S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 [1977]). This precedent seemed to give school authorities ample means to elude LIABILITY for unconstitu- tional terminations. However, neither of the principles helped City University of New York (CUNY) when it was sued by the chair of its black studies department. Professor Leonard Jeffries specialized in black studies and the history of Africa, and his teaching style at CUNY was controversial. Some students felt that Jeffries discouraged classroom debate, whereas others applauded him for verbalizing the frustrations of many African Americans. Jeffries referred to Europeans as “ice people” and as “egotistic, individualistic, and exploitative.” Africans, by contrast, were “sun people” who had “humanistic, spiritualistic value system[s].” On July 20, 1991, Jeffries spoke at the Empire State Black Arts and Cultural Festival, in Albany, New York. In his speech, he assailed perceived Jewish power, asserting that Jews controlled CUNY and Hollywood and had financed the American slave trade. The speech attracted national attention and placed CUNY on the horns of a dilemma: Either it could punish Jeffries and risk running afoul of the First Amendment and academic freedom prin- ciples, or it could do nothing and risk losing expected income from offended school bene- factors. For several months, the univers ity wrestled with the problem. Then, in October, the board of trustees voted, without explana- tion, to limit Je ffries’s current appointment as chair to one year instead of the customary three. On March 23, 1992, the CUNY Board of Trustees appointed Professor Edmund Gordon to the positio n of black studies chair. Jeffries filed suit in federal court on June 5, 1992. Jeffries argued that the defendants violated his First Amendment free speech rights and his FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT due process rights when they denied him a full three-year term as chair of black studies. The jury agreed with Jeffries that a substantial motivating factor in his dismissal was his speech in Albany. The jury did find, however, that CUNY had reasonably expected the speech to have a detrimental effect on the school. Despite this seemingly justifiable excuse for the school’s action, the jury finally found that CUNY had deprived Jeffries of property (the position of chair) without DUE PROCESS OF LAW . The district court judge held that Jeffries’s First Amendment rights had been violated, and in August 1993 reduced Jeffries’s recovery in damages by $40,000 but awarded him the black studies chair ( Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 [S.D.N.Y., 1993]). Upon APPEAL, the U.S. Supreme Cour t remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions to consider the Court’s RULING in Waters v. Churchill (511 U. S. 661 [1994]). The CIRCUIT COURT reversed and remanded the case to the district court. The FINAL DECISION con- cluded that Jeffries’s occupation did not afford him “greater protection from state interference with his speech than did the nurse in Waters.” By taking away Jeffries’s position as chair of the department, the university did not infringe on his ability to speak publicly or to teach in his own style, both of which could have been violations of his First Amendment rights (Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F. 3d 9 [2d Cir. 1995]). The Supreme Court has decided several cases that identified more precisely how much control school authorities may exercise over education. The Court held in Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico (457 U.S. 853, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 73 L. Ed. 2d 435 [1982]), that a school board can control curriculum and book selection, but it may not remove “objectionable” books from public school libraries solely in response to community pressure. Among the books that the Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 in New York had banned in the mid-1970s were Slaughter- house Five, by Kurt Vonnegut Jr.; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; and The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud. School boards and state legislatures generally control public school curriculums, but their control is not complete. For instance, a state statute will be struck down if it requires public schools to also teach creationism if they teach evolution and vice versa. According to the Court in Edwards v. Aguillard (482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 96 L. Ed. 2d 510 [1987]), such a law un- dermines a comprehensive scientific education and impermissibly endorses RELIGION by advanc- ing the religious belief that a supernatural power created human beings. State legislatures have accommodated court rulings by drafting legislative language intended to create academic latitude without violating CONSTITUTIONAL rights. In July 2008 Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal signed into law the Louisiana Science Edu cation Act, S.B. 733, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 48 ACADEMIC FREEDOM which (according to the act’s preamble) pur- ported to “promote students’ critical thinking skills and open discussion of scientific theories” in Louisiana classrooms. Section §285(B)(1) of the act states: The State Board of Elementary and Second- ary Education, upon request of a city, parish, or other local public school board, shall allow and assist teachers, principals, and other school administrators to create and foster an environment within public elemen- tary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific theories being studied including, but