Tai Lieu Chat Luong Table of contents Preface ~' Author's note ················································································· Abbreviations 11 Introduction 12 - Previous accounts 13 - The Moscow archives 16 - Further research 18 ~i -~ Chapter 1: Vietnamese communism and the Soviet Union (July- December 1954) 20 -Soviet and Chinese positions during the Geneva Conference 21 - The Geneva Agreements 22 - Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement 24 - Vietnat11's communist heritage 25 -Consolidation of the two zones 26 -Building the North 28 -Establishing a Soviet-Vietnamese relationship 30 -Moscow's first steps in Vietnam 32 Chapter 2: Forging anew relationship (December 1954- February 1956) 37 -Diplomatic struggle: Moscow, Hanoi and the International Control Commission 37 -The start of a new Soviet policy? 41 - Ho Chi Minh in Moscow 45 - "to counter the American influence" "to broaden the front and create a mass organization" 48 -The China factor 52 -Defining a new strategy 56 -Conclusions: a dual policy? 60 'I 1 J j J 'I DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1997 Chapter 3: Growing differences (January to December 1956) 63 -The Lao Dong and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU 63 -The Geneva Agreement in 1956 67 -No elections- no Soviet protest ·················· 72 - Land refonn and the rectification of errors -Hanoi's southern strategy ················ 77 2: The cost of training PA VN military in Soviet institutions ·················· 145 Sources and Bibliography ··········· 146 ·········· 147 ········· 152 ····························· ··················· 81 -The triangle- Hanoi, Moscow, Beijing 86 -Conclusions: growing differences 88 Chapter 4: A two-state solution? 91 (January 1957 to December 1958) -The Soviet Union and the UN proposal 91 -Effects of the UN proposal 93 - Sine-Soviet cooperation 98 -The Lao Dong debates its policy on reunification 101 - Beijing's position 106 -Conclusions: preparing for the 15th Plenum 108 Chapter 5: Toward a new revolution (January 1959- December 1960) -The Fifteenth Plenum, January 1959 -Moscow, Hanoi and the means ofreunification -Unrest in Laos - More unrest in the South -The Lao Dong and the Sino-Soviet split -The Lao Dong Third Party Congress -Economic and Military Assistance -Toward a new revolution: the foundation ofthe NLF 110 110 112 I 16 119 120 122 124 126 Epilogue and conclusions -Vietnamese perceptions of the relationship - Soviet perceptions of the relationship -The China factor -Solidarity and national revolution 129 131 134 137 138 Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao DongCentra!Committee 141 DEFENCE STUDIES 411997 DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1997 and Vietnamese sources as well The degree of actual Soviet in Vietnam can perhaps best be measured on the Vietnamese side Preface A new generation of international historians is growing up with access to pr_irnary sources from former communist states Mari Olsen's generation, With some backing from veteran historians of the cold war, is going to correct the Western bias that still characterises cold war history Her study ofSov1et-V1etnarnese relations in the period between the two lndochina Wars builds on a thorough examination of available material from the foreign ministry of the former Soviet Union, and sheds new light on the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship Ironically her most conspicuous finding is that the Soviet Union wielded less influence over Vietnamese decisions than many earlier historians have thought Moscow had some moderating influence, insisting for a long time that the Vietnamese comrades should stick to the Geneva agreement and seek a peaceful solution to the problem of national unification Since, however, this policy led nowhere and the communist movement in South Vietnam was subjected to disastrous repression from the regime ofNgo Dinh Diem, the Vietnamese communists adopted a new policy in the late 1950s leading to the formation of the National Liberation Front in 1960 and to the southern insurgency that would bring about the Second lndochina War The Vietnamese were able to secure support both from China and the Soviet Union for this policy, but it grew out of the Vietnamese experience and was only reluctantly accepted in Moscow Mari Olsen goes far towards arguing that the Soviet Union was dragged unwlilmgly mto supporting Hanoi's policy for an armed insurgency in the south She has many other interesting points to make in her study, but this IS probably the one that most of her readers will remember Some may also want to seek further evidence before being entirely convinced Since Mari Olsen could only examine foreign ministry files, and was prevented from getting access to minutes from the few high level meetings that took place m the penod (see her introduction), there will be a need for additional studies in the future Mari Olsen' s point needs to be confirmed by further research, based on the Soviet Central Committee archives, and perhaps on DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1997 Vietnamese sources Olsen is part of a collective effort to correct a Western bias One of the communist system was to prevent the emergence of historical scholarship in a great number of the world's nations and tPI·ev•entforeign experts from basing their historical studies on solid Thus the Vietnam War is often thought of as a war in the history United States and its foreign policy rather than an event in the of Southeast Asia, lndochina and Vietnam After the end of the cold we have seen not only an upsurge of western studies based on Soviet and East European source material, but also the emergence of a ~eneration of independent-minded, source-critical historians from former on,mlln;