This page intentionally left blank e modern view of causation can be traced back to the mechan istic science of Descartes, whose rejection of Aristotelian physics, with its concept of substantial forms, in favor of mechanical explan ation was a turning point in the history of philosophy. However, the reasoning which led Descartes and other early moderns in this direction is not well understood. For the first time, this book traces Descartes’ groundbreaking theory of scientific explanation back to the mathematical demonstrations of Aristotelian mechanics and interprets these advances in light of the available arguments for and against substantial forms. It also examines how Descartes’ new the- ory led him to develop a metaphysical foundation for his science that could avoid skeptical objections. It will appeal to a wide range of readers interested in the philosophy and science of the early modern period.   is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Houston. DESCARTES ON FORMS AND MECHANISMS DESCARTES ON FORMS AND MECHANISMS Helen Hattab CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK First published in print format ISBN-13 978-0-521-51892-5 ISBN-13 978-0-511-59508-0 © Helen Hattab 2009 2009 Information on this title: www.cambrid g e.or g /9780521518925 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org eBook ( EBL ) Hardback To my father, Stephan Andel vii Acknowledgments page viii List of abbreviations x Introduction          Descartes’ arguments against the substantial form   Aquinas’ introduction of the substantial form   Suarez’s defense of the substantial form          Sanchez’s skeptical humanist attack   e mechanical alternative to substantial forms   Cartesian science and the principles of Aristotelian mechanics         Atoms, modes, and other heresies   Descartes’ metaphysical alternative to substantial forms  Conclusion  Works cited  Index  Contents viii I may be the proximate efficient cause of this work, but many other causes were involved in its generation. Prior studies of Descartes and his con- text provided me with exemplars of what I could only aspire to attain. In particular, over the years, I have benefited both from the scholarly examples and from the personal encouragement offered by Roger Ariew, Dennis Des Chene, and Dan Garber. A series of fellowships provided the material resources to translate my aspirations into actualities. A National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar on “Descartes and His Contemporaries” directed by Dan and Roger first sparked my interest in the Aristotelian Mechanica tradition. My participation in an NEH Summer Institute in Washington DC, directed by Pam Long and Pam Smith the following summer, put me in the vicinity of rare book collections that could satisfy my curiosity. e two Pams, as we affec- tionately called them, were both excellent role models as I began my historical forays into Aristotelian Mechanica commentaries. My inves- tigations advanced significantly thanks to a residential research grant from the Dibner Library of the History of Science and Technology at the Smithsonian Institution in the spring of . Ron Brashear, then the director of the Dibner Library, and his assistants, Kirsten van der Veen and Daria Wingreen-Mason, provided invaluable assistance and support both during and after my residency. e remaining research for this book was completed thanks to residential fellowships at the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Germany, in the summer of ; the Scaliger Institute in Leiden, the Netherlands, in the summer of ; and the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington DC in fall . I thank all the staff who assisted me, especially Dr. Gillian Bepler and Mr. Kaspar van Ommen, who oversaw the nuts and bolts of the fellowship programs at the Herzog August Bibliothek and Scaliger Institute, respectively. e year in which this book was conceived was also the year when I was first confronted with a painful, long-term physical illness. ere were Acknowledgments [...]... Dominican Province (London: R & T Washbourne, 1912) x Introduction René Descartes gives few philosophical arguments to directly support his rejection of forms in favor of mechanisms Moreover, the scattered reasons he offers in his corpus are cryptic and hard to unpack Hence I will draw on Descartes intellectual context to reconstruct his reasoning and shed light on his historic elimination of Scholastic... Netherlands 17   See, e.g., Klaas Van Berkel, Descartes Debt to Beeckman: Inspiration, Cooperation, Conflict,” in Descartes Natural Philosophy, ed Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp 46–59; and Stephen Gaukroger, “The Foundational Role of Hydrostatics and Statics in Descartes Natural Philosophy,” in ibid., pp 60–80 Henk Kubbinga, “Le Concept... transition that forever changed our conceptions of causality and scientific explanation  Over the last few centuries, this has had serious ramifications for both science and theories of human agency and moral responsibility The wide-ranging effects of this conceptual revolution are well studied The underlying philosophical concerns and arguments that prompted it remain, for the most part, as hidden and. .. Introduction whether at   rst hand or second hand, via other Scholastics, Descartes fi is likely to have come into contact with the arguments Suarez  had collected in his Disputations Even though the Jesuits  were instructed to follow St Thomas Aquinas  on all non-controversial issues and Descartes owned a copy of the Summa Theologica, I show that Descartes metaphysical arguments against substantial forms ... proceeds from something we do not understand Descartes concludes from this that substantial forms should not be introduced to explain natural actions We should rather adopt Descartes theory, for “Essential forms explained in our fashion, on the other hand, give manifest and mathematical reasons for natural actions, as can be seen with regard to the form of common salt in my Meteorology.”3 I will explore... can be , inferred only from such sensory ideas In short, the scientific argument based on the obscurity  of Aristotelian notions and clarity  of Cartesian ideas is insufficient, on its own, to fully convince someone educated in Scholastic Aristotelian metaphysics and natural philosophy  that one should abandon substantial forms Nor does it reflect the actual scientific explanations  Descartes gives... will cite the Adam and Tannery edition (Oeuvres de Descartes, ed Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols [Paris: Vrin, 1996]); otherwise I will cite the standard English translations of Descartes works by Cottingham et al and cross-refer to the Adam and Tannery edition as follows: AT viiib, p 26 4   See, e.g., J. A van Ruler’s excellent discussion of the controversies between Voetius and Dutch Cartesians... part of Descartes mixed mathematical  studies at this time, introduced three important conceptual shifts which help us understand his application of mechanical demonstrations  to physics and Introduction 13 eventual replacement of scientific explanations  in terms of substantial forms with mechanical explanations  Finally, in light of this background, chapter 6 advances a new interpretation of Descartes ... the principles of hot and cold, characterizing heat, in particular, as both “substance and form.”8 By 1585 Giordano Bruno , the   controversial proponent of Copernicanism, infinite worlds, and monism  , had published his dialogue on Cause, Principle and Unity, in which he argued: Now take away that material common to iron, to wood, to stone, and ask, “What substantial form of iron remains?” They will... geometers use it to explain notions such as ‘line’ and ‘surface’ is supposed to convince his contemporaries that Descartes idea of motion is simple and easy to understand Like the mathematicians of his time, whose views will be discussed in chapter 5, Descartes appeals to the intuitive intelligibility and certainty of mathematical definitions  But in Descartes case this notion of intelligibility is also . philosophy and science of the early modern period.   is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Houston. DESCARTES ON FORMS AND MECHANISMS DESCARTES ON FORMS AND. reasons he offers in his corpus are cryptic and hard to unpack. Hence I will draw on Descartes intellectual context to reconstruct his reason- ing and shed light on his historic elimination of. directly on the substantial form and interconnected concerns about causation, scientific demonstration , matter, form, and substance in general. erefore, I will address such related concerns only