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Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 e RAND Corporation is a nonprot institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. is electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. CHILDREN AND FAMILIES EDUCATION AND THE ARTS ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY is product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research ndings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. ARROYO CENTER Lessons from the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, Jerry M. Sollinger Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2012 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/ publications/permissions.html). Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pernin, Christopher G., 1973- Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems program / Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, Jerry M. Sollinger. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-7639-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States. Army —Procurement. 2. Armored vehicles, Military—United States. 3. United States. Army—Weapons systems—Evaluation. 4. United States. Army— Technological innovations—Evaluation. 5. Technological innovations—United States— Management . 6. Systems engineering—United States—Management . I. Title. UC263.P46 2012 355.6'2120973—dc23 2012045151 iii Preface e Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was the largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army’s history. As a program it was intended to eld not just a system, but an entire brigade: a system of systems developed from scratch and integrated by means of an advanced, wireless network. Moreover, the FCS- equipped brigade would operate with novel doctrine that was being developed and tested along with the materiel components of the unit. To paraphrase the Army at the time, FCS was Army modernization. In 2009 the FCS program was cancelled, although some of its eorts contin- ued on as follow-on programs. e FCS program had garnered considerable attention throughout its existence, but few studies have been released documenting the lessons from the program to aid the Army in moving forward from such a large acquisition termination. In 2010, the Army’s Acquisition Executive asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an after-action analysis of the FCS program in order to leverage its successes and learn from its problems. is report documents a history and lessons from the FCS program. It should be of interest to the broad acquisition community, as well as those interested in Army modernization, requirements generation, and program management. is research was sponsored by Dr. Malcolm O’Neill, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisi- tion, Logistics and Technology. It was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Force Development and Technology Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. e Project Unique Identication Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD105725. iv Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Oper- ations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; fax 310-451-6952; email Marcy_ Agmon@rand.org), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard.html. v Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxi Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sources for is Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Organization of is Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 CHAPTER TWO Background of the Future Combat Systems Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Strategic Contexts of the 1990s Informed Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 FCS Grew Out of the Need to Move the Army into the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Not “Out of Nowhere” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Program Assumptions Were Derived from the Army’s Understanding of the Future Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Most Conicts Would Involve High-Intensity, State-to-State Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Army Forces Must Be Deployed Very Early in a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Future Army Forces Would Have to Dominate Any Type of Conict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Very High Levels of Situational Awareness Will Be Available to Army Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Army Operations Would Be Supported by Intratheater Air Mobility of Light Mechanized/Motorized Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Conclusions and Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 vi Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program CHAPTER THREE Cost, Schedule, and Performance of the FCS Program over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 “System-of-Systems” Interoperability and Unit View Were Key to FCS Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Initial FCS Schedule Incorporated Immediate and Future Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 e Army Began Execution of the Vision Immediately . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Acquisition Was to Be Realized rough Multiple Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Costs and Schedule During Concept and Technology Demonstration Phase: Why So Fast and All at Once? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Problems Became Clear as FCS Neared Milestone B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 e Program at Milestone B Left Multiple Issues to Be Resolved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Costs at Milestone B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Schedule at Milestone B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 First Restructuring in 2004 Increased Systems and Introduced Spin-Outs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Inclusion of Spin-Outs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Eects on Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Life-Cycle Cost Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Eects on Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Other Ongoing Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Second Restructuring in 2007 Elicited Deferments and Changes in Some Systems . . . . . . . . 44 Changing the Number of Program Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Costs at 2007 Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Schedule at 2007 Restructuring Incurred a Nunn-McCurdy Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2009 Cancellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Conclusions and Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 CHAPTER FOUR How the Army Generated Requirements for the Future Combat Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 What Role Did Requirements Play? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Genesis and Generation of FCS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Dicult Deployability Requirements Were Inserted Early into Operational Concepts . . 54 Early Requirements Were Based on the Army Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Early Requirements Established Priorities and Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C-130 Transportability and Sub-20-Ton, Combat Ready Vehicles Were Singled Out as the Only Non-Tradable Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 e C-130 Requirement Became Dicult to Remove Without Fundamental Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 C-130 Transportability Was Initially Considered Suboptimal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Contents vii C-130s Were Intended to Enable Ambitious Intertheater and Revolutionary Intratheater Deployment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Ambitious, Initial Requirements Were Based on Tenuous Technical Analysis or Evidence of Achievability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Contractors Had Flexibility to Pursue Creative Operational and Design Concepts, but the C-130 Crucible Became an Early, Impractical Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Dicult Transportability Requirements Were Partly Intended as Design Constraints . . . . . . 