[...]... with truth s supposed non-trivial dependence on being So opposition to cheaters and the idea that truth depends substantively on being are two sides of a single coin Truthmaker does not require that each truth have just one truthmaker or each truthmaker just one truth For example, Truthmaker allows that Aristotle himself made it true not only that Aristotle exists, but also that a human exists And Truthmaker... theory of truth, but also every other version of the claim that being true is a relation that holds between, on the one hand, primary truth- bearers and, on the other, that in virtue of which those truth- bearers are true It defends the claim that there is a property of being true And so it concludes that being true is a monadic (and even a primitive) property of truth- bearers 1 TRUTHMAKER AND MAKING... entail Truthmaker, that would not show that Truthmaker is correct For, as we shall see in Chapter 8 (§I), the correspondence theory of truth is false 2 TRUTHMAKERS This chapter defends the following: Truthmaker requires states of affairs, among other things, to serve as truthmakers; truthmaking states of affairs have certain of their constituents essentially; a truth is ‘about’ its truthmaker; and some... Objection VI Modality Redux 119 119 125 133 137 142 144 7 Subjunctive Conditionals I Molinism II Counterfactuals of Determined Action III Dispositional Conditionals IV The Truth in Truthmaker and TSB 146 146 155 158 166 8 Theory of Truth I The Correspondence Theory of Truth II Realism about Truth 170 170 175 Contents III Coherence and Identity Theories IV Truth as a Primitive V There is a Property of Being... thing exists Truthmaker says that this is so for every true claim That is, Truthmaker says that for every true claim there is something or other that—just by existing—makes that claim true In other words, Truthmaker says that every truth has a ‘truthmaker’ This chapter presents the central motivations for Truthmaker and begins to explore the making true relation I Motivating Truthmaker Bertrand Russell... about truth By the end of the book, I shall have concluded that some truths simply fail to depend on being in any substantive way at all Along the way, we shall gain new insights into the many theories that interact with Truthmaker and related theses But the book begins with Truthmaker As we see in the first chapter, ‘Truthmaker and Making True’, Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth. .. relation?’ and ‘What is the making true relation?’ Or: ‘To what do negative existential truths (e.g., that hobbits do not exist) correspond?’ and ‘What are the truthmakers for negative existential truths?’ So suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the correspondence theory is Truthmaker by another name (But it is not; see §IV and Ch 2, §IV.) Then to take the correspondence theory as a premiss and Truthmaker... presentism, that truth seems to lack both a truthmaker and also a supervenience base of the sort required by TSB Thus presentism appears to be and, this chapter argues, really is—inconsistent with Truthmaker and Introduction xvii TSB Rather than take this to be a reason to reject presentism, this chapter argues, we should instead see it as a reason to jettison Truthmaker and TSB ‘Subjunctive Conditionals’... nature of truth itself The thesis known as Truthmaker is one attempt to articulate truth s dependence on being Truthmaker says that each truth has a ‘truthmaker’ That is, Truthmaker says that for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true Because it is an account of truth s substantive dependence on being, Truthmaker has implications for a variety... allow truths such as that hobbits do not exist to lack truthmakers And it argues that the best truthmaker for all such truths is a single totality state of affairs, even though this truthmaker is, so this chapter argues, subject to serious objections This chapter also shows that Truthmaker implies that each true negative existential is really about the positive existence of something: namely, its truthmaker . CONTENTS Introduction xiii 1.TruthmakerandMaking True 1 I. Motivating Truthmaker 1 II. Necessitarianism and Conditional Necessitarianism 5 III. Truthmaker and de re Modality 11 IV. Truthmaker and the Correspondence. 158 IV. TheTruthinTruthmakerandTSB 166 8.TheoryofTruth 170 I. The Correspondence Theory of Truth 170 II. Realism about Truth 175 Contents xi III. Coherence and Identity Theories 177 IV. Truth as. interact with Truthmaker and related theses. But the book begins with Truthmaker. As we see in the first chapter, ‘Truthmaker and Making True’, Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth depends