not limited to, evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning. Section §285(C) provides that after teaching the material contained in a standard textbook supplied by the school system, a teacher may use supplemental textbooks and other instruc- tional mat erials “to help students understand, analyze, critique, and review scientific theories in an objective manner.” Section §285(D) expressly states: “This Sec- tion shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine, promote DISCRIMINATION for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination for or against religion or non-re ligion.” The Louisiana Science Education Act was one of several similar bills introduced in state legislatures in 2008 and 2009, including those in Alabama (HB 300), Florida, Iowa (HF 183), Michigan, Missouri (HB 656), New Mexico (SB 433), Oklahoma (SB 320), South Carolina, and Texas (HB 224). Only Louisiana’s was enacted in 2008. (Oklahoma’s bill, the language of which closely paralleled that of Louisiana, was narrowly defeated by a 7-6 vote in the state’s Senate Edu cation Committee in early 2009.) The question regarding whether the federal government can deny grants or funds to educational institutions which speak out against federal policies was the issue before the courts in Rumsfeld v. F.A.I.R. (Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.) (547 U.S. 47, 126 S. Ct. 1297 [2006]). Congress had passed the SOLOMON AMENDMENT in 1994 (10 U.S.C. 983), which requires the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) to deny federal funding to institutions of higher education that prohibit ACCESS to the institution for military representatives and/or deny or impede assistance for recruiting purposes. The conflict arose over military policies regarding homosexua lity. Since at least WORLD WAR I , the U.S. military maintained a policy of excluding service members based on evidence of homosexual conduct or orientation (10 U.S.C. 654). Unlike the military, many graduate schools (and law schools in particular) have, over the years, maintained formal policies expressly tolerant of expanded personal factors such as sexual orientation. Of particular import in this case was the prevalence of law school policies that withheld career services/career placement services from prospective employers who discriminated on the grounds of sexual orientation as well as the more traditional protected categories such as race, gender, religion. In F.A.I.R. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Circuit Court of Appeals, 2004) the two conflicting policies over homosexuality faced- off in court, when a coalition of law schools and law faculty calling itself the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (F.A.I.R.) filed PETITION for PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon Amend- ment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted injunction against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, holding that the law violated schools’ First Amendment rights of expressive association, and forcing them to engage in the expressive act of recruiting. It reasoned that Congress could not require the FORFEITURE of a constitutional right as the basis for receiving federal funds. But the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the government could deny funds to schools that did not permit recruitment; indeed, said the Court, through the U.S. Constitution’s “raise and support Armies” clause (Article I, Section 8), Congress could go so far as to force schools to allow recruiting without even threatening the withholding of funds. The Court continued that the Solomon Amendment neither denied the institutions the right to speak nor required them to say anything. Though the concept of acad emic freedom has traditionally been applied only to teachers, it has affected lower-court opinions involving the rights of students. Several Supreme Court cases are cited in support of such rights. In Healy v. James (408 U.S. 169, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266 [1972]), the Supreme Court held that a public university may deny campus access to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ACADEMIC FREEDOM 49 provably disruptive groups, but it may not deny access based on the views the students wish to express. The Supreme Court ruled in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 [1988]) that a public school may censor the content of a student newspaper if the newspaper is not an entirely public forum and the reason for CENSURE is related to a legitimate educational concern. In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 [1990]), the Court approved the establishment of a Christian student group in a public school. The Court also held in Mergens that a school’s refusal to permit a religious student group to meet at school and use its facilities violates the federal Equal Access Act (Education for Economic Security Act § 802, 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071 et seq. [1984]) if the school provides such access to other extracurricular student groups. And in Morse v. Frederick (551 U.S. 393 [2007]), the Supreme Court held that a student’s free speech rights were not violated when he was suspended for displaying a “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner during a school authorized event. The Court distinguished the constitutional rights of stu- dents in public schools from adults in other settings, finding that students’ rights could be delineated “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” FURTHER READINGS “Act No. 473 (Senate Bill No. 733).” Text available online at http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp? did=503483; website home page: http://www.legis.state. la.us (accessed July 10, 2009). DeGeorge, Richard T. 1997. