38 SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT cheers, and catcalls. Because Scopes did not deny that he had taught evolution, his lawyers sought to sway the jury into nullifying the statute by acquitting him in spite of the evidence. Darrow, Malone, and Hays attempted to win over the jury by attacking creationism and confirming the theory of evolution. The most significant evidence offered by the defense did not make it into the record. Darrow placed Bryan on the WITNESS STAND and ques- tioned him on the merits of evolution and creationism. The most memorable moments of the trial consisted of the debate between the two men. However, the examination of Bryan had little impact on the jury’s decision because the jury was not present to hear it. After Bryan stepped down from the witness stand, the defense rested. The Tennessee jury found Scopes guilty. Judge Raulston instructed the jury that it could leave the punishment to the court. The jury did not set the fine, so Raulston set it at $100. Scopes appealed the verdict to the Tennessee Supreme Court, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of church and state under the FIRST AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. Unfortunately, his local counsel, John R. Neal, failed to file a bill of exceptions within 30 days after the trial. Without such a bill, Scopes’s arguments on appeal were limited to the actual trial transcript. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not decide whether the statute was constitutional. It held merely that the fine was invalid under the state constitution (Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 [1927]). Under article VI, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution, a judge could not fine anyone more than $50. In the opinion, written by Chief Justice Grafton Green, the court urged the state to dismiss the case against Scopes, noting that Scopes was no longer in the employ of the state and declaring, “We see nothing to be gained by prolonging the life of this bizarre case.” Bryan died shortly after the trial. Darrow litigated several more high-profile cases, and Scopes returned to his teaching career. Scopes never had to pay the fine. When asked later in life whether he had any regrets about the case, Scopes said, “ my decision would be the same as it was in 1925. I would go home and think about it. I would sleep on it. And the next day I would do it again.” Scopes received a measure of vindication shortly before his death in 1970. In 1968 the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional statutes that forbid the teaching of evolution (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266, 21 L. Ed. 2d 228). Since the Epperson case, advocates of creationism have been hard pressed to find public schools willing to teach scientific creationism. In a gradual reversal of fortune, scientific creationists have been unable to obtain equal time for the teaching of creationism in public schools. In 1987 a splintered U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Louisiana statute that mandated equal time for the teaching of creationism violated the First Amendment because it served no identified secular purpose and had the primary purpose of promoting a particular religious belief (Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 96 L. Ed. 2d 510). Epperson and Aguillard did not directly resolve whether school officials could constitu- tionally prohibit the teaching of creationism in public schools, or whether school officials could affirmatively require public school teachers to teach evolution. At least three post-Aguillard federal appellate cases have directly involved these issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that school officials may require a teacher to teach evolution without violating the teacher’s Free Speech rights under In May 1925, John T. Scopes challenged the Butler Act, a Tennessee state law that prohibited public school teachers from teaching evolution. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SCOPES MONKEY TRIAL 39 the First Amendment. Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990). Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the required teaching of evolution, either as fact or as theory, did not contravene the Establishment Clause. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School Dist.,37F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a school authorized disclaimer qualifying the teaching of evolution as “theory” violated the Establish- ment Clause because the disclaimer was adopted as a substitute for “a failed attempt to introduce creationism into the school curricu- lum as a legitimate scientific alternative to evolution.” Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). In 2005 a Pennsylvania district court became the first federal court to address the constitutionality of teaching Intelligent Design in public schools. Intelligent Design is the belief that the universe and laws of nature show convincing proof of a divine creator, though Intelligent Design does not reveal the identity of the creator or rely on the Bible as its foundation. The court held that the teaching of Intelligent Design really amounts to teaching creationism by disguise and struck down the school district ’s program. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). The court found that a required disclaimer explain- ing the holes in the theory of evolution and offering Intelligent Design as a viable alternative was unconstitutional. Like the disclaimer in Freilier, the disclaimer in this case was uncon- stitutional because a reasonable student would view the presentation of the disclaimer as a strong endorsement of religion, the court found. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Debra. 1999. “Trials of the Century.” ABA Journal 85 (January). Larson, Edward J. 1997. Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate over Science and Religion. New York: BasicBooks. Moran, Jeffrey P. 2002. The Scopes Trial: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Palgrave. Paine, Donald F. 1996. “State of Tennessee v. John Scopes Revisited.” Tennessee Bar Journal 32 (May–June). Scopes, John Thomas. 