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WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 25
i.e., to provide liquidity assistance to most of the banks on the London
place and it became known as the bankers’ banker. ... loan.
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WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 29
Economists have examined several questions. F...
... Introduction and Outline of the Book 1
References 14
PART 1. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 19
Chapter 1. Why Are there So Many Banking Crises?
Jean-Charles Rochet 21
1.1 Introduction 21
1 .2 The Sources ... Commercial Banks
Jean-Charles Rochet 22 9
8.1 Introduction 22 9
8 .2 The Model 23 2
8.3 The Behavior of Banks in the Complete M...
... 0.
(3.8)
Conditions (3.7) and (3.8) are satisfied if the costs of efforts e
0
and e
1
are small and if δ (the increase in the probability of success) and ∆β
(the reduction in the probability of solvency) are large. ... Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28 (Part 2) :804 24 .
Folkerts-Landau, D., and P. Garber. 19 92. The ECB: a bank or a monetary po...
... the
first version of the model there are only two protagonists:
5
the “banker”
(who represents the collective interests of the bank s managers and
shareholders) and the DIF (which subrogates the collective ... senior.
Second, there are fundamental externalities between the CB, interbank
markets, and the banking supervisor. When supervision is not perfect,...
... hitting bank 1, the lower the value of the
interbank loan and the higher the overall liquidity shock of bank 2.
While the qualitative features of the implementation of the optimum
are clear, the ... f
2
(ρ
2
) on [0, ∞).
Let ρ = (ρ
1
,ρ
2
) denote the vector of liquidity shocks encountered
by the two banks at date 1. We maximize the same weigh...
... on the value of the deposits in the other banks. Similarly,
an increase in the fraction of travelers spreads on the other banks a
larger fraction of the loss due to the insolvency of one bank. ... pass
part of their losses to other banks through the interbank market.
We now compare the two systems for given values of λ and N. We then
compare the exposure to...
... the liquidation of bank 1 triggers the
liquidation of all other banks (too-big-to-fail).
(ii) If λ> ;2 /D
0
, liquidation of banks 2 or 3 does not trigger the
liquidation of either of the other ... at
location 2 and the other half at location 3. That is, t
12
= t
13
=
1
2
and
t
21
= t
31
= 1, t
23
= t
32
= 0.
22
This implies that
X
1
= max
1 −
D
0...
... which the bank declares bankruptcy)
23
and the shirking threshold
A
S
(below which the bank shirks) are chosen by bankers so as to maxi-
mize the value of equity. The reason why shirking is sometimes ... ∆σ
2
= 0), but
rather the agency problem between the bank and the deposit insurance
fund. Indeed, the cost of monitoring is entirely borne by the b...
... Banking and Finance 14(1):69–84.
Gennotte, G., and D. Pyle. 1991. Capital controls and bank risk. Journal of
Banking and Finance 15:805 24 .
Gropp, R., J. Vesala, and G. Vulpes. 20 02. Equity and ... contingent on the level of risk chosen by the bank. Then
they examine the complementarity between two policy instruments of
bank regulators: the level of c...
... Marshall.
HD57.7.A77 20 04
658.4′0 92 dc 22
200401 622 5
Printed in the United States of America.
10987654 321
T
HE
C
OACHING
L
ANDSCAPE
5
range of options. Some executive coaches are helping people plan their lives;
others ... classification. There are many other ways in which we
could have “sliced the pie” of coaching. On the other hand, these five cate-
gories are...