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Ethical Issues. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Finkin, Matthew W., and Robert C. Post. 2009. For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press. Hamilton, Neil W. 2002. Academic Ethics: Problems and Materials on Professional Conduct and Shared Gover- nance. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Hiers, Richard H. 2002. “Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy.” Journal of College and Univ. Law 29 (October): 35-109. Rahdert, Mark C. July 2007. “The Roberts Court and Academic Freedom.” Chronicle of Higher Education 53. CROSS REFERENCES Censorship; Douglas, William Orville; First Amendment; Frankfurter, Felix; Freedom of Speech; Loyalty Oath; Religion; Schools and School Districts; Tenure; Warren, Earl ACADEMIC YEAR That period of time necessary to complete an actual course of study during a school year. SOCIAL SECURITY benefits may terminate at the end of an ACADEMIC YEAR, or a deferment from compulsory military service may continue only during an academic year. ACADEMY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCIENCES The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS) was founded in 1963 to foster professionalism in the criminal justice system by advancing the quality of education and research programs in the field. The academy seeks to enrich education and research programs in institutions of higher learning, criminal justice agencies, and agencies in related fields by improving cooperation and communication, by serving as a clearinghouse for the collection and dissemination of information produced by the programs, and by promoting the highest ethical and personal standards in criminal justice research and education. To that end, the ACJS created an ad hoc committee in 1995 to adopt minimum standards for the improvement of quality in criminal justice higher education. The standards, reprinted in 2001, have been widely utilized in the curricular development of associate, undergraduate and graduate degree programs. The academy also PRESENTS numerous awards for outstanding contributions by indivi- duals in the field. The members of the academy are individual teachers, administrators, research- ers, students, and practitioners. The academy publishes the Journal of Crimi- nal Justice quarterly and a directory annually. It holds annual meetings in March. FURTHER READINGS Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Web site. Available online at http://www.acjs.org (accessed July 2, 2009). “J Journal: New Writing on Justice” New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Available online at http:// www.conference2004.jjay.cuny.edu/jjournal/index.asp; website home page: http://www.conference2004.jjay. cuny.edu/ (accessed August 28, 2009). ACCEDE To consent or to agree, as to accede to another’s point of view. To enter an office or to accept a position, as to accede to the presidency. ACCELERATION A hastening; a shortening of the time until some event takes place. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 50 ACADEMIC YEAR A person who has the right to take possession of property at some future time may have that right accelerated if the present holder loses his or her LEGAL RIGHT to the property. If a LIFE ESTATE fails for any reason, the remainder is accelerated. The principle of acceleration can be applied when it becomes clear that one party to a contract is not going to perform his or her obligations. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION, or the possibility of future breach, makes it possible to move the right to remedies back to the time of repudiation rather than to wait for the time when performance would be due and an actual breach would occur. ACCELERATION CLAUSE The provision in a credit agreement, such as a mortgage, note, bond, or deed of trust, that allows the lender to require immediate payment of all money due if certain conditions occur before the time that payment would otherwise be due. The agreement may call for ACCELERATION whenever there i s a default of an y important obligation, such as nonpayment of principal or interest, or the failure to pay insurance premiums. ACCEPTANCE An express act or implication by conduct that manifests assent to the terms of an offer in a manner invited or required by the offer so that a binding contract is formed. The exercise of power conferred by an offer by performance of some act. The act of a person to whom something is offered or tendered by another, whereby the offeree demonstrates through an act invited by the offer an intention of retaining the subject of the offer. In the law of contracts, acceptance is one person’s compliance with the terms of an offer made by another. Acceptance occurs in the law of insurance when an insurer agrees to receive a person’s application for insurance and to issue a policy protecting the person against certain risks, such as fire or THEFT. When a person who is offered a gift by someone keeps the gift, this indicates his or her acceptance of it. Acceptance also occurs when a bank pays a check written by a customer who has a checking account with that bank. In business dealings between merchants, which is governed by the law of sales, a buyer demonstrates his or her acceptance of goods that are not exactly what he or she had ordered from the seller by telling the seller that he or she will keep the goods