1997. The World’s Most Famous Court Trial: Tennessee Evolution Case: A Complete Stenographic Report of the Famous Court Test of the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, at Dayton, July 10 to 21, 1925, Including Speeches and Arguments of Attorneys. Union, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange. Uelmen, Gerald F. 1996. “The Trial as a Circus: Inherit the Wind.” University of San Francisco Law Review 30 (summer). CROSS REFERENCES Bryan, William Jennings; Darrow, Clarence Seward; Reli- gion; Schools and School Districts. SCORCHED-EARTH PLAN A slang expression for a defensive tactic used by an unwilling corporate takeover target to make itself less attractive to a buyer. Scorched-earth tactics include selling off assets or entering into long-term contractual commitments. A difficulty with such maneuvers is that they tend to be irreversible and may permanently harm the company. As a result, they tend to be used as a last resort in a takeover struggle. The name comes from the military strategy of destroying everything that might be useful to an enemy in a city or town that a fighting force is passing through or retreating from. It is generally considered a war crime. CROSS REFERENCES Mergers and Acquisiti ons; Risk Arbitrage. SCOTTSBORO CASES See POWELL V. ALABAMA. SEA See LAW OF THE SEA. SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY OF 1971 The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 was an agreement for the denuclearization of the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil of the seabed. It may be regarded as a NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY since it limits or prevents the spread of nuclear devices to the seabed areas. The full name of the treaty, which didn’t enter into force until May 18, 1972, is Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of NUCLEAR WEAPONS and Other WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23(1) U.S.T. 701; 955 U.N.T.S. 115. CROSS REFERENCE Arms Control and Disarmament. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 40 SCORCHED-EARTH PLAN SEAL To close records by any type of fastening that must be broken before access can be obtained. An impression upon wax, wafer, or some other substance capable of being impressed. The use of seals began at a time when writing was not common, but when every person of means possessed a coat-of-arms or other distinc- tive device. Great significance was attached to the use of seals as a means of distinguishing persons. With the spread of education, the signature on an instrument became more important than the seal, and seals lost their former dignity and importance. Modern judicial decisions minimize or eliminate the distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments, and most statutes have abolished the use of seals. Other statutes abolishing the use of private seals do not make sealed instruments unlawful, but merely render the seals ineffective. In jurisdictions that still recognize the use of seals, the seal can assume the form of a wax impression, an impression made on paper, or a gummed sticker attached to the document. The letters L.S., an abbrevia- tion for the Latin phrase locus sigilli, meaning “the place of the seal,” can also be used in place of a material seal, as can the word seal or a statement to the effect that the document is to take effect as a sealed instrument. Seals are currently used for authenticating documents, such as birth and marriage records and deeds to real property. They are also used to authenticate signatures witnessed by a NOTARY PUBLIC and in formalizing corporate documents. In regard to contracts, at COMMON LAW a promise under seal was enforceable without the necessity of legal consideration—something of value—either because the seal was a substitute for consideration or because the existence of consideration was conclusively presumed. Al- though most states have abolished seals, some states have provided by statute that a seal raises a presumption of consideration. Article 2 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC)—a body of law adopted by the states to govern commercial transactions—has eliminated the seal as consid- eration in commercial sales to which the act is applicable. At one time, the statute of limitations—the prescribed period during which legal proceedings must be instituted— was longer for an action brought on a contract under seal than for one not under seal. SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES The official die or signet, which has a raised emblem and is used by federal officials on documents of importance. The United States seal is sometimes offi- cially known as the great seal. The SECRETARY OF STATE has custody and charge of the official seal and makes out, records, and affixes the seal to all civil commissions for officers of the United States, who are appointed by the president alone, or by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. In order for the seal to be affixed to any commission or other instrument, the president must sign or specially warrant the commission. When the seal is affixed to an appointment, such appointment is made and the commission is valid. Each state also has an official seal, which is carefully described by law and serves functions on the state level of government that are similar to those of the seal of the United States on the federal level. SEALED VERDICT A decision reached by the jury when the court is not in session, which is placed in a closed envelope by the jurors, who then separate. The Great Seal of King Edward III of England. Often used as a signature or imprimatur, seals once had a practical importance. In the early 2000s, many government offices have seals, though they are mainly decorative in function. BRITISH MUSEUM COLLECTION. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SEALED VERDICT 41 A sealed verdict is opened and read when the court reconvenes, and it has the same effect as if it had been returned in open court before the jury separated. However, the court holds that a sealed verdict is merely an agreement reached by the jurors and does not become final until it is read into the record and the jurors are discharged. SEARCH AND SEIZURE A hunt by law enforcement officials for property or communications believed to be evidence of crime, and the act of taking possession of this property. In international law, the right of ships of war, as regulated by treaties, to examine a merchant vessel during war in order to determine whether the ship or its cargo is liable to seizure. Overview Search and seizure is a necessary exercise in the ongoing pursuit of criminals. Searches and seizures are used to produce evidence for the prosecution of alleged criminals. T he police have the power to search and seize, but individuals are protected against arbitrary, unreasonable police intrusions. Freedom from unrestricted search warrants was critical to American colonists. Under England’s rule, many searches were unlimited in scope and were conducted without justification. Customs officials could enter the homes of colonists at will, to search for violations of customs and trade laws, and suspicionless searches were carried out against outspoken political activists. Searches in the colonies came to represent governmental oppression. To guard against arbitrary police intrusions, the newly formed United States in 1791 ratified the U.S. Constitution’s FOURTH AMENDMENT, which states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon PROBABLE CAUSE, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. State Action Law enforcement officers are entrusted with the power to conduct investigations, make arrests, perform searches and seizures of persons and their belongings, and occasionally use lethal force in the line of duty. But this power must be exercised within the boundaries of the law, and when police officers exceed those boundaries, they jeopardize the admissibility of any evidenc e collected for prosecution. By and large, the Fourth Amendment and the CASE LAW interpret- ing it establish these boundaries. The safeguards enumerated by the Fourth Amendment only apply against STATE ACTION, namely action taken by a governmental official or at the dire ction of a governmental official. Thus, actions taken by state or federal law enforcement offi cials or private persons work- ing with law enforcement officials will be subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amend- ment. Bugging, WIRETAPPING, and other related snooping activity performed by purely private citizens, such as private investigators, do not receive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Individuals receive no Fourth Amendment protection unless they can demonstrate that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that was searched or the property that was seized. The U.S. SUPREME COURT explained that what “a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 [1976]). In general, the Court has said that individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own bodies, PERSONAL PROPERTY, homes, and business offices. Individuals also enjoy a qualified expecta- tion of privacy in their automobiles. Individuals ordinarily possess no reasonable expectation of privacy in things such as bank records, vehicle location and vehicle paint, garbage left at roadside for collection, hand- writing, the smell of luggage, land visible from a public place, and other places and things visible in plain or open view. Houseguests typically do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the homes they are visiting, especially when they do not stay overnight and their sole purpose for being inside the house is to participate in criminal activity such as a drug transaction (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 [1998]). Similarly, a DEFENDANT showing only that he was a passenger in a searched car has not shown an expectation of privacy in the car or its contents (Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 42 SEARCH AND SEIZURE [1978]). Both the houseguest and the motor vehicle passenger must assert a property or possessory interest in the home or motor vehicle before a court will recognize any Fourth Amendment privacy interests that would prevent a police officer from searching those places without first obtaining a warrant. Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Once it has been established that an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place to be searched or a thing to be seized, the Fourth Amendment’s protections take hold, and the question then becomes what is the nature of those protections. Police officers need no justification to stop someone on a public street and ask questions, and individuals are completely entitled to refuse to answer any such questions and go about their business. However, a police officer may only search people and places when the officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to suspect criminal activity. “Probable cause” means that the officer must possess sufficiently trustworthy facts to believe that a crime has been committed. In some cases, an officer may need only a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a limited search. Reasonable suspicion means that the officer has sufficient knowledge to believe that criminal activity is at hand. This level of knowledge is less than that of probable cause, so reasonable suspicion is usually used to justify a brief frisk in a public area or a traffic stop at roadside. To possess either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to cite specific articulable facts to warrant the intrusion. Items related to suspected criminal activity found in a search may be taken, or “seized,” by the officer. Arrest and Miranda Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure refers to the collection of evidence by law enforcement officials and to the arrest of persons. An arrest occurs when a police officer takes a person against his or her will for questioning or criminal prosecution. The general rule is that to make an arrest, the police must obtain an ARREST WARRANT. However, if an officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, and there is no time to obtain a warrant, the officer may make a warrantless arrest. Also, an officer may make a warrantless arrest of persons who commit a crime in the officer’s presence. An invalid arrest is not generally a defense to prosecution. However, if an arrest is unsup- ported by probable cause, evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid arrest may be excluded from trial. When an arrest is made, the arresting officer must read the Miranda warnings to the arrestee. The Miranda warnings apprise an arrestee of the right to obtain counsel and the right to remain silent. If these warnings are not read to an arrestee as soon as he or she is taken into custody, any statements the arrestee makes after the arrest may be excluded from trial. Legal commentators have criticized Miranda and its subsequent line of decisions, stating that criminal