This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. 6 Jump down to document THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details For More Information Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution Support RAND This product is part of the RAND Corporation occasional paper series. RAND occasional papers may include an informed perspective on a timely policy issue, a discussion of new research methodologies, essays, a paper presented at a conference, a conference summary, or a summary of work in progress. All RAND occasional papers undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006 Austin Long Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 3"/%$06/5&3*/463(&/$:456%:t PAPER 6 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Long, Austin G. Doctrine of eternal recurrence—the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006 / Austin Long. p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study ; Paper 6) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4470-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Counterinsurgency—United States. 2. Military doctrine—United States. I. Title. U241.L64 2008 355.02'18097309046—dc22 2008018294 iii Preface Counterinsurgency (COIN) is not a new challenge for the U.S. military, yet creating an appro- priate and uniform organizational response continues to bedevil the services. Typically, gener- ating a uniform organizational response is accomplished by the formulation of service or joint doctrine for a given type of conflict. us, the creation of new doctrine should be accompanied (perhaps after a lag) by an overall change in organizational behavior. is paper challenges this tight linkage between doctrine and behavior in the realm of COIN. By comparing COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s to the more recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seeks to demonstrate that more-fundamental organizational changes (involving significant trade-offs) may be needed for the U.S. military to adapt to COIN both now and in the future. is research is part of a larger RAND effort to develop a roadmap for long-term investment in Department of Defense COIN capabilities. is research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, please contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@ rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at http://www.rand.org/. v Contents Preface iii Summary vii Acknowledgments ix Abbreviations xi Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—e U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 1 Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms 2 Small Wars Before COIN: U.S. Experiences Prior to 1960 3 e Kennedy Years: e Birth of COIN Doctrine 5 Early Doctrinal Views on COIN Organization and Operations 6 Early Doctrinal Views on Intelligence and COIN 8 Limits of Doctrine: Vietnam, 1961 to 1963 9 Attempts to Put Doctrine into Practice: e PROVN Study, 1965 to 1966 10 COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1965 to 1968 12 Doctrine in the Late 1960s 15 COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1969 to 1972 17 Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003 19 COIN Doctrine, 2003 to 2005 20 COIN Operations, 2003 to 2005 22 Doctrine and Operations in 2006 23 Getting It Right? COIN in Iraq, 2007 26 Komer’s Lament: COIN Doctrine vs. COIN Practice 26 Conclusion 29 References 31 vii Summary e publication of a new COIN doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indi- cation that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. is interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations conducted. As one way to test this proposition, this paper compares modern COIN doctrine and operations with those of the 1960s. In the 1960s, two periods of COIN doctrine can be observed. e first is 1960 to 1965, the period after John Kennedy was elected President but before U.S. combat troops were committed to Vietnam. e second is 1965 to 1970, the period of heaviest U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. In both cases, COIN doctrine as written by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps emphasized the role of the population (so-called hearts and minds), civil- military relations, small-unit operations, intelligence gathering, and related concepts. Yet oper- ations seldom matched this written doctrine; instead, the military attempted to attrite the insurgency through large-scale operations and heavy reliance on firepower. In short, doctrine as written and operations conducted were not tightly linked. As at least a partial explanation for this weak linkage, this paper posits a deeper set of organizational concepts and beliefs that has a much greater influence on operations than writ- ten doctrine. While a set of beliefs can often be helpful to organizations in conducting their preferred missions, it can be detrimental in other contexts. Much of the U.S. military prefers high-intensity warfare, a mission for which the organization is mentally and materially well prepared. However, mental preparation for this mission makes the military poorly suited to COIN. Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reori- entation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the military’s ability to truly be a “full-spectrum force,” because attempting to optimize for the full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of that spectrum. [...]... Company, 1990, for an overview Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 5 tions in countries like Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, but these interventions were of very short duration and relatively bloodless The Kennedy Years: The Birth of COIN Doctrine With the election of John F Kennedy in 1960, COIN became one of the foremost concerns of the U.S government President... 2006, comparing these manuals with those of the earlier periods as well as to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms The U.S military has brief and easily accessible definitions of both doctrine and counterinsurgency Doctrine is defined as the “[f]undamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national... involving the participation of the people It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in the government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion The key to pacification is the provision of sustained... that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military I do not agree The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military. ”35 It was in Vietnam that the differences between written doctrine and actual practice became glaringly apparent First and foremost, the principle of unity of effort between civil and military elements of the U.S COIN effort enshrined in written doctrine. .. on all high-level contacts with the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam] and on major political and military plans, the operational command of U.S military personnel will be the direct responsibility of the senior U.S military commander.36 33 U.S Marine Corps, FMFM-21 (1962), pp 22–24; and U.S Department of the Army, FM 31-16 (1963), pp 95–98 34 U.S Department of the Army, FM 31-16 (1963), p 96... U.S Department of the Army (1966), pp 2-47–2-50 44 For the history of PROVN and reactions to it, see William Gibbons, The U.S Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, Part Four, pp 201–212; and 12 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine was minimal for the next several... the population and the need for civil -military integration: Since the essence of the counterguerilla campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government, the importance of civil affairs is paramount [I]n internal defense operations, because of the importance of isolating the guerillas from the people, civil affairs becomes one of the primary missions of the counterguerilla... 2–3 20 The White House (1962), pp 12–13 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 7 normally does not provide a complete solution The population must be convinced that the conduct or support of irregular activities will not only fail to gain the desired results, but may result in the imposition of sanctions and actually delay the elimination of the causes of discontent... Reinforce Military Judgment, Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1974, p 78 80 Ewell and Hunt (1974), p 160 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 19 taken under General Westmoreland, and continued to reward those who performed these operations well Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003 The end of significant U.S involvement in Vietnam also marked the. .. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the contingency underlying the deployment are vital to mission success 82 This edition also stresses the importance of the population and of coordination between civilian and military efforts.83 The chapter devoted to FID presents the following summary of COIN: Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that . Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U. S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine prevailed and became the basis of General MacArthur s successful pacification. Training and Doctrine Command TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures VC Viet Cong 1 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U. S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine Present