even though they are not what was ordered; by failing to reject the goods; or by doing something to the goods inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of them, such as selling the goods to consumers of the buyer’sstore. Types of Acceptance An acceptance may be conditional, express, or implied. Conditional Acceptance A conditional accep- tance, sometimes called a QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE, occurs when a person to whom an offer has been made tells the offeror that he or she is willing to agree to the offer provided that some changes are made in its terms or that some condition or event occurs. This type of accep- tance operates as a COUNTEROFFER. A counteroffer must be accepted by the original offeror before a contract can be established between the parties. Another type of conditional acceptance occurs when a drawee promises to pay a draft upon the fulfillment of a condition, such as a shipment of goods reaching its destination on the date specified in the contract. Express Acceptance An express acceptance occurs when a person clearly and explicitly agrees to an offer or agrees to pay a draft that is presented for payment. Implied Acceptance An implied acceptance is one that is not directly stated but is demon- strated by any acts indicating a person’s assent to the proposed bargain. An implied acceptance occurs when a shopper selects an item in a supermarket and pays the cashier for it. The shopper’s conduct indicates that he or she has agreed to the supermarket owner’s offer to sell the item for the price stated on it. FURTHER READINGS Chirelstein, Marvin A. 2006. Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts. 5th ed. Eagan, MN: West. Perillo, Joseph M. 2009. Calamari and Perillo’s Hornbook on Contracts. 6th ed. Eagan, MN: West. “Silence as Acceptance in Contracts Lawyers.” 2009. LegalMatch Website. Available online at http://www. legalmatch.com/law-library/article/silence-as-acceptance- in-contracts.html; website home page: http://www. legalmatch.com (accessed August 28, 2009). ACCESS Freedom of approach or communication; or the means, power, or opportunity of approaching, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ACCESS 51 communicating, or passing to and from. Sometimes importing the occurrence of sexual intercourse; otherwise as importing opportunity of communica- tion for that purpose as between HUSBAND AND WIFE. In real property law, the term access denotes the right vested in the owner of the land that adjoins a road or other highway to go and return from his own land to the highway without A sample acceleration clause ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. FOR VALUE RECEIVED, WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, jointly and severally promise to pay, in lawful money of the United States of America, to the order of __________________________________________ at ____________________________________________________, (__________) Dollars in installments as follows: _____________________________ on ___________________________________ , and _________________ successive payments of ____________________________ beginning on _________________________________ together with a delinquency charge on each installment in default for _________________ days in an amount equal to _______________ percent of such installment but not less than $_______________________ . In the event of default in the payment of any of the said installments or said interest when due as herein provided, time being of the essence hereof, the holder of this note may, without notice or demand, declare the entire principal sum then unpaid immediately due and payable. The holder of this note may, with or without notice to any of us, cause additional parties to be added hereto, or release any party hereto, or revise, extend, or renew the note, or extend the time for making any installment provided for herein, or accept any installment in advance, all without affecting the liability of us, or any of us, hereon. If suit be commenced on said note, the parties hereto jointly and severally agree to pay to the holder of said note a reasonable attorney fee. The borrower agrees to pay a reasonable collection charge should collection be referred to a collection agency or to the payee`s collection facilities. The parties hereto, jointly and severally, hereby waive presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and/or protest and notice of nonpayment; the right, if any, to the benefit of, or to direct the application of, any security hypothecated to the holder until all indebtedness of the borrower to the holder shall have been paid; the right to require the holder to proceed against the borrower, or to pursue any other remedy in the holder's power; and agree that the holder may proceed against us directly and independently of the borrower, and that the cessation of liability of the borrower for any reason, other than full payment, or any revision, renewal, extension, forebearance, change of rate of interest, or acceptance, release or substitution of security, or any impairment or suspension of the holder's remedies or rights against the borrower, shall not in anywise affect the liability of any of the parties hereto. The parties hereto hereby authorize __________________________________________ to date this note as of the day when the loan evidenced hereby is made and to complete this note in any other particular according to the terms of the said loan. It is agreed that if the parties hereto, or any of them at any time fail in business or become insolvent, or commit an act of bankruptcy, or if any deposit