suspects seldom truly understand the meaning or importance of the rights recited to them. Studies have indicated that the Miranda decision has had little effect on the numbers of confessions and requests for lawyers made by suspects in custody. Moreover, critics of Miranda cite concerns that the police may fabricate waivers, since a suspect’swaiverofMiranda rights need not be recorded or made to a neutral party. Defenders of Miranda argue that it p rotects criminal suspects and reduces needless LITIGATION by providing the police with concrete guidelines for permissible interrogation. In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fueled long-standing speculation that Miranda would be overruled when it held that the admissibility of confessions in federal court is governed not by Miranda,butbya federal statute enacted two years after Miranda. The statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501, provides that a confession is admissible if voluntarily given. Congress enacted the statute to overturn Miranda, the Fourth Circuit said, and Congress hadtheauthoritytodosopursuanttoitsauthority to OVERRULE judicially created rules of evidence that are not mandated by the Constitution. U.S. v. Di ckerson, 166 F.3d 667 ( 4th Cir. 1999). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST , the Court said that, whether it agreed with Miranda or not, the principles of STARE DECISIS weighed heavily against overruling it. While the Supreme Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent cases have under- mined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not happened to the Miranda decision, which the Court said “has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SEARCH AND SEIZURE 43 warnings have become part of our national culture.” Although the Court acknowledged that a few guilty defendants may sometimes go free as the result of the application of the Miranda rule, “experience suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test [that] § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to and for courts to apply in a consistent manner” (Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S . 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 [2000]). The Search Warrant Requirement A SEARCH WARRANT is a judicially approved document that authorizes law enforcement officials to search a particular place. To obtain a search warrant, a police officer must provide an account of information supporting probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place or places. The officer must also make a list of the particular places to be searched and the items sought. Finally, the officer must swea r to the truthful- ness of the information. The officer presents the information in an AFFIDAVIT to a magistrate or judge, who determines whether to approve the warrant. An officer may search only the places where items identified in the search warrant may be found. For example, if the only item sought is a snowmobile, the officer may not rummage through desk drawers. Only the items listed in the warrant may be seized, unless other evidence of illegal activity is in plain view. Judges or magistrates may approve a variety of types of searches. The removal of blood from a person’s body, a search of body cavities, and even surgery may be approved for the gathering of evidence. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE and phone records may also be used to gather evidence upon the issuance of a warrant. A warrant is not required for a search incident to a lawful arrest, the seizu re of items in plain view, a border search, a search effected in open fields, a vehicle search (except for the trunk), an inventory search of an impounded vehicle, and any search necessitated by exigent circumstances. It is also no t required for a stop- and-frisk, a limited search for weap ons based on a reasonable suspicion that the subject has committed or is committing a crime. A police officer may also conduct a warrantless search if the subject consents. Exceptions to Warrant Requirement Administrative agencies may conduct warrant- less searches of highly regulated industries, such as strip mining and food service. Federal and state statutes authorize warrantless, random drug testing of persons in sensitive positions, such as air traffic controllers, drug interdiction officers, railroad employees, and customs offi- cials. In each of these types of searches, the Supreme Court has ruled that the need for public safety outweighs the countervailing privacy interests that would normally require a search warrant. However, a few lower federal courts have ruled that warrantless searches of public housing projects are unconstitutional, notwith- standing the fact that residents of the public housings projects signed petitions supporting warrantless searches to rid their communities of drugs and weapons. Nor may states pass a law requiring candidates for state political office to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result was negative, without violating the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (U.S. 1997), the state of Georgia failed to show a special need that was important enough to justify such drug testing and override the candidate ’s countervailing privacy interests, the Court said. Moreover, the Court found, the certification requirement was not well designed to identify candidates who violate anti-drug laws and was not a credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking state office, since the Georgia law allowed the candidates to select the test date, and all but the prohibitively addicted could abstain from using drugs for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection. The Supreme Court has given law enforce- ment mixed signals over the constitutionality of warrantless motor vehicle checkpoints. The Court approved warrantless, suspicionless searches at roadside sobriety checkpoints. These searches must be carried out in some neutral, articulable way, such as by stopping every fifth car. However, a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics violates the Fourth Amendment. In distinguishing between sobriety and drug interdiction checkpoints, the Court said that the sobriety checkpoints under review were designed to ensure roadway safety, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 44 SEARCH AND SEIZURE while the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint under review were to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, and, as such, the program contravened the Fourth Amendment (City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed.2d 333 [U.S. 2000]). Warrant exceptions have been carved out by courts because requiring a warrant in certain situations would unnecessarily hamper law enforcement. For example, it makes little sense to require an officer to obtain a search warrant to seize CONTRABAND that is in plain view. Under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re- quirement, the appropriateness of every war- rantless search is decided on a case-by-case basis, weighing the defendant’s privacy interests against the reasonable needs of law enforcement under the circumstances. However, in Arizona v. Gant , __U.S.