63 C-130 Transportability Was ought to Play the Role of a “Forcing Function” Rather an a Realistic Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Brigade Designs Were Driven by Broad Concepts and Performance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 In 2001, the Army Compressed by Half the Amount of Time for Generating Concepts and Operational Requirements for Milestone B Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 TRADOC Made Important Progress by Standing Up an Integrated Requirements Organization and Designing Brigade-Level CONOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 e Operational and Organizational Plan Represented the Best Example of an Integrated, Brigade-Level Approach to Force Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 UAMBL Was Unable to Translate Integrated Concepts into Eective Integration of Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Operational Requirements Were Not Structured to Prioritize SoS- Rather an System-Level Functionalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 FCS Trade Space Was Overly Constrained by Too Many System-Specic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Ingrained Approaches to Developing Requirements and a Lack of Faith in the SoS-Based Survivability Concept Contributed to Bottom-Heavy ORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 e ORD Was Ultimately Structured More for a Family of Systems an an Integrated System-of-Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Detailed Operational Concepts and Requirements Preceded Standard Assessments . . . . . . . . . 76 Critical, Operational Gaps Were Presupposed and Dened as Inherent Dierences Between Legacy and Future Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 TRADOC Recognized the Importance of Asymmetric Warfare Early . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 FCS Forces Were Optimized for MCO and Expected to Dominate the Full Spectrum of Potential Conicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 “See First, Act First” Concept Underestimated Technical Hurdles and Operational Applications in Non-MCO Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Armor-for-Information Tradeo Was ought to Enable Unprecedented Survivability, Not Perfect Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Dierences Between Tactical Intelligence Requirements for MCO and Non-Conventional Warfare Were Underappreciated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Expert Assessments at Questioned Core Requirements Were Sometimes Liberally Interpreted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 viii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program Experts Warned Against Setting the Weight Limit for FCS Manned Vehicles So Close to the C-130 Maximum Payload Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 FCS Operational Requirements Were Sometimes Inconsistent with Requirements of Key Complementary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Tensions Between Unreconciled FCS Requirements and Complementary Program Requirements Created Burdens for Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Technical Analysis of Most Requirements Did Not Take Place Prior to Milestone B . . . . . . . 88 Compressed Timeline and Confusion Surrounding Technical Feasibility Verication Created Signicant Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Unit Design and Detailed Architecting Sometimes Began Before Operational Requirements Were Settled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Conclusions and Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 CHAPTER FIVE e Evolution and Adjustment of Requirements After Milestone B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 e C-130 Requirement Never Ocially Changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 e FCC, Nondeployable Weight Limit for the MGV Was Adjusted Upward Several Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 While Estimated Vehicle Weights Were Climbing Above 19 Tons, the Ocial 38,000-Pound MGV Limit Did Not Adjust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 While FCC Estimates Grew, Requirements Deemed Less Important an C-130 Deployability in ECC Were Adjusted to Preserve the 19-Ton ECC Weight Limit . . 97 Changes in Requirements Related to ECC-to-FCC Transition Created Inconsistencies with Key Operational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Deployability Concepts Were Degraded as ey Were Relaxed to Enable 19-Ton ECC Vehicle Weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Relaxing Limits on How Vehicles Would Transition from ECC to FCC Undermined the Operational Value of FCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Changes to Operational Requirements Were Allowed, but Trades and Requirements Relief Did Not Occur Often Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 e Requirements Change Process Made Timely Trades and Change Approvals Dicult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 TRADOC Representatives Were Typically Unwilling to Grant Requirements Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 While UAMBL Was Technically Empowered to Override Proponent Commands on Requirements Changes, Branches Exerted Signicant Inuence on Trades . . . . . 103 Almost Half of Changes to the ORD Consisted of Addition of reshold Values to Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 [...]... the requirements process; the program s manage- xvii xviii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program ment; the program s contracts; and the program s associated technology The requirements process was quite lengthy, so we consider it from two perspectives: the generation of the initial requirements and the evolution of requirements during the program Lessons from the Background Wargames are... organizational lessons can be pulled from the FCS experience based on the successes and problems encountered The scope of the FCS program, in terms of the systems and network it represented, mirrored many of the organizations existing in the Army—aviation, ground combat systems, artillery, and the like In addition, the FCS program had integrating elements to help facilitate tradeoffs The entrenched... consider for future development of the acquisition system and for acquiring complex systems of systems (SoS) like the FCS Our summary judgment of the FCS program is that the Army’s intent in creating FCS was largely correct, but the execution faced far too many challenges Lessons We distilled lessons from six aspects of the program: its background; the evolution of cost, schedule, and performance; the requirements... experience for years to come, was progressing slowly compared to the milestones and showed how long such major undertakings can take The early, aggressive timelines were unrealistic and importantly had to be moved significantly into the future for the program to continue xx Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program Lessons from Requirements Generation An organization and operation (O&O)... happened over the course of the FCS program with the aim of dispelling some myths and providing a backdrop for further discussion within and outside the Army Second, Arroyo would identify lessons that the Army should carry away from the FCS experience Some of these the Army has already begun to learn, while others remain to be learned Arroyo’s ultimate goal was to provide lessons that the Army’s Acquisition... FCS Program Focused on Future Programs 219 FCS Relied Heavily on Army S&T 222 Risk, Testing, and Other Technology Development Processes Added to the Complexity of the Program 226 xii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program. .. another and fit into the operational architecture, which was relatively underdeveloped and reportedly marginalized as the program focused on preparing the ORD to pass Milestone B xxii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program A detailed and early operational architecture may connect operational requirements and unit-level concepts more tightly A bridge is needed between the O&O Plan and the. .. systems of systems The LSI succeeded in bringing industry leaders and their top talent to the FCS program, and the Army generally managed to recruit the best talent from its service and from the wider DoD acquisition community as well Even so, the personnel “bench” was not deep, particularly on the government side, for such an ambitious undertaking Key areas were developed in real time, including the. .. pointing out the problems with the concepts prior to the FCS program start In the end, those concepts were integrated as early requirements for the FCS program, without technical, operational, or organizational support Concept generation and exploration would benefit from increased deliberation, input, and consideration from across the Army The FCS program showed the importance of understanding the technical... advocated to produce a system-wide metric of readiness called the SRL TRLs, MRLs, and SRLs are critical to objective measuring of the maturity of a technology These metrics, as well as CTEs, help determine the xxviii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program extent to which the technology is appropriate for the solution and guide the development of downstream user evaluation criteria Including . requirements process; the program s manage- xviii Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program ment; the program s contracts; and the program s associated. Identication Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD105725. iv Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program For more information