account or other property of the parties hereto, or any of them, be attempted to be obtained or held by writ of execution, garnishment, attachment, or other legal process, or if any assessment for taxes against the parties hereto, or any of them, other than taxes on real property, is made by the federal or state government, or any department thereof, or if the parties hereto fail to notify you of any material change in their financial condition, then, and in such case all of the obligations of the parties hereto to you, or held by you, shall at your option immediately become due and payable without demand or notice. Signatures Address _________________________________________ __________________________________________ Borrower _________________________________________ __________________________________________ Co-Maker Acceleration Clause PROMISSORY NOTE INSTALLMENT - WITH ACCELERATION CLAUSE ____________________________________ [name of lender] [address of lender] [amount] [amount of payment] [date] [amount] [date of payment] [payee] [number] [city, state, date] GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 52 ACCESS obstruction. Access to property does not necessarily carry with it possession. For purposes of establishing element of access by defendant in COPYRIGHT infringement action, access is ordinarily defined as opportunity to copy. Prisoners are entitled to have access to court. PRISON officials cannot prevent prisoners from filing papers or appearing in court even if they honestly think that such prevention would help them maintain discipline and good order. Owners of real property are entitled to some means of access to their property from a road or highway. They do not necessarily need to own a corridor of land from their property to the nearest road, but they may claim an easement of access. In a PATERNITY SUIT, access means the opportunity to have had sexual relations. When there is a question about who is the father of a certain child, it is appropriate for a court to determine which man had access to the mother around the estimated time of conception. A man charged with being the father of an illegitimate child may plead the defense of multiple access—that the mother had several lovers at the time of conception. ACCESSION Coming into possession of a right or office; increase; augmentation; addition. The right to all that one's own property produces, whether that property be movable or immovable; and the right to that which is united to it by accession, either naturally or artificially. The right to own things that become a part of something already owned. Aprinciplederivedfromthe CIVIL LAW,bywhich the owner of property becomes entitled to all that it produces, and to all that is added or united to it, either naturally or artificially (that is, by the labor or skill of another) even where such addition extends to a change of form or materials; and by which, on the other hand, the possessor of property becomes entitled to it, as against the original owner, where the addition made to it by skill and labor is of greater value than the property itself, or where the change effected in its form is so great as to render it impossible to restore it to its original shape. Generally, accession signifies acquisition of title to PERSONAL PROPERTY by bestowing labor on it that converts it into an entirely different thing or by incorporation of property into a union with other property. The commencement or inauguration of a sovereign’s reign. For example, a person who owns property along a river also takes ownership of any additional land that builds up along the riverbank. This right may extend to additions that result from the work or skill of another person. The buyer of a car who fails to make scheduled payments cannot get back his new spark plugs after the car is repossessed because they have become a part of the whole car. The principle of accession does not necessarily apply, however, where the addition has substantially improved the value and changed the character of the property, as when by mistake someone else’sgrapeswere made into wine or someone else’sclaymadeinto bricks. In such cases, the original owner might recover only the value of the raw material rather than take ownership of the finished product. In the context of a treaty, accession may be gained in either of two ways: (1) the new member nation may be formally accepted by all the nations already parties to the treaty; or (2) the new nation may simply bind itself to the obligations already existing in the treaty. Frequently, a treaty will expressly provide that certain nations or catego- ries of nations may ACCEDE. In some cases, the parties to a treaty will invite one or more nations to accede to the treaty. ACCESSORY Aiding or contributing in a secondary way or assisting in or contributing to as a subordinate. In CRIMINAL LAW, contributing to or aiding in the commission of a crime. One who, without being present at the commission of an offense, becomes guilty of such offense, not as a chief actor, but as a participant, as by command, advice, instigation, or concealment; either before or after the fact or commission. One who aids, abets, comman ds, or counsels another in the commission of a crime. In common law, an accessory could not be found guilty unless the actual PERPETRATOR was convicted. In most U.S. jurisdictions, however, an accessory can be convicted even if the principal actor is not arrested or is acquitted. The prosecution must establish that the acces- sory in some way instigated, furthered, or concealed the crime. Typically, PUNISHMENT for GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ACCESSORY 53 a convicted accessory is not as severe as that for the perpetrator. An accessory must knowingly promote or contribute to the crime. In other words, she or he must aid or encourage the offense deliberately, not accidentally. The accessory may withdraw from the crime by denouncing the plans, refusing to assist with the crime, contacting the police, or trying to stop the crime from occurring. An accessory before the fact is someone behind the scenes who orders a crime or helps another person commit it. Many jurisdictions now refer to accessories before the fact as parties to the crime or even accomplices. This substi- tution of terms can be confusing because accessories are fundamentally different from accomplices. Strictly speaking, whereas an ACCOMPLICE may be present at the crime scene, an accessory may not. Also, an accomplice generally is considered to be as guilty of the crime as the perpetrator, whereas an accessory has traditionally received a lighter punishment. An accessory after the fact is someone who knows that a crime has occurred but nonethe- less helps to conceal it. In the early twenty-first century, this action is often termed obstructing justice or harboring a fugitive. An infamous accessory after the fact was Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, the physician and Confederate sympathizer who set John Wilkes Booth’s leg after it was broken when the assassin jumped from President Abraham Lincoln’s box at Ford Theater. Despite Mudd’s protestation of innocence, he was tried and convicted as an accessory after the fact in Lincoln’s MURDER.He was sentenced to life IMPRISONMENT at Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas off Key West, Florida. President ANDREW JOHNSON pardoned Mudd in 1869, and the U.S. Congress gave him an official PARDON in 1979. FURTHER READINGS Berg, Alan. 1996. “Accessory Liability for Breach of Trust.” Modern Law Review 59 (May). Blakey, Robert G., and Kevin P. Roddy. 1996. “Reflections on Revesv.Ernst&Young:ItsMeaningandImpact on Substantive, Acces sory, Aiding Abet ting and Conspiracy Liability under R ICO. ” American Criminal Law Review 33. Huett, Lisa. 2001. “Could You Be an Accessory? Uncertainty and Risk For Lawyers.” Law Institute Journal 75 (March). ACCIDENT The word accident is derived from the Latin verb accidere, signifying “fall upon, befall, happen, chance.” In its most commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary or popular sense, the word may be defined as meaning: some sudden and unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon the instant, rather than something that continues, progresses or develops; something happening by chance; something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, extraordinary, or phenomenal, taking place not according to the usual course of things or events, out of the range of ordinary calculations; that which exists or occurs abnormally, or an uncommon occurrence. The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or unfortunate happening; any unex- pected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence that causes injury, loss, suffering, or death; some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events. An event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event. Accident is not always a precise legal term. It may be used generally in reference to various types of mishaps, or it may be given a technical meaning that applies when used in a certain statute or kind of case. Where it is used in a general sense, no particular significance can be attached to it. Where it is precisely defin ed, as in a statute, that definition strictly controls any decision about whether a certain event covered by that statute was in fact an accident. In its most limited sense, the word accident is used only for events that occur without the intervention of a human being. This kind of accident also may be called an ACT OF GOD.Itis an event that no person caused or could have Emergency workers attend to a woman involved in a single- car accident. Crashes such as this one are considered accidents unless a driver intentionally causes the crash. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 54 ACCIDENT prevented—such as a tornado, a tidal wave, or an ice storm. An accident insurance policy can by its terms be limited to coverage only for this type of accident. Damage by hail to a field of wheat may be considered such an accident. A policy of insurance, by its very nature, covers only accidents and not intentionally caused injuries. That principle explains why courts will read some exceptions into a ny insurance policy, whether or not they are expressly stated. For example, life insurance generally will not compensate for a SUICIDE, and ordinary automobile insurance will n ot cover damages sustained when the owner is drag racing. Accident insurance policies frequently insure not only against an act of God but also for accidents caused by a person’s carelessness. An insured homeowner will expect coverage, for example, if someone drowns in his or her pool, even though the accident might have occurred because someone in the family left the gate open. Not every unintended event is an accident for which insurance benefits can be paid; all the circumstances in a particular case must first be considered. For example, a policeman who waded into a surging crowd of forty or fifty fighting teenagers and then experienced a heart attack was found to have suffered from an accident. In another case, a man who was shot when he was found in bed with another man’s wife was also found to have