... increasehasbeennotable,72Thisisnottodenysuccessfuleffortsbyanumber of countries,includingChina,toexpandmarketsinotherEME’s. Of coursethisstillleaves the broaderquestion of the robustness of the totality of thosemarketsin the event of aseriousdownturnin the AME’s.73ThisproblemisanalogoustothatfacedbyJapanesecorporationsin the 1990’s,aftermanyyears of debtfinancedinvestmentwhichprovedunprofitable.Koo(2003)stronglycontendsthat the weakness of investmentspendinginJapanin the 1990’swasduetothis“balancesheeteffect”,andwasnotduetoashortage of loanscausedbyaweakenedbankingsystem.74SeeBIS(2012)p29forafullerdocumentation.AlsoseeMcKinsey(2010)whoidentify the householdsectorinfive of the fourteencountriestheyconsiderashavingahighprobability of futuredeleveraging.TheyidentifySpain, the US, the UK,CanadaandKorea.While the householdsectorsinBrazil,Russia,ChinaandIndiawerenotjudgedtobeoverleveraged,notethat the dataconsideredextendedonlyto2009.Thus the reportmissed the recentsharpincreasesinhouseholddebtlevelsinthosecountries.22andmightwellhaveoutpaced the capacity of the localfinancialsystemstoaccuratelyestimate the capacity of borrowerstorepay.Indeedbymid2012, the percentage of nonperformingcarloans ... because the value of available collateralreflectsthreecomponents; the marketvalue of the collateral, the haircutimposedon the borrowerand the velocity of turnover (rehypothecation )of ... suggested the magnitude of any crisis woulddependon the size of the accumulated imbalances, which would themselves depend on the size andduration of the differencesbetween the tworatesWere...