__, __S.Ct.__, __L.Ed.2d__ 2009 WL 1045962 (2009), the Supreme Court put limits on when police make search a vehicle without a warrant. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Court had authorized police to search a vehicle without a warrant if the vehicle was within an arrestee’s reach. In another case, Chimel v. Califrornia, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Court held that a search-incident-to-an-arrest warrant re- quirement was justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. Over time, lower court decisions led police to believe that this type of search was an “entitlement" rather than an exception justified by the two factors in Chimel. The Court made clear that this practice must end. It held that a vehicle search “incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." Moreover, even if police meet these requirements, they must also have a reasonable belief “evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. The Exclusionary Rule and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine A criminal defendant’s claim of unreasonable search and seizure is usually heard in a suppression hearing before the presiding trial judge. This hearing is conducted before trial to determine what evidence will be suppressed, or excluded, from trial. When a judge deems a search unreasonable, he or she frequently applies the EXCLUSIONARY RULE. For the entire nineteenth century, a Fourth Amendment violation had little consequence. Evidence seized by law enforcement from a warrantless or otherwise unreasonable search was admissible at trial if the judge found it reliable. This made the Fourth Amendment essentially meaningless to criminal defendants. But in 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court devised a way to enforce the Fourth Amendment. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), a federal agent conducted a warrantless search for evidence of gambling at the home of Fremont Weeks. The evidence seized in the search was used at trial, and Weeks was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amend- ment barred the use of evidence secured through a warrantless search and seizure. Weeks’s conviction was reversed, and thus was born the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy used to deter police misconduct in obtaining evidence. Under the exclusionary rule, a judge may exclude incriminating evi- dence from a criminal trial if there was police misconduct in obtaining the evidence. Without the evidence, the PROSECUTOR may lose the case or drop the charges for lack of proof. This rule provides some substantive protection against illegal search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was constitutionally required only in federal court until MAPP V. OHIO, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to state criminal proceedings through the Due Process Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.BeforetheMapp ruling, not all states excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After Mapp, adefendant’s claim of unreasonable search and seizure became commonplace in criminal prosecutions. The application of the exclusionary rule has been significantly limited by a GOOD FAITH exception created by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Under the good faith exception, evidence obtained in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights will not be excluded from trial if the law enforcement officer, though mistaken, acts reasonably. For example, if an officer reasonably conducts a search relying on information that is later GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SEARCH AND SEIZURE 45 proved to be false, any evidence seized in the search will not be excluded if the officer acted in good faith, with a reasonable reliance on the information. The Supreme Court has carved out this exception to the exclusionary rule because, according to a majority of the court, the rule was designed to deter police misconduct, and excluding evidence when the police did not misbehave would not deter police misconduct. In Herring v. United States, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 695, __L.Ed.2d__ (2009), the Court ex- tended this good faith exception to evidence that was seized as a consequence of NEGLIGENCE by the police records department. A companion to the exclusionary rule is the FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939). Under this doctrine, a court may exclude from trial any evidenc e derived from the results of an illegal search. For example, assume that an illegal search has garnered evidence of illegal explosives. This evidence is then used to obtain a warrant to search the suspect’s home. The exclusionary rule excludes the evidence initially used to obtain the search warrant, and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes any evidenc e obtained in a search of the home. The Knock and Announce Requirement The Fourth Amendment incorporates the COMMON LAW requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests” (Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 [1995]). Instead, the Court left to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. But the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state high court’s decision in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (U.S. 1997). In Richards the Court said Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for the execution of a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. The fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry, the Court said, cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Rather, it