died in an accident because death is not the usual or expected result of ADULTERY. However, the family of another man was not allowed to collect insurance benefits when he was shot after starting a fight with a knife. In that case, the court ruled that DEADLY FORCE was a predictable response to a life-threatening attack, whether the instigator actually anticipated it or not. Different states apply different standards when determining if an accident justifies payment of benefits under workers’ compensa- tion. Some states strictly limit benefits to events that clearly are accidents. They will permit payment when a sudden and unexpected strain causes an immediate injury during the course of work but they will not permit payment when an injury gradually results from prolonged assaults on the body. Under this approach, a worker who is asphyxiated by a lethal dose of carbon monoxide when he goes into a blast furnace to make repairs would be dee med to have suffered in an accident. However, a worker who contracts lung cancer after years of exposure to irritating dust in a factory could not CLAIM to have been injured in an accident. Because of the remedial purpose of workers’ compensation schemes, many states are liberal in allowin g compensation. In one state, a woman whose existing arthritic condition was aggravated when she took a job stuffing giblets into partially frozen chickens on a conveyor belt was allowed to collect workers’ compensation benefits. Insurance policies may set limits to the amount of benefits recoverable for one accident. A certain automobile insurance policy allowed a maximum of only $200 to compensate for damaged clothing or luggage in the event of an accident. When luggage was stolen from the insured automobile, however, a court ruled that the event was not an accident and the maximum did not apply. The owner was allowed to recover the full value of the lost property. Sometimes the duration of an accident must be determined. For example, if a drunken driver hit one car and then continued driving until he or she collided with a truck, a court might have to determine whether the two victims will share the maximum amount of money payable under the driver’s LIABILITY insurance policy or Septicemia 1.4% Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome, and nephrosis 1.9% Alzheimer's 3.0% Diabetes 3.0% Influenza and pneumonia 2.3% Accidents 5.0% Chronic lower respiratory diseases 5.1% Heart disease 26.0% Cancer 23.1% Cerebrovascular diseases/stroke 5.7% Ten Leading Causes of Death in the United States in 2006 Total number of deaths: 2,426,264 Number of deaths not accounted for in top ten: 570,654 Percentage of deaths not in top ten: 23.6% SOURCE: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Re p ort, vol. 57, no. 14, A p ril 2009. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ACCIDENT 55 whether each will collect the full maximum as a result of a separate accident. CROSS REFERENCES Automobiles “No-Fault Automobile Insurance” (In Focus); Automobiles “What to Do If You Are in an Auto Accident” (Sidebar); Insurance. ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT A provision of a life insurance policy stating that if the insured—the person whose life has been insured— dies in an accident, the beneficiary of the policy—the person to whom its proceeds are payable—will receivetwicethefacevalueofthepolicy. The insurance company that is liable for the payment of such a benefit will conduct a thorough investigation into the cause of death of the insured person before paying the CLAIM. Another name for an ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT is a DOUBLE INDEMNITY clause. ACCIDENTAL KILLING A death caused by a lawful act done under the reasonable belief that no harm was likely to result. Accidental killing is different from INVOLUN- TARY MANSLAUGHTER , which causes death by an UNLAWFUL act or a lawful act done in an unlawful way. The COMMON LAW of crimes distinguished two types of accidental killings: (1) accidental killings resulting from unlawful acts of violence not direc ted at the victim were punishable as MANSLAUGHTER (killings resulting from unlawful acts directed at the victim were punishable as MURDER); and (2) accidental killings resulting from lawful acts of violence were excusable as HOMICIDE by misadventure. For example, suppose that the DEFENDANT killed an innocent bystander while carrying out an ASSAULT, BATTERY, or other violent crime against the intended victim. The defendant told police that he intended to injure the victim by hitting him with a club but instead struck the bystander on the skull and killed him. The defendant could be prosecuted for manslaugh- ter under the common law of crimes. Now suppose that the defendant was lawfully defending himself or his property from attack, and in the process killed an innocent bystander. The defendant told police that lethal force was necessary to thwart an attack upon his person, and he tried to shoot the attacker but instead killed a nearby pedestrian, who had nothing to do w ith the attack. The common law would have treated the bystander’s death as an excusable accidental killing, so long as reason- able grounds existed for the defendant’s belief that lethal force was necessary for self-defense. Although most states have abolished the common law of crimes, some of the concepts underlying the common law distinctions be- tween manslaughter and accidental killings continue to appear in statutory classifications of manslaughter. Most states recognize at least two classes of manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary. In these states