is the duty of a court to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement. To justify a no-knock entry, the Court stres sed that police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. The Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard when a no-knock entry results in the destruction of property (U.S. v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 [U.S. 1998]). The “reasonable suspicion” standard is still applica- ble. The Supreme Court found that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when, during the execution of a “no-knock” warrant to enter and search a home, police officers broke a single window in a garage and pointed a gun through the opening. A reliable confidential informant had notified the police that an escaped prisoner might be inside the home, and an officer had confirmed that possibility, the Court said. The escapee had a violent past and reportedly had access to a large supply of weapons, and the police broke the window to discourage any occupant of the house from rushing toward the weapons. However, excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, the court emphasized, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are no t subject to exclusion. Search and Seizure at Public Schools A public school student’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure is less stringent in school than in the world at large. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (U.S. 1985), the U.S. Supreme GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 46 SEARCH AND SEIZURE Court held that a school principal could search a student’s purse without probable cause or a warrant. Considering the “legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place,” the Court set a lower level of reasonableness for searches by school personnel. Under ordinary circumstances, the Court said, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. The “ordinary circumstances” justifying a warrantless search and seizure of a public school student, the Court continued, are limited to searches and seizures that take place on-campus or off-campus at school-sponsored events. Warrantless searches of public school students who are found off campus and not attending a school-sponsored event would still contravene the Fourth Amendment. FURTHER READINGS Beckham, Joseph. 1997. Student Searches in Public Schools. Arlington, Va.: Educational Research Service. Bloom, Robert M. 2003. Searches, Seizures, and Warrants: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Cammack, Mark, and Garland, Norman. 2001. Advanced Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell. St. Paul, Minn: West. Dash, Samuel 2004. The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures from King John to John Ashcroft. Rutgers, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. Long, Carolyn. 2006. Mapp v. Ohio: Guarding Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.Lawrence, Kan.: Univ. Press of Kansas. CROSS REFERENCES Alcohol; Arrest; Automobile Searches; Automobiles; Crimi- nal Law; Criminal Procedure; Drugs and Narcotics; Due Process of Law; Electronic Surveillance; Fourth Amend- ment; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Mapp v. Ohio ; Miranda v. Arizona; Olmstead v. United States;PlainView Doctrine; Search Warrant; Stop and Frisk; Terry v. Ohio; Wiretapping. SEARCH WARRANT A search warrant is a court order authorizing the examination of a place for the purpose of discovering contraband, stolen property, or evi- dence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action. A search warrant is a judicial document that authorizes police officers to search a person or place to obtain evidence for presentation in criminal prosecutions. Police officers obtain search warrants by submitting affidavits and other evidence to a judge or magistrate to establish PROBABLE CAUSE to believe that a search will yield evidence related to a crime. If satisfied that the officers have established probable cause, the judge or magistrate will issue the warrant. The FOURTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitu- tion states that persons have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” State constitutions contain similar provisions. The U.S. SUPREME COURT has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that police must always obtain a search warrant before conducting a search. Rather, the Supreme Court holds that a search warrant is required for a search unless it fits into a recognized exception. The exceptions to the search warrant requirement are numerous. One common exception is the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court held in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), that an officer may search the arrestee as well as those areas in the arrestee’s immediate physical surroundings that may be deemed to be under the arrestee’s control. Other exceptions to the warrant requirement include situations in which an officer is in HOT PURSUIT of a person, in which an emergency exists, and in which the item to be searched is mobile, such as an automobile. Similarly, searches at public way checkpoints, airports, and international borders may be conducted without first obtaining a search warrant. Sobriety checkpoints on roads and highways do not require a warrant if the searches are conducted in a neutral way. As a condition of PROBATION, a person may waive a search of his person and home. To obtain a search warrant, an officer must personally appear before, or speak directly with, a judge or magistrate. The officer must present information that establishes probable cause to believe that a search would yield evidence related to a crime. Probable cause exists when GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SEARCH WARRANT 47 . or its contents (Rakas v. Illinois, 4 39 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 42 SEARCH AND SEIZURE [ 197 8]). Both the houseguest and the motor vehicle. evolution. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SCOPES MONKEY TRIAL 39 the First Amendment. Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 91 7 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 199 0). Similarly,. presentation of the disclaimer as a strong endorsement of religion, the court found. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Debra. 199 9. “Trials of the Century.” ABA Journal 85 (January). Larson, Edward J. 199 7. Summer