voluntary manslaughter is defined as act of murder reduced to manslaughter because of EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES such as adequate PROVOCATION (for example, murder committed in the heat of passion)or DIMINISHED CAPACITY. Involuntary manslaughter i s defined in these states as a homicide that is committed with CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE or during the commission of a crime that is not included w ithin the FELONY-MURDER RULE but for which the prosecu- tion has no proof that the defendant intend ed to kill the victim or do grievous bodily harm. Accidental killings that do not result from the defendant’s criminal NEGLIGENCE and do not occur during the commi ssion of a crime are not criminal offenses in these jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions expressly classify accidental killings as excusable or justifiable homicides, such as the state of California, which provides that “[h]omicide is excusable [w]hen committed by ACCIDENT and misfortune, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent” (CA PENAL § 195 ). Other states simply omit this class of homicide from their statutes defining prosecutable offenses. CROSS REFERENCES Common Law; Diminished Capacity; Homicide; Involun- tary Manslaughter; Murder. ACCIDENTAL VEIN An imprecise term that refers generally to a continuous body of a mineral or mineralized rock filling a seam other than the principal vein that led to the discovery of the mining claim or location. CROSS REFERENCES Mine and Mineral Law. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 56 ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT ACCIDENTS OF NAVIGATION Mishaps that are peculiar to travel by sea or to normal navigation; accidents caused at sea by the action of the elements, rather than by a failure to exercise good handling, working, or navigating of a ship. Such accidents could not have been avoided by the exercise of nautical skill or prudence. CROSS REFERENCES Admiralty and Maritime Law; Navigable Rivers. ACCOMMODATION ENDORSEMENT The act of a third person—the accommodation party—in writing his or her name on the back of a commercial paper without any consideration, but merely to benefit the person to whom the paper is payable or to enable the person who made the document—the maker—to obtain money or credit on it. An accommodation endorsement is a loan of the endorser’s credit up to the face amount of the paper. ACCOMMODATION PAPER A type of commercial paper (such as a bill or note promising that money will be paid to someone) that is signed by another person—the accommodation party—as a favor to the promi- sor—the accommodated party—so that credit may be extended to him or her on the basis of the paper. An accommodation paper guarantees that the money lent will be repaid by the ACCOMMO- DATION PARTY on the date specified in the COMMERCIAL PAPER if the accommodated party fails to repay it. A lender often uses an accommodation paper when the person who is seeking a loan is considered a poor credit risk, such as a person who has a history of being delinquent in the payment of installment loans. By having a person who is a good credit risk cosign the PROMISSORY NOTE, the lender’s finan- cial interests are protected. An accommodation bill and an accommo- dation note are two types of commercial papers. ACCOMMODATION PARTY One who signs a commercial paper for the purpose of lending his or her name and credit to another party to the document—the accommo- dated party—to help that party obtain a loan or an extension of credit. A person wanting to obtain a car loan, for example, may offer a finance company a PROMISSORY NOTE for the amount of the requested Accommodation Note Agreement of an Accommodation Party to Modifications in an Accommodation Note This agreement is made between ___________________________________________ [name of the holder of the note] ("holder") and ____________________________________________ [name of the accommodation party] ("accommodation party"). On [date of execution], ___________________________________ [name of maker] ("maker"), of ___________________________ _ _____________________________________ [address of maker] executed and issued a promissory note ("note") to the holder as payee, by which the maker promised to pay to the order of the holder ______________________________ [amount] [include any other specific payment terms, including days after the date of execution]. On [date], the accommodation party signed the note as co-maker in order to accommodate the maker at the request of the maker. The accommodation party and the holder agree that the holder may modify the terms of the note without notice to or the consent of the accommodation party. _______________________________________________ [Signature of holder], holder _______________________________________________ [Signature of Accommodation Party], accommodation party A sample accomodation note ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ACCOMMODATION PARTY 57 . concern. In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226, 11 0 S. Ct. 2356, 11 0 L. Ed. 2d 19 1 [19 90]), the Court approved the establishment of a Christian student. CLAUSE ____________________________________ [name of lender] [address of lender] [amount] [amount of payment] [date] [amount] [date of payment] [payee] [number] [city, state, date] GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 52. 28, 2009). ACCESS Freedom of approach or communication; or the means, power, or opportunity of approaching, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ACCESS 51 communicating, or passing